- Change to allow sandbox to run on nfs homedirs, add start python script
This commit is contained in:
Dan Walsh
parent
8937a040d8
commit
a548207cc4
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@ -222,3 +222,4 @@ policycoreutils-2.0.82.tgz
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sepolgen-1.0.23.tgz
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policycoreutils-2.0.83.tgz
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/policycoreutils-2.0.84.tgz
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/policycoreutils-2.0.85.tgz
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152982
policycoreutils-po.patch
152982
policycoreutils-po.patch
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
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@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ index 86ed03f..67d0ee8 100644
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INOTIFYH = $(shell ls /usr/include/sys/inotify.h 2>/dev/null)
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diff --git a/policycoreutils/audit2allow/audit2allow b/policycoreutils/audit2allow/audit2allow
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index 5435e9d..fddcdaa 100644
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index 5435e9d..c60490b 100644
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--- a/policycoreutils/audit2allow/audit2allow
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+++ b/policycoreutils/audit2allow/audit2allow
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@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ index 5435e9d..fddcdaa 100644
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parser.add_option("-d", "--dmesg", action="store_true", dest="dmesg", default=False,
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help="read input from dmesg - conflicts with --all and --input")
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parser.add_option("-i", "--input", dest="input",
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@@ -231,63 +233,44 @@ class AuditToPolicy:
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@@ -231,29 +233,12 @@ class AuditToPolicy:
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def __output_audit2why(self):
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import selinux
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@ -43,8 +43,9 @@ index 5435e9d..fddcdaa 100644
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- audit2why.init()
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for i in self.__parser.avc_msgs:
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- rc, bools = audit2why.analyze(i.scontext.to_string(), i.tcontext.to_string(), i.tclass, i.accesses)
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- if rc >= 0:
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+ if i.type >= 0:
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+ rc = i.type
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+ bools = i.bools
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if rc >= 0:
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print "%s\n\tWas caused by:" % i.message
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- if rc == audit2why.NOPOLICY:
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- raise RuntimeError("Must call policy_init first")
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@ -62,55 +63,10 @@ index 5435e9d..fddcdaa 100644
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- continue
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- if rc == audit2why. BADCOMPUTE:
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- raise RuntimeError("Error during access vector computation")
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- if rc == audit2why.ALLOW:
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+ if i.type == audit2why.ALLOW:
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if rc == audit2why.ALLOW:
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print "\t\tUnknown - would be allowed by active policy\n",
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print "\t\tPossible mismatch between this policy and the one under which the audit message was generated.\n"
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print "\t\tPossible mismatch between current in-memory boolean settings vs. permanent ones.\n"
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continue
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- if rc == audit2why.DONTAUDIT:
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+ if i.type == audit2why.DONTAUDIT:
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print "\t\tUnknown - should be dontaudit'd by active policy\n",
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print "\t\tPossible mismatch between this policy and the one under which the audit message was generated.\n"
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print "\t\tPossible mismatch between current in-memory boolean settings vs. permanent ones.\n"
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continue
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- if rc == audit2why.BOOLEAN:
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- if len(bools) > 1:
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+ if i.type == audit2why.BOOLEAN:
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+ if len(i.bools) > 1:
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print "\tOne of the following booleans was set incorrectly."
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- for b in bools:
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+ for b in i.bools:
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print "\tDescription:\n\t%s\n" % seobject.boolean_desc(b[0])
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print "\tAllow access by executing:\n\t# setsebool -P %s %d" % (b[0], b[1])
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else:
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- print "\tThe boolean %s was set incorrectly. " % (bools[0][0])
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- print "\tDescription:\n\t%s\n" % seobject.boolean_desc(bools[0][0])
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- print "\tAllow access by executing:\n\t# setsebool -P %s %d" % (bools[0][0], bools[0][1])
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+ print "\tThe boolean %s was set incorrectly. " % (i.bools[0][0])
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+ print "\tDescription:\n\t%s\n" % seobject.boolean_desc(i.bools[0][0])
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+ print "\tAllow access by executing:\n\t# setsebool -P %s %d" % (i.bools[0][0], i.bools[0][1])
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continue
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- if rc == audit2why.TERULE:
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+ if i.type == audit2why.TERULE:
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print "\t\tMissing type enforcement (TE) allow rule.\n"
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print "\t\tYou can use audit2allow to generate a loadable module to allow this access.\n"
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continue
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- if rc == audit2why.CONSTRAINT:
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+ if i.type == audit2why.CONSTRAINT:
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print "\t\tPolicy constraint violation.\n"
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print "\t\tMay require adding a type attribute to the domain or type to satisfy the constraint.\n"
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print "\t\tConstraints are defined in the policy sources in policy/constraints (general), policy/mcs (MCS), and policy/mls (MLS).\n"
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continue
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- if rc == audit2why.RBAC:
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+ if i.type == audit2why.RBAC:
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print "\t\tMissing role allow rule.\n"
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print "\t\tAdd an allow rule for the role pair.\n"
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continue
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@@ -350,11 +333,19 @@ class AuditToPolicy:
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@@ -350,11 +335,19 @@ class AuditToPolicy:
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def main(self):
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try:
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self.__parse_options()
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@ -332,276 +288,6 @@ index 03f95a1..5986b23 100644
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if_set.to_file(f)
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f.close()
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diff --git a/policycoreutils/load_policy/load_policy.c b/policycoreutils/load_policy/load_policy.c
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index 47d9b0f..566565f 100644
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--- a/policycoreutils/load_policy/load_policy.c
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+++ b/policycoreutils/load_policy/load_policy.c
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@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
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+#define _GNU_SOURCE
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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@@ -23,6 +24,14 @@ void usage(char *progname)
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exit(1);
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}
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+char *policy_path(void) {
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+ char *path=NULL;
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+ if (asprintf(&path, "%s.%d", selinux_binary_policy_path(), security_policyvers()) < 0) {
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+ return NULL;
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+ }
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+ return path;
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+}
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+
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int main(int argc, char **argv)
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{
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int ret, opt, quiet = 0, nargs, init=0, enforce=0;
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@@ -64,6 +73,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
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"%s: Warning! Boolean file argument (%s) is no longer supported, installed booleans file is always used. Continuing...\n",
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argv[0], argv[optind++]);
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}
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+ errno = 0;
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if (init) {
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if (is_selinux_enabled() == 1) {
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/* SELinux is already enabled, we should not do an initial load again */
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@@ -76,9 +86,11 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
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if (ret != 0 ) {
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if (enforce > 0) {
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/* SELinux in enforcing mode but load_policy failed */
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+ char *path=policy_path();
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fprintf(stderr,
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- _("%s: Can't load policy and enforcing mode requested: %s\n"),
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- argv[0], strerror(errno));
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+ _("%s: Can't load policy file %s and enforcing mode requested: %s\n"),
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+ argv[0], path, strerror(errno));
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+ free(path);
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exit(3);
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}
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}
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@@ -86,9 +98,16 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
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else {
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ret = selinux_mkload_policy(1);
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}
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- if (ret < 0) {
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- fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Can't load policy: %s\n"),
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- argv[0], strerror(errno));
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+
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+ /* selinux_init_load_policy returns -1 if it did not load_policy
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+ * On SELinux disabled system it will always return -1
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+ * So check errno to see if anything went wrong
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+ */
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+ if (ret < 0 && errno != 0) {
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+ char *path=policy_path();
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+ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Can't load policy file %s: %s\n"),
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+ argv[0], path, strerror(errno));
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+ free(path);
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exit(2);
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}
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exit(0);
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diff --git a/policycoreutils/newrole/Makefile b/policycoreutils/newrole/Makefile
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index 6c19bd1..bd8e7a7 100644
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--- a/policycoreutils/newrole/Makefile
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+++ b/policycoreutils/newrole/Makefile
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@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ ifeq (${NAMESPACE_PRIV},y)
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endif
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ifeq (${IS_SUID},y)
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MODE := 4555
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- LDLIBS += -lcap
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+ LDLIBS += -lcap-ng
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else
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MODE := 0555
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endif
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diff --git a/policycoreutils/newrole/newrole.c b/policycoreutils/newrole/newrole.c
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index d191be6..071b393 100644
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--- a/policycoreutils/newrole/newrole.c
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+++ b/policycoreutils/newrole/newrole.c
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@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@
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#endif
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#if defined(AUDIT_LOG_PRIV) || (NAMESPACE_PRIV)
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#include <sys/prctl.h>
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-#include <sys/capability.h>
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+#include <cap-ng.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef USE_NLS
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#include <locale.h> /* for setlocale() */
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@@ -90,6 +90,9 @@
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#define PACKAGE "policycoreutils" /* the name of this package lang translation */
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#endif
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+# define TRUE 1
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+# define FALSE 0
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+
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/* USAGE_STRING describes the command-line args of this program. */
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#define USAGE_STRING "USAGE: newrole [ -r role ] [ -t type ] [ -l level ] [ -p ] [ -V ] [ -- args ]"
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@@ -538,69 +541,23 @@ static int restore_environment(int preserve_environment,
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* Returns zero on success, non-zero otherwise
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*/
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#if defined(AUDIT_LOG_PRIV) && !defined(NAMESPACE_PRIV)
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-static int drop_capabilities(void)
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+static int drop_capabilities(int full)
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{
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- int rc = 0;
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- cap_t new_caps, tmp_caps;
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- cap_value_t cap_list[] = { CAP_AUDIT_WRITE };
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- cap_value_t tmp_cap_list[] = { CAP_AUDIT_WRITE, CAP_SETUID };
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- uid_t uid = getuid();
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-
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- if (!uid)
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- return 0;
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-
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- /* Non-root caller, suid root path */
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- new_caps = cap_init();
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- tmp_caps = cap_init();
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- if (!new_caps || !tmp_caps) {
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- fprintf(stderr, _("Error initializing capabilities, aborting.\n"));
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+ capng_clear(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH);
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+ if (capng_lock() < 0)
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return -1;
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- }
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- rc |= cap_set_flag(new_caps, CAP_PERMITTED, 1, cap_list, CAP_SET);
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- rc |= cap_set_flag(new_caps, CAP_EFFECTIVE, 1, cap_list, CAP_SET);
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- rc |= cap_set_flag(tmp_caps, CAP_PERMITTED, 2, tmp_cap_list, CAP_SET);
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- rc |= cap_set_flag(tmp_caps, CAP_EFFECTIVE, 2, tmp_cap_list, CAP_SET);
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- if (rc) {
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- fprintf(stderr, _("Error setting capabilities, aborting\n"));
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- goto out;
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- }
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-
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- /* Keep capabilities across uid change */
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- if (prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
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- fprintf(stderr, _("Error setting KEEPCAPS, aborting\n"));
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- rc = -1;
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- goto out;
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- }
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- /* Does this temporary change really buy us much? */
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- /* We should still have root's caps, so drop most capabilities now */
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- if ((rc = cap_set_proc(tmp_caps))) {
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- fprintf(stderr, _("Error dropping capabilities, aborting\n"));
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- goto out;
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- }
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+ uid_t uid = getuid();
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+ if (!uid) return 0;
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/* Change uid */
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- if ((rc = setresuid(uid, uid, uid))) {
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+ if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid)) {
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fprintf(stderr, _("Error changing uid, aborting.\n"));
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- goto out;
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- }
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-
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- /* Now get rid of this ability */
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- if ((rc = prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, 0, 0, 0, 0) < 0)) {
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- fprintf(stderr, _("Error resetting KEEPCAPS, aborting\n"));
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- goto out;
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- }
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-
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- /* Finish dropping capabilities. */
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- if ((rc = cap_set_proc(new_caps))) {
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- fprintf(stderr,
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- _("Error dropping SETUID capability, aborting\n"));
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- goto out;
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+ return -1;
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}
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- out:
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- if (cap_free(tmp_caps) || cap_free(new_caps))
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- fprintf(stderr, _("Error freeing caps\n"));
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- return rc;
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+ if (! full)
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+ capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_EFFECTIVE | CAPNG_PERMITTED, CAP_AUDIT_WRITE);
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+ return capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH);
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}
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#elif defined(NAMESPACE_PRIV)
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/**
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@@ -616,50 +573,25 @@ static int drop_capabilities(void)
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*
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* Returns zero on success, non-zero otherwise
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*/
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-static int drop_capabilities(void)
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+static int drop_capabilities(int full)
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{
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- int rc = 0;
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- cap_t new_caps;
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- cap_value_t cap_list[] = { CAP_AUDIT_WRITE, CAP_SETUID,
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- CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_FOWNER, CAP_CHOWN,
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- CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE
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- };
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-
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- if (!getuid())
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- return 0;
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-
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- /* Non-root caller, suid root path */
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- new_caps = cap_init();
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- if (!new_caps) {
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- fprintf(stderr, _("Error initializing capabilities, aborting.\n"));
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+ capng_clear(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH);
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+ if (capng_lock() < 0)
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return -1;
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- }
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- rc |= cap_set_flag(new_caps, CAP_PERMITTED, 6, cap_list, CAP_SET);
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- rc |= cap_set_flag(new_caps, CAP_EFFECTIVE, 6, cap_list, CAP_SET);
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- if (rc) {
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- fprintf(stderr, _("Error setting capabilities, aborting\n"));
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- goto out;
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- }
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- /* Ensure that caps are dropped after setuid call */
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- if ((rc = prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, 0, 0, 0, 0) < 0)) {
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- fprintf(stderr, _("Error resetting KEEPCAPS, aborting\n"));
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- goto out;
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- }
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-
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- /* We should still have root's caps, so drop most capabilities now */
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- if ((rc = cap_set_proc(new_caps))) {
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- fprintf(stderr, _("Error dropping capabilities, aborting\n"));
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- goto out;
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+ uid_t uid = getuid();
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+ /* Change uid */
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+ if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid)) {
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+ fprintf(stderr, _("Error changing uid, aborting.\n"));
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+ return -1;
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}
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- out:
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- if (cap_free(new_caps))
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- fprintf(stderr, _("Error freeing caps\n"));
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- return rc;
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+ if (! full)
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+ capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_EFFECTIVE | CAPNG_PERMITTED, CAP_SYS_ADMIN | CAP_FOWNER | CAP_CHOWN | CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE);
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+ return capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH);
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}
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#else
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-static inline int drop_capabilities(void)
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+static inline int drop_capabilities(__attribute__ ((__unused__)) int full)
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{
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return 0;
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}
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@@ -1098,7 +1030,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
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* if it makes sense to continue to run newrole, and setting up
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* a scrubbed environment.
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*/
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- if (drop_capabilities())
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+ if (drop_capabilities(FALSE))
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return -1;
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if (set_signal_handles())
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return -1;
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@@ -1334,11 +1266,15 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
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if (send_audit_message(1, old_context, new_context, ttyn))
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goto err_close_pam_session;
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+ freecon(old_context); old_context=NULL;
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+ freecon(new_context); new_context=NULL;
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+
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#ifdef NAMESPACE_PRIV
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if (transition_to_caller_uid())
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goto err_close_pam_session;
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#endif
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+ drop_capabilities(TRUE);
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/* Handle environment changes */
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if (restore_environment(preserve_environment, old_environ, &pw)) {
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fprintf(stderr, _("Unable to restore the environment, "
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diff --git a/policycoreutils/restorecond/Makefile b/policycoreutils/restorecond/Makefile
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index 3f235e6..7552668 100644
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--- a/policycoreutils/restorecond/Makefile
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|
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|||
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@ -6,11 +6,12 @@
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|||
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Summary: SELinux policy core utilities
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Name: policycoreutils
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Version: 2.0.84
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Release: 5%{?dist}
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Version: 2.0.85
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Release: 1%{?dist}
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License: GPLv2
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Group: System Environment/Base
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Source: http://www.nsa.gov/selinux/archives/policycoreutils-%{version}.tgz
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# Based on git repository with tag 20101221
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Source: git://oss.tresys.com/git/selinux/policycoreutils-%{version}.tgz
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Source1: git://oss.tresys.com/git/selinux/sepolgen-%{sepolgenver}.tgz
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||||
URL: http://www.selinuxproject.org
|
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Source2: system-config-selinux.png
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||||
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