useradd: modify check ID range for system users

Resolves: #2093692

Signed-off-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>

.gitignore

@@ -3,3 +3,18 @@ shadow-4.1.4.2.tar.bz2
 /shadow-4.1.5.tar.bz2
 /shadow-4.1.5.1.tar.bz2
 /shadow-4.1.5.1.tar.bz2.sig
+/shadow-4.2.1.tar.xz
+/shadow-4.2.1.tar.xz.sig
+/shadow-4.3.1.tar.gz
+/shadow-4.5.tar.xz
+/shadow-4.5.tar.xz.asc
+/shadow-4.6.tar.xz
+/shadow-4.6.tar.xz.asc
+/shadow-4.8.tar.xz
+/shadow-4.8.tar.xz.asc
+/shadow-4.8.1.tar.xz
+/shadow-4.8.1.tar.xz.asc
+/shadow-4.9.tar.xz
+/shadow-4.9.tar.xz.asc
+/shadow-4.11.1.tar.xz
+/shadow-4.11.1.tar.xz.asc

gpl-2.0.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
+                    GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
+                       Version 2, June 1991
+
+ Copyright (C) 1989, 1991 Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
+ 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA
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+
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shadow-4.1.5-2ndskip.patch

@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5/src/grpconv.c.2ndskip shadow-4.1.5/src/grpconv.c
---- shadow-4.1.5/src/grpconv.c.2ndskip	2012-06-18 13:08:34.438910815 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.1.5/src/grpconv.c	2012-06-18 13:12:51.270764552 +0200
-@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 	struct group grent;
- 	const struct sgrp *sg;
- 	struct sgrp sgent;
-+	char *np;
- 
- 	Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
- 
-@@ -184,20 +185,25 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 	 * Remove /etc/gshadow entries for groups not in /etc/group.
- 	 */
- 	(void) sgr_rewind ();
--	while ((sg = sgr_next ()) != NULL) {
--		if (gr_locate (sg->sg_name) != NULL) {
--			continue;
--		}
--
--		if (sgr_remove (sg->sg_name) == 0) {
--			/*
--			 * This shouldn't happen (the entry exists) but...
--			 */
--			fprintf (stderr,
--			         _("%s: cannot remove entry '%s' from %s\n"),
--			         Prog, sg->sg_name, sgr_dbname ());
--			fail_exit (3);
-+	sg = sgr_next ();
-+	np=NULL;
-+	while (sg != NULL) {
-+		np = strdup(sg->sg_name);
-+		sg = sgr_next ();
-+
-+		if(gr_locate (np) == NULL) {
-+			if (sgr_remove (np) == 0) {
-+				/*
-+				 * This shouldn't happen (the entry exists) but...
-+				 */
-+				fprintf (stderr,
-+					 _("%s: cannot remove entry '%s' from %s\n"),
-+					 Prog, np, sgr_dbname ());
-+				free(np);
-+				fail_exit (3);
-+			}
- 		}
-+		free(np);
- 	}
- 
- 	/*
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5/src/pwconv.c.2ndskip shadow-4.1.5/src/pwconv.c
---- shadow-4.1.5/src/pwconv.c.2ndskip	2012-06-18 11:23:33.938511797 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.1.5/src/pwconv.c	2012-06-18 12:57:18.396426194 +0200
-@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 	struct passwd pwent;
- 	const struct spwd *sp;
- 	struct spwd spent;
-+	char *np;
- 
- 	Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
- 
-@@ -223,20 +224,25 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 	 * Remove /etc/shadow entries for users not in /etc/passwd.
- 	 */
- 	(void) spw_rewind ();
--	while ((sp = spw_next ()) != NULL) {
--		if (pw_locate (sp->sp_namp) != NULL) {
--			continue;
--		}
--
--		if (spw_remove (sp->sp_namp) == 0) {
--			/*
--			 * This shouldn't happen (the entry exists) but...
--			 */
--			fprintf (stderr,
--			         _("%s: cannot remove entry '%s' from %s\n"),
--			         Prog, sp->sp_namp, spw_dbname ());
--			fail_exit (E_FAILURE);
-+	sp = spw_next ();
-+	np = NULL;
-+	while (sp != NULL) {
-+		np = strdup(sp->sp_namp);
-+		sp = spw_next ();
-+
-+		if (pw_locate (np) == NULL) {
-+			if (spw_remove (np) == 0) {
-+				/*
-+				 * This shouldn't happen (the entry exists) but...
-+				 */
-+				fprintf (stderr,
-+					 _("%s: cannot remove entry '%s' from %s\n"),
-+					 Prog, np, spw_dbname ());
-+				free(np);
-+				fail_exit (E_FAILURE);
-+			}
- 		}
-+		free(np);
- 	}
- 
- 	/*

shadow-4.1.5-grremove.patch

@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5/src/userdel.c.grremove shadow-4.1.5/src/userdel.c
---- shadow-4.1.5/src/userdel.c.grremove	2012-03-20 12:19:13.260854838 +0100
-+++ shadow-4.1.5/src/userdel.c	2012-03-20 12:38:26.235622957 +0100
-@@ -333,22 +333,22 @@ static void remove_usergroup (void)
- 		 * We can remove this group, it is not the primary
- 		 * group of any remaining user.
- 		 */
--		if (gr_remove (grp->gr_name) == 0) {
-+		if (gr_remove (user_name) == 0) {
- 			fprintf (stderr,
- 			         _("%s: cannot remove entry '%s' from %s\n"),
--			         Prog, grp->gr_name, gr_dbname ());
-+			         Prog, user_name, gr_dbname ());
- 			fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
- 		}
- 
- #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
- 		audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_GROUP, Prog,
- 		              "deleting group",
--		              grp->gr_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
-+		              user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
- 		              SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
- #endif				/* WITH_AUDIT */
- 		SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
- 		         "removed group '%s' owned by '%s'\n",
--		         grp->gr_name, user_name));
-+		         user_name, user_name));
- 
- #ifdef	SHADOWGRP
- 		if (sgr_locate (user_name) != NULL) {
-@@ -361,12 +361,12 @@ static void remove_usergroup (void)
- #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
- 			audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_GROUP, Prog,
- 			              "deleting shadow group",
--			              grp->gr_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
-+			              user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
- 			              SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
- #endif				/* WITH_AUDIT */
- 			SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO,
- 			         "removed shadow group '%s' owned by '%s'\n",
--			         grp->gr_name, user_name));
-+			         user_name, user_name));
- 
- 		}
- #endif				/* SHADOWGRP */

shadow-4.1.5-redhat.patch

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5/man/useradd.8.redhat shadow-4.1.5/man/useradd.8
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5/src/useradd.c.redhat shadow-4.1.5/src/useradd.c
---- shadow-4.1.5/src/useradd.c.redhat	2011-12-09 23:23:15.000000000 +0100
-+++ shadow-4.1.5/src/useradd.c	2012-03-19 09:50:05.227588669 +0100
-@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ const char *Prog;
- static gid_t def_group = 100;
- static const char *def_gname = "other";
- static const char *def_home = "/home";
--static const char *def_shell = "";
-+static const char *def_shell = "/sbin/nologin";
- static const char *def_template = SKEL_DIR;
- static const char *def_create_mail_spool = "no";
- 
-@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static const char *def_expire = "";
- #define	VALID(s)	(strcspn (s, ":\n") == strlen (s))
- 
- static const char *user_name = "";
--static const char *user_pass = "!";
-+static const char *user_pass = "!!";
- static uid_t user_id;
- static gid_t user_gid;
- static const char *user_comment = "";
-@@ -1011,9 +1011,9 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, cha
- 		};
- 		while ((c = getopt_long (argc, argv,
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--		                         "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:K:lmMNop:rR:s:u:UZ:",
-+		                         "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:K:lmMnNop:rR:s:u:UZ:",
- #else				/* !WITH_SELINUX */
--		                         "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:K:lmMNop:rR:s:u:U",
-+		                         "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:K:lmMnNop:rR:s:u:U",
- #endif				/* !WITH_SELINUX */
- 		                         long_options, NULL)) != -1) {
- 			switch (c) {
-@@ -1164,6 +1164,7 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, cha
- 			case 'M':
- 				Mflg = true;
- 				break;
-+			case 'n':
- 			case 'N':
- 				Nflg = true;
- 				break;

shadow-4.1.5-uflg.patch

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5/libmisc/find_new_gid.c.uflg shadow-4.1.5/libmisc/find_new_gid.c
---- shadow-4.1.5/libmisc/find_new_gid.c.uflg	2011-07-30 01:10:27.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.1.5/libmisc/find_new_gid.c	2012-03-19 12:51:46.090554116 +0100
-@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ int find_new_gid (bool sys_group,
- 			return -1;
- 		}
- 	} else {
--		gid_min = (gid_t) getdef_ulong ("SYS_GID_MIN", 101UL);
-+		gid_min = (gid_t) 1;
- 		gid_max = (gid_t) getdef_ulong ("GID_MIN", 1000UL) - 1;
- 		gid_max = (gid_t) getdef_ulong ("SYS_GID_MAX", (unsigned long) gid_max);
- 		if (gid_max < gid_min) {
-@@ -100,6 +100,10 @@ int find_new_gid (bool sys_group,
- 		return 0;
- 	}
- 
-+        /* if we did not find free preffered system gid, we start to look for
-+         * one in the range assigned to dynamic system IDs */
-+        if (sys_group)
-+                gid_min = (gid_t) getdef_ulong ("SYS_GID_MIN", 101UL);
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * Search the entire group file,

shadow-4.1.5.1-audit-owner.patch

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/usermod.c.audit shadow-4.1.5.1/src/usermod.c
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/usermod.c.audit	2011-11-21 23:02:16.000000000 +0100
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/usermod.c	2013-06-14 14:54:20.237026550 +0200
-@@ -1513,6 +1513,14 @@ static void move_home (void)
- 			fail_exit (E_HOMEDIR);
- 		}
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
-+		if (uflg || gflg) {
-+			audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
-+				      "changing home directory owner",
-+				      user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
-+		}
-+#endif
-+
- 		if (rename (user_home, user_newhome) == 0) {
- 			/* FIXME: rename above may have broken symlinks
- 			 *        pointing to the user's home directory
-@@ -1947,6 +1955,13 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 			 * ownership.
- 			 *
- 			 */
-+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
-+			if (uflg || gflg) {
-+				audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
-+					      "changing home directory owner",
-+					      user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
-+			}
-+#endif
- 			if (chown_tree (dflg ? user_newhome : user_home,
- 			                user_id,
- 			                uflg ? user_newid  : (uid_t)-1,

shadow-4.1.5.1-backup-mode.patch

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/commonio.c.backup-mode shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/commonio.c
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/commonio.c.backup-mode	2012-05-18 21:44:54.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/commonio.c	2012-09-19 20:27:16.089444234 +0200
-@@ -301,15 +301,12 @@ static int create_backup (const char *ba
- 	struct utimbuf ub;
- 	FILE *bkfp;
- 	int c;
--	mode_t mask;
- 
- 	if (fstat (fileno (fp), &sb) != 0) {
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- 
--	mask = umask (077);
--	bkfp = fopen (backup, "w");
--	(void) umask (mask);
-+	bkfp = fopen_set_perms (backup, "w", &sb);
- 	if (NULL == bkfp) {
- 		return -1;
- 	}

shadow-4.1.5.1-crypt-null.patch

@@ -1,195 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/encrypt.c.crypt-null shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/encrypt.c
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/encrypt.c.crypt-null	2010-08-22 15:05:02.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/encrypt.c	2013-07-25 12:27:30.438355782 +0200
-@@ -49,11 +49,10 @@
- 	if (!cp) {
- 		/*
- 		 * Single Unix Spec: crypt() may return a null pointer,
--		 * and set errno to indicate an error.  The caller doesn't
--		 * expect us to return NULL, so...
-+		 * and set errno to indicate an error. In this case return
-+		 * the NULL so the caller can handle appropriately.
- 		 */
--		perror ("crypt");
--		exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
-+		return cp;
- 	}
- 
- 	/* The GNU crypt does not return NULL if the algorithm is not
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/valid.c.crypt-null shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/valid.c
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/valid.c.crypt-null	2010-08-22 21:14:41.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/valid.c	2013-07-25 12:27:30.440355847 +0200
-@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ bool valid (const char *password, const
- 	 */
- 
- 	if (   (NULL != ent->pw_name)
-+	    && (NULL != encrypted)
- 	    && (strcmp (encrypted, ent->pw_passwd) == 0)) {
- 		return true;
- 	} else {
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/pwauth.c.crypt-null shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/pwauth.c
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/pwauth.c.crypt-null	2009-07-13 00:24:48.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/pwauth.c	2013-07-25 12:27:30.438355782 +0200
-@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ int pw_auth (const char *cipher,
- 	char prompt[1024];
- 	char *clear = NULL;
- 	const char *cp;
-+	const char *encrypted;
- 	int retval;
- 
- #ifdef	SKEY
-@@ -177,7 +178,11 @@ int pw_auth (const char *cipher,
- 	 * the results there as well.
- 	 */
- 
--	retval = strcmp (pw_encrypt (input, cipher), cipher);
-+	encrypted = pw_encrypt (input, cipher);
-+	if (encrypted!=NULL)
-+		retval = strcmp (encrypted, cipher);
-+	else
-+		retval = -1;
- 
- #ifdef  SKEY
- 	/*
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/chgpasswd.c.crypt-null shadow-4.1.5.1/src/chgpasswd.c
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/chgpasswd.c.crypt-null	2011-12-09 22:31:40.000000000 +0100
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/chgpasswd.c	2013-07-25 12:27:30.440355847 +0200
-@@ -469,6 +469,10 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- #endif
- 			cp = pw_encrypt (newpwd,
- 			                 crypt_make_salt (crypt_method, arg));
-+			if (cp == NULL) {
-+				perror ("crypt");
-+				exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
-+			}	
- 		}
- 
- 		/*
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/chpasswd.c.crypt-null shadow-4.1.5.1/src/chpasswd.c
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/chpasswd.c.crypt-null	2011-12-09 22:31:40.000000000 +0100
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/chpasswd.c	2013-07-25 12:27:30.440355847 +0200
-@@ -492,6 +492,10 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- #endif
- 			cp = pw_encrypt (newpwd,
- 			                 crypt_make_salt(crypt_method, arg));
-+			if (cp == NULL) {
-+				perror ("crypt");
-+				exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
-+			}
- 		}
- 
- 		/*
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/gpasswd.c.crypt-null shadow-4.1.5.1/src/gpasswd.c
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/gpasswd.c.crypt-null	2011-11-19 23:55:04.000000000 +0100
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/gpasswd.c	2013-07-25 12:27:30.441355866 +0200
-@@ -939,6 +939,10 @@ static void change_passwd (struct group
- 	}
- 
- 	cp = pw_encrypt (pass, crypt_make_salt (NULL, NULL));
-+	if (cp==NULL) {
-+		perror ("crypt");
-+		exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
-+	}
- 	memzero (pass, sizeof pass);
- #ifdef SHADOWGRP
- 	if (is_shadowgrp) {
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/newgrp.c.crypt-null shadow-4.1.5.1/src/newgrp.c
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/newgrp.c.crypt-null	2011-07-30 03:50:01.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/newgrp.c	2013-07-25 12:27:30.442355881 +0200
-@@ -184,7 +184,8 @@ static void check_perms (const struct gr
- 		cpasswd = pw_encrypt (cp, grp->gr_passwd);
- 		strzero (cp);
- 
--		if (grp->gr_passwd[0] == '\0' ||
-+		if (cpasswd == NULL ||
-+		    grp->gr_passwd[0] == '\0' ||
- 		    strcmp (cpasswd, grp->gr_passwd) != 0) {
- #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
- 			snprintf (audit_buf, sizeof(audit_buf),
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/newusers.c.crypt-null shadow-4.1.5.1/src/newusers.c
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/newusers.c.crypt-null	2011-12-09 22:31:40.000000000 +0100
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/newusers.c	2013-07-25 12:27:30.442355881 +0200
-@@ -387,6 +387,7 @@ static int add_user (const char *name, u
- static void update_passwd (struct passwd *pwd, const char *password)
- {
- 	void *crypt_arg = NULL;
-+	char *cp;
- 	if (crypt_method != NULL) {
- #ifdef USE_SHA_CRYPT
- 		if (sflg) {
-@@ -398,9 +399,13 @@ static void update_passwd (struct passwd
- 	if ((crypt_method != NULL) && (0 == strcmp(crypt_method, "NONE"))) {
- 		pwd->pw_passwd = (char *)password;
- 	} else {
--		pwd->pw_passwd = pw_encrypt (password,
--		                             crypt_make_salt (crypt_method,
--		                                              crypt_arg));
-+		cp=pw_encrypt (password, crypt_make_salt (crypt_method, 
-+		                                          crypt_arg));
-+		if (cp == NULL) {
-+			perror ("crypt");
-+			exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
-+		}
-+		pwd->pw_passwd = cp;
- 	}
- }
- #endif				/* !USE_PAM */
-@@ -412,6 +417,7 @@ static int add_passwd (struct passwd *pw
- {
- 	const struct spwd *sp;
- 	struct spwd spent;
-+	char *cp;
- 
- #ifndef USE_PAM
- 	void *crypt_arg = NULL;
-@@ -448,7 +454,12 @@ static int add_passwd (struct passwd *pw
- 		} else {
- 			const char *salt = crypt_make_salt (crypt_method,
- 			                                    crypt_arg);
--			spent.sp_pwdp = pw_encrypt (password, salt);
-+			cp = pw_encrypt (password, salt);
-+			if (cp == NULL) {
-+				perror ("crypt");
-+				exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
-+			}
-+			spent.sp_pwdp = cp;
- 		}
- 		spent.sp_lstchg = (long) time ((time_t *) 0) / SCALE;
- 		if (0 == spent.sp_lstchg) {
-@@ -492,7 +503,12 @@ static int add_passwd (struct passwd *pw
- 		spent.sp_pwdp = (char *)password;
- 	} else {
- 		const char *salt = crypt_make_salt (crypt_method, crypt_arg);
--		spent.sp_pwdp = pw_encrypt (password, salt);
-+		cp = pw_encrypt (password, salt);
-+		if (cp == NULL) {
-+			perror ("crypt");
-+			exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
-+		}
-+		spent.sp_pwdp = cp;
- 	}
- #else
- 	/*
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/passwd.c.crypt-null shadow-4.1.5.1/src/passwd.c
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/passwd.c.crypt-null	2012-02-13 21:32:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/passwd.c	2013-07-25 12:27:30.443355896 +0200
-@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static int new_password (const struct pa
- 		}
- 
- 		cipher = pw_encrypt (clear, crypt_passwd);
--		if (strcmp (cipher, crypt_passwd) != 0) {
-+		if ((cipher == NULL) || (strcmp (cipher, crypt_passwd) != 0)) {
- 			strzero (clear);
- 			strzero (cipher);
- 			SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "incorrect password for %s",
-@@ -349,6 +349,10 @@ static int new_password (const struct pa
- 	 * Encrypt the password, then wipe the cleartext password.
- 	 */
- 	cp = pw_encrypt (pass, crypt_make_salt (NULL, NULL));
-+	if (cp == NULL) {
-+		perror ("crypt");
-+		exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
-+	}
- 	memzero (pass, sizeof pass);
- 
- #ifdef HAVE_LIBCRACK_HIST

shadow-4.1.5.1-errmsg.patch

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c.logmsg shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c.logmsg	2013-02-20 15:41:44.000000000 +0100
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c	2013-06-14 14:22:59.529661095 +0200
-@@ -1760,6 +1760,9 @@ static void create_home (void)
- 	if (access (user_home, F_OK) != 0) {
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- 		if (set_selinux_file_context (user_home, NULL) != 0) {
-+			fprintf (stderr,
-+			         _("%s: cannot set SELinux context for home directory %s\n"),
-+			         Prog, user_home);
- 			fail_exit (E_HOMEDIR);
- 		}
- #endif
-@@ -1789,6 +1792,9 @@ static void create_home (void)
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- 		/* Reset SELinux to create files with default contexts */
- 		if (reset_selinux_file_context () != 0) {
-+			fprintf (stderr,
-+			         _("%s: cannot reset SELinux file creation context\n"),
-+			         Prog);
- 			fail_exit (E_HOMEDIR);
- 		}
- #endif

shadow-4.1.5.1-goodname.patch

@@ -1,118 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/chkname.c.goodname shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/chkname.c
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/chkname.c.goodname	2009-07-13 00:24:45.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/chkname.c	2012-09-19 18:43:53.492160653 +0200
-@@ -49,20 +49,28 @@
- static bool is_valid_name (const char *name)
- {
- 	/*
--	 * User/group names must match [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]
--	 */
--	if (('\0' == *name) ||
--	    !((('a' <= *name) && ('z' >= *name)) || ('_' == *name))) {
-+         * User/group names must match gnu e-regex:
-+         *    [a-zA-Z0-9_.][a-zA-Z0-9_.-]{0,30}[a-zA-Z0-9_.$-]?
-+         *
-+         * as a non-POSIX, extension, allow "$" as the last char for
-+         * sake of Samba 3.x "add machine script"
-+         */
-+	if ( ('\0' == *name) ||
-+             !((*name >= 'a' && *name <= 'z') ||
-+               (*name >= 'A' && *name <= 'Z') ||
-+               (*name >= '0' && *name <= '9') ||
-+               (*name == '_') || (*name == '.') 
-+	      )) {
- 		return false;
- 	}
- 
- 	while ('\0' != *++name) {
--		if (!(( ('a' <= *name) && ('z' >= *name) ) ||
--		      ( ('0' <= *name) && ('9' >= *name) ) ||
--		      ('_' == *name) ||
--		      ('-' == *name) ||
--		      ( ('$' == *name) && ('\0' == *(name + 1)) )
--		     )) {
-+                if (!(  (*name >= 'a' && *name <= 'z') ||
-+                        (*name >= 'A' && *name <= 'Z') ||
-+                        (*name >= '0' && *name <= '9') ||
-+                        (*name == '_') || (*name == '.') || (*name == '-') ||
-+                        (*name == '$' && *(name + 1) == '\0') 
-+                     )) {
- 			return false;
- 		}
- 	}
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/man/groupadd.8.xml.goodname shadow-4.1.5.1/man/groupadd.8.xml
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/man/groupadd.8.xml.goodname	2012-05-25 13:45:27.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/man/groupadd.8.xml	2012-09-19 18:43:53.492160653 +0200
-@@ -259,12 +259,6 @@
-    <refsect1 id='caveats'>
-      <title>CAVEATS</title>
-      <para>
--       Groupnames must start with a lower case letter or an underscore,
--       followed by lower case letters, digits, underscores, or dashes.
--       They can end with a dollar sign.
--       In regular expression terms: [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]?
--     </para>
--     <para>
-        Groupnames may only be up to &GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH; characters long.
-      </para>
-      <para>
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/man/man8/groupadd.8.goodname shadow-4.1.5.1/man/man8/groupadd.8
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/man/man8/groupadd.8.goodname	2012-05-25 13:58:40.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/man/man8/groupadd.8	2012-09-19 18:44:42.175123079 +0200
-@@ -190,9 +190,7 @@ Shadow password suite configuration\&.
- .RE
- .SH "CAVEATS"
- .PP
--Groupnames must start with a lower case letter or an underscore, followed by lower case letters, digits, underscores, or dashes\&. They can end with a dollar sign\&. In regular expression terms: [a\-z_][a\-z0\-9_\-]*[$]?
--.PP
--Groupnames may only be up to 16 characters long\&.
-+Groupnames may only be up to 32 characters long\&.
- .PP
- You may not add a NIS or LDAP group\&. This must be performed on the corresponding server\&.
- .PP
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/man/man8/useradd.8.goodname shadow-4.1.5.1/man/man8/useradd.8
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/man/man8/useradd.8.goodname	2012-05-25 13:59:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/man/man8/useradd.8	2012-09-19 18:46:09.249033949 +0200
-@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ is not enabled, no home directories are
- .PP
- \fB\-M\fR
- .RS 4
--Do no create the user\*(Aqs home directory, even if the system wide setting from
-+Do not create the user\*(Aqs home directory, even if the system wide setting from
- /etc/login\&.defs
- (\fBCREATE_HOME\fR) is set to
- \fIyes\fR\&.
-@@ -430,8 +430,6 @@ Similarly, if the username already exist
- \fBuseradd\fR
- will deny the user account creation request\&.
- .PP
--Usernames must start with a lower case letter or an underscore, followed by lower case letters, digits, underscores, or dashes\&. They can end with a dollar sign\&. In regular expression terms: [a\-z_][a\-z0\-9_\-]*[$]?
--.PP
- Usernames may only be up to 32 characters long\&.
- .SH "CONFIGURATION"
- .PP
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/man/useradd.8.xml.goodname shadow-4.1.5.1/man/useradd.8.xml
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/man/useradd.8.xml.goodname	2012-05-25 13:45:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/man/useradd.8.xml	2012-09-19 18:43:53.493160675 +0200
-@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@
- 	</term>
- 	<listitem>
- 	  <para>
--	    Do no create the user's home directory, even if the system
-+	    Do not create the user's home directory, even if the system
- 	    wide setting from <filename>/etc/login.defs</filename>
- 	    (<option>CREATE_HOME</option>) is set to
- 	    <replaceable>yes</replaceable>.
-@@ -654,12 +654,6 @@
-     </para>
- 
-     <para>
--      Usernames must start with a lower case letter or an underscore,
--      followed by lower case letters, digits, underscores, or dashes.
--      They can end with a dollar sign.
--      In regular expression terms: [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]?
--    </para>
--    <para>
-       Usernames may only be up to 32 characters long.
-     </para>
-   </refsect1>

shadow-4.1.5.1-group-alloc.patch

@@ -1,642 +0,0 @@
-From e551be23be24508ecf5c8afdf74fd69b88832ecd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Stephen Gallagher <sgallagh@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2014 10:34:02 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Redesign automatic GID allocation
-
-Previously, this allocation was optimized for an outdated
-deployment style (that of /etc/group alongside nss_db). The issue
-here is that this results in extremely poor performance when using
-SSSD, Winbind or nss_ldap.
-
-There were actually three serious bugs here that have been addressed:
-
-1) Running getgrent() loops won't work in most SSSD or Winbind
-environments, as full group enumeration is disabled by default.
-This could easily result in auto-allocating a group that was
-already in use. (This might result in a security issue as well, if
-the shared GID is a privileged group).
-
-2) For system groups, the loop was always iterating through the
-complete SYS_GID_MIN->SYS_GID_MAX range. On SSSD and Winbind, this
-means hundreds of round-trips to LDAP (unless the GIDs were
-specifically configured to be ignored by the SSSD or winbindd).
-To a user with a slow connection to their LDAP server, this would
-appear as if groupadd -r was hung. (Though it would eventually
-complete).
-
-3) This patch also adds better error-handling for errno from
-getgrgid(), since if this function returns an unexpected error, we
-should not be treating it as "ID is available". This could result
-in assigning a GID that was already in use, with all the same
-issues as 1) above.
-
-This patch changes the algorithm to be more favorable for LDAP
-environments, at the expense of some performance when using nss_db.
-Given that the DB is a local service, this should have a negligible
-effect from a user's perspective.
-
-With the new algorithm, we simply first iterate through all entries
-in the local database with gr_next(), recording the IDs that are in
-use. We then start from the highest presumed-available entry and
-call getgrgid() to see if it is available. We continue this until
-we come to the first unused GID. We then select that and return it.
-
-If we make it through all the remaining IDs without finding a free
-one, we start over from the beginning of the range and try to find
-room in one of the gaps in the range.
----
- libmisc/find_new_gid.c | 533 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
- 1 file changed, 407 insertions(+), 126 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/libmisc/find_new_gid.c b/libmisc/find_new_gid.c
-index 05f5622edb79069d9a43d3f9c69a463b6b71141a..25900dd12874e46e5efdfcf7c895f6b814763a16 100644
---- a/libmisc/find_new_gid.c
-+++ b/libmisc/find_new_gid.c
-@@ -39,6 +39,118 @@
- #include "getdef.h"
- 
- /*
-+ * get_ranges - Get the minimum and maximum ID ranges for the search
-+ *
-+ * This function will return the minimum and maximum ranges for IDs
-+ *
-+ * 0: The function completed successfully
-+ * EINVAL: The provided ranges are impossible (such as maximum < minimum)
-+ *
-+ * preferred_min: The special-case minimum value for a specifically-
-+ * requested ID, which may be lower than the standard min_id
-+ */
-+static int get_ranges(bool sys_group, gid_t *min_id, gid_t *max_id,
-+	gid_t *preferred_min)
-+{
-+	gid_t gid_def_max = 0;
-+
-+	if (sys_group) {
-+		/* System groups */
-+
-+		/* A requested ID is allowed to be below the autoselect range */
-+		*preferred_min = (gid_t) 1;
-+
-+		/* Get the minimum ID range from login.defs or default to 101 */
-+		*min_id = (gid_t) getdef_ulong("SYS_GID_MIN", 101UL);
-+
-+		/*
-+		 * If SYS_GID_MAX is unspecified, we should assume it to be one
-+		 * less than the GID_MIN (which is reserved for non-system accounts)
-+		 */
-+		gid_def_max = (gid_t) getdef_ulong("GID_MIN", 1000UL) - 1;
-+		*max_id = (gid_t) getdef_ulong("SYS_GID_MAX",
-+				(unsigned long) gid_def_max);
-+
-+		/* Check that the ranges make sense */
-+		if (*max_id < *min_id) {
-+			(void) fprintf (stderr,
-+                            _("%s: Invalid configuration: SYS_GID_MIN (%lu), "
-+                              "GID_MIN (%lu), SYS_GID_MAX (%lu)\n"),
-+                            Prog, (unsigned long) *min_id,
-+                            getdef_ulong ("GID_MIN", 1000UL),
-+                            (unsigned long) *max_id);
-+			return EINVAL;
-+		}
-+	} else {
-+		/* Non-system groups */
-+
-+		/* Get the values from login.defs or use reasonable defaults */
-+		*min_id = (gid_t) getdef_ulong("GID_MIN", 1000UL);
-+		*max_id = (gid_t) getdef_ulong("GID_MAX", 60000UL);
-+
-+		/*
-+		 * The preferred minimum should match the standard ID minimum
-+		 * for non-system groups.
-+		 */
-+		*preferred_min = *min_id;
-+
-+		/* Check that the ranges make sense */
-+		if (*max_id < *min_id) {
-+			(void) fprintf(stderr,
-+					_("%s: Invalid configuration: GID_MIN (%lu), "
-+					  "GID_MAX (%lu)\n"),
-+					Prog, (unsigned long) *min_id,
-+					(unsigned long) *max_id);
-+			return EINVAL;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * check_gid - See if the requested GID is available
-+ *
-+ * On success, return 0
-+ * If the ID is in use, return EEXIST
-+ * If the ID is outside the range, return ERANGE
-+ * In other cases, return errno from getgrgid()
-+ */
-+static int check_gid(const gid_t gid,
-+		             const gid_t gid_min,
-+		             const gid_t gid_max,
-+		             bool *used_gids)
-+{
-+	/* First test that the preferred ID is in the range */
-+	if (gid < gid_min || gid > gid_max) {
-+		return ERANGE;
-+	}
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Check whether we already detected this GID
-+	 * using the gr_next() loop
-+	 */
-+	if (used_gids != NULL && used_gids[gid]) {
-+		return EEXIST;
-+	}
-+	/* Check if the GID exists according to NSS */
-+	errno = 0;
-+	if (getgrgid(gid) != NULL) {
-+		return EEXIST;
-+	} else {
-+		/* getgrgid() was NULL, check whether this was
-+		 * due to an error, so we can report it.
-+		 */
-+		/* ignore errors for now * if (errno != 0) {
-+			return errno;
-+		} */
-+	}
-+
-+	/* If we've made it here, the GID must be available */
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-  * find_new_gid - Find a new unused GID.
-  *
-  * If successful, find_new_gid provides an unused group ID in the
-@@ -48,166 +160,339 @@
-  * 
-  * Return 0 on success, -1 if no unused GIDs are available.
-  */
--int find_new_gid (bool sys_group,
--                  gid_t *gid,
--                  /*@null@*/gid_t const *preferred_gid)
-+int find_new_gid(bool sys_group,
-+                 gid_t *gid,
-+                 /*@null@*/gid_t const *preferred_gid)
- {
--	const struct group *grp;
--	gid_t gid_min, gid_max, group_id;
- 	bool *used_gids;
-+	const struct group *grp;
-+	gid_t gid_min, gid_max, preferred_min;
-+	gid_t group_id, id;
-+	gid_t lowest_found, highest_found;
-+	int result;
-+	int nospam = 0;
- 
--	assert (gid != NULL);
-+	assert(gid != NULL);
- 
--	if (!sys_group) {
--		gid_min = (gid_t) getdef_ulong ("GID_MIN", 1000UL);
--		gid_max = (gid_t) getdef_ulong ("GID_MAX", 60000UL);
--		if (gid_max < gid_min) {
--			(void) fprintf (stderr,
--			                _("%s: Invalid configuration: GID_MIN (%lu), GID_MAX (%lu)\n"),
--			                Prog, (unsigned long) gid_min, (unsigned long) gid_max);
--			return -1;
--		}
--	} else {
--		gid_min = (gid_t) 1;
--		gid_max = (gid_t) getdef_ulong ("GID_MIN", 1000UL) - 1;
--		gid_max = (gid_t) getdef_ulong ("SYS_GID_MAX", (unsigned long) gid_max);
--		if (gid_max < gid_min) {
--			(void) fprintf (stderr,
--			                _("%s: Invalid configuration: SYS_GID_MIN (%lu), GID_MIN (%lu), SYS_GID_MAX (%lu)\n"),
--			                Prog, (unsigned long) gid_min, getdef_ulong ("GID_MIN", 1000UL), (unsigned long) gid_max);
-+	/*
-+	 * First, figure out what ID range is appropriate for
-+	 * automatic assignment
-+	 */
-+	result = get_ranges(sys_group, &gid_min, &gid_max, &preferred_min);
-+	if (result == EINVAL) {
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* Check if the preferred GID is available */
-+	if (preferred_gid) {
-+		result = check_gid(*preferred_gid, preferred_min, gid_max, NULL);
-+		if (result == 0) {
-+			/*
-+			 * Make sure the GID isn't queued for use already
-+			 */
-+			if (gr_locate_gid (*preferred_gid) == NULL) {
-+				*gid = *preferred_gid;
-+				return 0;
-+			}
-+			/*
-+			 * gr_locate_gid() found the GID in an as-yet uncommitted
-+			 * entry. We'll proceed below and auto-set a GID.
-+			 */
-+		} else if (result == EEXIST || result == ERANGE) {
-+			/*
-+			 * Continue on below. At this time, we won't
-+			 * treat these two cases differently.
-+			 */
-+		} else {
-+			/*
-+			 * An unexpected error occurred. We should report
-+			 * this and fail the group creation.
-+			 * This differs from the automatic creation
-+			 * behavior below, since if a specific GID was
-+			 * requested and generated an error, the user is
-+			 * more likely to want to stop and address the
-+			 * issue.
-+			 */
-+			fprintf(stderr,
-+					_("%s: Encountered error attempting to use "
-+					  "preferred GID: %s\n"),
-+					Prog, strerror(result));
- 			return -1;
- 		}
- 	}
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Search the entire group file,
-+	 * looking for the next unused value.
-+	 *
-+	 * We first check the local database with gr_rewind/gr_next to find
-+	 * all local values that are in use.
-+	 *
-+	 * We then compare the next free value to all databases (local and
-+	 * remote) and iterate until we find a free one. If there are free
-+	 * values beyond the lowest (system groups) or highest (non-system
-+	 * groups), we will prefer those and avoid potentially reclaiming a
-+	 * deleted group (which can be a security issue, since it may grant
-+	 * access to files belonging to that former group).
-+	 *
-+	 * If there are no GIDs available at the end of the search, we will
-+	 * have no choice but to iterate through the range looking for gaps.
-+	 *
-+	 */
-+
-+	/* Create an array to hold all of the discovered GIDs */
- 	used_gids = malloc (sizeof (bool) * (gid_max +1));
- 	if (NULL == used_gids) {
- 		fprintf (stderr,
--		         _("%s: failed to allocate memory: %s\n"),
--		         Prog, strerror (errno));
-+				 _("%s: failed to allocate memory: %s\n"),
-+				 Prog, strerror (errno));
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- 	memset (used_gids, false, sizeof (bool) * (gid_max + 1));
- 
--	if (   (NULL != preferred_gid)
--	    && (*preferred_gid >= gid_min)
--	    && (*preferred_gid <= gid_max)
--	    /* Check if the user exists according to NSS */
--	    && (getgrgid (*preferred_gid) == NULL)
--	    /* Check also the local database in case of uncommitted
--	     * changes */
--	    && (gr_locate_gid (*preferred_gid) == NULL)) {
--		*gid = *preferred_gid;
--		free (used_gids);
--		return 0;
--	}
-+	/* First look for the lowest and highest value in the local database */
-+	(void) gr_rewind ();
-+	highest_found = gid_min;
-+	lowest_found = gid_max;
-+	while ((grp = gr_next ()) != NULL) {
-+		/*
-+		 * Does this entry have a lower GID than the lowest we've found
-+		 * so far?
-+		 */
-+		if ((grp->gr_gid <= lowest_found) && (grp->gr_gid >= gid_min)) {
-+			lowest_found = grp->gr_gid - 1;
-+		}
-+
-+		/*
-+		 * Does this entry have a higher GID than the highest we've found
-+		 * so far?
-+		 */
-+		if ((grp->gr_gid >= highest_found) && (grp->gr_gid <= gid_max)) {
-+			highest_found = grp->gr_gid + 1;
-+		}
-+
-+		/* create index of used GIDs */
-+		if (grp->gr_gid >= gid_min
-+			&& grp->gr_gid <= gid_max) {
- 
--        /* if we did not find free preffered system gid, we start to look for
--         * one in the range assigned to dynamic system IDs */
--        if (sys_group)
--                gid_min = (gid_t) getdef_ulong ("SYS_GID_MIN", 101UL);
-+			used_gids[grp->gr_gid] = true;
-+		}
-+	}
- 
--	/*
--	 * Search the entire group file,
--	 * looking for the largest unused value.
--	 *
--	 * We check the list of groups according to NSS (setgrent/getgrent),
--	 * but we also check the local database (gr_rewind/gr_next) in case
--	 * some groups were created but the changes were not committed yet.
--	 */
- 	if (sys_group) {
--		gid_t id;
--		/* setgrent / getgrent / endgrent can be very slow with
--		 * LDAP configurations (and many accounts).
--		 * Since there is a limited amount of IDs to be tested
--		 * for system accounts, we just check the existence
--		 * of IDs with getgrgid.
-+		/*
-+		 * For system groups, we want to start from the
-+		 * top of the range and work downwards.
- 		 */
--		group_id = gid_max;
--		for (id = gid_max; id >= gid_min; id--) {
--			if (getgrgid (id) != NULL) {
--				group_id = id - 1;
--				used_gids[id] = true;
--			}
-+
-+		/*
-+		 * At the conclusion of the gr_next() search, we will either
-+		 * have a presumed-free GID or we will be at GID_MIN - 1.
-+		 */
-+		if (lowest_found < gid_min) {
-+			/*
-+			 * In this case, a GID is in use at GID_MIN.
-+			 *
-+			 * We will reset the search to GID_MAX and proceed down
-+			 * through all the GIDs (skipping those we detected with
-+			 * used_gids) for a free one. It is a known issue that
-+			 * this may result in reusing a previously-deleted GID,
-+			 * so administrators should be instructed to use this
-+			 * auto-detection with care (and prefer to assign GIDs
-+			 * explicitly).
-+			 */
-+			lowest_found = gid_max;
- 		}
- 
--		(void) gr_rewind ();
--		while ((grp = gr_next ()) != NULL) {
--			if ((grp->gr_gid <= group_id) && (grp->gr_gid >= gid_min)) {
--				group_id = grp->gr_gid - 1;
--			}
--			/* create index of used GIDs */
--			if (grp->gr_gid <= gid_max) {
--				used_gids[grp->gr_gid] = true;
-+		/* Search through all of the IDs in the range */
-+		for (id = lowest_found; id >= gid_min; id--) {
-+			result = check_gid(id, gid_min, gid_max, used_gids);
-+			if (result == 0) {
-+				/* This GID is available. Return it. */
-+				*gid = id;
-+				free(used_gids);
-+				return 0;
-+			} else if (result == EEXIST) {
-+				/* This GID is in use, we'll continue to the next */
-+			} else {
-+				/*
-+				 * An unexpected error occurred.
-+				 *
-+				 * Only report it the first time to avoid spamming
-+				 * the logs
-+				 *
-+				 */
-+				if (!nospam) {
-+					fprintf(stderr,
-+							_("%s: Can't get unique system GID (%s). "
-+							  "Suppressing additional messages.\n"),
-+							Prog, strerror(result));
-+					SYSLOG((LOG_ERR,
-+							"Error checking available GIDs: %s",
-+							strerror(result)));
-+					nospam = 1;
-+				}
-+				/*
-+				 * We will continue anyway. Hopefully a later GID
-+				 * will work properly.
-+				 */
- 			}
- 		}
--	} else {
--		group_id = gid_min;
--		setgrent ();
--		while ((grp = getgrent ()) != NULL) {
--			if ((grp->gr_gid >= group_id) && (grp->gr_gid <= gid_max)) {
--				group_id = grp->gr_gid + 1;
--			}
--			/* create index of used GIDs */
--			if (grp->gr_gid <= gid_max) {
--				used_gids[grp->gr_gid] = true;
-+
-+		/*
-+		 * If we get all the way through the loop, try again from GID_MAX,
-+		 * unless that was where we previously started. (NOTE: the worst-case
-+		 * scenario here is that we will run through (GID_MAX - GID_MIN - 1)
-+		 * cycles *again* if we fall into this case with lowest_found as
-+		 * GID_MAX - 1, all groups in the range in use and maintained by
-+		 * network services such as LDAP.)
-+		 */
-+		if (lowest_found != gid_max) {
-+			for (id = gid_max; id >= gid_min; id--) {
-+				result = check_gid(id, gid_min, gid_max, used_gids);
-+				if (result == 0) {
-+					/* This GID is available. Return it. */
-+					*gid = id;
-+					free(used_gids);
-+					return 0;
-+				} else if (result == EEXIST) {
-+					/* This GID is in use, we'll continue to the next */
-+				} else {
-+					/*
-+					 * An unexpected error occurred.
-+					 *
-+					 * Only report it the first time to avoid spamming
-+					 * the logs
-+					 *
-+					 */
-+					if (!nospam) {
-+						fprintf(stderr,
-+								_("%s: Can't get unique system GID (%s). "
-+								  "Suppressing additional messages.\n"),
-+								Prog, strerror(result));
-+						SYSLOG((LOG_ERR,
-+								"Error checking available GIDs: %s",
-+								strerror(result)));
-+						nospam = 1;
-+					}
-+					/*
-+					 * We will continue anyway. Hopefully a later GID
-+					 * will work properly.
-+					 */
-+				}
- 			}
- 		}
--		endgrent ();
-+	} else { /* !sys_group */
-+		/*
-+		 * For non-system groups, we want to start from the
-+		 * bottom of the range and work upwards.
-+		 */
- 
--		(void) gr_rewind ();
--		while ((grp = gr_next ()) != NULL) {
--			if ((grp->gr_gid >= group_id) && (grp->gr_gid <= gid_max)) {
--				group_id = grp->gr_gid + 1;
--			}
--			/* create index of used GIDs */
--			if (grp->gr_gid <= gid_max) {
--				used_gids[grp->gr_gid] = true;
--			}
-+		/*
-+		 * At the conclusion of the gr_next() search, we will either
-+		 * have a presumed-free GID or we will be at GID_MAX + 1.
-+		 */
-+		if (highest_found > gid_max) {
-+			/*
-+			 * In this case, a GID is in use at GID_MAX.
-+			 *
-+			 * We will reset the search to GID_MIN and proceed up
-+			 * through all the GIDs (skipping those we detected with
-+			 * used_gids) for a free one. It is a known issue that
-+			 * this may result in reusing a previously-deleted GID,
-+			 * so administrators should be instructed to use this
-+			 * auto-detection with care (and prefer to assign GIDs
-+			 * explicitly).
-+			 */
-+			highest_found = gid_min;
- 		}
--	}
- 
--	/*
--	 * If a group (resp. system group) with GID equal to GID_MAX (resp.
--	 * GID_MIN) exists, the above algorithm will give us GID_MAX+1
--	 * (resp. GID_MIN-1) even if not unique. Search for the first free
--	 * GID starting with GID_MIN (resp. GID_MAX).
--	 */
--	if (sys_group) {
--		if (group_id < gid_min) {
--			for (group_id = gid_max; group_id >= gid_min; group_id--) {
--				if (false == used_gids[group_id]) {
--					break;
-+		/* Search through all of the IDs in the range */
-+		for (id = highest_found; id <= gid_max; id++) {
-+			result = check_gid(id, gid_min, gid_max, used_gids);
-+			if (result == 0) {
-+				/* This GID is available. Return it. */
-+				*gid = id;
-+				free(used_gids);
-+				return 0;
-+			} else if (result == EEXIST) {
-+				/* This GID is in use, we'll continue to the next */
-+			} else {
-+				/*
-+				 * An unexpected error occurred.
-+				 *
-+				 * Only report it the first time to avoid spamming
-+				 * the logs
-+				 *
-+				 */
-+				if (!nospam) {
-+					fprintf(stderr,
-+							_("%s: Can't get unique GID (%s). "
-+							  "Suppressing additional messages.\n"),
-+							Prog, strerror(result));
-+					SYSLOG((LOG_ERR,
-+							"Error checking available GIDs: %s",
-+							strerror(result)));
-+					nospam = 1;
- 				}
--			}
--			if (group_id < gid_min) {
--				fprintf (stderr,
--				         _("%s: Can't get unique system GID (no more available GIDs)\n"),
--				         Prog);
--				SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN,
--				         "no more available GID on the system"));
--				free (used_gids);
--				return -1;
-+				/*
-+				 * We will continue anyway. Hopefully a later GID
-+				 * will work properly.
-+				 */
- 			}
- 		}
--	} else {
--		if (group_id > gid_max) {
--			for (group_id = gid_min; group_id <= gid_max; group_id++) {
--				if (false == used_gids[group_id]) {
--					break;
-+
-+		/*
-+		 * If we get all the way through the loop, try again from GID_MIN,
-+		 * unless that was where we previously started. (NOTE: the worst-case
-+		 * scenario here is that we will run through (GID_MAX - GID_MIN - 1)
-+		 * cycles *again* if we fall into this case with highest_found as
-+		 * GID_MIN + 1, all groups in the range in use and maintained by
-+		 * network services such as LDAP.)
-+		 */
-+		if (highest_found != gid_min) {
-+			for (id = gid_min; id <= gid_max; id++) {
-+				result = check_gid(id, gid_min, gid_max, used_gids);
-+				if (result == 0) {
-+					/* This GID is available. Return it. */
-+					*gid = id;
-+					free(used_gids);
-+					return 0;
-+				} else if (result == EEXIST) {
-+					/* This GID is in use, we'll continue to the next */
-+				} else {
-+					/*
-+					 * An unexpected error occurred.
-+					 *
-+					 * Only report it the first time to avoid spamming
-+					 * the logs
-+					 *
-+					 */
-+					if (!nospam) {
-+						fprintf(stderr,
-+								_("%s: Can't get unique GID (%s). "
-+								  "Suppressing additional messages.\n"),
-+								Prog, strerror(result));
-+						SYSLOG((LOG_ERR,
-+								"Error checking available GIDs: %s",
-+								strerror(result)));
-+						nospam = 1;
-+					}
-+					/*
-+					 * We will continue anyway. Hopefully a later GID
-+					 * will work properly.
-+					 */
- 				}
- 			}
--			if (group_id > gid_max) {
--				fprintf (stderr,
--				         _("%s: Can't get unique GID (no more available GIDs)\n"),
--				         Prog);
--				SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "no more available GID on the system"));
--				free (used_gids);
--				return -1;
--			}
- 		}
- 	}
- 
--	free (used_gids);
--	*gid = group_id;
--	return 0;
-+	/* The code reached here and found no available IDs in the range */
-+	fprintf(stderr,
-+			_("%s: Can't get unique GID (no more available GIDs)\n"),
-+			Prog);
-+	SYSLOG((LOG_WARN, "no more available GIDs on the system"));
-+	free(used_gids);
-+	return -1;
- }
- 
--- 
-1.9.3
-

shadow-4.1.5.1-info-parent-dir.patch

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/man/man8/newusers.8.info-parent-dir shadow-4.1.5.1/man/man8/newusers.8
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/man/man8/newusers.8.info-parent-dir	2012-05-25 13:59:09.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/man/man8/newusers.8	2012-09-19 18:47:17.203525237 +0200
-@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ This field is copied in the GECOS field
- .RS 4
- This field is used to define the home directory of the user\&.
- .sp
--If this field does not specify an existing directory, the specified directory is created, with ownership set to the user being created or updated and its primary group\&.
-+If this field does not specify an existing directory, the specified directory is created, with ownership set to the user being created or updated and its primary group\&. Note that newusers does not create parent directories of the new user's home directory. The newusers command will fail to create the home directory if the parent directories do not exist, and will send a message to stderr informing the user of the failure. The newusers command will not halt or return a failure to the calling shell if it fails to create the home directory, it will continue to process the batch of new users specified\&.
- .sp
- If the home directory of an existing user is changed,
- \fBnewusers\fR
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/man/newusers.8.xml.info-parent-dir shadow-4.1.5.1/man/newusers.8.xml
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/man/newusers.8.xml.info-parent-dir	2012-05-25 13:45:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/man/newusers.8.xml	2012-09-19 18:46:35.651613365 +0200
-@@ -216,7 +216,15 @@
- 	  <para>
- 	    If this field does not specify an existing directory, the
- 	    specified directory is created, with ownership set to the
--	    user being created or updated and its primary group.
-+	    user being created or updated and its primary group. Note 
-+            that newusers does not create parent directories of the new 
-+            user's home directory. The newusers command will fail to 
-+            create the home directory if the parent directories do not 
-+            exist, and will send a message to stderr informing the user 
-+            of the failure. The newusers command will not halt or return 
-+            a failure to the calling shell if it fails to create the home 
-+            directory, it will continue to process the batch of new users 
-+            specified.
- 	  </para>
- 	  <para>
- 	    If the home directory of an existing user is changed,

shadow-4.1.5.1-logmsg.patch

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c.logmsg shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c.logmsg	2013-02-20 15:41:44.000000000 +0100
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c	2013-03-19 18:40:04.908292810 +0100
-@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ static void fail_exit (int code)
- 	              user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
- 	              SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
- #endif
--	SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "failed adding user '%s', data deleted", user_name));
-+	SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "failed adding user '%s', exit code: %d", user_name, code));
- 	exit (code);
- }
- 

shadow-4.1.5.1-manfix.patch

@@ -1,199 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/man/login.defs.5.xml.manfix shadow-4.1.5.1/man/login.defs.5.xml
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/man/login.defs.5.xml.manfix	2012-05-25 13:45:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/man/login.defs.5.xml	2014-02-12 11:18:36.126334872 +0100
-@@ -160,6 +160,17 @@
-       long numeric parameters is machine-dependent.
-     </para>
- 
-+    <para>
-+      Please note that the parameters in this configuration file control the
-+      behavior of the tools from the shadow-utils component. None of these
-+      tools uses the PAM mechanism, and the utilities that use PAM (such as the
-+      passwd command) should be configured elsewhere. The only values that
-+      affect PAM modules are <emphasis>ENCRYPT_METHOD</emphasis> and <emphasis>SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS</emphasis>
-+      for pam_unix module, <emphasis>FAIL_DELAY</emphasis> for pam_faildelay module,
-+      and <emphasis>UMASK</emphasis> for pam_umask module. Refer to
-+      pam(8) for more information.
-+    </para>
-+
-     <para>The following configuration items are provided:</para>
- 
-     <variablelist remap='IP'>
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/man/man5/login.defs.5.manfix shadow-4.1.5.1/man/man5/login.defs.5
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/man/man5/login.defs.5.manfix	2012-05-25 13:59:03.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/man/man5/login.defs.5	2014-02-12 11:26:27.159851843 +0100
-@@ -46,6 +46,14 @@ value\&. Numbers (both regular and long)
- \fI0\fR) or hexadecimal values (precede the value with
- \fI0x\fR)\&. The maximum value of the regular and long numeric parameters is machine\-dependent\&.
- .PP
-+Please note that the parameters in this configuration file control the
-+behavior of the tools from the shadow-utils component\&. None of these
-+tools uses the PAM mechanism, and the utilities that use PAM (such as the
-+passwd command) should be configured elsewhere\&. The only values that
-+affect PAM modules are \fBENCRYPT_METHOD\fR and \fBSHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS\fR for pam_unix module,
-+\fBFAIL_DELAY\fR for pam_faildelay module, and \fBUMASK\fR for pam_umask module\&. Refer to
-+pam(8) for more information\&.
-+.PP
- The following configuration items are provided:
- .PP
- \fBCHFN_AUTH\fR (boolean)
-@@ -625,20 +633,6 @@ will create by default a group with the
- .PP
- The following cross references show which programs in the shadow password suite use which parameters\&.
- .PP
--chfn
--.RS 4
--
--CHFN_AUTH
--CHFN_RESTRICT
--LOGIN_STRING
--.RE
--.PP
--chgpasswd
--.RS 4
--ENCRYPT_METHOD MAX_MEMBERS_PER_GROUP MD5_CRYPT_ENAB
--SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS
--.RE
--.PP
- chpasswd
- .RS 4
- 
-@@ -646,11 +640,6 @@ ENCRYPT_METHOD MD5_CRYPT_ENAB
- SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS
- .RE
- .PP
--chsh
--.RS 4
--CHSH_AUTH LOGIN_STRING
--.RE
--.PP
- gpasswd
- .RS 4
- ENCRYPT_METHOD MAX_MEMBERS_PER_GROUP MD5_CRYPT_ENAB
-@@ -692,29 +681,6 @@ grpunconv
- MAX_MEMBERS_PER_GROUP
- .RE
- .PP
--login
--.RS 4
--
--CONSOLE
--CONSOLE_GROUPS DEFAULT_HOME
--ENV_HZ ENV_PATH ENV_SUPATH ENV_TZ ENVIRON_FILE
--ERASECHAR FAIL_DELAY
--FAILLOG_ENAB
--FAKE_SHELL
--FTMP_FILE
--HUSHLOGIN_FILE
--ISSUE_FILE
--KILLCHAR
--LASTLOG_ENAB
--LOGIN_RETRIES
--LOGIN_STRING
--LOGIN_TIMEOUT LOG_OK_LOGINS LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB
--MAIL_CHECK_ENAB MAIL_DIR MAIL_FILE MOTD_FILE NOLOGINS_FILE PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB QUOTAS_ENAB
--TTYGROUP TTYPERM TTYTYPE_FILE
--ULIMIT UMASK
--USERGROUPS_ENAB
--.RE
--.PP
- newgrp / sg
- .RS 4
- SYSLOG_SG_ENAB
-@@ -727,12 +693,6 @@ SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUND
- SYS_GID_MAX SYS_GID_MIN SYS_UID_MAX SYS_UID_MIN UID_MAX UID_MIN UMASK
- .RE
- .PP
--passwd
--.RS 4
--ENCRYPT_METHOD MD5_CRYPT_ENAB OBSCURE_CHECKS_ENAB PASS_ALWAYS_WARN PASS_CHANGE_TRIES PASS_MAX_LEN PASS_MIN_LEN
--SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS
--.RE
--.PP
- pwck
- .RS 4
- PASS_MAX_DAYS PASS_MIN_DAYS PASS_WARN_AGE
-@@ -743,26 +703,6 @@ pwconv
- PASS_MAX_DAYS PASS_MIN_DAYS PASS_WARN_AGE
- .RE
- .PP
--su
--.RS 4
--
--CONSOLE
--CONSOLE_GROUPS DEFAULT_HOME
--ENV_HZ ENVIRON_FILE
--ENV_PATH ENV_SUPATH
--ENV_TZ LOGIN_STRING MAIL_CHECK_ENAB MAIL_DIR MAIL_FILE QUOTAS_ENAB
--SULOG_FILE SU_NAME
--SU_WHEEL_ONLY
--SYSLOG_SU_ENAB
--USERGROUPS_ENAB
--.RE
--.PP
--sulogin
--.RS 4
--ENV_HZ
--ENV_TZ
--.RE
--.PP
- useradd
- .RS 4
- CREATE_HOME GID_MAX GID_MIN MAIL_DIR MAX_MEMBERS_PER_GROUP PASS_MAX_DAYS PASS_MIN_DAYS PASS_WARN_AGE SYS_GID_MAX SYS_GID_MIN SYS_UID_MAX SYS_UID_MIN UID_MAX UID_MIN UMASK
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/man/man8/useradd.8.manfix shadow-4.1.5.1/man/man8/useradd.8
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/man/man8/useradd.8.manfix	2013-11-27 10:25:34.740049650 +0100
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/man/man8/useradd.8	2013-11-27 10:25:34.758050045 +0100
-@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ by default\&.
- Any text string\&. It is generally a short description of the login, and is currently used as the field for the user\*(Aqs full name\&.
- .RE
- .PP
--\fB\-d\fR, \fB\-\-home\fR \fIHOME_DIR\fR
-+\fB\-d\fR, \fB\-\-home\-dir\fR \fIHOME_DIR\fR
- .RS 4
- The new user will be created using
- \fIHOME_DIR\fR
-@@ -220,9 +220,13 @@ option) will be copied to the home direc
- By default, if this option is not specified and
- \fBCREATE_HOME\fR
- is not enabled, no home directories are created\&.
-+.sp
-+The directory where the user\*(Aqs home directory is created must
-+exist and have proper SELinux context and permissions\&. Otherwise
-+the user\*(Aqs home directory cannot be created or accessed\&.
- .RE
- .PP
--\fB\-M\fR
-+\fB\-M\fR, \fB\-\-no\-create\-home\fR
- .RS 4
- Do not create the user\*(Aqs home directory, even if the system wide setting from
- /etc/login\&.defs
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/man/useradd.8.xml.manfix shadow-4.1.5.1/man/useradd.8.xml
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/man/useradd.8.xml.manfix	2013-11-27 10:25:34.740049650 +0100
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/man/useradd.8.xml	2013-11-27 10:25:34.759050067 +0100
-@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@
-       </varlistentry>
-       <varlistentry>
- 	<term>
--	  <option>-d</option>, <option>--home</option>
-+	  <option>-d</option>, <option>--home-dir</option>
- 	  <replaceable>HOME_DIR</replaceable>
- 	</term>
- 	<listitem>
-@@ -358,11 +358,16 @@
- 	    <option>CREATE_HOME</option> is not enabled, no home
- 	    directories are created.
- 	  </para>
-+	  <para>
-+	    The directory where the user's home directory is created must
-+	    exist and have proper SELinux context and permissions. Otherwise
-+	    the user's home directory cannot be created or accessed.
-+	  </para>
- 	</listitem>
-       </varlistentry>
-       <varlistentry>
- 	<term>
--	  <option>-M</option>
-+	  <option>-M</option>, <option>--no-create-home</option>
- 	</term>
- 	<listitem>
- 	  <para>

shadow-4.1.5.1-merge-group.patch

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/groupio.c.merge-group shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/groupio.c
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/groupio.c.merge-group	2011-02-16 21:32:24.000000000 +0100
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/groupio.c	2013-01-29 13:56:43.049275513 +0100
-@@ -330,12 +330,12 @@ static /*@null@*/struct commonio_entry *
- 
- 	/* Concatenate the 2 lines */
- 	new_line_len = strlen (gr1->line) + strlen (gr2->line) +1;
--	new_line = (char *)malloc ((new_line_len + 1) * sizeof(char*));
-+	new_line = (char *)malloc (new_line_len + 1);
- 	if (NULL == new_line) {
- 		errno = ENOMEM;
- 		return NULL;
- 	}
--	snprintf(new_line, new_line_len, "%s\n%s", gr1->line, gr2->line);
-+	snprintf(new_line, new_line_len + 1, "%s\n%s", gr1->line, gr2->line);
- 	new_line[new_line_len] = '\0';
- 
- 	/* Concatenate the 2 list of members */
-@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ static /*@null@*/struct commonio_entry *
- 			members++;
- 		}
- 	}
--	new_members = (char **)malloc ( (members+1) * sizeof(char*) );
-+	new_members = (char **)calloc (members+1, sizeof(char*));
- 	if (NULL == new_members) {
- 		free (new_line);
- 		errno = ENOMEM;

shadow-4.1.5.1-orig-context.patch

@@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/commonio.c.orig-context shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/commonio.c
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/commonio.c.orig-context	2012-09-19 20:27:16.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/commonio.c	2013-02-20 15:20:55.064962324 +0100
-@@ -941,7 +941,7 @@ int commonio_close (struct commonio_db *
- 		snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%s-", db->filename);
- 
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--		if (set_selinux_file_context (buf) != 0) {
-+		if (set_selinux_file_context (buf, db->filename) != 0) {
- 			errors++;
- 		}
- #endif
-@@ -975,7 +975,7 @@ int commonio_close (struct commonio_db *
- 	snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%s+", db->filename);
- 
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--	if (set_selinux_file_context (buf) != 0) {
-+	if (set_selinux_file_context (buf, db->filename) != 0) {
- 		errors++;
- 	}
- #endif
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/copydir.c.orig-context shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/copydir.c
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/copydir.c.orig-context	2012-02-13 20:16:32.000000000 +0100
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/libmisc/copydir.c	2013-02-20 15:19:01.495623232 +0100
-@@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ static int copy_dir (const char *src, co
- 	 */
- 
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst) != 0) {
-+	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst, NULL) != 0) {
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- #endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
-@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ static int copy_symlink (const char *src
- 	}
- 
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst) != 0) {
-+	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst, NULL) != 0) {
- 		free (oldlink);
- 		return -1;
- 	}
-@@ -684,7 +684,7 @@ static int copy_special (const char *src
- 	int err = 0;
- 
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst) != 0) {
-+	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst, NULL) != 0) {
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- #endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
-@@ -744,7 +744,7 @@ static int copy_file (const char *src, c
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst) != 0) {
-+	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst, NULL) != 0) {
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- #endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/prototypes.h.orig-context shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/prototypes.h
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/prototypes.h.orig-context	2012-01-08 17:04:29.000000000 +0100
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/prototypes.h	2013-02-20 15:24:17.251126575 +0100
-@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ extern /*@observer@*/const char *crypt_m
- 
- /* selinux.c */
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--extern int set_selinux_file_context (const char *dst_name);
-+extern int set_selinux_file_context (const char *dst_name, const char *orig_name);
- extern int reset_selinux_file_context (void);
- #endif
- 
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/selinux.c.orig-context shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/selinux.c
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/selinux.c.orig-context	2012-01-08 17:35:44.000000000 +0100
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/selinux.c	2013-02-20 15:16:40.383716877 +0100
-@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static bool selinux_enabled;
-  *	Callers may have to Reset SELinux to create files with default
-  *	contexts with reset_selinux_file_context
-  */
--int set_selinux_file_context (const char *dst_name)
-+int set_selinux_file_context (const char *dst_name, const char *orig_name)
- {
- 	/*@null@*/security_context_t scontext = NULL;
- 
-@@ -62,19 +62,23 @@ int set_selinux_file_context (const char
- 	if (selinux_enabled) {
- 		/* Get the default security context for this file */
- 		if (matchpathcon (dst_name, 0, &scontext) < 0) {
--			if (security_getenforce () != 0) {
--				return 1;
--			}
-+			/* We could not get the default, copy the original */
-+			if (orig_name == NULL)
-+				goto error;
-+			if (getfilecon (orig_name, &scontext) < 0)
-+				goto error;
- 		}
- 		/* Set the security context for the next created file */
--		if (setfscreatecon (scontext) < 0) {
--			if (security_getenforce () != 0) {
--				return 1;
--			}
--		}
-+		if (setfscreatecon (scontext) < 0)
-+			goto error;
- 		freecon (scontext);
- 	}
- 	return 0;
-+    error:
-+	if (security_getenforce () != 0) {
-+		return 1;
-+	}
-+	return 0;
- }
- 
- /*
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c.orig-context shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c.orig-context	2012-09-19 20:23:33.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c	2013-02-20 15:19:31.221235459 +0100
-@@ -1759,7 +1759,7 @@ static void create_home (void)
- {
- 	if (access (user_home, F_OK) != 0) {
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--		if (set_selinux_file_context (user_home) != 0) {
-+		if (set_selinux_file_context (user_home, NULL) != 0) {
- 			fail_exit (E_HOMEDIR);
- 		}
- #endif

shadow-4.1.5.1-selinux.patch

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c.selinux shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c.selinux	2012-09-19 18:28:37.662060468 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/useradd.c	2012-09-19 18:28:37.672060688 +0200
-@@ -2040,7 +2040,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 	if (mflg) {
- 		create_home ();
- 		if (home_added) {
--			copy_tree (def_template, user_home, false, false,
-+			copy_tree (def_template, user_home, false, true,
- 			           (uid_t)-1, user_id, (gid_t)-1, user_gid);
- 		} else {
- 			fprintf (stderr,

shadow-4.1.5.1-userdel-helpfix.patch

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/src/userdel.c.userdel shadow-4.1.5.1/src/userdel.c
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/src/userdel.c.userdel	2012-05-25 13:51:55.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/userdel.c	2014-02-12 11:40:30.707686132 +0100
-@@ -130,8 +130,9 @@ static void usage (int status)
- 	                  "\n"
- 	                  "Options:\n"),
- 	                Prog);
--	(void) fputs (_("  -f, --force                   force removal of files,\n"
--	                "                                even if not owned by user\n"),
-+	(void) fputs (_("  -f, --force                   force some actions that would fail otherwise\n"
-+			"                                e.g. removal of user still logged in\n"
-+			"                                or files, even if not owned by the user\n"),
- 	              usageout);
- 	(void) fputs (_("  -h, --help                    display this help message and exit\n"), usageout);
- 	(void) fputs (_("  -r, --remove                  remove home directory and mail spool\n"), usageout);

shadow-4.11.1-null-tm.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.11.1/src/chage.c.null-tm shadow-4.11.1/src/chage.c
+diff -up shadow-4.11.1/src/lastlog.c.null-tm shadow-4.11.1/src/lastlog.c
+--- shadow-4.11.1/src/lastlog.c.null-tm	2022-01-03 15:31:56.348555620 +0100
++++ shadow-4.11.1/src/lastlog.c	2022-01-03 15:38:41.262229024 +0100
+@@ -151,9 +151,12 @@ static void print_one (/*@null@*/const s
+ 
+ 	ll_time = ll.ll_time;
+ 	tm = localtime (&ll_time);
+-	strftime (ptime, sizeof (ptime), "%a %b %e %H:%M:%S %z %Y", tm);
+-	cp = ptime;
+-
++	if (tm == NULL) {
++		cp = "(unknown)";
++	} else {
++		strftime (ptime, sizeof (ptime), "%a %b %e %H:%M:%S %z %Y", tm);
++		cp = ptime;
++	}
+ 	if (ll.ll_time == (time_t) 0) {
+ 		cp = _("**Never logged in**\0");
+ 	}
+diff -up shadow-4.11.1/src/passwd.c.null-tm shadow-4.11.1/src/passwd.c
+diff -up shadow-4.11.1/src/usermod.c.null-tm shadow-4.11.1/src/usermod.c

shadow-4.11.1-redhat.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.11.1/src/useradd.c.redhat shadow-4.11.1/src/useradd.c
+--- shadow-4.11.1/src/useradd.c.redhat	2022-01-03 01:46:53.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.11.1/src/useradd.c	2022-01-03 14:53:12.988484829 +0100
+@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ const char *Prog;
+ static gid_t def_group = 1000;
+ static const char *def_gname = "other";
+ static const char *def_home = "/home";
+-static const char *def_shell = "/bin/bash";
++static const char *def_shell = "/sbin/nologin";
+ static const char *def_template = SKEL_DIR;
+ static const char *def_create_mail_spool = "yes";
+ static const char *def_log_init = "yes";
+@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ static const char *def_expire = "";
+ #define	VALID(s)	(strcspn (s, ":\n") == strlen (s))
+ 
+ static const char *user_name = "";
+-static const char *user_pass = "!";
++static const char *user_pass = "!!";
+ static uid_t user_id;
+ static gid_t user_gid;
+ static const char *user_comment = "";
+@@ -1219,9 +1219,9 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, cha
+ 		};
+ 		while ((c = getopt_long (argc, argv,
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-		                         "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:K:lmMNop:rR:P:s:u:UZ:",
++		                         "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:K:lmMnNop:rR:P:s:u:UZ:",
+ #else				/* !WITH_SELINUX */
+-		                         "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:K:lmMNop:rR:P:s:u:U",
++		                         "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:K:lmMnNop:rR:P:s:u:U",
+ #endif				/* !WITH_SELINUX */
+ 		                         long_options, NULL)) != -1) {
+ 			switch (c) {
+@@ -1378,6 +1378,7 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, cha
+ 			case 'M':
+ 				Mflg = true;
+ 				break;
++			case 'n':
+ 			case 'N':
+ 				Nflg = true;
+ 				break;

shadow-4.11.1-useradd-modify-check-ID-range-for-system-users.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From f1f1678e13aa3ae49bdb139efaa2c5bc53dcfe92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 4 Jan 2022 13:06:00 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] useradd: modify check ID range for system users
+
+useradd warns that a system user ID less than SYS_UID_MIN is outside the
+expected range, even though that ID has been specifically selected with
+the "-u" option.
+
+In my opinion all the user ID's below SYS_UID_MAX are for the system,
+thus I change the condition to take that into account.
+
+Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2004911
+
+Signed-off-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
+---
+ src/useradd.c | 6 ++----
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/useradd.c b/src/useradd.c
+index 34376fa5..4c71c38a 100644
+--- a/src/useradd.c
++++ b/src/useradd.c
+@@ -2409,11 +2409,9 @@ static void check_uid_range(int rflg, uid_t user_id)
+ 	uid_t uid_min ;
+ 	uid_t uid_max ;
+ 	if (rflg) {
+-		uid_min = (uid_t)getdef_ulong("SYS_UID_MIN",101UL);
+ 		uid_max = (uid_t)getdef_ulong("SYS_UID_MAX",getdef_ulong("UID_MIN",1000UL)-1);
+-		if (uid_min <= uid_max) {
+-			if (user_id < uid_min || user_id >uid_max)
+-				fprintf(stderr, _("%s warning: %s's uid %d outside of the SYS_UID_MIN %d and SYS_UID_MAX %d range.\n"), Prog, user_name, user_id, uid_min, uid_max);
++		if (user_id > uid_max) {
++			fprintf(stderr, _("%s warning: %s's uid %d is greater than SYS_UID_MAX %d\n"), Prog, user_name, user_id, uid_max);
+ 		}
+ 	}else{
+ 		uid_min = (uid_t)getdef_ulong("UID_MIN", 1000UL);
+-- 
+2.37.1
+

shadow-4.2.1-date-parsing.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+Index: shadow-4.5/libmisc/getdate.y
+===================================================================
+--- shadow-4.5.orig/libmisc/getdate.y
++++ shadow-4.5/libmisc/getdate.y
+@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ static int	yyHaveDay;
+ static int	yyHaveRel;
+ static int	yyHaveTime;
+ static int	yyHaveZone;
++static int      yyHaveYear;
+ static int	yyTimezone;
+ static int	yyDay;
+ static int	yyHour;
+@@ -293,18 +294,21 @@ date	: tUNUMBER '/' tUNUMBER {
+ 	      yyDay = $3;
+ 	      yyYear = $5;
+ 	    }
++	    yyHaveYear++;
+ 	}
+ 	| tUNUMBER tSNUMBER tSNUMBER {
+ 	    /* ISO 8601 format.  yyyy-mm-dd.  */
+ 	    yyYear = $1;
+ 	    yyMonth = -$2;
+ 	    yyDay = -$3;
++	    yyHaveYear++;
+ 	}
+ 	| tUNUMBER tMONTH tSNUMBER {
+ 	    /* e.g. 17-JUN-1992.  */
+ 	    yyDay = $1;
+ 	    yyMonth = $2;
+ 	    yyYear = -$3;
++	    yyHaveYear++;
+ 	}
+ 	| tMONTH tUNUMBER {
+ 	    yyMonth = $1;
+@@ -314,6 +318,7 @@ date	: tUNUMBER '/' tUNUMBER {
+ 	    yyMonth = $1;
+ 	    yyDay = $2;
+ 	    yyYear = $4;
++	    yyHaveYear++;
+ 	}
+ 	| tUNUMBER tMONTH {
+ 	    yyMonth = $2;
+@@ -323,6 +328,7 @@ date	: tUNUMBER '/' tUNUMBER {
+ 	    yyMonth = $2;
+ 	    yyDay = $1;
+ 	    yyYear = $3;
++	    yyHaveYear++;
+ 	}
+ 	;
+ 
+@@ -395,7 +401,8 @@ relunit	: tUNUMBER tYEAR_UNIT {
+ 
+ number	: tUNUMBER
+           {
+-	    if ((yyHaveTime != 0) && (yyHaveDate != 0) && (yyHaveRel == 0))
++	    if ((yyHaveTime != 0 || $1 >= 100) && !yyHaveYear
++		&& (yyHaveDate != 0) && (yyHaveRel == 0))
+ 	      yyYear = $1;
+ 	    else
+ 	      {
+@@ -802,7 +809,7 @@ yylex (void)
+ 	  return LookupWord (buff);
+ 	}
+       if (c != '(')
+-	return *yyInput++;
++	return (unsigned char)*yyInput++;
+       Count = 0;
+       do
+ 	{

shadow-4.5-usermod-unlock.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+Index: shadow-4.5/src/usermod.c
+===================================================================
+--- shadow-4.5.orig/src/usermod.c
++++ shadow-4.5/src/usermod.c
+@@ -455,14 +455,17 @@ static char *new_pw_passwd (char *pw_pas
+ 		strcat (buf, pw_pass);
+ 		pw_pass = buf;
+ 	} else if (Uflg && pw_pass[0] == '!') {
+-		char *s;
++		char *s = pw_pass;
+ 
+-		if (pw_pass[1] == '\0') {
++		while ('!' == *s)
++			++s;
++
++		if (*s == '\0') {
+ 			fprintf (stderr,
+ 			         _("%s: unlocking the user's password would result in a passwordless account.\n"
+ 			           "You should set a password with usermod -p to unlock this user's password.\n"),
+ 			         Prog);
+-			return pw_pass;
++			return NULL;
+ 		}
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+@@ -471,12 +474,15 @@ static char *new_pw_passwd (char *pw_pas
+ 		              user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
+ #endif
+ 		SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "unlock user '%s' password", user_newname));
+-		s = pw_pass;
+-		while ('\0' != *s) {
+-			*s = *(s + 1);
+-			s++;
+-		}
++		memmove (pw_pass, s, strlen (s) + 1);
+ 	} else if (pflg) {
++		if (strchr (user_pass, ':') != NULL) {
++			fprintf (stderr,
++			         _("%s: The password field cannot contain a colon character.\n"),
++			         Prog);
++			return NULL;
++
++		}
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ 		audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+ 		              "updating-password",
+@@ -525,6 +531,8 @@ static void new_pwent (struct passwd *pw
+ 	if (   (!is_shadow_pwd)
+ 	    || (strcmp (pwent->pw_passwd, SHADOW_PASSWD_STRING) != 0)) {
+ 		pwent->pw_passwd = new_pw_passwd (pwent->pw_passwd);
++		if (pwent->pw_passwd == NULL)
++			fail_exit (E_PW_UPDATE);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (uflg) {
+@@ -639,6 +647,8 @@ static void new_spent (struct spwd *spen
+ 	 *  + aging has been requested
+ 	 */
+ 	spent->sp_pwdp = new_pw_passwd (spent->sp_pwdp);
++	if (spent->sp_pwdp == NULL)
++		fail_exit(E_PW_UPDATE);
+ 
+ 	if (pflg) {
+ 		spent->sp_lstchg = (long) gettime () / SCALE;

shadow-4.6-move-home.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.6/src/usermod.c.move-home shadow-4.6/src/usermod.c
+--- shadow-4.6/src/usermod.c.move-home	2018-05-28 14:59:05.594076665 +0200
++++ shadow-4.6/src/usermod.c	2018-05-28 15:00:28.479837392 +0200
+@@ -1845,6 +1845,11 @@ static void move_home (void)
+ 			         Prog, prefix_user_home, prefix_user_newhome);
+ 			fail_exit (E_HOMEDIR);
+ 		}
++	} else {
++		fprintf (stderr,
++		         _("%s: The previous home directory (%s) does "
++		           "not exist or is inaccessible. Move cannot be completed.\n"),
++		         Prog, prefix_user_home);
+ 	}
+ }
+ 

shadow-4.6-sysugid-min-limit.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.6/libmisc/find_new_gid.c.min-limit shadow-4.6/libmisc/find_new_gid.c
+--- shadow-4.6/libmisc/find_new_gid.c.min-limit	2018-04-29 18:42:37.000000001 +0200
++++ shadow-4.6/libmisc/find_new_gid.c	2018-11-06 10:51:20.554963292 +0100
+@@ -82,6 +82,13 @@ static int get_ranges (bool sys_group, g
+                             (unsigned long) *max_id);
+ 			return EINVAL;
+ 		}
++		/*
++		 * Zero is reserved for root and the allocation algorithm does not
++		 * work right with it.
++		 */
++		if (*min_id == 0) {
++			*min_id = (gid_t) 1;
++		}
+ 	} else {
+ 		/* Non-system groups */
+ 
+diff -up shadow-4.6/libmisc/find_new_uid.c.min-limit shadow-4.6/libmisc/find_new_uid.c
+--- shadow-4.6/libmisc/find_new_uid.c.min-limit	2018-04-29 18:42:37.000000001 +0200
++++ shadow-4.6/libmisc/find_new_uid.c	2018-11-06 10:51:39.341399569 +0100
+@@ -82,6 +82,13 @@ static int get_ranges (bool sys_user, ui
+                             (unsigned long) *max_id);
+ 			return EINVAL;
+ 		}
++		/*
++		 * Zero is reserved for root and the allocation algorithm does not
++		 * work right with it.
++		 */
++		if (*min_id == 0) {
++			*min_id = (uid_t) 1;
++		}
+ 	} else {
+ 		/* Non-system users */
+ 

shadow-4.8-goodname.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.8/libmisc/chkname.c.goodname shadow-4.8/libmisc/chkname.c
+--- shadow-4.8/libmisc/chkname.c.goodname	2020-01-13 09:44:41.968507996 +0100
++++ shadow-4.8/libmisc/chkname.c	2020-01-13 09:46:27.863727732 +0100
+@@ -55,26 +55,44 @@ static bool is_valid_name (const char *n
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/*
+-	 * User/group names must match [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]
+-	 */
++         * User/group names must match gnu e-regex:
++         *    [a-zA-Z0-9_.][a-zA-Z0-9_.-]{0,30}[a-zA-Z0-9_.$-]?
++         *
++         * as a non-POSIX, extension, allow "$" as the last char for
++         * sake of Samba 3.x "add machine script"
++         *
++         * Also do not allow fully numeric names or just "." or "..".
++         */
++	int numeric;
+ 
+-	if (('\0' == *name) ||
+-	    !((('a' <= *name) && ('z' >= *name)) || ('_' == *name))) {
++	if ('\0' == *name ||
++	    ('.' == *name && (('.' == name[1] && '\0' == name[2]) ||
++			      '\0' == name[1])) ||
++	    !((*name >= 'a' && *name <= 'z') ||
++	      (*name >= 'A' && *name <= 'Z') ||
++	      (*name >= '0' && *name <= '9') ||
++	      *name == '_' ||
++	      *name == '.')) {
+ 		return false;
+ 	}
+ 
++	numeric = isdigit(*name);
++
+ 	while ('\0' != *++name) {
+-		if (!(( ('a' <= *name) && ('z' >= *name) ) ||
+-		      ( ('0' <= *name) && ('9' >= *name) ) ||
+-		      ('_' == *name) ||
+-		      ('-' == *name) ||
+-		      ( ('$' == *name) && ('\0' == *(name + 1)) )
++		if (!((*name >= 'a' && *name <= 'z') ||
++		      (*name >= 'A' && *name <= 'Z') ||
++		      (*name >= '0' && *name <= '9') ||
++		      *name == '_' ||
++		      *name == '.' ||
++		      *name == '-' ||
++		      (*name == '$' && name[1] == '\0')
+ 		     )) {
+ 			return false;
+ 		}
++		numeric &= isdigit(*name);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	return true;
++	return !numeric;
+ }
+ 
+ bool is_valid_user_name (const char *name)
+diff -up shadow-4.8/man/groupadd.8.xml.goodname shadow-4.8/man/groupadd.8.xml
+--- shadow-4.8/man/groupadd.8.xml.goodname	2019-07-23 17:26:08.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.8/man/groupadd.8.xml	2020-01-13 09:44:41.968507996 +0100
+@@ -273,10 +273,12 @@
+    <refsect1 id='caveats'>
+      <title>CAVEATS</title>
+      <para>
+-       Groupnames must start with a lower case letter or an underscore,
+-       followed by lower case letters, digits, underscores, or dashes.
+-       They can end with a dollar sign.
+-       In regular expression terms: [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]?
++       Groupnames may contain only lower and upper case letters, digits,
++       underscores, or dashes. They can end with a dollar sign.
++
++       Dashes are not allowed at the beginning of the groupname.
++       Fully numeric groupnames and groupnames . or .. are
++       also disallowed.
+      </para>
+      <para>
+        Groupnames may only be up to &GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH; characters long.
+diff -up shadow-4.8/man/useradd.8.xml.goodname shadow-4.8/man/useradd.8.xml
+--- shadow-4.8/man/useradd.8.xml.goodname	2019-10-05 03:23:58.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.8/man/useradd.8.xml	2020-01-13 09:44:41.968507996 +0100
+@@ -661,10 +661,14 @@
+     </para>
+ 
+     <para>
+-      Usernames must start with a lower case letter or an underscore,
+-      followed by lower case letters, digits, underscores, or dashes.
+-      They can end with a dollar sign.
+-      In regular expression terms: [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]?
++      Usernames may contain only lower and upper case letters, digits,
++      underscores, or dashes. They can end with a dollar sign.
++
++      Dashes are not allowed at the beginning of the username.
++      Fully numeric usernames and usernames . or .. are
++      also disallowed. It is not recommended to use usernames beginning
++      with . character as their home directories will be hidden in
++      the <command>ls</command> output.
+     </para>
+     <para>
+       Usernames may only be up to 32 characters long.

shadow-4.8-ignore-login-prompt.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.8/lib/getdef.c.login-prompt shadow-4.8/lib/getdef.c
+--- shadow-4.8/lib/getdef.c.login-prompt	2020-01-13 10:38:44.852796681 +0100
++++ shadow-4.8/lib/getdef.c	2020-01-13 10:39:54.472612511 +0100
+@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ static struct itemdef def_table[] = {
+ 	{"LASTLOG_UID_MAX", NULL},
+ 	{"LOGIN_RETRIES", NULL},
+ 	{"LOGIN_TIMEOUT", NULL},
++	{"LOGIN_PLAIN_PROMPT", NULL},
+ 	{"LOG_OK_LOGINS", NULL},
+ 	{"LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB", NULL},
+ 	{"MAIL_DIR", NULL},

shadow-4.8-long-entry.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.8/lib/defines.h.long-entry shadow-4.8/lib/defines.h
+--- shadow-4.8/lib/defines.h.long-entry	2020-01-13 10:29:45.288957339 +0100
++++ shadow-4.8/lib/defines.h	2020-01-13 10:30:47.482902954 +0100
+@@ -388,6 +388,9 @@ extern char *strerror ();
+ # endif
+ #endif
+ 
++/* Maximum length of passwd entry */
++#define PASSWD_ENTRY_MAX_LENGTH 32768
++
+ #ifdef HAVE_SECURE_GETENV
+ #  define shadow_getenv(name) secure_getenv(name)
+ # else
+diff -up shadow-4.8/lib/pwio.c.long-entry shadow-4.8/lib/pwio.c
+--- shadow-4.8/lib/pwio.c.long-entry	2019-07-23 17:26:08.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.8/lib/pwio.c	2020-01-13 10:29:45.288957339 +0100
+@@ -79,7 +79,10 @@ static int passwd_put (const void *ent,
+ 	    || (pw->pw_gid == (gid_t)-1)
+ 	    || (valid_field (pw->pw_gecos, ":\n") == -1)
+ 	    || (valid_field (pw->pw_dir, ":\n") == -1)
+-	    || (valid_field (pw->pw_shell, ":\n") == -1)) {
++	    || (valid_field (pw->pw_shell, ":\n") == -1)
++	    || (strlen (pw->pw_name) + strlen (pw->pw_passwd) +
++	        strlen (pw->pw_gecos) + strlen (pw->pw_dir) +
++	        strlen (pw->pw_shell) + 100 > PASSWD_ENTRY_MAX_LENGTH)) {
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+diff -up shadow-4.8/lib/sgetpwent.c.long-entry shadow-4.8/lib/sgetpwent.c
+--- shadow-4.8/lib/sgetpwent.c.long-entry	2019-10-05 03:23:58.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.8/lib/sgetpwent.c	2020-01-13 10:29:45.288957339 +0100
+@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
+ struct passwd *sgetpwent (const char *buf)
+ {
+ 	static struct passwd pwent;
+-	static char pwdbuf[1024];
++	static char pwdbuf[PASSWD_ENTRY_MAX_LENGTH];
+ 	register int i;
+ 	register char *cp;
+ 	char *fields[NFIELDS];
+@@ -67,8 +67,10 @@ struct passwd *sgetpwent (const char *bu
+ 	 * the password structure remain valid.
+ 	 */
+ 
+-	if (strlen (buf) >= sizeof pwdbuf)
++	if (strlen (buf) >= sizeof pwdbuf) {
++		fprintf (stderr, "Too long passwd entry encountered, file corruption?\n");
+ 		return 0;	/* fail if too long */
++	}
+ 	strcpy (pwdbuf, buf);
+ 
+ 	/*
+diff -up shadow-4.8/lib/sgetspent.c.long-entry shadow-4.8/lib/sgetspent.c
+--- shadow-4.8/lib/sgetspent.c.long-entry	2019-07-23 17:26:08.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.8/lib/sgetspent.c	2020-01-13 10:29:45.289957322 +0100
+@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
+  */
+ struct spwd *sgetspent (const char *string)
+ {
+-	static char spwbuf[1024];
++	static char spwbuf[PASSWD_ENTRY_MAX_LENGTH];
+ 	static struct spwd spwd;
+ 	char *fields[FIELDS];
+ 	char *cp;
+@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ struct spwd *sgetspent (const char *stri
+ 	 */
+ 
+ 	if (strlen (string) >= sizeof spwbuf) {
++		fprintf (stderr, "Too long shadow entry encountered, file corruption?\n");
+ 		return 0;	/* fail if too long */
+ 	}
+ 	strcpy (spwbuf, string);
+diff -up shadow-4.8/lib/shadowio.c.long-entry shadow-4.8/lib/shadowio.c
+--- shadow-4.8/lib/shadowio.c.long-entry	2019-07-23 17:26:08.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.8/lib/shadowio.c	2020-01-13 10:29:45.289957322 +0100
+@@ -79,7 +79,9 @@ static int shadow_put (const void *ent,
+ 
+ 	if (   (NULL == sp)
+ 	    || (valid_field (sp->sp_namp, ":\n") == -1)
+-	    || (valid_field (sp->sp_pwdp, ":\n") == -1)) {
++	    || (valid_field (sp->sp_pwdp, ":\n") == -1)
++	    || (strlen (sp->sp_namp) + strlen (sp->sp_pwdp) +
++	        1000 > PASSWD_ENTRY_MAX_LENGTH)) {
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 

shadow-4.8-selinux-perms.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.8/src/chgpasswd.c.selinux-perms shadow-4.8/src/chgpasswd.c
+--- shadow-4.8/src/chgpasswd.c.selinux-perms	2019-12-01 18:02:43.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.8/src/chgpasswd.c	2020-01-13 10:21:44.558107260 +0100
+@@ -39,6 +39,13 @@
+ #include <pwd.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++#include <selinux/selinux.h>
++#include <selinux/avc.h>
++#endif
++#ifdef WITH_LIBAUDIT
++#include <libaudit.h>
++#endif
+ #ifdef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ #include "pam_defs.h"
+@@ -80,6 +87,9 @@ static bool sgr_locked = false;
+ #endif
+ static bool gr_locked = false;
+ 
++/* The name of the caller */
++static char *myname = NULL;
++
+ /* local function prototypes */
+ static void fail_exit (int code);
+ static /*@noreturn@*/void usage (int status);
+@@ -334,6 +344,63 @@ static void check_perms (void)
+ #endif				/* ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++static int
++log_callback (int type, const char *fmt, ...)
++{
++    int audit_fd;
++    va_list ap;
++
++    va_start(ap, fmt);
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++    audit_fd = audit_open();
++
++    if (audit_fd >= 0) {
++	char *buf;
++
++	if (vasprintf (&buf, fmt, ap) < 0)
++		goto ret;
++	audit_log_user_avc_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AVC, buf, NULL, NULL,
++				   NULL, 0);
++	audit_close(audit_fd);
++	free(buf);
++	goto ret;
++    }
++
++#endif
++    vsyslog (LOG_USER | LOG_INFO, fmt, ap);
++ret:
++    va_end(ap);
++    return 0;
++}
++
++static void
++selinux_check_root (void)
++{
++    int status = -1;
++    security_context_t user_context;
++    union selinux_callback old_callback;
++
++    if (is_selinux_enabled() < 1)
++	return;
++
++    old_callback = selinux_get_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG);
++    /* setup callbacks */
++    selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG, (union selinux_callback) &log_callback);
++    if ((status = getprevcon(&user_context)) < 0) {
++	selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG, old_callback);
++	exit(1);
++    }
++
++    status = selinux_check_access(user_context, user_context, "passwd", "passwd", NULL);
++
++    selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG, old_callback);
++    freecon(user_context);
++    if (status != 0 && security_getenforce() != 0)
++	exit(1);
++}
++#endif
++
+ /*
+  * open_files - lock and open the group databases
+  */
+@@ -427,6 +494,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 
+ 	const struct group *gr;
+ 	struct group newgr;
++	struct passwd *pw = NULL;
+ 	int errors = 0;
+ 	int line = 0;
+ 
+@@ -436,12 +504,37 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 	(void) bindtextdomain (PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
+ 	(void) textdomain (PACKAGE);
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	selinux_check_root ();
++#endif
++
+ 	process_root_flag ("-R", argc, argv);
+ 
+ 	process_flags (argc, argv);
+ 
+ 	OPENLOG ("chgpasswd");
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++	audit_help_open ();
++#endif
++
++	/*
++	 * Determine the name of the user that invoked this command. This
++	 * is really hit or miss because there are so many ways that command
++	 * can be executed and so many ways to trip up the routines that
++	 * report the user name.
++	 */
++	pw = get_my_pwent ();
++	if (NULL == pw) {
++		fprintf (stderr, _("%s: Cannot determine your user name.\n"),
++		         Prog);
++		SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN,
++		         "Cannot determine the user name of the caller (UID %lu)",
++		         (unsigned long) getuid ()));
++		exit (E_NOPERM);
++	}
++	myname = xstrdup (pw->pw_name);
++
+ 	check_perms ();
+ 
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+diff -up shadow-4.8/src/chpasswd.c.selinux-perms shadow-4.8/src/chpasswd.c
+--- shadow-4.8/src/chpasswd.c.selinux-perms	2019-12-01 18:02:43.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.8/src/chpasswd.c	2020-01-13 10:21:44.558107260 +0100
+@@ -39,6 +39,13 @@
+ #include <pwd.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++#include <selinux/selinux.h>
++#include <selinux/avc.h>
++#endif
++#ifdef WITH_LIBAUDIT
++#include <libaudit.h>
++#endif
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ #include "pam_defs.h"
+ #endif				/* USE_PAM */
+@@ -332,6 +339,63 @@ static void check_perms (void)
+ #endif				/* USE_PAM */
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++static int
++log_callback (int type, const char *fmt, ...)
++{
++    int audit_fd;
++    va_list ap;
++
++    va_start(ap, fmt);
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++    audit_fd = audit_open();
++
++    if (audit_fd >= 0) {
++	char *buf;
++
++	if (vasprintf (&buf, fmt, ap) < 0)
++		goto ret;
++	audit_log_user_avc_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AVC, buf, NULL, NULL,
++				   NULL, 0);
++	audit_close(audit_fd);
++	free(buf);
++	goto ret;
++    }
++
++#endif
++    vsyslog (LOG_USER | LOG_INFO, fmt, ap);
++ret:
++    va_end(ap);
++    return 0;
++}
++
++static void
++selinux_check_root (void)
++{
++    int status = -1;
++    security_context_t user_context;
++    union selinux_callback old_callback;
++
++    if (is_selinux_enabled() < 1)
++	return;
++
++    old_callback = selinux_get_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG);
++    /* setup callbacks */
++    selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG, (union selinux_callback) &log_callback);
++    if ((status = getprevcon(&user_context)) < 0) {
++	selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG, old_callback);
++	exit(1);
++    }
++
++    status = selinux_check_access(user_context, user_context, "passwd", "passwd", NULL);
++
++    selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG, old_callback);
++    freecon(user_context);
++    if (status != 0 && security_getenforce() != 0)
++	exit(1);
++}
++#endif
++
+ /*
+  * open_files - lock and open the password databases
+  */
+@@ -428,6 +492,10 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 	(void) bindtextdomain (PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
+ 	(void) textdomain (PACKAGE);
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	selinux_check_root ();
++#endif
++
+ 	process_root_flag ("-R", argc, argv);
+ 
+ 	process_flags (argc, argv);
+@@ -440,6 +508,10 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 
+ 	OPENLOG ("chpasswd");
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++	audit_help_open ();
++#endif
++
+ 	check_perms ();
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM

shadow-4.9-default-range.patch

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/semanage.c.default-range shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/semanage.c
---- shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/semanage.c.default-range	2012-01-08 17:35:44.000000000 +0100
-+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/semanage.c	2013-06-14 15:14:51.970237594 +0200
+diff -up shadow-4.9/lib/semanage.c.default-range shadow-4.9/lib/semanage.c
+--- shadow-4.9/lib/semanage.c.default-range	2021-07-22 23:55:35.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.9/lib/semanage.c	2021-08-02 12:43:16.822817392 +0200
 @@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ static int semanage_user_mod (semanage_h
  		goto done;
  	}
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/semanage.c.default-range shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/semanage
 +#if 0
  	ret = semanage_seuser_set_mlsrange (handle, seuser, DEFAULT_SERANGE);
  	if (ret != 0) {
- 		fprintf (stderr,
+ 		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 @@ -150,6 +151,7 @@ static int semanage_user_mod (semanage_h
  		ret = 1;
  		goto done;
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ diff -up shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/semanage.c.default-range shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/semanage
 +#if 0
  	ret = semanage_seuser_set_mlsrange (handle, seuser, DEFAULT_SERANGE);
  	if (ret != 0) {
- 		fprintf (stderr,
+ 		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 @@ -208,6 +211,7 @@ static int semanage_user_add (semanage_h
  		ret = 1;
  		goto done;

shadow-4.9-manfix.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.8.1/man/groupmems.8.xml.manfix shadow-4.8.1/man/groupmems.8.xml
+--- shadow-4.8.1/man/groupmems.8.xml.manfix	2020-03-17 15:34:48.750414984 +0100
++++ shadow-4.8.1/man/groupmems.8.xml	2020-03-17 15:41:13.383588722 +0100
+@@ -179,20 +179,10 @@
+   <refsect1 id='setup'>
+     <title>SETUP</title>
+     <para>
+-      The <command>groupmems</command> executable should be in mode
+-      <literal>2710</literal> as user <emphasis>root</emphasis> and in group
+-      <emphasis>groups</emphasis>. The system administrator can add users to
+-      group <emphasis>groups</emphasis> to allow or disallow them using the
+-      <command>groupmems</command> utility to manage their own group
+-      membership list.
++      In this operating system the <command>groupmems</command> executable
++      is not setuid and regular users cannot use it to manipulate
++      the membership of their own group.
+     </para>
+-
+-    <programlisting>
+-	$ groupadd -r groups
+-	$ chmod 2710 groupmems
+-	$ chown root.groups groupmems
+-	$ groupmems -g groups -a gk4
+-    </programlisting>
+   </refsect1>
+ 
+   <refsect1 id='configuration'>
+diff -up shadow-4.8.1/man/ja/man5/login.defs.5.manfix shadow-4.8.1/man/ja/man5/login.defs.5
+--- shadow-4.8.1/man/ja/man5/login.defs.5.manfix	2019-07-23 17:26:08.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.8.1/man/ja/man5/login.defs.5	2020-03-17 15:34:48.750414984 +0100
+@@ -147,10 +147,6 @@ 以下の参照表は、
+ shadow パスワード機能のどのプログラムが
+ どのパラメータを使用するかを示したものである。
+ .na
+-.IP chfn 12
+-CHFN_AUTH CHFN_RESTRICT
+-.IP chsh 12
+-CHFN_AUTH
+ .IP groupadd 12
+ GID_MAX GID_MIN
+ .IP newusers 12
+diff -up shadow-4.8.1/man/login.defs.5.xml.manfix shadow-4.8.1/man/login.defs.5.xml
+--- shadow-4.8.1/man/login.defs.5.xml.manfix	2020-01-17 16:47:56.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.8.1/man/login.defs.5.xml	2020-03-17 15:34:48.750414984 +0100
+@@ -164,6 +164,17 @@
+       long numeric parameters is machine-dependent.
+     </para>
+ 
++    <para>
++      Please note that the parameters in this configuration file control the
++      behavior of the tools from the shadow-utils component. None of these
++      tools uses the PAM mechanism, and the utilities that use PAM (such as the
++      passwd command) should be configured elsewhere. The only values that
++      affect PAM modules are <emphasis>ENCRYPT_METHOD</emphasis> and <emphasis>SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS</emphasis>
++      for pam_unix module, <emphasis>FAIL_DELAY</emphasis> for pam_faildelay module,
++      and <emphasis>UMASK</emphasis> for pam_umask module. Refer to
++      pam(8) for more information.
++    </para>
++
+     <para>The following configuration items are provided:</para>
+ 
+     <variablelist remap='IP'>
+@@ -256,16 +267,6 @@
+ 	</listitem>
+       </varlistentry>
+       <varlistentry>
+-	<term>chfn</term>
+-	<listitem>
+-	  <para>
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">CHFN_AUTH</phrase>
+-	    CHFN_RESTRICT
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">LOGIN_STRING</phrase>
+-	  </para>
+-	</listitem>
+-      </varlistentry>
+-      <varlistentry>
+ 	<term>chgpasswd</term>
+ 	<listitem>
+ 	  <para>
+@@ -286,14 +287,6 @@
+ 	  </para>
+ 	</listitem>
+       </varlistentry>
+-      <varlistentry condition="no_pam">
+-	<term>chsh</term>
+-	<listitem>
+-	  <para>
+-	    CHSH_AUTH LOGIN_STRING
+-	  </para>
+-	</listitem>
+-      </varlistentry>
+       <!-- expiry: no variables (CONSOLE_GROUPS linked, but not used) -->
+       <!-- faillog: no variables -->
+       <varlistentry>
+@@ -359,34 +352,6 @@
+ 	  <para>LASTLOG_UID_MAX</para>
+ 	</listitem>
+       </varlistentry>
+-      <varlistentry>
+-	<term>login</term>
+-	<listitem>
+-	  <para>
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">CONSOLE</phrase>
+-	    CONSOLE_GROUPS DEFAULT_HOME
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">ENV_HZ ENV_PATH ENV_SUPATH
+-	    ENV_TZ ENVIRON_FILE</phrase>
+-	    ERASECHAR FAIL_DELAY
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">FAILLOG_ENAB</phrase>
+-	    FAKE_SHELL
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">FTMP_FILE</phrase>
+-	    HUSHLOGIN_FILE
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">ISSUE_FILE</phrase>
+-	    KILLCHAR
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">LASTLOG_ENAB LASTLOG_UID_MAX</phrase>
+-	    LOGIN_RETRIES
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">LOGIN_STRING</phrase>
+-	    LOGIN_TIMEOUT LOG_OK_LOGINS LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">MAIL_CHECK_ENAB MAIL_DIR MAIL_FILE
+-	    MOTD_FILE NOLOGINS_FILE PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB
+-	    QUOTAS_ENAB</phrase>
+-	    TTYGROUP TTYPERM TTYTYPE_FILE
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">ULIMIT UMASK</phrase>
+-	    USERGROUPS_ENAB
+-	  </para>
+-	</listitem>
+-      </varlistentry>
+       <!-- logoutd: no variables -->
+       <varlistentry>
+ 	<term>newgrp / sg</term>
+@@ -415,17 +380,6 @@
+ 	</listitem>
+       </varlistentry>
+       <!-- nologin: no variables -->
+-      <varlistentry condition="no_pam">
+-	<term>passwd</term>
+-	<listitem>
+-	  <para>
+-	    ENCRYPT_METHOD MD5_CRYPT_ENAB OBSCURE_CHECKS_ENAB
+-	    PASS_ALWAYS_WARN PASS_CHANGE_TRIES PASS_MAX_LEN PASS_MIN_LEN
+-	    <phrase condition="sha_crypt">SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS
+-	    SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS</phrase>
+-	  </para>
+-	</listitem>
+-      </varlistentry>
+       <varlistentry>
+ 	<term>pwck</term>
+ 	<listitem>
+@@ -452,32 +406,6 @@
+ 	  </para>
+ 	</listitem>
+       </varlistentry>
+-      <varlistentry>
+-	<term>su</term>
+-	<listitem>
+-	  <para>
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">CONSOLE</phrase>
+-	    CONSOLE_GROUPS DEFAULT_HOME
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">ENV_HZ ENVIRON_FILE</phrase>
+-	    ENV_PATH ENV_SUPATH
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">ENV_TZ LOGIN_STRING MAIL_CHECK_ENAB
+-	    MAIL_DIR MAIL_FILE QUOTAS_ENAB</phrase>
+-	    SULOG_FILE SU_NAME
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">SU_WHEEL_ONLY</phrase>
+-	    SYSLOG_SU_ENAB
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">USERGROUPS_ENAB</phrase>
+-	  </para>
+-	</listitem>
+-      </varlistentry>
+-      <varlistentry>
+-	<term>sulogin</term>
+-	<listitem>
+-	  <para>
+-	    ENV_HZ
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">ENV_TZ</phrase>
+-	  </para>
+-	</listitem>
+-      </varlistentry>
+       <varlistentry>
+ 	<term>useradd</term>
+ 	<listitem>

shadow-4.9-nss-get-shadow-logfd-with-log-get-logfd.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From e101219ad71de11da3fdd1b3ec2620fd1a97b92c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 10 Jan 2022 15:30:28 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] nss: get shadow_logfd with log_get_logfd()
+
+If /etc/nsswitch.conf doesn't exist podman crashes because shadow_logfd
+is NULL. In order to avoid that load the log file descriptor with the
+log_get_logfd() helper function.
+
+Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2038811
+
+Signed-off-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
+---
+ lib/nss.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/nss.c b/lib/nss.c
+index 02742902..06fa48e5 100644
+--- a/lib/nss.c
++++ b/lib/nss.c
+@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
+ #include "prototypes.h"
+ #include "../libsubid/subid.h"
+ #include "shadowlog_internal.h"
++#include "shadowlog.h"
+ 
+ #define NSSWITCH "/etc/nsswitch.conf"
+ 
+@@ -42,6 +43,7 @@ void nss_init(const char *nsswitch_path) {
+ 	FILE *nssfp = NULL;
+ 	char *line = NULL, *p, *token, *saveptr;
+ 	size_t len = 0;
++	FILE *shadow_logfd = log_get_logfd();
+ 
+ 	if (atomic_flag_test_and_set(&nss_init_started)) {
+ 		// Another thread has started nss_init, wait for it to complete
+@@ -57,7 +59,7 @@ void nss_init(const char *nsswitch_path) {
+ 	//   subid:	files
+ 	nssfp = fopen(nsswitch_path, "r");
+ 	if (!nssfp) {
+-		fprintf(shadow_logfd, "Failed opening %s: %m", nsswitch_path);
++		fprintf(shadow_logfd, "Failed opening %s: %m\n", nsswitch_path);
+ 		atomic_store(&nss_init_completed, true);
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+-- 
+2.34.1
+

shadow-bsd.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1990 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
+ * Copyright (c) 1996 - 2000, Marek Michałkiewicz
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 - 2006, Tomasz Kłoczko
+ * Copyright (c) 2007 - 2011, Nicolas François
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
+ * PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+ * HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+ * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+

shadow-utils.HOME_MODE.xml

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+<!--
+   Copyright (c) 1991 - 1993, Julianne Frances Haugh
+   Copyright (c) 1991 - 1993, Chip Rosenthal
+   Copyright (c) 2007 - 2009, Nicolas François
+   All rights reserved.
+  
+   Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+   modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+   are met:
+   1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+      notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+   2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+      notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+      documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+   3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
+      endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+      specific prior written permission.
+  
+   THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+   ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+   LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
+   PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+   HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+   SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+   LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+   DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+   THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+   (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+   OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+-->
+<varlistentry>
+  <term><option>HOME_MODE</option> (number)</term>
+  <listitem>
+    <para>
+      The mode for new home directories. If not specified,
+      the <option>UMASK</option> is used to create the mode.
+    </para>
+    <para>
+      <command>useradd</command> and <command>newusers</command> use this
+      to set the mode of the home directory they create.
+    </para>
+  </listitem>
+</varlistentry>

shadow-utils.login.defs

@@ -6,15 +6,121 @@
 # /etc/pam.d/system-auth for more information.
 #
 
+#
+# Delay in seconds before being allowed another attempt after a login failure
+# Note: When PAM is used, some modules may enforce a minimum delay (e.g.
+#       pam_unix(8) enforces a 2s delay)
+#
+#FAIL_DELAY		3
+
+# Currently FAILLOG_ENAB is not supported
+
+#
+# Enable display of unknown usernames when login(1) failures are recorded.
+#
+#LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB	no
+
+# Currently LOG_OK_LOGINS is not supported
+
+# Currently LASTLOG_ENAB is not supported
+
+#
+# Limit the highest user ID number for which the lastlog entries should
+# be updated.
+#
+# No LASTLOG_UID_MAX means that there is no user ID limit for writing
+# lastlog entries.
+#
+#LASTLOG_UID_MAX
+
+# Currently MAIL_CHECK_ENAB is not supported
+
+# Currently OBSCURE_CHECKS_ENAB is not supported
+
+# Currently PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB is not supported
+
+# Currently QUOTAS_ENAB is not supported
+
+# Currently SYSLOG_SU_ENAB is not supported
+
+#
+# Enable "syslog" logging of newgrp(1) and sg(1) activity.
+#
+#SYSLOG_SG_ENAB		yes
+
+# Currently CONSOLE is not supported
+
+# Currently SULOG_FILE is not supported
+
+# Currently MOTD_FILE is not supported
+
+# Currently ISSUE_FILE is not supported
+
+# Currently TTYTYPE_FILE is not supported
+
+# Currently FTMP_FILE is not supported
+
+# Currently NOLOGINS_FILE is not supported
+
+# Currently SU_NAME is not supported
+
 # *REQUIRED*
 #   Directory where mailboxes reside, _or_ name of file, relative to the
 #   home directory.  If you _do_ define both, MAIL_DIR takes precedence.
-#   QMAIL_DIR is for Qmail
 #
-#QMAIL_DIR	Maildir
 MAIL_DIR	/var/spool/mail
 #MAIL_FILE	.mail
 
+#
+# If defined, file which inhibits all the usual chatter during the login
+# sequence.  If a full pathname, then hushed mode will be enabled if the
+# user's name or shell are found in the file.  If not a full pathname, then
+# hushed mode will be enabled if the file exists in the user's home directory.
+#
+#HUSHLOGIN_FILE	.hushlogin
+#HUSHLOGIN_FILE	/etc/hushlogins
+
+# Currently ENV_TZ is not supported
+
+# Currently ENV_HZ is not supported
+
+#
+# The default PATH settings, for superuser and normal users.
+#
+# (they are minimal, add the rest in the shell startup files)
+#ENV_SUPATH	PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin
+#ENV_PATH	PATH=/bin:/usr/bin
+
+#
+# Terminal permissions
+#
+#	TTYGROUP	Login tty will be assigned this group ownership.
+#	TTYPERM		Login tty will be set to this permission.
+#
+# If you have a write(1) program which is "setgid" to a special group
+# which owns the terminals, define TTYGROUP as the number of such group
+# and TTYPERM as 0620.  Otherwise leave TTYGROUP commented out and
+# set TTYPERM to either 622 or 600.
+#
+#TTYGROUP	tty
+#TTYPERM		0600
+
+# Currently ERASECHAR, KILLCHAR and ULIMIT are not supported
+
+# Default initial "umask" value used by login(1) on non-PAM enabled systems.
+# Default "umask" value for pam_umask(8) on PAM enabled systems.
+# UMASK is also used by useradd(8) and newusers(8) to set the mode for new
+# home directories if HOME_MODE is not set.
+# 022 is the default value, but 027, or even 077, could be considered
+# for increased privacy. There is no One True Answer here: each sysadmin
+# must make up their mind.
+UMASK		022
+
+# HOME_MODE is used by useradd(8) and newusers(8) to set the mode for new
+# home directories.
+# If HOME_MODE is not set, the value of UMASK is used to create the mode.
+HOME_MODE	0700
+
 # Password aging controls:
 #
 #	PASS_MAX_DAYS	Maximum number of days a password may be used.
@@ -24,26 +130,132 @@ MAIL_DIR	/var/spool/mail
 #
 PASS_MAX_DAYS	99999
 PASS_MIN_DAYS	0
-PASS_MIN_LEN	5
 PASS_WARN_AGE	7
 
+# Currently PASS_MIN_LEN is not supported
+
+# Currently SU_WHEEL_ONLY is not supported
+
+# Currently CRACKLIB_DICTPATH is not supported
+
 #
-# Min/max values for automatic uid selection in useradd
+# Min/max values for automatic uid selection in useradd(8)
 #
 UID_MIN                  1000
 UID_MAX                 60000
 # System accounts
 SYS_UID_MIN               201
 SYS_UID_MAX               999
+# Extra per user uids
+SUB_UID_MIN		   100000
+SUB_UID_MAX		600100000
+SUB_UID_COUNT		    65536
 
 #
-# Min/max values for automatic gid selection in groupadd
+# Min/max values for automatic gid selection in groupadd(8)
 #
 GID_MIN                  1000
 GID_MAX                 60000
 # System accounts
 SYS_GID_MIN               201
 SYS_GID_MAX               999
+# Extra per user group ids
+SUB_GID_MIN		   100000
+SUB_GID_MAX		600100000
+SUB_GID_COUNT		    65536
+
+#
+# Max number of login(1) retries if password is bad
+#
+#LOGIN_RETRIES		3
+
+#
+# Max time in seconds for login(1)
+#
+#LOGIN_TIMEOUT		60
+
+# Currently PASS_CHANGE_TRIES is not supported
+
+# Currently PASS_ALWAYS_WARN is not supported
+
+# Currently PASS_MAX_LEN is not supported
+
+# Currently CHFN_AUTH is not supported
+
+#
+# Which fields may be changed by regular users using chfn(1) - use
+# any combination of letters "frwh" (full name, room number, work
+# phone, home phone).  If not defined, no changes are allowed.
+# For backward compatibility, "yes" = "rwh" and "no" = "frwh".
+# 
+#CHFN_RESTRICT		rwh
+
+# Currently LOGIN_STRING is not supported
+
+# Currently MD5_CRYPT_ENAB is not supported
+
+#
+# If set to MD5, MD5-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
+# If set to SHA256, SHA256-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
+# If set to SHA512, SHA512-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
+# If set to BCRYPT, BCRYPT-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
+# If set to YESCRYPT, YESCRYPT-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
+# If set to DES, DES-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password (default)
+#
+ENCRYPT_METHOD YESCRYPT
+
+#
+# Only works if ENCRYPT_METHOD is set to SHA256 or SHA512.
+#
+# Define the number of SHA rounds.
+# With a lot of rounds, it is more difficult to brute-force the password.
+# However, more CPU resources will be needed to authenticate users if
+# this value is increased.
+#
+# If not specified, the libc will choose the default number of rounds (5000).
+# The values must be within the 1000-999999999 range.
+#
+#SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS 5000
+
+# Currently SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS is not supported
+
+#
+# Only works if ENCRYPT_METHOD is set to BCRYPT.
+#
+# Define the number of BCRYPT rounds.
+# With a lot of rounds, it is more difficult to brute-force the password.
+# However, more CPU resources will be needed to authenticate users if
+# this value is increased.
+#
+# If not specified, 13 rounds will be attempted.
+# If only one of the MIN or MAX values is set, then this value will be used.
+# If MIN > MAX, the highest value will be used.
+#
+#BCRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS 13
+#BCRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS 31
+
+#
+# Only works if ENCRYPT_METHOD is set to YESCRYPT.
+#
+# Define the YESCRYPT cost factor.
+# With a higher cost factor, it is more difficult to brute-force the password.
+# However, more CPU time and more memory will be needed to authenticate users
+# if this value is increased.
+#
+# If not specified, a cost factor of 5 will be used.
+# The value must be within the 1-11 range.
+#
+#YESCRYPT_COST_FACTOR 5
+
+# Currently CONSOLE_GROUPS is not supported
+
+#
+# Should login be allowed if we can't cd to the home directory?
+# Default is yes.
+#
+#DEFAULT_HOME	yes
+
+# Currently ENVIRON_FILE is not supported
 
 #
 # If defined, this command is run when removing a user.
@@ -53,20 +265,41 @@ SYS_GID_MAX               999
 #USERDEL_CMD	/usr/sbin/userdel_local
 
 #
-# If useradd should create home directories for users by default
-# On RH systems, we do. This option is overridden with the -m flag on
-# useradd command line.
-#
-CREATE_HOME	yes
-
-# The permission mask is initialized to this value. If not specified, 
-# the permission mask will be initialized to 022.
-UMASK           077
-
-# This enables userdel to remove user groups if no members exist.
+# Enables userdel(8) to remove user groups if no members exist.
 #
 USERGROUPS_ENAB yes
 
-# Use SHA512 to encrypt password.
-ENCRYPT_METHOD SHA512 
+#
+# If set to a non-zero number, the shadow utilities will make sure that
+# groups never have more than this number of users on one line.
+# This permits to support split groups (groups split into multiple lines,
+# with the same group ID, to avoid limitation of the line length in the
+# group file).
+#
+# 0 is the default value and disables this feature.
+#
+#MAX_MEMBERS_PER_GROUP	0
 
+#
+# If useradd(8) should create home directories for users by default (non
+# system users only).
+# This option is overridden with the -M or -m flags on the useradd(8)
+# command-line.
+#
+CREATE_HOME	yes
+
+#
+# Force use shadow, even if shadow passwd & shadow group files are
+# missing.
+#
+#FORCE_SHADOW    yes
+
+#
+# Select the HMAC cryptography algorithm.
+# Used in pam_timestamp module to calculate the keyed-hash message
+# authentication code.
+#
+# Note: It is recommended to check hmac(3) to see the possible algorithms
+# that are available in your system.
+#
+HMAC_CRYPTO_ALGO SHA512

shadow-utils.spec

@@ -1,44 +1,79 @@
 Summary: Utilities for managing accounts and shadow password files
 Name: shadow-utils
-Version: 4.1.5.1
-Release: 15%{?dist}
+Version: 4.11.1
+Release: 4%{?dist}
 Epoch: 2
-URL: http://pkg-shadow.alioth.debian.org/
-Source0: http://pkg-shadow.alioth.debian.org/releases/shadow-%{version}.tar.bz2
-Source3: http://pkg-shadow.alioth.debian.org/releases/shadow-%{version}.tar.bz2.sig
-Source1: shadow-utils.login.defs
-Source2: shadow-utils.useradd
-Patch0: shadow-4.1.5-redhat.patch
-Patch1: shadow-4.1.5.1-goodname.patch
-Patch2: shadow-4.1.5.1-info-parent-dir.patch
-Patch3: shadow-4.1.5-uflg.patch
-Patch6: shadow-4.1.5.1-selinux.patch
-Patch7: shadow-4.1.5-2ndskip.patch
-Patch8: shadow-4.1.5.1-backup-mode.patch
-Patch9: shadow-4.1.5.1-merge-group.patch
-Patch10: shadow-4.1.5.1-orig-context.patch
-Patch11: shadow-4.1.5.1-logmsg.patch
-Patch12: shadow-4.1.5.1-errmsg.patch
-Patch13: shadow-4.1.5.1-audit-owner.patch
-Patch14: shadow-4.1.5.1-default-range.patch
-Patch15: shadow-4.1.5.1-manfix.patch
-Patch16: shadow-4.1.5.1-crypt-null.patch
-Patch17: shadow-4.1.5.1-userdel-helpfix.patch
-Patch18: shadow-4.1.5.1-group-alloc.patch
-
 License: BSD and GPLv2+
-Group: System Environment/Base
-BuildRequires: libselinux-devel >= 1.25.2-1
-BuildRequires: audit-libs-devel >= 1.6.5
-BuildRequires: libsemanage-devel
-BuildRequires: libacl-devel libattr-devel
-#BuildRequires: autoconf, automake, libtool, gettext-devel
-Requires: libselinux >= 1.25.2-1
+URL: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow
+Source0: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases/download/v%{version}/shadow-%{version}.tar.xz
+Source1: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases/download/v%{version}/shadow-%{version}.tar.xz.asc
+Source2: shadow-utils.useradd
+Source3: shadow-utils.login.defs
+Source4: shadow-bsd.txt
+Source5: https://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/gpl-2.0.txt
+Source6: shadow-utils.HOME_MODE.xml
+
+### Globals ###
+%global includesubiddir %{_includedir}/shadow
+
+### Patches ###
+# Misc small changes - most probably non-upstreamable
+Patch0: shadow-4.11.1-redhat.patch
+# Be more lenient with acceptable user/group names - non upstreamable
+Patch1: shadow-4.8-goodname.patch
+# SElinux related - upstreamability unknown
+Patch3: shadow-4.9-default-range.patch
+# Misc manual page changes - non-upstreamable
+Patch4: shadow-4.9-manfix.patch
+# Date parsing improvement - could be upstreamed
+Patch5: shadow-4.2.1-date-parsing.patch
+# Additional error message - could be upstreamed
+Patch6: shadow-4.6-move-home.patch
+# Audit message changes - upstreamability unknown
+Patch7: shadow-4.11.1-audit-update.patch
+# Changes related to password unlocking - could be upstreamed
+Patch8: shadow-4.5-usermod-unlock.patch
+# Additional SElinux related changes - upstreamability unknown
+Patch9: shadow-4.8-selinux-perms.patch
+# Handle NULL return from *time funcs - upstreamable
+Patch10: shadow-4.11.1-null-tm.patch
+# Handle /etc/passwd corruption - could be upstreamed
+Patch11: shadow-4.8-long-entry.patch
+# Limit uid/gid allocation to non-zero - could be upstreamed
+Patch12: shadow-4.6-sysugid-min-limit.patch
+# Ignore LOGIN_PLAIN_PROMPT in login.defs - upstreamability unknown
+Patch13: shadow-4.8-ignore-login-prompt.patch
+# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/e101219ad71de11da3fdd1b3ec2620fd1a97b92c
+Patch14: shadow-4.9-nss-get-shadow-logfd-with-log-get-logfd.patch
+# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/f1f1678e13aa3ae49bdb139efaa2c5bc53dcfe92
+Patch15: shadow-4.11.1-useradd-modify-check-ID-range-for-system-users.patch
+
+### Dependencies ###
 Requires: audit-libs >= 1.6.5
+Requires: libselinux >= 1.25.2-1
 Requires: setup
-Requires(pre): coreutils
-Requires(post): coreutils
-Buildroot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-%{release}-root-%(%{__id_u} -n)
+
+### Build Dependencies ###
+BuildRequires: audit-libs-devel >= 1.6.5
+BuildRequires: autoconf
+BuildRequires: automake
+BuildRequires: bison
+BuildRequires: docbook-dtds
+BuildRequires: docbook-style-xsl
+BuildRequires: flex
+BuildRequires: gcc
+BuildRequires: gettext-devel
+BuildRequires: itstool
+BuildRequires: libacl-devel
+BuildRequires: libattr-devel
+BuildRequires: libselinux-devel >= 1.25.2-1
+BuildRequires: libsemanage-devel
+BuildRequires: libtool
+BuildRequires: libxslt
+BuildRequires: make
+
+### Provides ###
+Provides: shadow = %{epoch}:%{version}-%{release}
 
 %description
 The shadow-utils package includes the necessary programs for
@@ -52,38 +87,52 @@ for all users. The useradd, userdel, and usermod commands are used for
 managing user accounts. The groupadd, groupdel, and groupmod commands
 are used for managing group accounts.
 
+
+### Subpackages ###
+%package subid
+Summary: A library to manage subordinate uid and gid ranges
+License: BSD and GPLv2+
+
+%description subid
+Utility library that provides a way to manage subid ranges.
+
+
+%package subid-devel
+Summary: Development package for shadow-utils-subid
+License: BSD and GPLv2+
+Requires: shadow-utils-subid = %{epoch}:%{version}-%{release}
+
+%description subid-devel
+Development files for shadow-utils-subid.
+
 %prep
 %setup -q -n shadow-%{version}
 %patch0 -p1 -b .redhat
 %patch1 -p1 -b .goodname
-%patch2 -p1 -b .info-parent-dir
-%patch3 -p1 -b .uflg
-%patch6 -p1 -b .selinux
-%patch7 -p1 -b .2ndskip
-%patch8 -p1 -b .backup-mode
-%patch9 -p1 -b .merge-group
-%patch10 -p1 -b .orig-context
-%patch11 -p1 -b .logmsg
-%patch12 -p1 -b .errmsg
-%patch13 -p1 -b .audit-owner
-%patch14 -p1 -b .default-range
-%patch15 -p1 -b .manfix
-%patch16 -p1 -b .crypt-null
-%patch17 -p1 -b .userdel
-%patch18 -p1 -b .group-alloc
+%patch3 -p1 -b .default-range
+%patch4 -p1 -b .manfix
+%patch5 -p1 -b .date-parsing
+%patch6 -p1 -b .move-home
+%patch7 -p1 -b .audit-update
+%patch8 -p1 -b .unlock
+%patch9 -p1 -b .selinux-perms
+%patch10 -p1 -b .null-tm
+%patch11 -p1 -b .long-entry
+%patch12 -p1 -b .sysugid-min-limit
+%patch13 -p1 -b .login-prompt
+%patch14 -p1 -b .nss-get-shadow-logfd-with-log-get-logfd
+%patch15 -p1 -b .useradd-modify-check-ID-range-for-system-users
 
 iconv -f ISO88591 -t utf-8  doc/HOWTO > doc/HOWTO.utf8
 cp -f doc/HOWTO.utf8 doc/HOWTO
 
-#rm po/*.gmo
-#rm po/stamp-po
-#aclocal
-#libtoolize --force
-#automake -a
-#autoconf
+cp -a %{SOURCE4} %{SOURCE5} .
+cp -a %{SOURCE6} man/login.defs.d/HOME_MODE.xml
+
+# Force regeneration of getdate.c
+rm libmisc/getdate.c
 
 %build
-
 %ifarch sparc64
 #sparc64 need big PIE
 export CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS -fPIE"
@@ -93,82 +142,81 @@ export CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS -fpie"
 export LDFLAGS="-pie -Wl,-z,relro -Wl,-z,now"
 %endif
 
+autoreconf
 %configure \
         --enable-shadowgrp \
+        --enable-man \
         --with-audit \
         --with-sha-crypt \
+        --with-bcrypt \
+        --with-yescrypt \
         --with-selinux \
         --without-libcrack \
         --without-libpam \
-        --disable-shared \
+        --enable-shared \
         --with-group-name-max-length=32
-make
+%make_build
 
 %install
-rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
-make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT gnulocaledir=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_datadir}/locale MKINSTALLDIRS=`pwd`/mkinstalldirs
-install -d -m 755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sysconfdir}/default
-install -p -c -m 0644 %{SOURCE1} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sysconfdir}/login.defs
-install -p -c -m 0600 %{SOURCE2} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sysconfdir}/default/useradd
+%make_install gnulocaledir=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/locale MKINSTALLDIRS=`pwd`/mkinstalldirs
+install -d -m 755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/default
+install -p -c -m 0644 %{SOURCE3} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/login.defs
+install -p -c -m 0600 %{SOURCE2} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/default/useradd
 
 
 ln -s useradd $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sbindir}/adduser
-#ln -s %{_mandir}/man8/useradd.8 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man8/adduser.8
-ln -s useradd.8 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man8/adduser.8
-for subdir in $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/{??,??_??,??_??.*}/man* ; do
+ln -s useradd.8 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man8/adduser.8
+for subdir in $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/{??,??_??,??_??.*}/man* ; do
         test -d $subdir && test -e $subdir/useradd.8 && echo ".so man8/useradd.8" > $subdir/adduser.8
 done
 
 # Remove binaries we don't use.
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/chfn
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/chsh
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/expiry
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/groups
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/login
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/passwd
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/su
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/faillog
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sysconfdir}/login.access
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sysconfdir}/limits
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sbindir}/logoutd
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sbindir}/nologin
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sbindir}/chgpasswd
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man1/chfn.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man1/chfn.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man1/chsh.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man1/chsh.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man1/expiry.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man1/expiry.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man1/groups.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man1/groups.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man1/login.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man1/login.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man1/passwd.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man1/passwd.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man1/su.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man1/su.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man5/limits.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man5/limits.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man5/login.access.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man5/login.access.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man5/passwd.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man5/passwd.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man5/porttime.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man5/porttime.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man5/suauth.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man5/suauth.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man8/logoutd.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man8/logoutd.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man8/nologin.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man8/nologin.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man8/chgpasswd.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man8/chgpasswd.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man3/getspnam.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man3/getspnam.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man5/faillog.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man5/faillog.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man8/faillog.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man8/faillog.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/chfn
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/chsh
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/expiry
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/groups
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/login
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/passwd
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/su
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/faillog
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/login.access
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/limits
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sbindir}/logoutd
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sbindir}/nologin
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/chfn.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man1/chfn.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/chsh.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man1/chsh.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/expiry.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man1/expiry.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/groups.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man1/groups.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/login.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man1/login.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/passwd.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man1/passwd.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/su.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man1/su.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man5/limits.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man5/limits.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man5/login.access.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man5/login.access.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man5/passwd.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man5/passwd.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man5/porttime.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man5/porttime.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man5/suauth.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man5/suauth.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man8/logoutd.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man8/logoutd.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man8/nologin.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man8/nologin.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man3/getspnam.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man3/getspnam.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man5/faillog.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man5/faillog.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man8/faillog.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man8/faillog.*
 
 find $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir} -depth -type d -empty -delete
 %find_lang shadow
@@ -180,12 +228,18 @@ for dir in $(ls -1d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/{??,??_??}) ; do
     echo "%%lang($lang) $dir/man*/*" >> shadow.lang
 done
 
-%clean
-rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
+# Move header files to its own folder
+echo $(ls)
+mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{includesubiddir}
+install -m 644 libsubid/subid.h $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{includesubiddir}/
+
+# Remove .la and .a files created by libsubid
+rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/libsubid.la
+rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/libsubid.a
 
 %files -f shadow.lang
-%defattr(-,root,root)
 %doc NEWS doc/HOWTO README
+%license gpl-2.0.txt shadow-bsd.txt
 %attr(0644,root,root)   %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/login.defs
 %attr(0644,root,root)   %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/default/useradd
 %{_bindir}/sg
@@ -193,13 +247,16 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
 %attr(4755,root,root) %{_bindir}/gpasswd
 %{_bindir}/lastlog
 %attr(4755,root,root) %{_bindir}/newgrp
+%attr(0755,root,root) %caps(cap_setgid=ep) %{_bindir}/newgidmap
+%attr(0755,root,root) %caps(cap_setuid=ep) %{_bindir}/newuidmap
 %{_sbindir}/adduser
-%attr(0750,root,root)   %{_sbindir}/user*
-%attr(0750,root,root)   %{_sbindir}/group*
+%attr(0755,root,root)   %{_sbindir}/user*
+%attr(0755,root,root)   %{_sbindir}/group*
 %{_sbindir}/grpck
 %{_sbindir}/pwck
 %{_sbindir}/*conv
 %{_sbindir}/chpasswd
+%{_sbindir}/chgpasswd
 %{_sbindir}/newusers
 %{_sbindir}/vipw
 %{_sbindir}/vigr
@@ -207,23 +264,353 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
 %{_mandir}/man1/gpasswd.1*
 %{_mandir}/man1/sg.1*
 %{_mandir}/man1/newgrp.1*
+%{_mandir}/man1/newgidmap.1*
+%{_mandir}/man1/newuidmap.1*
 %{_mandir}/man3/shadow.3*
 %{_mandir}/man5/shadow.5*
 %{_mandir}/man5/login.defs.5*
 %{_mandir}/man5/gshadow.5*
+%{_mandir}/man5/subuid.5*
+%{_mandir}/man5/subgid.5*
 %{_mandir}/man8/adduser.8*
 %{_mandir}/man8/group*.8*
 %{_mandir}/man8/user*.8*
 %{_mandir}/man8/pwck.8*
 %{_mandir}/man8/grpck.8*
 %{_mandir}/man8/chpasswd.8*
+%{_mandir}/man8/chgpasswd.8*
 %{_mandir}/man8/newusers.8*
 %{_mandir}/man8/*conv.8*
 %{_mandir}/man8/lastlog.8*
 %{_mandir}/man8/vipw.8*
 %{_mandir}/man8/vigr.8*
 
+%files subid
+%{_libdir}/libsubid.so.*
+%{_bindir}/getsubids
+%{_mandir}/man1/getsubids.1*
+
+%files subid-devel
+%{includesubiddir}/subid.h
+%{_libdir}/libsubid.so
+
 %changelog
+* Mon Aug  1 2022 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.11.1-4
+- useradd: modify check ID range for system users. Resolves: #2093692
+
+* Sat Jul 23 2022 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.11.1-3
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_37_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Thu Feb 10 2022 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.11.1-2
+- Fix explicit subid requirement for subid-devel
+
+* Tue Jan 25 2022 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.11.1-1
+- Rebase to version 4.11.1 (#2034038)
+- Fix release sources
+- Add explicit subid requirement for subid-devel
+
+* Sat Jan 22 2022 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.9-10
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_36_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Mon Jan 17 2022 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.9-9
+- nss: get shadow_logfd with log_get_logfd() (#2038811)
+- lib: make shadow_logfd and Prog not extern
+- lib: rename Prog to shadow_progname
+- lib: provide default values for shadow_progname
+- libsubid: use log_set_progname in subid_init
+
+* Fri Nov 19 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.9-8
+- getsubids: provide system binary and man page (#1980780)
+- pwck: fix segfault when calling fprintf() (#2021339)
+- newgrp: fix segmentation fault (#2019553)
+- groupdel: fix SIGSEGV when passwd does not exist (#1986111)
+
+* Fri Nov 12 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.9-7
+- useradd: change SELinux labels for home files (#2022658)
+
+* Thu Nov  4 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.9-6
+- useradd: revert fix memleak of grp (#2018697)
+
+* Wed Oct 27 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.9-5
+- useradd: generate home and mail directories with selinux user attribute
+
+* Thu Sep 23 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.9-4
+- login.defs: include HMAC_CRYPTO_ALGO key
+- Clean spec file: organize dependencies and move License location
+
+* Tue Aug 17 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.9-3
+- libmisc: fix default value in SHA_get_salt_rounds()
+
+* Mon Aug  9 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.9-2
+- useradd: avoid generating an empty subid range (#1990653)
+
+* Wed Aug  4 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.9-1
+- Rebase to version 4.9
+- usermod: allow all group types with -G option (#1975327)
+- Clean spec file
+
+* Fri Jul 23 2021 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.8.1-20
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_35_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Wed Jul 14 2021 Björn Esser <besser82@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.8.1-19
+- Add patch to fix 'fread returns element count, not element size'
+
+* Wed Jul 14 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.8.1-18
+- Fix regression issues detected in rhbz#667593 and rhbz#672510
+
+* Mon Jul 12 2021 Björn Esser <besser82@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.8.1-17
+- Enable bcrypt support, as libxcrypt supports it well
+
+* Sun Jul 04 2021 Björn Esser <besser82@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.8.1-16
+- Add a patch to obtain random bytes using getentropy()
+- Update shadow-4.8-crypt_h.patch with the upstreamed version
+- Add a patch to make use of crypt_gensalt() from libxcrypt
+
+* Tue Jun 29 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.8.1-15
+- useradd: free correct pointer (#1976809)
+
+* Mon Jun 28 2021 Björn Esser <besser82@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.8.1-14
+- Add a patch to fix the used prefix for the bcrypt hash method
+- Add a patch to cleanup the code in libmisc/salt.c
+- Add a patch adding some clarifying comments in libmisc/salt.c
+- Add a patch to obtain random bytes from /dev/urandom
+
+* Mon Jun 28 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.8.1-13
+- Covscan fixes
+
+* Mon Jun 21 2021 Björn Esser <besser82@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.8.1-12
+- Backport support for yescrypt hash method
+- Add a patch to fix the parameter type of YESCRYPT_salt_cost()
+
+* Mon Jun 21 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.8.1-11
+- libsubid: don't print error messages on stderr by default
+- libsubid: libsubid_init return false if out of memory
+- useradd: fix SUB_UID_COUNT=0
+- libsubid: don't return owner in list_owner_ranges API call
+- libsubid: libsubid_init don't print messages on error
+- libsubid: fix newusers when nss provides subids
+- man: clarify subid delegation
+- libsubid: make shadow_logfd not extern
+
+* Thu May  6 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.8.1-10
+- man: mention NSS in new[ug]idmap manpages
+- libsubid: move development header to shadow folder
+
+* Fri Apr 16 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.8.1-9
+- libsubid: creation and nsswitch support
+- Creation of subid and subid-devel subpackages
+
+* Mon Mar 29 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.8.1-8
+- man: include lastlog file caveat (#951564)
+- Upstream links to several patches
+- Spec file cleanup by Robert Scheck
+- Add BuildRequires: make by Tom Stellard
+
+* Wed Jan 27 2021 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.8.1-7
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_34_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Mon Nov  9 2020 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.8.1-6
+- commonio: force lock file sync (#1862056)
+
+* Tue Nov  3 2020 Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com> - 2:4.8.1-5
+- Rebuild with libsemanage.so.2
+
+* Wed Jul 29 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.8.1-4
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_33_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Thu May 14 2020 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.8.1-3
+- check only local groups when adding new supplementary groups to a user (#1727236)
+
+* Tue Mar 24 2020 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.8.1-2
+- useradd: clarify the useradd -d parameter behavior in man page
+
+* Tue Mar 17 2020 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.8.1-1
+- updated upstream to 4.8.1
+
+* Tue Mar 17 2020 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.8-5
+- synchronized login.defs with upstream file (#1261099 and #1807957)
+
+* Mon Feb 24 2020 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.8-4
+- fix useradd: doesn't generate spool mail with the proper SELinux user identity
+  (#1690527)
+
+* Thu Jan 30 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.8-3
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_32_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Thu Jan 16 2020 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.8-2
+- make the invalid shell check into warning
+
+* Mon Jan 13 2020 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.8-1
+- update to current upstream release 4.8
+
+* Mon Sep  2 2019 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-16
+- fix SELinux related problem in chpasswd/chgpasswd when run with -R
+  (patch by Petr Lautrbach) (#1747215)
+
+* Fri Jul 26 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.6-15
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_31_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Fri Jun  7 2019 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-14
+- minor auditing fixes
+
+* Fri May  3 2019 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-13
+- use lckpwdf() again to disable concurrent edits of databases by
+  other applications
+
+* Tue Apr  2 2019 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-12
+- force regeneration of getdate.c otherwise the date parsing fix
+  is not applied
+
+* Fri Mar 22 2019 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-11
+- clarify chage manual page in regards to shadow and passwd
+  inconsistency (#1686440)
+
+* Thu Mar 21 2019 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-10
+- Ignore LOGIN_PLAIN_PROMPT variable in login.defs
+
+* Thu Mar  7 2019 Tim Landscheidt <tim@tim-landscheidt.de> - 2:4.6-9
+- Remove obsolete requirements for post/pre scriptlets
+
+* Sat Feb 02 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.6-8
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_30_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Mon Jan 14 2019 Björn Esser <besser82@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.6-7
+- Rebuilt for libcrypt.so.2 (#1666033)
+
+* Tue Dec 18 2018 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-6
+- usermod: guard against unsafe change of ownership of
+  special home directories
+
+* Mon Nov 19 2018 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-5
+- use itstool instead of xml2po
+
+* Tue Nov  6 2018 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-4
+- use cap_setxid file capabilities for newxidmap instead of making them setuid
+- limit the SYS_U/GID_MIN value to 1 as the algorithm does not work with 0
+  and the 0 is always used by root anyway
+- manual page improvements
+
+* Wed Oct 10 2018 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-3
+- fix some issues from Coverity scan
+- flush sssd caches - patch by Jakub Hrozek
+
+* Sat Jul 14 2018 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.6-2
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_29_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Mon May 28 2018 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-1
+- update to current upstream release 4.6
+
+* Fri Apr 20 2018 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.5-10
+- Raise limit for passwd and shadow entry length but also prevent
+  writing longer entries (#1422497)
+
+* Tue Feb 06 2018 Björn Esser <besser82@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.5-9
+- Add patch to include crypt.h, if present
+- Use %%make_{build,install} macros
+- Refresh other patches for proper alignment
+
+* Sat Jan 20 2018 Björn Esser <besser82@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.5-8
+- Rebuilt for switch to libxcrypt
+
+* Mon Nov  6 2017 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.5-7
+- fix regression caused by the userdel-chroot patch (#1509978)
+
+* Thu Nov  2 2017 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.5-6
+- fix userdel in chroot (#1316168)
+- add useful chage -E example to chage manpage
+
+* Fri Sep 15 2017 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.5-5
+- do not allow "." and ".." user names
+
+* Mon Aug 14 2017 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.5-4
+- allow switching to secondary group without checking the membership
+  explicitly (patch from upstream)
+
+* Thu Aug 03 2017 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.5-3
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_27_Binutils_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Thu Jul 27 2017 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.5-2
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_27_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Fri Jul 21 2017 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.5-1
+- update to current upstream release 4.5
+
+* Sat Feb 11 2017 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.3.1-3
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_26_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Thu Aug 25 2016 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.3.1-2
+- fix regression in useradd - not processing defaults properly (#1369979)
+
+* Tue Aug 23 2016 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.3.1-1
+- new upstream release fixing low impact security issue
+
+* Tue Jun 14 2016 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.2.1-11
+- guard for localtime() and gmtime() failure
+
+* Mon May 30 2016 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.2.1-10
+- chpasswd, chgpasswd: open audit when starting
+
+* Thu May 26 2016 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.2.1-9
+- chgpasswd: do not remove it
+- chpasswd, chgpasswd: add selinux_check_access call (#1336902)
+
+* Thu Mar 17 2016 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.2.1-8
+- userdel: fix userdel -f with /etc/subuid present (#1316168)
+
+* Tue Feb  9 2016 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.2.1-7
+- usermod: properly return error during password manipulation
+
+* Wed Feb  3 2016 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.2.1-6
+- add possibility to clear or set lastlog record for user via lastlog
+
+* Fri Jan  8 2016 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.2.1-5
+- do not use obscure permissions for binaries
+- remove unused commands from login.defs(5) cross-reference
+
+* Fri Nov  6 2015 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.2.1-4
+- document that groupmems is not setuid root
+- document that expiration of the password after inactivity period
+  locks the user account completely
+
+* Thu Aug 27 2015 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.2.1-3
+- unlock also passwords locked with passwd -l
+- prevent breaking user entry by entering a password containing colon
+- fix possible DoS when locking the database files for update
+- properly use login.defs from the chroot in useradd
+
+* Fri Jun 19 2015 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.2.1-2
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_23_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Wed Nov 26 2014 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.2.1-1
+- new upstream release with support for subordinate uids and gids
+
+* Tue Nov 25 2014 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.5.1-22
+- small adjustments to the audit patch
+
+* Fri Oct 17 2014 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.5.1-21
+- update auditing to cover more events and fix some incorrect audit
+  records - patch by Steve Grubb (#1151580)
+- apply the same new allocation algorithm to uids as for gids
+
+* Wed Sep 10 2014 Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.5.1-20
+- discard obsolete matchpathcon cache after semanage_commit()
+
+* Tue Sep  9 2014 Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.5.1-19
+- disallow all-numeric user and group names (#1139318)
+
+* Fri Aug 29 2014 Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.5.1-18
+- label the newly created home dir correctly (#1077809)
+- mention that chage -d 0 forces password change (#1135010)
+- improve date parsing and error detecting in chage
+- avoid full group database scanning in newgrp in most common case
+- report error if usermod asked for moving homedir and it does not exist
+
+* Mon Aug 18 2014 Fedora Release Engineering <rel-eng@lists.fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.1.5.1-17
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_21_22_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Tue Aug  5 2014 Tom Callaway <spot@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.1.5.1-16
+- fix license handling
+
 * Mon Jul 14 2014 Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.1.5.1-15
 - revert the last change as it is not really needed
 

sources

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-a00449aa439c69287b6d472191dc2247  shadow-4.1.5.1.tar.bz2
-f16f31f6f5a607b1ffb1aa1aac4c37f2  shadow-4.1.5.1.tar.bz2.sig
+SHA512 (shadow-4.11.1.tar.xz) = 12fbe4d6ac929ad3c21525ed0f1026b5b678ccec9762f2ec7e611d9c180934def506325f2835fb750dd30af035b592f827ff151cd6e4c805aaaf8e01425c279f
+SHA512 (shadow-4.11.1.tar.xz.asc) = 4594189678cc9bcc8831f62a5d42c605b085be4a3b540429d7c800f4304e2e8fe04358547917eb90c1513646fade7c714611bfdc98af7dec5321a3dc3e65c4fd

tests/sanity/Makefile

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2006 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved. This copyrighted material 
+# is made available to anyone wishing to use, modify, copy, or
+# redistribute it subject to the terms and conditions of the GNU General
+# Public License v.2.
+#
+# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY
+# WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A
+# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more details.
+#
+# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+# Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA.
+#
+# Author: Jakub Hrozek
+
+#~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~#
+# Example Makefile for RHTS                                          #
+# This example is geared towards a test for a specific package       #
+# It does most of the work for you, but may require further coding   #
+#~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~#
+
+# The toplevel namespace within which the test lives.
+TOPLEVEL_NAMESPACE=CoreOS
+
+# The name of the package under test:
+PACKAGE_NAME=shadow-utils
+
+# The path of the test below the package:
+RELATIVE_PATH=sanity
+
+# Version of the Test. Used with make tag.
+export TESTVERSION=1.1
+
+# The combined namespace of the test.
+export TEST=/$(TOPLEVEL_NAMESPACE)/$(PACKAGE_NAME)/$(RELATIVE_PATH)
+
+# A phony target is one that is not really the name of a file.
+# It is just a name for some commands to be executed when you
+# make an explicit request. There are two reasons to use a
+# phony target: to avoid a conflict with a file of the same
+# name, and to improve performance.
+.PHONY: all install download clean
+
+# Executables to be built should be added here, they will be generated on the system under test.
+BUILT_FILES= 
+
+# Data files, .c files, scripts anything needed to either compile the test and/or run it.
+FILES=$(METADATA) Makefile PURPOSE sanity_test.py runtest.sh
+
+run: $(FILES) build
+	./runtest.sh
+
+build: $(BUILT_FILES)
+	chmod a+x ./sanity_test.py
+	chmod a+x ./runtest.sh
+
+clean:
+	rm -f *~ *.rpm $(BUILT_FILES)
+
+# Include Common Makefile
+include /usr/share/rhts/lib/rhts-make.include
+
+# Generate the testinfo.desc here:
+$(METADATA): Makefile
+	@touch $(METADATA)
+	@echo "Owner:        Jakub Hrozek <jhrozek@redhat.com>" > $(METADATA)
+	@echo "Name:         $(TEST)" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "Path:         $(TEST_DIR)" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "TestVersion:  $(TESTVERSION)" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "License:      GNU GPL" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "Description:  Basic sanity test for shadow-utils" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "TestTime:     5m" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "RunFor:       $(PACKAGE_NAME)" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "Requires:     $(PACKAGE_NAME)" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "Requires:     python" >> $(METADATA)
+	rhts-lint $(METADATA)
+

tests/sanity/PURPOSE

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+This is a basic sanity test for the shadow-utils package. It is implemented
+in python on top of the unittesting.py module.
+
+Its purpose is to ensure that the binaries in the shadow-utils package behave
+as expected and its switches/options work correctly.
+
+For the most part, every binary in the shadow-utils package is represented by
+a single class named Test<BinaryName>, i.e. TestUsermod etc. There are some 
+exceptions, like TestUseraddWeirdNameTest though.
+

tests/sanity/runtest.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+. /usr/bin/rhts-environment.sh
+. /usr/share/beakerlib/beakerlib.sh || exit 1
+
+rlJournalStart
+rlFileBackup --clean /etc/default/useradd- /etc/default/useradd
+setenforce 0
+python sanity_test.py -v
+setenforce 1
+rlFileRestore
+
+EXIT=$?
+if [[ $EXIT -eq 0 ]]; then
+    RESULT="PASS"
+else
+    RESULT="FAIL"
+fi
+
+
+rlJournalEnd
+
+echo "Result: $RESULT"
+echo "Exit: $EXIT"
+report_result $TEST $RESULT $EXIT

tests/tests.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+---
+# This first play always runs on the local staging system
+- hosts: localhost
+  roles:
+  - role: standard-test-beakerlib
+    tags:
+    - classic
+    - atomic
+    tests:
+    - sanity
+    required_packages:
+    - shadow-utils     # sanity test needs shadow-utils
+    - python           # sanity test needs python