diff --git a/samba-gc-lookup_unix_user_name-allow-lookup-for-own-realm.patch b/samba-gc-lookup_unix_user_name-allow-lookup-for-own-realm.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e0ed8ae --- /dev/null +++ b/samba-gc-lookup_unix_user_name-allow-lookup-for-own-realm.patch @@ -0,0 +1,210 @@ +From 81d6949acdad70ecfb130d3286eeab1b3a51937f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alexander Bokovoy +Date: Wed, 7 Oct 2020 19:25:24 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 1/2] cli_credentials_parse_string: fix parsing of principals + +When parsing a principal-like name, user name was left with full +principal instead of taking only the left part before '@' sign. + +>>> from samba import credentials +>>> t = credentials.Credentials() +>>> t.parse_string('admin@realm.test', credentials.SPECIFIED) +>>> t.get_username() +'admin@realm.test' + +The issue is that cli_credentials_set_username() does a talloc_strdup() +of the argument, so we need to change order of assignment to allow +talloc_strdup() to copy the right part of the string. + +Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy +--- + auth/credentials/credentials.c | 5 ++--- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/auth/credentials/credentials.c b/auth/credentials/credentials.c +index 77c35dd104b..06ac79058f9 100644 +--- a/auth/credentials/credentials.c ++++ b/auth/credentials/credentials.c +@@ -840,11 +840,10 @@ _PUBLIC_ void cli_credentials_parse_string(struct cli_credentials *credentials, + * in order to undo the effect of + * cli_credentials_guess(). + */ +- cli_credentials_set_username(credentials, uname, obtained); +- cli_credentials_set_domain(credentials, "", obtained); +- + cli_credentials_set_principal(credentials, uname, obtained); + *p = 0; ++ cli_credentials_set_username(credentials, uname, obtained); ++ cli_credentials_set_domain(credentials, "", obtained); + cli_credentials_set_realm(credentials, p+1, obtained); + return; + } else if ((p = strchr_m(uname,'\\')) +-- +2.28.0 + + +From fa38bebb993011428612d51819530218d8358f5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alexander Bokovoy +Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2020 16:04:20 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 2/2] lookup_name: allow lookup for own realm + +When using security tab in Windows Explorer, a lookup over a trusted +forest might come as realm\name instead of NetBIOS domain name: + +-------------------------------------------------------------------- +[2020/01/13 11:12:39.859134, 1, pid=33253, effective(1732401004, 1732401004), real(1732401004, 0), class=rpc_parse] ../../librpc/ndr/ndr.c:471(ndr_print_function_debug) + lsa_LookupNames3: struct lsa_LookupNames3 + in: struct lsa_LookupNames3 + handle : * + handle: struct policy_handle + handle_type : 0x00000000 (0) + uuid : 0000000e-0000-0000-1c5e-a750e5810000 + num_names : 0x00000001 (1) + names: ARRAY(1) + names: struct lsa_String + length : 0x001e (30) + size : 0x0020 (32) + string : * + string : 'ipa.test\admins' + sids : * + sids: struct lsa_TransSidArray3 + count : 0x00000000 (0) + sids : NULL + level : LSA_LOOKUP_NAMES_UPLEVEL_TRUSTS_ONLY2 (6) + count : * + count : 0x00000000 (0) + lookup_options : LSA_LOOKUP_OPTION_SEARCH_ISOLATED_NAMES (0) + client_revision : LSA_CLIENT_REVISION_2 (2) +-------------------------------------------------------------------- + +Allow this lookup using realm to be done against primary domain. + +Refactor user name parsing code to reuse cli_credentials_* API to be +consistent with other places. cli_credentials_parse_string() handles +both domain and realm-based user name variants. + +Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy +--- + source3/passdb/lookup_sid.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- + 1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/source3/passdb/lookup_sid.c b/source3/passdb/lookup_sid.c +index 82c47b3145b..39d599fed27 100644 +--- a/source3/passdb/lookup_sid.c ++++ b/source3/passdb/lookup_sid.c +@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ + #include "../libcli/security/security.h" + #include "lib/winbind_util.h" + #include "../librpc/gen_ndr/idmap.h" ++#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h" + + static bool lookup_unix_user_name(const char *name, struct dom_sid *sid) + { +@@ -78,52 +79,82 @@ bool lookup_name(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + const char **ret_domain, const char **ret_name, + struct dom_sid *ret_sid, enum lsa_SidType *ret_type) + { +- char *p; + const char *tmp; + const char *domain = NULL; + const char *name = NULL; ++ const char *realm = NULL; + uint32_t rid; + struct dom_sid sid; + enum lsa_SidType type; + TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx); ++ struct cli_credentials *creds = NULL; + + if (tmp_ctx == NULL) { + DEBUG(0, ("talloc_new failed\n")); + return false; + } + +- p = strchr_m(full_name, '\\'); +- +- if (p != NULL) { +- domain = talloc_strndup(tmp_ctx, full_name, +- PTR_DIFF(p, full_name)); +- name = talloc_strdup(tmp_ctx, p+1); +- } else { +- domain = talloc_strdup(tmp_ctx, ""); +- name = talloc_strdup(tmp_ctx, full_name); ++ creds = cli_credentials_init(tmp_ctx); ++ if (creds == NULL) { ++ DEBUG(0, ("cli_credentials_init failed\n")); ++ return false; + } + +- if ((domain == NULL) || (name == NULL)) { +- DEBUG(0, ("talloc failed\n")); +- TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); ++ cli_credentials_parse_string(creds, full_name, CRED_SPECIFIED); ++ name = cli_credentials_get_username(creds); ++ domain = cli_credentials_get_domain(creds); ++ realm = cli_credentials_get_realm(creds); ++ ++ /* At this point we have: ++ * - name -- normal name or empty string ++ * - domain -- either NULL or domain name ++ * - realm -- either NULL or realm name ++ * ++ * domain and realm are exclusive to each other ++ * the code below in lookup_name assumes domain ++ * to be at least empty string, not NULL ++ */ ++ ++ if ((name == NULL) || (name[0] == '\0')) { ++ DEBUG(0, ("lookup_name with empty name, exit\n")); + return false; + } + ++ if ((domain == NULL) && (realm == NULL)) { ++ domain = talloc_strdup(creds, ""); ++ } ++ + DEBUG(10,("lookup_name: %s => domain=[%s], name=[%s]\n", + full_name, domain, name)); + DEBUG(10, ("lookup_name: flags = 0x0%x\n", flags)); + +- if (((flags & LOOKUP_NAME_DOMAIN) || (flags == 0)) && +- strequal(domain, get_global_sam_name())) +- { ++ /* Windows clients may send a LookupNames request with both NetBIOS ++ * domain name- and realm-qualified user names. Thus, we need to check ++ * both against both of the SAM domain name and realm, if set. Since ++ * domain name and realm in the request are exclusive, test the one ++ * that is specified. cli_credentials_parse_string() will either set ++ * realm or wouldn't so we can use it to detect if realm was specified. ++ */ ++ if ((flags & LOOKUP_NAME_DOMAIN) || (flags == 0)) { ++ const char *domain_name = realm ? realm : domain; ++ bool check_global_sam = false; ++ ++ if (domain_name[0] != '\0') { ++ check_global_sam = strequal(domain_name, get_global_sam_name()); ++ if (!check_global_sam && lp_realm() != NULL) { ++ check_global_sam = strequal(domain_name, lp_realm()); ++ } ++ } + +- /* It's our own domain, lookup the name in passdb */ +- if (lookup_global_sam_name(name, flags, &rid, &type)) { +- sid_compose(&sid, get_global_sam_sid(), rid); +- goto ok; ++ if (check_global_sam) { ++ /* It's our own domain, lookup the name in passdb */ ++ if (lookup_global_sam_name(name, flags, &rid, &type)) { ++ sid_compose(&sid, get_global_sam_sid(), rid); ++ goto ok; ++ } ++ TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); ++ return false; + } +- TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx); +- return false; + } + + if ((flags & LOOKUP_NAME_BUILTIN) && +-- +2.28.0 + diff --git a/samba.spec b/samba.spec index dac3754..16edcd2 100644 --- a/samba.spec +++ b/samba.spec @@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ Source14: samba.pamd Source201: README.downgrade Patch1: samba-s4u.patch +Patch2: samba-gc-lookup_unix_user_name-allow-lookup-for-own-realm.patch Requires(pre): /usr/sbin/groupadd Requires(post): systemd @@ -3623,6 +3624,8 @@ fi * Thu Oct 22 2020 Alexander Bokovoy - 4.13.0-12 - Add preliminary support for S4U operations in Samba AD DC resolves: #1836630 - Samba DC: Remote Desktop cannot access files +- Fix lookup_unix_user_name to allow lookup of realm-qualified users and groups + required for upcoming FreeIPA Global Catalog support * Tue Sep 22 2020 Guenther Deschner - 4.13.0-11 - Update to Samba 4.13.0