pam/pam-0.99.7.1-unix-bigcrypt.patch
Tomáš Mráz 71ab958a92 - correctly relabel tty in the default case (#229542)
- pam_unix: cleanup of bigcrypt support
- pam_unix: allow modification of '*' passwords to root
2007-02-21 20:32:28 +00:00

127 lines
3.4 KiB
Diff

--- Linux-PAM-0.99.7.1/modules/pam_unix/support.c.bigcrypt 2007-02-21 20:30:24.000000000 +0100
+++ Linux-PAM-0.99.7.1/modules/pam_unix/support.c 2007-02-21 21:17:29.000000000 +0100
@@ -694,7 +694,7 @@
}
}
} else {
- int salt_len;
+ size_t salt_len;
strip_hpux_aging(salt);
salt_len = strlen(salt);
if (!salt_len) {
@@ -706,19 +706,19 @@
D(("user has empty password - access denied"));
retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
}
- } else if (!p || (*salt == '*')) {
+ } else if (!p || *salt == '*' || *salt == '!') {
retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
} else {
if (!strncmp(salt, "$1$", 3)) {
pp = Goodcrypt_md5(p, salt);
- if (strcmp(pp, salt) != 0) {
+ if (pp && strcmp(pp, salt) != 0) {
_pam_delete(pp);
pp = Brokencrypt_md5(p, salt);
}
} else if (*salt != '$' && salt_len >= 13) {
pp = bigcrypt(p, salt);
- if (strlen(pp) > salt_len) {
- pp[salt_len] = '\0';
+ if (pp && salt_len == 13 && strlen(pp) > salt_len) {
+ _pam_overwrite(pp + salt_len);
}
} else {
/*
@@ -732,7 +732,7 @@
/* the moment of truth -- do we agree with the password? */
D(("comparing state of pp[%s] and salt[%s]", pp, salt));
- if (strcmp(pp, salt) == 0) {
+ if (pp && strcmp(pp, salt) == 0) {
retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
} else {
retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
--- Linux-PAM-0.99.7.1/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.c.bigcrypt 2007-02-21 20:30:24.000000000 +0100
+++ Linux-PAM-0.99.7.1/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.c 2007-02-21 21:18:57.000000000 +0100
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@
char *salt = NULL;
char *pp = NULL;
int retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
- int salt_len;
+ size_t salt_len;
/* UNIX passwords area */
setpwent();
@@ -205,6 +205,8 @@
return (nullok == 0) ? PAM_AUTH_ERR : PAM_SUCCESS;
}
if (p == NULL || strlen(p) == 0) {
+ _pam_overwrite(salt);
+ _pam_drop(salt);
return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
}
@@ -212,11 +214,13 @@
retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
if (!strncmp(salt, "$1$", 3)) {
pp = Goodcrypt_md5(p, salt);
- if (strcmp(pp, salt) == 0) {
+ if (pp && strcmp(pp, salt) == 0) {
retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
} else {
+ _pam_overwrite(pp);
+ _pam_drop(pp);
pp = Brokencrypt_md5(p, salt);
- if (strcmp(pp, salt) == 0)
+ if (pp && strcmp(pp, salt) == 0)
retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
}
} else if (*salt == '$') {
@@ -225,10 +229,10 @@
* libcrypt nows about it? We should try it.
*/
pp = x_strdup (crypt(p, salt));
- if (strcmp(pp, salt) == 0) {
+ if (pp && strcmp(pp, salt) == 0) {
retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
}
- } else if ((*salt == '*') || (salt_len < 13)) {
+ } else if (*salt == '*' || *salt == '!' || salt_len < 13) {
retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
} else {
pp = bigcrypt(p, salt);
@@ -239,24 +243,21 @@
* have been truncated for storage relative to the output
* of bigcrypt here. As such we need to compare only the
* stored string with the subset of bigcrypt's result.
- * Bug 521314: the strncmp comparison is for legacy support.
+ * Bug 521314.
*/
- if (strncmp(pp, salt, salt_len) == 0) {
+ if (pp && salt_len == 13 && strlen(pp) > salt_len) {
+ _pam_overwrite(pp+salt_len);
+ }
+
+ if (pp && strcmp(pp, salt) == 0) {
retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
}
}
p = NULL; /* no longer needed here */
/* clean up */
- {
- char *tp = pp;
- if (pp != NULL) {
- while (tp && *tp)
- *tp++ = '\0';
- free(pp);
- }
- pp = tp = NULL;
- }
+ _pam_overwrite(pp);
+ _pam_drop(pp);
return retval;
}