a0f61528af
CVE-2016-7909: pcnet: Infinite loop in pcnet_rdra_addr (bz #1381196) CVE-2016-7994: virtio-gpu: memory leak in resource_create_2d (bz #1382667) CVE-2016-8577: 9pfs: host memory leakage in v9fs_read (bz #1383286) CVE-2016-8578: 9pfs: potential NULL dereferencein 9pfs routines (bz #1383292) CVE-2016-8668: OOB buffer access in rocker switch emulation (bz #1384898) CVE-2016-8669: divide by zero error in serial_update_parameters (bz #1384911) CVE-2016-8909: intel-hda: infinite loop in dma buffer stream (bz #1388053) Infinite loop vulnerability in a9_gtimer_update (bz #1388300) CVE-2016-9101: eepro100: memory leakage at device unplug (bz #1389539) CVE-2016-9103: 9pfs: information leakage via xattr (bz #1389643) CVE-2016-9102: 9pfs: memory leakage when creating extended attribute (bz #1389551) CVE-2016-9104: 9pfs: integer overflow leading to OOB access (bz #1389687) CVE-2016-9105: 9pfs: memory leakage in v9fs_link (bz #1389704) CVE-2016-9106: 9pfs: memory leakage in v9fs_write (bz #1389713) CVE-2016-9381: xen: incautious about shared ring processing (bz #1397385) CVE-2016-9921: Divide by zero vulnerability in cirrus_do_copy (bz #1399054) CVE-2016-9776: infinite loop while receiving data in mcf_fec_receive (bz #1400830) CVE-2016-9845: information leakage in virgl_cmd_get_capset_info (bz #1402247) CVE-2016-9846: virtio-gpu: memory leakage while updating cursor data (bz #1402258) CVE-2016-9907: usbredir: memory leakage when destroying redirector (bz #1402266) CVE-2016-9911: usb: ehci: memory leakage in ehci_init_transfer (bz #1402273) CVE-2016-9913: 9pfs: memory leakage via proxy/handle callbacks (bz #1402277) CVE-2016-10028: virtio-gpu-3d: OOB access while reading virgl capabilities (bz #1406368) CVE-2016-9908: virtio-gpu: information leakage in virgl_cmd_get_capset (bz #1402263) CVE-2016-9912: virtio-gpu: memory leakage when destroying gpu resource (bz #1402285)
90 lines
2.8 KiB
Diff
90 lines
2.8 KiB
Diff
From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
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Date: Tue, 1 Nov 2016 12:00:40 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: fix integer overflow issue in xattr read/write
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
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The v9fs_xattr_read() and v9fs_xattr_write() are passed a guest
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originated offset: they must ensure this offset does not go beyond
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the size of the extended attribute that was set in v9fs_xattrcreate().
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Unfortunately, the current code implement these checks with unsafe
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calculations on 32 and 64 bit values, which may allow a malicious
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guest to cause OOB access anyway.
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Fix this by comparing the offset and the xattr size, which are
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both uint64_t, before trying to compute the effective number of bytes
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to read or write.
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Suggested-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
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Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
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Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
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Reviewed-By: Guido Günther <agx@sigxcpu.org>
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Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
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(cherry picked from commit 7e55d65c56a03dcd2c5d7c49d37c5a74b55d4bd6)
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---
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hw/9pfs/9p.c | 32 ++++++++++++--------------------
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1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
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index ad57123..9c18322 100644
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--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
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+++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
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@@ -1629,20 +1629,17 @@ static int v9fs_xattr_read(V9fsState *s, V9fsPDU *pdu, V9fsFidState *fidp,
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{
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ssize_t err;
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size_t offset = 7;
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- int read_count;
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- int64_t xattr_len;
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+ uint64_t read_count;
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V9fsVirtioState *v = container_of(s, V9fsVirtioState, state);
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VirtQueueElement *elem = v->elems[pdu->idx];
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- xattr_len = fidp->fs.xattr.len;
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- read_count = xattr_len - off;
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+ if (fidp->fs.xattr.len < off) {
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+ read_count = 0;
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+ } else {
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+ read_count = fidp->fs.xattr.len - off;
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+ }
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if (read_count > max_count) {
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read_count = max_count;
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- } else if (read_count < 0) {
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- /*
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- * read beyond XATTR value
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- */
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- read_count = 0;
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}
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err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "d", read_count);
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if (err < 0) {
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@@ -1970,23 +1967,18 @@ static int v9fs_xattr_write(V9fsState *s, V9fsPDU *pdu, V9fsFidState *fidp,
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{
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int i, to_copy;
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ssize_t err = 0;
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- int write_count;
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- int64_t xattr_len;
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+ uint64_t write_count;
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size_t offset = 7;
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- xattr_len = fidp->fs.xattr.len;
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- write_count = xattr_len - off;
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- if (write_count > count) {
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- write_count = count;
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- } else if (write_count < 0) {
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- /*
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- * write beyond XATTR value len specified in
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- * xattrcreate
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- */
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+ if (fidp->fs.xattr.len < off) {
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err = -ENOSPC;
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goto out;
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}
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+ write_count = fidp->fs.xattr.len - off;
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+ if (write_count > count) {
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+ write_count = count;
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+ }
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err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "d", write_count);
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if (err < 0) {
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return err;
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