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Backport fix for CVE-2021-28861

This commit is contained in:
Lumir Balhar 2022-10-10 18:00:52 +02:00
parent 6252193c55
commit f429fecdd7
2 changed files with 109 additions and 1 deletions
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386-cve-2021-28861.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
From e42be9b593f1d5e83a947f73058b919395398424 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Julian Berman <Julian+Hg@GrayVines.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2022 11:30:55 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Pull in the http.server vulnerability fix from
python/cpython#87389
Fixes an open redirection vulnerability for paths starting with `//`.
Closes: #3812
--HG--
branch : http_server_vuln_fix
---
lib-python/3/http/server.py | 7 ++++
lib-python/3/test/test_httpservers.py | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 56 insertions(+)
diff --git a/lib-python/3/http/server.py b/lib-python/3/http/server.py
index 38f7accad7..39de35458c 100644
--- a/lib-python/3/http/server.py
+++ b/lib-python/3/http/server.py
@@ -332,6 +332,13 @@ class BaseHTTPRequestHandler(socketserver.StreamRequestHandler):
return False
self.command, self.path = command, path
+ # gh-87389: The purpose of replacing '//' with '/' is to protect
+ # against open redirect attacks possibly triggered if the path starts
+ # with '//' because http clients treat //path as an absolute URI
+ # without scheme (similar to http://path) rather than a path.
+ if self.path.startswith('//'):
+ self.path = '/' + self.path.lstrip('/') # Reduce to a single /
+
# Examine the headers and look for a Connection directive.
try:
self.headers = http.client.parse_headers(self.rfile,
diff --git a/lib-python/3/test/test_httpservers.py b/lib-python/3/test/test_httpservers.py
index c5b833723e..97dae7a7ce 100644
--- a/lib-python/3/test/test_httpservers.py
+++ b/lib-python/3/test/test_httpservers.py
@@ -416,6 +416,55 @@ class SimpleHTTPServerTestCase(BaseTestCase):
self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.OK,
data=support.TESTFN_UNDECODABLE)
+ def test_get_dir_redirect_location_domain_injection_bug(self):
+ """Ensure //evil.co/..%2f../../X does not put //evil.co/ in Location.
+
+ //netloc/ in a Location header is a redirect to a new host.
+ https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/87389
+
+ This checks that a path resolving to a directory on our server cannot
+ resolve into a redirect to another server.
+ """
+ os.mkdir(os.path.join(self.tempdir, 'existing_directory'))
+ url = f'/python.org/..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f../%0a%0d/../{self.tempdir_name}/existing_directory'
+ expected_location = f'{url}/' # /python.org.../ single slash single prefix, trailing slash
+ # Canonicalizes to /tmp/tempdir_name/existing_directory which does
+ # exist and is a dir, triggering the 301 redirect logic.
+ response = self.request(url)
+ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
+ location = response.getheader('Location')
+ self.assertEqual(location, expected_location, msg='non-attack failed!')
+
+ # //python.org... multi-slash prefix, no trailing slash
+ attack_url = f'/{url}'
+ response = self.request(attack_url)
+ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
+ location = response.getheader('Location')
+ self.assertFalse(location.startswith('//'), msg=location)
+ self.assertEqual(location, expected_location,
+ msg='Expected Location header to start with a single / and '
+ 'end with a / as this is a directory redirect.')
+
+ # ///python.org... triple-slash prefix, no trailing slash
+ attack3_url = f'//{url}'
+ response = self.request(attack3_url)
+ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
+ self.assertEqual(response.getheader('Location'), expected_location)
+
+ # If the second word in the http request (Request-URI for the http
+ # method) is a full URI, we don't worry about it, as that'll be parsed
+ # and reassembled as a full URI within BaseHTTPRequestHandler.send_head
+ # so no errant scheme-less //netloc//evil.co/ domain mixup can happen.
+ attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url = f'https://pypi.org/{url}'
+ expected_scheme_netloc_location = f'{attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url}/'
+ response = self.request(attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url)
+ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
+ location = response.getheader('Location')
+ # We're just ensuring that the scheme and domain make it through, if
+ # there are or aren't multiple slashes at the start of the path that
+ # follows that isn't important in this Location: header.
+ self.assertTrue(location.startswith('https://pypi.org/'), msg=location)
+
def test_get(self):
#constructs the path relative to the root directory of the HTTPServer
response = self.request(self.base_url + '/test')
--
GitLab

12
pypy3.9.spec
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@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ Version: %{basever}.%{micro}%{?pre:~%{pre}}
# by Python version as well.
# This potentially allows tags like Obsoletes: pypy3 < %%{version}-%%{release}.
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2053880
%global baserelease 3
%global baserelease 4
Release: %{baserelease}.%{pyversion}%{?dist}
Summary: Python %{pyversion} implementation with a Just-In-Time compiler
@ -130,6 +130,12 @@ Source189: 189-use-rpm-wheels.patch
# Tracker bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2075390
Patch382: 382-cve-2015-20107.patch
# 00386 #
# CVE-2021-28861: open redirection in http.server
# Upstream: https://foss.heptapod.net/pypy/pypy/-/commit/e42be9b593f1d5e83a947f73058b919395398424.patch
# Tracker bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2120642
Patch386: 386-cve-2021-28861.patch
# Build-time requirements:
# pypy's can be rebuilt using pypy2, rather than with CPython 2; doing so
@ -836,6 +842,10 @@ CheckPyPy pypy%{pyversion}-c
%changelog
* Mon Oct 10 2022 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 7.3.9-4.3.9
- Backport fix for CVE-2021-28861
Resolves: rhbz#2120789
* Fri Jul 22 2022 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 7.3.9-3.3.9
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_37_Mass_Rebuild