qemu/0320-ssi-sd-fix-buffer-overrun-on-invalid-state-load.patch
Cole Robinson 1369de9828 CVE-2014-7815 vnc: insufficient bits_per_pixel from the client sanitization (bz #1157647, bz #1157641)
CVE-2014-3689 vmware_vga: insufficient parameter validation in rectangle functions (bz #1153038, bz #1153035)
2014-10-29 15:12:00 -04:00

41 lines
1.2 KiB
Diff

From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2014 16:08:14 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] ssi-sd: fix buffer overrun on invalid state load
CVE-2013-4537
s->arglen is taken from wire and used as idx
in ssi_sd_transfer().
Validate it before access.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit a9c380db3b8c6af19546a68145c8d1438a09c92b)
---
hw/sd/ssi-sd.c | 9 +++++++++
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/hw/sd/ssi-sd.c b/hw/sd/ssi-sd.c
index d47e237..6a21f95 100644
--- a/hw/sd/ssi-sd.c
+++ b/hw/sd/ssi-sd.c
@@ -230,8 +230,17 @@ static int ssi_sd_load(QEMUFile *f, void *opaque, int version_id)
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++)
s->response[i] = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->arglen = qemu_get_be32(f);
+ if (s->mode == SSI_SD_CMDARG &&
+ (s->arglen < 0 || s->arglen >= ARRAY_SIZE(s->cmdarg))) {
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
s->response_pos = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->stopping = qemu_get_be32(f);
+ if (s->mode == SSI_SD_RESPONSE &&
+ (s->response_pos < 0 || s->response_pos >= ARRAY_SIZE(s->response) ||
+ (!s->stopping && s->arglen > ARRAY_SIZE(s->response)))) {
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
ss->cs = qemu_get_be32(f);