130 lines
5.3 KiB
Diff
130 lines
5.3 KiB
Diff
diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c.fipsrand openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c
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--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c.fipsrand 2022-08-03 11:09:01.301637515 +0200
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+++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c 2022-08-03 11:13:00.058688605 +0200
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@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@
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# include <fcntl.h>
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# include <unistd.h>
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# include <sys/time.h>
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+# include <sys/random.h>
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+# include <openssl/evp.h>
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static uint64_t get_time_stamp(void);
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static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void);
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@@ -342,66 +342,8 @@ static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf,
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* which is way below the OSSL_SSIZE_MAX limit. Therefore sign conversion
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* between size_t and ssize_t is safe even without a range check.
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*/
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-
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- /*
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- * Do runtime detection to find getentropy().
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- *
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- * Known OSs that should support this:
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- * - Darwin since 16 (OSX 10.12, IOS 10.0).
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- * - Solaris since 11.3
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- * - OpenBSD since 5.6
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- * - Linux since 3.17 with glibc 2.25
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- * - FreeBSD since 12.0 (1200061)
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- *
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- * Note: Sometimes getentropy() can be provided but not implemented
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- * internally. So we need to check errno for ENOSYS
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- */
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-# if !defined(__DragonFly__) && !defined(__NetBSD__)
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-# if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && defined(__ELF__) && !defined(__hpux)
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- extern int getentropy(void *buffer, size_t length) __attribute__((weak));
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-
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- if (getentropy != NULL) {
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- if (getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0)
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- return (ssize_t)buflen;
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- if (errno != ENOSYS)
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- return -1;
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- }
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-# elif defined(OPENSSL_APPLE_CRYPTO_RANDOM)
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-
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- if (CCRandomGenerateBytes(buf, buflen) == kCCSuccess)
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- return (ssize_t)buflen;
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-
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- return -1;
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-# else
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- union {
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- void *p;
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- int (*f)(void *buffer, size_t length);
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- } p_getentropy;
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-
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- /*
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- * We could cache the result of the lookup, but we normally don't
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- * call this function often.
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- */
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- ERR_set_mark();
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- p_getentropy.p = DSO_global_lookup("getentropy");
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- ERR_pop_to_mark();
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- if (p_getentropy.p != NULL)
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- return p_getentropy.f(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1;
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-# endif
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-# endif /* !__DragonFly__ */
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-
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- /* Linux supports this since version 3.17 */
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-# if defined(__linux) && defined(__NR_getrandom)
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- return syscall(__NR_getrandom, buf, buflen, 0);
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-# elif (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
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- return sysctl_random(buf, buflen);
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-# elif (defined(__DragonFly__) && __DragonFly_version >= 500700) \
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- || (defined(__NetBSD__) && __NetBSD_Version >= 1000000000)
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- return getrandom(buf, buflen, 0);
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-# else
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- errno = ENOSYS;
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- return -1;
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-# endif
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+ /* Red Hat uses downstream patch to always seed from getrandom() */
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+ return EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(NULL) ? getrandom(buf, buflen, GRND_RANDOM) : getrandom(buf, buflen, 0);
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}
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# endif /* defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM) */
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diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c.fipsrand openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c
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--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c.fipsrand 2022-08-03 12:14:39.409370134 +0200
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+++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c 2022-08-03 12:19:06.320700346 +0200
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@@ -575,6 +575,9 @@ int ossl_prov_drbg_reseed(PROV_DRBG *drb
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#endif
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}
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+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
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+ prediction_resistance = 1;
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+#endif
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/* Reseed using our sources in addition */
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entropylen = get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength,
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drbg->min_entropylen, drbg->max_entropylen,
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diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c.fipsrand openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c
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--- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c.fipsrand 2022-08-04 12:17:52.148556301 +0200
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+++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c 2022-08-04 12:19:41.783533552 +0200
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@@ -20,7 +20,14 @@ size_t ossl_rand_get_entropy(ossl_unused
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size_t entropy_available;
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RAND_POOL *pool;
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- pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy, 1, min_len, max_len);
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+ /*
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+ * OpenSSL still implements an internal entropy pool of
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+ * some size that is hashed to get seed data.
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+ * Note that this is a conditioning step for which SP800-90C requires
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+ * 64 additional bits from the entropy source to claim the requested
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+ * amount of entropy.
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+ */
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+ pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy + 64, 1, min_len, max_len);
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if (pool == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c.fipsrand openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c
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--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c.fipsrand 2022-08-04 11:56:10.100950299 +0200
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+++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c 2022-08-04 11:59:11.241564925 +0200
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@@ -139,7 +139,11 @@ size_t ossl_crngt_get_entropy(PROV_DRBG
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* to the nearest byte. If the entropy is of less than full quality,
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* the amount required should be scaled up appropriately here.
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*/
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- bytes_needed = (entropy + 7) / 8;
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+ /*
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+ * FIPS 140-3: the yet draft SP800-90C requires requested entropy
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+ * + 128 bits during initial seeding
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+ */
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+ bytes_needed = (entropy + 128 + 7) / 8;
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if (bytes_needed < min_len)
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bytes_needed = min_len;
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if (bytes_needed > max_len)
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