Update to 7.3.11
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6414747578
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.gitignore
vendored
@ -21,3 +21,4 @@
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/pypy3.9-v7.3.8rc2-src.tar.bz2
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/pypy3.9-v7.3.8-src.tar.bz2
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/pypy3.9-v7.3.9-src.tar.bz2
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/pypy3.9-v7.3.11-src.tar.bz2
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@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
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From c3caa02fe5e48e02a2ff2c0f409317022b05d34f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Petr Viktorin <encukou@gmail.com>
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Date: Fri, 3 Jun 2022 11:43:35 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] 00382: CVE-2015-20107
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Make mailcap refuse to match unsafe filenames/types/params (GH-91993)
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Upstream: https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/68966
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Tracker bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2075390
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---
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lib-python/3/mailcap.py | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
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lib-python/3/test/test_mailcap.py | 8 ++++++--
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2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/lib-python/3/mailcap.py b/lib-python/3/mailcap.py
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index ae416a8..444c640 100644
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--- a/lib-python/3/mailcap.py
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+++ b/lib-python/3/mailcap.py
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@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
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import os
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import warnings
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+import re
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__all__ = ["getcaps","findmatch"]
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@@ -13,6 +14,11 @@ def lineno_sort_key(entry):
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else:
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return 1, 0
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+_find_unsafe = re.compile(r'[^\xa1-\U0010FFFF\w@+=:,./-]').search
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+
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+class UnsafeMailcapInput(Warning):
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+ """Warning raised when refusing unsafe input"""
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+
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# Part 1: top-level interface.
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@@ -165,15 +171,22 @@ def findmatch(caps, MIMEtype, key='view', filename="/dev/null", plist=[]):
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entry to use.
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"""
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+ if _find_unsafe(filename):
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+ msg = "Refusing to use mailcap with filename %r. Use a safe temporary filename." % (filename,)
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+ warnings.warn(msg, UnsafeMailcapInput)
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+ return None, None
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entries = lookup(caps, MIMEtype, key)
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# XXX This code should somehow check for the needsterminal flag.
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for e in entries:
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if 'test' in e:
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test = subst(e['test'], filename, plist)
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+ if test is None:
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+ continue
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if test and os.system(test) != 0:
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continue
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command = subst(e[key], MIMEtype, filename, plist)
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- return command, e
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+ if command is not None:
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+ return command, e
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return None, None
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def lookup(caps, MIMEtype, key=None):
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@@ -206,6 +219,10 @@ def subst(field, MIMEtype, filename, plist=[]):
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elif c == 's':
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res = res + filename
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elif c == 't':
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+ if _find_unsafe(MIMEtype):
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+ msg = "Refusing to substitute MIME type %r into a shell command." % (MIMEtype,)
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+ warnings.warn(msg, UnsafeMailcapInput)
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+ return None
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res = res + MIMEtype
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elif c == '{':
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start = i
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@@ -213,7 +230,12 @@ def subst(field, MIMEtype, filename, plist=[]):
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i = i+1
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name = field[start:i]
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i = i+1
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- res = res + findparam(name, plist)
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+ param = findparam(name, plist)
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+ if _find_unsafe(param):
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+ msg = "Refusing to substitute parameter %r (%s) into a shell command" % (param, name)
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+ warnings.warn(msg, UnsafeMailcapInput)
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+ return None
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+ res = res + param
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# XXX To do:
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# %n == number of parts if type is multipart/*
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# %F == list of alternating type and filename for parts
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diff --git a/lib-python/3/test/test_mailcap.py b/lib-python/3/test/test_mailcap.py
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index c08423c..920283d 100644
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--- a/lib-python/3/test/test_mailcap.py
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+++ b/lib-python/3/test/test_mailcap.py
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@@ -121,7 +121,8 @@ class HelperFunctionTest(unittest.TestCase):
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(["", "audio/*", "foo.txt"], ""),
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(["echo foo", "audio/*", "foo.txt"], "echo foo"),
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(["echo %s", "audio/*", "foo.txt"], "echo foo.txt"),
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- (["echo %t", "audio/*", "foo.txt"], "echo audio/*"),
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+ (["echo %t", "audio/*", "foo.txt"], None),
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+ (["echo %t", "audio/wav", "foo.txt"], "echo audio/wav"),
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(["echo \\%t", "audio/*", "foo.txt"], "echo %t"),
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(["echo foo", "audio/*", "foo.txt", plist], "echo foo"),
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(["echo %{total}", "audio/*", "foo.txt", plist], "echo 3")
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@@ -205,7 +206,10 @@ class FindmatchTest(unittest.TestCase):
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('"An audio fragment"', audio_basic_entry)),
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([c, "audio/*"],
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{"filename": fname},
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- ("/usr/local/bin/showaudio audio/*", audio_entry)),
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+ (None, None)),
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+ ([c, "audio/wav"],
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+ {"filename": fname},
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+ ("/usr/local/bin/showaudio audio/wav", audio_entry)),
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([c, "message/external-body"],
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{"plist": plist},
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("showexternal /dev/null default john python.org /tmp foo bar", message_entry))
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--
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2.35.3
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@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
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From e42be9b593f1d5e83a947f73058b919395398424 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Julian Berman <Julian+Hg@GrayVines.com>
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Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2022 11:30:55 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] Pull in the http.server vulnerability fix from
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python/cpython#87389
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Fixes an open redirection vulnerability for paths starting with `//`.
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Closes: #3812
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--HG--
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branch : http_server_vuln_fix
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---
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lib-python/3/http/server.py | 7 ++++
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lib-python/3/test/test_httpservers.py | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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2 files changed, 56 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/lib-python/3/http/server.py b/lib-python/3/http/server.py
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index 38f7accad7..39de35458c 100644
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--- a/lib-python/3/http/server.py
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+++ b/lib-python/3/http/server.py
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@@ -332,6 +332,13 @@ class BaseHTTPRequestHandler(socketserver.StreamRequestHandler):
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return False
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self.command, self.path = command, path
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+ # gh-87389: The purpose of replacing '//' with '/' is to protect
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+ # against open redirect attacks possibly triggered if the path starts
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+ # with '//' because http clients treat //path as an absolute URI
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+ # without scheme (similar to http://path) rather than a path.
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+ if self.path.startswith('//'):
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+ self.path = '/' + self.path.lstrip('/') # Reduce to a single /
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+
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# Examine the headers and look for a Connection directive.
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try:
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self.headers = http.client.parse_headers(self.rfile,
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diff --git a/lib-python/3/test/test_httpservers.py b/lib-python/3/test/test_httpservers.py
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index c5b833723e..97dae7a7ce 100644
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--- a/lib-python/3/test/test_httpservers.py
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+++ b/lib-python/3/test/test_httpservers.py
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@@ -416,6 +416,55 @@ class SimpleHTTPServerTestCase(BaseTestCase):
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self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.OK,
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data=support.TESTFN_UNDECODABLE)
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+ def test_get_dir_redirect_location_domain_injection_bug(self):
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+ """Ensure //evil.co/..%2f../../X does not put //evil.co/ in Location.
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+
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+ //netloc/ in a Location header is a redirect to a new host.
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+ https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/87389
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+
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+ This checks that a path resolving to a directory on our server cannot
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+ resolve into a redirect to another server.
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+ """
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+ os.mkdir(os.path.join(self.tempdir, 'existing_directory'))
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+ url = f'/python.org/..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f../%0a%0d/../{self.tempdir_name}/existing_directory'
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+ expected_location = f'{url}/' # /python.org.../ single slash single prefix, trailing slash
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+ # Canonicalizes to /tmp/tempdir_name/existing_directory which does
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+ # exist and is a dir, triggering the 301 redirect logic.
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+ response = self.request(url)
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+ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
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+ location = response.getheader('Location')
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+ self.assertEqual(location, expected_location, msg='non-attack failed!')
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+
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+ # //python.org... multi-slash prefix, no trailing slash
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+ attack_url = f'/{url}'
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+ response = self.request(attack_url)
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+ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
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+ location = response.getheader('Location')
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+ self.assertFalse(location.startswith('//'), msg=location)
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+ self.assertEqual(location, expected_location,
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+ msg='Expected Location header to start with a single / and '
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+ 'end with a / as this is a directory redirect.')
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+
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+ # ///python.org... triple-slash prefix, no trailing slash
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+ attack3_url = f'//{url}'
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+ response = self.request(attack3_url)
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+ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
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+ self.assertEqual(response.getheader('Location'), expected_location)
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+
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+ # If the second word in the http request (Request-URI for the http
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+ # method) is a full URI, we don't worry about it, as that'll be parsed
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+ # and reassembled as a full URI within BaseHTTPRequestHandler.send_head
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+ # so no errant scheme-less //netloc//evil.co/ domain mixup can happen.
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+ attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url = f'https://pypi.org/{url}'
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+ expected_scheme_netloc_location = f'{attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url}/'
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+ response = self.request(attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url)
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+ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
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+ location = response.getheader('Location')
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+ # We're just ensuring that the scheme and domain make it through, if
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+ # there are or aren't multiple slashes at the start of the path that
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+ # follows that isn't important in this Location: header.
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+ self.assertTrue(location.startswith('https://pypi.org/'), msg=location)
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+
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def test_get(self):
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#constructs the path relative to the root directory of the HTTPServer
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response = self.request(self.base_url + '/test')
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--
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GitLab
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24
pypy3.9.spec
24
pypy3.9.spec
@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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%global basever 7.3
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%global micro 9
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%global micro 11
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#global pre ...
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%global pyversion 3.9
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Name: pypy%{pyversion}
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@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ Version: %{basever}.%{micro}%{?pre:~%{pre}}
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# by Python version as well.
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# This potentially allows tags like Obsoletes: pypy3 < %%{version}-%%{release}.
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# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2053880
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%global baserelease 5
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%global baserelease 1
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Release: %{baserelease}.%{pyversion}%{?dist}
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Summary: Python %{pyversion} implementation with a Just-In-Time compiler
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@ -120,22 +120,6 @@ Patch9: 009-add-libxcrypt-support.patch
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# We conditionally apply this, but we use autosetup, so we use Source here
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Source189: 189-use-rpm-wheels.patch
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# 00382 #
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# CVE-2015-20107
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#
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# Make mailcap refuse to match unsafe filenames/types/params (GH-91993)
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#
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# Upstream: https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/68966
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#
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# Tracker bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2075390
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Patch382: 382-cve-2015-20107.patch
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# 00386 #
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# CVE-2021-28861: open redirection in http.server
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# Upstream: https://foss.heptapod.net/pypy/pypy/-/commit/e42be9b593f1d5e83a947f73058b919395398424.patch
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# Tracker bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2120642
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Patch386: 386-cve-2021-28861.patch
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# Build-time requirements:
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# pypy's can be rebuilt using pypy2, rather than with CPython 2; doing so
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@ -854,6 +838,10 @@ CheckPyPy pypy%{pyversion}-c
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%changelog
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* Fri Dec 30 2022 Miro Hrončok <mhroncok@redhat.com> - 7.3.11-1.3.9
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- Update to 7.3.11
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- Fixes: rhbz#2147520
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* Fri Dec 02 2022 Miro Hrončok <mhroncok@redhat.com> - 7.3.9-5.3.9
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- On Fedora 37+, obsolete the pypy3.7 package which is no longer available
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2
sources
2
sources
@ -1 +1 @@
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SHA512 (pypy3.9-v7.3.9-src.tar.bz2) = 83f8a6a2da351c190d2d224242cbc35e35529c7a8e8d842eaf5c945cbce2e172b02a340f32af3d49df8d5288370d794d5bc95fc12dd4a13d817c925abf06198a
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SHA512 (pypy3.9-v7.3.11-src.tar.bz2) = 33c978ffbeeb39453028d1d1646ccfdace062ce48a5d939245bea41643038dd3687e80e34f88fa0622bcb175d7dd78f75cbe36b24229c8052f09d2d17dcdfd8c
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