openssl/openssl-0.9.8b-cve-2006-4339.patch

78 lines
2.7 KiB
Diff

*) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher
(CVE-2006-4339) [Ben Laurie; Google Security Team]
openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa.h 1.55.2.4 -> 1.55.2.5
--- openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa.h 2006/01/09 16:05:18 1.55.2.4
+++ openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa.h 2006/09/05 08:25:42 1.55.2.5
@@ -412,6 +412,7 @@
#define RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q 127
#define RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR 121
#define RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 114
+#define RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT 105
#define RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME 128
#define RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME 129
#define RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED 130
openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c 1.46.2.4 -> 1.46.2.5
--- openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c 2006/06/14 08:51:40 1.46.2.4
+++ openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c 2006/09/05 08:25:42 1.46.2.5
@@ -640,6 +640,15 @@
{
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
+ /* Generally signatures should be at least 2/3 padding, though
+ this isn't possible for really short keys and some standard
+ signature schemes, so don't check if the unpadded data is
+ small. */
+ if(r > 42 && 3*8*r >= BN_num_bits(rsa->n))
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto err;
+ }
break;
case RSA_X931_PADDING:
r=RSA_padding_check_X931(to,num,buf,i,num);
openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c 1.17.2.3 -> 1.17.2.4
--- openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c 2006/01/09 16:05:18 1.17.2.3
+++ openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c 2006/09/05 08:25:42 1.17.2.4
@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q) ,"n does not equal p q"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR) ,"oaep decoding error"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED) ,"padding check failed"},
+{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT),"pkcs1 padding too short"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME) ,"p not prime"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME) ,"q not prime"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED),"rsa operations not supported"},
openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c 1.21 -> 1.21.2.1
--- openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c 2005/04/26 22:07:17 1.21
+++ openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c 2006/09/05 08:25:42 1.21.2.1
@@ -185,6 +185,23 @@
sig=d2i_X509_SIG(NULL,&p,(long)i);
if (sig == NULL) goto err;
+
+ /* Excess data can be used to create forgeries */
+ if(p != s+i)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Parameters to the signature algorithm can also be used to
+ create forgeries */
+ if(sig->algor->parameter
+ && ASN1_TYPE_get(sig->algor->parameter) != V_ASN1_NULL)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
sigtype=OBJ_obj2nid(sig->algor->algorithm);