diff --git a/sepolgen/src/sepolgen/audit.py b/sepolgen/src/sepolgen/audit.py index 24e308e..e23725f 100644 --- a/sepolgen/src/sepolgen/audit.py +++ b/sepolgen/src/sepolgen/audit.py @@ -68,6 +68,17 @@ def get_dmesg_msgs(): stdout=subprocess.PIPE).communicate()[0] return output +def get_log_msgs(): + """Obtain all of the avc and policy load messages from /var/log/messages. + + Returns: + string contain all of the audit messages returned by /var/log/messages. + """ + import subprocess + output = subprocess.Popen(["/bin/grep", "avc", "/var/log/messages"], + stdout=subprocess.PIPE).communicate()[0] + return output + # Classes representing audit messages class AuditMessage: @@ -127,6 +138,9 @@ class PathMessage(AuditMessage): if fields[0] == "path": self.path = fields[1][1:-1] return +import selinux.audit2why as audit2why + +avcdict = {} class AVCMessage(AuditMessage): """AVC message representing an access denial or granted message. @@ -167,6 +181,8 @@ class AVCMessage(AuditMessage): self.path = "" self.accesses = [] self.denial = True + self.type = audit2why.TERULE + self.bools = [] def __parse_access(self, recs, start): # This is kind of sucky - the access that is in a space separated @@ -226,7 +242,31 @@ class AVCMessage(AuditMessage): if not found_src or not found_tgt or not found_class or not found_access: raise ValueError("AVC message in invalid format [%s]\n" % self.message) - + self.analyze() + + def analyze(self): + tcontext = self.tcontext.to_string() + scontext = self.scontext.to_string() + access_tuple = tuple( self.accesses) + if (scontext, tcontext, self.tclass, access_tuple) in avcdict.keys(): + self.type, self.bools = avcdict[(scontext, tcontext, self.tclass, access_tuple)] + else: + self.type, self.bools = audit2why.analyze(scontext, tcontext, self.tclass, self.accesses); + if self.type == audit2why.NOPOLICY: + self.type = audit2why.TERULE + if self.type == audit2why.BADTCON: + raise ValueError("Invalid Target Context %s\n" % tcontext) + if self.type == audit2why.BADSCON: + raise ValueError("Invalid Source Context %s\n" % scontext) + if self.type == audit2why.BADSCON: + raise ValueError("Invalid Type Class %s\n" % self.tclass) + if self.type == audit2why.BADPERM: + raise ValueError("Invalid permission %s\n" % " ".join(self.accesses)) + if self.type == audit2why.BADCOMPUTE: + raise ValueError("Error during access vector computation") + + avcdict[(scontext, tcontext, self.tclass, access_tuple)] = (self.type, self.bools) + class PolicyLoadMessage(AuditMessage): """Audit message indicating that the policy was reloaded.""" def __init__(self, message): @@ -469,10 +509,10 @@ class AuditParser: if avc_filter: if avc_filter.filter(avc): av_set.add(avc.scontext.type, avc.tcontext.type, avc.tclass, - avc.accesses, avc) + avc.accesses, avc, avc_type=avc.type, bools=avc.bools) else: av_set.add(avc.scontext.type, avc.tcontext.type, avc.tclass, - avc.accesses, avc) + avc.accesses, avc, avc_type=avc.type, bools=avc.bools) return av_set class AVCTypeFilter: diff --git a/sepolgen/src/sepolgen/matching.py b/sepolgen/src/sepolgen/matching.py index 1a9a3e5..d56dd92 100644 --- a/sepolgen/src/sepolgen/matching.py +++ b/sepolgen/src/sepolgen/matching.py @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ class Match: return 1 class MatchList: - DEFAULT_THRESHOLD = 120 + DEFAULT_THRESHOLD = 150 def __init__(self): # Match objects that pass the threshold self.children = [] @@ -63,14 +63,15 @@ class MatchList: def best(self): if len(self.children): return self.children[0] - else: - return None + if len(self.bastards): + return self.bastards[0] + return None def __len__(self): # Only return the length of the matches so # that this can be used to test if there is # a match. - return len(self.children) + return len(self.children) + len(self.bastards) def __iter__(self): return iter(self.children) diff --git a/sepolgen/src/sepolgen/policygen.py b/sepolgen/src/sepolgen/policygen.py index 0e6b502..6ce892c 100644 --- a/sepolgen/src/sepolgen/policygen.py +++ b/sepolgen/src/sepolgen/policygen.py @@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ import objectmodel import access import interfaces import matching +import selinux.audit2why as audit2why +from setools import * # Constants for the level of explanation from the generation # routines @@ -77,6 +79,7 @@ class PolicyGenerator: self.dontaudit = False + self.domains = None def set_gen_refpol(self, if_set=None, perm_maps=None): """Set whether reference policy interfaces are generated. @@ -151,8 +154,41 @@ class PolicyGenerator: rule = refpolicy.AVRule(av) if self.dontaudit: rule.rule_type = rule.DONTAUDIT + rule.comment = "" if self.explain: - rule.comment = refpolicy.Comment(explain_access(av, verbosity=self.explain)) + rule.comment = str(refpolicy.Comment(explain_access(av, verbosity=self.explain))) + if av.type == audit2why.ALLOW: + rule.comment += "#!!!! This avc is allowed in the current policy\n" + if av.type == audit2why.DONTAUDIT: + rule.comment += "#!!!! This avc has a dontaudit rule in the current policy\n" + + if av.type == audit2why.BOOLEAN: + if len(av.bools) > 1: + rule.comment += "#!!!! This avc can be allowed using one of the these booleans:\n# %s\n" % ", ".join(map(lambda x: x[0], av.bools)) + else: + rule.comment += "#!!!! This avc can be allowed using the boolean '%s'\n" % av.bools[0][0] + + if av.type == audit2why.CONSTRAINT: + rule.comment += "#!!!! This avc is a constraint violation. You will need to add an attribute to either the source or target type to make it work.\n" + rule.comment += "#Constraint rule: " + + if av.type == audit2why.TERULE: + if "write" in av.perms: + if "dir" in av.obj_class or "open" in av.perms: + if not self.domains: + self.domains = seinfo(ATTRIBUTE, name="domain")[0]["types"] + types=[] + + try: + for i in map(lambda x: x[TCONTEXT], sesearch([ALLOW], {SCONTEXT: av.src_type, CLASS: av.obj_class, PERMS: av.perms})): + if i not in self.domains: + types.append(i) + if len(types) == 1: + rule.comment += "#!!!! The source type '%s' can write to a '%s' of the following type:\n# %s\n" % ( av.src_type, av.obj_class, ", ".join(types)) + elif len(types) >= 1: + rule.comment += "#!!!! The source type '%s' can write to a '%s' of the following types:\n# %s\n" % ( av.src_type, av.obj_class, ", ".join(types)) + except: + pass self.module.children.append(rule) diff --git a/sepolgen/src/sepolgen/refparser.py b/sepolgen/src/sepolgen/refparser.py index 1a2eec8..955784d 100644 --- a/sepolgen/src/sepolgen/refparser.py +++ b/sepolgen/src/sepolgen/refparser.py @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ tokens = ( 'DONTAUDIT', 'AUDITALLOW', 'NEVERALLOW', + 'PERMISSIVE', 'TYPE_TRANSITION', 'TYPE_CHANGE', 'TYPE_MEMBER', @@ -170,6 +171,7 @@ reserved = { 'dontaudit' : 'DONTAUDIT', 'auditallow' : 'AUDITALLOW', 'neverallow' : 'NEVERALLOW', + 'permissive' : 'PERMISSIVE', 'type_transition' : 'TYPE_TRANSITION', 'type_change' : 'TYPE_CHANGE', 'type_member' : 'TYPE_MEMBER', @@ -490,6 +492,7 @@ def p_policy_stmt(p): | interface_call | role_def | role_allow + | permissive | type_def | typealias_def | attribute_def @@ -747,6 +750,10 @@ def p_role_allow(p): r.tgt_roles = p[3] p[0] = r +def p_permissive(p): + 'permissive : PERMISSIVE names SEMI' + t.skip(1) + def p_avrule_def(p): '''avrule_def : ALLOW names names COLON names names SEMI | DONTAUDIT names names COLON names names SEMI