Fix xen pv graphical display failure (bz #1350264)

CVE-2016-8667: dma: divide by zero error in set_next_tick (bz #1384876)
CVE-2017-5579: serial: fix memory leak in serial exit (bz #1416161)

.gitignore

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 /.build*.log
 /x86_64/
 /*.src.rpm
-/qemu-*.tar.xz
+/qemu-*.tar.bz2

0001-spice-F24-spice-has-backported-gl-support.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+From: Pavel Grunt <pgrunt@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 11 Mar 2016 14:40:59 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] spice: F24 spice has backported gl support
+
+Not for upstream, this just adjusts the version check to work with
+f24 backported spice gl support
+---
+ include/ui/spice-display.h | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/ui/spice-display.h b/include/ui/spice-display.h
+index 568b64a..3c679e8 100644
+--- a/include/ui/spice-display.h
++++ b/include/ui/spice-display.h
+@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
+ #include "sysemu/sysemu.h"
+ 
+ #if defined(CONFIG_OPENGL_DMABUF)
+-# if SPICE_SERVER_VERSION >= 0x000d01 /* release 0.13.1 */
++# if SPICE_SERVER_VERSION >= 0x000c07 /* release 0.12.7 */
+ #  define HAVE_SPICE_GL 1
+ #  include "ui/egl-helpers.h"
+ #  include "ui/egl-context.h"

0002-scsi-esp-fix-migration.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2016 16:32:39 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] scsi: esp: fix migration
+
+Commit 926cde5 ("scsi: esp: make cmdbuf big enough for maximum CDB size",
+2016-06-16) changed the size of a migrated field.  Split it in two
+parts, and only migrate the second part in a new vmstate version.
+
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit cc96677469388bad3d66479379735cf75db069e3)
+---
+ hw/scsi/esp.c               | 5 +++--
+ include/migration/vmstate.h | 5 ++++-
+ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/scsi/esp.c b/hw/scsi/esp.c
+index baa0a2c..1f2f2d3 100644
+--- a/hw/scsi/esp.c
++++ b/hw/scsi/esp.c
+@@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ static bool esp_mem_accepts(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
+ 
+ const VMStateDescription vmstate_esp = {
+     .name ="esp",
+-    .version_id = 3,
++    .version_id = 4,
+     .minimum_version_id = 3,
+     .fields = (VMStateField[]) {
+         VMSTATE_BUFFER(rregs, ESPState),
+@@ -585,7 +585,8 @@ const VMStateDescription vmstate_esp = {
+         VMSTATE_BUFFER(ti_buf, ESPState),
+         VMSTATE_UINT32(status, ESPState),
+         VMSTATE_UINT32(dma, ESPState),
+-        VMSTATE_BUFFER(cmdbuf, ESPState),
++        VMSTATE_PARTIAL_BUFFER(cmdbuf, ESPState, 16),
++        VMSTATE_BUFFER_START_MIDDLE_V(cmdbuf, ESPState, 16, 4),
+         VMSTATE_UINT32(cmdlen, ESPState),
+         VMSTATE_UINT32(do_cmd, ESPState),
+         VMSTATE_UINT32(dma_left, ESPState),
+diff --git a/include/migration/vmstate.h b/include/migration/vmstate.h
+index 84ee355..853a2bd 100644
+--- a/include/migration/vmstate.h
++++ b/include/migration/vmstate.h
+@@ -888,8 +888,11 @@ extern const VMStateInfo vmstate_info_bitmap;
+ #define VMSTATE_PARTIAL_BUFFER(_f, _s, _size)                         \
+     VMSTATE_STATIC_BUFFER(_f, _s, 0, NULL, 0, _size)
+ 
++#define VMSTATE_BUFFER_START_MIDDLE_V(_f, _s, _start, _v) \
++    VMSTATE_STATIC_BUFFER(_f, _s, _v, NULL, _start, sizeof(typeof_field(_s, _f)))
++
+ #define VMSTATE_BUFFER_START_MIDDLE(_f, _s, _start) \
+-    VMSTATE_STATIC_BUFFER(_f, _s, 0, NULL, _start, sizeof(typeof_field(_s, _f)))
++    VMSTATE_BUFFER_START_MIDDLE_V(_f, _s, _start, 0)
+ 
+ #define VMSTATE_PARTIAL_VBUFFER(_f, _s, _size)                        \
+     VMSTATE_VBUFFER(_f, _s, 0, NULL, 0, _size)

0003-net-vmxnet3-check-for-device_active-before-write.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Mon, 8 Aug 2016 18:08:31 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] net: vmxnet3: check for device_active before write
+
+Vmxnet3 device emulator does not check if the device is active,
+before using it for write. It leads to a use after free issue,
+if the vmxnet3_io_bar0_write routine is called after the device is
+deactivated. Add check to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Acked-by: Dmitry Fleytman <dmitry@daynix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 6c352ca9b4ee3e1e286ea9e8434bd8e69ac7d0d8)
+---
+ hw/net/vmxnet3.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/vmxnet3.c b/hw/net/vmxnet3.c
+index 20f26b7..a6ce16e 100644
+--- a/hw/net/vmxnet3.c
++++ b/hw/net/vmxnet3.c
+@@ -1158,6 +1158,10 @@ vmxnet3_io_bar0_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
+ {
+     VMXNET3State *s = opaque;
+ 
++    if (!s->device_active) {
++        return;
++    }
++
+     if (VMW_IS_MULTIREG_ADDR(addr, VMXNET3_REG_TXPROD,
+                         VMXNET3_DEVICE_MAX_TX_QUEUES, VMXNET3_REG_ALIGN)) {
+         int tx_queue_idx =

0004-virtio-check-vring-descriptor-buffer-length.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Wed, 27 Jul 2016 21:07:56 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] virtio: check vring descriptor buffer length
+
+virtio back end uses set of buffers to facilitate I/O operations.
+An infinite loop unfolds in virtqueue_pop() if a buffer was
+of zero size. Add check to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 1e7aed70144b4673fc26e73062064b6724795e5f)
+---
+ hw/virtio/virtio.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio.c b/hw/virtio/virtio.c
+index 519bb03..20c4f39 100644
+--- a/hw/virtio/virtio.c
++++ b/hw/virtio/virtio.c
+@@ -458,6 +458,11 @@ static void virtqueue_map_desc(unsigned int *p_num_sg, hwaddr *addr, struct iove
+     unsigned num_sg = *p_num_sg;
+     assert(num_sg <= max_num_sg);
+ 
++    if (!sz) {
++        error_report("virtio: zero sized buffers are not allowed");
++        exit(1);
++    }
++
+     while (sz) {
+         hwaddr len = sz;
+ 

0005-scsi-pvscsi-limit-loop-to-fetch-SG-list.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Tue, 6 Sep 2016 02:20:43 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] scsi: pvscsi: limit loop to fetch SG list
+
+In PVSCSI paravirtual SCSI bus, pvscsi_convert_sglist can take a very
+long time or go into an infinite loop due to two different bugs:
+
+1) the request descriptor data length is defined to be 64 bit. While
+building SG list from a request descriptor, it gets truncated to 32bit
+in routine 'pvscsi_convert_sglist'. This could lead to an infinite loop
+situation large 'dataLen' values when data_length is cast to uint32_t and
+chunk_size becomes always zero.  Fix this by removing the incorrect cast.
+
+2) pvscsi_get_next_sg_elem can be called arbitrarily many times if the
+element has a zero length.  Get out of the loop early when this happens,
+by introducing an upper limit on the number of SG list elements.
+
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Message-Id: <1473108643-12983-1-git-send-email-ppandit@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 49adc5d3f8c6bb75e55ebfeab109c5c37dea65e8)
+---
+ hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c | 11 ++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c b/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
+index b845729..a13e72c 100644
+--- a/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
++++ b/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
+@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@
+ #define PVSCSI_MAX_DEVS                   (64)
+ #define PVSCSI_MSIX_NUM_VECTORS           (1)
+ 
++#define PVSCSI_MAX_SG_ELEM                2048
++
+ #define PVSCSI_MAX_CMD_DATA_WORDS \
+     (sizeof(PVSCSICmdDescSetupRings)/sizeof(uint32_t))
+ 
+@@ -632,17 +634,16 @@ pvscsi_queue_pending_descriptor(PVSCSIState *s, SCSIDevice **d,
+ static void
+ pvscsi_convert_sglist(PVSCSIRequest *r)
+ {
+-    int chunk_size;
++    uint32_t chunk_size, elmcnt = 0;
+     uint64_t data_length = r->req.dataLen;
+     PVSCSISGState sg = r->sg;
+-    while (data_length) {
+-        while (!sg.resid) {
++    while (data_length && elmcnt < PVSCSI_MAX_SG_ELEM) {
++        while (!sg.resid && elmcnt++ < PVSCSI_MAX_SG_ELEM) {
+             pvscsi_get_next_sg_elem(&sg);
+             trace_pvscsi_convert_sglist(r->req.context, r->sg.dataAddr,
+                                         r->sg.resid);
+         }
+-        assert(data_length > 0);
+-        chunk_size = MIN((unsigned) data_length, sg.resid);
++        chunk_size = MIN(data_length, sg.resid);
+         if (chunk_size) {
+             qemu_sglist_add(&r->sgl, sg.dataAddr, chunk_size);
+         }

0006-vmsvga-correct-bitmap-and-pixmap-size-checks.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Thu, 8 Sep 2016 18:15:54 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] vmsvga: correct bitmap and pixmap size checks
+
+When processing svga command DEFINE_CURSOR in vmsvga_fifo_run,
+the computed BITMAP and PIXMAP size are checked against the
+'cursor.mask[]' and 'cursor.image[]' array sizes in bytes.
+Correct these checks to avoid OOB memory access.
+
+Reported-by: Qinghao Tang <luodalongde@gmail.com>
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Message-id: 1473338754-15430-1-git-send-email-ppandit@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 167d97a3def77ee2dbf6e908b0ecbfe2103977db)
+---
+ hw/display/vmware_vga.c | 12 +++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/vmware_vga.c b/hw/display/vmware_vga.c
+index e51a05e..6599cf0 100644
+--- a/hw/display/vmware_vga.c
++++ b/hw/display/vmware_vga.c
+@@ -676,11 +676,13 @@ static void vmsvga_fifo_run(struct vmsvga_state_s *s)
+             cursor.bpp = vmsvga_fifo_read(s);
+ 
+             args = SVGA_BITMAP_SIZE(x, y) + SVGA_PIXMAP_SIZE(x, y, cursor.bpp);
+-            if (cursor.width > 256 ||
+-                cursor.height > 256 ||
+-                cursor.bpp > 32 ||
+-                SVGA_BITMAP_SIZE(x, y) > sizeof cursor.mask ||
+-                SVGA_PIXMAP_SIZE(x, y, cursor.bpp) > sizeof cursor.image) {
++            if (cursor.width > 256
++                || cursor.height > 256
++                || cursor.bpp > 32
++                || SVGA_BITMAP_SIZE(x, y)
++                    > sizeof(cursor.mask) / sizeof(cursor.mask[0])
++                || SVGA_PIXMAP_SIZE(x, y, cursor.bpp)
++                    > sizeof(cursor.image) / sizeof(cursor.image[0])) {
+                     goto badcmd;
+             }
+ 

0007-hw-net-Fix-a-heap-overflow-in-xlnx.xps-ethernetlite.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From: chaojianhu <chaojianhu@hotmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 9 Aug 2016 11:52:54 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] hw/net: Fix a heap overflow in xlnx.xps-ethernetlite
+
+The .receive callback of xlnx.xps-ethernetlite doesn't check the length
+of data before calling memcpy. As a result, the NetClientState object in
+heap will be overflowed. All versions of qemu with xlnx.xps-ethernetlite
+will be affected.
+
+Reported-by: chaojianhu <chaojianhu@hotmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: chaojianhu <chaojianhu@hotmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit a0d1cbdacff5df4ded16b753b38fdd9da6092968)
+---
+ hw/net/xilinx_ethlite.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/xilinx_ethlite.c b/hw/net/xilinx_ethlite.c
+index bc846e7..12b7419 100644
+--- a/hw/net/xilinx_ethlite.c
++++ b/hw/net/xilinx_ethlite.c
+@@ -197,6 +197,10 @@ static ssize_t eth_rx(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size)
+     }
+ 
+     D(qemu_log("%s %zd rxbase=%x\n", __func__, size, rxbase));
++    if (size > (R_MAX - R_RX_BUF0 - rxbase) * 4) {
++        D(qemu_log("ethlite packet is too big, size=%x\n", size));
++        return -1;
++    }
+     memcpy(&s->regs[rxbase + R_RX_BUF0], buf, size);
+ 
+     s->regs[rxbase + R_RX_CTRL0] |= CTRL_S;

0008-usb-xhci-fix-memory-leak-in-usb_xhci_exit.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2016 03:20:03 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] usb:xhci:fix memory leak in usb_xhci_exit
+
+If the xhci uses msix, it doesn't free the corresponding
+memory, thus leading a memory leak. This patch avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Message-id: 57d7d2e0.d4301c0a.d13e9.9a55@mx.google.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit b53dd4495ced2432a0b652ea895e651d07336f7e)
+---
+ hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c | 3 +--
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c b/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
+index 43ba615..510a3e1 100644
+--- a/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
++++ b/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
+@@ -3689,8 +3689,7 @@ static void usb_xhci_exit(PCIDevice *dev)
+     /* destroy msix memory region */
+     if (dev->msix_table && dev->msix_pba
+         && dev->msix_entry_used) {
+-        memory_region_del_subregion(&xhci->mem, &dev->msix_table_mmio);
+-        memory_region_del_subregion(&xhci->mem, &dev->msix_pba_mmio);
++        msix_uninit(dev, &xhci->mem, &xhci->mem);
+     }
+ 
+     usb_bus_release(&xhci->bus);

0009-virtio-add-check-for-descriptor-s-mapped-address.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2016 23:55:45 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] virtio: add check for descriptor's mapped address
+
+virtio back end uses set of buffers to facilitate I/O operations.
+If its size is too large, 'cpu_physical_memory_map' could return
+a null address. This would result in a null dereference while
+un-mapping descriptors. Add check to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Qinghao Tang <luodalongde@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 973e7170dddefb491a48df5cba33b2ae151013a0)
+---
+ hw/virtio/virtio.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio.c b/hw/virtio/virtio.c
+index 20c4f39..3a470fc 100644
+--- a/hw/virtio/virtio.c
++++ b/hw/virtio/virtio.c
+@@ -472,6 +472,11 @@ static void virtqueue_map_desc(unsigned int *p_num_sg, hwaddr *addr, struct iove
+         }
+ 
+         iov[num_sg].iov_base = cpu_physical_memory_map(pa, &len, is_write);
++        if (!iov[num_sg].iov_base) {
++            error_report("virtio: bogus descriptor or out of resources");
++            exit(1);
++        }
++
+         iov[num_sg].iov_len = len;
+         addr[num_sg] = pa;
+ 

0010-net-mcf-limit-buffer-descriptor-count.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2016 16:02:37 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] net: mcf: limit buffer descriptor count
+
+ColdFire Fast Ethernet Controller uses buffer descriptors to manage
+data flow to/fro receive & transmit queues. While transmitting
+packets, it could continue to read buffer descriptors if a buffer
+descriptor has length of zero and has crafted values in bd.flags.
+Set upper limit to number of buffer descriptors.
+
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 070c4b92b8cd5390889716677a0b92444d6e087a)
+---
+ hw/net/mcf_fec.c | 5 +++--
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/mcf_fec.c b/hw/net/mcf_fec.c
+index 7c0398e..6d3418e 100644
+--- a/hw/net/mcf_fec.c
++++ b/hw/net/mcf_fec.c
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ do { printf("mcf_fec: " fmt , ## __VA_ARGS__); } while (0)
+ #define DPRINTF(fmt, ...) do {} while(0)
+ #endif
+ 
++#define FEC_MAX_DESC 1024
+ #define FEC_MAX_FRAME_SIZE 2032
+ 
+ typedef struct {
+@@ -149,7 +150,7 @@ static void mcf_fec_do_tx(mcf_fec_state *s)
+     uint32_t addr;
+     mcf_fec_bd bd;
+     int frame_size;
+-    int len;
++    int len, descnt = 0;
+     uint8_t frame[FEC_MAX_FRAME_SIZE];
+     uint8_t *ptr;
+ 
+@@ -157,7 +158,7 @@ static void mcf_fec_do_tx(mcf_fec_state *s)
+     ptr = frame;
+     frame_size = 0;
+     addr = s->tx_descriptor;
+-    while (1) {
++    while (descnt++ < FEC_MAX_DESC) {
+         mcf_fec_read_bd(&bd, addr);
+         DPRINTF("tx_bd %x flags %04x len %d data %08x\n",
+                 addr, bd.flags, bd.length, bd.data);

0011-xhci-limit-the-number-of-link-trbs-we-are-willing-to.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 10 Oct 2016 12:46:22 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] xhci: limit the number of link trbs we are willing to process
+
+Needed to avoid we run in circles forever in case the guest builds
+an endless loop with link trbs.
+
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Tested-by: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 1476096382-7981-1-git-send-email-kraxel@redhat.com
+(cherry picked from commit 05f43d44e4bc26611ce25fd7d726e483f73363ce)
+---
+ hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c b/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
+index 510a3e1..4e9dea5 100644
+--- a/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
++++ b/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
+@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@
+  * to the specs when it gets them */
+ #define ER_FULL_HACK
+ 
++#define TRB_LINK_LIMIT  4
++
+ #define LEN_CAP         0x40
+ #define LEN_OPER        (0x400 + 0x10 * MAXPORTS)
+ #define LEN_RUNTIME     ((MAXINTRS + 1) * 0x20)
+@@ -999,6 +1001,7 @@ static TRBType xhci_ring_fetch(XHCIState *xhci, XHCIRing *ring, XHCITRB *trb,
+                                dma_addr_t *addr)
+ {
+     PCIDevice *pci_dev = PCI_DEVICE(xhci);
++    uint32_t link_cnt = 0;
+ 
+     while (1) {
+         TRBType type;
+@@ -1025,6 +1028,9 @@ static TRBType xhci_ring_fetch(XHCIState *xhci, XHCIRing *ring, XHCITRB *trb,
+             ring->dequeue += TRB_SIZE;
+             return type;
+         } else {
++            if (++link_cnt > TRB_LINK_LIMIT) {
++                return 0;
++            }
+             ring->dequeue = xhci_mask64(trb->parameter);
+             if (trb->control & TRB_LK_TC) {
+                 ring->ccs = !ring->ccs;
+@@ -1042,6 +1048,7 @@ static int xhci_ring_chain_length(XHCIState *xhci, const XHCIRing *ring)
+     bool ccs = ring->ccs;
+     /* hack to bundle together the two/three TDs that make a setup transfer */
+     bool control_td_set = 0;
++    uint32_t link_cnt = 0;
+ 
+     while (1) {
+         TRBType type;
+@@ -1057,6 +1064,9 @@ static int xhci_ring_chain_length(XHCIState *xhci, const XHCIRing *ring)
+         type = TRB_TYPE(trb);
+ 
+         if (type == TR_LINK) {
++            if (++link_cnt > TRB_LINK_LIMIT) {
++                return -length;
++            }
+             dequeue = xhci_mask64(trb.parameter);
+             if (trb.control & TRB_LK_TC) {
+                 ccs = !ccs;

0012-usb-ehci-fix-memory-leak-in-ehci_process_itd.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Sun, 18 Sep 2016 19:48:35 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] usb: ehci: fix memory leak in ehci_process_itd
+
+While processing isochronous transfer descriptors(iTD), if the page
+select(PG) field value is out of bands it will return. In this
+situation the ehci's sg list is not freed thus leading to a memory
+leak issue. This patch avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
+(cherry picked from commit b16c129daf0fed91febbb88de23dae8271c8898a)
+---
+ hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c b/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c
+index 43a8f7a..92241bb 100644
+--- a/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c
++++ b/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c
+@@ -1426,6 +1426,7 @@ static int ehci_process_itd(EHCIState *ehci,
+             if (off + len > 4096) {
+                 /* transfer crosses page border */
+                 if (pg == 6) {
++                    qemu_sglist_destroy(&ehci->isgl);
+                     return -1;  /* avoid page pg + 1 */
+                 }
+                 ptr2 = (itd->bufptr[pg + 1] & ITD_BUFPTR_MASK);

0013-qxl-Only-emit-QXL_INTERRUPT_CLIENT_MONITORS_CONFIG-o.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+From: Christophe Fergeau <cfergeau@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 14 Oct 2016 14:22:36 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] qxl: Only emit QXL_INTERRUPT_CLIENT_MONITORS_CONFIG on config
+ changes
+
+Currently if the client keeps sending the same monitor config to
+QEMU/spice-server, QEMU will always raise
+a QXL_INTERRUPT_CLIENT_MONITORS_CONFIG regardless of whether there was a
+change or not.
+Guest-side (with fedora 25), the kernel QXL KMS driver will also forward the
+event to user-space without checking if there were actual changes.
+Next in line are gnome-shell/mutter (on a default f25 install), which
+will try to reconfigure everything without checking if there is anything
+to do.
+Where this gets ugly is that when applying the resolution changes,
+gnome-shell/mutter will call drmModeRmFB, drmModeAddFB, and
+drmModeSetCrtc, which will cause the primary surface to be destroyed and
+recreated by the QXL KMS driver. This in turn will cause the client to
+resend a client monitors config message, which will cause QEMU to reemit
+an interrupt with an unchanged monitors configuration, ...
+This causes https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1266484
+
+This commit makes sure that we only emit
+QXL_INTERRUPT_CLIENT_MONITORS_CONFIG when there are actual configuration
+changes the guest should act on.
+---
+ hw/display/qxl.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/qxl.c b/hw/display/qxl.c
+index 919dc5c..3cc8d38 100644
+--- a/hw/display/qxl.c
++++ b/hw/display/qxl.c
+@@ -997,6 +997,7 @@ static int interface_client_monitors_config(QXLInstance *sin,
+     QXLRom *rom = memory_region_get_ram_ptr(&qxl->rom_bar);
+     int i;
+     unsigned max_outputs = ARRAY_SIZE(rom->client_monitors_config.heads);
++    bool config_changed = false;
+ 
+     if (qxl->revision < 4) {
+         trace_qxl_client_monitors_config_unsupported_by_device(qxl->id,
+@@ -1027,6 +1028,21 @@ static int interface_client_monitors_config(QXLInstance *sin,
+     }
+ #endif
+ 
++    if (rom->client_monitors_config.count != MIN(monitors_config->num_of_monitors, max_outputs)) {
++        config_changed = true;
++    }
++    for (i = 0 ; i < rom->client_monitors_config.count ; ++i) {
++        VDAgentMonConfig *monitor = &monitors_config->monitors[i];
++        QXLURect *rect = &rom->client_monitors_config.heads[i];
++        /* monitor->depth ignored */
++        if ((rect->left != monitor->x) ||
++            (rect->top != monitor->y)  ||
++            (rect->right != monitor->x + monitor->width) ||
++            (rect->bottom != monitor->y + monitor->height)) {
++            config_changed = true;
++        }
++    }
++
+     memset(&rom->client_monitors_config, 0,
+            sizeof(rom->client_monitors_config));
+     rom->client_monitors_config.count = monitors_config->num_of_monitors;
+@@ -1056,7 +1072,9 @@ static int interface_client_monitors_config(QXLInstance *sin,
+     trace_qxl_interrupt_client_monitors_config(qxl->id,
+                         rom->client_monitors_config.count,
+                         rom->client_monitors_config.heads);
+-    qxl_send_events(qxl, QXL_INTERRUPT_CLIENT_MONITORS_CONFIG);
++    if (config_changed) {
++        qxl_send_events(qxl, QXL_INTERRUPT_CLIENT_MONITORS_CONFIG);
++    }
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 

0014-net-vmxnet-initialise-local-tx-descriptor.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2016 00:42:20 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] net: vmxnet: initialise local tx descriptor
+
+In Vmxnet3 device emulator while processing transmit(tx) queue,
+when it reaches end of packet, it calls vmxnet3_complete_packet.
+In that local 'txcq_descr' object is not initialised, which could
+leak host memory bytes a guest.
+
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Reviewed-by: Dmitry Fleytman <dmitry@daynix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit fdda170e50b8af062cf5741e12c4fb5e57a2eacf)
+---
+ hw/net/vmxnet3.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/vmxnet3.c b/hw/net/vmxnet3.c
+index a6ce16e..360290d 100644
+--- a/hw/net/vmxnet3.c
++++ b/hw/net/vmxnet3.c
+@@ -529,6 +529,7 @@ static void vmxnet3_complete_packet(VMXNET3State *s, int qidx, uint32_t tx_ridx)
+ 
+     VMXNET3_RING_DUMP(VMW_RIPRN, "TXC", qidx, &s->txq_descr[qidx].comp_ring);
+ 
++    memset(&txcq_descr, 0, sizeof(txcq_descr));
+     txcq_descr.txdIdx = tx_ridx;
+     txcq_descr.gen = vmxnet3_ring_curr_gen(&s->txq_descr[qidx].comp_ring);
+ 

0015-net-pcnet-check-rx-tx-descriptor-ring-length.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Fri, 30 Sep 2016 00:27:33 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] net: pcnet: check rx/tx descriptor ring length
+
+The AMD PC-Net II emulator has set of control and status(CSR)
+registers. Of these, CSR76 and CSR78 hold receive and transmit
+descriptor ring length respectively. This ring length could range
+from 1 to 65535. Setting ring length to zero leads to an infinite
+loop in pcnet_rdra_addr() or pcnet_transmit(). Add check to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 34e29ce754c02bb6b3bdd244fbb85033460feaff)
+---
+ hw/net/pcnet.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/pcnet.c b/hw/net/pcnet.c
+index 198a01f..3078de8 100644
+--- a/hw/net/pcnet.c
++++ b/hw/net/pcnet.c
+@@ -1429,8 +1429,11 @@ static void pcnet_csr_writew(PCNetState *s, uint32_t rap, uint32_t new_value)
+     case 47: /* POLLINT */
+     case 72:
+     case 74:
++        break;
+     case 76: /* RCVRL */
+     case 78: /* XMTRL */
++        val = (val > 0) ? val : 512;
++        break;
+     case 112:
+        if (CSR_STOP(s) || CSR_SPND(s))
+            break;

0016-virtio-gpu-fix-memory-leak-in-virtio_gpu_resource_cr.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Sun, 18 Sep 2016 19:07:11 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] virtio-gpu: fix memory leak in virtio_gpu_resource_create_2d
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+In virtio gpu resource create dispatch, if the pixman format is zero
+it doesn't free the resource object allocated previously. Thus leading
+a host memory leak issue. This patch avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 57df486e.8379240a.c3620.ff81@mx.google.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit cb3a0522b694cc5bb6424497b3f828ccd28fd1dd)
+---
+ hw/display/virtio-gpu.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c b/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
+index c181fb3..d345276 100644
+--- a/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
++++ b/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
+@@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ static void virtio_gpu_resource_create_2d(VirtIOGPU *g,
+         qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
+                       "%s: host couldn't handle guest format %d\n",
+                       __func__, c2d.format);
++        g_free(res);
+         cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+         return;
+     }

0017-9pfs-fix-potential-host-memory-leak-in-v9fs_read.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2016 14:13:58 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: fix potential host memory leak in v9fs_read
+
+In 9pfs read dispatch function, it doesn't free two QEMUIOVector
+object thus causing potential memory leak. This patch avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+(cherry picked from commit e95c9a493a5a8d6f969e86c9f19f80ffe6587e19)
+---
+ hw/9pfs/9p.c | 5 +++--
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+index d47f5de..afb1c4e 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+@@ -1807,14 +1807,15 @@ static void v9fs_read(void *opaque)
+             if (len < 0) {
+                 /* IO error return the error */
+                 err = len;
+-                goto out;
++                goto out_free_iovec;
+             }
+         } while (count < max_count && len > 0);
+         err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "d", count);
+         if (err < 0) {
+-            goto out;
++            goto out_free_iovec;
+         }
+         err += offset + count;
++out_free_iovec:
+         qemu_iovec_destroy(&qiov);
+         qemu_iovec_destroy(&qiov_full);
+     } else if (fidp->fid_type == P9_FID_XATTR) {

0018-9pfs-allocate-space-for-guest-originated-empty-strin.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2016 14:13:58 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: allocate space for guest originated empty strings
+
+If a guest sends an empty string paramater to any 9P operation, the current
+code unmarshals it into a V9fsString equal to { .size = 0, .data = NULL }.
+
+This is unfortunate because it can cause NULL pointer dereference to happen
+at various locations in the 9pfs code. And we don't want to check str->data
+everywhere we pass it to strcmp() or any other function which expects a
+dereferenceable pointer.
+
+This patch enforces the allocation of genuine C empty strings instead, so
+callers don't have to bother.
+
+Out of all v9fs_iov_vunmarshal() users, only v9fs_xattrwalk() checks if
+the returned string is empty. It now uses v9fs_string_size() since
+name.data cannot be NULL anymore.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+[groug, rewritten title and changelog,
+ fix empty string check in v9fs_xattrwalk()]
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+
+(cherry picked from commit ba42ebb863ab7d40adc79298422ed9596df8f73a)
+---
+ fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.c | 2 +-
+ hw/9pfs/9p.c           | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.c b/fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.c
+index fb40bdf..741e4d9 100644
+--- a/fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.c
++++ b/fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.c
+@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ ssize_t v9fs_iov_vunmarshal(struct iovec *out_sg, int out_num, size_t offset,
+                 str->data = g_malloc(str->size + 1);
+                 copied = v9fs_unpack(str->data, out_sg, out_num, offset,
+                                      str->size);
+-                if (copied > 0) {
++                if (copied >= 0) {
+                     str->data[str->size] = 0;
+                 } else {
+                     v9fs_string_free(str);
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+index afb1c4e..856544d 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+@@ -3151,7 +3151,7 @@ static void v9fs_xattrwalk(void *opaque)
+         goto out;
+     }
+     v9fs_path_copy(&xattr_fidp->path, &file_fidp->path);
+-    if (name.data == NULL) {
++    if (!v9fs_string_size(&name)) {
+         /*
+          * listxattr request. Get the size first
+          */

0019-net-rocker-set-limit-to-DMA-buffer-size.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Wed, 12 Oct 2016 14:40:55 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] net: rocker: set limit to DMA buffer size
+
+Rocker network switch emulator has test registers to help debug
+DMA operations. While testing host DMA access, a buffer address
+is written to register 'TEST_DMA_ADDR' and its size is written to
+register 'TEST_DMA_SIZE'. When performing TEST_DMA_CTRL_INVERT
+test, if DMA buffer size was greater than 'INT_MAX', it leads to
+an invalid buffer access. Limit the DMA buffer size to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Huawei PSIRT <psirt@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 8caed3d564672e8bc6d2e4c6a35228afd01f4723)
+---
+ hw/net/rocker/rocker.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/rocker/rocker.c b/hw/net/rocker/rocker.c
+index 30f2ce4..e9d215a 100644
+--- a/hw/net/rocker/rocker.c
++++ b/hw/net/rocker/rocker.c
+@@ -860,7 +860,7 @@ static void rocker_io_writel(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, uint32_t val)
+         rocker_msix_irq(r, val);
+         break;
+     case ROCKER_TEST_DMA_SIZE:
+-        r->test_dma_size = val;
++        r->test_dma_size = val & 0xFFFF;
+         break;
+     case ROCKER_TEST_DMA_ADDR + 4:
+         r->test_dma_addr = ((uint64_t)val) << 32 | r->lower32;

0020-char-serial-check-divider-value-against-baud-base.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Wed, 12 Oct 2016 11:28:08 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] char: serial: check divider value against baud base
+
+16550A UART device uses an oscillator to generate frequencies
+(baud base), which decide communication speed. This speed could
+be changed by dividing it by a divider. If the divider is
+greater than the baud base, speed is set to zero, leading to a
+divide by zero error. Add check to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Huawei PSIRT <psirt@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Message-Id: <1476251888-20238-1-git-send-email-ppandit@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 3592fe0c919cf27a81d8e9f9b4f269553418bb01)
+---
+ hw/char/serial.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/char/serial.c b/hw/char/serial.c
+index 6d815b5..3998131 100644
+--- a/hw/char/serial.c
++++ b/hw/char/serial.c
+@@ -152,8 +152,9 @@ static void serial_update_parameters(SerialState *s)
+     int speed, parity, data_bits, stop_bits, frame_size;
+     QEMUSerialSetParams ssp;
+ 
+-    if (s->divider == 0)
++    if (s->divider == 0 || s->divider > s->baudbase) {
+         return;
++    }
+ 
+     /* Start bit. */
+     frame_size = 1;

0021-net-rtl8139-limit-processing-of-ring-descriptors.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Fri, 21 Oct 2016 17:39:29 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] net: rtl8139: limit processing of ring descriptors
+
+RTL8139 ethernet controller in C+ mode supports multiple
+descriptor rings, each with maximum of 64 descriptors. While
+processing transmit descriptor ring in 'rtl8139_cplus_transmit',
+it does not limit the descriptor count and runs forever. Add
+check to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Andrew Henderson <hendersa@icculus.org>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit c7c35916692fe010fef25ac338443d3fe40be225)
+---
+ hw/net/rtl8139.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/rtl8139.c b/hw/net/rtl8139.c
+index 1e5ec14..138fa62 100644
+--- a/hw/net/rtl8139.c
++++ b/hw/net/rtl8139.c
+@@ -2379,7 +2379,7 @@ static void rtl8139_cplus_transmit(RTL8139State *s)
+ {
+     int txcount = 0;
+ 
+-    while (rtl8139_cplus_transmit_one(s))
++    while (txcount < 64 && rtl8139_cplus_transmit_one(s))
+     {
+         ++txcount;
+     }

0022-audio-intel-hda-check-stream-entry-count-during-tran.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Thu, 20 Oct 2016 13:10:24 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] audio: intel-hda: check stream entry count during transfer
+
+Intel HDA emulator uses stream of buffers during DMA data
+transfers. Each entry has buffer length and buffer pointer
+position, which are used to derive bytes to 'copy'. If this
+length and buffer pointer were to be same, 'copy' could be
+set to zero(0), leading to an infinite loop. Add check to
+avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Huawei PSIRT <psirt@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 1476949224-6865-1-git-send-email-ppandit@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 0c0fc2b5fd534786051889459848764edd798050)
+---
+ hw/audio/intel-hda.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/audio/intel-hda.c b/hw/audio/intel-hda.c
+index d372d4a..cd3b03c 100644
+--- a/hw/audio/intel-hda.c
++++ b/hw/audio/intel-hda.c
+@@ -415,7 +415,8 @@ static bool intel_hda_xfer(HDACodecDevice *dev, uint32_t stnr, bool output,
+     }
+ 
+     left = len;
+-    while (left > 0) {
++    s = st->bentries;
++    while (left > 0 && s-- > 0) {
+         copy = left;
+         if (copy > st->bsize - st->lpib)
+             copy = st->bsize - st->lpib;

0023-timer-a9gtimer-remove-loop-to-auto-increment-compara.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2016 16:26:54 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] timer: a9gtimer: remove loop to auto-increment comparator
+
+ARM A9MP processor has a peripheral timer with an auto-increment
+register, which holds an increment step value. A user could set
+this value to zero. When auto-increment control bit is enabled,
+it leads to an infinite loop in 'a9_gtimer_update' while
+updating comparator value. Remove this loop incrementing the
+comparator value.
+
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Message-id: 1476733226-11635-1-git-send-email-ppandit@redhat.com
+Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
+Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 6be8f5e2626e102433e569d9cece2120baf0c879)
+---
+ hw/timer/a9gtimer.c | 14 +++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/timer/a9gtimer.c b/hw/timer/a9gtimer.c
+index 772f85f..ce1dc63 100644
+--- a/hw/timer/a9gtimer.c
++++ b/hw/timer/a9gtimer.c
+@@ -82,15 +82,15 @@ static void a9_gtimer_update(A9GTimerState *s, bool sync)
+         if ((s->control & R_CONTROL_TIMER_ENABLE) &&
+                 (gtb->control & R_CONTROL_COMP_ENABLE)) {
+             /* R2p0+, where the compare function is >= */
+-            while (gtb->compare < update.new) {
++            if (gtb->compare < update.new) {
+                 DB_PRINT("Compare event happened for CPU %d\n", i);
+                 gtb->status = 1;
+-                if (gtb->control & R_CONTROL_AUTO_INCREMENT) {
+-                    DB_PRINT("Auto incrementing timer compare by %" PRId32 "\n",
+-                             gtb->inc);
+-                    gtb->compare += gtb->inc;
+-                } else {
+-                    break;
++                if (gtb->control & R_CONTROL_AUTO_INCREMENT && gtb->inc) {
++                    uint64_t inc =
++                        QEMU_ALIGN_UP(update.new - gtb->compare, gtb->inc);
++                    DB_PRINT("Auto incrementing timer compare by %"
++                                                        PRId64 "\n", inc);
++                    gtb->compare += inc;
+                 }
+             }
+             cdiff = (int64_t)gtb->compare - (int64_t)update.new + 1;

0024-net-eepro100-fix-memory-leak-in-device-uninit.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Sat, 8 Oct 2016 05:07:25 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] net: eepro100: fix memory leak in device uninit
+
+The exit dispatch of eepro100 network card device doesn't free
+the 's->vmstate' field which was allocated in device realize thus
+leading a host memory leak. This patch avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 2634ab7fe29b3f75d0865b719caf8f310d634aae)
+---
+ hw/net/eepro100.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/eepro100.c b/hw/net/eepro100.c
+index 9b4b9b5..c39fd19 100644
+--- a/hw/net/eepro100.c
++++ b/hw/net/eepro100.c
+@@ -1843,6 +1843,7 @@ static void pci_nic_uninit(PCIDevice *pci_dev)
+     EEPRO100State *s = DO_UPCAST(EEPRO100State, dev, pci_dev);
+ 
+     vmstate_unregister(&pci_dev->qdev, s->vmstate, s);
++    g_free(s->vmstate);
+     eeprom93xx_free(&pci_dev->qdev, s->eeprom);
+     qemu_del_nic(s->nic);
+ }

0025-9pfs-fix-information-leak-in-xattr-read.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2016 14:13:58 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: fix information leak in xattr read
+
+9pfs uses g_malloc() to allocate the xattr memory space, if the guest
+reads this memory before writing to it, this will leak host heap memory
+to the guest. This patch avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+(cherry picked from commit eb687602853b4ae656e9236ee4222609f3a6887d)
+---
+ hw/9pfs/9p.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+index 856544d..0735246 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+@@ -3259,7 +3259,7 @@ static void v9fs_xattrcreate(void *opaque)
+     xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.flags = flags;
+     v9fs_string_init(&xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.name);
+     v9fs_string_copy(&xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.name, &name);
+-    xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value = g_malloc(size);
++    xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value = g_malloc0(size);
+     err = offset;
+     put_fid(pdu, file_fidp);
+ out_nofid:

0026-9pfs-fix-memory-leak-in-v9fs_xattrcreate.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2016 14:13:58 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: fix memory leak in v9fs_xattrcreate
+
+The 'fs.xattr.value' field in V9fsFidState object doesn't consider the
+situation that this field has been allocated previously. Every time, it
+will be allocated directly. This leads to a host memory leak issue if
+the client sends another Txattrcreate message with the same fid number
+before the fid from the previous time got clunked.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+[groug, updated the changelog to indicate how the leak can occur]
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+
+(cherry picked from commit ff55e94d23ae94c8628b0115320157c763eb3e06)
+---
+ hw/9pfs/9p.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+index 0735246..54e5ed4 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+@@ -3259,6 +3259,7 @@ static void v9fs_xattrcreate(void *opaque)
+     xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.flags = flags;
+     v9fs_string_init(&xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.name);
+     v9fs_string_copy(&xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.name, &name);
++    g_free(xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value);
+     xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value = g_malloc0(size);
+     err = offset;
+     put_fid(pdu, file_fidp);

0027-9pfs-add-xattrwalk_fid-field-in-V9fsXattr-struct.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Tue, 1 Nov 2016 12:00:40 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: add xattrwalk_fid field in V9fsXattr struct
+
+Currently, 9pfs sets the 'copied_len' field in V9fsXattr
+to -1 to tag xattr walk fid. As the 'copied_len' is also
+used to account for copied bytes, this may make confusion. This patch
+add a bool 'xattrwalk_fid' to tag the xattr walk fid.
+
+Suggested-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+(cherry picked from commit dd28fbbc2edc0822965d402d927ce646326d6954)
+---
+ hw/9pfs/9p.c | 7 ++++---
+ hw/9pfs/9p.h | 1 +
+ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+index 54e5ed4..22690f2 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ static int v9fs_xattr_fid_clunk(V9fsPDU *pdu, V9fsFidState *fidp)
+ {
+     int retval = 0;
+ 
+-    if (fidp->fs.xattr.copied_len == -1) {
++    if (fidp->fs.xattr.xattrwalk_fid) {
+         /* getxattr/listxattr fid */
+         goto free_value;
+     }
+@@ -3166,7 +3166,7 @@ static void v9fs_xattrwalk(void *opaque)
+          */
+         xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.len = size;
+         xattr_fidp->fid_type = P9_FID_XATTR;
+-        xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.copied_len = -1;
++        xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.xattrwalk_fid = true;
+         if (size) {
+             xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value = g_malloc(size);
+             err = v9fs_co_llistxattr(pdu, &xattr_fidp->path,
+@@ -3199,7 +3199,7 @@ static void v9fs_xattrwalk(void *opaque)
+          */
+         xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.len = size;
+         xattr_fidp->fid_type = P9_FID_XATTR;
+-        xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.copied_len = -1;
++        xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.xattrwalk_fid = true;
+         if (size) {
+             xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value = g_malloc(size);
+             err = v9fs_co_lgetxattr(pdu, &xattr_fidp->path,
+@@ -3255,6 +3255,7 @@ static void v9fs_xattrcreate(void *opaque)
+     xattr_fidp = file_fidp;
+     xattr_fidp->fid_type = P9_FID_XATTR;
+     xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.copied_len = 0;
++    xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.xattrwalk_fid = false;
+     xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.len = size;
+     xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.flags = flags;
+     v9fs_string_init(&xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.name);
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.h b/hw/9pfs/9p.h
+index 589b3a5..5750d67 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.h
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.h
+@@ -167,6 +167,7 @@ typedef struct V9fsXattr
+     void *value;
+     V9fsString name;
+     int flags;
++    bool xattrwalk_fid;
+ } V9fsXattr;
+ 
+ /*

0028-9pfs-convert-len-copied_len-field-in-V9fsXattr-to-th.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Tue, 1 Nov 2016 12:00:40 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: convert 'len/copied_len' field in V9fsXattr to the type
+ of uint64_t
+
+The 'len' in V9fsXattr comes from the 'size' argument in setxattr()
+function in guest. The setxattr() function's declaration is this:
+
+int setxattr(const char *path, const char *name,
+             const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
+
+and 'size' is treated as u64 in linux kernel client code:
+
+int p9_client_xattrcreate(struct p9_fid *fid, const char *name,
+                          u64 attr_size, int flags)
+
+So the 'len' should have an type of 'uint64_t'.
+The 'copied_len' in V9fsXattr is used to account for copied bytes, it
+should also have an type of 'uint64_t'.
+
+Suggested-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 8495f9ad26d398f01e208a53f1a5152483a16084)
+---
+ hw/9pfs/9p.h | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.h b/hw/9pfs/9p.h
+index 5750d67..4e3bc52 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.h
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.h
+@@ -162,8 +162,8 @@ typedef struct V9fsConf
+ 
+ typedef struct V9fsXattr
+ {
+-    int64_t copied_len;
+-    int64_t len;
++    uint64_t copied_len;
++    uint64_t len;
+     void *value;
+     V9fsString name;
+     int flags;

0029-9pfs-fix-integer-overflow-issue-in-xattr-read-write.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Tue, 1 Nov 2016 12:00:40 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: fix integer overflow issue in xattr read/write
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The v9fs_xattr_read() and v9fs_xattr_write() are passed a guest
+originated offset: they must ensure this offset does not go beyond
+the size of the extended attribute that was set in v9fs_xattrcreate().
+Unfortunately, the current code implement these checks with unsafe
+calculations on 32 and 64 bit values, which may allow a malicious
+guest to cause OOB access anyway.
+
+Fix this by comparing the offset and the xattr size, which are
+both uint64_t, before trying to compute the effective number of bytes
+to read or write.
+
+Suggested-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Reviewed-By: Guido Günther <agx@sigxcpu.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 7e55d65c56a03dcd2c5d7c49d37c5a74b55d4bd6)
+---
+ hw/9pfs/9p.c | 32 ++++++++++++--------------------
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+index 22690f2..5126459 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+@@ -1627,20 +1627,17 @@ static int v9fs_xattr_read(V9fsState *s, V9fsPDU *pdu, V9fsFidState *fidp,
+ {
+     ssize_t err;
+     size_t offset = 7;
+-    int read_count;
+-    int64_t xattr_len;
++    uint64_t read_count;
+     V9fsVirtioState *v = container_of(s, V9fsVirtioState, state);
+     VirtQueueElement *elem = v->elems[pdu->idx];
+ 
+-    xattr_len = fidp->fs.xattr.len;
+-    read_count = xattr_len - off;
++    if (fidp->fs.xattr.len < off) {
++        read_count = 0;
++    } else {
++        read_count = fidp->fs.xattr.len - off;
++    }
+     if (read_count > max_count) {
+         read_count = max_count;
+-    } else if (read_count < 0) {
+-        /*
+-         * read beyond XATTR value
+-         */
+-        read_count = 0;
+     }
+     err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "d", read_count);
+     if (err < 0) {
+@@ -1959,23 +1956,18 @@ static int v9fs_xattr_write(V9fsState *s, V9fsPDU *pdu, V9fsFidState *fidp,
+ {
+     int i, to_copy;
+     ssize_t err = 0;
+-    int write_count;
+-    int64_t xattr_len;
++    uint64_t write_count;
+     size_t offset = 7;
+ 
+ 
+-    xattr_len = fidp->fs.xattr.len;
+-    write_count = xattr_len - off;
+-    if (write_count > count) {
+-        write_count = count;
+-    } else if (write_count < 0) {
+-        /*
+-         * write beyond XATTR value len specified in
+-         * xattrcreate
+-         */
++    if (fidp->fs.xattr.len < off) {
+         err = -ENOSPC;
+         goto out;
+     }
++    write_count = fidp->fs.xattr.len - off;
++    if (write_count > count) {
++        write_count = count;
++    }
+     err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "d", write_count);
+     if (err < 0) {
+         return err;

0030-9pfs-fix-memory-leak-in-v9fs_link.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2016 14:13:58 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: fix memory leak in v9fs_link
+
+The v9fs_link() function keeps a reference on the source fid object. This
+causes a memory leak since the reference never goes down to 0. This patch
+fixes the issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+[groug, rephrased the changelog]
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+
+(cherry picked from commit 4c1586787ff43c9acd18a56c12d720e3e6be9f7c)
+---
+ hw/9pfs/9p.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+index 5126459..0de545b 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+@@ -2385,6 +2385,7 @@ static void v9fs_link(void *opaque)
+     if (!err) {
+         err = offset;
+     }
++    put_fid(pdu, oldfidp);
+ out:
+     put_fid(pdu, dfidp);
+ out_nofid:

0031-9pfs-fix-memory-leak-in-v9fs_write.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2016 14:13:58 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: fix memory leak in v9fs_write
+
+If an error occurs when marshalling the transfer length to the guest, the
+v9fs_write() function doesn't free an IO vector, thus leading to a memory
+leak. This patch fixes the issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+[groug, rephrased the changelog]
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+
+(cherry picked from commit fdfcc9aeea1492f4b819a24c94dfb678145b1bf9)
+---
+ hw/9pfs/9p.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+index 0de545b..86f44db 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+@@ -2062,7 +2062,7 @@ static void v9fs_write(void *opaque)
+     offset = 7;
+     err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "d", total);
+     if (err < 0) {
+-        goto out;
++        goto out_qiov;
+     }
+     err += offset;
+     trace_v9fs_write_return(pdu->tag, pdu->id, total, err);

0032-xen-fix-ioreq-handling.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
+Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 05:56:51 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] xen: fix ioreq handling
+
+Avoid double fetches and bounds check size to avoid overflowing
+internal variables.
+
+This is CVE-2016-9381 / XSA-197.
+
+Reported-by: yanghongke <yanghongke@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
+(cherry picked from commit b85f9dfdb156ae2a2a52f39a36e9f1f270614cd2)
+---
+ xen-hvm.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/xen-hvm.c b/xen-hvm.c
+index 039680a..ba823c3 100644
+--- a/xen-hvm.c
++++ b/xen-hvm.c
+@@ -797,6 +797,10 @@ static void cpu_ioreq_pio(ioreq_t *req)
+     trace_cpu_ioreq_pio(req, req->dir, req->df, req->data_is_ptr, req->addr,
+                          req->data, req->count, req->size);
+ 
++    if (req->size > sizeof(uint32_t)) {
++        hw_error("PIO: bad size (%u)", req->size);
++    }
++
+     if (req->dir == IOREQ_READ) {
+         if (!req->data_is_ptr) {
+             req->data = do_inp(req->addr, req->size);
+@@ -833,6 +837,10 @@ static void cpu_ioreq_move(ioreq_t *req)
+     trace_cpu_ioreq_move(req, req->dir, req->df, req->data_is_ptr, req->addr,
+                          req->data, req->count, req->size);
+ 
++    if (req->size > sizeof(req->data)) {
++        hw_error("MMIO: bad size (%u)", req->size);
++    }
++
+     if (!req->data_is_ptr) {
+         if (req->dir == IOREQ_READ) {
+             for (i = 0; i < req->count; i++) {
+@@ -997,11 +1005,13 @@ static int handle_buffered_iopage(XenIOState *state)
+         req.df = 1;
+         req.type = buf_req->type;
+         req.data_is_ptr = 0;
++        xen_rmb();
+         qw = (req.size == 8);
+         if (qw) {
+             buf_req = &buf_page->buf_ioreq[(rdptr + 1) %
+                                            IOREQ_BUFFER_SLOT_NUM];
+             req.data |= ((uint64_t)buf_req->data) << 32;
++            xen_rmb();
+         }
+ 
+         handle_ioreq(state, &req);
+@@ -1032,7 +1042,11 @@ static void cpu_handle_ioreq(void *opaque)
+ 
+     handle_buffered_iopage(state);
+     if (req) {
+-        handle_ioreq(state, req);
++        ioreq_t copy = *req;
++
++        xen_rmb();
++        handle_ioreq(state, &copy);
++        req->data = copy.data;
+ 
+         if (req->state != STATE_IOREQ_INPROCESS) {
+             fprintf(stderr, "Badness in I/O request ... not in service?!: "

0033-display-cirrus-check-vga-bits-per-pixel-bpp-value.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Tue, 18 Oct 2016 13:15:17 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] display: cirrus: check vga bits per pixel(bpp) value
+
+In Cirrus CLGD 54xx VGA Emulator, if cirrus graphics mode is VGA,
+'cirrus_get_bpp' returns zero(0), which could lead to a divide
+by zero error in while copying pixel data. The same could occur
+via blit pitch values. Add check to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Huawei PSIRT <psirt@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Message-id: 1476776717-24807-1-git-send-email-ppandit@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 4299b90e9ba9ce5ca9024572804ba751aa1a7e70)
+---
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 14 ++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+index 3d712d5..bdb092e 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+@@ -272,6 +272,9 @@ static void cirrus_update_memory_access(CirrusVGAState *s);
+ static bool blit_region_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s,
+                                   int32_t pitch, int32_t addr)
+ {
++    if (!pitch) {
++        return true;
++    }
+     if (pitch < 0) {
+         int64_t min = addr
+             + ((int64_t)s->cirrus_blt_height-1) * pitch;
+@@ -715,7 +718,7 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState * s)
+                                             s->cirrus_addr_mask));
+ }
+ 
+-static void cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
++static int cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
+ {
+     int sx = 0, sy = 0;
+     int dx = 0, dy = 0;
+@@ -729,6 +732,9 @@ static void cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
+         int width, height;
+ 
+         depth = s->vga.get_bpp(&s->vga) / 8;
++        if (!depth) {
++            return 0;
++        }
+         s->vga.get_resolution(&s->vga, &width, &height);
+ 
+         /* extra x, y */
+@@ -783,6 +789,8 @@ static void cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
+     cirrus_invalidate_region(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
+ 				s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch, s->cirrus_blt_width,
+ 				s->cirrus_blt_height);
++
++    return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_copy(CirrusVGAState * s)
+@@ -790,11 +798,9 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_copy(CirrusVGAState * s)
+     if (blit_is_unsafe(s))
+         return 0;
+ 
+-    cirrus_do_copy(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr - s->vga.start_addr,
++    return cirrus_do_copy(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr - s->vga.start_addr,
+             s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr - s->vga.start_addr,
+             s->cirrus_blt_width, s->cirrus_blt_height);
+-
+-    return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ /***************************************

0034-net-mcf-check-receive-buffer-size-register-value.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2016 00:38:39 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] net: mcf: check receive buffer size register value
+
+ColdFire Fast Ethernet Controller uses a receive buffer size
+register(EMRBR) to hold maximum size of all receive buffers.
+It is set by a user before any operation. If it was set to be
+zero, ColdFire emulator would go into an infinite loop while
+receiving data in mcf_fec_receive. Add check to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Wjjzhang <wjjzhang@tencent.com>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 77d54985b85a0cb760330ec2bd92505e0a2a97a9)
+---
+ hw/net/mcf_fec.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/mcf_fec.c b/hw/net/mcf_fec.c
+index 6d3418e..8a69fa2 100644
+--- a/hw/net/mcf_fec.c
++++ b/hw/net/mcf_fec.c
+@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ static void mcf_fec_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
+         s->tx_descriptor = s->etdsr;
+         break;
+     case 0x188:
+-        s->emrbr = value & 0x7f0;
++        s->emrbr = value > 0 ? value & 0x7F0 : 0x7F0;
+         break;
+     default:
+         hw_error("mcf_fec_write Bad address 0x%x\n", (int)addr);

0035-virtio-gpu-fix-information-leak-in-getting-capset-in.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Tue, 1 Nov 2016 02:53:11 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] virtio-gpu: fix information leak in getting capset info
+ dispatch
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+In virgl_cmd_get_capset_info dispatch function, the 'resp' hasn't
+been full initialized before writing to the guest. This will leak
+the 'resp.padding' and 'resp.hdr.padding' fieds to the guest. This
+patch fix this issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Message-id: 5818661e.0860240a.77264.7a56@mx.google.com
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 42a8dadc74f8982fc269e54e3c5627b54d9f83d8)
+---
+ hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c b/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
+index fa19294..5878809 100644
+--- a/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
++++ b/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
+@@ -345,6 +345,7 @@ static void virgl_cmd_get_capset_info(VirtIOGPU *g,
+ 
+     VIRTIO_GPU_FILL_CMD(info);
+ 
++    memset(&resp, 0, sizeof(resp));
+     if (info.capset_index == 0) {
+         resp.capset_id = VIRTIO_GPU_CAPSET_VIRGL;
+         virgl_renderer_get_cap_set(resp.capset_id,

0036-virtio-gpu-fix-memory-leak-in-update_cursor_data_vir.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Tue, 1 Nov 2016 04:06:58 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] virtio-gpu: fix memory leak in update_cursor_data_virgl
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+In update_cursor_data_virgl function, if the 'width'/ 'height'
+is not equal to current cursor's width/height it will return
+without free the 'data' allocated previously. This will lead
+a memory leak issue. This patch fix this issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Message-id: 58187760.41d71c0a.cca75.4cb9@mx.google.com
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 2d1cd6c7a91a4beb99a0c3a21be529222a708545)
+---
+ hw/display/virtio-gpu.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c b/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
+index d345276..f41afc7 100644
+--- a/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
++++ b/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
+@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ static void update_cursor_data_virgl(VirtIOGPU *g,
+ 
+     if (width != s->current_cursor->width ||
+         height != s->current_cursor->height) {
++        free(data);
+         return;
+     }
+ 

0037-usbredir-free-vm_change_state_handler-in-usbredir-de.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2016 21:57:46 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] usbredir: free vm_change_state_handler in usbredir destroy
+ dispatch
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+In usbredir destroy dispatch function, it doesn't free the vm change
+state handler once registered in usbredir_realize function. This will
+lead a memory leak issue. This patch avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 58216976.d0236b0a.77b99.bcd6@mx.google.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 07b026fd82d6cf11baf7d7c603c4f5f6070b35bf)
+---
+ hw/usb/redirect.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/usb/redirect.c b/hw/usb/redirect.c
+index 8d80540..136cacc 100644
+--- a/hw/usb/redirect.c
++++ b/hw/usb/redirect.c
+@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ struct USBRedirDevice {
+     struct usbredirfilter_rule *filter_rules;
+     int filter_rules_count;
+     int compatible_speedmask;
++    VMChangeStateEntry *vmstate;
+ };
+ 
+ #define TYPE_USB_REDIR "usb-redir"
+@@ -1406,7 +1407,8 @@ static void usbredir_realize(USBDevice *udev, Error **errp)
+     qemu_chr_add_handlers(dev->cs, usbredir_chardev_can_read,
+                           usbredir_chardev_read, usbredir_chardev_event, dev);
+ 
+-    qemu_add_vm_change_state_handler(usbredir_vm_state_change, dev);
++    dev->vmstate =
++        qemu_add_vm_change_state_handler(usbredir_vm_state_change, dev);
+ }
+ 
+ static void usbredir_cleanup_device_queues(USBRedirDevice *dev)
+@@ -1443,6 +1445,7 @@ static void usbredir_handle_destroy(USBDevice *udev)
+     }
+ 
+     free(dev->filter_rules);
++    qemu_del_vm_change_state_handler(dev->vmstate);
+ }
+ 
+ static int usbredir_check_filter(USBRedirDevice *dev)

0038-usb-ehci-fix-memory-leak-in-ehci_init_transfer.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Tue, 8 Nov 2016 04:11:10 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] usb: ehci: fix memory leak in ehci_init_transfer
+
+In ehci_init_transfer function, if the 'cpage' is bigger than 4,
+it doesn't free the 'p->sgl' once allocated previously thus leading
+a memory leak issue. This patch avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Message-id: 5821c0f4.091c6b0a.e0c92.e811@mx.google.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 791f97758e223de3290592d169f8e6339c281714)
+---
+ hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c b/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c
+index 92241bb..b8559e2 100644
+--- a/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c
++++ b/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c
+@@ -1190,6 +1190,7 @@ static int ehci_init_transfer(EHCIPacket *p)
+     while (bytes > 0) {
+         if (cpage > 4) {
+             fprintf(stderr, "cpage out of range (%d)\n", cpage);
++            qemu_sglist_destroy(&p->sgl);
+             return -1;
+         }
+ 

0039-9pfs-adjust-the-order-of-resource-cleanup-in-device-.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:53:34 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: adjust the order of resource cleanup in device
+ unrealize
+
+Unrealize should undo things that were set during realize in
+reverse order. So should do in the error path in realize.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 4774718e5c194026ba5ee7a28d9be49be3080e42)
+---
+ hw/9pfs/9p.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+index 86f44db..6979c58 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+@@ -3481,8 +3481,8 @@ int v9fs_device_realize_common(V9fsState *s, Error **errp)
+     rc = 0;
+ out:
+     if (rc) {
+-        g_free(s->ctx.fs_root);
+         g_free(s->tag);
++        g_free(s->ctx.fs_root);
+         v9fs_path_free(&path);
+     }
+     return rc;
+@@ -3490,8 +3490,8 @@ out:
+ 
+ void v9fs_device_unrealize_common(V9fsState *s, Error **errp)
+ {
+-    g_free(s->ctx.fs_root);
+     g_free(s->tag);
++    g_free(s->ctx.fs_root);
+ }
+ 
+ static void __attribute__((__constructor__)) v9fs_set_fd_limit(void)

0040-9pfs-add-cleanup-operation-in-FileOperations.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:53:34 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: add cleanup operation in FileOperations
+
+Currently, the backend of VirtFS doesn't have a cleanup
+function. This will lead resource leak issues if the backed
+driver allocates resources. This patch addresses this issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 702dbcc274e2ca43be20ba64c758c0ca57dab91d)
+---
+ fsdev/file-op-9p.h | 1 +
+ hw/9pfs/9p.c       | 6 ++++++
+ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/fsdev/file-op-9p.h b/fsdev/file-op-9p.h
+index b8c2602..0681021 100644
+--- a/fsdev/file-op-9p.h
++++ b/fsdev/file-op-9p.h
+@@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ struct FileOperations
+ {
+     int (*parse_opts)(QemuOpts *, struct FsDriverEntry *);
+     int (*init)(struct FsContext *);
++    void (*cleanup)(struct FsContext *);
+     int (*lstat)(FsContext *, V9fsPath *, struct stat *);
+     ssize_t (*readlink)(FsContext *, V9fsPath *, char *, size_t);
+     int (*chmod)(FsContext *, V9fsPath *, FsCred *);
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+index 6979c58..84be1c8 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+@@ -3481,6 +3481,9 @@ int v9fs_device_realize_common(V9fsState *s, Error **errp)
+     rc = 0;
+ out:
+     if (rc) {
++        if (s->ops->cleanup && s->ctx.private) {
++            s->ops->cleanup(&s->ctx);
++        }
+         g_free(s->tag);
+         g_free(s->ctx.fs_root);
+         v9fs_path_free(&path);
+@@ -3490,6 +3493,9 @@ out:
+ 
+ void v9fs_device_unrealize_common(V9fsState *s, Error **errp)
+ {
++    if (s->ops->cleanup) {
++        s->ops->cleanup(&s->ctx);
++    }
+     g_free(s->tag);
+     g_free(s->ctx.fs_root);
+ }

0041-9pfs-add-cleanup-operation-for-handle-backend-driver.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:53:34 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: add cleanup operation for handle backend driver
+
+In the init operation of handle backend dirver, it allocates a
+handle_data struct and opens a mount file. We should free these
+resources when the 9pfs device is unrealized. This is what this
+patch does.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 971f406b77a6eb84e0ad27dcc416b663765aee30)
+---
+ hw/9pfs/9p-handle.c | 9 +++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p-handle.c b/hw/9pfs/9p-handle.c
+index 8940414..6ce923d 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p-handle.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p-handle.c
+@@ -651,6 +651,14 @@ out:
+     return ret;
+ }
+ 
++static void handle_cleanup(FsContext *ctx)
++{
++    struct handle_data *data = ctx->private;
++
++    close(data->mountfd);
++    g_free(data);
++}
++
+ static int handle_parse_opts(QemuOpts *opts, struct FsDriverEntry *fse)
+ {
+     const char *sec_model = qemu_opt_get(opts, "security_model");
+@@ -673,6 +681,7 @@ static int handle_parse_opts(QemuOpts *opts, struct FsDriverEntry *fse)
+ FileOperations handle_ops = {
+     .parse_opts   = handle_parse_opts,
+     .init         = handle_init,
++    .cleanup      = handle_cleanup,
+     .lstat        = handle_lstat,
+     .readlink     = handle_readlink,
+     .close        = handle_close,

0042-9pfs-add-cleanup-operation-for-proxy-backend-driver.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:53:34 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: add cleanup operation for proxy backend driver
+
+In the init operation of proxy backend dirver, it allocates a
+V9fsProxy struct and some other resources. We should free these
+resources when the 9pfs device is unrealized. This is what this
+patch does.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 898ae90a44551d25b8e956fd87372d303c82fe68)
+---
+ hw/9pfs/9p-proxy.c | 13 +++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p-proxy.c b/hw/9pfs/9p-proxy.c
+index 00a4eb2..7c6aaf3 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p-proxy.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p-proxy.c
+@@ -1181,9 +1181,22 @@ static int proxy_init(FsContext *ctx)
+     return 0;
+ }
+ 
++static void proxy_cleanup(FsContext *ctx)
++{
++    V9fsProxy *proxy = ctx->private;
++
++    g_free(proxy->out_iovec.iov_base);
++    g_free(proxy->in_iovec.iov_base);
++    if (ctx->export_flags & V9FS_PROXY_SOCK_NAME) {
++        close(proxy->sockfd);
++    }
++    g_free(proxy);
++}
++
+ FileOperations proxy_ops = {
+     .parse_opts   = proxy_parse_opts,
+     .init         = proxy_init,
++    .cleanup      = proxy_cleanup,
+     .lstat        = proxy_lstat,
+     .readlink     = proxy_readlink,
+     .close        = proxy_close,

0043-9pfs-fix-crash-when-fsdev-is-missing.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2017 17:28:44 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: fix crash when fsdev is missing
+
+If the user passes -device virtio-9p without the corresponding -fsdev, QEMU
+dereferences a NULL pointer and crashes.
+
+This is a 2.8 regression introduced by commit 702dbcc274e2c.
+
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Reviewed-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+(cherry picked from commit f2b58c43758efc61e2a49b899f5e58848489d0dc)
+---
+ hw/9pfs/9p.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+index 84be1c8..be2095a 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+@@ -3481,7 +3481,7 @@ int v9fs_device_realize_common(V9fsState *s, Error **errp)
+     rc = 0;
+ out:
+     if (rc) {
+-        if (s->ops->cleanup && s->ctx.private) {
++        if (s->ops && s->ops->cleanup && s->ctx.private) {
+             s->ops->cleanup(&s->ctx);
+         }
+         g_free(s->tag);

0044-display-virtio-gpu-3d-check-virgl-capabilities-max_s.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2016 12:31:56 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] display: virtio-gpu-3d: check virgl capabilities max_size
+
+Virtio GPU device while processing 'VIRTIO_GPU_CMD_GET_CAPSET'
+command, retrieves the maximum capabilities size to fill in the
+response object. It continues to fill in capabilities even if
+retrieved 'max_size' is zero(0), thus resulting in OOB access.
+Add check to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Zhenhao Hong <zhenhaohong@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Message-id: 20161214070156.23368-1-ppandit@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit abd7f08b2353f43274b785db8c7224f082ef4d31)
+---
+ hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c | 6 +++++-
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c b/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
+index 5878809..bb2e9a1 100644
+--- a/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
++++ b/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
+@@ -369,8 +369,12 @@ static void virgl_cmd_get_capset(VirtIOGPU *g,
+ 
+     virgl_renderer_get_cap_set(gc.capset_id, &max_ver,
+                                &max_size);
+-    resp = g_malloc(sizeof(*resp) + max_size);
++    if (!max_size) {
++        cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
++        return;
++    }
+ 
++    resp = g_malloc(sizeof(*resp) + max_size);
+     resp->hdr.type = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_OK_CAPSET;
+     virgl_renderer_fill_caps(gc.capset_id,
+                              gc.capset_version,

0045-virtio-gpu-fix-information-leak-in-capset-get-dispat.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Tue, 1 Nov 2016 05:37:57 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] virtio-gpu: fix information leak in capset get dispatch
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+In virgl_cmd_get_capset function, it uses g_malloc to allocate
+a response struct to the guest. As the 'resp'struct hasn't been full
+initialized it will lead the 'resp->padding' field to the guest.
+Use g_malloc0 to avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 58188cae.4a6ec20a.3d2d1.aff2@mx.google.com
+
+[ kraxel: resolved conflict ]
+
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 85d9d044471f93c48c5c396f7e217b4ef12f69f8)
+---
+ hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c b/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
+index bb2e9a1..420187e 100644
+--- a/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
++++ b/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
+@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ static void virgl_cmd_get_capset(VirtIOGPU *g,
+         return;
+     }
+ 
+-    resp = g_malloc(sizeof(*resp) + max_size);
++    resp = g_malloc0(sizeof(*resp) + max_size);
+     resp->hdr.type = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_OK_CAPSET;
+     virgl_renderer_fill_caps(gc.capset_id,
+                              gc.capset_version,

0046-virtio-gpu-call-cleanup-mapping-function-in-resource.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 28 Nov 2016 21:29:25 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] virtio-gpu: call cleanup mapping function in resource destroy
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+If the guest destroy the resource before detach banking, the 'iov'
+and 'addrs' field in resource is not freed thus leading memory
+leak issue. This patch avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 1480386565-10077-1-git-send-email-liq3ea@gmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit b8e23926c568f2e963af39028b71c472e3023793)
+---
+ hw/display/virtio-gpu.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c b/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
+index f41afc7..4ccc8bc 100644
+--- a/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
++++ b/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
+@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
+ static struct virtio_gpu_simple_resource*
+ virtio_gpu_find_resource(VirtIOGPU *g, uint32_t resource_id);
+ 
++static void virtio_gpu_cleanup_mapping(struct virtio_gpu_simple_resource *res);
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_VIRGL
+ #include "virglrenderer.h"
+ #define VIRGL(_g, _virgl, _simple, ...)                     \
+@@ -349,6 +351,7 @@ static void virtio_gpu_resource_destroy(VirtIOGPU *g,
+                                         struct virtio_gpu_simple_resource *res)
+ {
+     pixman_image_unref(res->image);
++    virtio_gpu_cleanup_mapping(res);
+     QTAILQ_REMOVE(&g->reslist, res, next);
+     g_free(res);
+ }

0047-audio-ac97-add-exit-function.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2016 18:30:21 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] audio: ac97: add exit function
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Currently the ac97 device emulation doesn't have a exit function,
+hot unplug this device will leak some memory. Add a exit function to
+avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 58520052.4825ed0a.27a71.6cae@mx.google.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 12351a91da97b414eec8cdb09f1d9f41e535a401)
+---
+ hw/audio/ac97.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/audio/ac97.c b/hw/audio/ac97.c
+index cbd959e..c306575 100644
+--- a/hw/audio/ac97.c
++++ b/hw/audio/ac97.c
+@@ -1387,6 +1387,16 @@ static void ac97_realize(PCIDevice *dev, Error **errp)
+     ac97_on_reset (&s->dev.qdev);
+ }
+ 
++static void ac97_exit(PCIDevice *dev)
++{
++    AC97LinkState *s = DO_UPCAST(AC97LinkState, dev, dev);
++
++    AUD_close_in(&s->card, s->voice_pi);
++    AUD_close_out(&s->card, s->voice_po);
++    AUD_close_in(&s->card, s->voice_mc);
++    AUD_remove_card(&s->card);
++}
++
+ static int ac97_init (PCIBus *bus)
+ {
+     pci_create_simple (bus, -1, "AC97");
+@@ -1404,6 +1414,7 @@ static void ac97_class_init (ObjectClass *klass, void *data)
+     PCIDeviceClass *k = PCI_DEVICE_CLASS (klass);
+ 
+     k->realize = ac97_realize;
++    k->exit = ac97_exit;
+     k->vendor_id = PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL;
+     k->device_id = PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_82801AA_5;
+     k->revision = 0x01;

0048-audio-es1370-add-exit-function.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2016 18:32:22 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] audio: es1370: add exit function
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Currently the es1370 device emulation doesn't have a exit function,
+hot unplug this device will leak some memory. Add a exit function to
+avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 585200c9.a968ca0a.1ab80.4c98@mx.google.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 069eb7b2b8fc47c7cb52e5a4af23ea98d939e3da)
+---
+ hw/audio/es1370.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/audio/es1370.c b/hw/audio/es1370.c
+index 8449b5f..883ec69 100644
+--- a/hw/audio/es1370.c
++++ b/hw/audio/es1370.c
+@@ -1041,6 +1041,19 @@ static void es1370_realize(PCIDevice *dev, Error **errp)
+     es1370_reset (s);
+ }
+ 
++static void es1370_exit(PCIDevice *dev)
++{
++    ES1370State *s = ES1370(dev);
++    int i;
++
++    for (i = 0; i < 2; ++i) {
++        AUD_close_out(&s->card, s->dac_voice[i]);
++    }
++
++    AUD_close_in(&s->card, s->adc_voice);
++    AUD_remove_card(&s->card);
++}
++
+ static int es1370_init (PCIBus *bus)
+ {
+     pci_create_simple (bus, -1, TYPE_ES1370);
+@@ -1053,6 +1066,7 @@ static void es1370_class_init (ObjectClass *klass, void *data)
+     PCIDeviceClass *k = PCI_DEVICE_CLASS (klass);
+ 
+     k->realize = es1370_realize;
++    k->exit = es1370_exit;
+     k->vendor_id = PCI_VENDOR_ID_ENSONIQ;
+     k->device_id = PCI_DEVICE_ID_ENSONIQ_ES1370;
+     k->class_id = PCI_CLASS_MULTIMEDIA_AUDIO;

0049-watchdog-6300esb-add-exit-function.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Mon, 28 Nov 2016 17:49:04 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] watchdog: 6300esb: add exit function
+
+When the Intel 6300ESB watchdog is hot unplug. The timer allocated
+in realize isn't freed thus leaking memory leak. This patch avoid
+this through adding the exit function.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Message-Id: <583cde9c.3223ed0a.7f0c2.886e@mx.google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit eb7a20a3616085d46aa6b4b4224e15587ec67e6e)
+---
+ hw/watchdog/wdt_i6300esb.c | 9 +++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/watchdog/wdt_i6300esb.c b/hw/watchdog/wdt_i6300esb.c
+index a83d951..49b3cd1 100644
+--- a/hw/watchdog/wdt_i6300esb.c
++++ b/hw/watchdog/wdt_i6300esb.c
+@@ -428,6 +428,14 @@ static void i6300esb_realize(PCIDevice *dev, Error **errp)
+     /* qemu_register_coalesced_mmio (addr, 0x10); ? */
+ }
+ 
++static void i6300esb_exit(PCIDevice *dev)
++{
++    I6300State *d = WATCHDOG_I6300ESB_DEVICE(dev);
++
++    timer_del(d->timer);
++    timer_free(d->timer);
++}
++
+ static WatchdogTimerModel model = {
+     .wdt_name = "i6300esb",
+     .wdt_description = "Intel 6300ESB",
+@@ -441,6 +449,7 @@ static void i6300esb_class_init(ObjectClass *klass, void *data)
+     k->config_read = i6300esb_config_read;
+     k->config_write = i6300esb_config_write;
+     k->realize = i6300esb_realize;
++    k->exit = i6300esb_exit;
+     k->vendor_id = PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL;
+     k->device_id = PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_ESB_9;
+     k->class_id = PCI_CLASS_SYSTEM_OTHER;

0050-virtio-gpu-3d-fix-memory-leak-in-resource-attach-bac.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 29 Dec 2016 03:11:26 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] virtio-gpu-3d: fix memory leak in resource attach backing
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+If the virgl_renderer_resource_attach_iov function fails the
+'res_iovs' will be leaked. Add check of the return value to
+free the 'res_iovs' when failing.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 1482999086-59795-1-git-send-email-liq3ea@gmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 33243031dad02d161225ba99d782616da133f689)
+---
+ hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c | 7 +++++--
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c b/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
+index 420187e..4cffab5 100644
+--- a/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
++++ b/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
+@@ -289,8 +289,11 @@ static void virgl_resource_attach_backing(VirtIOGPU *g,
+         return;
+     }
+ 
+-    virgl_renderer_resource_attach_iov(att_rb.resource_id,
+-                                       res_iovs, att_rb.nr_entries);
++    ret = virgl_renderer_resource_attach_iov(att_rb.resource_id,
++                                             res_iovs, att_rb.nr_entries);
++
++    if (ret != 0)
++        virtio_gpu_cleanup_mapping_iov(res_iovs, att_rb.nr_entries);
+ }
+ 
+ static void virgl_resource_detach_backing(VirtIOGPU *g,

0051-sd-sdhci-check-data-length-during-dma_memory_read.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2017 18:29:59 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] sd: sdhci: check data length during dma_memory_read
+
+While doing multi block SDMA transfer in routine
+'sdhci_sdma_transfer_multi_blocks', the 's->fifo_buffer' starting
+index 'begin' and data length 's->data_count' could end up to be same.
+This could lead to an OOB access issue. Correct transfer data length
+to avoid it.
+
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Reported-by: Jiang Xin <jiangxin1@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
+Message-id: 20170130064736.9236-1-ppandit@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 42922105beb14c2fc58185ea022b9f72fb5465e9)
+---
+ hw/sd/sdhci.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/sd/sdhci.c b/hw/sd/sdhci.c
+index d28b587..f4cf5c7 100644
+--- a/hw/sd/sdhci.c
++++ b/hw/sd/sdhci.c
+@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ static void sdhci_sdma_transfer_multi_blocks(SDHCIState *s)
+                 boundary_count -= block_size - begin;
+             }
+             dma_memory_read(&address_space_memory, s->sdmasysad,
+-                            &s->fifo_buffer[begin], s->data_count);
++                            &s->fifo_buffer[begin], s->data_count - begin);
+             s->sdmasysad += s->data_count - begin;
+             if (s->data_count == block_size) {
+                 for (n = 0; n < block_size; n++) {

0052-megasas-fix-guest-triggered-memory-leak.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 2 Jan 2017 11:03:33 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] megasas: fix guest-triggered memory leak
+
+If the guest sets the sglist size to a value >=2GB, megasas_handle_dcmd
+will return MFI_STAT_MEMORY_NOT_AVAILABLE without freeing the memory.
+Avoid this by returning only the status from map_dcmd, and loading
+cmd->iov_size in the caller.
+
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 765a707000e838c30b18d712fe6cb3dd8e0435f3)
+---
+ hw/scsi/megasas.c | 11 ++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/scsi/megasas.c b/hw/scsi/megasas.c
+index a9ffc32..d42d34b 100644
+--- a/hw/scsi/megasas.c
++++ b/hw/scsi/megasas.c
+@@ -682,14 +682,14 @@ static int megasas_map_dcmd(MegasasState *s, MegasasCmd *cmd)
+         trace_megasas_dcmd_invalid_sge(cmd->index,
+                                        cmd->frame->header.sge_count);
+         cmd->iov_size = 0;
+-        return -1;
++        return -EINVAL;
+     }
+     iov_pa = megasas_sgl_get_addr(cmd, &cmd->frame->dcmd.sgl);
+     iov_size = megasas_sgl_get_len(cmd, &cmd->frame->dcmd.sgl);
+     pci_dma_sglist_init(&cmd->qsg, PCI_DEVICE(s), 1);
+     qemu_sglist_add(&cmd->qsg, iov_pa, iov_size);
+     cmd->iov_size = iov_size;
+-    return cmd->iov_size;
++    return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ static void megasas_finish_dcmd(MegasasCmd *cmd, uint32_t iov_size)
+@@ -1562,19 +1562,20 @@ static const struct dcmd_cmd_tbl_t {
+ 
+ static int megasas_handle_dcmd(MegasasState *s, MegasasCmd *cmd)
+ {
+-    int opcode, len;
++    int opcode;
+     int retval = 0;
++    size_t len;
+     const struct dcmd_cmd_tbl_t *cmdptr = dcmd_cmd_tbl;
+ 
+     opcode = le32_to_cpu(cmd->frame->dcmd.opcode);
+     trace_megasas_handle_dcmd(cmd->index, opcode);
+-    len = megasas_map_dcmd(s, cmd);
+-    if (len < 0) {
++    if (megasas_map_dcmd(s, cmd) < 0) {
+         return MFI_STAT_MEMORY_NOT_AVAILABLE;
+     }
+     while (cmdptr->opcode != -1 && cmdptr->opcode != opcode) {
+         cmdptr++;
+     }
++    len = cmd->iov_size;
+     if (cmdptr->opcode == -1) {
+         trace_megasas_dcmd_unhandled(cmd->index, opcode, len);
+         retval = megasas_dcmd_dummy(s, cmd);

0053-virtio-gpu-fix-resource-leak-in-virgl_cmd_resource_u.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 23 Jan 2017 11:26:50 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] virtio-gpu: fix resource leak in virgl_cmd_resource_unref
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+When the guest sends VIRTIO_GPU_CMD_RESOURCE_UNREF without detaching the
+backing storage beforehand (VIRTIO_GPU_CMD_RESOURCE_DETACH_BACKING)
+we'll leak memory.
+
+This patch fixes it for 3d mode, simliar to the 2d mode fix in commit
+"b8e2392 virtio-gpu: call cleanup mapping function in resource destroy".
+
+Reported-by: 李强 <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 1485167210-4757-1-git-send-email-kraxel@redhat.com
+(cherry picked from commit 5e8e3c4c75c199aa1017db816fca02be2a9f8798)
+---
+ hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c b/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
+index 4cffab5..e78b3c8 100644
+--- a/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
++++ b/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
+@@ -76,10 +76,18 @@ static void virgl_cmd_resource_unref(VirtIOGPU *g,
+                                      struct virtio_gpu_ctrl_command *cmd)
+ {
+     struct virtio_gpu_resource_unref unref;
++    struct iovec *res_iovs = NULL;
++    int num_iovs = 0;
+ 
+     VIRTIO_GPU_FILL_CMD(unref);
+     trace_virtio_gpu_cmd_res_unref(unref.resource_id);
+ 
++    virgl_renderer_resource_detach_iov(unref.resource_id,
++                                       &res_iovs,
++                                       &num_iovs);
++    if (res_iovs != NULL && num_iovs != 0) {
++        virtio_gpu_cleanup_mapping_iov(res_iovs, num_iovs);
++    }
+     virgl_renderer_resource_unref(unref.resource_id);
+ }
+ 

0054-usb-ccid-check-ccid-apdu-length.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Fri, 3 Feb 2017 00:52:28 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] usb: ccid: check ccid apdu length
+
+CCID device emulator uses Application Protocol Data Units(APDU)
+to exchange command and responses to and from the host.
+The length in these units couldn't be greater than 65536. Add
+check to ensure the same. It'd also avoid potential integer
+overflow in emulated_apdu_from_guest.
+
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Message-id: 20170202192228.10847-1-ppandit@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit c7dfbf322595ded4e70b626bf83158a9f3807c6a)
+---
+ hw/usb/dev-smartcard-reader.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/usb/dev-smartcard-reader.c b/hw/usb/dev-smartcard-reader.c
+index af4b851..fc32b00 100644
+--- a/hw/usb/dev-smartcard-reader.c
++++ b/hw/usb/dev-smartcard-reader.c
+@@ -967,7 +967,7 @@ static void ccid_on_apdu_from_guest(USBCCIDState *s, CCID_XferBlock *recv)
+     DPRINTF(s, 1, "%s: seq %d, len %d\n", __func__,
+                 recv->hdr.bSeq, len);
+     ccid_add_pending_answer(s, (CCID_Header *)recv);
+-    if (s->card) {
++    if (s->card && len <= BULK_OUT_DATA_SIZE) {
+         ccid_card_apdu_from_guest(s->card, recv->abData, len);
+     } else {
+         DPRINTF(s, D_WARN, "warning: discarded apdu\n");

0055-sd-sdhci-check-transfer-mode-register-in-multi-block.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2017 12:08:14 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] sd: sdhci: check transfer mode register in multi block
+ transfer
+
+In the SDHCI protocol, the transfer mode register value
+is used during multi block transfer to check if block count
+register is enabled and should be updated. Transfer mode
+register could be set such that, block count register would
+not be updated, thus leading to an infinite loop. Add check
+to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Wjjzhang <wjjzhang@tencent.com>
+Reported-by: Jiang Xin <jiangxin1@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Message-id: 20170214185225.7994-3-ppandit@redhat.com
+Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@xilinx.com>
+Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 6e86d90352adf6cb08295255220295cf23c4286e)
+---
+ hw/sd/sdhci.c | 10 +++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/sd/sdhci.c b/hw/sd/sdhci.c
+index f4cf5c7..fedc786 100644
+--- a/hw/sd/sdhci.c
++++ b/hw/sd/sdhci.c
+@@ -485,6 +485,11 @@ static void sdhci_sdma_transfer_multi_blocks(SDHCIState *s)
+     uint32_t boundary_chk = 1 << (((s->blksize & 0xf000) >> 12) + 12);
+     uint32_t boundary_count = boundary_chk - (s->sdmasysad % boundary_chk);
+ 
++    if (!(s->trnmod & SDHC_TRNS_BLK_CNT_EN) || !s->blkcnt) {
++        qemu_log_mask(LOG_UNIMP, "infinite transfer is not supported\n");
++        return;
++    }
++
+     /* XXX: Some sd/mmc drivers (for example, u-boot-slp) do not account for
+      * possible stop at page boundary if initial address is not page aligned,
+      * allow them to work properly */
+@@ -796,11 +801,6 @@ static void sdhci_data_transfer(void *opaque)
+     if (s->trnmod & SDHC_TRNS_DMA) {
+         switch (SDHC_DMA_TYPE(s->hostctl)) {
+         case SDHC_CTRL_SDMA:
+-            if ((s->trnmod & SDHC_TRNS_MULTI) &&
+-                    (!(s->trnmod & SDHC_TRNS_BLK_CNT_EN) || s->blkcnt == 0)) {
+-                break;
+-            }
+-
+             if ((s->blkcnt == 1) || !(s->trnmod & SDHC_TRNS_MULTI)) {
+                 sdhci_sdma_transfer_single_block(s);
+             } else {

0056-usb-ohci-limit-the-number-of-link-eds.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2017 02:23:33 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] usb: ohci: limit the number of link eds
+
+The guest may builds an infinite loop with link eds. This patch
+limit the number of linked ed to avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Message-id: 5899a02e.45ca240a.6c373.93c1@mx.google.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 95ed56939eb2eaa4e2f349fe6dcd13ca4edfd8fb)
+---
+ hw/usb/hcd-ohci.c | 9 ++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/usb/hcd-ohci.c b/hw/usb/hcd-ohci.c
+index 16d9ff7..1af518d 100644
+--- a/hw/usb/hcd-ohci.c
++++ b/hw/usb/hcd-ohci.c
+@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@
+ 
+ #define OHCI_MAX_PORTS 15
+ 
++#define ED_LINK_LIMIT 4
++
+ static int64_t usb_frame_time;
+ static int64_t usb_bit_time;
+ 
+@@ -1184,7 +1186,7 @@ static int ohci_service_ed_list(OHCIState *ohci, uint32_t head, int completion)
+     uint32_t next_ed;
+     uint32_t cur;
+     int active;
+-
++    uint32_t link_cnt = 0;
+     active = 0;
+ 
+     if (head == 0)
+@@ -1199,6 +1201,11 @@ static int ohci_service_ed_list(OHCIState *ohci, uint32_t head, int completion)
+ 
+         next_ed = ed.next & OHCI_DPTR_MASK;
+ 
++        if (++link_cnt > ED_LINK_LIMIT) {
++            ohci_die(ohci);
++            return 0;
++        }
++
+         if ((ed.head & OHCI_ED_H) || (ed.flags & OHCI_ED_K)) {
+             uint32_t addr;
+             /* Cancel pending packets for ED that have been paused.  */

0057-display-cirrus-ignore-source-pitch-value-as-needed-i.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+From: Bruce Rogers <brogers@suse.com>
+Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2017 13:35:20 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] display: cirrus: ignore source pitch value as needed in
+ blit_is_unsafe
+
+Commit 4299b90 added a check which is too broad, given that the source
+pitch value is not required to be initialized for solid fill operations.
+This patch refines the blit_is_unsafe() check to ignore source pitch in
+that case. After applying the above commit as a security patch, we
+noticed the SLES 11 SP4 guest gui failed to initialize properly.
+
+Signed-off-by: Bruce Rogers <brogers@suse.com>
+Message-id: 20170109203520.5619-1-brogers@suse.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 913a87885f589d263e682c2eb6637c6e14538061)
+---
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 11 +++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+index bdb092e..379910d 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ static bool blit_region_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s,
+     return false;
+ }
+ 
+-static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s)
++static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s, bool dst_only)
+ {
+     /* should be the case, see cirrus_bitblt_start */
+     assert(s->cirrus_blt_width > 0);
+@@ -308,6 +308,9 @@ static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s)
+                               s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask)) {
+         return true;
+     }
++    if (dst_only) {
++        return false;
++    }
+     if (blit_region_is_unsafe(s, s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch,
+                               s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask)) {
+         return true;
+@@ -673,7 +676,7 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState * s,
+ 
+     dst = s->vga.vram_ptr + (s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask);
+ 
+-    if (blit_is_unsafe(s))
++    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, false))
+         return 0;
+ 
+     (*s->cirrus_rop) (s, dst, src,
+@@ -691,7 +694,7 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_solidfill(CirrusVGAState *s, int blt_rop)
+ {
+     cirrus_fill_t rop_func;
+ 
+-    if (blit_is_unsafe(s)) {
++    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, true)) {
+         return 0;
+     }
+     rop_func = cirrus_fill[rop_to_index[blt_rop]][s->cirrus_blt_pixelwidth - 1];
+@@ -795,7 +798,7 @@ static int cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
+ 
+ static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_copy(CirrusVGAState * s)
+ {
+-    if (blit_is_unsafe(s))
++    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, false))
+         return 0;
+ 
+     return cirrus_do_copy(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr - s->vga.start_addr,

0058-cirrus-handle-negative-pitch-in-cirrus_invalidate_re.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
+Date: Wed, 25 Jan 2017 14:48:57 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] cirrus: handle negative pitch in cirrus_invalidate_region()
+
+cirrus_invalidate_region() calls memory_region_set_dirty()
+on a per-line basis, always ranging from off_begin to
+off_begin+bytesperline. With a negative pitch off_begin
+marks the top most used address and thus we need to do an
+initial shift backwards by a line for negative pitches of
+backward blits, otherwise the first iteration covers the
+line going from the start offset forwards instead of
+backwards.
+Additionally since the start address is inclusive, if we
+shift by a full `bytesperline` we move to the first address
+*not* included in the blit, so we only shift by one less
+than bytesperline.
+
+Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
+Message-id: 1485352137-29367-1-git-send-email-w.bumiller@proxmox.com
+
+[ kraxel: codestyle fixes ]
+
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit f153b563f8cf121aebf5a2fff5f0110faf58ccb3)
+---
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+index 379910d..0f05e45 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+@@ -661,9 +661,14 @@ static void cirrus_invalidate_region(CirrusVGAState * s, int off_begin,
+     int off_cur;
+     int off_cur_end;
+ 
++    if (off_pitch < 0) {
++        off_begin -= bytesperline - 1;
++    }
++
+     for (y = 0; y < lines; y++) {
+ 	off_cur = off_begin;
+ 	off_cur_end = (off_cur + bytesperline) & s->cirrus_addr_mask;
++        assert(off_cur_end >= off_cur);
+         memory_region_set_dirty(&s->vga.vram, off_cur, off_cur_end - off_cur);
+ 	off_begin += off_pitch;
+     }

0059-cirrus-allow-zero-source-pitch-in-pattern-fill-rops.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+From: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
+Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2017 16:35:38 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] cirrus: allow zero source pitch in pattern fill rops
+
+The rops used by cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy only use
+the destination pitch, so the source pitch shoul allowed to
+be zero and the blit with used for the range check around the
+source address.
+
+Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
+Message-id: 1485272138-23249-1-git-send-email-w.bumiller@proxmox.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 5858dd1801883309bdd208d72ddb81c4e9fee30c)
+---
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+index 0f05e45..98f089e 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+@@ -272,9 +272,6 @@ static void cirrus_update_memory_access(CirrusVGAState *s);
+ static bool blit_region_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s,
+                                   int32_t pitch, int32_t addr)
+ {
+-    if (!pitch) {
+-        return true;
+-    }
+     if (pitch < 0) {
+         int64_t min = addr
+             + ((int64_t)s->cirrus_blt_height-1) * pitch;
+@@ -294,8 +291,11 @@ static bool blit_region_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s,
+     return false;
+ }
+ 
+-static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s, bool dst_only)
++static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s, bool dst_only,
++                           bool zero_src_pitch_ok)
+ {
++    int32_t check_pitch;
++
+     /* should be the case, see cirrus_bitblt_start */
+     assert(s->cirrus_blt_width > 0);
+     assert(s->cirrus_blt_height > 0);
+@@ -304,6 +304,10 @@ static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s, bool dst_only)
+         return true;
+     }
+ 
++    if (!s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch) {
++        return true;
++    }
++
+     if (blit_region_is_unsafe(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch,
+                               s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask)) {
+         return true;
+@@ -311,7 +315,13 @@ static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s, bool dst_only)
+     if (dst_only) {
+         return false;
+     }
+-    if (blit_region_is_unsafe(s, s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch,
++
++    check_pitch = s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch;
++    if (!zero_src_pitch_ok && !check_pitch) {
++        check_pitch = s->cirrus_blt_width;
++    }
++
++    if (blit_region_is_unsafe(s, check_pitch,
+                               s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask)) {
+         return true;
+     }
+@@ -681,8 +691,9 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState * s,
+ 
+     dst = s->vga.vram_ptr + (s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask);
+ 
+-    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, false))
++    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, false, true)) {
+         return 0;
++    }
+ 
+     (*s->cirrus_rop) (s, dst, src,
+                       s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch, 0,
+@@ -699,7 +710,7 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_solidfill(CirrusVGAState *s, int blt_rop)
+ {
+     cirrus_fill_t rop_func;
+ 
+-    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, true)) {
++    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, true, true)) {
+         return 0;
+     }
+     rop_func = cirrus_fill[rop_to_index[blt_rop]][s->cirrus_blt_pixelwidth - 1];
+@@ -803,7 +814,7 @@ static int cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
+ 
+ static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_copy(CirrusVGAState * s)
+ {
+-    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, false))
++    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, false, false))
+         return 0;
+ 
+     return cirrus_do_copy(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr - s->vga.start_addr,

0060-cirrus-fix-blit-address-mask-handling.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 25 Jan 2017 11:09:56 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] cirrus: fix blit address mask handling
+
+Apply the cirrus_addr_mask to cirrus_blt_dstaddr and cirrus_blt_srcaddr
+right after assigning them, in cirrus_bitblt_start(), instead of having
+this all over the place in the cirrus code, and missing a few places.
+
+Reported-by: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 1485338996-17095-1-git-send-email-kraxel@redhat.com
+(cherry picked from commit 60cd23e85151525ab26591394c4e7e06fa07d216)
+---
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 25 ++++++++++++-------------
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+index 98f089e..7db6409 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s, bool dst_only,
+     }
+ 
+     if (blit_region_is_unsafe(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch,
+-                              s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask)) {
++                              s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr)) {
+         return true;
+     }
+     if (dst_only) {
+@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s, bool dst_only,
+     }
+ 
+     if (blit_region_is_unsafe(s, check_pitch,
+-                              s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask)) {
++                              s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr)) {
+         return true;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState * s,
+ {
+     uint8_t *dst;
+ 
+-    dst = s->vga.vram_ptr + (s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask);
++    dst = s->vga.vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr;
+ 
+     if (blit_is_unsafe(s, false, true)) {
+         return 0;
+@@ -714,7 +714,7 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_solidfill(CirrusVGAState *s, int blt_rop)
+         return 0;
+     }
+     rop_func = cirrus_fill[rop_to_index[blt_rop]][s->cirrus_blt_pixelwidth - 1];
+-    rop_func(s, s->vga.vram_ptr + (s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask),
++    rop_func(s, s->vga.vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
+              s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch,
+              s->cirrus_blt_width, s->cirrus_blt_height);
+     cirrus_invalidate_region(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
+@@ -732,9 +732,8 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_solidfill(CirrusVGAState *s, int blt_rop)
+ 
+ static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState * s)
+ {
+-    return cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(s,
+-					    s->vga.vram_ptr + ((s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr & ~7) &
+-                                            s->cirrus_addr_mask));
++    return cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(s, s->vga.vram_ptr +
++                                            (s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr & ~7));
+ }
+ 
+ static int cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
+@@ -788,10 +787,8 @@ static int cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
+     if (notify)
+         graphic_hw_update(s->vga.con);
+ 
+-    (*s->cirrus_rop) (s, s->vga.vram_ptr +
+-		      (s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask),
+-		      s->vga.vram_ptr +
+-		      (s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask),
++    (*s->cirrus_rop) (s, s->vga.vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
++                      s->vga.vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr,
+ 		      s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch, s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch,
+ 		      s->cirrus_blt_width, s->cirrus_blt_height);
+ 
+@@ -842,8 +839,7 @@ static void cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo_next(CirrusVGAState * s)
+         } else {
+             /* at least one scan line */
+             do {
+-                (*s->cirrus_rop)(s, s->vga.vram_ptr +
+-                                 (s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask),
++                (*s->cirrus_rop)(s, s->vga.vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
+                                   s->cirrus_bltbuf, 0, 0, s->cirrus_blt_width, 1);
+                 cirrus_invalidate_region(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr, 0,
+                                          s->cirrus_blt_width, 1);
+@@ -962,6 +958,9 @@ static void cirrus_bitblt_start(CirrusVGAState * s)
+     s->cirrus_blt_modeext = s->vga.gr[0x33];
+     blt_rop = s->vga.gr[0x32];
+ 
++    s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr &= s->cirrus_addr_mask;
++    s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr &= s->cirrus_addr_mask;
++
+ #ifdef DEBUG_BITBLT
+     printf("rop=0x%02x mode=0x%02x modeext=0x%02x w=%d h=%d dpitch=%d spitch=%d daddr=0x%08x saddr=0x%08x writemask=0x%02x\n",
+            blt_rop,

0061-cirrus-fix-oob-access-issue-CVE-2017-2615.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2017 09:35:01 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] cirrus: fix oob access issue (CVE-2017-2615)
+
+When doing bitblt copy in backward mode, we should minus the
+blt width first just like the adding in the forward mode. This
+can avoid the oob access of the front of vga's vram.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+
+{ kraxel: with backward blits (negative pitch) addr is the topmost
+          address, so check it as-is against vram size ]
+
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
+Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
+Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Cc: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
+Fixes: d3532a0db02296e687711b8cdc7791924efccea0 (CVE-2014-8106)
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 1485938101-26602-1-git-send-email-kraxel@redhat.com
+Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 62d4c6bd5263bb8413a06c80144fc678df6dfb64)
+---
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 7 +++----
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+index 7db6409..16f27e8 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+@@ -274,10 +274,9 @@ static bool blit_region_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s,
+ {
+     if (pitch < 0) {
+         int64_t min = addr
+-            + ((int64_t)s->cirrus_blt_height-1) * pitch;
+-        int32_t max = addr
+-            + s->cirrus_blt_width;
+-        if (min < 0 || max > s->vga.vram_size) {
++            + ((int64_t)s->cirrus_blt_height - 1) * pitch
++            - s->cirrus_blt_width;
++        if (min < -1 || addr >= s->vga.vram_size) {
+             return true;
+         }
+     } else {

0062-cirrus-fix-patterncopy-checks.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 9 Feb 2017 14:02:20 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] cirrus: fix patterncopy checks
+
+The blit_region_is_unsafe checks don't work correctly for the
+patterncopy source.  It's a fixed-sized region, which doesn't
+depend on cirrus_blt_{width,height}.  So go do the check in
+cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy instead, then tell blit_is_unsafe that
+it doesn't need to verify the source.  Also handle the case where we
+blit from cirrus_bitbuf correctly.
+
+This patch replaces 5858dd1801883309bdd208d72ddb81c4e9fee30c.
+
+Security impact:  I think for the most part error on the safe side this
+time, refusing blits which should have been allowed.
+
+Only exception is placing the blit source at the end of the video ram,
+so cirrus_blt_srcaddr + 256 goes beyond the end of video memory.  But
+even in that case I'm not fully sure this actually allows read access to
+host memory.  To trick the commit 5858dd18 security checks one has to
+pick very small cirrus_blt_{width,height} values, which in turn implies
+only a fraction of the blit source will actually be used.
+
+Cc: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
+Cc: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
+Reviewed-by: Laurent Vivier <lvivier@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 1486645341-5010-1-git-send-email-kraxel@redhat.com
+(cherry picked from commit 95280c31cda79bb1d0968afc7b19a220b3a9d986)
+---
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+index 16f27e8..6bd13fc 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+@@ -683,14 +683,39 @@ static void cirrus_invalidate_region(CirrusVGAState * s, int off_begin,
+     }
+ }
+ 
+-static int cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState * s,
+-					    const uint8_t * src)
++static int cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState *s, bool videosrc)
+ {
++    uint32_t patternsize;
+     uint8_t *dst;
++    uint8_t *src;
+ 
+     dst = s->vga.vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr;
+ 
+-    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, false, true)) {
++    if (videosrc) {
++        switch (s->vga.get_bpp(&s->vga)) {
++        case 8:
++            patternsize = 64;
++            break;
++        case 15:
++        case 16:
++            patternsize = 128;
++            break;
++        case 24:
++        case 32:
++        default:
++            patternsize = 256;
++            break;
++        }
++        s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr &= ~(patternsize - 1);
++        if (s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr + patternsize > s->vga.vram_size) {
++            return 0;
++        }
++        src = s->vga.vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr;
++    } else {
++        src = s->cirrus_bltbuf;
++    }
++
++    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, true, true)) {
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -731,8 +756,7 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_solidfill(CirrusVGAState *s, int blt_rop)
+ 
+ static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState * s)
+ {
+-    return cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(s, s->vga.vram_ptr +
+-                                            (s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr & ~7));
++    return cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(s, true);
+ }
+ 
+ static int cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
+@@ -831,7 +855,7 @@ static void cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo_next(CirrusVGAState * s)
+ 
+     if (s->cirrus_srccounter > 0) {
+         if (s->cirrus_blt_mode & CIRRUS_BLTMODE_PATTERNCOPY) {
+-            cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(s, s->cirrus_bltbuf);
++            cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(s, false);
+         the_end:
+             s->cirrus_srccounter = 0;
+             cirrus_bitblt_reset(s);

0063-Revert-cirrus-allow-zero-source-pitch-in-pattern-fil.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 9 Feb 2017 14:02:21 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Revert "cirrus: allow zero source pitch in pattern fill rops"
+
+This reverts commit 5858dd1801883309bdd208d72ddb81c4e9fee30c.
+
+Conflicts:
+	hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+
+Cc: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
+Cc: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Laurent Vivier <lvivier@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 1486645341-5010-2-git-send-email-kraxel@redhat.com
+(cherry picked from commit 12e97ec39931e5321645fd483ab761319d48bf16)
+---
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 26 ++++++++------------------
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+index 6bd13fc..0e47cf8 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+@@ -272,6 +272,9 @@ static void cirrus_update_memory_access(CirrusVGAState *s);
+ static bool blit_region_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s,
+                                   int32_t pitch, int32_t addr)
+ {
++    if (!pitch) {
++        return true;
++    }
+     if (pitch < 0) {
+         int64_t min = addr
+             + ((int64_t)s->cirrus_blt_height - 1) * pitch
+@@ -290,11 +293,8 @@ static bool blit_region_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s,
+     return false;
+ }
+ 
+-static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s, bool dst_only,
+-                           bool zero_src_pitch_ok)
++static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s, bool dst_only)
+ {
+-    int32_t check_pitch;
+-
+     /* should be the case, see cirrus_bitblt_start */
+     assert(s->cirrus_blt_width > 0);
+     assert(s->cirrus_blt_height > 0);
+@@ -303,10 +303,6 @@ static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s, bool dst_only,
+         return true;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (!s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch) {
+-        return true;
+-    }
+-
+     if (blit_region_is_unsafe(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch,
+                               s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr)) {
+         return true;
+@@ -314,13 +310,7 @@ static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s, bool dst_only,
+     if (dst_only) {
+         return false;
+     }
+-
+-    check_pitch = s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch;
+-    if (!zero_src_pitch_ok && !check_pitch) {
+-        check_pitch = s->cirrus_blt_width;
+-    }
+-
+-    if (blit_region_is_unsafe(s, check_pitch,
++    if (blit_region_is_unsafe(s, s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch,
+                               s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr)) {
+         return true;
+     }
+@@ -715,7 +705,7 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState *s, bool videosrc)
+         src = s->cirrus_bltbuf;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, true, true)) {
++    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, true)) {
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -734,7 +724,7 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_solidfill(CirrusVGAState *s, int blt_rop)
+ {
+     cirrus_fill_t rop_func;
+ 
+-    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, true, true)) {
++    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, true)) {
+         return 0;
+     }
+     rop_func = cirrus_fill[rop_to_index[blt_rop]][s->cirrus_blt_pixelwidth - 1];
+@@ -834,7 +824,7 @@ static int cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
+ 
+ static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_copy(CirrusVGAState * s)
+ {
+-    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, false, false))
++    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, false))
+         return 0;
+ 
+     return cirrus_do_copy(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr - s->vga.start_addr,

0064-cirrus-add-blit_is_unsafe-call-to-cirrus_bitblt_cput.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2017 11:18:36 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] cirrus: add blit_is_unsafe call to cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo
+ (CVE-2017-2620)
+
+CIRRUS_BLTMODE_MEMSYSSRC blits do NOT check blit destination
+and blit width, at all.  Oops.  Fix it.
+
+Security impact: high.
+
+The missing blit destination check allows to write to host memory.
+Basically same as CVE-2014-8106 for the other blit variants.
+
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 92f2b88cea48c6aeba8de568a45f2ed958f3c298)
+---
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+index 0e47cf8..a093dc8 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+@@ -899,6 +899,10 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo(CirrusVGAState * s)
+ {
+     int w;
+ 
++    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, true)) {
++        return 0;
++    }
++
+     s->cirrus_blt_mode &= ~CIRRUS_BLTMODE_MEMSYSSRC;
+     s->cirrus_srcptr = &s->cirrus_bltbuf[0];
+     s->cirrus_srcptr_end = &s->cirrus_bltbuf[0];
+@@ -924,6 +928,10 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo(CirrusVGAState * s)
+ 	}
+         s->cirrus_srccounter = s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch * s->cirrus_blt_height;
+     }
++
++    /* the blit_is_unsafe call above should catch this */
++    assert(s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch <= CIRRUS_BLTBUFSIZE);
++
+     s->cirrus_srcptr = s->cirrus_bltbuf;
+     s->cirrus_srcptr_end = s->cirrus_bltbuf + s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch;
+     cirrus_update_memory_access(s);

0065-vnc-enc-tight-use-thread-local-storage-for-palette.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+From: Peter Lieven <pl@kamp.de>
+Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2016 12:00:46 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] vnc-enc-tight: use thread local storage for palette
+
+currently the color counting palette is allocated from heap, used and destroyed
+for each single subrect. Use a static palette per thread for this purpose and
+avoid the malloc and free for each update.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Lieven <pl@kamp.de>
+Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 1467280846-9674-1-git-send-email-pl@kamp.de
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 095497ffc66b7f031ff2a17f1e50f5cb105ce588)
+---
+ ui/vnc-enc-tight.c | 23 ++++++++++++-----------
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ui/vnc-enc-tight.c b/ui/vnc-enc-tight.c
+index 678c5df..877c093 100644
+--- a/ui/vnc-enc-tight.c
++++ b/ui/vnc-enc-tight.c
+@@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ tight_detect_smooth_image(VncState *vs, int w, int h)
+     tight_fill_palette##bpp(VncState *vs, int x, int y,                 \
+                             int max, size_t count,                      \
+                             uint32_t *bg, uint32_t *fg,                 \
+-                            VncPalette **palette) {                     \
++                            VncPalette *palette) {                      \
+         uint##bpp##_t *data;                                            \
+         uint##bpp##_t c0, c1, ci;                                       \
+         int i, n0, n1;                                                  \
+@@ -396,23 +396,23 @@ tight_detect_smooth_image(VncState *vs, int w, int h)
+             return 0;                                                   \
+         }                                                               \
+                                                                         \
+-        *palette = palette_new(max, bpp);                               \
+-        palette_put(*palette, c0);                                      \
+-        palette_put(*palette, c1);                                      \
+-        palette_put(*palette, ci);                                      \
++        palette_init(palette, max, bpp);                                \
++        palette_put(palette, c0);                                       \
++        palette_put(palette, c1);                                       \
++        palette_put(palette, ci);                                       \
+                                                                         \
+         for (i++; i < count; i++) {                                     \
+             if (data[i] == ci) {                                        \
+                 continue;                                               \
+             } else {                                                    \
+                 ci = data[i];                                           \
+-                if (!palette_put(*palette, (uint32_t)ci)) {             \
++                if (!palette_put(palette, (uint32_t)ci)) {              \
+                     return 0;                                           \
+                 }                                                       \
+             }                                                           \
+         }                                                               \
+                                                                         \
+-        return palette_size(*palette);                                  \
++        return palette_size(palette);                                   \
+     }
+ 
+ DEFINE_FILL_PALETTE_FUNCTION(8)
+@@ -421,7 +421,7 @@ DEFINE_FILL_PALETTE_FUNCTION(32)
+ 
+ static int tight_fill_palette(VncState *vs, int x, int y,
+                               size_t count, uint32_t *bg, uint32_t *fg,
+-                              VncPalette **palette)
++                              VncPalette *palette)
+ {
+     int max;
+ 
+@@ -1458,9 +1458,11 @@ static int send_sub_rect_jpeg(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h,
+ }
+ #endif
+ 
++static __thread VncPalette color_count_palette;
++
+ static int send_sub_rect(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h)
+ {
+-    VncPalette *palette = NULL;
++    VncPalette *palette = &color_count_palette;
+     uint32_t bg = 0, fg = 0;
+     int colors;
+     int ret = 0;
+@@ -1489,7 +1491,7 @@ static int send_sub_rect(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h)
+     }
+ #endif
+ 
+-    colors = tight_fill_palette(vs, x, y, w * h, &bg, &fg, &palette);
++    colors = tight_fill_palette(vs, x, y, w * h, &bg, &fg, palette);
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_VNC_JPEG
+     if (allow_jpeg && vs->tight.quality != (uint8_t)-1) {
+@@ -1502,7 +1504,6 @@ static int send_sub_rect(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h)
+     ret = send_sub_rect_nojpeg(vs, x, y, w, h, bg, fg, colors, palette);
+ #endif
+ 
+-    palette_destroy(palette);
+     return ret;
+ }
+ 

0066-vnc-tight-fix-regression-with-libxenstore.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+From: Peter Lieven <pl@kamp.de>
+Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2016 11:45:11 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] vnc-tight: fix regression with libxenstore
+
+commit 095497ff added thread local storage for the color counting
+palette. Unfortunately, a VncPalette is about 7kB on a x86_64 system.
+This memory is reserved from the stack of every thread and it
+exhausted the stack space of a libxenstore thread.
+
+Fix this by allocating memory only for the VNC encoding thread.
+
+Fixes: 095497ffc66b7f031ff2a17f1e50f5cb105ce588
+Reported-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
+Tested-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: Peter Lieven <pl@kamp.de>
+Message-id: 1468575911-20656-1-git-send-email-pl@kamp.de
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 66668d197fa40747e835e15617eda2f1bc80982f)
+---
+ ui/vnc-enc-tight.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ui/vnc-enc-tight.c b/ui/vnc-enc-tight.c
+index 877c093..49df85e 100644
+--- a/ui/vnc-enc-tight.c
++++ b/ui/vnc-enc-tight.c
+@@ -1458,11 +1458,17 @@ static int send_sub_rect_jpeg(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h,
+ }
+ #endif
+ 
+-static __thread VncPalette color_count_palette;
++static __thread VncPalette *color_count_palette;
++static __thread Notifier vnc_tight_cleanup_notifier;
++
++static void vnc_tight_cleanup(Notifier *n, void *value)
++{
++    g_free(color_count_palette);
++    color_count_palette = NULL;
++}
+ 
+ static int send_sub_rect(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h)
+ {
+-    VncPalette *palette = &color_count_palette;
+     uint32_t bg = 0, fg = 0;
+     int colors;
+     int ret = 0;
+@@ -1471,6 +1477,12 @@ static int send_sub_rect(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h)
+     bool allow_jpeg = true;
+ #endif
+ 
++    if (!color_count_palette) {
++        color_count_palette = g_malloc(sizeof(VncPalette));
++        vnc_tight_cleanup_notifier.notify = vnc_tight_cleanup;
++        qemu_thread_atexit_add(&vnc_tight_cleanup_notifier);
++    }
++
+     vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, x, y, w, h, vs->tight.type);
+ 
+     vnc_tight_start(vs);
+@@ -1491,17 +1503,19 @@ static int send_sub_rect(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h)
+     }
+ #endif
+ 
+-    colors = tight_fill_palette(vs, x, y, w * h, &bg, &fg, palette);
++    colors = tight_fill_palette(vs, x, y, w * h, &bg, &fg, color_count_palette);
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_VNC_JPEG
+     if (allow_jpeg && vs->tight.quality != (uint8_t)-1) {
+-        ret = send_sub_rect_jpeg(vs, x, y, w, h, bg, fg, colors, palette,
+-                                 force_jpeg);
++        ret = send_sub_rect_jpeg(vs, x, y, w, h, bg, fg, colors,
++                                 color_count_palette, force_jpeg);
+     } else {
+-        ret = send_sub_rect_nojpeg(vs, x, y, w, h, bg, fg, colors, palette);
++        ret = send_sub_rect_nojpeg(vs, x, y, w, h, bg, fg, colors,
++                                   color_count_palette);
+     }
+ #else
+-    ret = send_sub_rect_nojpeg(vs, x, y, w, h, bg, fg, colors, palette);
++    ret = send_sub_rect_nojpeg(vs, x, y, w, h, bg, fg, colors,
++                               color_count_palette);
+ #endif
+ 
+     return ret;

0067-dma-rc4030-limit-interval-timer-reload-value.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Wed, 12 Oct 2016 18:07:41 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] dma: rc4030: limit interval timer reload value
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The JAZZ RC4030 chipset emulator has a periodic timer and
+associated interval reload register. The reload value is used
+as divider when computing timer's next tick value. If reload
+value is large, it could lead to divide by zero error. Limit
+the interval reload value to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Huawei PSIRT <psirt@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Tested-by: Hervé Poussineau <hpoussin@reactos.org>
+Signed-off-by: Yongbok Kim <yongbok.kim@imgtec.com>
+(cherry picked from commit c0a3172fa6bbddcc73192f2a2c48d0bf3a7ba61c)
+---
+ hw/dma/rc4030.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/dma/rc4030.c b/hw/dma/rc4030.c
+index a06c235..1814ca6 100644
+--- a/hw/dma/rc4030.c
++++ b/hw/dma/rc4030.c
+@@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ static void rc4030_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, uint64_t data,
+         break;
+     /* Interval timer reload */
+     case 0x0228:
+-        s->itr = val;
++        s->itr = val & 0x01FF;
+         qemu_irq_lower(s->timer_irq);
+         set_next_tick(s);
+         break;

0068-serial-fix-memory-leak-in-serial-exit.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Wed, 4 Jan 2017 00:43:16 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] serial: fix memory leak in serial exit
+
+The serial_exit_core function doesn't free some resources.
+This can lead memory leak when hotplug and unplug. This
+patch avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Message-Id: <586cb5ab.f31d9d0a.38ac3.acf2@mx.google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 8409dc884a201bf74b30a9d232b6bbdd00cb7e2b)
+---
+ hw/char/serial.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/char/serial.c b/hw/char/serial.c
+index 3998131..ebf507b 100644
+--- a/hw/char/serial.c
++++ b/hw/char/serial.c
+@@ -869,6 +869,16 @@ void serial_realize_core(SerialState *s, Error **errp)
+ void serial_exit_core(SerialState *s)
+ {
+     qemu_chr_add_handlers(s->chr, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
++
++    timer_del(s->modem_status_poll);
++    timer_free(s->modem_status_poll);
++
++    timer_del(s->fifo_timeout_timer);
++    timer_free(s->fifo_timeout_timer);
++
++    fifo8_destroy(&s->recv_fifo);
++    fifo8_destroy(&s->xmit_fifo);
++
+     qemu_unregister_reset(serial_reset, s);
+ }
+ 

50-kvm-s390x.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+# KVM S390 VM creation fails without this set
+# https://www.mail-archive.com/kvm@vger.kernel.org/msg115576.html
+vm.allocate_pgste = 1

80-kvm.rules

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+KERNEL=="kvm", GROUP="kvm", MODE="0666"

ksm.service

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Kernel Samepage Merging
+ConditionPathExists=/sys/kernel/mm/ksm
+ConditionVirtualization=no
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+RemainAfterExit=yes
+EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/ksm
+ExecStart=/usr/libexec/ksmctl start
+ExecStop=/usr/libexec/ksmctl stop
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

ksm.sysconfig

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# The maximum number of unswappable kernel pages
+# which may be allocated by ksm (0 for unlimited)
+# If unset, defaults to half of total memory
+# KSM_MAX_KERNEL_PAGES=

ksmctl.c

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+/* Start/stop KSM, for systemd.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009, 2011 Red Hat, Inc.
+ * Written by Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>.
+ * Based on the original sysvinit script by Dan Kenigsberg <danken@redhat.com>
+ * This file is distributed under the GNU General Public License, version 2
+ * or later.  */
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#define KSM_MAX_KERNEL_PAGES_FILE "/sys/kernel/mm/ksm/max_kernel_pages"
+#define KSM_RUN_FILE		  "/sys/kernel/mm/ksm/run"
+
+char *program_name;
+
+int usage(void)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s {start|stop}\n", program_name);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+int write_value(uint64_t value, char *filename)
+{
+	FILE *fp;
+	if (!(fp = fopen(filename, "w")) ||
+	    fprintf(fp, "%llu\n", (unsigned long long) value) == EOF ||
+	    fflush(fp) == EOF ||
+	    fclose(fp) == EOF)
+		return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+uint64_t ksm_max_kernel_pages()
+{
+	char *var = getenv("KSM_MAX_KERNEL_PAGES");
+	char *endptr;
+	uint64_t value;
+	if (var && *var) {
+		value = strtoll(var, &endptr, 0);
+		if (value < LLONG_MAX && !*endptr)
+			return value;
+	}
+	/* Unless KSM_MAX_KERNEL_PAGES is set, let KSM munch up to half of
+	 * total memory.  */
+	return sysconf(_SC_PHYS_PAGES) / 2;
+}
+
+int start(void)
+{
+	if (access(KSM_MAX_KERNEL_PAGES_FILE, R_OK) >= 0)
+		write_value(ksm_max_kernel_pages(), KSM_MAX_KERNEL_PAGES_FILE);
+	return write_value(1, KSM_RUN_FILE);
+}
+
+int stop(void)
+{
+	return write_value(0, KSM_RUN_FILE);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	program_name = argv[0];
+	if (argc < 2) {
+		return usage();
+	} else if (!strcmp(argv[1], "start")) {
+		return start();
+	} else if (!strcmp(argv[1], "stop")) {
+		return stop();
+	} else {
+		return usage();
+	}
+}

ksmtuned

@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+#
+# Copyright 2009 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
+# Released under the GPL
+#
+# Author:      Dan Kenigsberg <danken@redhat.com>
+#
+# ksmtuned - a simple script that controls whether (and with what vigor) ksm
+# should search for duplicated pages.
+#
+# starts ksm when memory commited to qemu processes exceeds a threshold, and
+# make ksm work harder and harder untill memory load falls below that
+# threshold.
+#
+# send SIGUSR1 to this process right after a new qemu process is started, or
+# following its death, to retune ksm accordingly
+#
+# needs testing and ironing. contact danken@redhat.com if something breaks.
+
+if [ -f /etc/ksmtuned.conf ]; then
+    . /etc/ksmtuned.conf
+fi
+
+debug() {
+    if [ -n "$DEBUG" ]; then
+        s="`/bin/date`: $*"
+        [ -n "$LOGFILE" ] && echo "$s" >> "$LOGFILE" || echo "$s"
+    fi
+}
+
+
+KSM_MONITOR_INTERVAL=${KSM_MONITOR_INTERVAL:-60}
+KSM_NPAGES_BOOST=${KSM_NPAGES_BOOST:-300}
+KSM_NPAGES_DECAY=${KSM_NPAGES_DECAY:--50}
+
+KSM_NPAGES_MIN=${KSM_NPAGES_MIN:-64}
+KSM_NPAGES_MAX=${KSM_NPAGES_MAX:-1250}
+# millisecond sleep between ksm scans for 16Gb server. Smaller servers sleep
+# more, bigger sleep less.
+KSM_SLEEP_MSEC=${KSM_SLEEP_MSEC:-10}
+
+KSM_THRES_COEF=${KSM_THRES_COEF:-20}
+KSM_THRES_CONST=${KSM_THRES_CONST:-2048}
+
+total=`awk '/^MemTotal:/ {print $2}' /proc/meminfo`
+debug total $total
+
+npages=0
+sleep=$[KSM_SLEEP_MSEC * 16 * 1024 * 1024 / total]
+[ $sleep -le 10 ] && sleep=10
+debug sleep $sleep
+thres=$[total * KSM_THRES_COEF / 100]
+if [ $KSM_THRES_CONST -gt $thres ]; then
+    thres=$KSM_THRES_CONST
+fi
+debug thres $thres
+
+KSMCTL () {
+    case x$1 in
+        xstop)
+            echo 0 > /sys/kernel/mm/ksm/run
+            ;;
+        xstart)
+            echo $2 > /sys/kernel/mm/ksm/pages_to_scan
+            echo $3 > /sys/kernel/mm/ksm/sleep_millisecs
+            echo 1 > /sys/kernel/mm/ksm/run
+            ;;
+    esac
+}
+
+committed_memory () {
+    # calculate how much memory is committed to running qemu processes
+    local pidlist
+    pidlist=$(pgrep -d ' ' -- '^qemu(-(kvm|system-.+)|:.{1,11})$')
+    if [ -n "$pidlist" ]; then
+        ps -p "$pidlist" -o rsz=
+    fi | awk '{ sum += $1 }; END { print 0+sum }'
+}
+
+free_memory () {
+    awk '/^(MemFree|Buffers|Cached):/ {free += $2}; END {print free}' \
+                /proc/meminfo
+}
+
+increase_npages() {
+    local delta
+    delta=${1:-0}
+    npages=$[npages + delta]
+    if [ $npages -lt $KSM_NPAGES_MIN ]; then
+        npages=$KSM_NPAGES_MIN
+    elif [ $npages -gt $KSM_NPAGES_MAX ]; then
+        npages=$KSM_NPAGES_MAX
+    fi
+    echo $npages
+}
+
+
+adjust () {
+    local free committed
+    free=`free_memory`
+    committed=`committed_memory`
+    debug committed $committed free $free
+    if [ $[committed + thres] -lt $total -a $free -gt $thres ]; then
+        KSMCTL stop
+        debug "$[committed + thres] < $total and free > $thres, stop ksm"
+        return 1
+    fi
+    debug "$[committed + thres] > $total, start ksm"
+    if [ $free -lt $thres ]; then
+        npages=`increase_npages $KSM_NPAGES_BOOST`
+        debug "$free < $thres, boost"
+    else
+        npages=`increase_npages $KSM_NPAGES_DECAY`
+        debug "$free > $thres, decay"
+    fi
+    KSMCTL start $npages $sleep
+    debug "KSMCTL start $npages $sleep"
+    return 0
+}
+
+function nothing () {
+    :
+}
+
+loop () {
+    trap nothing SIGUSR1
+    while true
+    do
+        sleep $KSM_MONITOR_INTERVAL &
+        wait $!
+        adjust
+    done
+}
+
+PIDFILE=${PIDFILE-/var/run/ksmtune.pid}
+if touch "$PIDFILE"; then
+  loop &
+  echo $! > "$PIDFILE"
+fi

ksmtuned.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# Configuration file for ksmtuned.
+
+# How long ksmtuned should sleep between tuning adjustments
+# KSM_MONITOR_INTERVAL=60
+
+# Millisecond sleep between ksm scans for 16Gb server.
+# Smaller servers sleep more, bigger sleep less.
+# KSM_SLEEP_MSEC=10
+
+# KSM_NPAGES_BOOST=300
+# KSM_NPAGES_DECAY=-50
+# KSM_NPAGES_MIN=64
+# KSM_NPAGES_MAX=1250
+
+# KSM_THRES_COEF=20
+# KSM_THRES_CONST=2048
+
+# uncomment the following if you want ksmtuned debug info
+
+# LOGFILE=/var/log/ksmtuned
+# DEBUG=1

ksmtuned.service

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Kernel Samepage Merging (KSM) Tuning Daemon
+After=ksm.service
+Requires=ksm.service
+ConditionVirtualization=no
+
+[Service]
+ExecStart=/usr/sbin/ksmtuned
+ExecReload=/bin/kill -USR1 $MAINPID
+Type=forking
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

kvm.modules

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+case $(uname -m) in
+    ppc64)
+        grep OPAL  /proc/cpuinfo >/dev/null 2>&1 && opal=1
+
+        modprobe -b kvm >/dev/null 2>&1
+        modprobe -b kvm-pr >/dev/null 2>&1 && kvm=1
+        if [ "$opal" ]; then
+            modprobe -b kvm-hv >/dev/null 2>&1
+        fi
+        ;;
+    s390x)
+        modprobe -b kvm >/dev/null 2>&1 && kvm=1
+        ;;
+esac
+
+exit 0

qemu-ga.sysconfig

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-# This is a systemd environment file, not a shell script.
-# It provides settings for "/lib/systemd/system/qemu-guest-agent.service".
-
-# Comma-separated blacklist of RPCs to disable, or empty list to enable all.
-#
-# You can get the list of RPC commands using "qemu-ga --blacklist='?'".
-# There should be no spaces between commas and commands in the blacklist.
-#BLACKLIST_RPC=guest-file-open,guest-file-close,guest-file-read,guest-file-write,guest-file-seek,guest-file-flush,guest-exec,guest-exec-status
-
-# Fsfreeze hook script specification.
-#
-# FSFREEZE_HOOK_PATHNAME=/dev/null           : disables the feature.
-#
-# FSFREEZE_HOOK_PATHNAME=/path/to/executable : enables the feature with the
-# specified binary or shell script.
-#
-# FSFREEZE_HOOK_PATHNAME=                    : enables the feature with the
-# default value (invoke "qemu-ga --help" to interrogate).
-FSFREEZE_HOOK_PATHNAME=/etc/qemu-ga/fsfreeze-hook

qemu-guest-agent.service

@@ -1,19 +1,11 @@
 [Unit]
 Description=QEMU Guest Agent
-BindsTo=dev-virtio\x2dports-org.qemu.guest_agent.0.device
+BindTo=dev-virtio\x2dports-org.qemu.guest_agent.0.device
 After=dev-virtio\x2dports-org.qemu.guest_agent.0.device
-IgnoreOnIsolate=True
 
 [Service]
-UMask=0077
-EnvironmentFile=/etc/sysconfig/qemu-ga
-ExecStart=/usr/bin/qemu-ga \
-  --method=virtio-serial \
-  --path=/dev/virtio-ports/org.qemu.guest_agent.0 \
-  --blacklist=${BLACKLIST_RPC} \
-  -F${FSFREEZE_HOOK_PATHNAME}
+ExecStart=-/usr/bin/qemu-ga
 Restart=always
 RestartSec=0
 
 [Install]
-WantedBy=dev-virtio\x2dports-org.qemu.guest_agent.0.device

qemu.binfmt

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+:qemu-alpha:M::\x7fELF\x02\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x26\x90:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xfe\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-alpha:
+:qemu-armeb:M::\x7fELF\x01\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x28:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-armeb:
+:qemu-arm:M::\x7fELF\x01\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x28\x00:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-arm:
+:qemu-cris:M::\x7fELF\x01\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x4c\x00:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-cris:
+:qemu-i386:M::\x7fELF\x01\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x03\x00:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xfe\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-i386:
+:qemu-i486:M::\x7fELF\x01\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x06\x00:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xfe\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-i386:
+:qemu-m68k:M::\x7fELF\x01\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x04:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-m68k:
+:qemu-microblazeel:M::\x7fELF\x01\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\xab\xba:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-microblazeel:
+:qemu-microblaze:M::\x7fELF\x01\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\xba\xab:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-microblaze:
+:qemu-mips64el:M::\x7fELF\x02\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x08\x00:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\xfe\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-mips64el:
+:qemu-mips64:M::\x7fELF\x02\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x08:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\xfe\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-mips64:
+:qemu-mipsel:M::\x7fELF\x01\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x08\x00:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\xfe\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-mipsel:
+:qemu-mips:M::\x7fELF\x01\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x08:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\xfe\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-mips:
+:qemu-ppc64abi32:M::\x7fELF\x01\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x15:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-ppc64abi32:
+:qemu-ppc64:M::\x7fELF\x02\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x15:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-ppc64:
+:qemu-ppc:M::\x7fELF\x01\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x14:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-ppc:
+:qemu-s390x:M::\x7fELF\x02\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x16:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-s390x:
+:qemu-sh4eb:M::\x7fELF\x01\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x2a:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-sh4eb:
+:qemu-sh4:M::\x7fELF\x01\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x2a\x00:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-sh4:
+:qemu-sparc32plus:M::\x7fELF\x01\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x12:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-sparc32plus:
+:qemu-sparc64:M::\x7fELF\x02\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x2b:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-sparc64:
+:qemu-sparc:M::\x7fELF\x01\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x02:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-sparc:

sources

@@ -1 +1 @@
-SHA512 (qemu-5.2.0-rc4.tar.xz) = 47e918392609c34f904962e5759125485407ae52c273053729054300e10fc67fc7ed443c9af25d1d852a5f5c70eee125c703ce15d0e571068848f405de33db3b
+bdf1f3d0c177ebeb35a079a4bc3fc74e  qemu-2.6.2.tar.bz2