68 lines
2.9 KiB
Diff
68 lines
2.9 KiB
Diff
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From cc2e6770697e343f4af534114ab7e633d5beabec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Paul Jakma <paul@jakma.org>
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Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 23:57:33 +0000
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Subject: [PATCH] bgpd/security: invalid attr length sends NOTIFY with data
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overrun
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Security issue: Quagga-2018-0543
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See: https://www.quagga.net/security/Quagga-2018-0543.txt
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* bgpd/bgp_attr.c: (bgp_attr_parse) An invalid attribute length is correctly
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checked, and a NOTIFY prepared. The NOTIFY can include the incorrect
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received data with the NOTIFY, for debug purposes. Commit
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c69698704806a9ac5 modified the code to do that just, and also send the
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malformed attr with the NOTIFY. However, the invalid attribute length was
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used as the length of the data to send back.
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The result is a read past the end of data, which is then written to the
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NOTIFY message and sent to the peer.
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A configured BGP peer can use this bug to read up to 64 KiB of memory from
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the bgpd process, or crash the process if the invalid read is caught by
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some means (unmapped page and SEGV, or other mechanism) resulting in a DoS.
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This bug _ought_ /not/ be exploitable by anything other than the connected
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BGP peer, assuming the underlying TCP transport is secure. For no BGP
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peer should send on an UPDATE with this attribute. Quagga will not, as
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Quagga always validates the attr header length, regardless of type.
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However, it is possible that there are BGP implementations that do not
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check lengths on some attributes (e.g. optional/transitive ones of a type
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they do not recognise), and might pass such malformed attrs on. If such
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implementations exists and are common, then this bug might be triggerable
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by BGP speakers further hops away. Those peers will not receive the
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NOTIFY (unless they sit on a shared medium), however they might then be
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able to trigger a DoS.
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Fix: use the valid bound to calculate the length.
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---
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bgpd/bgp_attr.c | 4 +++-
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1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/bgpd/bgp_attr.c b/bgpd/bgp_attr.c
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index ef58beb1..9564637e 100644
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--- a/bgpd/bgp_attr.c
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+++ b/bgpd/bgp_attr.c
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@@ -2147,6 +2147,8 @@ bgp_attr_parse (struct peer *peer, struct attr *attr, bgp_size_t size,
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memset (seen, 0, BGP_ATTR_BITMAP_SIZE);
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/* End pointer of BGP attribute. */
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+ assert (size <= stream_get_size (BGP_INPUT (peer)));
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+ assert (size <= stream_get_endp (BGP_INPUT (peer)));
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endp = BGP_INPUT_PNT (peer) + size;
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/* Get attributes to the end of attribute length. */
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@@ -2228,7 +2230,7 @@ bgp_attr_parse (struct peer *peer, struct attr *attr, bgp_size_t size,
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bgp_notify_send_with_data (peer,
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BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ERR,
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BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ATTR_LENG_ERR,
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- startp, attr_endp - startp);
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+ startp, endp - startp);
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return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_ERROR;
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}
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--
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2.14.3
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