diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/bn/bn.h.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/bn/bn.h
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/bn/bn.h.fips-reqs	2013-11-26 14:36:35.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/bn/bn.h	2013-12-13 11:58:58.623821669 +0100
@@ -386,9 +386,11 @@ int BN_GENCB_call(BN_GENCB *cb, int a, i
  * of Applied Cryptography [Menezes, van Oorschot, Vanstone; CRC Press 1996];
  * original paper: Damgaard, Landrock, Pomerance: Average case error estimates
  * for the strong probable prime test. -- Math. Comp. 61 (1993) 177-194) */
-#define BN_prime_checks_for_size(b) ((b) >= 1300 ?  2 : \
-                                (b) >=  850 ?  3 : \
-                                (b) >=  650 ?  4 : \
+/* FIPS 186-4 specifies error rate given the security strength of the
+ * resulting RSA key bit size. So the error rate is 2^-112 or 2^-128 for
+ * 1024 and 1536 bit keys.
+ */
+#define BN_prime_checks_for_size(b) ((b) >= 1300 ?  4 : \
                                 (b) >=  550 ?  5 : \
                                 (b) >=  450 ?  6 : \
                                 (b) >=  400 ?  7 : \
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c.fips-reqs	2013-11-26 14:36:35.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c	2013-12-11 16:50:54.181130000 +0100
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static int dh_builtin_genparams(DH *ret,
 		return 0;
 		}
 
-	if (FIPS_mode() && (prime_len < OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))
+	if (FIPS_mode() && (prime_len < OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS_GEN))
 		{
 		DHerr(DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS, DH_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
 		goto err;
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh.h.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh.h
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh.h.fips-reqs	2013-11-26 14:36:35.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh.h	2013-12-11 16:51:18.345675737 +0100
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@
 #endif
 
 #define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024
+#define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS_GEN 2048
 
 #define DH_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P     0x01
 #define DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME 0x02 /* new with 0.9.7h; the built-in DH
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh_check.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh_check.c.fips-reqs	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh_check.c	2013-12-11 18:02:26.759075219 +0100
@@ -134,7 +134,33 @@ int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const
 	BN_sub_word(q,1);
 	if (BN_cmp(pub_key,q)>=0)
 		*ret|=DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+	if (FIPS_mode())
+		{
+		BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
 
+		ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+		if (ctx == NULL)
+			goto err;
+
+		if (BN_mod_exp_mont(q, pub_key, dh->q, dh->p, ctx, NULL) <= 0)
+			{
+			BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		if (!BN_is_one(q))
+			{
+			/* it would be more correct to add new return flag 
+			 * for this test, but we do not want to do it
+			 * so just error out
+			 */
+			BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		
+		BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+		}
+#endif
 	ok = 1;
 err:
 	if (q != NULL) BN_free(q);
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c.fips-reqs	2013-11-26 14:36:35.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c	2013-12-11 16:47:25.882425812 +0100
@@ -159,7 +159,6 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_
 	    }
 
 	if (FIPS_module_mode() &&
-	    (bits != 1024 || qbits != 160) &&
 	    (bits != 2048 || qbits != 224) &&
 	    (bits != 2048 || qbits != 256) &&
 	    (bits != 3072 || qbits != 256))
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa.h.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa.h
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa.h.fips-reqs	2013-11-26 14:36:35.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa.h	2013-12-13 11:53:04.637827187 +0100
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@
 #endif
 
 #define OPENSSL_DSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024
+#define OPENSSL_DSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS_GEN 2048
 
 #define DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P	0x01
 #define DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME       0x02 /* new with 0.9.7h; the built-in DSA
@@ -254,9 +255,9 @@ int	DSAparams_print_fp(FILE *fp, const D
 int	DSA_print_fp(FILE *bp, const DSA *x, int off);
 #endif
 
-#define DSS_prime_checks 50
-/* Primality test according to FIPS PUB 186[-1], Appendix 2.1:
- * 50 rounds of Rabin-Miller */
+#define DSS_prime_checks 64
+/* Primality test according to FIPS PUB 186[-4], Appendix 2.1:
+ * 64 rounds of Rabin-Miller */
 #define DSA_is_prime(n, callback, cb_arg) \
 	BN_is_prime(n, DSS_prime_checks, callback, NULL, cb_arg)
 
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_key.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_key.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_key.c.fips-reqs	2013-12-11 16:34:58.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_key.c	2013-12-11 16:47:57.815146894 +0100
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ static int dsa_builtin_keygen(DSA *dsa)
 
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
 	if (FIPS_mode() && !(dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)
-		&& (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) < OPENSSL_DSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))
+		&& (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) < OPENSSL_DSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS_GEN))
 		{
 		DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, DSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
 		goto err;
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_drbg_rand.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_drbg_rand.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_drbg_rand.c.fips-reqs	2013-11-26 14:36:35.551708593 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_drbg_rand.c	2013-11-26 14:36:35.601709689 +0100
@@ -77,7 +77,8 @@ static int fips_drbg_bytes(unsigned char
 	int rv = 0;
 	unsigned char *adin = NULL;
 	size_t adinlen = 0;
-	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+	int locked;
+	locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
 	do 
 		{
 		size_t rcnt;
@@ -109,7 +110,8 @@ static int fips_drbg_bytes(unsigned char
 	while (count);
 	rv = 1;
 	err:
-	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+	if (locked)
+		private_RAND_lock(0);
 	return rv;
 	}
 
@@ -141,8 +143,13 @@ static void fips_drbg_cleanup(void)
 static int fips_drbg_seed(const void *seed, int seedlen)
 	{
 	DRBG_CTX *dctx = &ossl_dctx;
+	int locked;
+
+	locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
 	if (dctx->rand_seed_cb)
 		return dctx->rand_seed_cb(dctx, seed, seedlen);
+	if (locked)
+		private_RAND_lock(0);
 	return 1;
 	}
 
@@ -150,8 +157,13 @@ static int fips_drbg_add(const void *see
 					double add_entropy)
 	{
 	DRBG_CTX *dctx = &ossl_dctx;
+	int locked;
+
+	locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
 	if (dctx->rand_add_cb)
 		return dctx->rand_add_cb(dctx, seed, seedlen, add_entropy);
+	if (locked)
+		private_RAND_lock(0);
 	return 1;
 	}
 
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_rsa_selftest.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_rsa_selftest.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_rsa_selftest.c.fips-reqs	2013-11-26 14:36:35.555708680 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_rsa_selftest.c	2013-11-26 14:36:35.601709689 +0100
@@ -340,6 +340,42 @@ static const unsigned char kat_RSA_X931_
   0x60, 0x83, 0x18, 0x88, 0xA3, 0xF5, 0x59, 0xC3
 };
 
+static int fips_rsa_encrypt_test(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *plaintext, int ptlen)
+	{
+	unsigned char *ctbuf = NULL, *ptbuf = NULL;
+	int ret = 0;
+	int len;
+
+	ctbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
+	if (!ctbuf)
+		goto err;
+
+	len = RSA_public_encrypt(ptlen, plaintext, ctbuf, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+	if (len <= 0)
+		goto err;
+	/* Check ciphertext doesn't match plaintext */
+	if (len >= ptlen && !memcmp(plaintext, ctbuf, ptlen))
+		goto err;
+
+	ptbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
+	if (!ptbuf)
+		goto err;
+
+	len = RSA_private_decrypt(len, ctbuf, ptbuf, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+	if (len != ptlen)
+		goto err;
+	if (memcmp(ptbuf, plaintext, len))
+		goto err;
+
+	ret = 1;
+
+	err:
+	if (ctbuf)
+		OPENSSL_free(ctbuf);
+	if (ptbuf)
+		OPENSSL_free(ptbuf);
+	return ret;
+	}
 
 int FIPS_selftest_rsa()
 	{
@@ -353,7 +389,7 @@ int FIPS_selftest_rsa()
 	if ((pk=EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
 		goto err;
 
-	EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pk, key);
+	EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pk, key);
 
 	if (!fips_pkey_signature_test(pk, kat_tbs, sizeof(kat_tbs) - 1,
 				kat_RSA_SHA1, sizeof(kat_RSA_SHA1),
@@ -430,13 +466,15 @@ int FIPS_selftest_rsa()
 			"RSA SHA512 X931"))
 		goto err;
 
+	if (!fips_rsa_encrypt_test(key, kat_tbs, sizeof(kat_tbs) - 1))
+		goto err;
 
 	ret = 1;
 
 	err:
 	if (pk)
 		EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
-	else if (key)
+	if (key)
 		RSA_free(key);
 	return ret;
 	}
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/gcm128.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/gcm128.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/gcm128.c.fips-reqs	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/gcm128.c	2013-11-26 14:36:35.601709689 +0100
@@ -898,6 +898,10 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT
 # endif
 #endif
 
+	ctx->totlen += len;
+	if (ctx->totlen>(U64(1)<<36) || (sizeof(len)==8 && ctx->totlen<len))
+		return -1;
+
 #if 0
 	n = (unsigned int)mlen%16; /* alternative to ctx->mres */
 #endif
@@ -1200,6 +1204,10 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(GCM128_C
 # endif
 #endif
 
+	ctx->totlen += len;
+	if (ctx->totlen>(U64(1)<<36) || (sizeof(len)==8 && ctx->totlen<len))
+		return -1;
+
 	mlen += len;
 	if (mlen>((U64(1)<<36)-32) || (sizeof(len)==8 && mlen<len))
 		return -1;
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h.fips-reqs	2013-11-26 14:36:35.089698458 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h	2013-11-26 14:36:35.601709689 +0100
@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ struct gcm128_context {
 	unsigned int mres, ares;
 	block128_f block;
 	void *key;
+	u64 totlen;
 };
 
 struct xts128_context {
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/md_rand.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/md_rand.c.fips-reqs	2013-11-26 14:36:35.557708724 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/md_rand.c	2013-11-26 14:36:35.602709711 +0100
@@ -143,12 +143,6 @@ static long md_count[2]={0,0};
 static double entropy=0;
 static int initialized=0;
 
-static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; /* may be set only when a thread
-                                           * holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND
-                                           * (to prevent double locking) */
-/* access to lockin_thread is synchronized by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 */
-static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */
-
 
 #ifdef PREDICT
 int rand_predictable=0;
@@ -196,7 +190,7 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *
 	long md_c[2];
 	unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
 	EVP_MD_CTX m;
-	int do_not_lock;
+	int locked;
 
 	/*
 	 * (Based on the rand(3) manpage)
@@ -213,19 +207,8 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *
          * hash function.
 	 */
 
-	/* check if we already have the lock */
-	if (crypto_lock_rand)
-		{
-		CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
-		CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
-		CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
-		do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
-		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
-		}
-	else
-		do_not_lock = 0;
+	locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
 
-	if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
 	st_idx=state_index;
 
 	/* use our own copies of the counters so that even
@@ -257,7 +240,8 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *
 
 	md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0);
 
-	if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+	if (locked)
+		private_RAND_lock(0);
 
 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m);
 	for (i=0; i<num; i+=MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)
@@ -308,7 +292,7 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *
 		}
 	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
 
-	if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+	locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
 	/* Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that
 	 * other thread's seeding remains without effect (except for
 	 * the incremented counter).  By XORing it we keep at least as
@@ -319,7 +303,8 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *
 		}
 	if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */
 	    entropy += add;
-	if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+	if (locked)
+		private_RAND_lock(0);
 	
 #if !defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
 	assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]);
@@ -344,6 +329,7 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned ch
 	pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
 #endif
 	int do_stir_pool = 0;
+	int locked;
 
 #ifdef PREDICT
 	if (rand_predictable)
@@ -381,13 +367,7 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned ch
 	 * global 'md'.
 	 */
 
-	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
-
-	/* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
-	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
-	CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid);
-	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
-	crypto_lock_rand = 1;
+	locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
 
 	/* always poll for external entropy in FIPS mode, drbg provides the 
 	 * expansion
@@ -461,9 +441,8 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned ch
 
 	md_count[0] += 1;
 
-	/* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
-	crypto_lock_rand = 0;
-	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+	if (locked)
+		private_RAND_lock(0);
 
 	while (num > 0)
 		{
@@ -515,10 +494,11 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned ch
 	MD_Init(&m);
 	MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
 	MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+	locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
 	MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
 	MD_Final(&m,md);
-	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+	if (locked)
+		private_RAND_lock(0);
 
 	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
 	if (ok)
@@ -548,32 +528,10 @@ static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsi
 
 static int ssleay_rand_status(void)
 	{
-	CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
 	int ret;
-	int do_not_lock;
+	int locked;
 
-	CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
-	/* check if we already have the lock
-	 * (could happen if a RAND_poll() implementation calls RAND_status()) */
-	if (crypto_lock_rand)
-		{
-		CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
-		do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
-		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
-		}
-	else
-		do_not_lock = 0;
-	
-	if (!do_not_lock)
-		{
-		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
-		
-		/* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
-		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
-		CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&locking_threadid, &cur);
-		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
-		crypto_lock_rand = 1;
-		}
+	locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
 	
 	if (!initialized)
 		{
@@ -583,13 +541,8 @@ static int ssleay_rand_status(void)
 
 	ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED;
 
-	if (!do_not_lock)
-		{
-		/* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
-		crypto_lock_rand = 0;
-		
-		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
-		}
+	if (locked)
+		private_RAND_lock(0);
 	
 	return ret;
 	}
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand.h.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand.h
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand.h.fips-reqs	2013-11-26 14:36:35.558708746 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand.h	2013-11-26 14:36:35.602709711 +0100
@@ -124,6 +124,8 @@ void RAND_set_fips_drbg_type(int type, i
 int RAND_init_fips(void);
 #endif
 
+int private_RAND_lock(int lock);
+
 /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
 /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
  * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h.fips-reqs	2013-11-26 14:36:35.239701748 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h	2013-11-26 14:36:35.602709711 +0100
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@
 #ifndef HEADER_RAND_LCL_H
 #define HEADER_RAND_LCL_H
 
-#define ENTROPY_NEEDED 32  /* require 256 bits = 32 bytes of randomness */
+#define ENTROPY_NEEDED 48  /* require 384 bits = 48 bytes of randomness */
 
 
 #if !defined(USE_MD5_RAND) && !defined(USE_SHA1_RAND) && !defined(USE_MDC2_RAND) && !defined(USE_MD2_RAND)
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c.fips-reqs	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c	2013-11-26 14:36:35.602709711 +0100
@@ -181,6 +181,41 @@ int RAND_status(void)
 	return 0;
 	}
 
+int private_RAND_lock(int lock)
+	{
+	static int crypto_lock_rand;
+	static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid;
+	int do_lock;
+
+	if (!lock)
+		{
+		crypto_lock_rand = 0;
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+		return 0;
+		}
+
+	/* check if we already have the lock */
+	if (crypto_lock_rand)
+		{
+		CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
+		CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
+		CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+		do_lock = !!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
+		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+		}
+        else
+		do_lock = 1;
+	if (do_lock)
+		{
+		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+		crypto_lock_rand = 1;
+		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+		CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid);
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+		}
+	return do_lock;
+	}
+
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
 
 /* FIPS DRBG initialisation code. This sets up the DRBG for use by the
@@ -239,12 +274,14 @@ static int drbg_rand_add(DRBG_CTX *ctx,
 				double entropy)
 	{
 	RAND_SSLeay()->add(in, inlen, entropy);
+	FIPS_drbg_reseed(ctx, NULL, 0);
 	return 1;
 	}
 
 static int drbg_rand_seed(DRBG_CTX *ctx, const void *in, int inlen)
 	{
 	RAND_SSLeay()->seed(in, inlen);
+	FIPS_drbg_reseed(ctx, NULL, 0);
 	return 1;
 	}
 
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c.fips-reqs	2013-11-26 14:36:35.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c	2013-12-11 16:45:18.661552527 +0100
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa,
 	    	return 0;
 	    	}
 
-		if (bits < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS)
+		if (bits < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS_GEN)
 		    {
 		    FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN,FIPS_R_KEY_TOO_SHORT);
 		    return 0;
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rsa/rsa.h.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rsa/rsa.h.fips-reqs	2013-11-26 14:36:35.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rsa/rsa.h	2013-12-11 16:45:05.937265150 +0100
@@ -166,6 +166,8 @@ struct rsa_st
 
 #define OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024
 
+#define OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS_GEN 2048
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS
 # define OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS	3072
 #endif
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_enc.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_enc.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_enc.c.fips-reqs	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_enc.c	2013-11-26 14:36:35.603709733 +0100
@@ -291,6 +291,27 @@ static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask,
 err:
 	return ret;
 }
+
+int private_tls1_PRF(long digest_mask,
+		     const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
+		     const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
+		     const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
+		     const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
+		     const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
+		     const unsigned char *sec, int slen,
+		     unsigned char *out1,
+		     unsigned char *out2, int olen)
+	{
+	return tls1_PRF(digest_mask,
+		seed1, seed1_len,
+		seed2, seed2_len,
+		seed3, seed3_len,
+		seed4, seed4_len,
+		seed5, seed5_len,
+		sec, slen,
+		out1, out2, olen);
+	}
+
 static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
 	     unsigned char *tmp, int num)
 	{