CVE-2017-7718: cirrus: OOB read access issue (bz #1443443)

CVE-2016-9603: cirrus: heap buffer overflow via vnc connection (bz #1432040)
CVE-2017-7377: 9pfs: fix file descriptor leak (bz #1437872)
CVE-2017-7980: cirrus: OOB r/w access issues in bitblt (bz #1444372)
CVE-2017-8112: vmw_pvscsi: infinite loop in pvscsi_log2 (bz #1445622)
CVE-2017-8309: audio: host memory lekage via capture buffer (bz #1446520)
CVE-2017-8379: input: host memory lekage via keyboard events (bz #1446560)
CVE-2017-8380: scsi: megasas: out-of-bounds read in megasas_mmio_write (bz #1446578)
CVE-2017-9060: virtio-gpu: host memory leakage in Virtio GPU device (bz #1452598)
CVE-2017-9310: net: infinite loop in e1000e NIC emulation (bz #1452623)
CVE-2017-9330: usb: ohci: infinite loop due to incorrect return value (bz #1457699)
CVE-2017-9374: usb: ehci host memory leakage during hotunplug (bz #1459137)
CVE-2017-10806: usb-redirect: stack buffer overflow in debug logging (bz #1468497)

0001-scsi-pvscsi-limit-loop-to-fetch-SG-list.patch

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
  1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c b/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
-index 4245c15..babac5a 100644
+index 4d94b363a9..a5ce7dea8e 100644
 --- a/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
 +++ b/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
 @@ -40,6 +40,8 @@
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ index 4245c15..babac5a 100644
  #define PVSCSI_MAX_CMD_DATA_WORDS \
      (sizeof(PVSCSICmdDescSetupRings)/sizeof(uint32_t))
  
-@@ -628,17 +630,16 @@ pvscsi_queue_pending_descriptor(PVSCSIState *s, SCSIDevice **d,
+@@ -631,17 +633,16 @@ pvscsi_queue_pending_descriptor(PVSCSIState *s, SCSIDevice **d,
  static void
  pvscsi_convert_sglist(PVSCSIRequest *r)
  {

0001-vmw_pvscsi-check-page-count-while-initialising-descr.patch

@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Date: Wed, 31 Aug 2016 12:19:29 +0530
-Subject: [PATCH] vmw_pvscsi: check page count while initialising descriptor
- rings
-
-Vmware Paravirtual SCSI emulation uses command descriptors to
-process SCSI commands. These descriptors come with their ring
-buffers. A guest could set the page count for these rings to
-an arbitrary value, leading to infinite loop or OOB access.
-Add check to avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Tom Victor <vv474172261@gmail.com>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Message-Id: <1472626169-12989-1-git-send-email-ppandit@redhat.com>
-Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
-Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 7f61f4690dd153be98900a2a508b88989e692753)
----
- hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c | 19 +++++++++----------
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c b/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
-index 5116f4a..4245c15 100644
---- a/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
-+++ b/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
-@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ pvscsi_log2(uint32_t input)
-     return log;
- }
- 
--static int
-+static void
- pvscsi_ring_init_data(PVSCSIRingInfo *m, PVSCSICmdDescSetupRings *ri)
- {
-     int i;
-@@ -160,10 +160,6 @@ pvscsi_ring_init_data(PVSCSIRingInfo *m, PVSCSICmdDescSetupRings *ri)
-     uint32_t req_ring_size, cmp_ring_size;
-     m->rs_pa = ri->ringsStatePPN << VMW_PAGE_SHIFT;
- 
--    if ((ri->reqRingNumPages > PVSCSI_SETUP_RINGS_MAX_NUM_PAGES)
--        || (ri->cmpRingNumPages > PVSCSI_SETUP_RINGS_MAX_NUM_PAGES)) {
--        return -1;
--    }
-     req_ring_size = ri->reqRingNumPages * PVSCSI_MAX_NUM_REQ_ENTRIES_PER_PAGE;
-     cmp_ring_size = ri->cmpRingNumPages * PVSCSI_MAX_NUM_CMP_ENTRIES_PER_PAGE;
-     txr_len_log2 = pvscsi_log2(req_ring_size - 1);
-@@ -195,8 +191,6 @@ pvscsi_ring_init_data(PVSCSIRingInfo *m, PVSCSICmdDescSetupRings *ri)
- 
-     /* Flush ring state page changes */
-     smp_wmb();
--
--    return 0;
- }
- 
- static int
-@@ -746,7 +740,7 @@ pvscsi_dbg_dump_tx_rings_config(PVSCSICmdDescSetupRings *rc)
- 
-     trace_pvscsi_tx_rings_num_pages("Confirm Ring", rc->cmpRingNumPages);
-     for (i = 0; i < rc->cmpRingNumPages; i++) {
--        trace_pvscsi_tx_rings_ppn("Confirm Ring", rc->reqRingPPNs[i]);
-+        trace_pvscsi_tx_rings_ppn("Confirm Ring", rc->cmpRingPPNs[i]);
-     }
- }
- 
-@@ -779,11 +773,16 @@ pvscsi_on_cmd_setup_rings(PVSCSIState *s)
- 
-     trace_pvscsi_on_cmd_arrived("PVSCSI_CMD_SETUP_RINGS");
- 
--    pvscsi_dbg_dump_tx_rings_config(rc);
--    if (pvscsi_ring_init_data(&s->rings, rc) < 0) {
-+    if (!rc->reqRingNumPages
-+        || rc->reqRingNumPages > PVSCSI_SETUP_RINGS_MAX_NUM_PAGES
-+        || !rc->cmpRingNumPages
-+        || rc->cmpRingNumPages > PVSCSI_SETUP_RINGS_MAX_NUM_PAGES) {
-         return PVSCSI_COMMAND_PROCESSING_FAILED;
-     }
- 
-+    pvscsi_dbg_dump_tx_rings_config(rc);
-+    pvscsi_ring_init_data(&s->rings, rc);
-+
-     s->rings_info_valid = TRUE;
-     return PVSCSI_COMMAND_PROCESSING_SUCCEEDED;
- }

0002-vmsvga-correct-bitmap-and-pixmap-size-checks.patch

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
  1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/hw/display/vmware_vga.c b/hw/display/vmware_vga.c
-index e51a05e..6599cf0 100644
+index e51a05ea7e..6599cf078d 100644
 --- a/hw/display/vmware_vga.c
 +++ b/hw/display/vmware_vga.c
 @@ -676,11 +676,13 @@ static void vmsvga_fifo_run(struct vmsvga_state_s *s)

0003-scsi-pvscsi-limit-process-IO-loop-to-ring-size.patch

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2016 15:09:12 +0530
-Subject: [PATCH] scsi: pvscsi: limit process IO loop to ring size
-
-Vmware Paravirtual SCSI emulator while processing IO requests
-could run into an infinite loop if 'pvscsi_ring_pop_req_descr'
-always returned positive value. Limit IO loop to the ring size.
-
-Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
-Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Message-Id: <1473845952-30785-1-git-send-email-ppandit@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit d251157ac1928191af851d199a9ff255d330bec9)
----
- hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c | 5 ++++-
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c b/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
-index babac5a..a5ce7de 100644
---- a/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
-+++ b/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
-@@ -247,8 +247,11 @@ static hwaddr
- pvscsi_ring_pop_req_descr(PVSCSIRingInfo *mgr)
- {
-     uint32_t ready_ptr = RS_GET_FIELD(mgr, reqProdIdx);
-+    uint32_t ring_size = PVSCSI_MAX_NUM_PAGES_REQ_RING
-+                            * PVSCSI_MAX_NUM_REQ_ENTRIES_PER_PAGE;
- 
--    if (ready_ptr != mgr->consumed_ptr) {
-+    if (ready_ptr != mgr->consumed_ptr
-+        && ready_ptr - mgr->consumed_ptr < ring_size) {
-         uint32_t next_ready_ptr =
-             mgr->consumed_ptr++ & mgr->txr_len_mask;
-         uint32_t next_ready_page =

0003-usb-xhci-fix-memory-leak-in-usb_xhci_exit.patch

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c b/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
-index 188f954..281a2a5 100644
+index 188f95416a..281a2a59f0 100644
 --- a/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
 +++ b/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
 @@ -3709,8 +3709,7 @@ static void usb_xhci_exit(PCIDevice *dev)

0004-virtio-add-check-for-descriptor-s-mapped-address.patch

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
 
 diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio.c b/hw/virtio/virtio.c
-index 74c085c..eabe573 100644
+index f31140aba4..58edd9952a 100644
 --- a/hw/virtio/virtio.c
 +++ b/hw/virtio/virtio.c
 @@ -473,6 +473,11 @@ static void virtqueue_map_desc(unsigned int *p_num_sg, hwaddr *addr, struct iove

0005-net-mcf-limit-buffer-descriptor-count.patch

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/hw/net/mcf_fec.c b/hw/net/mcf_fec.c
-index 0ee8ad9..d31fea1 100644
+index 0ee8ad9d66..d31fea1f18 100644
 --- a/hw/net/mcf_fec.c
 +++ b/hw/net/mcf_fec.c
 @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ do { printf("mcf_fec: " fmt , ## __VA_ARGS__); } while (0)

0005-scsi-mptconfig-fix-an-assert-expression.patch

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Date: Wed, 31 Aug 2016 17:36:07 +0530
-Subject: [PATCH] scsi: mptconfig: fix an assert expression
-
-When LSI SAS1068 Host Bus emulator builds configuration page
-headers, mptsas_config_pack() should assert that the size
-fits in a byte.  However, the size is expressed in 32-bit
-units, so up to 1020 bytes fit.  The assertion was only
-allowing replies up to 252 bytes, so fix it.
-
-Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Message-Id: <1472645167-30765-2-git-send-email-ppandit@redhat.com>
-Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
-Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit cf2bce203a45d7437029d108357fb23fea0967b6)
----
- hw/scsi/mptconfig.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/scsi/mptconfig.c b/hw/scsi/mptconfig.c
-index 7071854..3e4f400 100644
---- a/hw/scsi/mptconfig.c
-+++ b/hw/scsi/mptconfig.c
-@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ static size_t mptsas_config_pack(uint8_t **data, const char *fmt, ...)
-     va_end(ap);
- 
-     if (data) {
--        assert(ret < 256 && (ret % 4) == 0);
-+        assert(ret / 4 < 256 && (ret % 4) == 0);
-         stb_p(*data + 1, ret / 4);
-     }
-     return ret;

0006-scsi-mptconfig-fix-misuse-of-MPTSAS_CONFIG_PACK.patch

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 29 Aug 2016 11:35:37 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] scsi: mptconfig: fix misuse of MPTSAS_CONFIG_PACK
-
-These issues cause respectively a QEMU crash and a leak of 2 bytes of
-stack.  They were discovered by VictorV of 360 Marvel Team.
-
-Reported-by: Tom Victor <i-tangtianwen@360.cm>
-Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
-Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 65a8e1f6413a0f6f79894da710b5d6d43361d27d)
----
- hw/scsi/mptconfig.c | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/scsi/mptconfig.c b/hw/scsi/mptconfig.c
-index 3e4f400..87a416a 100644
---- a/hw/scsi/mptconfig.c
-+++ b/hw/scsi/mptconfig.c
-@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ size_t mptsas_config_manufacturing_1(MPTSASState *s, uint8_t **data, int address
- {
-     /* VPD - all zeros */
-     return MPTSAS_CONFIG_PACK(1, MPI_CONFIG_PAGETYPE_MANUFACTURING, 0x00,
--                              "s256");
-+                              "*s256");
- }
- 
- static
-@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ size_t mptsas_config_ioc_0(MPTSASState *s, uint8_t **data, int address)
-     return MPTSAS_CONFIG_PACK(0, MPI_CONFIG_PAGETYPE_IOC, 0x01,
-                               "*l*lwwb*b*b*blww",
-                               pcic->vendor_id, pcic->device_id, pcic->revision,
--                              pcic->subsystem_vendor_id,
-+                              pcic->class_id, pcic->subsystem_vendor_id,
-                               pcic->subsystem_id);
- }
- 

0006-xhci-limit-the-number-of-link-trbs-we-are-willing-to.patch

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Message-id: 1476096382-7981-1-git-send-email-kraxel@redhat.com
  1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
 
 diff --git a/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c b/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
-index 281a2a5..8a9a31a 100644
+index 281a2a59f0..8a9a31a2f7 100644
 --- a/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
 +++ b/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
 @@ -54,6 +54,8 @@

0007-usb-ehci-fix-memory-leak-in-ehci_process_itd.patch

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
 
 diff --git a/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c b/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c
-index b093db7..f4ece9a 100644
+index b093db729c..f4ece9abed 100644
 --- a/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c
 +++ b/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c
 @@ -1426,6 +1426,7 @@ static int ehci_process_itd(EHCIState *ehci,

0008-scsi-mptsas-use-g_new0-to-allocate-MPTSASRequest-obj.patch

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-Date: Mon, 12 Sep 2016 18:14:11 +0530
-Subject: [PATCH] scsi: mptsas: use g_new0 to allocate MPTSASRequest object
-
-When processing IO request in mptsas, it uses g_new to allocate
-a 'req' object. If an error occurs before 'req->sreq' is
-allocated, It could lead to an OOB write in mptsas_free_request
-function. Use g_new0 to avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Message-Id: <1473684251-17476-1-git-send-email-ppandit@redhat.com>
-Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
-Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 670e56d3ed2918b3861d9216f2c0540d9e9ae0d5)
----
- hw/scsi/mptsas.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/scsi/mptsas.c b/hw/scsi/mptsas.c
-index 0e0a22f..eaae1bb 100644
---- a/hw/scsi/mptsas.c
-+++ b/hw/scsi/mptsas.c
-@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ static int mptsas_process_scsi_io_request(MPTSASState *s,
-         goto bad;
-     }
- 
--    req = g_new(MPTSASRequest, 1);
-+    req = g_new0(MPTSASRequest, 1);
-     QTAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&s->pending, req, next);
-     req->scsi_io = *scsi_io;
-     req->dev = s;

0008-usb-redir-allocate-buffers-before-waking-up-the-host.patch

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
  1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/hw/usb/redirect.c b/hw/usb/redirect.c
-index 444672a..d4ca026 100644
+index 444672a000..d4ca026f00 100644
 --- a/hw/usb/redirect.c
 +++ b/hw/usb/redirect.c
 @@ -2036,18 +2036,22 @@ static void usbredir_interrupt_packet(void *priv, uint64_t id,

0009-qxl-Only-emit-QXL_INTERRUPT_CLIENT_MONITORS_CONFIG-o.patch

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 From: Christophe Fergeau <cfergeau@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 14 Oct 2016 14:22:36 +0200
+Date: Fri, 28 Oct 2016 16:48:40 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] qxl: Only emit QXL_INTERRUPT_CLIENT_MONITORS_CONFIG on config
  changes
 
@@ -23,29 +23,36 @@ This causes https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1266484
 This commit makes sure that we only emit
 QXL_INTERRUPT_CLIENT_MONITORS_CONFIG when there are actual configuration
 changes the guest should act on.
+
+Signed-off-by: Christophe Fergeau <cfergeau@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 20161028144840.18326-1-cfergeau@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 6c7565028c272c4c6f2a83c3a90b044eeaf2804a)
 ---
- hw/display/qxl.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+ hw/display/qxl.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 
 diff --git a/hw/display/qxl.c b/hw/display/qxl.c
-index 0e2682d..56759f8 100644
+index 0e2682d28b..62d0c80dcf 100644
 --- a/hw/display/qxl.c
 +++ b/hw/display/qxl.c
-@@ -1000,6 +1000,7 @@ static int interface_client_monitors_config(QXLInstance *sin,
-     QXLRom *rom = memory_region_get_ram_ptr(&qxl->rom_bar);
-     int i;
-     unsigned max_outputs = ARRAY_SIZE(rom->client_monitors_config.heads);
-+    bool config_changed = false;
+@@ -992,6 +992,34 @@ static uint32_t qxl_crc32(const uint8_t *p, unsigned len)
+     return crc32(0xffffffff, p, len) ^ 0xffffffff;
+ }
  
-     if (qxl->revision < 4) {
-         trace_qxl_client_monitors_config_unsupported_by_device(qxl->id,
-@@ -1030,6 +1031,21 @@ static int interface_client_monitors_config(QXLInstance *sin,
-     }
- #endif
- 
-+    if (rom->client_monitors_config.count != MIN(monitors_config->num_of_monitors, max_outputs)) {
-+        config_changed = true;
++static bool qxl_rom_monitors_config_changed(QXLRom *rom,
++        VDAgentMonitorsConfig *monitors_config,
++        unsigned int max_outputs)
++{
++    int i;
++    unsigned int monitors_count;
++
++    monitors_count = MIN(monitors_config->num_of_monitors, max_outputs);
++
++    if (rom->client_monitors_config.count != monitors_count) {
++        return true;
 +    }
++
 +    for (i = 0 ; i < rom->client_monitors_config.count ; ++i) {
 +        VDAgentMonConfig *monitor = &monitors_config->monitors[i];
 +        QXLURect *rect = &rom->client_monitors_config.heads[i];
@@ -54,14 +61,36 @@ index 0e2682d..56759f8 100644
 +            (rect->top != monitor->y)  ||
 +            (rect->right != monitor->x + monitor->width) ||
 +            (rect->bottom != monitor->y + monitor->height)) {
-+            config_changed = true;
++            return true;
 +        }
 +    }
++
++    return false;
++}
++
+ /* called from main context only */
+ static int interface_client_monitors_config(QXLInstance *sin,
+                                         VDAgentMonitorsConfig *monitors_config)
+@@ -1000,6 +1028,7 @@ static int interface_client_monitors_config(QXLInstance *sin,
+     QXLRom *rom = memory_region_get_ram_ptr(&qxl->rom_bar);
+     int i;
+     unsigned max_outputs = ARRAY_SIZE(rom->client_monitors_config.heads);
++    bool config_changed = false;
+ 
+     if (qxl->revision < 4) {
+         trace_qxl_client_monitors_config_unsupported_by_device(qxl->id,
+@@ -1030,6 +1059,10 @@ static int interface_client_monitors_config(QXLInstance *sin,
+     }
+ #endif
+ 
++    config_changed = qxl_rom_monitors_config_changed(rom,
++                                                     monitors_config,
++                                                     max_outputs);
 +
      memset(&rom->client_monitors_config, 0,
             sizeof(rom->client_monitors_config));
      rom->client_monitors_config.count = monitors_config->num_of_monitors;
-@@ -1059,7 +1075,9 @@ static int interface_client_monitors_config(QXLInstance *sin,
+@@ -1059,7 +1092,9 @@ static int interface_client_monitors_config(QXLInstance *sin,
      trace_qxl_interrupt_client_monitors_config(qxl->id,
                          rom->client_monitors_config.count,
                          rom->client_monitors_config.heads);

0010-ui-use-evdev-keymap-when-running-under-wayland.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2016 09:41:17 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] ui: use evdev keymap when running under wayland
+
+Wayland always uses evdev as its input source, so QEMU
+can use the existing evdev keymap data
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
+---
+ include/ui/gtk.h | 4 ++++
+ ui/gtk.c         | 7 +++++++
+ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/include/ui/gtk.h b/include/ui/gtk.h
+index 42ca0fea8b..b3b50059c7 100644
+--- a/include/ui/gtk.h
++++ b/include/ui/gtk.h
+@@ -18,6 +18,10 @@
+ #include <X11/XKBlib.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef GDK_WINDOWING_WAYLAND
++#include <gdk/gdkwayland.h>
++#endif
++
+ #if defined(CONFIG_OPENGL)
+ #include "ui/egl-helpers.h"
+ #include "ui/egl-context.h"
+diff --git a/ui/gtk.c b/ui/gtk.c
+index 21ae4cbccc..c641e49033 100644
+--- a/ui/gtk.c
++++ b/ui/gtk.c
+@@ -90,6 +90,9 @@
+ #ifndef GDK_IS_X11_DISPLAY
+ #define GDK_IS_X11_DISPLAY(dpy) (dpy == dpy)
+ #endif
++#ifndef GDK_IS_WAYLAND_DISPLAY
++#define GDK_IS_WAYLAND_DISPLAY(dpy) (dpy == dpy)
++#endif
+ #ifndef GDK_IS_WIN32_DISPLAY
+ #define GDK_IS_WIN32_DISPLAY(dpy) (dpy == dpy)
+ #endif
+@@ -1034,6 +1037,10 @@ static int gd_map_keycode(GtkDisplayState *s, GdkDisplay *dpy, int gdk_keycode)
+             qemu_keycode = translate_xfree86_keycode(gdk_keycode - 97);
+         }
+ #endif
++#ifdef GDK_WINDOWING_WAYLAND
++    } else if (GDK_IS_WAYLAND_DISPLAY(dpy) && gdk_keycode < 158) {
++        qemu_keycode = translate_evdev_keycode(gdk_keycode - 97);
++#endif
+     } else if (gdk_keycode == 208) { /* Hiragana_Katakana */
+         qemu_keycode = 0x70;
+     } else if (gdk_keycode == 211) { /* backslash */

0011-net-vmxnet-initialise-local-tx-descriptor.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2016 00:42:20 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] net: vmxnet: initialise local tx descriptor
+
+In Vmxnet3 device emulator while processing transmit(tx) queue,
+when it reaches end of packet, it calls vmxnet3_complete_packet.
+In that local 'txcq_descr' object is not initialised, which could
+leak host memory bytes a guest.
+
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Reviewed-by: Dmitry Fleytman <dmitry@daynix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit fdda170e50b8af062cf5741e12c4fb5e57a2eacf)
+---
+ hw/net/vmxnet3.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/vmxnet3.c b/hw/net/vmxnet3.c
+index 90f6943668..92f6af9620 100644
+--- a/hw/net/vmxnet3.c
++++ b/hw/net/vmxnet3.c
+@@ -531,6 +531,7 @@ static void vmxnet3_complete_packet(VMXNET3State *s, int qidx, uint32_t tx_ridx)
+ 
+     VMXNET3_RING_DUMP(VMW_RIPRN, "TXC", qidx, &s->txq_descr[qidx].comp_ring);
+ 
++    memset(&txcq_descr, 0, sizeof(txcq_descr));
+     txcq_descr.txdIdx = tx_ridx;
+     txcq_descr.gen = vmxnet3_ring_curr_gen(&s->txq_descr[qidx].comp_ring);
+ 

0012-net-pcnet-check-rx-tx-descriptor-ring-length.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Fri, 30 Sep 2016 00:27:33 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] net: pcnet: check rx/tx descriptor ring length
+
+The AMD PC-Net II emulator has set of control and status(CSR)
+registers. Of these, CSR76 and CSR78 hold receive and transmit
+descriptor ring length respectively. This ring length could range
+from 1 to 65535. Setting ring length to zero leads to an infinite
+loop in pcnet_rdra_addr() or pcnet_transmit(). Add check to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 34e29ce754c02bb6b3bdd244fbb85033460feaff)
+---
+ hw/net/pcnet.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/pcnet.c b/hw/net/pcnet.c
+index 198a01f92d..3078de8aba 100644
+--- a/hw/net/pcnet.c
++++ b/hw/net/pcnet.c
+@@ -1429,8 +1429,11 @@ static void pcnet_csr_writew(PCNetState *s, uint32_t rap, uint32_t new_value)
+     case 47: /* POLLINT */
+     case 72:
+     case 74:
++        break;
+     case 76: /* RCVRL */
+     case 78: /* XMTRL */
++        val = (val > 0) ? val : 512;
++        break;
+     case 112:
+        if (CSR_STOP(s) || CSR_SPND(s))
+            break;

0013-virtio-gpu-fix-memory-leak-in-virtio_gpu_resource_cr.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Sun, 18 Sep 2016 19:07:11 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] virtio-gpu: fix memory leak in virtio_gpu_resource_create_2d
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+In virtio gpu resource create dispatch, if the pixman format is zero
+it doesn't free the resource object allocated previously. Thus leading
+a host memory leak issue. This patch avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 57df486e.8379240a.c3620.ff81@mx.google.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit cb3a0522b694cc5bb6424497b3f828ccd28fd1dd)
+---
+ hw/display/virtio-gpu.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c b/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
+index 7fe6ed8bf0..5b6d17be00 100644
+--- a/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
++++ b/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
+@@ -333,6 +333,7 @@ static void virtio_gpu_resource_create_2d(VirtIOGPU *g,
+         qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
+                       "%s: host couldn't handle guest format %d\n",
+                       __func__, c2d.format);
++        g_free(res);
+         cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+         return;
+     }

0014-9pfs-fix-potential-host-memory-leak-in-v9fs_read.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2016 14:13:58 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: fix potential host memory leak in v9fs_read
+
+In 9pfs read dispatch function, it doesn't free two QEMUIOVector
+object thus causing potential memory leak. This patch avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+(cherry picked from commit e95c9a493a5a8d6f969e86c9f19f80ffe6587e19)
+---
+ hw/9pfs/9p.c | 5 +++--
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+index 91a497079a..1a9ec7ede9 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+@@ -1813,14 +1813,15 @@ static void v9fs_read(void *opaque)
+             if (len < 0) {
+                 /* IO error return the error */
+                 err = len;
+-                goto out;
++                goto out_free_iovec;
+             }
+         } while (count < max_count && len > 0);
+         err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "d", count);
+         if (err < 0) {
+-            goto out;
++            goto out_free_iovec;
+         }
+         err += offset + count;
++out_free_iovec:
+         qemu_iovec_destroy(&qiov);
+         qemu_iovec_destroy(&qiov_full);
+     } else if (fidp->fid_type == P9_FID_XATTR) {

0014-ppc-kvm-Mark-64kB-page-size-support-as-disabled-if-n.patch

@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-From: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 21 Sep 2016 11:42:15 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] ppc/kvm: Mark 64kB page size support as disabled if not
- available
-
-QEMU currently refuses to start with KVM-PR and only prints out
-
-	qemu: fatal: Unknown MMU model 851972
-
-when being started there. This is because commit 4322e8ced5aaac719
-("ppc: Fix 64K pages support in full emulation") introduced a new
-POWERPC_MMU_64K bit to indicate support for this page size, but
-it never gets cleared on KVM-PR if the host kernel does not support
-this. Thus we've got to turn off this bit in the mmu_model for KVM-PR.
-
-Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
-(cherry picked from commit 0d594f5565837fe2886a8aa307ef8abb65eab8f7)
----
- target-ppc/kvm.c | 7 +++++++
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/target-ppc/kvm.c b/target-ppc/kvm.c
-index dcb68b9..6bdc804 100644
---- a/target-ppc/kvm.c
-+++ b/target-ppc/kvm.c
-@@ -427,6 +427,7 @@ static void kvm_fixup_page_sizes(PowerPCCPU *cpu)
-     CPUPPCState *env = &cpu->env;
-     long rampagesize;
-     int iq, ik, jq, jk;
-+    bool has_64k_pages = false;
- 
-     /* We only handle page sizes for 64-bit server guests for now */
-     if (!(env->mmu_model & POWERPC_MMU_64)) {
-@@ -470,6 +471,9 @@ static void kvm_fixup_page_sizes(PowerPCCPU *cpu)
-                                      ksps->enc[jk].page_shift)) {
-                 continue;
-             }
-+            if (ksps->enc[jk].page_shift == 16) {
-+                has_64k_pages = true;
-+            }
-             qsps->enc[jq].page_shift = ksps->enc[jk].page_shift;
-             qsps->enc[jq].pte_enc = ksps->enc[jk].pte_enc;
-             if (++jq >= PPC_PAGE_SIZES_MAX_SZ) {
-@@ -484,6 +488,9 @@ static void kvm_fixup_page_sizes(PowerPCCPU *cpu)
-     if (!(smmu_info.flags & KVM_PPC_1T_SEGMENTS)) {
-         env->mmu_model &= ~POWERPC_MMU_1TSEG;
-     }
-+    if (!has_64k_pages) {
-+        env->mmu_model &= ~POWERPC_MMU_64K;
-+    }
- }
- #else /* defined (TARGET_PPC64) */
- 

0015-9pfs-allocate-space-for-guest-originated-empty-strin.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2016 14:13:58 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: allocate space for guest originated empty strings
+
+If a guest sends an empty string paramater to any 9P operation, the current
+code unmarshals it into a V9fsString equal to { .size = 0, .data = NULL }.
+
+This is unfortunate because it can cause NULL pointer dereference to happen
+at various locations in the 9pfs code. And we don't want to check str->data
+everywhere we pass it to strcmp() or any other function which expects a
+dereferenceable pointer.
+
+This patch enforces the allocation of genuine C empty strings instead, so
+callers don't have to bother.
+
+Out of all v9fs_iov_vunmarshal() users, only v9fs_xattrwalk() checks if
+the returned string is empty. It now uses v9fs_string_size() since
+name.data cannot be NULL anymore.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+[groug, rewritten title and changelog,
+ fix empty string check in v9fs_xattrwalk()]
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+
+(cherry picked from commit ba42ebb863ab7d40adc79298422ed9596df8f73a)
+---
+ fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.c | 2 +-
+ hw/9pfs/9p.c           | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.c b/fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.c
+index 663cad5429..1d16f8df4b 100644
+--- a/fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.c
++++ b/fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.c
+@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ ssize_t v9fs_iov_vunmarshal(struct iovec *out_sg, int out_num, size_t offset,
+                 str->data = g_malloc(str->size + 1);
+                 copied = v9fs_unpack(str->data, out_sg, out_num, offset,
+                                      str->size);
+-                if (copied > 0) {
++                if (copied >= 0) {
+                     str->data[str->size] = 0;
+                 } else {
+                     v9fs_string_free(str);
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+index 1a9ec7ede9..2b161ed6c0 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+@@ -3162,7 +3162,7 @@ static void v9fs_xattrwalk(void *opaque)
+         goto out;
+     }
+     v9fs_path_copy(&xattr_fidp->path, &file_fidp->path);
+-    if (name.data == NULL) {
++    if (!v9fs_string_size(&name)) {
+         /*
+          * listxattr request. Get the size first
+          */

0016-net-rocker-set-limit-to-DMA-buffer-size.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Wed, 12 Oct 2016 14:40:55 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] net: rocker: set limit to DMA buffer size
+
+Rocker network switch emulator has test registers to help debug
+DMA operations. While testing host DMA access, a buffer address
+is written to register 'TEST_DMA_ADDR' and its size is written to
+register 'TEST_DMA_SIZE'. When performing TEST_DMA_CTRL_INVERT
+test, if DMA buffer size was greater than 'INT_MAX', it leads to
+an invalid buffer access. Limit the DMA buffer size to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Huawei PSIRT <psirt@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 8caed3d564672e8bc6d2e4c6a35228afd01f4723)
+---
+ hw/net/rocker/rocker.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/rocker/rocker.c b/hw/net/rocker/rocker.c
+index 30f2ce417b..e9d215aa4d 100644
+--- a/hw/net/rocker/rocker.c
++++ b/hw/net/rocker/rocker.c
+@@ -860,7 +860,7 @@ static void rocker_io_writel(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, uint32_t val)
+         rocker_msix_irq(r, val);
+         break;
+     case ROCKER_TEST_DMA_SIZE:
+-        r->test_dma_size = val;
++        r->test_dma_size = val & 0xFFFF;
+         break;
+     case ROCKER_TEST_DMA_ADDR + 4:
+         r->test_dma_addr = ((uint64_t)val) << 32 | r->lower32;

0017-char-serial-check-divider-value-against-baud-base.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Wed, 12 Oct 2016 11:28:08 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] char: serial: check divider value against baud base
+
+16550A UART device uses an oscillator to generate frequencies
+(baud base), which decide communication speed. This speed could
+be changed by dividing it by a divider. If the divider is
+greater than the baud base, speed is set to zero, leading to a
+divide by zero error. Add check to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Huawei PSIRT <psirt@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Message-Id: <1476251888-20238-1-git-send-email-ppandit@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 3592fe0c919cf27a81d8e9f9b4f269553418bb01)
+---
+ hw/char/serial.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/char/serial.c b/hw/char/serial.c
+index 3442f47d36..eec72b7b9e 100644
+--- a/hw/char/serial.c
++++ b/hw/char/serial.c
+@@ -153,8 +153,9 @@ static void serial_update_parameters(SerialState *s)
+     int speed, parity, data_bits, stop_bits, frame_size;
+     QEMUSerialSetParams ssp;
+ 
+-    if (s->divider == 0)
++    if (s->divider == 0 || s->divider > s->baudbase) {
+         return;
++    }
+ 
+     /* Start bit. */
+     frame_size = 1;

0018-audio-intel-hda-check-stream-entry-count-during-tran.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Thu, 20 Oct 2016 13:10:24 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] audio: intel-hda: check stream entry count during transfer
+
+Intel HDA emulator uses stream of buffers during DMA data
+transfers. Each entry has buffer length and buffer pointer
+position, which are used to derive bytes to 'copy'. If this
+length and buffer pointer were to be same, 'copy' could be
+set to zero(0), leading to an infinite loop. Add check to
+avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Huawei PSIRT <psirt@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 1476949224-6865-1-git-send-email-ppandit@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 0c0fc2b5fd534786051889459848764edd798050)
+---
+ hw/audio/intel-hda.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/audio/intel-hda.c b/hw/audio/intel-hda.c
+index cd95340cd9..537face94d 100644
+--- a/hw/audio/intel-hda.c
++++ b/hw/audio/intel-hda.c
+@@ -416,7 +416,8 @@ static bool intel_hda_xfer(HDACodecDevice *dev, uint32_t stnr, bool output,
+     }
+ 
+     left = len;
+-    while (left > 0) {
++    s = st->bentries;
++    while (left > 0 && s-- > 0) {
+         copy = left;
+         if (copy > st->bsize - st->lpib)
+             copy = st->bsize - st->lpib;

0019-timer-a9gtimer-remove-loop-to-auto-increment-compara.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2016 16:26:54 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] timer: a9gtimer: remove loop to auto-increment comparator
+
+ARM A9MP processor has a peripheral timer with an auto-increment
+register, which holds an increment step value. A user could set
+this value to zero. When auto-increment control bit is enabled,
+it leads to an infinite loop in 'a9_gtimer_update' while
+updating comparator value. Remove this loop incrementing the
+comparator value.
+
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Message-id: 1476733226-11635-1-git-send-email-ppandit@redhat.com
+Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
+Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 6be8f5e2626e102433e569d9cece2120baf0c879)
+---
+ hw/timer/a9gtimer.c | 14 +++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/timer/a9gtimer.c b/hw/timer/a9gtimer.c
+index 772f85f5fd..ce1dc63911 100644
+--- a/hw/timer/a9gtimer.c
++++ b/hw/timer/a9gtimer.c
+@@ -82,15 +82,15 @@ static void a9_gtimer_update(A9GTimerState *s, bool sync)
+         if ((s->control & R_CONTROL_TIMER_ENABLE) &&
+                 (gtb->control & R_CONTROL_COMP_ENABLE)) {
+             /* R2p0+, where the compare function is >= */
+-            while (gtb->compare < update.new) {
++            if (gtb->compare < update.new) {
+                 DB_PRINT("Compare event happened for CPU %d\n", i);
+                 gtb->status = 1;
+-                if (gtb->control & R_CONTROL_AUTO_INCREMENT) {
+-                    DB_PRINT("Auto incrementing timer compare by %" PRId32 "\n",
+-                             gtb->inc);
+-                    gtb->compare += gtb->inc;
+-                } else {
+-                    break;
++                if (gtb->control & R_CONTROL_AUTO_INCREMENT && gtb->inc) {
++                    uint64_t inc =
++                        QEMU_ALIGN_UP(update.new - gtb->compare, gtb->inc);
++                    DB_PRINT("Auto incrementing timer compare by %"
++                                                        PRId64 "\n", inc);
++                    gtb->compare += inc;
+                 }
+             }
+             cdiff = (int64_t)gtb->compare - (int64_t)update.new + 1;

0020-net-eepro100-fix-memory-leak-in-device-uninit.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Sat, 8 Oct 2016 05:07:25 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] net: eepro100: fix memory leak in device uninit
+
+The exit dispatch of eepro100 network card device doesn't free
+the 's->vmstate' field which was allocated in device realize thus
+leading a host memory leak. This patch avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 2634ab7fe29b3f75d0865b719caf8f310d634aae)
+---
+ hw/net/eepro100.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/eepro100.c b/hw/net/eepro100.c
+index bab4dbfc98..4bf71f2d85 100644
+--- a/hw/net/eepro100.c
++++ b/hw/net/eepro100.c
+@@ -1843,6 +1843,7 @@ static void pci_nic_uninit(PCIDevice *pci_dev)
+     EEPRO100State *s = DO_UPCAST(EEPRO100State, dev, pci_dev);
+ 
+     vmstate_unregister(&pci_dev->qdev, s->vmstate, s);
++    g_free(s->vmstate);
+     eeprom93xx_free(&pci_dev->qdev, s->eeprom);
+     qemu_del_nic(s->nic);
+ }

0021-9pfs-fix-information-leak-in-xattr-read.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2016 14:13:58 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: fix information leak in xattr read
+
+9pfs uses g_malloc() to allocate the xattr memory space, if the guest
+reads this memory before writing to it, this will leak host heap memory
+to the guest. This patch avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+(cherry picked from commit eb687602853b4ae656e9236ee4222609f3a6887d)
+---
+ hw/9pfs/9p.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+index 2b161ed6c0..0c0645fe9a 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+@@ -3270,7 +3270,7 @@ static void v9fs_xattrcreate(void *opaque)
+     xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.flags = flags;
+     v9fs_string_init(&xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.name);
+     v9fs_string_copy(&xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.name, &name);
+-    xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value = g_malloc(size);
++    xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value = g_malloc0(size);
+     err = offset;
+     put_fid(pdu, file_fidp);
+ out_nofid:

0022-9pfs-fix-memory-leak-in-v9fs_xattrcreate.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2016 14:13:58 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: fix memory leak in v9fs_xattrcreate
+
+The 'fs.xattr.value' field in V9fsFidState object doesn't consider the
+situation that this field has been allocated previously. Every time, it
+will be allocated directly. This leads to a host memory leak issue if
+the client sends another Txattrcreate message with the same fid number
+before the fid from the previous time got clunked.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+[groug, updated the changelog to indicate how the leak can occur]
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+
+(cherry picked from commit ff55e94d23ae94c8628b0115320157c763eb3e06)
+---
+ hw/9pfs/9p.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+index 0c0645fe9a..54554bac51 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+@@ -3270,6 +3270,7 @@ static void v9fs_xattrcreate(void *opaque)
+     xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.flags = flags;
+     v9fs_string_init(&xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.name);
+     v9fs_string_copy(&xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.name, &name);
++    g_free(xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value);
+     xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value = g_malloc0(size);
+     err = offset;
+     put_fid(pdu, file_fidp);

0023-9pfs-add-xattrwalk_fid-field-in-V9fsXattr-struct.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Tue, 1 Nov 2016 12:00:40 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: add xattrwalk_fid field in V9fsXattr struct
+
+Currently, 9pfs sets the 'copied_len' field in V9fsXattr
+to -1 to tag xattr walk fid. As the 'copied_len' is also
+used to account for copied bytes, this may make confusion. This patch
+add a bool 'xattrwalk_fid' to tag the xattr walk fid.
+
+Suggested-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+(cherry picked from commit dd28fbbc2edc0822965d402d927ce646326d6954)
+---
+ hw/9pfs/9p.c | 7 ++++---
+ hw/9pfs/9p.h | 1 +
+ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+index 54554bac51..ad57123aaf 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ static int v9fs_xattr_fid_clunk(V9fsPDU *pdu, V9fsFidState *fidp)
+ {
+     int retval = 0;
+ 
+-    if (fidp->fs.xattr.copied_len == -1) {
++    if (fidp->fs.xattr.xattrwalk_fid) {
+         /* getxattr/listxattr fid */
+         goto free_value;
+     }
+@@ -3177,7 +3177,7 @@ static void v9fs_xattrwalk(void *opaque)
+          */
+         xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.len = size;
+         xattr_fidp->fid_type = P9_FID_XATTR;
+-        xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.copied_len = -1;
++        xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.xattrwalk_fid = true;
+         if (size) {
+             xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value = g_malloc(size);
+             err = v9fs_co_llistxattr(pdu, &xattr_fidp->path,
+@@ -3210,7 +3210,7 @@ static void v9fs_xattrwalk(void *opaque)
+          */
+         xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.len = size;
+         xattr_fidp->fid_type = P9_FID_XATTR;
+-        xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.copied_len = -1;
++        xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.xattrwalk_fid = true;
+         if (size) {
+             xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value = g_malloc(size);
+             err = v9fs_co_lgetxattr(pdu, &xattr_fidp->path,
+@@ -3266,6 +3266,7 @@ static void v9fs_xattrcreate(void *opaque)
+     xattr_fidp = file_fidp;
+     xattr_fidp->fid_type = P9_FID_XATTR;
+     xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.copied_len = 0;
++    xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.xattrwalk_fid = false;
+     xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.len = size;
+     xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.flags = flags;
+     v9fs_string_init(&xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.name);
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.h b/hw/9pfs/9p.h
+index a38603398e..699235d81c 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.h
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.h
+@@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ typedef struct V9fsXattr
+     void *value;
+     V9fsString name;
+     int flags;
++    bool xattrwalk_fid;
+ } V9fsXattr;
+ 
+ typedef struct V9fsDir {

0024-9pfs-convert-len-copied_len-field-in-V9fsXattr-to-th.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Tue, 1 Nov 2016 12:00:40 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: convert 'len/copied_len' field in V9fsXattr to the type
+ of uint64_t
+
+The 'len' in V9fsXattr comes from the 'size' argument in setxattr()
+function in guest. The setxattr() function's declaration is this:
+
+int setxattr(const char *path, const char *name,
+             const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
+
+and 'size' is treated as u64 in linux kernel client code:
+
+int p9_client_xattrcreate(struct p9_fid *fid, const char *name,
+                          u64 attr_size, int flags)
+
+So the 'len' should have an type of 'uint64_t'.
+The 'copied_len' in V9fsXattr is used to account for copied bytes, it
+should also have an type of 'uint64_t'.
+
+Suggested-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 8495f9ad26d398f01e208a53f1a5152483a16084)
+---
+ hw/9pfs/9p.h | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.h b/hw/9pfs/9p.h
+index 699235d81c..2067863100 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.h
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.h
+@@ -159,8 +159,8 @@ typedef struct V9fsConf
+ 
+ typedef struct V9fsXattr
+ {
+-    int64_t copied_len;
+-    int64_t len;
++    uint64_t copied_len;
++    uint64_t len;
+     void *value;
+     V9fsString name;
+     int flags;

0025-9pfs-fix-integer-overflow-issue-in-xattr-read-write.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Tue, 1 Nov 2016 12:00:40 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: fix integer overflow issue in xattr read/write
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The v9fs_xattr_read() and v9fs_xattr_write() are passed a guest
+originated offset: they must ensure this offset does not go beyond
+the size of the extended attribute that was set in v9fs_xattrcreate().
+Unfortunately, the current code implement these checks with unsafe
+calculations on 32 and 64 bit values, which may allow a malicious
+guest to cause OOB access anyway.
+
+Fix this by comparing the offset and the xattr size, which are
+both uint64_t, before trying to compute the effective number of bytes
+to read or write.
+
+Suggested-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Reviewed-By: Guido Günther <agx@sigxcpu.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 7e55d65c56a03dcd2c5d7c49d37c5a74b55d4bd6)
+---
+ hw/9pfs/9p.c | 32 ++++++++++++--------------------
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+index ad57123aaf..9c18322945 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+@@ -1629,20 +1629,17 @@ static int v9fs_xattr_read(V9fsState *s, V9fsPDU *pdu, V9fsFidState *fidp,
+ {
+     ssize_t err;
+     size_t offset = 7;
+-    int read_count;
+-    int64_t xattr_len;
++    uint64_t read_count;
+     V9fsVirtioState *v = container_of(s, V9fsVirtioState, state);
+     VirtQueueElement *elem = v->elems[pdu->idx];
+ 
+-    xattr_len = fidp->fs.xattr.len;
+-    read_count = xattr_len - off;
++    if (fidp->fs.xattr.len < off) {
++        read_count = 0;
++    } else {
++        read_count = fidp->fs.xattr.len - off;
++    }
+     if (read_count > max_count) {
+         read_count = max_count;
+-    } else if (read_count < 0) {
+-        /*
+-         * read beyond XATTR value
+-         */
+-        read_count = 0;
+     }
+     err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "d", read_count);
+     if (err < 0) {
+@@ -1970,23 +1967,18 @@ static int v9fs_xattr_write(V9fsState *s, V9fsPDU *pdu, V9fsFidState *fidp,
+ {
+     int i, to_copy;
+     ssize_t err = 0;
+-    int write_count;
+-    int64_t xattr_len;
++    uint64_t write_count;
+     size_t offset = 7;
+ 
+ 
+-    xattr_len = fidp->fs.xattr.len;
+-    write_count = xattr_len - off;
+-    if (write_count > count) {
+-        write_count = count;
+-    } else if (write_count < 0) {
+-        /*
+-         * write beyond XATTR value len specified in
+-         * xattrcreate
+-         */
++    if (fidp->fs.xattr.len < off) {
+         err = -ENOSPC;
+         goto out;
+     }
++    write_count = fidp->fs.xattr.len - off;
++    if (write_count > count) {
++        write_count = count;
++    }
+     err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "d", write_count);
+     if (err < 0) {
+         return err;

0026-9pfs-fix-memory-leak-in-v9fs_link.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2016 14:13:58 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: fix memory leak in v9fs_link
+
+The v9fs_link() function keeps a reference on the source fid object. This
+causes a memory leak since the reference never goes down to 0. This patch
+fixes the issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+[groug, rephrased the changelog]
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+
+(cherry picked from commit 4c1586787ff43c9acd18a56c12d720e3e6be9f7c)
+---
+ hw/9pfs/9p.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+index 9c18322945..a4ee24fe74 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+@@ -2396,6 +2396,7 @@ static void v9fs_link(void *opaque)
+     if (!err) {
+         err = offset;
+     }
++    put_fid(pdu, oldfidp);
+ out:
+     put_fid(pdu, dfidp);
+ out_nofid:

0027-9pfs-fix-memory-leak-in-v9fs_write.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2016 14:13:58 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: fix memory leak in v9fs_write
+
+If an error occurs when marshalling the transfer length to the guest, the
+v9fs_write() function doesn't free an IO vector, thus leading to a memory
+leak. This patch fixes the issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+[groug, rephrased the changelog]
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+
+(cherry picked from commit fdfcc9aeea1492f4b819a24c94dfb678145b1bf9)
+---
+ hw/9pfs/9p.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+index a4ee24fe74..03a5a35ea4 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+@@ -2073,7 +2073,7 @@ static void v9fs_write(void *opaque)
+     offset = 7;
+     err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "d", total);
+     if (err < 0) {
+-        goto out;
++        goto out_qiov;
+     }
+     err += offset;
+     trace_v9fs_write_return(pdu->tag, pdu->id, total, err);

0028-xen-fix-ioreq-handling.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
+Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 05:56:51 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] xen: fix ioreq handling
+
+Avoid double fetches and bounds check size to avoid overflowing
+internal variables.
+
+This is CVE-2016-9381 / XSA-197.
+
+Reported-by: yanghongke <yanghongke@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
+(cherry picked from commit b85f9dfdb156ae2a2a52f39a36e9f1f270614cd2)
+---
+ xen-hvm.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/xen-hvm.c b/xen-hvm.c
+index 2f348edf86..097007d3ed 100644
+--- a/xen-hvm.c
++++ b/xen-hvm.c
+@@ -810,6 +810,10 @@ static void cpu_ioreq_pio(ioreq_t *req)
+     trace_cpu_ioreq_pio(req, req->dir, req->df, req->data_is_ptr, req->addr,
+                          req->data, req->count, req->size);
+ 
++    if (req->size > sizeof(uint32_t)) {
++        hw_error("PIO: bad size (%u)", req->size);
++    }
++
+     if (req->dir == IOREQ_READ) {
+         if (!req->data_is_ptr) {
+             req->data = do_inp(req->addr, req->size);
+@@ -846,6 +850,10 @@ static void cpu_ioreq_move(ioreq_t *req)
+     trace_cpu_ioreq_move(req, req->dir, req->df, req->data_is_ptr, req->addr,
+                          req->data, req->count, req->size);
+ 
++    if (req->size > sizeof(req->data)) {
++        hw_error("MMIO: bad size (%u)", req->size);
++    }
++
+     if (!req->data_is_ptr) {
+         if (req->dir == IOREQ_READ) {
+             for (i = 0; i < req->count; i++) {
+@@ -1010,11 +1018,13 @@ static int handle_buffered_iopage(XenIOState *state)
+         req.df = 1;
+         req.type = buf_req->type;
+         req.data_is_ptr = 0;
++        xen_rmb();
+         qw = (req.size == 8);
+         if (qw) {
+             buf_req = &buf_page->buf_ioreq[(rdptr + 1) %
+                                            IOREQ_BUFFER_SLOT_NUM];
+             req.data |= ((uint64_t)buf_req->data) << 32;
++            xen_rmb();
+         }
+ 
+         handle_ioreq(state, &req);
+@@ -1045,7 +1055,11 @@ static void cpu_handle_ioreq(void *opaque)
+ 
+     handle_buffered_iopage(state);
+     if (req) {
+-        handle_ioreq(state, req);
++        ioreq_t copy = *req;
++
++        xen_rmb();
++        handle_ioreq(state, &copy);
++        req->data = copy.data;
+ 
+         if (req->state != STATE_IOREQ_INPROCESS) {
+             fprintf(stderr, "Badness in I/O request ... not in service?!: "

0029-display-cirrus-check-vga-bits-per-pixel-bpp-value.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Tue, 18 Oct 2016 13:15:17 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] display: cirrus: check vga bits per pixel(bpp) value
+
+In Cirrus CLGD 54xx VGA Emulator, if cirrus graphics mode is VGA,
+'cirrus_get_bpp' returns zero(0), which could lead to a divide
+by zero error in while copying pixel data. The same could occur
+via blit pitch values. Add check to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Huawei PSIRT <psirt@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Message-id: 1476776717-24807-1-git-send-email-ppandit@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 4299b90e9ba9ce5ca9024572804ba751aa1a7e70)
+---
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 14 ++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+index 3d712d592f..bdb092ee9d 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+@@ -272,6 +272,9 @@ static void cirrus_update_memory_access(CirrusVGAState *s);
+ static bool blit_region_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s,
+                                   int32_t pitch, int32_t addr)
+ {
++    if (!pitch) {
++        return true;
++    }
+     if (pitch < 0) {
+         int64_t min = addr
+             + ((int64_t)s->cirrus_blt_height-1) * pitch;
+@@ -715,7 +718,7 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState * s)
+                                             s->cirrus_addr_mask));
+ }
+ 
+-static void cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
++static int cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
+ {
+     int sx = 0, sy = 0;
+     int dx = 0, dy = 0;
+@@ -729,6 +732,9 @@ static void cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
+         int width, height;
+ 
+         depth = s->vga.get_bpp(&s->vga) / 8;
++        if (!depth) {
++            return 0;
++        }
+         s->vga.get_resolution(&s->vga, &width, &height);
+ 
+         /* extra x, y */
+@@ -783,6 +789,8 @@ static void cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
+     cirrus_invalidate_region(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
+ 				s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch, s->cirrus_blt_width,
+ 				s->cirrus_blt_height);
++
++    return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_copy(CirrusVGAState * s)
+@@ -790,11 +798,9 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_copy(CirrusVGAState * s)
+     if (blit_is_unsafe(s))
+         return 0;
+ 
+-    cirrus_do_copy(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr - s->vga.start_addr,
++    return cirrus_do_copy(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr - s->vga.start_addr,
+             s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr - s->vga.start_addr,
+             s->cirrus_blt_width, s->cirrus_blt_height);
+-
+-    return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ /***************************************

0030-net-mcf-check-receive-buffer-size-register-value.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2016 00:38:39 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] net: mcf: check receive buffer size register value
+
+ColdFire Fast Ethernet Controller uses a receive buffer size
+register(EMRBR) to hold maximum size of all receive buffers.
+It is set by a user before any operation. If it was set to be
+zero, ColdFire emulator would go into an infinite loop while
+receiving data in mcf_fec_receive. Add check to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Wjjzhang <wjjzhang@tencent.com>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 77d54985b85a0cb760330ec2bd92505e0a2a97a9)
+---
+ hw/net/mcf_fec.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/mcf_fec.c b/hw/net/mcf_fec.c
+index d31fea1f18..3d4b3b3b39 100644
+--- a/hw/net/mcf_fec.c
++++ b/hw/net/mcf_fec.c
+@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ static void mcf_fec_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
+         s->tx_descriptor = s->etdsr;
+         break;
+     case 0x188:
+-        s->emrbr = value & 0x7f0;
++        s->emrbr = value > 0 ? value & 0x7F0 : 0x7F0;
+         break;
+     default:
+         hw_error("mcf_fec_write Bad address 0x%x\n", (int)addr);

0031-virtio-gpu-fix-information-leak-in-getting-capset-in.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Tue, 1 Nov 2016 02:53:11 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] virtio-gpu: fix information leak in getting capset info
+ dispatch
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+In virgl_cmd_get_capset_info dispatch function, the 'resp' hasn't
+been full initialized before writing to the guest. This will leak
+the 'resp.padding' and 'resp.hdr.padding' fieds to the guest. This
+patch fix this issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Message-id: 5818661e.0860240a.77264.7a56@mx.google.com
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 42a8dadc74f8982fc269e54e3c5627b54d9f83d8)
+---
+ hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c b/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
+index 758d33a09d..23f39de94d 100644
+--- a/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
++++ b/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
+@@ -347,6 +347,7 @@ static void virgl_cmd_get_capset_info(VirtIOGPU *g,
+ 
+     VIRTIO_GPU_FILL_CMD(info);
+ 
++    memset(&resp, 0, sizeof(resp));
+     if (info.capset_index == 0) {
+         resp.capset_id = VIRTIO_GPU_CAPSET_VIRGL;
+         virgl_renderer_get_cap_set(resp.capset_id,

0032-virtio-gpu-fix-memory-leak-in-update_cursor_data_vir.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Tue, 1 Nov 2016 04:06:58 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] virtio-gpu: fix memory leak in update_cursor_data_virgl
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+In update_cursor_data_virgl function, if the 'width'/ 'height'
+is not equal to current cursor's width/height it will return
+without free the 'data' allocated previously. This will lead
+a memory leak issue. This patch fix this issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Message-id: 58187760.41d71c0a.cca75.4cb9@mx.google.com
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 2d1cd6c7a91a4beb99a0c3a21be529222a708545)
+---
+ hw/display/virtio-gpu.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c b/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
+index 5b6d17be00..41f80965a6 100644
+--- a/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
++++ b/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
+@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ static void update_cursor_data_virgl(VirtIOGPU *g,
+ 
+     if (width != s->current_cursor->width ||
+         height != s->current_cursor->height) {
++        free(data);
+         return;
+     }
+ 

0033-usbredir-free-vm_change_state_handler-in-usbredir-de.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2016 21:57:46 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] usbredir: free vm_change_state_handler in usbredir destroy
+ dispatch
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+In usbredir destroy dispatch function, it doesn't free the vm change
+state handler once registered in usbredir_realize function. This will
+lead a memory leak issue. This patch avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 58216976.d0236b0a.77b99.bcd6@mx.google.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 07b026fd82d6cf11baf7d7c603c4f5f6070b35bf)
+---
+ hw/usb/redirect.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/usb/redirect.c b/hw/usb/redirect.c
+index d4ca026f00..d064961203 100644
+--- a/hw/usb/redirect.c
++++ b/hw/usb/redirect.c
+@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ struct USBRedirDevice {
+     struct usbredirfilter_rule *filter_rules;
+     int filter_rules_count;
+     int compatible_speedmask;
++    VMChangeStateEntry *vmstate;
+ };
+ 
+ #define TYPE_USB_REDIR "usb-redir"
+@@ -1409,7 +1410,8 @@ static void usbredir_realize(USBDevice *udev, Error **errp)
+     qemu_chr_add_handlers(dev->cs, usbredir_chardev_can_read,
+                           usbredir_chardev_read, usbredir_chardev_event, dev);
+ 
+-    qemu_add_vm_change_state_handler(usbredir_vm_state_change, dev);
++    dev->vmstate =
++        qemu_add_vm_change_state_handler(usbredir_vm_state_change, dev);
+ }
+ 
+ static void usbredir_cleanup_device_queues(USBRedirDevice *dev)
+@@ -1446,6 +1448,7 @@ static void usbredir_handle_destroy(USBDevice *udev)
+     }
+ 
+     free(dev->filter_rules);
++    qemu_del_vm_change_state_handler(dev->vmstate);
+ }
+ 
+ static int usbredir_check_filter(USBRedirDevice *dev)

0034-usb-ehci-fix-memory-leak-in-ehci_init_transfer.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Tue, 8 Nov 2016 04:11:10 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] usb: ehci: fix memory leak in ehci_init_transfer
+
+In ehci_init_transfer function, if the 'cpage' is bigger than 4,
+it doesn't free the 'p->sgl' once allocated previously thus leading
+a memory leak issue. This patch avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Message-id: 5821c0f4.091c6b0a.e0c92.e811@mx.google.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 791f97758e223de3290592d169f8e6339c281714)
+---
+ hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c b/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c
+index f4ece9abed..7622a3ae72 100644
+--- a/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c
++++ b/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c
+@@ -1190,6 +1190,7 @@ static int ehci_init_transfer(EHCIPacket *p)
+     while (bytes > 0) {
+         if (cpage > 4) {
+             fprintf(stderr, "cpage out of range (%d)\n", cpage);
++            qemu_sglist_destroy(&p->sgl);
+             return -1;
+         }
+ 

0035-9pfs-adjust-the-order-of-resource-cleanup-in-device-.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:53:34 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: adjust the order of resource cleanup in device
+ unrealize
+
+Unrealize should undo things that were set during realize in
+reverse order. So should do in the error path in realize.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 4774718e5c194026ba5ee7a28d9be49be3080e42)
+---
+ hw/9pfs/9p.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+index 03a5a35ea4..1b7dd8437c 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+@@ -3492,8 +3492,8 @@ int v9fs_device_realize_common(V9fsState *s, Error **errp)
+     rc = 0;
+ out:
+     if (rc) {
+-        g_free(s->ctx.fs_root);
+         g_free(s->tag);
++        g_free(s->ctx.fs_root);
+         v9fs_path_free(&path);
+     }
+     return rc;
+@@ -3501,8 +3501,8 @@ out:
+ 
+ void v9fs_device_unrealize_common(V9fsState *s, Error **errp)
+ {
+-    g_free(s->ctx.fs_root);
+     g_free(s->tag);
++    g_free(s->ctx.fs_root);
+ }
+ 
+ static void __attribute__((__constructor__)) v9fs_set_fd_limit(void)

0036-9pfs-add-cleanup-operation-in-FileOperations.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:53:34 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: add cleanup operation in FileOperations
+
+Currently, the backend of VirtFS doesn't have a cleanup
+function. This will lead resource leak issues if the backed
+driver allocates resources. This patch addresses this issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 702dbcc274e2ca43be20ba64c758c0ca57dab91d)
+---
+ fsdev/file-op-9p.h | 1 +
+ hw/9pfs/9p.c       | 6 ++++++
+ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/fsdev/file-op-9p.h b/fsdev/file-op-9p.h
+index 6db9feac8f..a56dc8488d 100644
+--- a/fsdev/file-op-9p.h
++++ b/fsdev/file-op-9p.h
+@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ struct FileOperations
+ {
+     int (*parse_opts)(QemuOpts *, struct FsDriverEntry *);
+     int (*init)(struct FsContext *);
++    void (*cleanup)(struct FsContext *);
+     int (*lstat)(FsContext *, V9fsPath *, struct stat *);
+     ssize_t (*readlink)(FsContext *, V9fsPath *, char *, size_t);
+     int (*chmod)(FsContext *, V9fsPath *, FsCred *);
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+index 1b7dd8437c..641a348234 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+@@ -3492,6 +3492,9 @@ int v9fs_device_realize_common(V9fsState *s, Error **errp)
+     rc = 0;
+ out:
+     if (rc) {
++        if (s->ops->cleanup && s->ctx.private) {
++            s->ops->cleanup(&s->ctx);
++        }
+         g_free(s->tag);
+         g_free(s->ctx.fs_root);
+         v9fs_path_free(&path);
+@@ -3501,6 +3504,9 @@ out:
+ 
+ void v9fs_device_unrealize_common(V9fsState *s, Error **errp)
+ {
++    if (s->ops->cleanup) {
++        s->ops->cleanup(&s->ctx);
++    }
+     g_free(s->tag);
+     g_free(s->ctx.fs_root);
+ }

0037-9pfs-add-cleanup-operation-for-handle-backend-driver.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:53:34 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: add cleanup operation for handle backend driver
+
+In the init operation of handle backend dirver, it allocates a
+handle_data struct and opens a mount file. We should free these
+resources when the 9pfs device is unrealized. This is what this
+patch does.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 971f406b77a6eb84e0ad27dcc416b663765aee30)
+---
+ hw/9pfs/9p-handle.c | 9 +++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p-handle.c b/hw/9pfs/9p-handle.c
+index 3d77594f92..1687661bc9 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p-handle.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p-handle.c
+@@ -649,6 +649,14 @@ out:
+     return ret;
+ }
+ 
++static void handle_cleanup(FsContext *ctx)
++{
++    struct handle_data *data = ctx->private;
++
++    close(data->mountfd);
++    g_free(data);
++}
++
+ static int handle_parse_opts(QemuOpts *opts, struct FsDriverEntry *fse)
+ {
+     const char *sec_model = qemu_opt_get(opts, "security_model");
+@@ -671,6 +679,7 @@ static int handle_parse_opts(QemuOpts *opts, struct FsDriverEntry *fse)
+ FileOperations handle_ops = {
+     .parse_opts   = handle_parse_opts,
+     .init         = handle_init,
++    .cleanup      = handle_cleanup,
+     .lstat        = handle_lstat,
+     .readlink     = handle_readlink,
+     .close        = handle_close,

0038-9pfs-add-cleanup-operation-for-proxy-backend-driver.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 13:53:34 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: add cleanup operation for proxy backend driver
+
+In the init operation of proxy backend dirver, it allocates a
+V9fsProxy struct and some other resources. We should free these
+resources when the 9pfs device is unrealized. This is what this
+patch does.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 898ae90a44551d25b8e956fd87372d303c82fe68)
+---
+ hw/9pfs/9p-proxy.c | 13 +++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p-proxy.c b/hw/9pfs/9p-proxy.c
+index f265501eac..336e9fef84 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p-proxy.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p-proxy.c
+@@ -1179,9 +1179,22 @@ static int proxy_init(FsContext *ctx)
+     return 0;
+ }
+ 
++static void proxy_cleanup(FsContext *ctx)
++{
++    V9fsProxy *proxy = ctx->private;
++
++    g_free(proxy->out_iovec.iov_base);
++    g_free(proxy->in_iovec.iov_base);
++    if (ctx->export_flags & V9FS_PROXY_SOCK_NAME) {
++        close(proxy->sockfd);
++    }
++    g_free(proxy);
++}
++
+ FileOperations proxy_ops = {
+     .parse_opts   = proxy_parse_opts,
+     .init         = proxy_init,
++    .cleanup      = proxy_cleanup,
+     .lstat        = proxy_lstat,
+     .readlink     = proxy_readlink,
+     .close        = proxy_close,

0039-9pfs-fix-crash-when-fsdev-is-missing.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2017 17:28:44 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: fix crash when fsdev is missing
+
+If the user passes -device virtio-9p without the corresponding -fsdev, QEMU
+dereferences a NULL pointer and crashes.
+
+This is a 2.8 regression introduced by commit 702dbcc274e2c.
+
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Reviewed-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+(cherry picked from commit f2b58c43758efc61e2a49b899f5e58848489d0dc)
+---
+ hw/9pfs/9p.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+index 641a348234..9a89f75d90 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+@@ -3492,7 +3492,7 @@ int v9fs_device_realize_common(V9fsState *s, Error **errp)
+     rc = 0;
+ out:
+     if (rc) {
+-        if (s->ops->cleanup && s->ctx.private) {
++        if (s->ops && s->ops->cleanup && s->ctx.private) {
+             s->ops->cleanup(&s->ctx);
+         }
+         g_free(s->tag);

0040-display-virtio-gpu-3d-check-virgl-capabilities-max_s.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2016 12:31:56 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] display: virtio-gpu-3d: check virgl capabilities max_size
+
+Virtio GPU device while processing 'VIRTIO_GPU_CMD_GET_CAPSET'
+command, retrieves the maximum capabilities size to fill in the
+response object. It continues to fill in capabilities even if
+retrieved 'max_size' is zero(0), thus resulting in OOB access.
+Add check to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Zhenhao Hong <zhenhaohong@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Message-id: 20161214070156.23368-1-ppandit@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit abd7f08b2353f43274b785db8c7224f082ef4d31)
+---
+ hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c | 6 +++++-
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c b/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
+index 23f39de94d..e29f099bd5 100644
+--- a/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
++++ b/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
+@@ -371,8 +371,12 @@ static void virgl_cmd_get_capset(VirtIOGPU *g,
+ 
+     virgl_renderer_get_cap_set(gc.capset_id, &max_ver,
+                                &max_size);
+-    resp = g_malloc(sizeof(*resp) + max_size);
++    if (!max_size) {
++        cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
++        return;
++    }
+ 
++    resp = g_malloc(sizeof(*resp) + max_size);
+     resp->hdr.type = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_OK_CAPSET;
+     virgl_renderer_fill_caps(gc.capset_id,
+                              gc.capset_version,

0041-virtio-gpu-fix-information-leak-in-capset-get-dispat.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Tue, 1 Nov 2016 05:37:57 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] virtio-gpu: fix information leak in capset get dispatch
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+In virgl_cmd_get_capset function, it uses g_malloc to allocate
+a response struct to the guest. As the 'resp'struct hasn't been full
+initialized it will lead the 'resp->padding' field to the guest.
+Use g_malloc0 to avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 58188cae.4a6ec20a.3d2d1.aff2@mx.google.com
+
+[ kraxel: resolved conflict ]
+
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 85d9d044471f93c48c5c396f7e217b4ef12f69f8)
+---
+ hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c b/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
+index e29f099bd5..cdd03a47bd 100644
+--- a/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
++++ b/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
+@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ static void virgl_cmd_get_capset(VirtIOGPU *g,
+         return;
+     }
+ 
+-    resp = g_malloc(sizeof(*resp) + max_size);
++    resp = g_malloc0(sizeof(*resp) + max_size);
+     resp->hdr.type = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_OK_CAPSET;
+     virgl_renderer_fill_caps(gc.capset_id,
+                              gc.capset_version,

0042-virtio-gpu-call-cleanup-mapping-function-in-resource.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 28 Nov 2016 21:29:25 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] virtio-gpu: call cleanup mapping function in resource destroy
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+If the guest destroy the resource before detach banking, the 'iov'
+and 'addrs' field in resource is not freed thus leading memory
+leak issue. This patch avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 1480386565-10077-1-git-send-email-liq3ea@gmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit b8e23926c568f2e963af39028b71c472e3023793)
+---
+ hw/display/virtio-gpu.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c b/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
+index 41f80965a6..8903dee4f5 100644
+--- a/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
++++ b/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
+@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
+ static struct virtio_gpu_simple_resource*
+ virtio_gpu_find_resource(VirtIOGPU *g, uint32_t resource_id);
+ 
++static void virtio_gpu_cleanup_mapping(struct virtio_gpu_simple_resource *res);
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_VIRGL
+ #include <virglrenderer.h>
+ #define VIRGL(_g, _virgl, _simple, ...)                     \
+@@ -359,6 +361,7 @@ static void virtio_gpu_resource_destroy(VirtIOGPU *g,
+                                         struct virtio_gpu_simple_resource *res)
+ {
+     pixman_image_unref(res->image);
++    virtio_gpu_cleanup_mapping(res);
+     QTAILQ_REMOVE(&g->reslist, res, next);
+     g_free(res);
+ }

0043-net-imx-limit-buffer-descriptor-count.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Thu, 2 Feb 2017 16:16:24 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] net: imx: limit buffer descriptor count
+
+i.MX Fast Ethernet Controller uses buffer descriptors to manage
+data flow to/fro receive & transmit queues. While transmitting
+packets, it could continue to read buffer descriptors if a buffer
+descriptor has length of zero and has crafted values in bd.flags.
+Set an upper limit to number of buffer descriptors.
+
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 81f17e0d435c3db3a3e67e0d32ebf9c98973211f)
+---
+ hw/net/imx_fec.c | 10 ++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/imx_fec.c b/hw/net/imx_fec.c
+index 1c415ab3b1..6b42c10d96 100644
+--- a/hw/net/imx_fec.c
++++ b/hw/net/imx_fec.c
+@@ -55,6 +55,8 @@
+         } \
+     } while (0)
+ 
++#define IMX_MAX_DESC    1024
++
+ static const char *imx_default_reg_name(IMXFECState *s, uint32_t index)
+ {
+     static char tmp[20];
+@@ -402,12 +404,12 @@ static void imx_eth_update(IMXFECState *s)
+ 
+ static void imx_fec_do_tx(IMXFECState *s)
+ {
+-    int frame_size = 0;
++    int frame_size = 0, descnt = 0;
+     uint8_t frame[ENET_MAX_FRAME_SIZE];
+     uint8_t *ptr = frame;
+     uint32_t addr = s->tx_descriptor;
+ 
+-    while (1) {
++    while (descnt++ < IMX_MAX_DESC) {
+         IMXFECBufDesc bd;
+         int len;
+ 
+@@ -453,12 +455,12 @@ static void imx_fec_do_tx(IMXFECState *s)
+ 
+ static void imx_enet_do_tx(IMXFECState *s)
+ {
+-    int frame_size = 0;
++    int frame_size = 0, descnt = 0;
+     uint8_t frame[ENET_MAX_FRAME_SIZE];
+     uint8_t *ptr = frame;
+     uint32_t addr = s->tx_descriptor;
+ 
+-    while (1) {
++    while (descnt++ < IMX_MAX_DESC) {
+         IMXENETBufDesc bd;
+         int len;
+ 

0044-audio-ac97-add-exit-function.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2016 18:30:21 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] audio: ac97: add exit function
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Currently the ac97 device emulation doesn't have a exit function,
+hot unplug this device will leak some memory. Add a exit function to
+avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 58520052.4825ed0a.27a71.6cae@mx.google.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 12351a91da97b414eec8cdb09f1d9f41e535a401)
+---
+ hw/audio/ac97.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/audio/ac97.c b/hw/audio/ac97.c
+index cbd959e0bd..c30657501c 100644
+--- a/hw/audio/ac97.c
++++ b/hw/audio/ac97.c
+@@ -1387,6 +1387,16 @@ static void ac97_realize(PCIDevice *dev, Error **errp)
+     ac97_on_reset (&s->dev.qdev);
+ }
+ 
++static void ac97_exit(PCIDevice *dev)
++{
++    AC97LinkState *s = DO_UPCAST(AC97LinkState, dev, dev);
++
++    AUD_close_in(&s->card, s->voice_pi);
++    AUD_close_out(&s->card, s->voice_po);
++    AUD_close_in(&s->card, s->voice_mc);
++    AUD_remove_card(&s->card);
++}
++
+ static int ac97_init (PCIBus *bus)
+ {
+     pci_create_simple (bus, -1, "AC97");
+@@ -1404,6 +1414,7 @@ static void ac97_class_init (ObjectClass *klass, void *data)
+     PCIDeviceClass *k = PCI_DEVICE_CLASS (klass);
+ 
+     k->realize = ac97_realize;
++    k->exit = ac97_exit;
+     k->vendor_id = PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL;
+     k->device_id = PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_82801AA_5;
+     k->revision = 0x01;

0045-audio-es1370-add-exit-function.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2016 18:32:22 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] audio: es1370: add exit function
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Currently the es1370 device emulation doesn't have a exit function,
+hot unplug this device will leak some memory. Add a exit function to
+avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 585200c9.a968ca0a.1ab80.4c98@mx.google.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 069eb7b2b8fc47c7cb52e5a4af23ea98d939e3da)
+---
+ hw/audio/es1370.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/audio/es1370.c b/hw/audio/es1370.c
+index 8449b5f436..883ec69b30 100644
+--- a/hw/audio/es1370.c
++++ b/hw/audio/es1370.c
+@@ -1041,6 +1041,19 @@ static void es1370_realize(PCIDevice *dev, Error **errp)
+     es1370_reset (s);
+ }
+ 
++static void es1370_exit(PCIDevice *dev)
++{
++    ES1370State *s = ES1370(dev);
++    int i;
++
++    for (i = 0; i < 2; ++i) {
++        AUD_close_out(&s->card, s->dac_voice[i]);
++    }
++
++    AUD_close_in(&s->card, s->adc_voice);
++    AUD_remove_card(&s->card);
++}
++
+ static int es1370_init (PCIBus *bus)
+ {
+     pci_create_simple (bus, -1, TYPE_ES1370);
+@@ -1053,6 +1066,7 @@ static void es1370_class_init (ObjectClass *klass, void *data)
+     PCIDeviceClass *k = PCI_DEVICE_CLASS (klass);
+ 
+     k->realize = es1370_realize;
++    k->exit = es1370_exit;
+     k->vendor_id = PCI_VENDOR_ID_ENSONIQ;
+     k->device_id = PCI_DEVICE_ID_ENSONIQ_ES1370;
+     k->class_id = PCI_CLASS_MULTIMEDIA_AUDIO;

0046-watchdog-6300esb-add-exit-function.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Mon, 28 Nov 2016 17:49:04 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] watchdog: 6300esb: add exit function
+
+When the Intel 6300ESB watchdog is hot unplug. The timer allocated
+in realize isn't freed thus leaking memory leak. This patch avoid
+this through adding the exit function.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Message-Id: <583cde9c.3223ed0a.7f0c2.886e@mx.google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit eb7a20a3616085d46aa6b4b4224e15587ec67e6e)
+---
+ hw/watchdog/wdt_i6300esb.c | 9 +++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/watchdog/wdt_i6300esb.c b/hw/watchdog/wdt_i6300esb.c
+index a83d951213..49b3cd188a 100644
+--- a/hw/watchdog/wdt_i6300esb.c
++++ b/hw/watchdog/wdt_i6300esb.c
+@@ -428,6 +428,14 @@ static void i6300esb_realize(PCIDevice *dev, Error **errp)
+     /* qemu_register_coalesced_mmio (addr, 0x10); ? */
+ }
+ 
++static void i6300esb_exit(PCIDevice *dev)
++{
++    I6300State *d = WATCHDOG_I6300ESB_DEVICE(dev);
++
++    timer_del(d->timer);
++    timer_free(d->timer);
++}
++
+ static WatchdogTimerModel model = {
+     .wdt_name = "i6300esb",
+     .wdt_description = "Intel 6300ESB",
+@@ -441,6 +449,7 @@ static void i6300esb_class_init(ObjectClass *klass, void *data)
+     k->config_read = i6300esb_config_read;
+     k->config_write = i6300esb_config_write;
+     k->realize = i6300esb_realize;
++    k->exit = i6300esb_exit;
+     k->vendor_id = PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL;
+     k->device_id = PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_ESB_9;
+     k->class_id = PCI_CLASS_SYSTEM_OTHER;

0047-virtio-gpu-3d-fix-memory-leak-in-resource-attach-bac.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 29 Dec 2016 03:11:26 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] virtio-gpu-3d: fix memory leak in resource attach backing
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+If the virgl_renderer_resource_attach_iov function fails the
+'res_iovs' will be leaked. Add check of the return value to
+free the 'res_iovs' when failing.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 1482999086-59795-1-git-send-email-liq3ea@gmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 33243031dad02d161225ba99d782616da133f689)
+---
+ hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c | 7 +++++--
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c b/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
+index cdd03a47bd..f96a0c2e59 100644
+--- a/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
++++ b/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
+@@ -291,8 +291,11 @@ static void virgl_resource_attach_backing(VirtIOGPU *g,
+         return;
+     }
+ 
+-    virgl_renderer_resource_attach_iov(att_rb.resource_id,
+-                                       res_iovs, att_rb.nr_entries);
++    ret = virgl_renderer_resource_attach_iov(att_rb.resource_id,
++                                             res_iovs, att_rb.nr_entries);
++
++    if (ret != 0)
++        virtio_gpu_cleanup_mapping_iov(res_iovs, att_rb.nr_entries);
+ }
+ 
+ static void virgl_resource_detach_backing(VirtIOGPU *g,

0048-virtio-gpu-fix-memory-leak-in-resource-attach-backin.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 29 Dec 2016 04:28:41 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] virtio-gpu: fix memory leak in resource attach backing
+
+In the resource attach backing function, everytime it will
+allocate 'res->iov' thus can leading a memory leak. This
+patch avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Message-id: 1483003721-65360-1-git-send-email-liq3ea@gmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 204f01b30975923c64006f8067f0937b91eea68b)
+---
+ hw/display/virtio-gpu.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c b/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
+index 8903dee4f5..cadd7d899d 100644
+--- a/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
++++ b/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
+@@ -708,6 +708,11 @@ virtio_gpu_resource_attach_backing(VirtIOGPU *g,
+         return;
+     }
+ 
++    if (res->iov) {
++        cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_UNSPEC;
++        return;
++    }
++
+     ret = virtio_gpu_create_mapping_iov(&ab, cmd, &res->addrs, &res->iov);
+     if (ret != 0) {
+         cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_UNSPEC;

0049-sd-sdhci-check-data-length-during-dma_memory_read.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2017 18:29:59 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] sd: sdhci: check data length during dma_memory_read
+
+While doing multi block SDMA transfer in routine
+'sdhci_sdma_transfer_multi_blocks', the 's->fifo_buffer' starting
+index 'begin' and data length 's->data_count' could end up to be same.
+This could lead to an OOB access issue. Correct transfer data length
+to avoid it.
+
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Reported-by: Jiang Xin <jiangxin1@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
+Message-id: 20170130064736.9236-1-ppandit@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 42922105beb14c2fc58185ea022b9f72fb5465e9)
+---
+ hw/sd/sdhci.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/sd/sdhci.c b/hw/sd/sdhci.c
+index 01fbf228be..5bd5ab6319 100644
+--- a/hw/sd/sdhci.c
++++ b/hw/sd/sdhci.c
+@@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ static void sdhci_sdma_transfer_multi_blocks(SDHCIState *s)
+                 boundary_count -= block_size - begin;
+             }
+             dma_memory_read(&address_space_memory, s->sdmasysad,
+-                            &s->fifo_buffer[begin], s->data_count);
++                            &s->fifo_buffer[begin], s->data_count - begin);
+             s->sdmasysad += s->data_count - begin;
+             if (s->data_count == block_size) {
+                 for (n = 0; n < block_size; n++) {

0050-megasas-fix-guest-triggered-memory-leak.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 2 Jan 2017 11:03:33 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] megasas: fix guest-triggered memory leak
+
+If the guest sets the sglist size to a value >=2GB, megasas_handle_dcmd
+will return MFI_STAT_MEMORY_NOT_AVAILABLE without freeing the memory.
+Avoid this by returning only the status from map_dcmd, and loading
+cmd->iov_size in the caller.
+
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 765a707000e838c30b18d712fe6cb3dd8e0435f3)
+---
+ hw/scsi/megasas.c | 11 ++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/scsi/megasas.c b/hw/scsi/megasas.c
+index 52a41239cf..ebf03022ed 100644
+--- a/hw/scsi/megasas.c
++++ b/hw/scsi/megasas.c
+@@ -672,14 +672,14 @@ static int megasas_map_dcmd(MegasasState *s, MegasasCmd *cmd)
+         trace_megasas_dcmd_invalid_sge(cmd->index,
+                                        cmd->frame->header.sge_count);
+         cmd->iov_size = 0;
+-        return -1;
++        return -EINVAL;
+     }
+     iov_pa = megasas_sgl_get_addr(cmd, &cmd->frame->dcmd.sgl);
+     iov_size = megasas_sgl_get_len(cmd, &cmd->frame->dcmd.sgl);
+     pci_dma_sglist_init(&cmd->qsg, PCI_DEVICE(s), 1);
+     qemu_sglist_add(&cmd->qsg, iov_pa, iov_size);
+     cmd->iov_size = iov_size;
+-    return cmd->iov_size;
++    return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ static void megasas_finish_dcmd(MegasasCmd *cmd, uint32_t iov_size)
+@@ -1552,19 +1552,20 @@ static const struct dcmd_cmd_tbl_t {
+ 
+ static int megasas_handle_dcmd(MegasasState *s, MegasasCmd *cmd)
+ {
+-    int opcode, len;
++    int opcode;
+     int retval = 0;
++    size_t len;
+     const struct dcmd_cmd_tbl_t *cmdptr = dcmd_cmd_tbl;
+ 
+     opcode = le32_to_cpu(cmd->frame->dcmd.opcode);
+     trace_megasas_handle_dcmd(cmd->index, opcode);
+-    len = megasas_map_dcmd(s, cmd);
+-    if (len < 0) {
++    if (megasas_map_dcmd(s, cmd) < 0) {
+         return MFI_STAT_MEMORY_NOT_AVAILABLE;
+     }
+     while (cmdptr->opcode != -1 && cmdptr->opcode != opcode) {
+         cmdptr++;
+     }
++    len = cmd->iov_size;
+     if (cmdptr->opcode == -1) {
+         trace_megasas_dcmd_unhandled(cmd->index, opcode, len);
+         retval = megasas_dcmd_dummy(s, cmd);

0051-virtio-gpu-fix-resource-leak-in-virgl_cmd_resource_u.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 23 Jan 2017 11:26:50 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] virtio-gpu: fix resource leak in virgl_cmd_resource_unref
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+When the guest sends VIRTIO_GPU_CMD_RESOURCE_UNREF without detaching the
+backing storage beforehand (VIRTIO_GPU_CMD_RESOURCE_DETACH_BACKING)
+we'll leak memory.
+
+This patch fixes it for 3d mode, simliar to the 2d mode fix in commit
+"b8e2392 virtio-gpu: call cleanup mapping function in resource destroy".
+
+Reported-by: 李强 <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 1485167210-4757-1-git-send-email-kraxel@redhat.com
+(cherry picked from commit 5e8e3c4c75c199aa1017db816fca02be2a9f8798)
+---
+ hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c b/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
+index f96a0c2e59..ecb09d17a1 100644
+--- a/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
++++ b/hw/display/virtio-gpu-3d.c
+@@ -77,10 +77,18 @@ static void virgl_cmd_resource_unref(VirtIOGPU *g,
+                                      struct virtio_gpu_ctrl_command *cmd)
+ {
+     struct virtio_gpu_resource_unref unref;
++    struct iovec *res_iovs = NULL;
++    int num_iovs = 0;
+ 
+     VIRTIO_GPU_FILL_CMD(unref);
+     trace_virtio_gpu_cmd_res_unref(unref.resource_id);
+ 
++    virgl_renderer_resource_detach_iov(unref.resource_id,
++                                       &res_iovs,
++                                       &num_iovs);
++    if (res_iovs != NULL && num_iovs != 0) {
++        virtio_gpu_cleanup_mapping_iov(res_iovs, num_iovs);
++    }
+     virgl_renderer_resource_unref(unref.resource_id);
+ }
+ 

0052-usb-ccid-check-ccid-apdu-length.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Fri, 3 Feb 2017 00:52:28 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] usb: ccid: check ccid apdu length
+
+CCID device emulator uses Application Protocol Data Units(APDU)
+to exchange command and responses to and from the host.
+The length in these units couldn't be greater than 65536. Add
+check to ensure the same. It'd also avoid potential integer
+overflow in emulated_apdu_from_guest.
+
+Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Message-id: 20170202192228.10847-1-ppandit@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit c7dfbf322595ded4e70b626bf83158a9f3807c6a)
+---
+ hw/usb/dev-smartcard-reader.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/usb/dev-smartcard-reader.c b/hw/usb/dev-smartcard-reader.c
+index af4b851356..fc32b00363 100644
+--- a/hw/usb/dev-smartcard-reader.c
++++ b/hw/usb/dev-smartcard-reader.c
+@@ -967,7 +967,7 @@ static void ccid_on_apdu_from_guest(USBCCIDState *s, CCID_XferBlock *recv)
+     DPRINTF(s, 1, "%s: seq %d, len %d\n", __func__,
+                 recv->hdr.bSeq, len);
+     ccid_add_pending_answer(s, (CCID_Header *)recv);
+-    if (s->card) {
++    if (s->card && len <= BULK_OUT_DATA_SIZE) {
+         ccid_card_apdu_from_guest(s->card, recv->abData, len);
+     } else {
+         DPRINTF(s, D_WARN, "warning: discarded apdu\n");

0053-sd-sdhci-check-transfer-mode-register-in-multi-block.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2017 12:08:14 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] sd: sdhci: check transfer mode register in multi block
+ transfer
+
+In the SDHCI protocol, the transfer mode register value
+is used during multi block transfer to check if block count
+register is enabled and should be updated. Transfer mode
+register could be set such that, block count register would
+not be updated, thus leading to an infinite loop. Add check
+to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Wjjzhang <wjjzhang@tencent.com>
+Reported-by: Jiang Xin <jiangxin1@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Message-id: 20170214185225.7994-3-ppandit@redhat.com
+Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@xilinx.com>
+Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 6e86d90352adf6cb08295255220295cf23c4286e)
+---
+ hw/sd/sdhci.c | 10 +++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/sd/sdhci.c b/hw/sd/sdhci.c
+index 5bd5ab6319..a9c744b50a 100644
+--- a/hw/sd/sdhci.c
++++ b/hw/sd/sdhci.c
+@@ -486,6 +486,11 @@ static void sdhci_sdma_transfer_multi_blocks(SDHCIState *s)
+     uint32_t boundary_chk = 1 << (((s->blksize & 0xf000) >> 12) + 12);
+     uint32_t boundary_count = boundary_chk - (s->sdmasysad % boundary_chk);
+ 
++    if (!(s->trnmod & SDHC_TRNS_BLK_CNT_EN) || !s->blkcnt) {
++        qemu_log_mask(LOG_UNIMP, "infinite transfer is not supported\n");
++        return;
++    }
++
+     /* XXX: Some sd/mmc drivers (for example, u-boot-slp) do not account for
+      * possible stop at page boundary if initial address is not page aligned,
+      * allow them to work properly */
+@@ -797,11 +802,6 @@ static void sdhci_data_transfer(void *opaque)
+     if (s->trnmod & SDHC_TRNS_DMA) {
+         switch (SDHC_DMA_TYPE(s->hostctl)) {
+         case SDHC_CTRL_SDMA:
+-            if ((s->trnmod & SDHC_TRNS_MULTI) &&
+-                    (!(s->trnmod & SDHC_TRNS_BLK_CNT_EN) || s->blkcnt == 0)) {
+-                break;
+-            }
+-
+             if ((s->blkcnt == 1) || !(s->trnmod & SDHC_TRNS_MULTI)) {
+                 sdhci_sdma_transfer_single_block(s);
+             } else {

0054-eth-Extend-vlan-stripping-functions.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+From: Dmitry Fleytman <dmitry@daynix.com>
+Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2017 14:29:32 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] eth: Extend vlan stripping functions
+
+Make VLAN stripping functions return number of bytes
+copied to given Ethernet header buffer.
+
+This information should be used to re-compose
+packet IOV after VLAN stripping.
+
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Signed-off-by: Dmitry Fleytman <dmitry@daynix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 566342c3125ac2e73abd36c650222318164517ed)
+---
+ include/net/eth.h |  4 ++--
+ net/eth.c         | 25 ++++++++++++++-----------
+ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/net/eth.h b/include/net/eth.h
+index 2013175857..afeb45be34 100644
+--- a/include/net/eth.h
++++ b/include/net/eth.h
+@@ -331,12 +331,12 @@ eth_get_pkt_tci(const void *p)
+     }
+ }
+ 
+-bool
++size_t
+ eth_strip_vlan(const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt, size_t iovoff,
+                uint8_t *new_ehdr_buf,
+                uint16_t *payload_offset, uint16_t *tci);
+ 
+-bool
++size_t
+ eth_strip_vlan_ex(const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt, size_t iovoff,
+                   uint16_t vet, uint8_t *new_ehdr_buf,
+                   uint16_t *payload_offset, uint16_t *tci);
+diff --git a/net/eth.c b/net/eth.c
+index df81efb676..5b9ba26a56 100644
+--- a/net/eth.c
++++ b/net/eth.c
+@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ void eth_get_protocols(const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt,
+     }
+ }
+ 
+-bool
++size_t
+ eth_strip_vlan(const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt, size_t iovoff,
+                uint8_t *new_ehdr_buf,
+                uint16_t *payload_offset, uint16_t *tci)
+@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ eth_strip_vlan(const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt, size_t iovoff,
+                                new_ehdr, sizeof(*new_ehdr));
+ 
+     if (copied < sizeof(*new_ehdr)) {
+-        return false;
++        return 0;
+     }
+ 
+     switch (be16_to_cpu(new_ehdr->h_proto)) {
+@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ eth_strip_vlan(const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt, size_t iovoff,
+                             &vlan_hdr, sizeof(vlan_hdr));
+ 
+         if (copied < sizeof(vlan_hdr)) {
+-            return false;
++            return 0;
+         }
+ 
+         new_ehdr->h_proto = vlan_hdr.h_proto;
+@@ -268,18 +268,21 @@ eth_strip_vlan(const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt, size_t iovoff,
+                                 PKT_GET_VLAN_HDR(new_ehdr), sizeof(vlan_hdr));
+ 
+             if (copied < sizeof(vlan_hdr)) {
+-                return false;
++                return 0;
+             }
+ 
+             *payload_offset += sizeof(vlan_hdr);
++
++            return sizeof(struct eth_header) + sizeof(struct vlan_header);
++        } else {
++            return sizeof(struct eth_header);
+         }
+-        return true;
+     default:
+-        return false;
++        return 0;
+     }
+ }
+ 
+-bool
++size_t
+ eth_strip_vlan_ex(const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt, size_t iovoff,
+                   uint16_t vet, uint8_t *new_ehdr_buf,
+                   uint16_t *payload_offset, uint16_t *tci)
+@@ -291,7 +294,7 @@ eth_strip_vlan_ex(const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt, size_t iovoff,
+                                new_ehdr, sizeof(*new_ehdr));
+ 
+     if (copied < sizeof(*new_ehdr)) {
+-        return false;
++        return 0;
+     }
+ 
+     if (be16_to_cpu(new_ehdr->h_proto) == vet) {
+@@ -299,17 +302,17 @@ eth_strip_vlan_ex(const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt, size_t iovoff,
+                             &vlan_hdr, sizeof(vlan_hdr));
+ 
+         if (copied < sizeof(vlan_hdr)) {
+-            return false;
++            return 0;
+         }
+ 
+         new_ehdr->h_proto = vlan_hdr.h_proto;
+ 
+         *tci = be16_to_cpu(vlan_hdr.h_tci);
+         *payload_offset = iovoff + sizeof(*new_ehdr) + sizeof(vlan_hdr);
+-        return true;
++        return sizeof(struct eth_header);
+     }
+ 
+-    return false;
++    return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ void

0055-NetRxPkt-Fix-memory-corruption-on-VLAN-header-stripp.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+From: Dmitry Fleytman <dmitry@daynix.com>
+Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2017 14:29:33 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] NetRxPkt: Fix memory corruption on VLAN header stripping
+
+This patch fixed a problem that was introduced in commit eb700029.
+
+When net_rx_pkt_attach_iovec() calls eth_strip_vlan()
+this can result in pkt->ehdr_buf being overflowed, because
+ehdr_buf is only sizeof(struct eth_header) bytes large
+but eth_strip_vlan() can write
+sizeof(struct eth_header) + sizeof(struct vlan_header)
+bytes into it.
+
+Devices affected by this problem: vmxnet3.
+
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Reported-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
+Signed-off-by: Dmitry Fleytman <dmitry@daynix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit df8bf7a7fe75eb5d5caffa55f5cd4292b757aea6)
+---
+ hw/net/net_rx_pkt.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++-----------------
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/net_rx_pkt.c b/hw/net/net_rx_pkt.c
+index 1019b50c18..7c0beace9e 100644
+--- a/hw/net/net_rx_pkt.c
++++ b/hw/net/net_rx_pkt.c
+@@ -23,13 +23,13 @@
+ 
+ struct NetRxPkt {
+     struct virtio_net_hdr virt_hdr;
+-    uint8_t ehdr_buf[sizeof(struct eth_header)];
++    uint8_t ehdr_buf[sizeof(struct eth_header) + sizeof(struct vlan_header)];
+     struct iovec *vec;
+     uint16_t vec_len_total;
+     uint16_t vec_len;
+     uint32_t tot_len;
+     uint16_t tci;
+-    bool vlan_stripped;
++    size_t ehdr_buf_len;
+     bool has_virt_hdr;
+     eth_pkt_types_e packet_type;
+ 
+@@ -88,15 +88,13 @@ net_rx_pkt_pull_data(struct NetRxPkt *pkt,
+                         const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt,
+                         size_t ploff)
+ {
+-    if (pkt->vlan_stripped) {
++    if (pkt->ehdr_buf_len) {
+         net_rx_pkt_iovec_realloc(pkt, iovcnt + 1);
+ 
+         pkt->vec[0].iov_base = pkt->ehdr_buf;
+-        pkt->vec[0].iov_len = sizeof(pkt->ehdr_buf);
+-
+-        pkt->tot_len =
+-            iov_size(iov, iovcnt) - ploff + sizeof(struct eth_header);
++        pkt->vec[0].iov_len = pkt->ehdr_buf_len;
+ 
++        pkt->tot_len = iov_size(iov, iovcnt) - ploff + pkt->ehdr_buf_len;
+         pkt->vec_len = iov_copy(pkt->vec + 1, pkt->vec_len_total - 1,
+                                 iov, iovcnt, ploff, pkt->tot_len);
+     } else {
+@@ -123,11 +121,12 @@ void net_rx_pkt_attach_iovec(struct NetRxPkt *pkt,
+     uint16_t tci = 0;
+     uint16_t ploff = iovoff;
+     assert(pkt);
+-    pkt->vlan_stripped = false;
+ 
+     if (strip_vlan) {
+-        pkt->vlan_stripped = eth_strip_vlan(iov, iovcnt, iovoff, pkt->ehdr_buf,
+-                                            &ploff, &tci);
++        pkt->ehdr_buf_len = eth_strip_vlan(iov, iovcnt, iovoff, pkt->ehdr_buf,
++                                           &ploff, &tci);
++    } else {
++        pkt->ehdr_buf_len = 0;
+     }
+ 
+     pkt->tci = tci;
+@@ -143,12 +142,13 @@ void net_rx_pkt_attach_iovec_ex(struct NetRxPkt *pkt,
+     uint16_t tci = 0;
+     uint16_t ploff = iovoff;
+     assert(pkt);
+-    pkt->vlan_stripped = false;
+ 
+     if (strip_vlan) {
+-        pkt->vlan_stripped = eth_strip_vlan_ex(iov, iovcnt, iovoff, vet,
+-                                               pkt->ehdr_buf,
+-                                               &ploff, &tci);
++        pkt->ehdr_buf_len = eth_strip_vlan_ex(iov, iovcnt, iovoff, vet,
++                                              pkt->ehdr_buf,
++                                              &ploff, &tci);
++    } else {
++        pkt->ehdr_buf_len = 0;
+     }
+ 
+     pkt->tci = tci;
+@@ -162,8 +162,8 @@ void net_rx_pkt_dump(struct NetRxPkt *pkt)
+     NetRxPkt *pkt = (NetRxPkt *)pkt;
+     assert(pkt);
+ 
+-    printf("RX PKT: tot_len: %d, vlan_stripped: %d, vlan_tag: %d\n",
+-              pkt->tot_len, pkt->vlan_stripped, pkt->tci);
++    printf("RX PKT: tot_len: %d, ehdr_buf_len: %lu, vlan_tag: %d\n",
++              pkt->tot_len, pkt->ehdr_buf_len, pkt->tci);
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ bool net_rx_pkt_is_vlan_stripped(struct NetRxPkt *pkt)
+ {
+     assert(pkt);
+ 
+-    return pkt->vlan_stripped;
++    return pkt->ehdr_buf_len ? true : false;
+ }
+ 
+ bool net_rx_pkt_has_virt_hdr(struct NetRxPkt *pkt)

0056-NetRxPkt-Do-not-try-to-pull-more-data-than-present.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From: Dmitry Fleytman <dmitry@daynix.com>
+Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2017 14:29:34 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] NetRxPkt: Do not try to pull more data than present
+
+In case of VLAN stripping, ETH header put into a
+separate buffer, therefore amont of data copied
+from original IOV should be smaller.
+
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Signed-off-by: Dmitry Fleytman <dmitry@daynix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit d5e772146d2bbc92e5126c145eddef3b2843d026)
+---
+ hw/net/net_rx_pkt.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/net_rx_pkt.c b/hw/net/net_rx_pkt.c
+index 7c0beace9e..d38babec88 100644
+--- a/hw/net/net_rx_pkt.c
++++ b/hw/net/net_rx_pkt.c
+@@ -96,7 +96,8 @@ net_rx_pkt_pull_data(struct NetRxPkt *pkt,
+ 
+         pkt->tot_len = iov_size(iov, iovcnt) - ploff + pkt->ehdr_buf_len;
+         pkt->vec_len = iov_copy(pkt->vec + 1, pkt->vec_len_total - 1,
+-                                iov, iovcnt, ploff, pkt->tot_len);
++                                iov, iovcnt, ploff,
++                                pkt->tot_len - pkt->ehdr_buf_len);
+     } else {
+         net_rx_pkt_iovec_realloc(pkt, iovcnt);
+ 

0057-NetRxPkt-Account-buffer-with-ETH-header-in-IOV-lengt.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From: Dmitry Fleytman <dmitry@daynix.com>
+Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2017 14:29:35 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] NetRxPkt: Account buffer with ETH header in IOV length
+
+In case of VLAN stripping ETH header is stored in a
+separate chunk and length of IOV should take this into
+account.
+
+This patch fixes checksum validation for RX packets
+with VLAN header.
+
+Devices affected by this problem: e1000e and vmxnet3.
+
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Signed-off-by: Dmitry Fleytman <dmitry@daynix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit c5d083c561a4f5297cc2e44a2f3cef3324d77a88)
+---
+ hw/net/net_rx_pkt.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/net_rx_pkt.c b/hw/net/net_rx_pkt.c
+index d38babec88..c7ae33d0d3 100644
+--- a/hw/net/net_rx_pkt.c
++++ b/hw/net/net_rx_pkt.c
+@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ net_rx_pkt_pull_data(struct NetRxPkt *pkt,
+         pkt->tot_len = iov_size(iov, iovcnt) - ploff + pkt->ehdr_buf_len;
+         pkt->vec_len = iov_copy(pkt->vec + 1, pkt->vec_len_total - 1,
+                                 iov, iovcnt, ploff,
+-                                pkt->tot_len - pkt->ehdr_buf_len);
++                                pkt->tot_len - pkt->ehdr_buf_len) + 1;
+     } else {
+         net_rx_pkt_iovec_realloc(pkt, iovcnt);
+ 

0058-usb-ohci-limit-the-number-of-link-eds.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2017 02:23:33 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] usb: ohci: limit the number of link eds
+
+The guest may builds an infinite loop with link eds. This patch
+limit the number of linked ed to avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Message-id: 5899a02e.45ca240a.6c373.93c1@mx.google.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 95ed56939eb2eaa4e2f349fe6dcd13ca4edfd8fb)
+---
+ hw/usb/hcd-ohci.c | 9 ++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/usb/hcd-ohci.c b/hw/usb/hcd-ohci.c
+index fa5703832c..48307febd3 100644
+--- a/hw/usb/hcd-ohci.c
++++ b/hw/usb/hcd-ohci.c
+@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@
+ 
+ #define OHCI_MAX_PORTS 15
+ 
++#define ED_LINK_LIMIT 4
++
+ static int64_t usb_frame_time;
+ static int64_t usb_bit_time;
+ 
+@@ -1184,7 +1186,7 @@ static int ohci_service_ed_list(OHCIState *ohci, uint32_t head, int completion)
+     uint32_t next_ed;
+     uint32_t cur;
+     int active;
+-
++    uint32_t link_cnt = 0;
+     active = 0;
+ 
+     if (head == 0)
+@@ -1199,6 +1201,11 @@ static int ohci_service_ed_list(OHCIState *ohci, uint32_t head, int completion)
+ 
+         next_ed = ed.next & OHCI_DPTR_MASK;
+ 
++        if (++link_cnt > ED_LINK_LIMIT) {
++            ohci_die(ohci);
++            return 0;
++        }
++
+         if ((ed.head & OHCI_ED_H) || (ed.flags & OHCI_ED_K)) {
+             uint32_t addr;
+             /* Cancel pending packets for ED that have been paused.  */

0059-display-cirrus-ignore-source-pitch-value-as-needed-i.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+From: Bruce Rogers <brogers@suse.com>
+Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2017 13:35:20 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] display: cirrus: ignore source pitch value as needed in
+ blit_is_unsafe
+
+Commit 4299b90 added a check which is too broad, given that the source
+pitch value is not required to be initialized for solid fill operations.
+This patch refines the blit_is_unsafe() check to ignore source pitch in
+that case. After applying the above commit as a security patch, we
+noticed the SLES 11 SP4 guest gui failed to initialize properly.
+
+Signed-off-by: Bruce Rogers <brogers@suse.com>
+Message-id: 20170109203520.5619-1-brogers@suse.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 913a87885f589d263e682c2eb6637c6e14538061)
+---
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 11 +++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+index bdb092ee9d..379910db2d 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ static bool blit_region_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s,
+     return false;
+ }
+ 
+-static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s)
++static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s, bool dst_only)
+ {
+     /* should be the case, see cirrus_bitblt_start */
+     assert(s->cirrus_blt_width > 0);
+@@ -308,6 +308,9 @@ static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s)
+                               s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask)) {
+         return true;
+     }
++    if (dst_only) {
++        return false;
++    }
+     if (blit_region_is_unsafe(s, s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch,
+                               s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask)) {
+         return true;
+@@ -673,7 +676,7 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState * s,
+ 
+     dst = s->vga.vram_ptr + (s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask);
+ 
+-    if (blit_is_unsafe(s))
++    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, false))
+         return 0;
+ 
+     (*s->cirrus_rop) (s, dst, src,
+@@ -691,7 +694,7 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_solidfill(CirrusVGAState *s, int blt_rop)
+ {
+     cirrus_fill_t rop_func;
+ 
+-    if (blit_is_unsafe(s)) {
++    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, true)) {
+         return 0;
+     }
+     rop_func = cirrus_fill[rop_to_index[blt_rop]][s->cirrus_blt_pixelwidth - 1];
+@@ -795,7 +798,7 @@ static int cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
+ 
+ static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_copy(CirrusVGAState * s)
+ {
+-    if (blit_is_unsafe(s))
++    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, false))
+         return 0;
+ 
+     return cirrus_do_copy(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr - s->vga.start_addr,

0060-cirrus-handle-negative-pitch-in-cirrus_invalidate_re.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
+Date: Wed, 25 Jan 2017 14:48:57 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] cirrus: handle negative pitch in cirrus_invalidate_region()
+
+cirrus_invalidate_region() calls memory_region_set_dirty()
+on a per-line basis, always ranging from off_begin to
+off_begin+bytesperline. With a negative pitch off_begin
+marks the top most used address and thus we need to do an
+initial shift backwards by a line for negative pitches of
+backward blits, otherwise the first iteration covers the
+line going from the start offset forwards instead of
+backwards.
+Additionally since the start address is inclusive, if we
+shift by a full `bytesperline` we move to the first address
+*not* included in the blit, so we only shift by one less
+than bytesperline.
+
+Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
+Message-id: 1485352137-29367-1-git-send-email-w.bumiller@proxmox.com
+
+[ kraxel: codestyle fixes ]
+
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit f153b563f8cf121aebf5a2fff5f0110faf58ccb3)
+---
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+index 379910db2d..0f05e4596e 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+@@ -661,9 +661,14 @@ static void cirrus_invalidate_region(CirrusVGAState * s, int off_begin,
+     int off_cur;
+     int off_cur_end;
+ 
++    if (off_pitch < 0) {
++        off_begin -= bytesperline - 1;
++    }
++
+     for (y = 0; y < lines; y++) {
+ 	off_cur = off_begin;
+ 	off_cur_end = (off_cur + bytesperline) & s->cirrus_addr_mask;
++        assert(off_cur_end >= off_cur);
+         memory_region_set_dirty(&s->vga.vram, off_cur, off_cur_end - off_cur);
+ 	off_begin += off_pitch;
+     }

0061-cirrus-allow-zero-source-pitch-in-pattern-fill-rops.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+From: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
+Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2017 16:35:38 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] cirrus: allow zero source pitch in pattern fill rops
+
+The rops used by cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy only use
+the destination pitch, so the source pitch shoul allowed to
+be zero and the blit with used for the range check around the
+source address.
+
+Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
+Message-id: 1485272138-23249-1-git-send-email-w.bumiller@proxmox.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 5858dd1801883309bdd208d72ddb81c4e9fee30c)
+---
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+index 0f05e4596e..98f089e4e9 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+@@ -272,9 +272,6 @@ static void cirrus_update_memory_access(CirrusVGAState *s);
+ static bool blit_region_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s,
+                                   int32_t pitch, int32_t addr)
+ {
+-    if (!pitch) {
+-        return true;
+-    }
+     if (pitch < 0) {
+         int64_t min = addr
+             + ((int64_t)s->cirrus_blt_height-1) * pitch;
+@@ -294,8 +291,11 @@ static bool blit_region_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s,
+     return false;
+ }
+ 
+-static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s, bool dst_only)
++static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s, bool dst_only,
++                           bool zero_src_pitch_ok)
+ {
++    int32_t check_pitch;
++
+     /* should be the case, see cirrus_bitblt_start */
+     assert(s->cirrus_blt_width > 0);
+     assert(s->cirrus_blt_height > 0);
+@@ -304,6 +304,10 @@ static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s, bool dst_only)
+         return true;
+     }
+ 
++    if (!s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch) {
++        return true;
++    }
++
+     if (blit_region_is_unsafe(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch,
+                               s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask)) {
+         return true;
+@@ -311,7 +315,13 @@ static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s, bool dst_only)
+     if (dst_only) {
+         return false;
+     }
+-    if (blit_region_is_unsafe(s, s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch,
++
++    check_pitch = s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch;
++    if (!zero_src_pitch_ok && !check_pitch) {
++        check_pitch = s->cirrus_blt_width;
++    }
++
++    if (blit_region_is_unsafe(s, check_pitch,
+                               s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask)) {
+         return true;
+     }
+@@ -681,8 +691,9 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState * s,
+ 
+     dst = s->vga.vram_ptr + (s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask);
+ 
+-    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, false))
++    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, false, true)) {
+         return 0;
++    }
+ 
+     (*s->cirrus_rop) (s, dst, src,
+                       s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch, 0,
+@@ -699,7 +710,7 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_solidfill(CirrusVGAState *s, int blt_rop)
+ {
+     cirrus_fill_t rop_func;
+ 
+-    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, true)) {
++    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, true, true)) {
+         return 0;
+     }
+     rop_func = cirrus_fill[rop_to_index[blt_rop]][s->cirrus_blt_pixelwidth - 1];
+@@ -803,7 +814,7 @@ static int cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
+ 
+ static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_copy(CirrusVGAState * s)
+ {
+-    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, false))
++    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, false, false))
+         return 0;
+ 
+     return cirrus_do_copy(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr - s->vga.start_addr,

0062-cirrus-fix-blit-address-mask-handling.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 25 Jan 2017 11:09:56 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] cirrus: fix blit address mask handling
+
+Apply the cirrus_addr_mask to cirrus_blt_dstaddr and cirrus_blt_srcaddr
+right after assigning them, in cirrus_bitblt_start(), instead of having
+this all over the place in the cirrus code, and missing a few places.
+
+Reported-by: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 1485338996-17095-1-git-send-email-kraxel@redhat.com
+(cherry picked from commit 60cd23e85151525ab26591394c4e7e06fa07d216)
+---
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 25 ++++++++++++-------------
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+index 98f089e4e9..7db6409dc5 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s, bool dst_only,
+     }
+ 
+     if (blit_region_is_unsafe(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch,
+-                              s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask)) {
++                              s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr)) {
+         return true;
+     }
+     if (dst_only) {
+@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s, bool dst_only,
+     }
+ 
+     if (blit_region_is_unsafe(s, check_pitch,
+-                              s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask)) {
++                              s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr)) {
+         return true;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState * s,
+ {
+     uint8_t *dst;
+ 
+-    dst = s->vga.vram_ptr + (s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask);
++    dst = s->vga.vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr;
+ 
+     if (blit_is_unsafe(s, false, true)) {
+         return 0;
+@@ -714,7 +714,7 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_solidfill(CirrusVGAState *s, int blt_rop)
+         return 0;
+     }
+     rop_func = cirrus_fill[rop_to_index[blt_rop]][s->cirrus_blt_pixelwidth - 1];
+-    rop_func(s, s->vga.vram_ptr + (s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask),
++    rop_func(s, s->vga.vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
+              s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch,
+              s->cirrus_blt_width, s->cirrus_blt_height);
+     cirrus_invalidate_region(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
+@@ -732,9 +732,8 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_solidfill(CirrusVGAState *s, int blt_rop)
+ 
+ static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState * s)
+ {
+-    return cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(s,
+-					    s->vga.vram_ptr + ((s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr & ~7) &
+-                                            s->cirrus_addr_mask));
++    return cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(s, s->vga.vram_ptr +
++                                            (s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr & ~7));
+ }
+ 
+ static int cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
+@@ -788,10 +787,8 @@ static int cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
+     if (notify)
+         graphic_hw_update(s->vga.con);
+ 
+-    (*s->cirrus_rop) (s, s->vga.vram_ptr +
+-		      (s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask),
+-		      s->vga.vram_ptr +
+-		      (s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask),
++    (*s->cirrus_rop) (s, s->vga.vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
++                      s->vga.vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr,
+ 		      s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch, s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch,
+ 		      s->cirrus_blt_width, s->cirrus_blt_height);
+ 
+@@ -842,8 +839,7 @@ static void cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo_next(CirrusVGAState * s)
+         } else {
+             /* at least one scan line */
+             do {
+-                (*s->cirrus_rop)(s, s->vga.vram_ptr +
+-                                 (s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask),
++                (*s->cirrus_rop)(s, s->vga.vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
+                                   s->cirrus_bltbuf, 0, 0, s->cirrus_blt_width, 1);
+                 cirrus_invalidate_region(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr, 0,
+                                          s->cirrus_blt_width, 1);
+@@ -962,6 +958,9 @@ static void cirrus_bitblt_start(CirrusVGAState * s)
+     s->cirrus_blt_modeext = s->vga.gr[0x33];
+     blt_rop = s->vga.gr[0x32];
+ 
++    s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr &= s->cirrus_addr_mask;
++    s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr &= s->cirrus_addr_mask;
++
+ #ifdef DEBUG_BITBLT
+     printf("rop=0x%02x mode=0x%02x modeext=0x%02x w=%d h=%d dpitch=%d spitch=%d daddr=0x%08x saddr=0x%08x writemask=0x%02x\n",
+            blt_rop,

0063-cirrus-fix-oob-access-issue-CVE-2017-2615.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2017 09:35:01 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] cirrus: fix oob access issue (CVE-2017-2615)
+
+When doing bitblt copy in backward mode, we should minus the
+blt width first just like the adding in the forward mode. This
+can avoid the oob access of the front of vga's vram.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+
+{ kraxel: with backward blits (negative pitch) addr is the topmost
+          address, so check it as-is against vram size ]
+
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
+Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
+Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Cc: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
+Fixes: d3532a0db02296e687711b8cdc7791924efccea0 (CVE-2014-8106)
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 1485938101-26602-1-git-send-email-kraxel@redhat.com
+Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 62d4c6bd5263bb8413a06c80144fc678df6dfb64)
+---
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 7 +++----
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+index 7db6409dc5..16f27e8ac5 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+@@ -274,10 +274,9 @@ static bool blit_region_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s,
+ {
+     if (pitch < 0) {
+         int64_t min = addr
+-            + ((int64_t)s->cirrus_blt_height-1) * pitch;
+-        int32_t max = addr
+-            + s->cirrus_blt_width;
+-        if (min < 0 || max > s->vga.vram_size) {
++            + ((int64_t)s->cirrus_blt_height - 1) * pitch
++            - s->cirrus_blt_width;
++        if (min < -1 || addr >= s->vga.vram_size) {
+             return true;
+         }
+     } else {

0064-cirrus-fix-patterncopy-checks.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 9 Feb 2017 14:02:20 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] cirrus: fix patterncopy checks
+
+The blit_region_is_unsafe checks don't work correctly for the
+patterncopy source.  It's a fixed-sized region, which doesn't
+depend on cirrus_blt_{width,height}.  So go do the check in
+cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy instead, then tell blit_is_unsafe that
+it doesn't need to verify the source.  Also handle the case where we
+blit from cirrus_bitbuf correctly.
+
+This patch replaces 5858dd1801883309bdd208d72ddb81c4e9fee30c.
+
+Security impact:  I think for the most part error on the safe side this
+time, refusing blits which should have been allowed.
+
+Only exception is placing the blit source at the end of the video ram,
+so cirrus_blt_srcaddr + 256 goes beyond the end of video memory.  But
+even in that case I'm not fully sure this actually allows read access to
+host memory.  To trick the commit 5858dd18 security checks one has to
+pick very small cirrus_blt_{width,height} values, which in turn implies
+only a fraction of the blit source will actually be used.
+
+Cc: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
+Cc: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
+Reviewed-by: Laurent Vivier <lvivier@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 1486645341-5010-1-git-send-email-kraxel@redhat.com
+(cherry picked from commit 95280c31cda79bb1d0968afc7b19a220b3a9d986)
+---
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+index 16f27e8ac5..6bd13fc78f 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+@@ -683,14 +683,39 @@ static void cirrus_invalidate_region(CirrusVGAState * s, int off_begin,
+     }
+ }
+ 
+-static int cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState * s,
+-					    const uint8_t * src)
++static int cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState *s, bool videosrc)
+ {
++    uint32_t patternsize;
+     uint8_t *dst;
++    uint8_t *src;
+ 
+     dst = s->vga.vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr;
+ 
+-    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, false, true)) {
++    if (videosrc) {
++        switch (s->vga.get_bpp(&s->vga)) {
++        case 8:
++            patternsize = 64;
++            break;
++        case 15:
++        case 16:
++            patternsize = 128;
++            break;
++        case 24:
++        case 32:
++        default:
++            patternsize = 256;
++            break;
++        }
++        s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr &= ~(patternsize - 1);
++        if (s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr + patternsize > s->vga.vram_size) {
++            return 0;
++        }
++        src = s->vga.vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr;
++    } else {
++        src = s->cirrus_bltbuf;
++    }
++
++    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, true, true)) {
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -731,8 +756,7 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_solidfill(CirrusVGAState *s, int blt_rop)
+ 
+ static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState * s)
+ {
+-    return cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(s, s->vga.vram_ptr +
+-                                            (s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr & ~7));
++    return cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(s, true);
+ }
+ 
+ static int cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
+@@ -831,7 +855,7 @@ static void cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo_next(CirrusVGAState * s)
+ 
+     if (s->cirrus_srccounter > 0) {
+         if (s->cirrus_blt_mode & CIRRUS_BLTMODE_PATTERNCOPY) {
+-            cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(s, s->cirrus_bltbuf);
++            cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(s, false);
+         the_end:
+             s->cirrus_srccounter = 0;
+             cirrus_bitblt_reset(s);

0065-Revert-cirrus-allow-zero-source-pitch-in-pattern-fil.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 9 Feb 2017 14:02:21 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Revert "cirrus: allow zero source pitch in pattern fill rops"
+
+This reverts commit 5858dd1801883309bdd208d72ddb81c4e9fee30c.
+
+Conflicts:
+	hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+
+Cc: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
+Cc: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Laurent Vivier <lvivier@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 1486645341-5010-2-git-send-email-kraxel@redhat.com
+(cherry picked from commit 12e97ec39931e5321645fd483ab761319d48bf16)
+---
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 26 ++++++++------------------
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+index 6bd13fc78f..0e47cf85ad 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+@@ -272,6 +272,9 @@ static void cirrus_update_memory_access(CirrusVGAState *s);
+ static bool blit_region_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s,
+                                   int32_t pitch, int32_t addr)
+ {
++    if (!pitch) {
++        return true;
++    }
+     if (pitch < 0) {
+         int64_t min = addr
+             + ((int64_t)s->cirrus_blt_height - 1) * pitch
+@@ -290,11 +293,8 @@ static bool blit_region_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s,
+     return false;
+ }
+ 
+-static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s, bool dst_only,
+-                           bool zero_src_pitch_ok)
++static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s, bool dst_only)
+ {
+-    int32_t check_pitch;
+-
+     /* should be the case, see cirrus_bitblt_start */
+     assert(s->cirrus_blt_width > 0);
+     assert(s->cirrus_blt_height > 0);
+@@ -303,10 +303,6 @@ static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s, bool dst_only,
+         return true;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (!s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch) {
+-        return true;
+-    }
+-
+     if (blit_region_is_unsafe(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch,
+                               s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr)) {
+         return true;
+@@ -314,13 +310,7 @@ static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s, bool dst_only,
+     if (dst_only) {
+         return false;
+     }
+-
+-    check_pitch = s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch;
+-    if (!zero_src_pitch_ok && !check_pitch) {
+-        check_pitch = s->cirrus_blt_width;
+-    }
+-
+-    if (blit_region_is_unsafe(s, check_pitch,
++    if (blit_region_is_unsafe(s, s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch,
+                               s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr)) {
+         return true;
+     }
+@@ -715,7 +705,7 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState *s, bool videosrc)
+         src = s->cirrus_bltbuf;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, true, true)) {
++    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, true)) {
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -734,7 +724,7 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_solidfill(CirrusVGAState *s, int blt_rop)
+ {
+     cirrus_fill_t rop_func;
+ 
+-    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, true, true)) {
++    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, true)) {
+         return 0;
+     }
+     rop_func = cirrus_fill[rop_to_index[blt_rop]][s->cirrus_blt_pixelwidth - 1];
+@@ -834,7 +824,7 @@ static int cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
+ 
+ static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_copy(CirrusVGAState * s)
+ {
+-    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, false, false))
++    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, false))
+         return 0;
+ 
+     return cirrus_do_copy(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr - s->vga.start_addr,

0066-cirrus-add-blit_is_unsafe-call-to-cirrus_bitblt_cput.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2017 11:18:36 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] cirrus: add blit_is_unsafe call to cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo
+ (CVE-2017-2620)
+
+CIRRUS_BLTMODE_MEMSYSSRC blits do NOT check blit destination
+and blit width, at all.  Oops.  Fix it.
+
+Security impact: high.
+
+The missing blit destination check allows to write to host memory.
+Basically same as CVE-2014-8106 for the other blit variants.
+
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 92f2b88cea48c6aeba8de568a45f2ed958f3c298)
+---
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+index 0e47cf85ad..a093dc8b16 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+@@ -899,6 +899,10 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo(CirrusVGAState * s)
+ {
+     int w;
+ 
++    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, true)) {
++        return 0;
++    }
++
+     s->cirrus_blt_mode &= ~CIRRUS_BLTMODE_MEMSYSSRC;
+     s->cirrus_srcptr = &s->cirrus_bltbuf[0];
+     s->cirrus_srcptr_end = &s->cirrus_bltbuf[0];
+@@ -924,6 +928,10 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo(CirrusVGAState * s)
+ 	}
+         s->cirrus_srccounter = s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch * s->cirrus_blt_height;
+     }
++
++    /* the blit_is_unsafe call above should catch this */
++    assert(s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch <= CIRRUS_BLTBUFSIZE);
++
+     s->cirrus_srcptr = s->cirrus_bltbuf;
+     s->cirrus_srcptr_end = s->cirrus_bltbuf + s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch;
+     cirrus_update_memory_access(s);

0067-egl-helpers-Support-newer-MESA-versions.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2017 09:50:55 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] egl-helpers: Support newer MESA versions
+
+According to
+https://www.khronos.org/registry/EGL/extensions/MESA/EGL_MESA_platform_gbm.txt
+if MESA_platform_gbm is supported display should be initialized
+from a GBM handle using eglGetPlatformDisplayEXT.
+
+Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 20170220095055.4234-1-fziglio@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 0ea1523fb6703aa0dcd65e66b59e96fec028e60a)
+---
+ ui/egl-helpers.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/ui/egl-helpers.c b/ui/egl-helpers.c
+index 79cee0503a..d8d57c4bbe 100644
+--- a/ui/egl-helpers.c
++++ b/ui/egl-helpers.c
+@@ -203,7 +203,11 @@ int qemu_egl_init_dpy(EGLNativeDisplayType dpy, bool gles, bool debug)
+     }
+ 
+     egl_dbg("eglGetDisplay (dpy %p) ...\n", dpy);
++#ifdef EGL_MESA_platform_gbm
++    qemu_egl_display = eglGetPlatformDisplayEXT(EGL_PLATFORM_GBM_MESA, dpy, NULL);
++#else
+     qemu_egl_display = eglGetDisplay(dpy);
++#endif
+     if (qemu_egl_display == EGL_NO_DISPLAY) {
+         error_report("egl: eglGetDisplay failed");
+         return -1;

0068-char-drop-data-written-to-a-disconnected-pty.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From: Ed Swierk <eswierk@skyportsystems.com>
+Date: Tue, 31 Jan 2017 05:45:29 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] char: drop data written to a disconnected pty
+
+When a serial port writes data to a pty that's disconnected, drop the
+data and return the length dropped. This avoids triggering pointless
+retries in callers like the 16550A serial_xmit(), and causes
+qemu_chr_fe_write() to write all data to the log file, rather than
+logging only while a pty client like virsh console happens to be
+connected.
+
+Signed-off-by: Ed Swierk <eswierk@skyportsystems.com>
+Message-Id: <1485870329-79428-1-git-send-email-eswierk@skyportsystems.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 1c64fdbc8177058802df205f5d7cd65edafa59a8)
+---
+ qemu-char.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/qemu-char.c b/qemu-char.c
+index 90e96271dd..4ec9ae5b94 100644
+--- a/qemu-char.c
++++ b/qemu-char.c
+@@ -1328,7 +1328,7 @@ static int pty_chr_write(CharDriverState *chr, const uint8_t *buf, int len)
+         /* guest sends data, check for (re-)connect */
+         pty_chr_update_read_handler_locked(chr);
+         if (!s->connected) {
+-            return 0;
++            return len;
+         }
+     }
+     return io_channel_send(s->ioc, buf, len);

0069-dma-rc4030-limit-interval-timer-reload-value.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Wed, 12 Oct 2016 18:07:41 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] dma: rc4030: limit interval timer reload value
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The JAZZ RC4030 chipset emulator has a periodic timer and
+associated interval reload register. The reload value is used
+as divider when computing timer's next tick value. If reload
+value is large, it could lead to divide by zero error. Limit
+the interval reload value to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: Huawei PSIRT <psirt@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Tested-by: Hervé Poussineau <hpoussin@reactos.org>
+Signed-off-by: Yongbok Kim <yongbok.kim@imgtec.com>
+(cherry picked from commit c0a3172fa6bbddcc73192f2a2c48d0bf3a7ba61c)
+---
+ hw/dma/rc4030.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/dma/rc4030.c b/hw/dma/rc4030.c
+index 2f2576fafb..c1b4997c73 100644
+--- a/hw/dma/rc4030.c
++++ b/hw/dma/rc4030.c
+@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ static void rc4030_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, uint64_t data,
+         break;
+     /* Interval timer reload */
+     case 0x0228:
+-        s->itr = val;
++        s->itr = val & 0x01FF;
+         qemu_irq_lower(s->timer_irq);
+         set_next_tick(s);
+         break;

0070-slirp-Make-RA-build-more-flexible.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+From: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
+Date: Sun, 26 Mar 2017 20:28:11 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] slirp: Make RA build more flexible
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Do not hardcode the RA size at all, use a pl_size variable which
+accounts the accumulated size, and fill rip->ip_pl at the end.
+
+This will allow to make some blocks optional.
+
+Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
+Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
+(cherry picked from commit e42f869b5118fa9ac64dcea624276204567fc581)
+---
+ slirp/ip6_icmp.c | 24 +++++++++---------------
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/slirp/ip6_icmp.c b/slirp/ip6_icmp.c
+index 6d18e28985..3f7438996f 100644
+--- a/slirp/ip6_icmp.c
++++ b/slirp/ip6_icmp.c
+@@ -143,17 +143,10 @@ void ndp_send_ra(Slirp *slirp)
+     /* Build IPv6 packet */
+     struct mbuf *t = m_get(slirp);
+     struct ip6 *rip = mtod(t, struct ip6 *);
++    size_t pl_size = 0;
+     rip->ip_src = (struct in6_addr)LINKLOCAL_ADDR;
+     rip->ip_dst = (struct in6_addr)ALLNODES_MULTICAST;
+     rip->ip_nh = IPPROTO_ICMPV6;
+-    rip->ip_pl = htons(ICMP6_NDP_RA_MINLEN
+-                        + NDPOPT_LINKLAYER_LEN
+-                        + NDPOPT_PREFIXINFO_LEN
+-#ifndef _WIN32
+-                        + NDPOPT_RDNSS_LEN
+-#endif
+-                        );
+-    t->m_len = sizeof(struct ip6) + ntohs(rip->ip_pl);
+ 
+     /* Build ICMPv6 packet */
+     t->m_data += sizeof(struct ip6);
+@@ -171,6 +164,7 @@ void ndp_send_ra(Slirp *slirp)
+     ricmp->icmp6_nra.reach_time = htonl(NDP_AdvReachableTime);
+     ricmp->icmp6_nra.retrans_time = htonl(NDP_AdvRetransTime);
+     t->m_data += ICMP6_NDP_RA_MINLEN;
++    pl_size += ICMP6_NDP_RA_MINLEN;
+ 
+     /* Source link-layer address (NDP option) */
+     struct ndpopt *opt = mtod(t, struct ndpopt *);
+@@ -178,6 +172,7 @@ void ndp_send_ra(Slirp *slirp)
+     opt->ndpopt_len = NDPOPT_LINKLAYER_LEN / 8;
+     in6_compute_ethaddr(rip->ip_src, opt->ndpopt_linklayer);
+     t->m_data += NDPOPT_LINKLAYER_LEN;
++    pl_size += NDPOPT_LINKLAYER_LEN;
+ 
+     /* Prefix information (NDP option) */
+     struct ndpopt *opt2 = mtod(t, struct ndpopt *);
+@@ -192,6 +187,7 @@ void ndp_send_ra(Slirp *slirp)
+     opt2->ndpopt_prefixinfo.reserved2 = 0;
+     opt2->ndpopt_prefixinfo.prefix = slirp->vprefix_addr6;
+     t->m_data += NDPOPT_PREFIXINFO_LEN;
++    pl_size += NDPOPT_PREFIXINFO_LEN;
+ 
+ #ifndef _WIN32
+     /* Prefix information (NDP option) */
+@@ -203,16 +199,14 @@ void ndp_send_ra(Slirp *slirp)
+     opt3->ndpopt_rdnss.lifetime = htonl(2 * NDP_MaxRtrAdvInterval);
+     opt3->ndpopt_rdnss.addr = slirp->vnameserver_addr6;
+     t->m_data += NDPOPT_RDNSS_LEN;
++    pl_size += NDPOPT_RDNSS_LEN;
+ #endif
+ 
++    rip->ip_pl = htons(pl_size);
++    t->m_data -= sizeof(struct ip6) + pl_size;
++    t->m_len = sizeof(struct ip6) + pl_size;
++
+     /* ICMPv6 Checksum */
+-#ifndef _WIN32
+-    t->m_data -= NDPOPT_RDNSS_LEN;
+-#endif
+-    t->m_data -= NDPOPT_PREFIXINFO_LEN;
+-    t->m_data -= NDPOPT_LINKLAYER_LEN;
+-    t->m_data -= ICMP6_NDP_RA_MINLEN;
+-    t->m_data -= sizeof(struct ip6);
+     ricmp->icmp6_cksum = ip6_cksum(t);
+ 
+     ip6_output(NULL, t, 0);

0071-slirp-Send-RDNSS-in-RA-only-if-host-has-an-IPv6-DNS-.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+From: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
+Date: Sun, 26 Mar 2017 20:46:34 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] slirp: Send RDNSS in RA only if host has an IPv6 DNS server
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Previously we would always send an RDNSS option in the RA, making the guest
+try to resolve DNS through IPv6, even if the host does not actually have
+and IPv6 DNS server available.
+
+This makes the RDNSS option enabled only when an IPv6 DNS server is
+available.
+
+Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
+Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
+(cherry picked from commit a2f80fdfc683019901cdf4c0863a5920c0ca7245)
+---
+ slirp/ip6_icmp.c | 25 ++++++++++++++-----------
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/slirp/ip6_icmp.c b/slirp/ip6_icmp.c
+index 3f7438996f..4c71f4c2fc 100644
+--- a/slirp/ip6_icmp.c
++++ b/slirp/ip6_icmp.c
+@@ -144,6 +144,9 @@ void ndp_send_ra(Slirp *slirp)
+     struct mbuf *t = m_get(slirp);
+     struct ip6 *rip = mtod(t, struct ip6 *);
+     size_t pl_size = 0;
++    struct in6_addr addr;
++    uint32_t scope_id;
++
+     rip->ip_src = (struct in6_addr)LINKLOCAL_ADDR;
+     rip->ip_dst = (struct in6_addr)ALLNODES_MULTICAST;
+     rip->ip_nh = IPPROTO_ICMPV6;
+@@ -189,18 +192,18 @@ void ndp_send_ra(Slirp *slirp)
+     t->m_data += NDPOPT_PREFIXINFO_LEN;
+     pl_size += NDPOPT_PREFIXINFO_LEN;
+ 
+-#ifndef _WIN32
+     /* Prefix information (NDP option) */
+-    /* disabled for windows for now, until get_dns6_addr is implemented */
+-    struct ndpopt *opt3 = mtod(t, struct ndpopt *);
+-    opt3->ndpopt_type = NDPOPT_RDNSS;
+-    opt3->ndpopt_len = NDPOPT_RDNSS_LEN / 8;
+-    opt3->ndpopt_rdnss.reserved = 0;
+-    opt3->ndpopt_rdnss.lifetime = htonl(2 * NDP_MaxRtrAdvInterval);
+-    opt3->ndpopt_rdnss.addr = slirp->vnameserver_addr6;
+-    t->m_data += NDPOPT_RDNSS_LEN;
+-    pl_size += NDPOPT_RDNSS_LEN;
+-#endif
++    if (get_dns6_addr(&addr, &scope_id) >= 0) {
++        /* Host system does have an IPv6 DNS server, announce our proxy.  */
++        struct ndpopt *opt3 = mtod(t, struct ndpopt *);
++        opt3->ndpopt_type = NDPOPT_RDNSS;
++        opt3->ndpopt_len = NDPOPT_RDNSS_LEN / 8;
++        opt3->ndpopt_rdnss.reserved = 0;
++        opt3->ndpopt_rdnss.lifetime = htonl(2 * NDP_MaxRtrAdvInterval);
++        opt3->ndpopt_rdnss.addr = slirp->vnameserver_addr6;
++        t->m_data += NDPOPT_RDNSS_LEN;
++        pl_size += NDPOPT_RDNSS_LEN;
++    }
+ 
+     rip->ip_pl = htons(pl_size);
+     t->m_data -= sizeof(struct ip6) + pl_size;

0072-qxl-clear-guest_cursor-on-QXL_CURSOR_HIDE.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2017 09:31:51 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] qxl: clear guest_cursor on QXL_CURSOR_HIDE
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Make sure we don't leave guest_cursor pointing into nowhere.  This might
+lead to (rare) live migration failures, due to target trying to restore
+the cursor from the stale pointer.
+
+Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1421788
+Reported-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 1488789111-27340-1-git-send-email-kraxel@redhat.com
+(cherry picked from commit dbb5fb8d3519130559b10fa4e1395e4486c633f8)
+---
+ hw/display/qxl.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/qxl.c b/hw/display/qxl.c
+index 62d0c80dcf..e09ce10660 100644
+--- a/hw/display/qxl.c
++++ b/hw/display/qxl.c
+@@ -478,6 +478,11 @@ static int qxl_track_command(PCIQXLDevice *qxl, struct QXLCommandExt *ext)
+             qxl->guest_cursor = ext->cmd.data;
+             qemu_mutex_unlock(&qxl->track_lock);
+         }
++        if (cmd->type == QXL_CURSOR_HIDE) {
++            qemu_mutex_lock(&qxl->track_lock);
++            qxl->guest_cursor = 0;
++            qemu_mutex_unlock(&qxl->track_lock);
++        }
+         break;
+     }
+     }

0073-serial-fix-memory-leak-in-serial-exit.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Wed, 4 Jan 2017 00:43:16 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] serial: fix memory leak in serial exit
+
+The serial_exit_core function doesn't free some resources.
+This can lead memory leak when hotplug and unplug. This
+patch avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Message-Id: <586cb5ab.f31d9d0a.38ac3.acf2@mx.google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 8409dc884a201bf74b30a9d232b6bbdd00cb7e2b)
+---
+ hw/char/serial.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/char/serial.c b/hw/char/serial.c
+index eec72b7b9e..455119f3d7 100644
+--- a/hw/char/serial.c
++++ b/hw/char/serial.c
+@@ -904,6 +904,16 @@ void serial_realize_core(SerialState *s, Error **errp)
+ void serial_exit_core(SerialState *s)
+ {
+     qemu_chr_add_handlers(s->chr, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
++
++    timer_del(s->modem_status_poll);
++    timer_free(s->modem_status_poll);
++
++    timer_del(s->fifo_timeout_timer);
++    timer_free(s->fifo_timeout_timer);
++
++    fifo8_destroy(&s->recv_fifo);
++    fifo8_destroy(&s->xmit_fifo);
++
+     qemu_unregister_reset(serial_reset, s);
+ }
+ 

0074-fix-cirrus_vga-fix-OOB-read-case-qemu-Segmentation-f.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From: hangaohuai <hangaohuai@huawei.com>
+Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2017 14:39:19 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] fix :cirrus_vga fix OOB read case qemu Segmentation fault
+
+check the validity of parameters in cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_transp_xxx
+and cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_xxx to avoid the OOB read which causes qemu Segmentation fault.
+
+After the fix, we will touch the assert in
+cirrus_invalidate_region:
+assert(off_cur_end >= off_cur);
+
+Signed-off-by: fangying <fangying1@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: hangaohuai <hangaohuai@huawei.com>
+Message-id: 20170314063919.16200-1-hangaohuai@huawei.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 215902d7b6fb50c6fc216fc74f770858278ed904)
+---
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga_rop.h | 10 ++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga_rop.h b/hw/display/cirrus_vga_rop.h
+index 0925a009fe..b7447f8733 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga_rop.h
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga_rop.h
+@@ -97,6 +97,11 @@ glue(glue(cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_transp_, ROP_NAME),_8)(CirrusVGAState *s,
+     uint8_t p;
+     dstpitch -= bltwidth;
+     srcpitch -= bltwidth;
++
++    if (bltheight > 1 && (dstpitch < 0 || srcpitch < 0)) {
++        return;
++    }
++
+     for (y = 0; y < bltheight; y++) {
+         for (x = 0; x < bltwidth; x++) {
+ 	    p = *dst;
+@@ -143,6 +148,11 @@ glue(glue(cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_transp_, ROP_NAME),_16)(CirrusVGAState *s,
+     uint8_t p1, p2;
+     dstpitch -= bltwidth;
+     srcpitch -= bltwidth;
++
++    if (bltheight > 1 && (dstpitch < 0 || srcpitch < 0)) {
++        return;
++    }
++
+     for (y = 0; y < bltheight; y++) {
+         for (x = 0; x < bltwidth; x+=2) {
+ 	    p1 = *dst;

0075-cirrus-vnc-zap-bitblit-support-from-console-code.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,269 @@
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2017 13:26:59 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] cirrus/vnc: zap bitblit support from console code.
+
+There is a special code path (dpy_gfx_copy) to allow graphic emulation
+notify user interface code about bitblit operations carryed out by
+guests.  It is supported by cirrus and vnc server.  The intended purpose
+is to optimize display scrolls and just send over the scroll op instead
+of a full display update.
+
+This is rarely used these days though because modern guests simply don't
+use the cirrus blitter any more.  Any linux guest using the cirrus drm
+driver doesn't.  Any windows guest newer than winxp doesn't ship with a
+cirrus driver any more and thus uses the cirrus as simple framebuffer.
+
+So this code tends to bitrot and bugs can go unnoticed for a long time.
+See for example commit "3e10c3e vnc: fix qemu crash because of SIGSEGV"
+which fixes a bug lingering in the code for almost a year, added by
+commit "c7628bf vnc: only alloc server surface with clients connected".
+
+Also the vnc server will throttle the frame rate in case it figures the
+network can't keep up (send buffers are full).  This doesn't work with
+dpy_gfx_copy, for any copy operation sent to the vnc client we have to
+send all outstanding updates beforehand, otherwise the vnc client might
+run the client side blit on outdated data and thereby corrupt the
+display.  So this dpy_gfx_copy "optimization" might even make things
+worse on slow network links.
+
+Lets kill it once for all.
+
+Oh, and one more reason: Turns out (after writing the patch) we have a
+security bug in that code path ...
+
+Fixes: CVE-2016-9603
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 1489494419-14340-1-git-send-email-kraxel@redhat.com
+(cherry picked from commit 50628d3479e4f9aa97e323506856e394fe7ad7a6)
+---
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga.c |  12 ++----
+ include/ui/console.h    |   7 ----
+ ui/console.c            |  28 --------------
+ ui/vnc.c                | 100 ------------------------------------------------
+ 4 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 144 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+index a093dc8b16..2ef2884823 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+@@ -795,21 +795,15 @@ static int cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
+         }
+     }
+ 
+-    /* we have to flush all pending changes so that the copy
+-       is generated at the appropriate moment in time */
+-    if (notify)
+-        graphic_hw_update(s->vga.con);
+-
+     (*s->cirrus_rop) (s, s->vga.vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
+                       s->vga.vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr,
+ 		      s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch, s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch,
+ 		      s->cirrus_blt_width, s->cirrus_blt_height);
+ 
+     if (notify) {
+-        qemu_console_copy(s->vga.con,
+-			  sx, sy, dx, dy,
+-			  s->cirrus_blt_width / depth,
+-			  s->cirrus_blt_height);
++        dpy_gfx_update(s->vga.con, dx, dy,
++                       s->cirrus_blt_width / depth,
++                       s->cirrus_blt_height);
+     }
+ 
+     /* we don't have to notify the display that this portion has
+diff --git a/include/ui/console.h b/include/ui/console.h
+index 2703a3aa5a..67927ed851 100644
+--- a/include/ui/console.h
++++ b/include/ui/console.h
+@@ -189,9 +189,6 @@ typedef struct DisplayChangeListenerOps {
+                            int x, int y, int w, int h);
+     void (*dpy_gfx_switch)(DisplayChangeListener *dcl,
+                            struct DisplaySurface *new_surface);
+-    void (*dpy_gfx_copy)(DisplayChangeListener *dcl,
+-                         int src_x, int src_y,
+-                         int dst_x, int dst_y, int w, int h);
+     bool (*dpy_gfx_check_format)(DisplayChangeListener *dcl,
+                                  pixman_format_code_t format);
+ 
+@@ -273,8 +270,6 @@ int dpy_set_ui_info(QemuConsole *con, QemuUIInfo *info);
+ void dpy_gfx_update(QemuConsole *con, int x, int y, int w, int h);
+ void dpy_gfx_replace_surface(QemuConsole *con,
+                              DisplaySurface *surface);
+-void dpy_gfx_copy(QemuConsole *con, int src_x, int src_y,
+-                  int dst_x, int dst_y, int w, int h);
+ void dpy_text_cursor(QemuConsole *con, int x, int y);
+ void dpy_text_update(QemuConsole *con, int x, int y, int w, int h);
+ void dpy_text_resize(QemuConsole *con, int w, int h);
+@@ -398,8 +393,6 @@ void text_consoles_set_display(DisplayState *ds);
+ void console_select(unsigned int index);
+ void console_color_init(DisplayState *ds);
+ void qemu_console_resize(QemuConsole *con, int width, int height);
+-void qemu_console_copy(QemuConsole *con, int src_x, int src_y,
+-                       int dst_x, int dst_y, int w, int h);
+ DisplaySurface *qemu_console_surface(QemuConsole *con);
+ 
+ /* console-gl.c */
+diff --git a/ui/console.c b/ui/console.c
+index c24bfe422d..ece0c04ddf 100644
+--- a/ui/console.c
++++ b/ui/console.c
+@@ -1558,27 +1558,6 @@ static void dpy_refresh(DisplayState *s)
+     }
+ }
+ 
+-void dpy_gfx_copy(QemuConsole *con, int src_x, int src_y,
+-                  int dst_x, int dst_y, int w, int h)
+-{
+-    DisplayState *s = con->ds;
+-    DisplayChangeListener *dcl;
+-
+-    if (!qemu_console_is_visible(con)) {
+-        return;
+-    }
+-    QLIST_FOREACH(dcl, &s->listeners, next) {
+-        if (con != (dcl->con ? dcl->con : active_console)) {
+-            continue;
+-        }
+-        if (dcl->ops->dpy_gfx_copy) {
+-            dcl->ops->dpy_gfx_copy(dcl, src_x, src_y, dst_x, dst_y, w, h);
+-        } else { /* TODO */
+-            dcl->ops->dpy_gfx_update(dcl, dst_x, dst_y, w, h);
+-        }
+-    }
+-}
+-
+ void dpy_text_cursor(QemuConsole *con, int x, int y)
+ {
+     DisplayState *s = con->ds;
+@@ -2104,13 +2083,6 @@ void qemu_console_resize(QemuConsole *s, int width, int height)
+     dpy_gfx_replace_surface(s, surface);
+ }
+ 
+-void qemu_console_copy(QemuConsole *con, int src_x, int src_y,
+-                       int dst_x, int dst_y, int w, int h)
+-{
+-    assert(con->console_type == GRAPHIC_CONSOLE);
+-    dpy_gfx_copy(con, src_x, src_y, dst_x, dst_y, w, h);
+-}
+-
+ DisplaySurface *qemu_console_surface(QemuConsole *console)
+ {
+     return console->surface;
+diff --git a/ui/vnc.c b/ui/vnc.c
+index 76a3273e0b..b45bb2c4b8 100644
+--- a/ui/vnc.c
++++ b/ui/vnc.c
+@@ -872,105 +872,6 @@ int vnc_send_framebuffer_update(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h)
+     return n;
+ }
+ 
+-static void vnc_copy(VncState *vs, int src_x, int src_y, int dst_x, int dst_y, int w, int h)
+-{
+-    /* send bitblit op to the vnc client */
+-    vnc_lock_output(vs);
+-    vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_FRAMEBUFFER_UPDATE);
+-    vnc_write_u8(vs, 0);
+-    vnc_write_u16(vs, 1); /* number of rects */
+-    vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, dst_x, dst_y, w, h, VNC_ENCODING_COPYRECT);
+-    vnc_write_u16(vs, src_x);
+-    vnc_write_u16(vs, src_y);
+-    vnc_unlock_output(vs);
+-    vnc_flush(vs);
+-}
+-
+-static void vnc_dpy_copy(DisplayChangeListener *dcl,
+-                         int src_x, int src_y,
+-                         int dst_x, int dst_y, int w, int h)
+-{
+-    VncDisplay *vd = container_of(dcl, VncDisplay, dcl);
+-    VncState *vs, *vn;
+-    uint8_t *src_row;
+-    uint8_t *dst_row;
+-    int i, x, y, pitch, inc, w_lim, s;
+-    int cmp_bytes;
+-
+-    if (!vd->server) {
+-        /* no client connected */
+-        return;
+-    }
+-
+-    vnc_refresh_server_surface(vd);
+-    QTAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(vs, &vd->clients, next, vn) {
+-        if (vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_COPYRECT)) {
+-            vs->force_update = 1;
+-            vnc_update_client(vs, 1, true);
+-            /* vs might be free()ed here */
+-        }
+-    }
+-
+-    if (!vd->server) {
+-        /* no client connected */
+-        return;
+-    }
+-    /* do bitblit op on the local surface too */
+-    pitch = vnc_server_fb_stride(vd);
+-    src_row = vnc_server_fb_ptr(vd, src_x, src_y);
+-    dst_row = vnc_server_fb_ptr(vd, dst_x, dst_y);
+-    y = dst_y;
+-    inc = 1;
+-    if (dst_y > src_y) {
+-        /* copy backwards */
+-        src_row += pitch * (h-1);
+-        dst_row += pitch * (h-1);
+-        pitch = -pitch;
+-        y = dst_y + h - 1;
+-        inc = -1;
+-    }
+-    w_lim = w - (VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT - (dst_x % VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT));
+-    if (w_lim < 0) {
+-        w_lim = w;
+-    } else {
+-        w_lim = w - (w_lim % VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT);
+-    }
+-    for (i = 0; i < h; i++) {
+-        for (x = 0; x <= w_lim;
+-                x += s, src_row += cmp_bytes, dst_row += cmp_bytes) {
+-            if (x == w_lim) {
+-                if ((s = w - w_lim) == 0)
+-                    break;
+-            } else if (!x) {
+-                s = (VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT -
+-                    (dst_x % VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT));
+-                s = MIN(s, w_lim);
+-            } else {
+-                s = VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT;
+-            }
+-            cmp_bytes = s * VNC_SERVER_FB_BYTES;
+-            if (memcmp(src_row, dst_row, cmp_bytes) == 0)
+-                continue;
+-            memmove(dst_row, src_row, cmp_bytes);
+-            QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
+-                if (!vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_COPYRECT)) {
+-                    set_bit(((x + dst_x) / VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT),
+-                            vs->dirty[y]);
+-                }
+-            }
+-        }
+-        src_row += pitch - w * VNC_SERVER_FB_BYTES;
+-        dst_row += pitch - w * VNC_SERVER_FB_BYTES;
+-        y += inc;
+-    }
+-
+-    QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
+-        if (vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_COPYRECT)) {
+-            vnc_copy(vs, src_x, src_y, dst_x, dst_y, w, h);
+-        }
+-    }
+-}
+-
+ static void vnc_mouse_set(DisplayChangeListener *dcl,
+                           int x, int y, int visible)
+ {
+@@ -3123,7 +3024,6 @@ static gboolean vnc_listen_io(QIOChannel *ioc,
+ static const DisplayChangeListenerOps dcl_ops = {
+     .dpy_name             = "vnc",
+     .dpy_refresh          = vnc_refresh,
+-    .dpy_gfx_copy         = vnc_dpy_copy,
+     .dpy_gfx_update       = vnc_dpy_update,
+     .dpy_gfx_switch       = vnc_dpy_switch,
+     .dpy_gfx_check_format = qemu_pixman_check_format,

0076-9pfs-fix-file-descriptor-leak.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2017 21:13:19 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: fix file descriptor leak
+
+The v9fs_create() and v9fs_lcreate() functions are used to create a file
+on the backend and to associate it to a fid. The fid shouldn't be already
+in-use, otherwise both functions may silently leak a file descriptor or
+allocated memory. The current code doesn't check that.
+
+This patch ensures that the fid isn't already associated to anything
+before using it.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+(reworded the changelog, Greg Kurz)
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+(cherry picked from commit d63fb193e71644a073b77ff5ac6f1216f2f6cf6e)
+---
+ hw/9pfs/9p.c | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+index 9a89f75d90..9d6b2caf1b 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
+@@ -1530,6 +1530,10 @@ static void v9fs_lcreate(void *opaque)
+         err = -ENOENT;
+         goto out_nofid;
+     }
++    if (fidp->fid_type != P9_FID_NONE) {
++        err = -EINVAL;
++        goto out;
++    }
+ 
+     flags = get_dotl_openflags(pdu->s, flags);
+     err = v9fs_co_open2(pdu, fidp, &name, gid,
+@@ -2127,6 +2131,10 @@ static void v9fs_create(void *opaque)
+         err = -EINVAL;
+         goto out_nofid;
+     }
++    if (fidp->fid_type != P9_FID_NONE) {
++        err = -EINVAL;
++        goto out;
++    }
+     if (perm & P9_STAT_MODE_DIR) {
+         err = v9fs_co_mkdir(pdu, fidp, &name, perm & 0777,
+                             fidp->uid, -1, &stbuf);

0077-cirrus-fix-cirrus_invalidate_region.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 13:06:46 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] cirrus: fix cirrus_invalidate_region
+
+off_cur_end is exclusive, so off_cur_end == cirrus_addr_mask is valid.
+Fix calculation to make sure to allow that, otherwise the assert added
+by commit f153b563f8cf121aebf5a2fff5f0110faf58ccb3 can trigger for valid
+blits.
+
+Test case: boot windows nt 4.0
+
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 1489579606-26020-1-git-send-email-kraxel@redhat.com
+(cherry picked from commit e048dac616748273c2153490e9fdf1da242f0cad)
+---
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+index 2ef2884823..444335f7c1 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+@@ -665,11 +665,11 @@ static void cirrus_invalidate_region(CirrusVGAState * s, int off_begin,
+     }
+ 
+     for (y = 0; y < lines; y++) {
+-	off_cur = off_begin;
+-	off_cur_end = (off_cur + bytesperline) & s->cirrus_addr_mask;
++        off_cur = off_begin;
++        off_cur_end = ((off_cur + bytesperline - 1) & s->cirrus_addr_mask) + 1;
+         assert(off_cur_end >= off_cur);
+         memory_region_set_dirty(&s->vga.vram, off_cur, off_cur_end - off_cur);
+-	off_begin += off_pitch;
++        off_begin += off_pitch;
+     }
+ }
+ 

0078-cirrus-stop-passing-around-dst-pointers-in-the-blitt.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,616 @@
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 11:47:52 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] cirrus: stop passing around dst pointers in the blitter
+
+Instead pass around the address (aka offset into vga memory).  Calculate
+the pointer in the rop_* functions, after applying the mask to the
+address, to make sure the address stays within the valid range.
+
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 1489574872-8679-1-git-send-email-kraxel@redhat.com
+(cherry picked from commit 026aeffcb4752054830ba203020ed6eb05bcaba8)
+---
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga.c      |  20 +++---
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga_rop.h  | 161 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga_rop2.h |  97 +++++++++++++-------------
+ 3 files changed, 153 insertions(+), 125 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+index 444335f7c1..f1952a00a8 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+@@ -177,11 +177,12 @@
+ 
+ struct CirrusVGAState;
+ typedef void (*cirrus_bitblt_rop_t) (struct CirrusVGAState *s,
+-                                     uint8_t * dst, const uint8_t * src,
++                                     uint32_t dstaddr, const uint8_t *src,
+ 				     int dstpitch, int srcpitch,
+ 				     int bltwidth, int bltheight);
+ typedef void (*cirrus_fill_t)(struct CirrusVGAState *s,
+-                              uint8_t *dst, int dst_pitch, int width, int height);
++                              uint32_t dstaddr, int dst_pitch,
++                              int width, int height);
+ 
+ typedef struct CirrusVGAState {
+     VGACommonState vga;
+@@ -319,14 +320,14 @@ static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s, bool dst_only)
+ }
+ 
+ static void cirrus_bitblt_rop_nop(CirrusVGAState *s,
+-                                  uint8_t *dst,const uint8_t *src,
++                                  uint32_t dstaddr, const uint8_t *src,
+                                   int dstpitch,int srcpitch,
+                                   int bltwidth,int bltheight)
+ {
+ }
+ 
+ static void cirrus_bitblt_fill_nop(CirrusVGAState *s,
+-                                   uint8_t *dst,
++                                   uint32_t dstaddr,
+                                    int dstpitch, int bltwidth,int bltheight)
+ {
+ }
+@@ -676,11 +677,8 @@ static void cirrus_invalidate_region(CirrusVGAState * s, int off_begin,
+ static int cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState *s, bool videosrc)
+ {
+     uint32_t patternsize;
+-    uint8_t *dst;
+     uint8_t *src;
+ 
+-    dst = s->vga.vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr;
+-
+     if (videosrc) {
+         switch (s->vga.get_bpp(&s->vga)) {
+         case 8:
+@@ -709,7 +707,7 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState *s, bool videosrc)
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
+-    (*s->cirrus_rop) (s, dst, src,
++    (*s->cirrus_rop) (s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr, src,
+                       s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch, 0,
+                       s->cirrus_blt_width, s->cirrus_blt_height);
+     cirrus_invalidate_region(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
+@@ -728,7 +726,7 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_solidfill(CirrusVGAState *s, int blt_rop)
+         return 0;
+     }
+     rop_func = cirrus_fill[rop_to_index[blt_rop]][s->cirrus_blt_pixelwidth - 1];
+-    rop_func(s, s->vga.vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
++    rop_func(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
+              s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch,
+              s->cirrus_blt_width, s->cirrus_blt_height);
+     cirrus_invalidate_region(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
+@@ -795,7 +793,7 @@ static int cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
+         }
+     }
+ 
+-    (*s->cirrus_rop) (s, s->vga.vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
++    (*s->cirrus_rop) (s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
+                       s->vga.vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr,
+ 		      s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch, s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch,
+ 		      s->cirrus_blt_width, s->cirrus_blt_height);
+@@ -846,7 +844,7 @@ static void cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo_next(CirrusVGAState * s)
+         } else {
+             /* at least one scan line */
+             do {
+-                (*s->cirrus_rop)(s, s->vga.vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
++                (*s->cirrus_rop)(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
+                                   s->cirrus_bltbuf, 0, 0, s->cirrus_blt_width, 1);
+                 cirrus_invalidate_region(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr, 0,
+                                          s->cirrus_blt_width, 1);
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga_rop.h b/hw/display/cirrus_vga_rop.h
+index b7447f8733..1aa778d3e8 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga_rop.h
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga_rop.h
+@@ -22,31 +22,65 @@
+  * THE SOFTWARE.
+  */
+ 
+-static inline void glue(rop_8_,ROP_NAME)(uint8_t *dst, uint8_t src)
++static inline void glue(rop_8_, ROP_NAME)(CirrusVGAState *s,
++                                          uint32_t dstaddr, uint8_t src)
+ {
++    uint8_t *dst = &s->vga.vram_ptr[dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask];
+     *dst = ROP_FN(*dst, src);
+ }
+ 
+-static inline void glue(rop_16_,ROP_NAME)(uint16_t *dst, uint16_t src)
++static inline void glue(rop_tr_8_, ROP_NAME)(CirrusVGAState *s,
++                                             uint32_t dstaddr, uint8_t src,
++                                             uint8_t transp)
+ {
++    uint8_t *dst = &s->vga.vram_ptr[dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask];
++    uint8_t pixel = ROP_FN(*dst, src);
++    if (pixel != transp) {
++        *dst = pixel;
++    }
++}
++
++static inline void glue(rop_16_, ROP_NAME)(CirrusVGAState *s,
++                                           uint32_t dstaddr, uint16_t src)
++{
++    uint16_t *dst = (uint16_t *)
++        (&s->vga.vram_ptr[dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask & ~1]);
+     *dst = ROP_FN(*dst, src);
+ }
+ 
+-static inline void glue(rop_32_,ROP_NAME)(uint32_t *dst, uint32_t src)
++static inline void glue(rop_tr_16_, ROP_NAME)(CirrusVGAState *s,
++                                              uint32_t dstaddr, uint16_t src,
++                                              uint16_t transp)
++{
++    uint16_t *dst = (uint16_t *)
++        (&s->vga.vram_ptr[dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask & ~1]);
++    uint16_t pixel = ROP_FN(*dst, src);
++    if (pixel != transp) {
++        *dst = pixel;
++    }
++}
++
++static inline void glue(rop_32_, ROP_NAME)(CirrusVGAState *s,
++                                           uint32_t dstaddr, uint32_t src)
+ {
++    uint32_t *dst = (uint32_t *)
++        (&s->vga.vram_ptr[dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask & ~3]);
+     *dst = ROP_FN(*dst, src);
+ }
+ 
+-#define ROP_OP(d, s) glue(rop_8_,ROP_NAME)(d, s)
+-#define ROP_OP_16(d, s) glue(rop_16_,ROP_NAME)(d, s)
+-#define ROP_OP_32(d, s) glue(rop_32_,ROP_NAME)(d, s)
++#define ROP_OP(st, d, s)           glue(rop_8_, ROP_NAME)(st, d, s)
++#define ROP_OP_TR(st, d, s, t)     glue(rop_tr_8_, ROP_NAME)(st, d, s, t)
++#define ROP_OP_16(st, d, s)        glue(rop_16_, ROP_NAME)(st, d, s)
++#define ROP_OP_TR_16(st, d, s, t)  glue(rop_tr_16_, ROP_NAME)(st, d, s, t)
++#define ROP_OP_32(st, d, s)        glue(rop_32_, ROP_NAME)(st, d, s)
+ #undef ROP_FN
+ 
+ static void
+ glue(cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_, ROP_NAME)(CirrusVGAState *s,
+-                             uint8_t *dst,const uint8_t *src,
+-                             int dstpitch,int srcpitch,
+-                             int bltwidth,int bltheight)
++                                       uint32_t dstaddr,
++                                       const uint8_t *src,
++                                       int dstpitch, int srcpitch,
++                                       int bltwidth, int bltheight)
+ {
+     int x,y;
+     dstpitch -= bltwidth;
+@@ -58,43 +92,47 @@ glue(cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_, ROP_NAME)(CirrusVGAState *s,
+ 
+     for (y = 0; y < bltheight; y++) {
+         for (x = 0; x < bltwidth; x++) {
+-            ROP_OP(dst, *src);
+-            dst++;
++            ROP_OP(s, dstaddr, *src);
++            dstaddr++;
+             src++;
+         }
+-        dst += dstpitch;
++        dstaddr += dstpitch;
+         src += srcpitch;
+     }
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+ glue(cirrus_bitblt_rop_bkwd_, ROP_NAME)(CirrusVGAState *s,
+-                                        uint8_t *dst,const uint8_t *src,
+-                                        int dstpitch,int srcpitch,
+-                                        int bltwidth,int bltheight)
++                                        uint32_t dstaddr,
++                                        const uint8_t *src,
++                                        int dstpitch, int srcpitch,
++                                        int bltwidth, int bltheight)
+ {
+     int x,y;
+     dstpitch += bltwidth;
+     srcpitch += bltwidth;
+     for (y = 0; y < bltheight; y++) {
+         for (x = 0; x < bltwidth; x++) {
+-            ROP_OP(dst, *src);
+-            dst--;
++            ROP_OP(s, dstaddr, *src);
++            dstaddr--;
+             src--;
+         }
+-        dst += dstpitch;
++        dstaddr += dstpitch;
+         src += srcpitch;
+     }
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+ glue(glue(cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_transp_, ROP_NAME),_8)(CirrusVGAState *s,
+-						       uint8_t *dst,const uint8_t *src,
+-						       int dstpitch,int srcpitch,
+-						       int bltwidth,int bltheight)
++                                                       uint32_t dstaddr,
++                                                       const uint8_t *src,
++                                                       int dstpitch,
++                                                       int srcpitch,
++                                                       int bltwidth,
++                                                       int bltheight)
+ {
+     int x,y;
+-    uint8_t p;
++    uint8_t transp = s->vga.gr[0x34];
+     dstpitch -= bltwidth;
+     srcpitch -= bltwidth;
+ 
+@@ -104,48 +142,50 @@ glue(glue(cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_transp_, ROP_NAME),_8)(CirrusVGAState *s,
+ 
+     for (y = 0; y < bltheight; y++) {
+         for (x = 0; x < bltwidth; x++) {
+-	    p = *dst;
+-            ROP_OP(&p, *src);
+-	    if (p != s->vga.gr[0x34]) *dst = p;
+-            dst++;
++            ROP_OP_TR(s, dstaddr, *src, transp);
++            dstaddr++;
+             src++;
+         }
+-        dst += dstpitch;
++        dstaddr += dstpitch;
+         src += srcpitch;
+     }
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+ glue(glue(cirrus_bitblt_rop_bkwd_transp_, ROP_NAME),_8)(CirrusVGAState *s,
+-							uint8_t *dst,const uint8_t *src,
+-							int dstpitch,int srcpitch,
+-							int bltwidth,int bltheight)
++                                                        uint32_t dstaddr,
++                                                        const uint8_t *src,
++                                                        int dstpitch,
++                                                        int srcpitch,
++                                                        int bltwidth,
++                                                        int bltheight)
+ {
+     int x,y;
+-    uint8_t p;
++    uint8_t transp = s->vga.gr[0x34];
+     dstpitch += bltwidth;
+     srcpitch += bltwidth;
+     for (y = 0; y < bltheight; y++) {
+         for (x = 0; x < bltwidth; x++) {
+-	    p = *dst;
+-            ROP_OP(&p, *src);
+-	    if (p != s->vga.gr[0x34]) *dst = p;
+-            dst--;
++            ROP_OP_TR(s, dstaddr, *src, transp);
++            dstaddr--;
+             src--;
+         }
+-        dst += dstpitch;
++        dstaddr += dstpitch;
+         src += srcpitch;
+     }
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+ glue(glue(cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_transp_, ROP_NAME),_16)(CirrusVGAState *s,
+-							uint8_t *dst,const uint8_t *src,
+-							int dstpitch,int srcpitch,
+-							int bltwidth,int bltheight)
++                                                        uint32_t dstaddr,
++                                                        const uint8_t *src,
++                                                        int dstpitch,
++                                                        int srcpitch,
++                                                        int bltwidth,
++                                                        int bltheight)
+ {
+     int x,y;
+-    uint8_t p1, p2;
++    uint16_t transp = s->vga.gr[0x34] | (uint16_t)s->vga.gr[0x35] << 8;
+     dstpitch -= bltwidth;
+     srcpitch -= bltwidth;
+ 
+@@ -155,46 +195,35 @@ glue(glue(cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_transp_, ROP_NAME),_16)(CirrusVGAState *s,
+ 
+     for (y = 0; y < bltheight; y++) {
+         for (x = 0; x < bltwidth; x+=2) {
+-	    p1 = *dst;
+-	    p2 = *(dst+1);
+-            ROP_OP(&p1, *src);
+-            ROP_OP(&p2, *(src + 1));
+-	    if ((p1 != s->vga.gr[0x34]) || (p2 != s->vga.gr[0x35])) {
+-		*dst = p1;
+-		*(dst+1) = p2;
+-	    }
+-            dst+=2;
+-            src+=2;
++            ROP_OP_TR_16(s, dstaddr, *(uint16_t *)src, transp);
++            dstaddr += 2;
++            src += 2;
+         }
+-        dst += dstpitch;
++        dstaddr += dstpitch;
+         src += srcpitch;
+     }
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+ glue(glue(cirrus_bitblt_rop_bkwd_transp_, ROP_NAME),_16)(CirrusVGAState *s,
+-							 uint8_t *dst,const uint8_t *src,
+-							 int dstpitch,int srcpitch,
+-							 int bltwidth,int bltheight)
++                                                         uint32_t dstaddr,
++                                                         const uint8_t *src,
++                                                         int dstpitch,
++                                                         int srcpitch,
++                                                         int bltwidth,
++                                                         int bltheight)
+ {
+     int x,y;
+-    uint8_t p1, p2;
++    uint16_t transp = s->vga.gr[0x34] | (uint16_t)s->vga.gr[0x35] << 8;
+     dstpitch += bltwidth;
+     srcpitch += bltwidth;
+     for (y = 0; y < bltheight; y++) {
+         for (x = 0; x < bltwidth; x+=2) {
+-	    p1 = *(dst-1);
+-	    p2 = *dst;
+-            ROP_OP(&p1, *(src - 1));
+-            ROP_OP(&p2, *src);
+-	    if ((p1 != s->vga.gr[0x34]) || (p2 != s->vga.gr[0x35])) {
+-		*(dst-1) = p1;
+-		*dst = p2;
+-	    }
+-            dst-=2;
+-            src-=2;
++            ROP_OP_TR_16(s, dstaddr, *(uint16_t *)src, transp);
++            dstaddr -= 2;
++            src -= 2;
+         }
+-        dst += dstpitch;
++        dstaddr += dstpitch;
+         src += srcpitch;
+     }
+ }
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga_rop2.h b/hw/display/cirrus_vga_rop2.h
+index d28bcc6f25..bc92f0e0e7 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga_rop2.h
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga_rop2.h
+@@ -23,27 +23,29 @@
+  */
+ 
+ #if DEPTH == 8
+-#define PUTPIXEL()    ROP_OP(&d[0], col)
++#define PUTPIXEL(s, a, c)    ROP_OP(s, a, c)
+ #elif DEPTH == 16
+-#define PUTPIXEL()    ROP_OP_16((uint16_t *)&d[0], col)
++#define PUTPIXEL(s, a, c)    ROP_OP_16(s, a, c)
+ #elif DEPTH == 24
+-#define PUTPIXEL()    ROP_OP(&d[0], col);        \
+-                      ROP_OP(&d[1], (col >> 8)); \
+-                      ROP_OP(&d[2], (col >> 16))
++#define PUTPIXEL(s, a, c)    do {          \
++        ROP_OP(s, a,     c);               \
++        ROP_OP(s, a + 1, (col >> 8));      \
++        ROP_OP(s, a + 2, (col >> 16));     \
++    } while (0)
+ #elif DEPTH == 32
+-#define PUTPIXEL()    ROP_OP_32(((uint32_t *)&d[0]), col)
++#define PUTPIXEL(s, a, c)    ROP_OP_32(s, a, c)
+ #else
+ #error unsupported DEPTH
+ #endif
+ 
+ static void
+ glue(glue(glue(cirrus_patternfill_, ROP_NAME), _),DEPTH)
+-     (CirrusVGAState * s, uint8_t * dst,
+-      const uint8_t * src,
++     (CirrusVGAState *s, uint32_t dstaddr,
++      const uint8_t *src,
+       int dstpitch, int srcpitch,
+       int bltwidth, int bltheight)
+ {
+-    uint8_t *d;
++    uint32_t addr;
+     int x, y, pattern_y, pattern_pitch, pattern_x;
+     unsigned int col;
+     const uint8_t *src1;
+@@ -63,7 +65,7 @@ glue(glue(glue(cirrus_patternfill_, ROP_NAME), _),DEPTH)
+     pattern_y = s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr & 7;
+     for(y = 0; y < bltheight; y++) {
+         pattern_x = skipleft;
+-        d = dst + skipleft;
++        addr = dstaddr + skipleft;
+         src1 = src + pattern_y * pattern_pitch;
+         for (x = skipleft; x < bltwidth; x += (DEPTH / 8)) {
+ #if DEPTH == 8
+@@ -82,23 +84,23 @@ glue(glue(glue(cirrus_patternfill_, ROP_NAME), _),DEPTH)
+             col = ((uint32_t *)(src1 + pattern_x))[0];
+             pattern_x = (pattern_x + 4) & 31;
+ #endif
+-            PUTPIXEL();
+-            d += (DEPTH / 8);
++            PUTPIXEL(s, addr, col);
++            addr += (DEPTH / 8);
+         }
+         pattern_y = (pattern_y + 1) & 7;
+-        dst += dstpitch;
++        dstaddr += dstpitch;
+     }
+ }
+ 
+ /* NOTE: srcpitch is ignored */
+ static void
+ glue(glue(glue(cirrus_colorexpand_transp_, ROP_NAME), _),DEPTH)
+-     (CirrusVGAState * s, uint8_t * dst,
+-      const uint8_t * src,
++     (CirrusVGAState *s, uint32_t dstaddr,
++      const uint8_t *src,
+       int dstpitch, int srcpitch,
+       int bltwidth, int bltheight)
+ {
+-    uint8_t *d;
++    uint32_t addr;
+     int x, y;
+     unsigned bits, bits_xor;
+     unsigned int col;
+@@ -123,7 +125,7 @@ glue(glue(glue(cirrus_colorexpand_transp_, ROP_NAME), _),DEPTH)
+     for(y = 0; y < bltheight; y++) {
+         bitmask = 0x80 >> srcskipleft;
+         bits = *src++ ^ bits_xor;
+-        d = dst + dstskipleft;
++        addr = dstaddr + dstskipleft;
+         for (x = dstskipleft; x < bltwidth; x += (DEPTH / 8)) {
+             if ((bitmask & 0xff) == 0) {
+                 bitmask = 0x80;
+@@ -131,24 +133,24 @@ glue(glue(glue(cirrus_colorexpand_transp_, ROP_NAME), _),DEPTH)
+             }
+             index = (bits & bitmask);
+             if (index) {
+-                PUTPIXEL();
++                PUTPIXEL(s, addr, col);
+             }
+-            d += (DEPTH / 8);
++            addr += (DEPTH / 8);
+             bitmask >>= 1;
+         }
+-        dst += dstpitch;
++        dstaddr += dstpitch;
+     }
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+ glue(glue(glue(cirrus_colorexpand_, ROP_NAME), _),DEPTH)
+-     (CirrusVGAState * s, uint8_t * dst,
+-      const uint8_t * src,
++     (CirrusVGAState *s, uint32_t dstaddr,
++      const uint8_t *src,
+       int dstpitch, int srcpitch,
+       int bltwidth, int bltheight)
+ {
+     uint32_t colors[2];
+-    uint8_t *d;
++    uint32_t addr;
+     int x, y;
+     unsigned bits;
+     unsigned int col;
+@@ -161,29 +163,29 @@ glue(glue(glue(cirrus_colorexpand_, ROP_NAME), _),DEPTH)
+     for(y = 0; y < bltheight; y++) {
+         bitmask = 0x80 >> srcskipleft;
+         bits = *src++;
+-        d = dst + dstskipleft;
++        addr = dstaddr + dstskipleft;
+         for (x = dstskipleft; x < bltwidth; x += (DEPTH / 8)) {
+             if ((bitmask & 0xff) == 0) {
+                 bitmask = 0x80;
+                 bits = *src++;
+             }
+             col = colors[!!(bits & bitmask)];
+-            PUTPIXEL();
+-            d += (DEPTH / 8);
++            PUTPIXEL(s, addr, col);
++            addr += (DEPTH / 8);
+             bitmask >>= 1;
+         }
+-        dst += dstpitch;
++        dstaddr += dstpitch;
+     }
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+ glue(glue(glue(cirrus_colorexpand_pattern_transp_, ROP_NAME), _),DEPTH)
+-     (CirrusVGAState * s, uint8_t * dst,
+-      const uint8_t * src,
++     (CirrusVGAState *s, uint32_t dstaddr,
++      const uint8_t *src,
+       int dstpitch, int srcpitch,
+       int bltwidth, int bltheight)
+ {
+-    uint8_t *d;
++    uint32_t addr;
+     int x, y, bitpos, pattern_y;
+     unsigned int bits, bits_xor;
+     unsigned int col;
+@@ -207,28 +209,28 @@ glue(glue(glue(cirrus_colorexpand_pattern_transp_, ROP_NAME), _),DEPTH)
+     for(y = 0; y < bltheight; y++) {
+         bits = src[pattern_y] ^ bits_xor;
+         bitpos = 7 - srcskipleft;
+-        d = dst + dstskipleft;
++        addr = dstaddr + dstskipleft;
+         for (x = dstskipleft; x < bltwidth; x += (DEPTH / 8)) {
+             if ((bits >> bitpos) & 1) {
+-                PUTPIXEL();
++                PUTPIXEL(s, addr, col);
+             }
+-            d += (DEPTH / 8);
++            addr += (DEPTH / 8);
+             bitpos = (bitpos - 1) & 7;
+         }
+         pattern_y = (pattern_y + 1) & 7;
+-        dst += dstpitch;
++        dstaddr += dstpitch;
+     }
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+ glue(glue(glue(cirrus_colorexpand_pattern_, ROP_NAME), _),DEPTH)
+-     (CirrusVGAState * s, uint8_t * dst,
+-      const uint8_t * src,
++     (CirrusVGAState *s, uint32_t dstaddr,
++      const uint8_t *src,
+       int dstpitch, int srcpitch,
+       int bltwidth, int bltheight)
+ {
+     uint32_t colors[2];
+-    uint8_t *d;
++    uint32_t addr;
+     int x, y, bitpos, pattern_y;
+     unsigned int bits;
+     unsigned int col;
+@@ -242,38 +244,37 @@ glue(glue(glue(cirrus_colorexpand_pattern_, ROP_NAME), _),DEPTH)
+     for(y = 0; y < bltheight; y++) {
+         bits = src[pattern_y];
+         bitpos = 7 - srcskipleft;
+-        d = dst + dstskipleft;
++        addr = dstaddr + dstskipleft;
+         for (x = dstskipleft; x < bltwidth; x += (DEPTH / 8)) {
+             col = colors[(bits >> bitpos) & 1];
+-            PUTPIXEL();
+-            d += (DEPTH / 8);
++            PUTPIXEL(s, addr, col);
++            addr += (DEPTH / 8);
+             bitpos = (bitpos - 1) & 7;
+         }
+         pattern_y = (pattern_y + 1) & 7;
+-        dst += dstpitch;
++        dstaddr += dstpitch;
+     }
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+ glue(glue(glue(cirrus_fill_, ROP_NAME), _),DEPTH)
+      (CirrusVGAState *s,
+-      uint8_t *dst, int dst_pitch,
++      uint32_t dstaddr, int dst_pitch,
+       int width, int height)
+ {
+-    uint8_t *d, *d1;
++    uint32_t addr;
+     uint32_t col;
+     int x, y;
+ 
+     col = s->cirrus_blt_fgcol;
+ 
+-    d1 = dst;
+     for(y = 0; y < height; y++) {
+-        d = d1;
++        addr = dstaddr;
+         for(x = 0; x < width; x += (DEPTH / 8)) {
+-            PUTPIXEL();
+-            d += (DEPTH / 8);
++            PUTPIXEL(s, addr, col);
++            addr += (DEPTH / 8);
+         }
+-        d1 += dst_pitch;
++        dstaddr += dst_pitch;
+     }
+ }
+ 

0079-cirrus-stop-passing-around-src-pointers-in-the-blitt.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,441 @@
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 14:28:07 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] cirrus: stop passing around src pointers in the blitter
+
+Does basically the same as "cirrus: stop passing around dst pointers in
+the blitter", just for the src pointer instead of the dst pointer.
+
+For the src we have to care about cputovideo blits though and fetch the
+data from s->cirrus_bltbuf instead of vga memory.  The cirrus_src*()
+helper functions handle that.
+
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 1489584487-3489-1-git-send-email-kraxel@redhat.com
+(cherry picked from commit ffaf857778286ca54e3804432a2369a279e73aa7)
+---
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga.c      | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga_rop.h  | 48 +++++++++++++++++-----------------
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga_rop2.h | 38 ++++++++++++++-------------
+ 3 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+index f1952a00a8..9274c25f46 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@
+ 
+ struct CirrusVGAState;
+ typedef void (*cirrus_bitblt_rop_t) (struct CirrusVGAState *s,
+-                                     uint32_t dstaddr, const uint8_t *src,
++                                     uint32_t dstaddr, uint32_t srcaddr,
+ 				     int dstpitch, int srcpitch,
+ 				     int bltwidth, int bltheight);
+ typedef void (*cirrus_fill_t)(struct CirrusVGAState *s,
+@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s, bool dst_only)
+ }
+ 
+ static void cirrus_bitblt_rop_nop(CirrusVGAState *s,
+-                                  uint32_t dstaddr, const uint8_t *src,
++                                  uint32_t dstaddr, uint32_t srcaddr,
+                                   int dstpitch,int srcpitch,
+                                   int bltwidth,int bltheight)
+ {
+@@ -332,6 +332,45 @@ static void cirrus_bitblt_fill_nop(CirrusVGAState *s,
+ {
+ }
+ 
++static inline uint8_t cirrus_src(CirrusVGAState *s, uint32_t srcaddr)
++{
++    if (s->cirrus_srccounter) {
++        /* cputovideo */
++        return s->cirrus_bltbuf[srcaddr & (CIRRUS_BLTBUFSIZE - 1)];
++    } else {
++        /* videotovideo */
++        return s->vga.vram_ptr[srcaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask];
++    }
++}
++
++static inline uint16_t cirrus_src16(CirrusVGAState *s, uint32_t srcaddr)
++{
++    uint16_t *src;
++
++    if (s->cirrus_srccounter) {
++        /* cputovideo */
++        src = (void *)&s->cirrus_bltbuf[srcaddr & (CIRRUS_BLTBUFSIZE - 1) & ~1];
++    } else {
++        /* videotovideo */
++        src = (void *)&s->vga.vram_ptr[srcaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask & ~1];
++    }
++    return *src;
++}
++
++static inline uint32_t cirrus_src32(CirrusVGAState *s, uint32_t srcaddr)
++{
++    uint32_t *src;
++
++    if (s->cirrus_srccounter) {
++        /* cputovideo */
++        src = (void *)&s->cirrus_bltbuf[srcaddr & (CIRRUS_BLTBUFSIZE - 1) & ~3];
++    } else {
++        /* videotovideo */
++        src = (void *)&s->vga.vram_ptr[srcaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask & ~3];
++    }
++    return *src;
++}
++
+ #define ROP_NAME 0
+ #define ROP_FN(d, s) 0
+ #include "cirrus_vga_rop.h"
+@@ -674,10 +713,10 @@ static void cirrus_invalidate_region(CirrusVGAState * s, int off_begin,
+     }
+ }
+ 
+-static int cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState *s, bool videosrc)
++static int cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState *s)
+ {
+     uint32_t patternsize;
+-    uint8_t *src;
++    bool videosrc = !s->cirrus_srccounter;
+ 
+     if (videosrc) {
+         switch (s->vga.get_bpp(&s->vga)) {
+@@ -698,16 +737,14 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState *s, bool videosrc)
+         if (s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr + patternsize > s->vga.vram_size) {
+             return 0;
+         }
+-        src = s->vga.vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr;
+-    } else {
+-        src = s->cirrus_bltbuf;
+     }
+ 
+     if (blit_is_unsafe(s, true)) {
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
+-    (*s->cirrus_rop) (s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr, src,
++    (*s->cirrus_rop) (s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
++                      videosrc ? s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr : 0,
+                       s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch, 0,
+                       s->cirrus_blt_width, s->cirrus_blt_height);
+     cirrus_invalidate_region(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
+@@ -744,7 +781,7 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_solidfill(CirrusVGAState *s, int blt_rop)
+ 
+ static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState * s)
+ {
+-    return cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(s, true);
++    return cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(s);
+ }
+ 
+ static int cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
+@@ -794,7 +831,7 @@ static int cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
+     }
+ 
+     (*s->cirrus_rop) (s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
+-                      s->vga.vram_ptr + s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr,
++                      s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr,
+ 		      s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch, s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch,
+ 		      s->cirrus_blt_width, s->cirrus_blt_height);
+ 
+@@ -837,7 +874,7 @@ static void cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo_next(CirrusVGAState * s)
+ 
+     if (s->cirrus_srccounter > 0) {
+         if (s->cirrus_blt_mode & CIRRUS_BLTMODE_PATTERNCOPY) {
+-            cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(s, false);
++            cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(s);
+         the_end:
+             s->cirrus_srccounter = 0;
+             cirrus_bitblt_reset(s);
+@@ -845,7 +882,7 @@ static void cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo_next(CirrusVGAState * s)
+             /* at least one scan line */
+             do {
+                 (*s->cirrus_rop)(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
+-                                  s->cirrus_bltbuf, 0, 0, s->cirrus_blt_width, 1);
++                                 0, 0, 0, s->cirrus_blt_width, 1);
+                 cirrus_invalidate_region(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr, 0,
+                                          s->cirrus_blt_width, 1);
+                 s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr += s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch;
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga_rop.h b/hw/display/cirrus_vga_rop.h
+index 1aa778d3e8..c61a677353 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga_rop.h
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga_rop.h
+@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ static inline void glue(rop_32_, ROP_NAME)(CirrusVGAState *s,
+ static void
+ glue(cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_, ROP_NAME)(CirrusVGAState *s,
+                                        uint32_t dstaddr,
+-                                       const uint8_t *src,
++                                       uint32_t srcaddr,
+                                        int dstpitch, int srcpitch,
+                                        int bltwidth, int bltheight)
+ {
+@@ -92,19 +92,19 @@ glue(cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_, ROP_NAME)(CirrusVGAState *s,
+ 
+     for (y = 0; y < bltheight; y++) {
+         for (x = 0; x < bltwidth; x++) {
+-            ROP_OP(s, dstaddr, *src);
++            ROP_OP(s, dstaddr, cirrus_src(s, srcaddr));
+             dstaddr++;
+-            src++;
++            srcaddr++;
+         }
+         dstaddr += dstpitch;
+-        src += srcpitch;
++        srcaddr += srcpitch;
+     }
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+ glue(cirrus_bitblt_rop_bkwd_, ROP_NAME)(CirrusVGAState *s,
+                                         uint32_t dstaddr,
+-                                        const uint8_t *src,
++                                        uint32_t srcaddr,
+                                         int dstpitch, int srcpitch,
+                                         int bltwidth, int bltheight)
+ {
+@@ -113,19 +113,19 @@ glue(cirrus_bitblt_rop_bkwd_, ROP_NAME)(CirrusVGAState *s,
+     srcpitch += bltwidth;
+     for (y = 0; y < bltheight; y++) {
+         for (x = 0; x < bltwidth; x++) {
+-            ROP_OP(s, dstaddr, *src);
++            ROP_OP(s, dstaddr, cirrus_src(s, srcaddr));
+             dstaddr--;
+-            src--;
++            srcaddr--;
+         }
+         dstaddr += dstpitch;
+-        src += srcpitch;
++        srcaddr += srcpitch;
+     }
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+ glue(glue(cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_transp_, ROP_NAME),_8)(CirrusVGAState *s,
+                                                        uint32_t dstaddr,
+-                                                       const uint8_t *src,
++                                                       uint32_t srcaddr,
+                                                        int dstpitch,
+                                                        int srcpitch,
+                                                        int bltwidth,
+@@ -142,19 +142,19 @@ glue(glue(cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_transp_, ROP_NAME),_8)(CirrusVGAState *s,
+ 
+     for (y = 0; y < bltheight; y++) {
+         for (x = 0; x < bltwidth; x++) {
+-            ROP_OP_TR(s, dstaddr, *src, transp);
++            ROP_OP_TR(s, dstaddr, cirrus_src(s, srcaddr), transp);
+             dstaddr++;
+-            src++;
++            srcaddr++;
+         }
+         dstaddr += dstpitch;
+-        src += srcpitch;
++        srcaddr += srcpitch;
+     }
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+ glue(glue(cirrus_bitblt_rop_bkwd_transp_, ROP_NAME),_8)(CirrusVGAState *s,
+                                                         uint32_t dstaddr,
+-                                                        const uint8_t *src,
++                                                        uint32_t srcaddr,
+                                                         int dstpitch,
+                                                         int srcpitch,
+                                                         int bltwidth,
+@@ -166,19 +166,19 @@ glue(glue(cirrus_bitblt_rop_bkwd_transp_, ROP_NAME),_8)(CirrusVGAState *s,
+     srcpitch += bltwidth;
+     for (y = 0; y < bltheight; y++) {
+         for (x = 0; x < bltwidth; x++) {
+-            ROP_OP_TR(s, dstaddr, *src, transp);
++            ROP_OP_TR(s, dstaddr, cirrus_src(s, srcaddr), transp);
+             dstaddr--;
+-            src--;
++            srcaddr--;
+         }
+         dstaddr += dstpitch;
+-        src += srcpitch;
++        srcaddr += srcpitch;
+     }
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+ glue(glue(cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_transp_, ROP_NAME),_16)(CirrusVGAState *s,
+                                                         uint32_t dstaddr,
+-                                                        const uint8_t *src,
++                                                        uint32_t srcaddr,
+                                                         int dstpitch,
+                                                         int srcpitch,
+                                                         int bltwidth,
+@@ -195,19 +195,19 @@ glue(glue(cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_transp_, ROP_NAME),_16)(CirrusVGAState *s,
+ 
+     for (y = 0; y < bltheight; y++) {
+         for (x = 0; x < bltwidth; x+=2) {
+-            ROP_OP_TR_16(s, dstaddr, *(uint16_t *)src, transp);
++            ROP_OP_TR_16(s, dstaddr, cirrus_src16(s, srcaddr), transp);
+             dstaddr += 2;
+-            src += 2;
++            srcaddr += 2;
+         }
+         dstaddr += dstpitch;
+-        src += srcpitch;
++        srcaddr += srcpitch;
+     }
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+ glue(glue(cirrus_bitblt_rop_bkwd_transp_, ROP_NAME),_16)(CirrusVGAState *s,
+                                                          uint32_t dstaddr,
+-                                                         const uint8_t *src,
++                                                         uint32_t srcaddr,
+                                                          int dstpitch,
+                                                          int srcpitch,
+                                                          int bltwidth,
+@@ -219,12 +219,12 @@ glue(glue(cirrus_bitblt_rop_bkwd_transp_, ROP_NAME),_16)(CirrusVGAState *s,
+     srcpitch += bltwidth;
+     for (y = 0; y < bltheight; y++) {
+         for (x = 0; x < bltwidth; x+=2) {
+-            ROP_OP_TR_16(s, dstaddr, *(uint16_t *)src, transp);
++            ROP_OP_TR_16(s, dstaddr, cirrus_src16(s, srcaddr), transp);
+             dstaddr -= 2;
+-            src -= 2;
++            srcaddr -= 2;
+         }
+         dstaddr += dstpitch;
+-        src += srcpitch;
++        srcaddr += srcpitch;
+     }
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga_rop2.h b/hw/display/cirrus_vga_rop2.h
+index bc92f0e0e7..b86bcd6e09 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga_rop2.h
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga_rop2.h
+@@ -41,14 +41,14 @@
+ static void
+ glue(glue(glue(cirrus_patternfill_, ROP_NAME), _),DEPTH)
+      (CirrusVGAState *s, uint32_t dstaddr,
+-      const uint8_t *src,
++      uint32_t srcaddr,
+       int dstpitch, int srcpitch,
+       int bltwidth, int bltheight)
+ {
+     uint32_t addr;
+     int x, y, pattern_y, pattern_pitch, pattern_x;
+     unsigned int col;
+-    const uint8_t *src1;
++    uint32_t src1addr;
+ #if DEPTH == 24
+     int skipleft = s->vga.gr[0x2f] & 0x1f;
+ #else
+@@ -66,22 +66,24 @@ glue(glue(glue(cirrus_patternfill_, ROP_NAME), _),DEPTH)
+     for(y = 0; y < bltheight; y++) {
+         pattern_x = skipleft;
+         addr = dstaddr + skipleft;
+-        src1 = src + pattern_y * pattern_pitch;
++        src1addr = srcaddr + pattern_y * pattern_pitch;
+         for (x = skipleft; x < bltwidth; x += (DEPTH / 8)) {
+ #if DEPTH == 8
+-            col = src1[pattern_x];
++            col = cirrus_src(s, src1addr + pattern_x);
+             pattern_x = (pattern_x + 1) & 7;
+ #elif DEPTH == 16
+-            col = ((uint16_t *)(src1 + pattern_x))[0];
++            col = cirrus_src16(s, src1addr + pattern_x);
+             pattern_x = (pattern_x + 2) & 15;
+ #elif DEPTH == 24
+             {
+-                const uint8_t *src2 = src1 + pattern_x * 3;
+-                col = src2[0] | (src2[1] << 8) | (src2[2] << 16);
++                uint32_t src2addr = src1addr + pattern_x * 3;
++                col = cirrus_src(s, src2addr) |
++                    (cirrus_src(s, src2addr + 1) << 8) |
++                    (cirrus_src(s, src2addr + 2) << 16);
+                 pattern_x = (pattern_x + 1) & 7;
+             }
+ #else
+-            col = ((uint32_t *)(src1 + pattern_x))[0];
++            col = cirrus_src32(s, src1addr + pattern_x);
+             pattern_x = (pattern_x + 4) & 31;
+ #endif
+             PUTPIXEL(s, addr, col);
+@@ -96,7 +98,7 @@ glue(glue(glue(cirrus_patternfill_, ROP_NAME), _),DEPTH)
+ static void
+ glue(glue(glue(cirrus_colorexpand_transp_, ROP_NAME), _),DEPTH)
+      (CirrusVGAState *s, uint32_t dstaddr,
+-      const uint8_t *src,
++      uint32_t srcaddr,
+       int dstpitch, int srcpitch,
+       int bltwidth, int bltheight)
+ {
+@@ -124,12 +126,12 @@ glue(glue(glue(cirrus_colorexpand_transp_, ROP_NAME), _),DEPTH)
+ 
+     for(y = 0; y < bltheight; y++) {
+         bitmask = 0x80 >> srcskipleft;
+-        bits = *src++ ^ bits_xor;
++        bits = cirrus_src(s, srcaddr++) ^ bits_xor;
+         addr = dstaddr + dstskipleft;
+         for (x = dstskipleft; x < bltwidth; x += (DEPTH / 8)) {
+             if ((bitmask & 0xff) == 0) {
+                 bitmask = 0x80;
+-                bits = *src++ ^ bits_xor;
++                bits = cirrus_src(s, srcaddr++) ^ bits_xor;
+             }
+             index = (bits & bitmask);
+             if (index) {
+@@ -145,7 +147,7 @@ glue(glue(glue(cirrus_colorexpand_transp_, ROP_NAME), _),DEPTH)
+ static void
+ glue(glue(glue(cirrus_colorexpand_, ROP_NAME), _),DEPTH)
+      (CirrusVGAState *s, uint32_t dstaddr,
+-      const uint8_t *src,
++      uint32_t srcaddr,
+       int dstpitch, int srcpitch,
+       int bltwidth, int bltheight)
+ {
+@@ -162,12 +164,12 @@ glue(glue(glue(cirrus_colorexpand_, ROP_NAME), _),DEPTH)
+     colors[1] = s->cirrus_blt_fgcol;
+     for(y = 0; y < bltheight; y++) {
+         bitmask = 0x80 >> srcskipleft;
+-        bits = *src++;
++        bits = cirrus_src(s, srcaddr++);
+         addr = dstaddr + dstskipleft;
+         for (x = dstskipleft; x < bltwidth; x += (DEPTH / 8)) {
+             if ((bitmask & 0xff) == 0) {
+                 bitmask = 0x80;
+-                bits = *src++;
++                bits = cirrus_src(s, srcaddr++);
+             }
+             col = colors[!!(bits & bitmask)];
+             PUTPIXEL(s, addr, col);
+@@ -181,7 +183,7 @@ glue(glue(glue(cirrus_colorexpand_, ROP_NAME), _),DEPTH)
+ static void
+ glue(glue(glue(cirrus_colorexpand_pattern_transp_, ROP_NAME), _),DEPTH)
+      (CirrusVGAState *s, uint32_t dstaddr,
+-      const uint8_t *src,
++      uint32_t srcaddr,
+       int dstpitch, int srcpitch,
+       int bltwidth, int bltheight)
+ {
+@@ -207,7 +209,7 @@ glue(glue(glue(cirrus_colorexpand_pattern_transp_, ROP_NAME), _),DEPTH)
+     pattern_y = s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr & 7;
+ 
+     for(y = 0; y < bltheight; y++) {
+-        bits = src[pattern_y] ^ bits_xor;
++        bits = cirrus_src(s, srcaddr + pattern_y) ^ bits_xor;
+         bitpos = 7 - srcskipleft;
+         addr = dstaddr + dstskipleft;
+         for (x = dstskipleft; x < bltwidth; x += (DEPTH / 8)) {
+@@ -225,7 +227,7 @@ glue(glue(glue(cirrus_colorexpand_pattern_transp_, ROP_NAME), _),DEPTH)
+ static void
+ glue(glue(glue(cirrus_colorexpand_pattern_, ROP_NAME), _),DEPTH)
+      (CirrusVGAState *s, uint32_t dstaddr,
+-      const uint8_t *src,
++      uint32_t srcaddr,
+       int dstpitch, int srcpitch,
+       int bltwidth, int bltheight)
+ {
+@@ -242,7 +244,7 @@ glue(glue(glue(cirrus_colorexpand_pattern_, ROP_NAME), _),DEPTH)
+     pattern_y = s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr & 7;
+ 
+     for(y = 0; y < bltheight; y++) {
+-        bits = src[pattern_y];
++        bits = cirrus_src(s, srcaddr + pattern_y);
+         bitpos = 7 - srcskipleft;
+         addr = dstaddr + dstskipleft;
+         for (x = dstskipleft; x < bltwidth; x += (DEPTH / 8)) {

0080-cirrus-fix-off-by-one-in-cirrus_bitblt_rop_bkwd_tran.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 17 Mar 2017 08:21:36 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] cirrus: fix off-by-one in cirrus_bitblt_rop_bkwd_transp_*_16
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The switch from pointers to addresses (commit
+026aeffcb4752054830ba203020ed6eb05bcaba8 and
+ffaf857778286ca54e3804432a2369a279e73aa7) added
+a off-by-one bug to 16bit backward blits.  Fix.
+
+Reported-by: 李强 <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Message-id: 1489735296-19047-1-git-send-email-kraxel@redhat.com
+(cherry picked from commit f019722cbbb45aea153294fc8921fcc96a4d3fa2)
+---
+ hw/display/cirrus_vga_rop.h | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga_rop.h b/hw/display/cirrus_vga_rop.h
+index c61a677353..0841b9efa9 100644
+--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga_rop.h
++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga_rop.h
+@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ glue(glue(cirrus_bitblt_rop_bkwd_transp_, ROP_NAME),_16)(CirrusVGAState *s,
+     srcpitch += bltwidth;
+     for (y = 0; y < bltheight; y++) {
+         for (x = 0; x < bltwidth; x+=2) {
+-            ROP_OP_TR_16(s, dstaddr, cirrus_src16(s, srcaddr), transp);
++            ROP_OP_TR_16(s, dstaddr - 1, cirrus_src16(s, srcaddr - 1), transp);
+             dstaddr -= 2;
+             srcaddr -= 2;
+         }

0081-vmw_pvscsi-check-message-ring-page-count-at-initiali.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2017 18:36:23 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] vmw_pvscsi: check message ring page count at initialisation
+
+A guest could set the message ring page count to zero, resulting in
+infinite loop. Add check to avoid it.
+
+Reported-by: YY Z <bigbird475958471@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
+Message-Id: <20170425130623.3649-1-ppandit@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Dmitry Fleytman <dmitry@daynix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit f68826989cd4d1217797251339579c57b3c0934e)
+---
+ hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c b/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
+index a5ce7dea8e..44141322de 100644
+--- a/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
++++ b/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
+@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ pvscsi_ring_init_msg(PVSCSIRingInfo *m, PVSCSICmdDescSetupMsgRing *ri)
+     uint32_t len_log2;
+     uint32_t ring_size;
+ 
+-    if (ri->numPages > PVSCSI_SETUP_MSG_RING_MAX_NUM_PAGES) {
++    if (!ri->numPages || ri->numPages > PVSCSI_SETUP_MSG_RING_MAX_NUM_PAGES) {
+         return -1;
+     }
+     ring_size = ri->numPages * PVSCSI_MAX_NUM_MSG_ENTRIES_PER_PAGE;

0082-audio-release-capture-buffers.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 28 Apr 2017 09:56:12 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] audio: release capture buffers
+
+AUD_add_capture() allocates two buffers which are never released.
+Add the missing calls to AUD_del_capture().
+
+Impact: Allows vnc clients to exhaust host memory by repeatedly
+starting and stopping audio capture.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2017-8309
+Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
+Cc: Huawei PSIRT <PSIRT@huawei.com>
+Reported-by: "Jiangxin (hunter, SCC)" <jiangxin1@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Message-id: 20170428075612.9997-1-kraxel@redhat.com
+(cherry picked from commit 3268a845f41253fb55852a8429c32b50f36f349a)
+---
+ audio/audio.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/audio/audio.c b/audio/audio.c
+index c845a44f0a..adede3c9ef 100644
+--- a/audio/audio.c
++++ b/audio/audio.c
+@@ -2023,6 +2023,8 @@ void AUD_del_capture (CaptureVoiceOut *cap, void *cb_opaque)
+                     sw = sw1;
+                 }
+                 QLIST_REMOVE (cap, entries);
++                g_free (cap->hw.mix_buf);
++                g_free (cap->buf);
+                 g_free (cap);
+             }
+             return;

0083-input-limit-kbd-queue-depth.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 28 Apr 2017 10:42:37 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] input: limit kbd queue depth
+
+Apply a limit to the number of items we accept into the keyboard queue.
+
+Impact: Without this limit vnc clients can exhaust host memory by
+sending keyboard events faster than qemu feeds them to the guest.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2017-8379
+Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
+Cc: Huawei PSIRT <PSIRT@huawei.com>
+Reported-by: jiangxin1@huawei.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 20170428084237.23960-1-kraxel@redhat.com
+(cherry picked from commit fa18f36a461984eae50ab957e47ec78dae3c14fc)
+---
+ ui/input.c | 14 +++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ui/input.c b/ui/input.c
+index ed88cda6d6..fb1f404095 100644
+--- a/ui/input.c
++++ b/ui/input.c
+@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ static QTAILQ_HEAD(QemuInputEventQueueHead, QemuInputEventQueue) kbd_queue =
+     QTAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(kbd_queue);
+ static QEMUTimer *kbd_timer;
+ static uint32_t kbd_default_delay_ms = 10;
++static uint32_t queue_count;
++static uint32_t queue_limit = 1024;
+ 
+ QemuInputHandlerState *qemu_input_handler_register(DeviceState *dev,
+                                                    QemuInputHandler *handler)
+@@ -268,6 +270,7 @@ static void qemu_input_queue_process(void *opaque)
+             break;
+         }
+         QTAILQ_REMOVE(queue, item, node);
++        queue_count--;
+         g_free(item);
+     }
+ }
+@@ -282,6 +285,7 @@ static void qemu_input_queue_delay(struct QemuInputEventQueueHead *queue,
+     item->delay_ms = delay_ms;
+     item->timer = timer;
+     QTAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(queue, item, node);
++    queue_count++;
+ 
+     if (start_timer) {
+         timer_mod(item->timer, qemu_clock_get_ms(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL)
+@@ -298,6 +302,7 @@ static void qemu_input_queue_event(struct QemuInputEventQueueHead *queue,
+     item->src = src;
+     item->evt = evt;
+     QTAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(queue, item, node);
++    queue_count++;
+ }
+ 
+ static void qemu_input_queue_sync(struct QemuInputEventQueueHead *queue)
+@@ -306,6 +311,7 @@ static void qemu_input_queue_sync(struct QemuInputEventQueueHead *queue)
+ 
+     item->type = QEMU_INPUT_QUEUE_SYNC;
+     QTAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(queue, item, node);
++    queue_count++;
+ }
+ 
+ void qemu_input_event_send_impl(QemuConsole *src, InputEvent *evt)
+@@ -381,7 +387,7 @@ void qemu_input_event_send_key(QemuConsole *src, KeyValue *key, bool down)
+         qemu_input_event_send(src, evt);
+         qemu_input_event_sync();
+         qapi_free_InputEvent(evt);
+-    } else {
++    } else if (queue_count < queue_limit) {
+         qemu_input_queue_event(&kbd_queue, src, evt);
+         qemu_input_queue_sync(&kbd_queue);
+     }
+@@ -409,8 +415,10 @@ void qemu_input_event_send_key_delay(uint32_t delay_ms)
+         kbd_timer = timer_new_ms(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL, qemu_input_queue_process,
+                                  &kbd_queue);
+     }
+-    qemu_input_queue_delay(&kbd_queue, kbd_timer,
+-                           delay_ms ? delay_ms : kbd_default_delay_ms);
++    if (queue_count < queue_limit) {
++        qemu_input_queue_delay(&kbd_queue, kbd_timer,
++                               delay_ms ? delay_ms : kbd_default_delay_ms);
++    }
+ }
+ 
+ InputEvent *qemu_input_event_new_btn(InputButton btn, bool down)

0084-scsi-avoid-an-off-by-one-error-in-megasas_mmio_write.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Mon, 24 Apr 2017 17:36:34 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] scsi: avoid an off-by-one error in megasas_mmio_write
+
+While reading magic sequence(MFI_SEQ) in megasas_mmio_write,
+an off-by-one error could occur as 's->adp_reset' index is not
+reset after reading the last sequence.
+
+Reported-by: YY Z <bigbird475958471@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
+Message-Id: <20170424120634.12268-1-ppandit@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 24dfa9fa2f90a95ac33c7372de4f4f2c8a2c141f)
+---
+ hw/scsi/megasas.c | 10 +++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/scsi/megasas.c b/hw/scsi/megasas.c
+index ebf03022ed..efcbaa9c8d 100644
+--- a/hw/scsi/megasas.c
++++ b/hw/scsi/megasas.c
+@@ -2132,15 +2132,15 @@ static void megasas_mmio_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
+     case MFI_SEQ:
+         trace_megasas_mmio_writel("MFI_SEQ", val);
+         /* Magic sequence to start ADP reset */
+-        if (adp_reset_seq[s->adp_reset] == val) {
+-            s->adp_reset++;
++        if (adp_reset_seq[s->adp_reset++] == val) {
++            if (s->adp_reset == 6) {
++                s->adp_reset = 0;
++                s->diag = MFI_DIAG_WRITE_ENABLE;
++            }
+         } else {
+             s->adp_reset = 0;
+             s->diag = 0;
+         }
+-        if (s->adp_reset == 6) {
+-            s->diag = MFI_DIAG_WRITE_ENABLE;
+-        }
+         break;
+     case MFI_DIAG:
+         trace_megasas_mmio_writel("MFI_DIAG", val);

0085-virtio-gpu-fix-memory-leak-in-set-scanout.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Sat, 21 Jan 2017 23:42:33 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] virtio-gpu: fix memory leak in set scanout
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+In virtio_gpu_set_scanout function, when creating the 'rect'
+its refcount is set to 2, by pixman_image_create_bits and
+qemu_create_displaysurface_pixman function. This can lead
+a memory leak issues. This patch avoid this issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 5884626f.5b2f6b0a.1bfff.3037@mx.google.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit dd248ed7e204ee8a1873914e02b8b526e8f1b80d)
+---
+ hw/display/virtio-gpu.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c b/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
+index cadd7d899d..7c8fda1733 100644
+--- a/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
++++ b/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
+@@ -602,6 +602,7 @@ static void virtio_gpu_set_scanout(VirtIOGPU *g,
+             cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_UNSPEC;
+             return;
+         }
++        pixman_image_unref(rect);
+         dpy_gfx_replace_surface(g->scanout[ss.scanout_id].con, scanout->ds);
+     }
+ 

0086-net-e1000e-fix-an-infinite-loop-issue.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 9 Feb 2017 18:19:19 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] net: e1000e: fix an infinite loop issue
+
+This issue is like the issue in e1000 network card addressed in
+this commit:
+e1000: eliminate infinite loops on out-of-bounds transfer start.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Dmitry Fleytman <dmitry@daynix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 4154c7e03fa55b4cf52509a83d50d6c09d743b77)
+---
+ hw/net/e1000e_core.c | 7 ++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/e1000e_core.c b/hw/net/e1000e_core.c
+index badb1feb7d..718154bc56 100644
+--- a/hw/net/e1000e_core.c
++++ b/hw/net/e1000e_core.c
+@@ -806,7 +806,8 @@ typedef struct E1000E_RingInfo_st {
+ static inline bool
+ e1000e_ring_empty(E1000ECore *core, const E1000E_RingInfo *r)
+ {
+-    return core->mac[r->dh] == core->mac[r->dt];
++    return core->mac[r->dh] == core->mac[r->dt] ||
++                core->mac[r->dt] >= core->mac[r->dlen] / E1000_RING_DESC_LEN;
+ }
+ 
+ static inline uint64_t
+@@ -1522,6 +1523,10 @@ e1000e_write_packet_to_guest(E1000ECore *core, struct NetRxPkt *pkt,
+             desc_size = core->rx_desc_buf_size;
+         }
+ 
++        if (e1000e_ring_empty(core, rxi)) {
++            return;
++        }
++
+         base = e1000e_ring_head_descr(core, rxi);
+ 
+         pci_dma_read(d, base, &desc, core->rx_desc_len);

0087-usb-ohci-fix-error-return-code-in-servicing-iso-td.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2017 03:15:03 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] usb: ohci: fix error return code in servicing iso td
+
+It should return 1 if an error occurs when reading iso td.
+This will avoid an infinite loop issue in ohci_service_ed_list.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Message-id: 5899ac3e.1033240a.944d5.9a2d@mx.google.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 26f670a244982335cc08943fb1ec099a2c81e42d)
+---
+ hw/usb/hcd-ohci.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/usb/hcd-ohci.c b/hw/usb/hcd-ohci.c
+index 48307febd3..27130fe08f 100644
+--- a/hw/usb/hcd-ohci.c
++++ b/hw/usb/hcd-ohci.c
+@@ -727,7 +727,7 @@ static int ohci_service_iso_td(OHCIState *ohci, struct ohci_ed *ed,
+     if (ohci_read_iso_td(ohci, addr, &iso_td)) {
+         trace_usb_ohci_iso_td_read_failed(addr);
+         ohci_die(ohci);
+-        return 0;
++        return 1;
+     }
+ 
+     starting_frame = OHCI_BM(iso_td.flags, TD_SF);

0088-usb-ehci-fix-memory-leak-in-ehci.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2017 18:42:55 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] usb: ehci: fix memory leak in ehci
+
+In usb_ehci_init function, it initializes 's->ipacket', but there
+is no corresponding function to free this. As the ehci can be hotplug
+and unplug, this will leak host memory leak. In order to make the
+hierarchy clean, we should add a ehci pci finalize function, then call
+the clean function in ehci device.
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Message-id: 589a85b8.3c2b9d0a.b8e6.1434@mx.google.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit d710e1e7bd3d5bfc26b631f02ae87901ebe646b0)
+---
+ hw/usb/hcd-ehci-pci.c | 9 +++++++++
+ hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c     | 5 +++++
+ hw/usb/hcd-ehci.h     | 1 +
+ 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/usb/hcd-ehci-pci.c b/hw/usb/hcd-ehci-pci.c
+index 56577051e2..6dedcb8989 100644
+--- a/hw/usb/hcd-ehci-pci.c
++++ b/hw/usb/hcd-ehci-pci.c
+@@ -89,6 +89,14 @@ static void usb_ehci_pci_init(Object *obj)
+     usb_ehci_init(s, DEVICE(obj));
+ }
+ 
++static void usb_ehci_pci_finalize(Object *obj)
++{
++    EHCIPCIState *i = PCI_EHCI(obj);
++    EHCIState *s = &i->ehci;
++
++    usb_ehci_finalize(s);
++}
++
+ static void usb_ehci_pci_exit(PCIDevice *dev)
+ {
+     EHCIPCIState *i = PCI_EHCI(dev);
+@@ -159,6 +167,7 @@ static const TypeInfo ehci_pci_type_info = {
+     .parent = TYPE_PCI_DEVICE,
+     .instance_size = sizeof(EHCIPCIState),
+     .instance_init = usb_ehci_pci_init,
++    .instance_finalize = usb_ehci_pci_finalize,
+     .abstract = true,
+     .class_init = ehci_class_init,
+ };
+diff --git a/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c b/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c
+index 7622a3ae72..50ef817f93 100644
+--- a/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c
++++ b/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c
+@@ -2545,6 +2545,11 @@ void usb_ehci_init(EHCIState *s, DeviceState *dev)
+                                 &s->mem_ports);
+ }
+ 
++void usb_ehci_finalize(EHCIState *s)
++{
++    usb_packet_cleanup(&s->ipacket);
++}
++
+ /*
+  * vim: expandtab ts=4
+  */
+diff --git a/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.h b/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.h
+index 3fd7038658..938d8aa284 100644
+--- a/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.h
++++ b/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.h
+@@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ struct EHCIState {
+ extern const VMStateDescription vmstate_ehci;
+ 
+ void usb_ehci_init(EHCIState *s, DeviceState *dev);
++void usb_ehci_finalize(EHCIState *s);
+ void usb_ehci_realize(EHCIState *s, DeviceState *dev, Error **errp);
+ void usb_ehci_unrealize(EHCIState *s, DeviceState *dev, Error **errp);
+ void ehci_reset(void *opaque);

0089-usb-redir-fix-stack-overflow-in-usbredir_log_data.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 13:01:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] usb-redir: fix stack overflow in usbredir_log_data
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Don't reinvent a broken wheel, just use the hexdump function we have.
+
+Impact: low, broken code doesn't run unless you have debug logging
+enabled.
+
+Reported-by: 李强 <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 20170509110128.27261-1-kraxel@redhat.com
+(cherry picked from commit bd4a683505b27adc1ac809f71e918e58573d851d)
+---
+ hw/usb/redirect.c | 13 +------------
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/usb/redirect.c b/hw/usb/redirect.c
+index d064961203..94249ec0b5 100644
+--- a/hw/usb/redirect.c
++++ b/hw/usb/redirect.c
+@@ -229,21 +229,10 @@ static void usbredir_log(void *priv, int level, const char *msg)
+ static void usbredir_log_data(USBRedirDevice *dev, const char *desc,
+     const uint8_t *data, int len)
+ {
+-    int i, j, n;
+-
+     if (dev->debug < usbredirparser_debug_data) {
+         return;
+     }
+-
+-    for (i = 0; i < len; i += j) {
+-        char buf[128];
+-
+-        n = sprintf(buf, "%s", desc);
+-        for (j = 0; j < 8 && i + j < len; j++) {
+-            n += sprintf(buf + n, " %02X", data[i + j]);
+-        }
+-        error_report("%s", buf);
+-    }
++    qemu_hexdump((char *)data, stderr, desc, len);
+ }
+ 
+ /*

qemu.binfmt

@@ -1,22 +1,23 @@
-:qemu-alpha:M::\x7fELF\x02\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x26\x90:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xfe\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-alpha:
-:qemu-armeb:M::\x7fELF\x01\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x28:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-armeb:
-:qemu-arm:M::\x7fELF\x01\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x28\x00:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-arm:
-:qemu-cris:M::\x7fELF\x01\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x4c\x00:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-cris:
-:qemu-i386:M::\x7fELF\x01\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x03\x00:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xfe\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-i386:
-:qemu-i486:M::\x7fELF\x01\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x06\x00:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xfe\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-i386:
-:qemu-m68k:M::\x7fELF\x01\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x04:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-m68k:
-:qemu-microblazeel:M::\x7fELF\x01\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\xab\xba:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-microblazeel:
-:qemu-microblaze:M::\x7fELF\x01\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\xba\xab:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-microblaze:
-:qemu-mips64el:M::\x7fELF\x02\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x08\x00:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\xfe\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-mips64el:
-:qemu-mips64:M::\x7fELF\x02\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x08:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\xfe\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-mips64:
-:qemu-mipsel:M::\x7fELF\x01\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x08\x00:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\xfe\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-mipsel:
-:qemu-mips:M::\x7fELF\x01\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x08:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\xfe\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-mips:
-:qemu-ppc64abi32:M::\x7fELF\x01\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x15:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-ppc64abi32:
-:qemu-ppc64:M::\x7fELF\x02\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x15:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-ppc64:
-:qemu-ppc:M::\x7fELF\x01\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x14:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-ppc:
-:qemu-s390x:M::\x7fELF\x02\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x16:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-s390x:
-:qemu-sh4eb:M::\x7fELF\x01\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x2a:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-sh4eb:
-:qemu-sh4:M::\x7fELF\x01\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x2a\x00:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-sh4:
-:qemu-sparc32plus:M::\x7fELF\x01\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x12:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-sparc32plus:
-:qemu-sparc64:M::\x7fELF\x02\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x2b:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-sparc64:
-:qemu-sparc:M::\x7fELF\x01\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x02:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-sparc:
+:qemu-aarch64:M::\x7fELF\x02\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\xb7\x00:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xfe\xff\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-aarch64:
+:qemu-alpha:M::\x7fELF\x02\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x26\x90:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xfe\xff\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-alpha:
+:qemu-armeb:M::\x7fELF\x01\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x28:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-armeb:
+:qemu-arm:M::\x7fELF\x01\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x28\x00:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xfe\xff\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-arm:
+:qemu-cris:M::\x7fELF\x01\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x4c\x00:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xfe\xff\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-cris:
+:qemu-i386:M::\x7fELF\x01\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x03\x00:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xfe\xff\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-i386:
+:qemu-i486:M::\x7fELF\x01\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x06\x00:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xfe\xff\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-i386:
+:qemu-m68k:M::\x7fELF\x01\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x04:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-m68k:
+:qemu-microblazeel:M::\x7fELF\x01\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\xab\xba:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xfe\xff\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-microblazeel:
+:qemu-microblaze:M::\x7fELF\x01\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\xba\xab:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-microblaze:
+:qemu-mips64el:M::\x7fELF\x02\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x08\x00:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xfe\xff\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-mips64el:
+:qemu-mips64:M::\x7fELF\x02\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x08:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-mips64:
+:qemu-mipsel:M::\x7fELF\x01\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x08\x00:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xfe\xff\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-mipsel:
+:qemu-mips:M::\x7fELF\x01\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x08:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-mips:
+:qemu-ppc64abi32:M::\x7fELF\x01\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x15:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-ppc64abi32:
+:qemu-ppc64:M::\x7fELF\x02\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x15:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-ppc64:
+:qemu-ppc:M::\x7fELF\x01\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x14:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-ppc:
+:qemu-s390x:M::\x7fELF\x02\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x16:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-s390x:
+:qemu-sh4eb:M::\x7fELF\x01\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x2a:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-sh4eb:
+:qemu-sh4:M::\x7fELF\x01\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x2a\x00:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xfe\xff\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-sh4:
+:qemu-sparc32plus:M::\x7fELF\x01\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x12:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-sparc32plus:
+:qemu-sparc64:M::\x7fELF\x02\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x2b:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-sparc64:
+:qemu-sparc:M::\x7fELF\x01\x02\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x02:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xfe\xff\xff:/usr/bin/qemu-sparc:

qemu.spec

@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@
 
 Summary: QEMU is a FAST! processor emulator
 Name: qemu
-Version: 2.7.0
+Version: 2.7.1
 Release: 7%{?rcrel}%{?dist}
 Epoch: 2
 License: GPLv2+ and LGPLv2+ and BSD
@@ -102,40 +102,195 @@ Source21: 50-kvm-s390x.conf
 # /etc/security/limits.d/95-kvm-ppc64-memlock.conf
 Source22: 95-kvm-ppc64-memlock.conf
 
-# CVE-2016-7155: pvscsi: OOB read and infinite loop (bz #1373463)
-Patch0001: 0001-vmw_pvscsi-check-page-count-while-initialising-descr.patch
 # CVE-2016-7156: pvscsi: infinite loop when building SG list (bz #1373480)
-Patch0002: 0002-scsi-pvscsi-limit-loop-to-fetch-SG-list.patch
-# CVE-2016-7156: pvscsi: infinite loop when processing IO requests (bz
-# #1373480)
-Patch0003: 0003-scsi-pvscsi-limit-process-IO-loop-to-ring-size.patch
+Patch0001: 0001-scsi-pvscsi-limit-loop-to-fetch-SG-list.patch
 # CVE-2016-7170: vmware_vga: OOB stack memory access (bz #1374709)
-Patch0004: 0004-vmsvga-correct-bitmap-and-pixmap-size-checks.patch
-# CVE-2016-7157: mptsas: invalid memory access (bz #1373505)
-Patch0005: 0005-scsi-mptconfig-fix-an-assert-expression.patch
-Patch0006: 0006-scsi-mptconfig-fix-misuse-of-MPTSAS_CONFIG_PACK.patch
+Patch0002: 0002-vmsvga-correct-bitmap-and-pixmap-size-checks.patch
 # CVE-2016-7466: usb: xhci memory leakage during device unplug (bz #1377838)
-Patch0007: 0007-usb-xhci-fix-memory-leak-in-usb_xhci_exit.patch
-# CVE-2016-7423: scsi: mptsas: OOB access (bz #1376777)
-Patch0008: 0008-scsi-mptsas-use-g_new0-to-allocate-MPTSASRequest-obj.patch
+Patch0003: 0003-usb-xhci-fix-memory-leak-in-usb_xhci_exit.patch
 # CVE-2016-7422: virtio: null pointer dereference (bz #1376756)
-Patch0009: 0009-virtio-add-check-for-descriptor-s-mapped-address.patch
+Patch0004: 0004-virtio-add-check-for-descriptor-s-mapped-address.patch
 # CVE-2016-7908: net: Infinite loop in mcf_fec_do_tx (bz #1381193)
-Patch0010: 0010-net-mcf-limit-buffer-descriptor-count.patch
+Patch0005: 0005-net-mcf-limit-buffer-descriptor-count.patch
 # CVE-2016-8576: usb: xHCI: infinite loop vulnerability (bz #1382322)
-Patch0011: 0011-xhci-limit-the-number-of-link-trbs-we-are-willing-to.patch
+Patch0006: 0006-xhci-limit-the-number-of-link-trbs-we-are-willing-to.patch
 # CVE-2016-7995: usb: hcd-ehci: memory leak (bz #1382669)
-Patch0012: 0012-usb-ehci-fix-memory-leak-in-ehci_process_itd.patch
+Patch0007: 0007-usb-ehci-fix-memory-leak-in-ehci_process_itd.patch
 # Fix interrupt endpoints not working with network/spice USB redirection on
 # guest with an emulated xhci controller (bz #1382331)
-Patch0013: 0013-usb-redir-allocate-buffers-before-waking-up-the-host.patch
-# Fix nested PPC 'Unknown MMU model' error (bz #1374749)
-Patch0014: 0014-ppc-kvm-Mark-64kB-page-size-support-as-disabled-if-n.patch
+Patch0008: 0008-usb-redir-allocate-buffers-before-waking-up-the-host.patch
 # Fix flickering display with boxes + wayland VM (bz #1266484)
-Patch0015: 0015-qxl-Only-emit-QXL_INTERRUPT_CLIENT_MONITORS_CONFIG-o.patch
+Patch0009: 0009-qxl-Only-emit-QXL_INTERRUPT_CLIENT_MONITORS_CONFIG-o.patch
+# Fix keyboard issues with -ui gtk + host wayland (bz #1401211)
+# Posted but not yet applied upstream
+Patch0010: 0010-ui-use-evdev-keymap-when-running-under-wayland.patch
+# CVE-2016-6836: vmxnet: Information leakage in vmxnet3_complete_packet (bz
+# #1366370)
+Patch0011: 0011-net-vmxnet-initialise-local-tx-descriptor.patch
+# CVE-2016-7909: pcnet: Infinite loop in pcnet_rdra_addr (bz #1381196)
+Patch0012: 0012-net-pcnet-check-rx-tx-descriptor-ring-length.patch
+# CVE-2016-7994: virtio-gpu: memory leak in resource_create_2d (bz #1382667)
+Patch0013: 0013-virtio-gpu-fix-memory-leak-in-virtio_gpu_resource_cr.patch
+# CVE-2016-8577: 9pfs: host memory leakage in v9fs_read (bz #1383286)
+Patch0014: 0014-9pfs-fix-potential-host-memory-leak-in-v9fs_read.patch
+# CVE-2016-8578: 9pfs: potential NULL dereferencein 9pfs routines (bz
+# #1383292)
+Patch0015: 0015-9pfs-allocate-space-for-guest-originated-empty-strin.patch
+# CVE-2016-8668: OOB buffer access in rocker switch emulation (bz #1384898)
+Patch0016: 0016-net-rocker-set-limit-to-DMA-buffer-size.patch
+# CVE-2016-8669: divide by zero error in serial_update_parameters (bz
+# #1384911)
+Patch0017: 0017-char-serial-check-divider-value-against-baud-base.patch
+# CVE-2016-8909: intel-hda: infinite loop in dma buffer stream (bz #1388053)
+Patch0018: 0018-audio-intel-hda-check-stream-entry-count-during-tran.patch
+# Infinite loop vulnerability in a9_gtimer_update (bz #1388300)
+Patch0019: 0019-timer-a9gtimer-remove-loop-to-auto-increment-compara.patch
+# CVE-2016-9101: eepro100: memory leakage at device unplug (bz #1389539)
+Patch0020: 0020-net-eepro100-fix-memory-leak-in-device-uninit.patch
+# CVE-2016-9103: 9pfs: information leakage via xattr (bz #1389643)
+Patch0021: 0021-9pfs-fix-information-leak-in-xattr-read.patch
+# CVE-2016-9102: 9pfs: memory leakage when creating extended attribute (bz
+# #1389551)
+Patch0022: 0022-9pfs-fix-memory-leak-in-v9fs_xattrcreate.patch
+# CVE-2016-9104: 9pfs: integer overflow leading to OOB access (bz #1389687)
+Patch0023: 0023-9pfs-add-xattrwalk_fid-field-in-V9fsXattr-struct.patch
+Patch0024: 0024-9pfs-convert-len-copied_len-field-in-V9fsXattr-to-th.patch
+Patch0025: 0025-9pfs-fix-integer-overflow-issue-in-xattr-read-write.patch
+# CVE-2016-9105: 9pfs: memory leakage in v9fs_link (bz #1389704)
+Patch0026: 0026-9pfs-fix-memory-leak-in-v9fs_link.patch
+# CVE-2016-9106: 9pfs: memory leakage in v9fs_write (bz #1389713)
+Patch0027: 0027-9pfs-fix-memory-leak-in-v9fs_write.patch
+# CVE-2016-9381: xen: incautious about shared ring processing (bz #1397385)
+Patch0028: 0028-xen-fix-ioreq-handling.patch
+# CVE-2016-9921: Divide by zero vulnerability in cirrus_do_copy (bz
+# #1399054)
+Patch0029: 0029-display-cirrus-check-vga-bits-per-pixel-bpp-value.patch
+# CVE-2016-9776: infinite loop while receiving data in mcf_fec_receive (bz
+# #1400830)
+Patch0030: 0030-net-mcf-check-receive-buffer-size-register-value.patch
+# CVE-2016-9845: information leakage in virgl_cmd_get_capset_info (bz
+# #1402247)
+Patch0031: 0031-virtio-gpu-fix-information-leak-in-getting-capset-in.patch
+# CVE-2016-9846: virtio-gpu: memory leakage while updating cursor data (bz
+# #1402258)
+Patch0032: 0032-virtio-gpu-fix-memory-leak-in-update_cursor_data_vir.patch
+# CVE-2016-9907: usbredir: memory leakage when destroying redirector (bz
+# #1402266)
+Patch0033: 0033-usbredir-free-vm_change_state_handler-in-usbredir-de.patch
+# CVE-2016-9911: usb: ehci: memory leakage in ehci_init_transfer (bz
+# #1402273)
+Patch0034: 0034-usb-ehci-fix-memory-leak-in-ehci_init_transfer.patch
+# CVE-2016-9913: 9pfs: memory leakage via proxy/handle callbacks (bz
+# #1402277)
+Patch0035: 0035-9pfs-adjust-the-order-of-resource-cleanup-in-device-.patch
+Patch0036: 0036-9pfs-add-cleanup-operation-in-FileOperations.patch
+Patch0037: 0037-9pfs-add-cleanup-operation-for-handle-backend-driver.patch
+Patch0038: 0038-9pfs-add-cleanup-operation-for-proxy-backend-driver.patch
+Patch0039: 0039-9pfs-fix-crash-when-fsdev-is-missing.patch
+# CVE-2016-10028: virtio-gpu-3d: OOB access while reading virgl capabilities
+# (bz #1406368)
+Patch0040: 0040-display-virtio-gpu-3d-check-virgl-capabilities-max_s.patch
+# CVE-2016-9908: virtio-gpu: information leakage in virgl_cmd_get_capset (bz
+# #1402263)
+Patch0041: 0041-virtio-gpu-fix-information-leak-in-capset-get-dispat.patch
+# CVE-2016-9912: virtio-gpu: memory leakage when destroying gpu resource (bz
+# #1402285)
+Patch0042: 0042-virtio-gpu-call-cleanup-mapping-function-in-resource.patch
+# CVE-2016-7907: net: imx: infinite loop (bz #1381182)
+Patch0043: 0043-net-imx-limit-buffer-descriptor-count.patch
+# CVE-2017-5525: audio: memory leakage in ac97 (bz #1414110)
+Patch0044: 0044-audio-ac97-add-exit-function.patch
+# CVE-2017-5526: audio: memory leakage in es1370 (bz #1414210)
+Patch0045: 0045-audio-es1370-add-exit-function.patch
+# CVE-2016-10155 watchdog: memory leakage in i6300esb (bz #1415200)
+Patch0046: 0046-watchdog-6300esb-add-exit-function.patch
+# CVE-2017-5552: virtio-gpu-3d: memory leakage (bz #1415283)
+Patch0047: 0047-virtio-gpu-3d-fix-memory-leak-in-resource-attach-bac.patch
+# CVE-2017-5578: virtio-gpu: memory leakage (bz #1415797)
+Patch0048: 0048-virtio-gpu-fix-memory-leak-in-resource-attach-backin.patch
+# CVE-2017-5667: sd: sdhci OOB access during multi block transfer (bz
+# #1417560)
+Patch0049: 0049-sd-sdhci-check-data-length-during-dma_memory_read.patch
+# CVE-2017-5856: scsi: megasas: memory leakage (bz #1418344)
+Patch0050: 0050-megasas-fix-guest-triggered-memory-leak.patch
+# CVE-2017-5857: virtio-gpu-3d: host memory leakage in
+# virgl_cmd_resource_unref (bz #1418383)
+Patch0051: 0051-virtio-gpu-fix-resource-leak-in-virgl_cmd_resource_u.patch
+# CVE-2017-5898: usb: integer overflow in emulated_apdu_from_guest (bz
+# #1419700)
+Patch0052: 0052-usb-ccid-check-ccid-apdu-length.patch
+# CVE-2017-5987: sd: infinite loop issue in multi block transfers (bz
+# #1422001)
+Patch0053: 0053-sd-sdhci-check-transfer-mode-register-in-multi-block.patch
+# CVE-2017-6058: vmxnet3: OOB access when doing vlan stripping (bz #1423359)
+Patch0054: 0054-eth-Extend-vlan-stripping-functions.patch
+Patch0055: 0055-NetRxPkt-Fix-memory-corruption-on-VLAN-header-stripp.patch
+Patch0056: 0056-NetRxPkt-Do-not-try-to-pull-more-data-than-present.patch
+Patch0057: 0057-NetRxPkt-Account-buffer-with-ETH-header-in-IOV-lengt.patch
+# CVE-2017-6505: usb: an infinite loop issue in ohci_service_ed_list (bz
+# #1429434)
+Patch0058: 0058-usb-ohci-limit-the-number-of-link-eds.patch
+# CVE-2017-2615: cirrus: oob access while doing bitblt copy backward (bz
+# #1418206)
+Patch0059: 0059-display-cirrus-ignore-source-pitch-value-as-needed-i.patch
+Patch0060: 0060-cirrus-handle-negative-pitch-in-cirrus_invalidate_re.patch
+Patch0061: 0061-cirrus-allow-zero-source-pitch-in-pattern-fill-rops.patch
+Patch0062: 0062-cirrus-fix-blit-address-mask-handling.patch
+Patch0063: 0063-cirrus-fix-oob-access-issue-CVE-2017-2615.patch
+# CVE-2017-2620: cirrus: potential arbitrary code execution (bz #1425419)
+Patch0064: 0064-cirrus-fix-patterncopy-checks.patch
+Patch0065: 0065-Revert-cirrus-allow-zero-source-pitch-in-pattern-fil.patch
+Patch0066: 0066-cirrus-add-blit_is_unsafe-call-to-cirrus_bitblt_cput.patch
+# Fix spice GL with new mesa/libglvnd (bz #1431905)
+Patch0067: 0067-egl-helpers-Support-newer-MESA-versions.patch
+# chardev data is dropped when host side closed (bz #1352977)
+Patch0068: 0068-char-drop-data-written-to-a-disconnected-pty.patch
+# CVE-2016-8667: dma: divide by zero error in set_next_tick (bz #1384876)
+Patch0069: 0069-dma-rc4030-limit-interval-timer-reload-value.patch
+# IPv6 DNS problems in qemu user networking (bz #1401165)
+Patch0070: 0070-slirp-Make-RA-build-more-flexible.patch
+Patch0071: 0071-slirp-Send-RDNSS-in-RA-only-if-host-has-an-IPv6-DNS-.patch
+# Fix crash in qxl memslot_get_virt (bz #1405847)
+Patch0072: 0072-qxl-clear-guest_cursor-on-QXL_CURSOR_HIDE.patch
+# CVE-2017-5579: serial: fix memory leak in serial exit (bz #1416161)
+Patch0073: 0073-serial-fix-memory-leak-in-serial-exit.patch
+# CVE-2017-7718: cirrus: OOB read access issue (bz #1443443)
+Patch0074: 0074-fix-cirrus_vga-fix-OOB-read-case-qemu-Segmentation-f.patch
+# CVE-2016-9603: cirrus: heap buffer overflow via vnc connection (bz
+# #1432040)
+Patch0075: 0075-cirrus-vnc-zap-bitblit-support-from-console-code.patch
+# CVE-2017-7377: 9pfs: fix file descriptor leak (bz #1437872)
+Patch0076: 0076-9pfs-fix-file-descriptor-leak.patch
+# CVE-2017-7980: cirrus: OOB r/w access issues in bitblt (bz #1444372)
+Patch0077: 0077-cirrus-fix-cirrus_invalidate_region.patch
+Patch0078: 0078-cirrus-stop-passing-around-dst-pointers-in-the-blitt.patch
+Patch0079: 0079-cirrus-stop-passing-around-src-pointers-in-the-blitt.patch
+Patch0080: 0080-cirrus-fix-off-by-one-in-cirrus_bitblt_rop_bkwd_tran.patch
+# CVE-2017-8112: vmw_pvscsi: infinite loop in pvscsi_log2 (bz #1445622)
+Patch0081: 0081-vmw_pvscsi-check-message-ring-page-count-at-initiali.patch
+# CVE-2017-8309: audio: host memory lekage via capture buffer (bz #1446520)
+Patch0082: 0082-audio-release-capture-buffers.patch
+# CVE-2017-8379: input: host memory lekage via keyboard events (bz #1446560)
+Patch0083: 0083-input-limit-kbd-queue-depth.patch
+# CVE-2017-8380: scsi: megasas: out-of-bounds read in megasas_mmio_write (bz
+# #1446578)
+Patch0084: 0084-scsi-avoid-an-off-by-one-error-in-megasas_mmio_write.patch
+# CVE-2017-9060: virtio-gpu: host memory leakage in Virtio GPU device (bz
+# #1452598)
+Patch0085: 0085-virtio-gpu-fix-memory-leak-in-set-scanout.patch
+# CVE-2017-9310: net: infinite loop in e1000e NIC emulation (bz #1452623)
+Patch0086: 0086-net-e1000e-fix-an-infinite-loop-issue.patch
+# CVE-2017-9330: usb: ohci: infinite loop due to incorrect return value (bz
+# #1457699)
+Patch0087: 0087-usb-ohci-fix-error-return-code-in-servicing-iso-td.patch
+# CVE-2017-9374: usb: ehci host memory leakage during hotunplug (bz
+# #1459137)
+Patch0088: 0088-usb-ehci-fix-memory-leak-in-ehci.patch
+# CVE-2017-10806: usb-redirect: stack buffer overflow in debug logging (bz
+# #1468497)
+Patch0089: 0089-usb-redir-fix-stack-overflow-in-usbredir_log_data.patch
 
 # documentation deps
-BuildRequires: texi2html
 BuildRequires: texinfo
 # For /usr/bin/pod2man
 BuildRequires: perl-podlators
@@ -291,6 +446,8 @@ As QEMU requires no host kernel patches to run, it is safe and easy to use.
 %package  common
 Summary: QEMU common files needed by all QEMU targets
 Group: Development/Tools
+Requires: ipxe-roms-qemu
+Requires: seavgabios-bin
 Requires(post): /usr/bin/getent
 Requires(post): /usr/sbin/groupadd
 Requires(post): /usr/sbin/useradd
@@ -421,12 +578,10 @@ Group: Development/Tools
 Requires: %{name}-common = %{epoch}:%{version}-%{release}
 Provides: kvm = 85
 Obsoletes: kvm < 85
-Requires: seavgabios-bin
 # virtio-blk booting is broken for Windows guests
 # if you mix seabios 1.7.4 and qemu 2.1.x
 Requires: seabios-bin >= 1.7.5
 Requires: sgabios-bin
-Requires: ipxe-roms-qemu
 %if 0%{?have_edk2:1}
 Requires: edk2-ovmf
 %endif
@@ -1002,6 +1157,9 @@ for i in dummy \
 %ifnarch alpha
     qemu-alpha \
 %endif
+%ifnarch aarch64
+    qemu-aarch64 \
+%endif
 %ifnarch %{arm}
     qemu-arm \
 %endif
@@ -1181,6 +1339,28 @@ getent passwd qemu >/dev/null || \
 %{_datadir}/%{name}/qemu_logo_no_text.svg
 %{_datadir}/%{name}/keymaps/
 %{_datadir}/%{name}/trace-events-all
+%{_datadir}/%{name}/vgabios.bin
+%{_datadir}/%{name}/vgabios-cirrus.bin
+%{_datadir}/%{name}/vgabios-qxl.bin
+%{_datadir}/%{name}/vgabios-stdvga.bin
+%{_datadir}/%{name}/vgabios-vmware.bin
+%{_datadir}/%{name}/vgabios-virtio.bin
+%{_datadir}/%{name}/pxe-e1000.rom
+%{_datadir}/%{name}/efi-e1000.rom
+%{_datadir}/%{name}/pxe-e1000e.rom
+%{_datadir}/%{name}/efi-e1000e.rom
+%{_datadir}/%{name}/pxe-eepro100.rom
+%{_datadir}/%{name}/efi-eepro100.rom
+%{_datadir}/%{name}/pxe-ne2k_pci.rom
+%{_datadir}/%{name}/efi-ne2k_pci.rom
+%{_datadir}/%{name}/pxe-pcnet.rom
+%{_datadir}/%{name}/efi-pcnet.rom
+%{_datadir}/%{name}/pxe-rtl8139.rom
+%{_datadir}/%{name}/efi-rtl8139.rom
+%{_datadir}/%{name}/pxe-virtio.rom
+%{_datadir}/%{name}/efi-virtio.rom
+%{_datadir}/%{name}/pxe-vmxnet3.rom
+%{_datadir}/%{name}/efi-vmxnet3.rom
 %{_mandir}/man1/qemu.1*
 %{_mandir}/man1/virtfs-proxy-helper.1*
 %{_bindir}/virtfs-proxy-helper
@@ -1430,28 +1610,6 @@ getent passwd qemu >/dev/null || \
 %{_datadir}/%{name}/linuxboot_dma.bin
 %{_datadir}/%{name}/multiboot.bin
 %{_datadir}/%{name}/kvmvapic.bin
-%{_datadir}/%{name}/vgabios.bin
-%{_datadir}/%{name}/vgabios-cirrus.bin
-%{_datadir}/%{name}/vgabios-qxl.bin
-%{_datadir}/%{name}/vgabios-stdvga.bin
-%{_datadir}/%{name}/vgabios-vmware.bin
-%{_datadir}/%{name}/vgabios-virtio.bin
-%{_datadir}/%{name}/pxe-e1000.rom
-%{_datadir}/%{name}/efi-e1000.rom
-%{_datadir}/%{name}/pxe-e1000e.rom
-%{_datadir}/%{name}/efi-e1000e.rom
-%{_datadir}/%{name}/pxe-eepro100.rom
-%{_datadir}/%{name}/efi-eepro100.rom
-%{_datadir}/%{name}/pxe-ne2k_pci.rom
-%{_datadir}/%{name}/efi-ne2k_pci.rom
-%{_datadir}/%{name}/pxe-pcnet.rom
-%{_datadir}/%{name}/efi-pcnet.rom
-%{_datadir}/%{name}/pxe-rtl8139.rom
-%{_datadir}/%{name}/efi-rtl8139.rom
-%{_datadir}/%{name}/pxe-virtio.rom
-%{_datadir}/%{name}/efi-virtio.rom
-%{_datadir}/%{name}/pxe-vmxnet3.rom
-%{_datadir}/%{name}/efi-vmxnet3.rom
 %ifarch %{ix86} x86_64
 %{?kvm_files:}
 %endif
@@ -1604,6 +1762,115 @@ getent passwd qemu >/dev/null || \
 
 
 %changelog
+* Wed Jul 12 2017 Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com> - 2:2.7.1-7
+- CVE-2017-7718: cirrus: OOB read access issue (bz #1443443)
+- CVE-2016-9603: cirrus: heap buffer overflow via vnc connection (bz
+  #1432040)
+- CVE-2017-7377: 9pfs: fix file descriptor leak (bz #1437872)
+- CVE-2017-7980: cirrus: OOB r/w access issues in bitblt (bz #1444372)
+- CVE-2017-8112: vmw_pvscsi: infinite loop in pvscsi_log2 (bz #1445622)
+- CVE-2017-8309: audio: host memory lekage via capture buffer (bz #1446520)
+- CVE-2017-8379: input: host memory lekage via keyboard events (bz #1446560)
+- CVE-2017-8380: scsi: megasas: out-of-bounds read in megasas_mmio_write (bz
+  #1446578)
+- CVE-2017-9060: virtio-gpu: host memory leakage in Virtio GPU device (bz
+  #1452598)
+- CVE-2017-9310: net: infinite loop in e1000e NIC emulation (bz #1452623)
+- CVE-2017-9330: usb: ohci: infinite loop due to incorrect return value (bz
+  #1457699)
+- CVE-2017-9374: usb: ehci host memory leakage during hotunplug (bz
+  #1459137)
+- CVE-2017-10806: usb-redirect: stack buffer overflow in debug logging (bz
+  #1468497)
+
+* Thu Apr 13 2017 Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com> - 2:2.7.1-6
+- chardev data is dropped when host side closed (bz #1352977)
+- CVE-2016-8667: dma: divide by zero error in set_next_tick (bz #1384876)
+- IPv6 DNS problems in qemu user networking (bz #1401165)
+- Fix crash in qxl memslot_get_virt (bz #1405847)
+- CVE-2017-5579: serial: fix memory leak in serial exit (bz #1416161)
+- spec: Pull in ipxe/vgabios links via -common package (bz #1431403)
+- Clean up binfmt.d configuration files (bz #1394859)
+
+* Tue Apr 4 2017 Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> - 2:2.7.1-5
+* Workaround hangs with recent glib (bz #1435432, gnome.org bz #761102)
+
+* Wed Mar 15 2017 Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com> - 2:2.7.1-4
+- CVE-2016-7907: net: imx: infinite loop (bz #1381182)
+- CVE-2017-5525: audio: memory leakage in ac97 (bz #1414110)
+- CVE-2017-5526: audio: memory leakage in es1370 (bz #1414210)
+- CVE-2016-10155 watchdog: memory leakage in i6300esb (bz #1415200)
+- CVE-2017-5552: virtio-gpu-3d: memory leakage (bz #1415283)
+- CVE-2017-5578: virtio-gpu: memory leakage (bz #1415797)
+- CVE-2017-5667: sd: sdhci OOB access during multi block transfer (bz
+  #1417560)
+- CVE-2017-5856: scsi: megasas: memory leakage (bz #1418344)
+- CVE-2017-5857: virtio-gpu-3d: host memory leakage in
+  virgl_cmd_resource_unref (bz #1418383)
+- CVE-2017-5898: usb: integer overflow in emulated_apdu_from_guest (bz
+  #1419700)
+- CVE-2017-5987: sd: infinite loop issue in multi block transfers (bz
+  #1422001)
+- CVE-2017-6058: vmxnet3: OOB access when doing vlan stripping (bz #1423359)
+- CVE-2017-6505: usb: an infinite loop issue in ohci_service_ed_list (bz
+  #1429434)
+- CVE-2017-2615: cirrus: oob access while doing bitblt copy backward (bz
+  #1418206)
+- CVE-2017-2620: cirrus: potential arbitrary code execution (bz #1425419)
+- Fix spice GL with new mesa/libglvnd (bz #1431905)
+
+* Tue Feb 21 2017 Daniel Berrange <berrange@redhat.com> - 2:2.7.1-3
+- Drop texi2html BR, since QEMU switched to using makeinfo back in 2010
+
+* Mon Jan 16 2017 Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com> - 2:2.7.1-2
+- CVE-2016-6836: vmxnet: Information leakage in vmxnet3_complete_packet (bz
+  #1366370)
+- CVE-2016-7909: pcnet: Infinite loop in pcnet_rdra_addr (bz #1381196)
+- CVE-2016-7994: virtio-gpu: memory leak in resource_create_2d (bz #1382667)
+- CVE-2016-8577: 9pfs: host memory leakage in v9fs_read (bz #1383286)
+- CVE-2016-8578: 9pfs: potential NULL dereferencein 9pfs routines (bz
+  #1383292)
+- CVE-2016-8668: OOB buffer access in rocker switch emulation (bz #1384898)
+- CVE-2016-8669: divide by zero error in serial_update_parameters (bz
+  #1384911)
+- CVE-2016-8909: intel-hda: infinite loop in dma buffer stream (bz #1388053)
+- Infinite loop vulnerability in a9_gtimer_update (bz #1388300)
+- CVE-2016-9101: eepro100: memory leakage at device unplug (bz #1389539)
+- CVE-2016-9103: 9pfs: information leakage via xattr (bz #1389643)
+- CVE-2016-9102: 9pfs: memory leakage when creating extended attribute (bz
+  #1389551)
+- CVE-2016-9104: 9pfs: integer overflow leading to OOB access (bz #1389687)
+- CVE-2016-9105: 9pfs: memory leakage in v9fs_link (bz #1389704)
+- CVE-2016-9106: 9pfs: memory leakage in v9fs_write (bz #1389713)
+- CVE-2016-9381: xen: incautious about shared ring processing (bz #1397385)
+- CVE-2016-9921: Divide by zero vulnerability in cirrus_do_copy (bz
+  #1399054)
+- CVE-2016-9776: infinite loop while receiving data in mcf_fec_receive (bz
+  #1400830)
+- CVE-2016-9845: information leakage in virgl_cmd_get_capset_info (bz
+  #1402247)
+- CVE-2016-9846: virtio-gpu: memory leakage while updating cursor data (bz
+  #1402258)
+- CVE-2016-9907: usbredir: memory leakage when destroying redirector (bz
+  #1402266)
+- CVE-2016-9911: usb: ehci: memory leakage in ehci_init_transfer (bz
+  #1402273)
+- CVE-2016-9913: 9pfs: memory leakage via proxy/handle callbacks (bz
+  #1402277)
+- CVE-2016-10028: virtio-gpu-3d: OOB access while reading virgl capabilities
+  (bz #1406368)
+- CVE-2016-9908: virtio-gpu: information leakage in virgl_cmd_get_capset (bz
+  #1402263)
+- CVE-2016-9912: virtio-gpu: memory leakage when destroying gpu resource (bz
+  #1402285)
+
+* Mon Jan 09 2017 Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com> - 2:2.7.1-1
+- Update to qemu 2.7.1
+
+* Mon Dec 12 2016 Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com> - 2:2.7.0-8
+- Fix sending of data with -net socket (bz #1391497)
+- Fix keyboard issues with -ui gtk + host wayland (bz #1401211)
+
 * Tue Oct 25 2016 Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com> - 2:2.7.0-7
 - Fix PPC64 build with memlock file (bz #1387601)
 

sources

@@ -1 +1 @@
-08d4d06d1cb598efecd796137f4844ab  qemu-2.7.0.tar.bz2
+SHA512 (qemu-2.7.1.tar.bz2) = 16a83946e9064733254c82c961749bf9c56a0a2a8ee46145b4a78e1452ac0e2548d888963d18c80e28f65202890fd643b0011951b5b1c66ef16234767ed91898