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diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/apps/apps.c.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/apps/apps.c
--- openssl-1.0.1k/apps/apps.c.alt-chains 2015-07-09 14:58:55.949753674 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/apps/apps.c 2015-07-09 14:58:55.970754174 +0200
@@ -2365,6 +2365,8 @@ int args_verify(char ***pargs, int *parg
flags |= X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-check_ss_sig"))
flags |= X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE;
+ else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no_alt_chains"))
+ flags |= X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-trusted_first"))
flags |= X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST;
else
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/apps/cms.c.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/apps/cms.c
--- openssl-1.0.1k/apps/cms.c.alt-chains 2015-07-09 14:58:55.949753674 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/apps/cms.c 2015-07-09 14:58:55.970754174 +0200
@@ -642,6 +642,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-text include or delete text MIME headers\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CApath dir trusted certificates directory\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CAfile file trusted certificates file\n");
+ BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_alt_chains only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-trusted_first use trusted certificates first when building the trust chain\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-crl_check check revocation status of signer's certificate using CRLs\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-crl_check_all check revocation status of signer's certificate chain using CRLs\n");
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/apps/ocsp.c.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/apps/ocsp.c
--- openssl-1.0.1k/apps/ocsp.c.alt-chains 2015-07-09 14:58:55.949753674 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/apps/ocsp.c 2015-07-09 14:58:55.971754198 +0200
@@ -605,6 +605,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-path path to use in OCSP request\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CApath dir trusted certificates directory\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CAfile file trusted certificates file\n");
+ BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_alt_chains only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-trusted_first use trusted certificates first when building the trust chain\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-VAfile file validator certificates file\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-validity_period n maximum validity discrepancy in seconds\n");
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/apps/s_client.c.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/apps/s_client.c
--- openssl-1.0.1k/apps/s_client.c.alt-chains 2015-07-09 14:58:55.956753841 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/apps/s_client.c 2015-07-09 14:58:55.971754198 +0200
@@ -299,6 +299,7 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
BIO_printf(bio_err," -pass arg - private key file pass phrase source\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -CApath arg - PEM format directory of CA's\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -CAfile arg - PEM format file of CA's\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_alt_chains - only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -trusted_first - Use trusted CA's first when building the trust chain\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -reconnect - Drop and re-make the connection with the same Session-ID\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -pause - sleep(1) after each read(2) and write(2) system call\n");
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/apps/smime.c.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/apps/smime.c
--- openssl-1.0.1k/apps/smime.c.alt-chains 2015-07-09 14:58:55.950753698 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/apps/smime.c 2015-07-09 14:58:55.971754198 +0200
@@ -479,6 +479,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-text include or delete text MIME headers\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CApath dir trusted certificates directory\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CAfile file trusted certificates file\n");
+ BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_alt_chains only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-trusted_first use trusted certificates first when building the trust chain\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-crl_check check revocation status of signer's certificate using CRLs\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-crl_check_all check revocation status of signer's certificate chain using CRLs\n");
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/apps/s_server.c.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/apps/s_server.c
--- openssl-1.0.1k/apps/s_server.c.alt-chains 2015-07-09 14:58:55.950753698 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/apps/s_server.c 2015-07-09 14:58:55.971754198 +0200
@@ -502,6 +502,7 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
BIO_printf(bio_err," -state - Print the SSL states\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -CApath arg - PEM format directory of CA's\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -CAfile arg - PEM format file of CA's\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_alt_chains - only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -trusted_first - Use trusted CA's first when building the trust chain\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -nocert - Don't use any certificates (Anon-DH)\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -cipher arg - play with 'openssl ciphers' to see what goes here\n");
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/apps/verify.c.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/apps/verify.c
--- openssl-1.0.1k/apps/verify.c.alt-chains 2015-07-09 14:58:55.951753722 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/apps/verify.c 2015-07-09 14:58:55.972754221 +0200
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
end:
if (ret == 1) {
BIO_printf(bio_err,"usage: verify [-verbose] [-CApath path] [-CAfile file] [-trusted_first] [-purpose purpose] [-crl_check]");
- BIO_printf(bio_err," [-attime timestamp]");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err," [-no_alt_chains] [-attime timestamp]");
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
BIO_printf(bio_err," [-engine e]");
#endif
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
--- openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.alt-chains 2015-07-09 14:58:55.951753722 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c 2015-07-09 15:28:03.630442145 +0200
@@ -154,11 +154,11 @@ static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X5
int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
+ X509 *x,*xtmp,*xtmp2,*chain_ss=NULL;
int bad_chain = 0;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
int depth,i,ok=0;
- int num;
+ int num, j, retry;
int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
if (ctx->cert == NULL)
@@ -167,21 +167,27 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx
return -1;
}
+ if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
+ * cannot do another one.
+ */
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
/* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
* present and that the first entry is in place */
- if (ctx->chain == NULL)
+ if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
+ (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
{
- if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
- (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
- {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto end;
- }
- CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- ctx->last_untrusted=1;
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto end;
}
+ CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ ctx->last_untrusted=1;
/* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
@@ -247,10 +253,14 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx
break;
}
+ /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
+ j = num;
+
/* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
* certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
* if possible, otherwise we complain. */
+ do {
/* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
* is self signed.
*/
@@ -294,6 +304,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx
chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
ctx->last_untrusted--;
num--;
+ j--;
x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
}
}
@@ -322,7 +333,42 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx
num++;
}
- /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
+ /*
+ * If we haven't got a least one certificate from our store then check
+ * if there is an alternative chain that could be used. We only do this
+ * if the user hasn't switched off alternate chain checking
+ */
+ retry = 0;
+ if (num == ctx->last_untrusted &&
+ !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
+ while (j-- > 1) {
+ xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
+ ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
+ if (ok < 0)
+ goto end;
+ /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
+ if (ok > 0) {
+ /*
+ * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
+ */
+ X509_free(xtmp);
+
+ /*
+ * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
+ * alternate chain
+ */
+ while (num > j) {
+ xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
+ X509_free(xtmp);
+ num--;
+ }
+ ctx->last_untrusted = j;
+ retry = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ } while (retry);
/* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h
--- openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h.alt-chains 2015-07-09 14:58:55.951753722 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h 2015-07-09 14:58:55.972754221 +0200
@@ -391,7 +391,12 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE
#define X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE 0x4000
/* Use trusted store first */
#define X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST 0x8000
-
+/*
+ * If the initial chain is not trusted, do not attempt to build an alternative
+ * chain. Alternate chain checking was introduced in 1.0.1n/1.0.2b. Setting
+ * this flag will force the behaviour to match that of previous versions.
+ */
+#define X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS 0x100000
#define X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT 0x1
#define X509_VP_FLAG_OVERWRITE 0x2
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/cms.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/cms.pod
--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/cms.pod.alt-chains 2015-07-09 14:58:55.951753722 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/cms.pod 2015-07-09 14:58:55.972754221 +0200
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ B<openssl> B<cms>
[B<-print>]
[B<-CAfile file>]
[B<-CApath dir>]
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]
[B<-trusted_first>]
[B<-md digest>]
[B<-[cipher]>]
@@ -413,7 +414,7 @@ portion of a message so they may be incl
then many S/MIME mail clients check the signers certificate's email
address matches that specified in the From: address.
-=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig>
+=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig -no_alt_chains>
Set various certificate chain valiadition option. See the
L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/ocsp.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/ocsp.pod
--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/ocsp.pod.alt-chains 2015-07-09 14:58:55.951753722 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/ocsp.pod 2015-07-09 14:58:55.973754245 +0200
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ B<openssl> B<ocsp>
[B<-path>]
[B<-CApath dir>]
[B<-CAfile file>]
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]]
[B<-trusted_first>]
[B<-VAfile file>]
[B<-validity_period n>]
@@ -143,6 +144,10 @@ connection timeout to the OCSP responder
file or pathname containing trusted CA certificates. These are used to verify
the signature on the OCSP response.
+=item B<-no_alt_chains>
+
+See L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.
+
=item B<-trusted_first>
Use certificates in CA file or CA directory over certificates provided
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/s_client.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/s_client.pod
--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/s_client.pod.alt-chains 2015-07-09 14:58:55.952753746 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/s_client.pod 2015-07-09 14:58:55.973754245 +0200
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_client>
[B<-pass arg>]
[B<-CApath directory>]
[B<-CAfile filename>]
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]
[B<-trusted_first>]
[B<-reconnect>]
[B<-pause>]
@@ -122,7 +123,7 @@ also used when building the client certi
A file containing trusted certificates to use during server authentication
and to use when attempting to build the client certificate chain.
-=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig, -trusted_first>
+=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig -no_alt_chains>
Set various certificate chain valiadition option. See the
L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/smime.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/smime.pod
--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/smime.pod.alt-chains 2015-07-09 14:58:55.952753746 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/smime.pod 2015-07-09 14:58:55.973754245 +0200
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ B<openssl> B<smime>
[B<-in file>]
[B<-CAfile file>]
[B<-CApath dir>]
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]
[B<-trusted_first>]
[B<-certfile file>]
[B<-signer file>]
@@ -268,7 +269,7 @@ portion of a message so they may be incl
then many S/MIME mail clients check the signers certificate's email
address matches that specified in the From: address.
-=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig>
+=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig -no_alt_chains>
Set various options of certificate chain verification. See
L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/s_server.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/s_server.pod
--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/s_server.pod.alt-chains 2015-07-09 14:58:55.952753746 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/s_server.pod 2015-07-09 14:58:55.973754245 +0200
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_server>
[B<-state>]
[B<-CApath directory>]
[B<-CAfile filename>]
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]
[B<-trusted_first>]
[B<-nocert>]
[B<-cipher cipherlist>]
@@ -179,6 +180,10 @@ and to use when attempting to build the
is also used in the list of acceptable client CAs passed to the client when
a certificate is requested.
+=item B<-no_alt_chains>
+
+See the L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.
+
=item B<-trusted_first>
Use certificates in CA file or CA directory before other certificates
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/verify.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/verify.pod
--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/verify.pod.alt-chains 2015-07-09 14:58:55.952753746 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/verify.pod 2015-07-09 14:58:55.973754245 +0200
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ B<openssl> B<verify>
[B<-extended_crl>]
[B<-use_deltas>]
[B<-policy_print>]
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]
[B<-untrusted file>]
[B<-help>]
[B<-issuer_checks>]
@@ -115,6 +116,14 @@ Set policy variable inhibit-any-policy (
Set policy variable inhibit-policy-mapping (see RFC5280).
+=item B<-no_alt_chains>
+
+When building a certificate chain, if the first certificate chain found is not
+trusted, then OpenSSL will continue to check to see if an alternative chain can
+be found that is trusted. With this option that behaviour is suppressed so that
+only the first chain found is ever used. Using this option will force the
+behaviour to match that of previous OpenSSL versions.
+
=item B<-policy_print>
Print out diagnostics related to policy processing.
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod
--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod.alt-chains 2014-10-15 15:49:15.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod 2015-07-09 15:29:16.461174414 +0200
@@ -39,10 +39,15 @@ X509_STORE_CTX_free() completely frees u
is no longer valid.
X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets up B<ctx> for a subsequent verification operation.
-The trusted certificate store is set to B<store>, the end entity certificate
-to be verified is set to B<x509> and a set of additional certificates (which
-will be untrusted but may be used to build the chain) in B<chain>. Any or
-all of the B<store>, B<x509> and B<chain> parameters can be B<NULL>.
+It must be called before each call to X509_verify_cert(), i.e. a B<ctx> is only
+good for one call to X509_verify_cert(); if you want to verify a second
+certificate with the same B<ctx> then you must call X509_XTORE_CTX_cleanup()
+and then X509_STORE_CTX_init() again before the second call to
+X509_verify_cert(). The trusted certificate store is set to B<store>, the end
+entity certificate to be verified is set to B<x509> and a set of additional
+certificates (which will be untrusted but may be used to build the chain) in
+B<chain>. Any or all of the B<store>, B<x509> and B<chain> parameters can be
+B<NULL>.
X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack() sets the set of trusted certificates of B<ctx>
to B<sk>. This is an alternative way of specifying trusted certificates
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod
--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod.alt-chains 2014-10-15 15:49:15.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod 2015-07-09 15:29:16.461174414 +0200
@@ -32,7 +32,8 @@ OpenSSL internally for certificate valid
SSL/TLS code.
The negative return value from X509_verify_cert() can only occur if no
-certificate is set in B<ctx> (due to a programming error) or if a retry
+certificate is set in B<ctx> (due to a programming error); if X509_verify_cert()
+twice without reinitialising B<ctx> in between; or if a retry
operation is requested during internal lookups (which never happens with
standard lookup methods). It is however recommended that application check
for <= 0 return value on error.
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod.alt-chains 2015-01-08 15:00:36.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod 2015-07-09 14:58:55.973754245 +0200
@@ -133,6 +133,12 @@ verification. If this flag is set then a
to the verification callback and it B<must> be prepared to handle such cases
without assuming they are hard errors.
+The B<X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS> flag suppresses checking for alternative
+chains. By default, when building a certificate chain, if the first certificate
+chain found is not trusted, then OpenSSL will continue to check to see if an
+alternative chain can be found that is trusted. With this flag set the behaviour
+will match that of OpenSSL versions prior to 1.0.1n and 1.0.2b.
+
=head1 NOTES
The above functions should be used to manipulate verification parameters
@@ -166,6 +172,6 @@ L<X509_verify_cert(3)|X509_verify_cert(3
=head1 HISTORY
-TBA
+The B<X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS> flag was added in upstream OpenSSL 1.0.1n and 1.0.2b
=cut
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