Fix for CVE-2016-0772 and CVE-2016-5699

Fix for: CVE-2016-0772 python: smtplib StartTLS stripping attack
- Raise an error when STARTTLS fails
- rhbz#1303647: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1303647
- rhbz#1351680: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1351680
- Fixed upstream: https://hg.python.org/cpython/rev/d590114c2394

Fix for: CVE-2016-5699 python: http protocol steam injection attack
- rhbz#1303699: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1303699
- rhbz#1351687: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1351687
- Fixed upstream: https://hg.python.org/cpython/rev/bf3e1c9b80e9
This commit is contained in:
Miro Hrončok 2016-07-01 15:59:13 +02:00
parent 4a3038ff56
commit 092bdc18b3
3 changed files with 224 additions and 1 deletions

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@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From 9092f6266c3054befff053aa943632856cedbdba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Miro=20Hron=C4=8Dok?= <miro@hroncok.cz>
Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2016 11:42:53 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Raise an error when STARTTLS fails
CVE-2016-0772 python: smtplib StartTLS stripping attack
rhbz#1303647: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1303647
rhbz#1351680: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1351680
Based on an upstream change by Benjamin Peterson <benjamin@python.org>
- in changeset 101887:d590114c2394 3.4
- https://hg.python.org/cpython/rev/d590114c2394
---
lib-python/3/smtplib.py | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/lib-python/3/smtplib.py b/lib-python/3/smtplib.py
index 679e478..1aacfaf 100644
--- a/lib-python/3/smtplib.py
+++ b/lib-python/3/smtplib.py
@@ -666,6 +666,11 @@ class SMTP:
self.ehlo_resp = None
self.esmtp_features = {}
self.does_esmtp = 0
+ else:
+ # RFC 3207:
+ # 501 Syntax error (no parameters allowed)
+ # 454 TLS not available due to temporary reason
+ raise SMTPResponseException(resp, reply)
return (resp, reply)
def sendmail(self, from_addr, to_addrs, msg, mail_options=[],
--
2.9.0

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@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
From 82dc922c7c4771ef789f5b395f54a603c693b05e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Miro=20Hron=C4=8Dok?= <miro@hroncok.cz>
Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2016 13:08:55 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Disabled HTTP header injections in http.client.
CVE-2016-5699 python: http protocol steam injection attack
rhbz#1303699: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1303699
rhbz#1351687: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1351687
Based on an upstream change by Demian Brecht and Serhiy Storchaka
- in changeset 94952:bf3e1c9b80e9 3.4
- https://hg.python.org/cpython/rev/bf3e1c9b80e9
---
lib-python/3/http/client.py | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
lib-python/3/test/test_httplib.py | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 94 insertions(+)
diff --git a/lib-python/3/http/client.py b/lib-python/3/http/client.py
index 5466d06..1d215d8 100644
--- a/lib-python/3/http/client.py
+++ b/lib-python/3/http/client.py
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ import email.parser
import email.message
import io
import os
+import re
import socket
import collections
from urllib.parse import urlsplit
@@ -207,6 +208,34 @@ MAXAMOUNT = 1048576
# maximal line length when calling readline().
_MAXLINE = 65536
+# Header name/value ABNF (http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-3.2)
+#
+# VCHAR = %x21-7E
+# obs-text = %x80-FF
+# header-field = field-name ":" OWS field-value OWS
+# field-name = token
+# field-value = *( field-content / obs-fold )
+# field-content = field-vchar [ 1*( SP / HTAB ) field-vchar ]
+# field-vchar = VCHAR / obs-text
+#
+# obs-fold = CRLF 1*( SP / HTAB )
+# ; obsolete line folding
+# ; see Section 3.2.4
+
+# token = 1*tchar
+#
+# tchar = "!" / "#" / "$" / "%" / "&" / "'" / "*"
+# / "+" / "-" / "." / "^" / "_" / "`" / "|" / "~"
+# / DIGIT / ALPHA
+# ; any VCHAR, except delimiters
+#
+# VCHAR defined in http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5234#appendix-B.1
+
+# the patterns for both name and value are more leniant than RFC
+# definitions to allow for backwards compatibility
+_is_legal_header_name = re.compile(b'^[^:\s][^:\r\n]*$').match
+_is_illegal_header_value = re.compile(b'\n(?![ \t])|\r(?![ \t\n])').search
+
class HTTPMessage(email.message.Message):
# XXX The only usage of this method is in
# http.server.CGIHTTPRequestHandler. Maybe move the code there so
@@ -953,12 +982,20 @@ class HTTPConnection:
if hasattr(header, 'encode'):
header = header.encode('ascii')
+
+ if not _is_legal_header_name(header):
+ raise ValueError('Invalid header name %r' % (header,))
+
values = list(values)
for i, one_value in enumerate(values):
if hasattr(one_value, 'encode'):
values[i] = one_value.encode('latin1')
elif isinstance(one_value, int):
values[i] = str(one_value).encode('ascii')
+
+ if _is_illegal_header_value(values[i]):
+ raise ValueError('Invalid header value %r' % (values[i],))
+
value = b'\r\n\t'.join(values)
header = header + b': ' + value
self._output(header)
diff --git a/lib-python/3/test/test_httplib.py b/lib-python/3/test/test_httplib.py
index 420302c..31d3bd0 100644
--- a/lib-python/3/test/test_httplib.py
+++ b/lib-python/3/test/test_httplib.py
@@ -134,6 +134,33 @@ class HeaderTests(TestCase):
conn.putheader('Content-length', 42)
self.assertTrue(b'Content-length: 42' in conn._buffer)
+ conn.putheader('Foo', ' bar ')
+ self.assertIn(b'Foo: bar ', conn._buffer)
+ conn.putheader('Bar', '\tbaz\t')
+ self.assertIn(b'Bar: \tbaz\t', conn._buffer)
+ conn.putheader('Authorization', 'Bearer mytoken')
+ self.assertIn(b'Authorization: Bearer mytoken', conn._buffer)
+ conn.putheader('IterHeader', 'IterA', 'IterB')
+ self.assertIn(b'IterHeader: IterA\r\n\tIterB', conn._buffer)
+ conn.putheader('LatinHeader', b'\xFF')
+ self.assertIn(b'LatinHeader: \xFF', conn._buffer)
+ conn.putheader('Utf8Header', b'\xc3\x80')
+ self.assertIn(b'Utf8Header: \xc3\x80', conn._buffer)
+ conn.putheader('C1-Control', b'next\x85line')
+ self.assertIn(b'C1-Control: next\x85line', conn._buffer)
+ conn.putheader('Embedded-Fold-Space', 'is\r\n allowed')
+ self.assertIn(b'Embedded-Fold-Space: is\r\n allowed', conn._buffer)
+ conn.putheader('Embedded-Fold-Tab', 'is\r\n\tallowed')
+ self.assertIn(b'Embedded-Fold-Tab: is\r\n\tallowed', conn._buffer)
+ conn.putheader('Key Space', 'value')
+ self.assertIn(b'Key Space: value', conn._buffer)
+ conn.putheader('KeySpace ', 'value')
+ self.assertIn(b'KeySpace : value', conn._buffer)
+ conn.putheader(b'Nonbreak\xa0Space', 'value')
+ self.assertIn(b'Nonbreak\xa0Space: value', conn._buffer)
+ conn.putheader(b'\xa0NonbreakSpace', 'value')
+ self.assertIn(b'\xa0NonbreakSpace: value', conn._buffer)
+
def test_ipv6host_header(self):
# Default host header on IPv6 transaction should wrapped by [] if
# its actual IPv6 address
@@ -153,6 +180,36 @@ class HeaderTests(TestCase):
conn.request('GET', '/foo')
self.assertTrue(sock.data.startswith(expected))
+ def test_invalid_headers(self):
+ conn = client.HTTPConnection('example.com')
+ conn.sock = FakeSocket('')
+ conn.putrequest('GET', '/')
+
+ # http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-3.2.4, whitespace is no
+ # longer allowed in header names
+ cases = (
+ (b'Invalid\r\nName', b'ValidValue'),
+ (b'Invalid\rName', b'ValidValue'),
+ (b'Invalid\nName', b'ValidValue'),
+ (b'\r\nInvalidName', b'ValidValue'),
+ (b'\rInvalidName', b'ValidValue'),
+ (b'\nInvalidName', b'ValidValue'),
+ (b' InvalidName', b'ValidValue'),
+ (b'\tInvalidName', b'ValidValue'),
+ (b'Invalid:Name', b'ValidValue'),
+ (b':InvalidName', b'ValidValue'),
+ (b'ValidName', b'Invalid\r\nValue'),
+ (b'ValidName', b'Invalid\rValue'),
+ (b'ValidName', b'Invalid\nValue'),
+ (b'ValidName', b'InvalidValue\r\n'),
+ (b'ValidName', b'InvalidValue\r'),
+ (b'ValidName', b'InvalidValue\n'),
+ )
+ for name, value in cases:
+ with self.subTest((name, value)):
+ with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, 'Invalid header'):
+ conn.putheader(name, value)
+
class BasicTest(TestCase):
def test_status_lines(self):
--
2.9.0

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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
Name: pypy3
Version: 2.4.0
Release: 5%{?dist}
Release: 6%{?dist}
Summary: Python 3 implementation with a Just-In-Time compiler
Group: Development/Languages
@ -156,6 +156,20 @@ Patch2: 007-remove-startup-message.patch
# https://bitbucket.org/pypy/pypy/commits/c4c54cb69aba
Patch3: 008-maximum-recursion-depth.patch
# CVE-2016-0772 python: smtplib StartTLS stripping attack
# rhbz#1303647: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1303647
# rhbz#1351680: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1351680
# FIXED UPSTREAM: https://hg.python.org/cpython/rev/d590114c2394
# Raise an error when STARTTLS fails
Patch4: 009-raise-an-error-when-STARTTLS-fails.patch
# CVE-2016-5699 python: http protocol steam injection attack
# rhbz#1303699: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1303699
# rhbz#1351687: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1351687
# FIXED UPSTREAM: https://hg.python.org/cpython/rev/bf3e1c9b80e9
# Disabled HTTP header injections in http.client
Patch5: 010-disabled-HTTP-header-injections-in-http.client.patch
# Build-time requirements:
# pypy's can be rebuilt using itself, rather than with CPython; doing so
@ -842,6 +856,17 @@ CheckPyPy %{name}-stackless
%changelog
* Fri Jul 01 2016 Miro Hrončok <mhroncok@redhat.com> - 2.4.0-6
- Fix for: CVE-2016-0772 python: smtplib StartTLS stripping attack
- Raise an error when STARTTLS fails
- rhbz#1303647: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1303647
- rhbz#1351680: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1351680
- Fixed upstream: https://hg.python.org/cpython/rev/d590114c2394
- Fix for: CVE-2016-5699 python: http protocol steam injection attack
- rhbz#1303699: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1303699
- rhbz#1351687: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1351687
- Fixed upstream: https://hg.python.org/cpython/rev/bf3e1c9b80e9
* Fri May 13 2016 Miro Hrončok <mhroncok@redhat.com> - 2.4.0-5
- Fix FTBFS (#1307889)
- Add patch to fix maximum recursion depth error during build