Multiple security issues fixed.

- fix CVE-2016-2105 - possible overflow in base64 encoding - fix CVE-2016-2106 - possible overflow in EVP_EncryptUpdate() - fix CVE-2016-2107 - padding oracle in stitched AES-NI CBC-MAC - fix CVE-2016-2108 - memory corruption in ASN.1 encoder - fix CVE-2016-2109 - possible DoS when reading ASN.1 data from BIO
Add missing file.
2016-05-03 18:29:16 +02:00 · 2016-03-02 11:05:10 +01:00 · 2016-03-02 11:00:13 +01:00 · 2015-12-04 16:38:05 +01:00 · 2015-08-13 08:09:25 -04:00 · 2015-07-09 15:36:41 +02:00
23 changed files with 3357 additions and 1 deletions
--- a/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1789.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1789.patch
@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.oob-read openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.oob-read	2015-05-25 12:03:41.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c	2015-06-09 15:01:51.688640453 +0200
+@@ -1702,49 +1702,92 @@ int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm,
+ 	ASN1_TIME atm;
+ 	long offset;
+ 	char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
+-	int i,j;
+	int i, j, remaining;
+ 
+ 	p=buff1;
+-	i=ctm->length;
+	remaining=ctm->length;
+ 	str=(char *)ctm->data;
+	/*
+	 * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
+	 * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
+	 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
+	 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
+	 */
+ 	if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
+ 		{
+-		if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
+		/* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
+		int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
+		int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
+		if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
+			return 0;
+ 		memcpy(p,str,10);
+ 		p+=10;
+ 		str+=10;
+		remaining -= 10;
+ 		}
+ 	else
+ 		{
+-		if (i < 13) return 0;
+		/* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
+		int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
+		int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
+		if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
+			return 0;
+ 		memcpy(p,str,12);
+ 		p+=12;
+ 		str+=12;
+		remaining -= 12;
+ 		}
+ 
+ 	if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
+ 		{ *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
+ 	else
+ 		{ 
+		/* SS (seconds) */
+		if (remaining < 2)
+			return 0;
+ 		*(p++)= *(str++);
+ 		*(p++)= *(str++);
+-		/* Skip any fractional seconds... */
+-		if (*str == '.')
+		remaining -= 2;
+		/*
+		 * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
+		 * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
+		 * Can we just kill them altogether?
+		 */
+		if (remaining && *str == '.')
+ 			{
+ 			str++;
+-			while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
+			remaining--;
+			for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--)
+				{
+				if (*str < '0' || *str > '9')
+					break;
+				}
+ 			}
+ 		
+ 		}
+ 	*(p++)='Z';
+ 	*(p++)='\0';
+ 
+	/* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
+	if (!remaining)
+		return 0;
+ 	if (*str == 'Z')
+		{
+		if (remaining != 1)
+			return 0;
+ 		offset=0;
+		}
+ 	else
+ 		{
+	        /* (+-)HHMM */
+ 		if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
+ 			return 0;
+		/* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
+		if (remaining != 5)
+			return 0;
+		if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' ||
+			str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9')
+			return 0;
+ 		offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
+ 		offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
+ 		if (*str == '-')
--- a/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1790.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1790.patch
@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c.missing-content openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c.missing-content	2015-05-25 12:03:41.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c	2015-06-09 15:21:21.377951520 +0200
+@@ -472,6 +472,12 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
+ 	switch (i)
+ 		{
+ 	case NID_pkcs7_signed:
+		/*
+		 * p7->d.sign->contents is a PKCS7 structure consisting of a contentType
+		 * field and optional content.
+		 * data_body is NULL if that structure has no (=detached) content
+		 * or if the contentType is wrong (i.e., not "data").
+		 */
+ 		data_body=PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.sign->contents);
+ 		if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7) && data_body == NULL)
+ 			{
+@@ -484,6 +490,7 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
+ 	case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
+ 		rsk=p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->recipientinfo;
+ 		md_sk=p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->md_algs;
+		/* data_body is NULL if the optional EncryptedContent is missing. */
+ 		data_body=p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
+ 		enc_alg=p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
+ 		evp_cipher=EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
+@@ -496,6 +503,7 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
+ 	case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
+ 		rsk=p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo;
+ 		enc_alg=p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
+		/* data_body is NULL if the optional EncryptedContent is missing. */
+ 		data_body=p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
+ 		evp_cipher=EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
+ 		if (evp_cipher == NULL)
+@@ -509,6 +517,13 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
+ 	        goto err;
+ 		}
+ 
+	/* Detached content must be supplied via in_bio instead. */
+	if (data_body == NULL && in_bio == NULL)
+		{
+		PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+ 	/* We will be checking the signature */
+ 	if (md_sk != NULL)
+ 		{
+@@ -665,7 +680,7 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
+ 		}
+ 
+ #if 1
+-	if (PKCS7_is_detached(p7) || (in_bio != NULL))
+	if (in_bio != NULL)
+ 		{
+ 		bio=in_bio;
+ 		}
--- a/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1792.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1792.patch
@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c.unknown-hash openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c.unknown-hash	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c	2015-06-09 16:07:16.001516190 +0200
+@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ static void do_free_upto(BIO *f, BIO *up
+ 			BIO_free(f);
+ 			f = tbio;
+ 			}
+-		while (f != upto);
+		while (f && f != upto);
+ 		}
+ 	else
+ 		BIO_free_all(f);
--- a/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-3194.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-3194.patch
@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c.pss-check openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c.pss-check	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c	2015-12-04 09:03:18.300660817 +0100
+@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_decode(co
+ 		{
+ 		ASN1_TYPE *param = pss->maskGenAlgorithm->parameter;
+ 		if (OBJ_obj2nid(pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) == NID_mgf1
+-			&& param->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+			&& param && param->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+ 			{
+ 			p = param->value.sequence->data;
+ 			plen = param->value.sequence->length;
--- a/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-3195.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-3195.patch
@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c.combine-leak openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c.combine-leak	2015-12-04 09:01:53.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c	2015-12-04 09:09:30.629793475 +0100
+@@ -169,6 +169,8 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
+ 	int otag;
+ 	int ret = 0;
+ 	ASN1_VALUE **pchptr, *ptmpval;
+	int combine = aclass & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE;
+	aclass &= ~ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE;
+ 	if (!pval)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	if (aux && aux->asn1_cb)
+@@ -539,7 +541,8 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
+ 	auxerr:
+ 	ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR);
+ 	err:
+-	ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
+	if (combine == 0)
+		ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
+ 	if (errtt)
+ 		ERR_add_error_data(4, "Field=", errtt->field_name,
+ 					", Type=", it->sname);
+@@ -767,7 +770,7 @@ static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_
+ 		{
+ 		/* Nothing special */
+ 		ret = ASN1_item_ex_d2i(val, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
+-							-1, 0, opt, ctx);
+							-1, tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE, opt, ctx);
+ 		if (!ret)
+ 			{
+ 			ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I,
--- a/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-3197.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-3197.patch
@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_srvr.c.ssl2-ciphers openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_srvr.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_srvr.c.ssl2-ciphers	2016-01-14 17:38:50.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_srvr.c	2016-02-16 16:18:59.790225008 +0100
+@@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
+ 			}
+ 
+ 		cp=ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(p);
+-		if (cp == NULL)
+		if (cp == NULL || sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(s->session->ciphers, cp) < 0)
+ 			{
+ 			ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
+ 			SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
+@@ -692,9 +692,13 @@ static int get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ 		    prio = cs;
+ 		    allow = cl;
+ 		    }
+
+		/* Generate list of SSLv2 ciphers shared between client and server */
+ 		for (z=0; z<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); z++)
+ 			{
+-			if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow,sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio,z)) < 0)
+			const SSL_CIPHER *cp = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio, z);
+			if ((cp->algorithm_ssl & SSL_SSLV2) == 0 ||
+				sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow,cp) < 0)
+ 				{
+ 				(void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_delete(prio,z);
+ 				z--;
+@@ -705,6 +709,14 @@ static int get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ 		    sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
+ 		    s->session->ciphers = prio;
+ 		    }
+
+		/* Make sure we have at least one cipher in common */
+		if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(s->session->ciphers) == 0)
+		    {
+		    ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
+		    SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
+		    return -1;
+		    }
+ 		/* s->session->ciphers should now have a list of
+ 		 * ciphers that are on both the client and server.
+ 		 * This list is ordered by the order the client sent
--- a/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2016-0705.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2016-0705.patch
@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c.dsa-doublefree openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c.dsa-doublefree	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c	2016-02-24 14:38:46.075165304 +0100
+@@ -201,6 +201,8 @@ static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pke
+ 	STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) *ndsa = NULL;
+ 	DSA *dsa = NULL;
+ 
+	int ret = 0;
+
+ 	if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, p8))
+ 		return 0;
+ 	X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, &pval, palg);
+@@ -281,23 +283,21 @@ static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pke
+ 		}
+ 
+ 	EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa);
+-	BN_CTX_free (ctx);
+-	if(ndsa)
+-		sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(ndsa, ASN1_TYPE_free);
+-	else
+-		ASN1_INTEGER_free(privkey);
+ 
+-	return 1;
+	ret = 1;
+	goto done;
+ 
+ 	decerr:
+ 	DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ 	dsaerr:
+-	BN_CTX_free (ctx);
+-	if (privkey)
+-		ASN1_INTEGER_free(privkey);
+-	sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(ndsa, ASN1_TYPE_free);
+ 	DSA_free(dsa);
+-	return 0;
+	done:
+	BN_CTX_free (ctx);
+	if (ndsa)
+		sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(ndsa, ASN1_TYPE_free);
+	else
+		ASN1_INTEGER_free(privkey);
+	return ret;
+ 	}
+ 
+ static int dsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
--- a/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2016-0797.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2016-0797.patch
@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/bn/bn.h.bn-hex openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/bn/bn.h
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/bn/bn.h.bn-hex	2016-02-24 14:23:33.020233047 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/bn/bn.h	2016-02-24 14:23:06.078615397 +0100
+@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
+ #include <stdio.h> /* FILE */
+ #endif
+#include <limits.h>
+ #include <openssl/ossl_typ.h>
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ 
+@@ -640,7 +641,8 @@ const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_521(voi
+ 
+ /* library internal functions */
+ 
+-#define bn_expand(a,bits) ((((((bits+BN_BITS2-1))/BN_BITS2)) <= (a)->dmax)?\
+#define bn_expand(a,bits) (bits > (INT_MAX - BN_BITS2 + 1)?\
+	NULL:(((((bits+BN_BITS2-1))/BN_BITS2)) <= (a)->dmax)?\
+ 	(a):bn_expand2((a),(bits+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2))
+ #define bn_wexpand(a,words) (((words) <= (a)->dmax)?(a):bn_expand2((a),(words)))
+ BIGNUM *bn_expand2(BIGNUM *a, int words);
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/bn/bn_print.c.bn-hex openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/bn/bn_print.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/bn/bn_print.c.bn-hex	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/bn/bn_print.c	2016-02-24 14:15:21.215948376 +0100
+@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <ctype.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+ #include "cryptlib.h"
+ #include <openssl/buffer.h>
+ #include "bn_lcl.h"
+@@ -180,8 +181,10 @@ int BN_hex2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a
+ 
+ 	if (*a == '-') { neg=1; a++; }
+ 
+-	for (i=0; isxdigit((unsigned char) a[i]); i++)
+	for (i=0; i <= (INT_MAX/4) && isxdigit((unsigned char) a[i]); i++)
+ 		;
+	if (i > INT_MAX/4)
+		goto err;
+ 
+ 	num=i+neg;
+ 	if (bn == NULL) return(num);
+@@ -197,7 +200,7 @@ int BN_hex2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a
+ 		BN_zero(ret);
+ 		}
+ 
+-	/* i is the number of hex digests; */
+	/* i is the number of hex digits */
+ 	if (bn_expand(ret,i*4) == NULL) goto err;
+ 
+ 	j=i; /* least significant 'hex' */
+@@ -246,8 +249,10 @@ int BN_dec2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a
+ 	if ((a == NULL) || (*a == '\0')) return(0);
+ 	if (*a == '-') { neg=1; a++; }
+ 
+-	for (i=0; isdigit((unsigned char) a[i]); i++)
+	for (i=0; i <= (INT_MAX/4) && isdigit((unsigned char) a[i]); i++)
+ 		;
+	if (i > INT_MAX/4)
+		goto err;
+ 
+ 	num=i+neg;
+ 	if (bn == NULL) return(num);
+@@ -264,7 +269,7 @@ int BN_dec2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a
+ 		BN_zero(ret);
+ 		}
+ 
+-	/* i is the number of digests, a bit of an over expand; */
+	/* i is the number of digits, a bit of an over expand */
+ 	if (bn_expand(ret,i*4) == NULL) goto err;
+ 
+ 	j=BN_DEC_NUM-(i%BN_DEC_NUM);
--- a/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2016-2105.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2016-2105.patch
@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/evp/encode.c.b64-overflow openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/evp/encode.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/evp/encode.c.b64-overflow	2016-04-07 15:45:20.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/evp/encode.c	2016-04-29 12:46:34.232656522 +0200
+@@ -132,12 +132,12 @@ void EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ct
+ 	     const unsigned char *in, int inl)
+ 	{
+ 	int i,j;
+-	unsigned int total=0;
+	size_t total=0;
+ 
+ 	*outl=0;
+ 	if (inl == 0) return;
+ 	OPENSSL_assert(ctx->length <= (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
+-	if ((ctx->num+inl) < ctx->length)
+	if (ctx->length - ctx->num > inl)
+ 		{
+ 		memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[ctx->num]),in,inl);
+ 		ctx->num+=inl;
+@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ void EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ct
+ 		*out='\0';
+ 		total=j+1;
+ 		}
+-	while (inl >= ctx->length)
+	while (inl >= ctx->length && total <= INT_MAX)
+ 		{
+ 		j=EVP_EncodeBlock(out,in,ctx->length);
+ 		in+=ctx->length;
+@@ -166,6 +166,12 @@ void EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ct
+ 		*out='\0';
+ 		total+=j+1;
+ 		}
+	if (total > INT_MAX)
+		{
+		/* Too much output data! */
+		*outl = 0;
+		return;
+		}
+ 	if (inl != 0)
+ 		memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[0]),in,inl);
+ 	ctx->num=inl;
--- a/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2016-2106.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2016-2106.patch
@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c.enc-overflow openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c.enc-overflow	2016-04-29 12:42:43.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c	2016-04-29 12:56:50.253736555 +0200
+@@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ct
+ 	OPENSSL_assert(bl <= (int)sizeof(ctx->buf));
+ 	if (i != 0)
+ 		{
+-		if (i+inl < bl)
+		if (bl - i > inl)
+ 			{
+ 			memcpy(&(ctx->buf[i]),in,inl);
+ 			ctx->buf_len+=inl;
--- a/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2016-2107.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2016-2107.patch
@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c.padding-check openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c.padding-check	2016-04-29 12:42:43.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c	2016-04-29 13:10:13.441125487 +0200
+@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/aes.h>
+ #include <openssl/sha.h>
+ #include "evp_locl.h"
+#include "constant_time_locl.h"
+ 
+ #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER
+ #define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER	0x200000
+@@ -278,6 +279,8 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher(EV
+ 			maxpad |= (255-maxpad)>>(sizeof(maxpad)*8-8);
+ 			maxpad &= 255;
+ 
+			ret &= constant_time_ge(maxpad, pad);
+
+ 			inp_len = len - (SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH+pad+1);
+ 			mask = (0-((inp_len-len)>>(sizeof(inp_len)*8-1)));
+ 			inp_len &= mask;
--- a/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2016-2108.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2016-2108.patch
@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_int.c.asn1-negative openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_int.c.asn1-negative	2016-04-29 13:23:05.221797998 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_int.c	2016-04-29 13:26:51.030957218 +0200
+@@ -124,6 +124,8 @@ int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a, un
+ 		{
+ 		ret=a->length;
+ 		i=a->data[0];
+		if (ret == 1 && i == 0)
+			neg = 0;
+ 		if (!neg && (i > 127)) {
+ 			pad=1;
+ 			pb=0;
+@@ -157,7 +159,7 @@ int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a, un
+ 		p += a->length - 1;
+ 		i = a->length;
+ 		/* Copy zeros to destination as long as source is zero */
+-		while(!*n) {
+		while(!*n && i > 1) {
+ 			*(p--) = 0;
+ 			n--;
+ 			i--;
+@@ -415,7 +417,7 @@ ASN1_INTEGER *BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(const B
+ 		ASN1err(ASN1_F_BN_TO_ASN1_INTEGER,ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+ 		goto err;
+ 		}
+-	if (BN_is_negative(bn))
+	if (BN_is_negative(bn) && !BN_is_zero(bn))
+ 		ret->type = V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER;
+ 	else ret->type=V_ASN1_INTEGER;
+ 	j=BN_num_bits(bn);
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_type.c.asn1-negative openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_type.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_type.c.asn1-negative	2016-04-29 12:42:43.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_type.c	2016-04-29 13:28:40.202443787 +0200
+@@ -131,9 +131,7 @@ int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, co
+ 		result = 0;	/* They do not have content. */
+ 		break;
+ 	case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
+-	case V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER:
+ 	case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
+-	case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED:
+ 	case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING:
+ 	case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:
+ 	case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE:
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c.asn1-negative openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c.asn1-negative	2016-04-29 12:42:43.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c	2016-04-29 13:30:08.560456293 +0200
+@@ -1011,9 +1011,7 @@ int asn1_ex_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const
+ 		break;
+ 
+ 		case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
+-		case V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER:
+ 		case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
+-		case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED:
+ 		tint = (ASN1_INTEGER **)pval;
+ 		if (!c2i_ASN1_INTEGER(tint, &cont, len))
+ 			goto err;
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c.asn1-negative openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c.asn1-negative	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c	2016-04-29 13:30:34.688051394 +0200
+@@ -638,9 +638,7 @@ int asn1_ex_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsig
+ 		break;
+ 
+ 		case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
+-		case V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER:
+ 		case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
+-		case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED:
+ 		/* These are all have the same content format
+ 		 * as ASN1_INTEGER
+ 		 */
--- a/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2016-2109.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2016-2109.patch
@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c.asn1-bio-dos openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c.asn1-bio-dos	2013-02-11 16:02:47.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c	2016-04-29 13:44:52.205538739 +0200
+@@ -139,6 +139,7 @@ void *ASN1_item_d2i_fp(const ASN1_ITEM *
+ #endif
+ 
+ #define HEADER_SIZE   8
+#define ASN1_CHUNK_INITIAL_SIZE (16 * 1024)
+ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
+ 	{
+ 	BUF_MEM *b;
+@@ -230,6 +231,8 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BU
+ 			want=c.slen;
+ 			if (want > (len-off))
+ 				{
+				size_t chunk_max = ASN1_CHUNK_INITIAL_SIZE;
+
+ 				want-=(len-off);
+ 				if (want > INT_MAX /* BIO_read takes an int length */ ||
+ 					len+want < len)
+@@ -237,24 +240,38 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BU
+ 						ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+ 						goto err;
+ 						}
+-				if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b,len+want))
+-					{
+-					ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+-					goto err;
+-					}
+ 				while (want > 0)
+ 					{
+-					i=BIO_read(in,&(b->data[len]),want);
+-					if (i <= 0)
+					/*
+					 * Read content in chunks of increasing size
+					 * so we can return an error for EOF without
+					 * having to allocate the entire content length
+					 * in one go.
+					 */
+					size_t chunk = want > chunk_max ? chunk_max : want;
+
+					if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b, len + chunk))
+ 						{
+-						ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,
+-						    ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA);
+						ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ 						goto err;
+ 						}
+-					/* This can't overflow because
+-					 * |len+want| didn't overflow. */
+-					len+=i;
+-					want-=i;
+					want -= chunk;
+					while (chunk > 0)
+						{
+						i = BIO_read(in, &(b->data[len]), chunk);
+						if (i <= 0)
+							{
+							ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,
+								ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA);
+							goto err;
+							}
+						/* This can't overflow because
+						 * |len+want| didn't overflow. */
+						len += i;
+						chunk -= i;
+						}
+					if (chunk_max < INT_MAX/2)
+						chunk_max *= 2;
+ 					}
+ 				}
+ 			if (off + c.slen < off)
--- a/openssl-1.0.1h-disable-sslv2v3.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1h-disable-sslv2v3.patch
@ -11,3 +11,73 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1h/ssl/ssl_lib.c.v2v3 openssl-1.0.1h/ssl/ssl_lib.c
 	return(ret);
 err:
 	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/ciphers.pod.disable-sslv2 openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/ciphers.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/ciphers.pod.disable-sslv2	2016-01-14 17:38:50.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/ciphers.pod	2016-02-24 11:17:36.297955053 +0100
+@@ -572,11 +572,11 @@ Note: these ciphers can also be used in
+ =head2 Deprecated SSL v2.0 cipher suites.
+ 
+  SSL_CK_RC4_128_WITH_MD5                 RC4-MD5
+- SSL_CK_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5        EXP-RC4-MD5
+- SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5             RC2-MD5
+- SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5    EXP-RC2-MD5
+ SSL_CK_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5        Not implemented.
+ SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5             RC2-CBC-MD5
+ SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5    Not implemented.
+  SSL_CK_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5            IDEA-CBC-MD5
+- SSL_CK_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5              DES-CBC-MD5
+ SSL_CK_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5              Not implemented.
+  SSL_CK_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5        DES-CBC3-MD5
+ 
+ =head1 NOTES
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c.disable-sslv2 openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c.disable-sslv2	2016-02-24 11:23:24.012237164 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c	2016-02-24 11:19:34.623773423 +0100
+@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_cip
+ 	128,
+ 	},
+ 
+#if 0
+ /* RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 */
+ 	{
+ 	1,
+@@ -171,6 +172,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_cip
+ 	40,
+ 	128,
+ 	},
+#endif
+ 
+ /* RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 */
+ 	{
+@@ -188,6 +190,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_cip
+ 	128,
+ 	},
+ 
+#if 0
+ /* RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 */
+ 	{
+ 	1,
+@@ -203,6 +206,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_cip
+ 	40,
+ 	128,
+ 	},
+#endif
+ 
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
+ /* IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 */
+@@ -222,6 +226,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_cip
+ 	},
+ #endif
+ 
+#if 0
+ /* DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5 */
+ 	{
+ 	1,
+@@ -237,6 +242,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_cip
+ 	56,
+ 	56,
+ 	},
+#endif
+ 
+ /* DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5 */
+ 	{
--- a/openssl-1.0.1k-alt-chains.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1k-alt-chains.patch
@ -0,0 +1,407 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/apps/apps.c.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/apps/apps.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/apps/apps.c.alt-chains	2015-07-09 14:58:55.949753674 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/apps/apps.c	2015-07-09 14:58:55.970754174 +0200
+@@ -2365,6 +2365,8 @@ int args_verify(char ***pargs, int *parg
+ 		flags |= X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY;
+ 	else if (!strcmp(arg, "-check_ss_sig"))
+ 		flags |= X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE;
+	else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no_alt_chains"))
+		flags |= X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS;
+ 	else if (!strcmp(arg, "-trusted_first"))
+ 		flags |= X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST;
+ 	else
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/apps/cms.c.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/apps/cms.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/apps/cms.c.alt-chains	2015-07-09 14:58:55.949753674 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/apps/cms.c	2015-07-09 14:58:55.970754174 +0200
+@@ -642,6 +642,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-text          include or delete text MIME headers\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CApath dir    trusted certificates directory\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CAfile file   trusted certificates file\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_alt_chains only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-trusted_first use trusted certificates first when building the trust chain\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-crl_check     check revocation status of signer's certificate using CRLs\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-crl_check_all check revocation status of signer's certificate chain using CRLs\n");
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/apps/ocsp.c.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/apps/ocsp.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/apps/ocsp.c.alt-chains	2015-07-09 14:58:55.949753674 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/apps/ocsp.c	2015-07-09 14:58:55.971754198 +0200
+@@ -605,6 +605,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-path                path to use in OCSP request\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CApath dir          trusted certificates directory\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CAfile file         trusted certificates file\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_alt_chains       only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-trusted_first       use trusted certificates first when building the trust chain\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-VAfile file         validator certificates file\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-validity_period n   maximum validity discrepancy in seconds\n");
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/apps/s_client.c.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/apps/s_client.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/apps/s_client.c.alt-chains	2015-07-09 14:58:55.956753841 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/apps/s_client.c	2015-07-09 14:58:55.971754198 +0200
+@@ -299,6 +299,7 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -pass arg     - private key file pass phrase source\n");
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -CApath arg   - PEM format directory of CA's\n");
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -CAfile arg   - PEM format file of CA's\n");
+	BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_alt_chains - only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -trusted_first - Use trusted CA's first when building the trust chain\n");
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -reconnect    - Drop and re-make the connection with the same Session-ID\n");
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -pause        - sleep(1) after each read(2) and write(2) system call\n");
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/apps/smime.c.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/apps/smime.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/apps/smime.c.alt-chains	2015-07-09 14:58:55.950753698 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/apps/smime.c	2015-07-09 14:58:55.971754198 +0200
+@@ -479,6 +479,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-text          include or delete text MIME headers\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CApath dir    trusted certificates directory\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CAfile file   trusted certificates file\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_alt_chains only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-trusted_first use trusted certificates first when building the trust chain\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-crl_check     check revocation status of signer's certificate using CRLs\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-crl_check_all check revocation status of signer's certificate chain using CRLs\n");
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/apps/s_server.c.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/apps/s_server.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/apps/s_server.c.alt-chains	2015-07-09 14:58:55.950753698 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/apps/s_server.c	2015-07-09 14:58:55.971754198 +0200
+@@ -502,6 +502,7 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -state        - Print the SSL states\n");
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -CApath arg   - PEM format directory of CA's\n");
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -CAfile arg   - PEM format file of CA's\n");
+	BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_alt_chains - only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -trusted_first - Use trusted CA's first when building the trust chain\n");
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -nocert       - Don't use any certificates (Anon-DH)\n");
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -cipher arg   - play with 'openssl ciphers' to see what goes here\n");
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/apps/verify.c.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/apps/verify.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/apps/verify.c.alt-chains	2015-07-09 14:58:55.951753722 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/apps/verify.c	2015-07-09 14:58:55.972754221 +0200
+@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
+ end:
+ 	if (ret == 1) {
+ 		BIO_printf(bio_err,"usage: verify [-verbose] [-CApath path] [-CAfile file] [-trusted_first] [-purpose purpose] [-crl_check]");
+-		BIO_printf(bio_err," [-attime timestamp]");
+		BIO_printf(bio_err," [-no_alt_chains] [-attime timestamp]");
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ 		BIO_printf(bio_err," [-engine e]");
+ #endif
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.alt-chains	2015-07-09 14:58:55.951753722 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c	2015-07-09 15:28:03.630442145 +0200
+@@ -154,11 +154,11 @@ static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X5
+ 
+ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+ 	{
+-	X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
+	X509 *x,*xtmp,*xtmp2,*chain_ss=NULL;
+ 	int bad_chain = 0;
+ 	X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
+ 	int depth,i,ok=0;
+-	int num;
+	int num, j, retry;
+ 	int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
+ 	STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
+ 	if (ctx->cert == NULL)
+@@ -167,21 +167,27 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx
+ 		return -1;
+ 		}
+ 
+        if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
+            /*
+             * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
+             * cannot do another one.
+             */
+            X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+            return -1;
+        }
+ 
+ 	cb=ctx->verify_cb;
+ 
+ 	/* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
+ 	 * present and that the first entry is in place */
+-	if (ctx->chain == NULL)
+	if (	((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
+		(!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
+ 		{
+-		if (	((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
+-			(!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
+-			{
+-			X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+-			goto end;
+-			}
+-		CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+-		ctx->last_untrusted=1;
+		X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto end;
+ 		}
+	CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+	ctx->last_untrusted=1;
+ 
+ 	/* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
+ 	if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
+@@ -247,10 +253,14 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx
+ 		break;
+ 		}
+ 
+	/* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
+	j = num;
+
+ 	/* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
+ 	 * certificates.  We now need to add at least one trusted one,
+ 	 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
+ 
+	do {
+ 	/* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
+  	 * is self signed.
+  	 */
+@@ -294,6 +304,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx
+ 			chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
+ 			ctx->last_untrusted--;
+ 			num--;
+			j--;
+ 			x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
+ 			}
+ 		}
+@@ -322,7 +333,42 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx
+ 		num++;
+ 		}
+ 
+-	/* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
+        /*
+         * If we haven't got a least one certificate from our store then check
+         * if there is an alternative chain that could be used.  We only do this
+         * if the user hasn't switched off alternate chain checking
+         */
+        retry = 0;
+        if (num == ctx->last_untrusted &&
+            !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
+            while (j-- > 1) {
+                xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
+                ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
+                if (ok < 0)
+                    goto end;
+                /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
+                if (ok > 0) {
+                    /*
+                     * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
+                     */
+                    X509_free(xtmp);
+
+                    /*
+                     * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
+                     * alternate chain
+                     */
+                    while (num > j) {
+                        xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
+                        X509_free(xtmp);
+                        num--;
+                    }
+                    ctx->last_untrusted = j;
+                    retry = 1;
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+	} while (retry);
+ 
+ 	/* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
+ 	if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h.alt-chains	2015-07-09 14:58:55.951753722 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h	2015-07-09 14:58:55.972754221 +0200
+@@ -391,7 +391,12 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE
+ #define X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE		0x4000
+ /* Use trusted store first */
+ #define X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST		0x8000
+-
+/*
+ * If the initial chain is not trusted, do not attempt to build an alternative
+ * chain. Alternate chain checking was introduced in 1.0.1n/1.0.2b. Setting
+ * this flag will force the behaviour to match that of previous versions.
+ */
+#define X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS               0x100000
+ 
+ #define X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT			0x1
+ #define X509_VP_FLAG_OVERWRITE			0x2
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/cms.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/cms.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/cms.pod.alt-chains	2015-07-09 14:58:55.951753722 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/cms.pod	2015-07-09 14:58:55.972754221 +0200
+@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ B<openssl> B<cms>
+ [B<-print>]
+ [B<-CAfile file>]
+ [B<-CApath dir>]
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]
+ [B<-trusted_first>]
+ [B<-md digest>]
+ [B<-[cipher]>]
+@@ -413,7 +414,7 @@ portion of a message so they may be incl
+ then many S/MIME mail clients check the signers certificate's email
+ address matches that specified in the From: address.
+ 
+-=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig>
+=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig -no_alt_chains>
+ 
+ Set various certificate chain valiadition option. See the
+ L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/ocsp.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/ocsp.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/ocsp.pod.alt-chains	2015-07-09 14:58:55.951753722 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/ocsp.pod	2015-07-09 14:58:55.973754245 +0200
+@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ B<openssl> B<ocsp>
+ [B<-path>]
+ [B<-CApath dir>]
+ [B<-CAfile file>]
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]]
+ [B<-trusted_first>]
+ [B<-VAfile file>]
+ [B<-validity_period n>]
+@@ -143,6 +144,10 @@ connection timeout to the OCSP responder
+ file or pathname containing trusted CA certificates. These are used to verify
+ the signature on the OCSP response.
+ 
+=item B<-no_alt_chains>
+
+See L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.
+
+ =item B<-trusted_first>
+ 
+ Use certificates in CA file or CA directory over certificates provided
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/s_client.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/s_client.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/s_client.pod.alt-chains	2015-07-09 14:58:55.952753746 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/s_client.pod	2015-07-09 14:58:55.973754245 +0200
+@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_client>
+ [B<-pass arg>]
+ [B<-CApath directory>]
+ [B<-CAfile filename>]
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]
+ [B<-trusted_first>]
+ [B<-reconnect>]
+ [B<-pause>]
+@@ -122,7 +123,7 @@ also used when building the client certi
+ A file containing trusted certificates to use during server authentication
+ and to use when attempting to build the client certificate chain.
+ 
+-=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig, -trusted_first>
+=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig -no_alt_chains>
+ 
+ Set various certificate chain valiadition option. See the
+ L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/smime.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/smime.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/smime.pod.alt-chains	2015-07-09 14:58:55.952753746 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/smime.pod	2015-07-09 14:58:55.973754245 +0200
+@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ B<openssl> B<smime>
+ [B<-in file>]
+ [B<-CAfile file>]
+ [B<-CApath dir>]
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]
+ [B<-trusted_first>]
+ [B<-certfile file>]
+ [B<-signer file>]
+@@ -268,7 +269,7 @@ portion of a message so they may be incl
+ then many S/MIME mail clients check the signers certificate's email
+ address matches that specified in the From: address.
+ 
+-=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig>
+=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig -no_alt_chains>
+ 
+ Set various options of certificate chain verification. See
+ L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/s_server.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/s_server.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/s_server.pod.alt-chains	2015-07-09 14:58:55.952753746 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/s_server.pod	2015-07-09 14:58:55.973754245 +0200
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_server>
+ [B<-state>]
+ [B<-CApath directory>]
+ [B<-CAfile filename>]
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]
+ [B<-trusted_first>]
+ [B<-nocert>]
+ [B<-cipher cipherlist>]
+@@ -179,6 +180,10 @@ and to use when attempting to build the
+ is also used in the list of acceptable client CAs passed to the client when
+ a certificate is requested.
+ 
+=item B<-no_alt_chains>
+
+See the L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.
+
+ =item B<-trusted_first>
+ 
+ Use certificates in CA file or CA directory before other certificates 
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/verify.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/verify.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/verify.pod.alt-chains	2015-07-09 14:58:55.952753746 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/verify.pod	2015-07-09 14:58:55.973754245 +0200
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ B<openssl> B<verify>
+ [B<-extended_crl>]
+ [B<-use_deltas>]
+ [B<-policy_print>]
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]
+ [B<-untrusted file>]
+ [B<-help>]
+ [B<-issuer_checks>]
+@@ -115,6 +116,14 @@ Set policy variable inhibit-any-policy (
+ 
+ Set policy variable inhibit-policy-mapping (see RFC5280).
+ 
+=item B<-no_alt_chains>
+
+When building a certificate chain, if the first certificate chain found is not
+trusted, then OpenSSL will continue to check to see if an alternative chain can
+be found that is trusted. With this option that behaviour is suppressed so that
+only the first chain found is ever used. Using this option will force the
+behaviour to match that of previous OpenSSL versions.
+
+ =item B<-policy_print>
+ 
+ Print out diagnostics related to policy processing.
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod.alt-chains	2014-10-15 15:49:15.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod	2015-07-09 15:29:16.461174414 +0200
+@@ -39,10 +39,15 @@ X509_STORE_CTX_free() completely frees u
+ is no longer valid.
+ 
+ X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets up B<ctx> for a subsequent verification operation.
+-The trusted certificate store is set to B<store>, the end entity certificate
+-to be verified is set to B<x509> and a set of additional certificates (which
+-will be untrusted but may be used to build the chain) in B<chain>. Any or
+-all of the B<store>, B<x509> and B<chain> parameters can be B<NULL>.
+It must be called before each call to X509_verify_cert(), i.e. a B<ctx> is only
+good for one call to X509_verify_cert(); if you want to verify a second
+certificate with the same B<ctx> then you must call X509_XTORE_CTX_cleanup()
+and then X509_STORE_CTX_init() again before the second call to
+X509_verify_cert(). The trusted certificate store is set to B<store>, the end
+entity certificate to be verified is set to B<x509> and a set of additional
+certificates (which will be untrusted but may be used to build the chain) in
+B<chain>. Any or all of the B<store>, B<x509> and B<chain> parameters can be
+B<NULL>.
+ 
+ X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack() sets the set of trusted certificates of B<ctx>
+ to B<sk>. This is an alternative way of specifying trusted certificates 
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod.alt-chains	2014-10-15 15:49:15.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod	2015-07-09 15:29:16.461174414 +0200
+@@ -32,7 +32,8 @@ OpenSSL internally for certificate valid
+ SSL/TLS code.
+ 
+ The negative return value from X509_verify_cert() can only occur if no
+-certificate is set in B<ctx> (due to a programming error) or if a retry
+certificate is set in B<ctx> (due to a programming error); if X509_verify_cert()
+twice without reinitialising B<ctx> in between; or if a retry
+ operation is requested during internal lookups (which never happens with
+ standard lookup methods). It is however recommended that application check
+ for <= 0 return value on error.
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod.alt-chains	2015-01-08 15:00:36.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod	2015-07-09 14:58:55.973754245 +0200
+@@ -133,6 +133,12 @@ verification. If this flag is set then a
+ to the verification callback and it B<must> be prepared to handle such cases
+ without assuming they are hard errors.
+ 
+The B<X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS> flag suppresses checking for alternative
+chains. By default, when building a certificate chain, if the first certificate
+chain found is not trusted, then OpenSSL will continue to check to see if an
+alternative chain can be found that is trusted. With this flag set the behaviour
+will match that of OpenSSL versions prior to 1.0.1n and 1.0.2b.
+
+ =head1 NOTES
+ 
+ The above functions should be used to manipulate verification parameters
+@@ -166,6 +172,6 @@ L<X509_verify_cert(3)|X509_verify_cert(3
+ 
+ =head1 HISTORY
+ 
+-TBA
+The B<X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS> flag was added in upstream OpenSSL 1.0.1n and 1.0.2b
+ 
+ =cut
--- a/openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-0209.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-0209.patch
@ -1,3 +1,34 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c.use-after-free openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c.use-after-free	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c	2015-06-11 11:14:52.581856349 +0200
+@@ -170,8 +170,14 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsig
+ {
+ 	const unsigned char *q;
+ 	X509 *ret;
+	int freeret = 0;
+
+ 	/* Save start position */
+ 	q = *pp;
+
+	if(!a || *a == NULL) {
+		freeret = 1;
+	}
+ 	ret = d2i_X509(a, pp, length);
+ 	/* If certificate unreadable then forget it */
+ 	if(!ret) return NULL;
+@@ -181,7 +187,11 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsig
+ 	if(!d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, pp, length)) goto err;
+ 	return ret;
+ 	err:
+-	X509_free(ret);
+	if(freeret) {
+		X509_free(ret);
+		if (a)
+			*a = NULL;
+	}
+ 	return NULL;
+ }
+ 
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c.use-after-free openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
 --- openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c.use-after-free	2014-10-15 15:49:54.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c	2015-03-19 17:28:03.349627040 +0100
@ -25,3 +56,27 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c.use-after-free openssl-1.0.1k/crypto
 			EC_KEY_free(ret);
 		ret = NULL;
 		}
+@@ -1377,8 +1377,6 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECParameters(EC_KEY **a, con
+ 			ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ 			return NULL;
+ 			}
+-		if (a)
+-			*a = ret;
+ 		}
+ 	else
+ 		ret = *a;
+@@ -1386,9 +1384,14 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECParameters(EC_KEY **a, con
+ 	if (!d2i_ECPKParameters(&ret->group, in, len))
+ 		{
+ 		ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+		if (a == NULL || *a != ret)
+			EC_KEY_free(ret);
+ 		return NULL;
+ 		}
+ 
+	if (a)
+		*a = ret;
+
+ 	return ret;
+ 	}
+ 
--- a/openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-1791.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-1791.patch
@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_err.c.ticket-race openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_err.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_err.c.ticket-race	2015-06-15 17:06:22.699702477 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_err.c	2015-06-15 17:06:22.704702592 +0200
+@@ -245,6 +245,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_READ),	"SSL_read"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT),	"SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT),	"SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP),	"ssl_session_dup"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW),	"SSL_SESSION_new"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP),	"SSL_SESSION_print_fp"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT),	"SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context"},
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl.h.ticket-race openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl.h
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl.h.ticket-race	2015-06-15 17:06:22.700702500 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl.h	2015-06-15 17:06:22.704702592 +0200
+@@ -2203,6 +2203,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
+ #define SSL_F_SSL_READ					 223
+ #define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT			 187
+ #define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT			 188
+#define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP				 348
+ #define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW				 189
+ #define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP			 190
+ #define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT		 312
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_locl.h.ticket-race openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_locl.h.ticket-race	2015-06-15 17:06:22.543698865 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_locl.h	2015-06-15 17:06:22.705702616 +0200
+@@ -831,6 +831,7 @@ void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc);
+ int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *c, int type);
+ int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session);
+ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session,int len, const unsigned char *limit);
+SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket);
+ int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a,const SSL_CIPHER *b);
+ DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER,
+ 				  ssl_cipher_id);
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_sess.c.ticket-race openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_sess.c.ticket-race	2015-01-08 15:00:56.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_sess.c	2015-06-15 17:06:22.705702616 +0200
+@@ -224,6 +224,146 @@ SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void)
+ 	return(ss);
+ 	}
+ 
+/*
+ * Create a new SSL_SESSION and duplicate the contents of |src| into it. If
+ * ticket == 0 then no ticket information is duplicated, otherwise it is.
+ */
+SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
+{
+	SSL_SESSION *dest;
+
+	dest = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*src));
+	if (dest == NULL)
+		{
+		goto err;
+		}
+	memcpy(dest, src, sizeof(*dest));
+
+	/*
+	 * Set the various pointers to NULL so that we can call SSL_SESSION_free in
+	 * the case of an error whilst halfway through constructing dest
+	 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+	dest->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+	dest->psk_identity = NULL;
+#endif
+	dest->ciphers = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+	dest->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+	dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
+	dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
+# endif
+#endif
+	dest->tlsext_tick = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+	dest->srp_username = NULL;
+#endif
+	memset(&dest->ex_data, 0, sizeof(dest->ex_data));
+
+	/* We deliberately don't copy the prev and next pointers */
+	dest->prev = NULL;
+	dest->next = NULL;
+
+	dest->references = 1;
+
+	if (src->sess_cert != NULL)
+		CRYPTO_add(&src->sess_cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT);
+
+	if (src->peer != NULL)
+		CRYPTO_add(&src->peer->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+	if (src->psk_identity_hint)
+		{
+		dest->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(src->psk_identity_hint);
+		if (dest->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+			{
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+	if (src->psk_identity)
+		{
+		dest->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(src->psk_identity);
+		if (dest->psk_identity == NULL)
+			{
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+#endif
+
+	if(src->ciphers != NULL)
+		{
+		dest->ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(src->ciphers);
+		if (dest->ciphers == NULL)
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION,
+				&dest->ex_data, &src->ex_data))
+		{
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+	if (src->tlsext_hostname)
+		{
+		dest->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(src->tlsext_hostname);
+		if (dest->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
+			{
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+	if (src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
+		{
+		dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
+			BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
+				src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
+		if (dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist == NULL)
+			goto err;
+		}
+	if (src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
+		{
+		dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
+			BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
+				src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
+		if (dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist == NULL)
+			goto err;
+		}
+# endif
+#endif
+
+	if (ticket != 0)
+		{
+		dest->tlsext_tick = BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_tick, src->tlsext_ticklen);
+        	if(dest->tlsext_tick == NULL)
+			goto err;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		dest->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = 0;
+		dest->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
+		}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+	if (src->srp_username)
+		{
+		dest->srp_username = BUF_strdup(src->srp_username);
+		if (dest->srp_username == NULL)
+			{
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+#endif
+
+	return dest;
+err:
+	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+	SSL_SESSION_free(dest);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+ const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len)
+ 	{
+ 	if(len)
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_clnt.c.ticket-race openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_clnt.c.ticket-race	2015-06-15 17:06:22.700702500 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_clnt.c	2015-06-15 17:06:37.434043557 +0200
+@@ -2191,6 +2191,44 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
+ 		}
+ 
+ 	p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+	if (s->session->session_id_length > 0)
+		{
+		int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
+		SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
+		/*
+		 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
+		 * one
+		 */
+		if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT)
+			{
+			/*
+			 * Remove the old session from the cache
+			 */
+			if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)
+				{
+				if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
+					s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx,
+						s->session);
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				/* We carry on if this fails */
+				SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
+				}
+			}
+
+		if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0)
+			{
+			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+
+		SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+		s->session = new_sess;
+		}
+
+ 	n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
+ 	n2s(p, ticklen);
+ 	/* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
--- a/openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-3196.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-3196.patch
@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_clnt.c.psk-identity openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_clnt.c.psk-identity	2015-12-04 16:25:45.606213013 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_clnt.c	2015-12-04 16:29:58.083945750 +0100
+@@ -1360,8 +1360,6 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ 	if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
+ 		{
+-		char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
+-
+ 		param_len = 2;
+ 		if (param_len > n)
+ 			{
+@@ -1390,16 +1388,8 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ 			}
+ 		param_len += i;
+ 
+-		/* If received PSK identity hint contains NULL
+-		 * characters, the hint is truncated from the first
+-		 * NULL. p may not be ending with NULL, so create a
+-		 * NULL-terminated string. */
+-		memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
+-		memset(tmp_id_hint+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
+-		if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+-			OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+-		s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
+-		if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+		s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
+		if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+ 			{
+ 			al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+@@ -3008,7 +2998,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s
+ 				}
+ 
+ 			memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
+-			psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
+			psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
+ 				identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
+ 				psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+ 			if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_srvr.c.psk-identity openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_srvr.c.psk-identity	2015-01-08 15:02:09.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_srvr.c	2015-12-04 16:25:45.606213013 +0100
+@@ -2816,7 +2816,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ 
+ 			if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
+ 				OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
+-			s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
+			s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
+ 			if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
+ 				{
+ 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
--- a/openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-4000.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-4000.patch
@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod.logjam openssl-1.0.1k/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod.logjam	2015-05-29 16:02:33.335187143 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod	2015-05-29 16:05:16.611940775 +0200
+@@ -61,12 +61,12 @@ negotiation is being saved.
+ 
+ If "strong" primes were used to generate the DH parameters, it is not strictly
+ necessary to generate a new key for each handshake but it does improve forward
+-secrecy. If it is not assured, that "strong" primes were used (see especially
+-the section about DSA parameters below), SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE must be used
+-in order to prevent small subgroup attacks. Always using SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
+-has an impact on the computer time needed during negotiation, but it is not
+-very large, so application authors/users should consider to always enable
+-this option.
+secrecy. If it is not assured that "strong" primes were used,
+SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE must be used in order to prevent small subgroup
+attacks. Always using SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE has an impact on the
+computer time needed during negotiation, but it is not very large, so
+application authors/users should consider always enabling this option.
+The option is required to implement perfect forward secrecy (PFS).
+ 
+ As generating DH parameters is extremely time consuming, an application
+ should not generate the parameters on the fly but supply the parameters.
+@@ -74,82 +74,62 @@ DH parameters can be reused, as the actu
+ the negotiation. The risk in reusing DH parameters is that an attacker
+ may specialize on a very often used DH group. Applications should therefore
+ generate their own DH parameters during the installation process using the
+-openssl L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application. In order to reduce the computer
+-time needed for this generation, it is possible to use DSA parameters
+-instead (see L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)>), but in this case SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
+-is mandatory.
+openssl L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application. This application
+guarantees that "strong" primes are used.
+ 
+-Application authors may compile in DH parameters. Files dh512.pem,
+-dh1024.pem, dh2048.pem, and dh4096.pem in the 'apps' directory of current
+Files dh2048.pem, and dh4096.pem in the 'apps' directory of the current
+ version of the OpenSSL distribution contain the 'SKIP' DH parameters,
+ which use safe primes and were generated verifiably pseudo-randomly.
+ These files can be converted into C code using the B<-C> option of the
+-L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application.
+-Authors may also generate their own set of parameters using
+-L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)>, but a user may not be sure how the parameters were
+-generated. The generation of DH parameters during installation is therefore
+-recommended.
+L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application. Generation of custom DH
+parameters during installation should still be preferred to stop an
+attacker from specializing on a commonly used group. Files dh1024.pem
+and dh512.pem contain old parameters that must not be used by
+applications.
+ 
+ An application may either directly specify the DH parameters or
+-can supply the DH parameters via a callback function. The callback approach
+-has the advantage, that the callback may supply DH parameters for different
+-key lengths.
+-
+-The B<tmp_dh_callback> is called with the B<keylength> needed and
+-the B<is_export> information. The B<is_export> flag is set, when the
+-ephemeral DH key exchange is performed with an export cipher.
+can supply the DH parameters via a callback function.
+
+Previous versions of the callback used B<is_export> and B<keylength>
+parameters to control parameter generation for export and non-export
+cipher suites. Modern servers that do not support export ciphersuites
+are advised to either use SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() in combination with
+SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE, or alternatively, use the callback but ignore
+B<keylength> and B<is_export> and simply supply at least 2048-bit
+parameters in the callback.
+ 
+ =head1 EXAMPLES
+ 
+-Handle DH parameters for key lengths of 512 and 1024 bits. (Error handling
+Setup DH parameters with a key length of 2048 bits. (Error handling
+ partly left out.)
+ 
+- ...
+- /* Set up ephemeral DH stuff */
+- DH *dh_512 = NULL;
+- DH *dh_1024 = NULL;
+- FILE *paramfile;
+ Command-line parameter generation:
+ $ openssl dhparam -out dh_param_2048.pem 2048
+
+ Code for setting up parameters during server initialization:
+ 
+  ...
+- /* "openssl dhparam -out dh_param_512.pem -2 512" */
+- paramfile = fopen("dh_param_512.pem", "r");
+ SSL_CTX ctx = SSL_CTX_new();
+ ...
+
+ /* Set up ephemeral DH parameters. */
+ DH *dh_2048 = NULL;
+ FILE *paramfile;
+ paramfile = fopen("dh_param_2048.pem", "r");
+  if (paramfile) {
+-   dh_512 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+   dh_2048 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    fclose(paramfile);
+ } else {
+   /* Error. */
+  }
+- /* "openssl dhparam -out dh_param_1024.pem -2 1024" */
+- paramfile = fopen("dh_param_1024.pem", "r");
+- if (paramfile) {
+-   dh_1024 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+-   fclose(paramfile);
+ if (dh_2048 == NULL) {
+  /* Error. */
+  }
+- ...
+-
+- /* "openssl dhparam -C -2 512" etc... */
+- DH *get_dh512() { ... }
+- DH *get_dh1024() { ... }
+-
+- DH *tmp_dh_callback(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength)
+- {
+-    DH *dh_tmp=NULL;
+-
+-    switch (keylength) {
+-    case 512:
+-      if (!dh_512)
+-        dh_512 = get_dh512();
+-      dh_tmp = dh_512;
+-      break;
+-    case 1024:
+-      if (!dh_1024)
+-        dh_1024 = get_dh1024();
+-      dh_tmp = dh_1024;
+-      break;
+-    default:
+-      /* Generating a key on the fly is very costly, so use what is there */
+-      setup_dh_parameters_like_above();
+ if (SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh_2048) != 1) {
+   /* Error. */
+     }
+-    return(dh_tmp);
+- }
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
+ ...
+ 
+ =head1 RETURN VALUES
+ 
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_err.c.logjam openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_err.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_err.c.logjam	2015-01-08 15:00:36.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_err.c	2015-05-29 16:02:33.336187166 +0200
+@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG)  ,"data length too long"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED)     ,"decryption failed"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC),"decryption failed or bad record mac"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL)      ,"dh key too small"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG),"dh public value length is wrong"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED)   ,"digest check failed"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG)  ,"dtls message too big"},
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl.h.logjam openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl.h
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl.h.logjam	2015-05-29 16:02:19.210862433 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl.h	2015-05-29 16:02:33.337187189 +0200
+@@ -2317,6 +2317,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
+ #define SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG			 146
+ #define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED				 147
+ #define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC	 281
+#define SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL                           372
+ #define SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG		 148
+ #define SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED			 149
+ #define SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG			 334
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_clnt.c.logjam openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_clnt.c.logjam	2015-01-08 15:00:56.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_clnt.c	2015-05-29 16:02:33.338187212 +0200
+@@ -3393,24 +3393,34 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s
+ 		}
+ #endif
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+-	if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) &&
+-		!(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL)))
+	if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) && dh == NULL)
+ 		{
+-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ 		goto f_err;
+ 		}
+-	else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_RSA))
+	if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_RSA))
+ 		{
+ 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
+ 		goto f_err;
+ 		}
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+-	else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_DSA))
+	if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_DSA))
+ 		{
+ 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
+ 		goto f_err;
+ 		}
+ #endif
+	/* Check DHE only: static DH not implemented. */
+	if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
+		{
+		int dh_size = BN_num_bits(dh->p);
+		if ((!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 768)
+		    || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 512))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		}
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PKT_EXP))
--- a/openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2016-0702.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2016-0702.patch
--- a/openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2016-0799.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2016-0799.patch
@ -0,0 +1,437 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/bio/b_print.c.bio-printf openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/bio/b_print.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/bio/b_print.c.bio-printf	2015-01-08 15:00:36.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/bio/b_print.c	2016-03-02 10:56:35.376167813 +0100
+@@ -125,14 +125,14 @@
+ #define LLONG long
+ #endif
+ 
+-static void fmtstr     (char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
+static int fmtstr(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
+ 			const char *, int, int, int);
+-static void fmtint     (char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
+static int fmtint(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
+ 			LLONG, int, int, int, int);
+-static void fmtfp      (char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
+static int fmtfp(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
+ 			LDOUBLE, int, int, int);
+-static void doapr_outch (char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *, int);
+-static void _dopr(char **sbuffer, char **buffer,
+static int doapr_outch(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *, int);
+static int _dopr(char **sbuffer, char **buffer,
+ 		  size_t *maxlen, size_t *retlen, int *truncated,
+ 		  const char *format, va_list args);
+ 
+@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static void _dopr(char **sbuffer, char *
+ #define char_to_int(p) (p - '0')
+ #define OSSL_MAX(p,q) ((p >= q) ? p : q)
+ 
+-static void
+static int
+ _dopr(
+     char **sbuffer,
+     char **buffer,
+@@ -200,7 +200,8 @@ _dopr(
+             if (ch == '%')
+                 state = DP_S_FLAGS;
+             else
+-                doapr_outch(sbuffer,buffer, &currlen, maxlen, ch);
+                if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, ch))
+			return 0;
+             ch = *format++;
+             break;
+         case DP_S_FLAGS:
+@@ -306,8 +307,9 @@ _dopr(
+                     value = va_arg(args, int);
+                     break;
+                 }
+-                fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
+-                       value, 10, min, max, flags);
+                if (!fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value, 10, min,
+                            max, flags))
+                    return 0;
+                 break;
+             case 'X':
+                 flags |= DP_F_UP;
+@@ -332,17 +334,19 @@ _dopr(
+                         unsigned int);
+                     break;
+                 }
+-                fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value,
+                if (!fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value,
+                        ch == 'o' ? 8 : (ch == 'u' ? 10 : 16),
+-                       min, max, flags);
+                            min, max, flags))
+                    return 0;
+                 break;
+             case 'f':
+                 if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
+                     fvalue = va_arg(args, LDOUBLE);
+                 else
+                     fvalue = va_arg(args, double);
+-                fmtfp(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
+-                      fvalue, min, max, flags);
+                if (!fmtfp(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue, min, max,
+                           flags))
+                    return 0;
+                 break;
+             case 'E':
+                 flags |= DP_F_UP;
+@@ -361,8 +365,9 @@ _dopr(
+                     fvalue = va_arg(args, double);
+                 break;
+             case 'c':
+-                doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
+-                    va_arg(args, int));
+                if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
+                            va_arg(args, int)))
+                    return 0;
+                 break;
+             case 's':
+                 strvalue = va_arg(args, char *);
+@@ -372,13 +377,15 @@ _dopr(
+ 		    else
+ 			max = *maxlen;
+ 		}
+-                fmtstr(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, strvalue,
+-                       flags, min, max);
+                if (!fmtstr(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, strvalue,
+                            flags, min, max))
+                    return 0;
+                 break;
+             case 'p':
+                 value = (long)va_arg(args, void *);
+-                fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
+-                    value, 16, min, max, flags|DP_F_NUM);
+                if (!fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
+                            value, 16, min, max, flags | DP_F_NUM))
+                    return 0;
+                 break;
+             case 'n': /* XXX */
+                 if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) {
+@@ -400,7 +407,8 @@ _dopr(
+                 }
+                 break;
+             case '%':
+-                doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, ch);
+                if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, ch))
+                    return 0;
+                 break;
+             case 'w':
+                 /* not supported yet, treat as next char */
+@@ -424,12 +432,13 @@ _dopr(
+     *truncated = (currlen > *maxlen - 1);
+     if (*truncated)
+         currlen = *maxlen - 1;
+-    doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, '\0');
+    if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, '\0'))
+        return 0;
+     *retlen = currlen - 1;
+-    return;
+    return 1;
+ }
+ 
+-static void
+static int
+ fmtstr(
+     char **sbuffer,
+     char **buffer,
+@@ -440,36 +449,44 @@ fmtstr(
+     int min,
+     int max)
+ {
+-    int padlen, strln;
+    int padlen;
+    size_t strln;
+     int cnt = 0;
+ 
+     if (value == 0)
+         value = "<NULL>";
+-    for (strln = 0; value[strln]; ++strln)
+-        ;
+
+    strln = strlen(value);
+    if (strln > INT_MAX)
+        strln = INT_MAX;
+
+     padlen = min - strln;
+-    if (padlen < 0)
+    if (min < 0 || padlen < 0)
+         padlen = 0;
+     if (flags & DP_F_MINUS)
+         padlen = -padlen;
+ 
+     while ((padlen > 0) && (cnt < max)) {
+-        doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+        if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
+            return 0;
+         --padlen;
+         ++cnt;
+     }
+     while (*value && (cnt < max)) {
+-        doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, *value++);
+        if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, *value++))
+            return 0;
+         ++cnt;
+     }
+     while ((padlen < 0) && (cnt < max)) {
+-        doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+        if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
+            return 0;
+         ++padlen;
+         ++cnt;
+     }
+    return 1;
+ }
+ 
+-static void
+static int
+ fmtint(
+     char **sbuffer,
+     char **buffer,
+@@ -533,37 +550,44 @@ fmtint(
+ 
+     /* spaces */
+     while (spadlen > 0) {
+-        doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+        if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
+            return 0;
+         --spadlen;
+     }
+ 
+     /* sign */
+     if (signvalue)
+-        doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
+        if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue))
+            return 0;
+ 
+     /* prefix */
+     while (*prefix) {
+-	doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, *prefix);
+        if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, *prefix))
+            return 0;
+ 	prefix++;
+     }
+ 
+     /* zeros */
+     if (zpadlen > 0) {
+         while (zpadlen > 0) {
+-            doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0');
+            if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0'))
+                return 0;
+             --zpadlen;
+         }
+     }
+     /* digits */
+-    while (place > 0)
+-        doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, convert[--place]);
+    while (place > 0) {
+        if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, convert[--place]))
+            return 0;
+    }
+ 
+     /* left justified spaces */
+     while (spadlen < 0) {
+-        doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+        if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
+            return 0;
+         ++spadlen;
+     }
+-    return;
+    return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ static LDOUBLE
+@@ -597,7 +621,7 @@ roundv(LDOUBLE value)
+     return intpart;
+ }
+ 
+-static void
+static int
+ fmtfp(
+     char **sbuffer,
+     char **buffer,
+@@ -616,7 +640,6 @@ fmtfp(
+     int fplace = 0;
+     int padlen = 0;
+     int zpadlen = 0;
+-    int caps = 0;
+     long intpart;
+     long fracpart;
+     long max10;
+@@ -650,9 +673,7 @@ fmtfp(
+ 
+     /* convert integer part */
+     do {
+-        iconvert[iplace++] =
+-            (caps ? "0123456789ABCDEF"
+-              : "0123456789abcdef")[intpart % 10];
+        iconvert[iplace++] = "0123456789"[intpart % 10];
+         intpart = (intpart / 10);
+     } while (intpart && (iplace < (int)sizeof(iconvert)));
+     if (iplace == sizeof iconvert)
+@@ -661,9 +682,7 @@ fmtfp(
+ 
+     /* convert fractional part */
+     do {
+-        fconvert[fplace++] =
+-            (caps ? "0123456789ABCDEF"
+-              : "0123456789abcdef")[fracpart % 10];
+        fconvert[fplace++] = "0123456789"[fracpart % 10];
+         fracpart = (fracpart / 10);
+     } while (fplace < max);
+     if (fplace == sizeof fconvert)
+@@ -682,47 +701,61 @@ fmtfp(
+ 
+     if ((flags & DP_F_ZERO) && (padlen > 0)) {
+         if (signvalue) {
+-            doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
+            if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue))
+                return 0;
+             --padlen;
+             signvalue = 0;
+         }
+         while (padlen > 0) {
+-            doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0');
+            if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0'))
+                return 0;
+             --padlen;
+         }
+     }
+     while (padlen > 0) {
+-        doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+        if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
+            return 0;
+         --padlen;
+     }
+-    if (signvalue)
+-        doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
+    if (signvalue && !doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue))
+        return 0;
+ 
+-    while (iplace > 0)
+-        doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, iconvert[--iplace]);
+    while (iplace > 0) {
+        if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, iconvert[--iplace]))
+            return 0;
+    }
+ 
+     /*
+      * Decimal point. This should probably use locale to find the correct
+      * char to print out.
+      */
+     if (max > 0 || (flags & DP_F_NUM)) {
+-        doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '.');
+        if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '.'))
+            return 0;
+ 
+-        while (fplace > 0)
+-            doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, fconvert[--fplace]);
+        while (fplace > 0) {
+            if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen,
+                            fconvert[--fplace]))
+                return 0;
+        }
+     }
+     while (zpadlen > 0) {
+-        doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0');
+        if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0'))
+            return 0;
+         --zpadlen;
+     }
+ 
+     while (padlen < 0) {
+-        doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+        if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
+            return 0;
+         ++padlen;
+     }
+    return 1;
+ }
+ 
+-static void
+#define BUFFER_INC  1024
+
+static int
+ doapr_outch(
+     char **sbuffer,
+     char **buffer,
+@@ -733,24 +766,30 @@ doapr_outch(
+     /* If we haven't at least one buffer, someone has doe a big booboo */
+     assert(*sbuffer != NULL || buffer != NULL);
+ 
+-    if (buffer) {
+-	while (*currlen >= *maxlen) {
+-	    if (*buffer == NULL) {
+-		if (*maxlen == 0)
+-		    *maxlen = 1024;
+    /* |currlen| must always be <= |*maxlen| */
+    assert(*currlen <= *maxlen);
+
+    if (buffer && *currlen == *maxlen) {
+        if (*maxlen > INT_MAX - BUFFER_INC)
+            return 0;
+
+        *maxlen += BUFFER_INC;
+	if (*buffer == NULL) {
+ 		*buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(*maxlen);
+		if (*buffer == NULL)
+	        	return 0;
+ 		if (*currlen > 0) {
+ 		    assert(*sbuffer != NULL);
+ 		    memcpy(*buffer, *sbuffer, *currlen);
+ 		}
+ 		*sbuffer = NULL;
+-	    } else {
+-		*maxlen += 1024;
+-		*buffer = OPENSSL_realloc(*buffer, *maxlen);
+-	    }
+	} else {
+            char *tmpbuf;
+            tmpbuf = OPENSSL_realloc(*buffer, *maxlen);
+            if (tmpbuf == NULL)
+                return 0;
+            *buffer = tmpbuf;
+ 	}
+-	/* What to do if *buffer is NULL? */
+-	assert(*sbuffer != NULL || *buffer != NULL);
+     }
+ 
+     if (*currlen < *maxlen) {
+@@ -760,7 +799,7 @@ doapr_outch(
+ 	    (*buffer)[(*currlen)++] = (char)c;
+     }
+ 
+-    return;
+    return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ /***************************************************************************/
+@@ -792,11 +831,15 @@ int BIO_vprintf (BIO *bio, const char *f
+ 
+ 	dynbuf = NULL;
+ 	CRYPTO_push_info("doapr()");
+-	_dopr(&hugebufp, &dynbuf, &hugebufsize,
+-		&retlen, &ignored, format, args);
+	if (!_dopr(&hugebufp, &dynbuf, &hugebufsize, &retlen, &ignored, format,
+                args))
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(dynbuf);
+        	return -1;
+		}
+ 	if (dynbuf)
+ 		{
+-		ret=BIO_write(bio, dynbuf, (int)retlen);
+		ret = BIO_write(bio, dynbuf, (int)retlen);
+ 		OPENSSL_free(dynbuf);
+ 		}
+ 	else
+@@ -829,7 +872,8 @@ int BIO_vsnprintf(char *buf, size_t n, c
+ 	size_t retlen;
+ 	int truncated;
+ 
+-	_dopr(&buf, NULL, &n, &retlen, &truncated, format, args);
+	if(!_dopr(&buf, NULL, &n, &retlen, &truncated, format, args))
+		return -1;
+ 
+ 	if (truncated)
+ 		/* In case of truncation, return -1 like traditional snprintf.
--- a/openssl-1.0.1k-secp256k1.patch
+++ b/openssl-1.0.1k-secp256k1.patch
@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c.secp256k1 openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c.secp256k1	2015-08-13 07:47:37.890966462 -0400
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c	2015-08-13 08:01:31.697866786 -0400
+@@ -82,6 +82,36 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	unsigned int cofactor;	/* promoted to BN_ULONG */
+ } EC_CURVE_DATA;
+ 
+static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0+32*6]; }
+	_EC_SECG_PRIME_256K1 = {
+	{ NID_X9_62_prime_field,0,32,1 },
+	{							/* no seed */
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,	/* p */
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFE,0xFF,0xFF,
+	  0xFC,0x2F,
+	  0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,	/* a */
+	  0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
+	  0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
+	  0x00,0x00,
+	  0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,	/* b */
+	  0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,    
+	  0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
+	  0x00,0x07,
+	  0x79,0xBE,0x66,0x7E,0xF9,0xDC,0xBB,0xAC,0x55,0xA0,	/* x */
+	  0x62,0x95,0xCE,0x87,0x0B,0x07,0x02,0x9B,0xFC,0xDB,
+	  0x2D,0xCE,0x28,0xD9,0x59,0xF2,0x81,0x5B,0x16,0xF8,
+	  0x17,0x98,
+	  0x48,0x3a,0xda,0x77,0x26,0xa3,0xc4,0x65,0x5d,0xa4,	/* y */
+	  0xfb,0xfc,0x0e,0x11,0x08,0xa8,0xfd,0x17,0xb4,0x48,
+	  0xa6,0x85,0x54,0x19,0x9c,0x47,0xd0,0x8f,0xfb,0x10,
+	  0xd4,0xb8,
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,	/* order */
+	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFE,0xBA,0xAE,0xDC,0xE6,
+	  0xAF,0x48,0xA0,0x3B,0xBF,0xD2,0x5E,0x8C,0xD0,0x36,
+	  0x41,0x41 }
+	};
+
+ static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20+48*6]; }
+ 	_EC_NIST_PRIME_384 = {
+ 	{ NID_X9_62_prime_field,20,48,1 },
+@@ -212,6 +242,7 @@ typedef struct _ec_list_element_st {
+ static const ec_list_element curve_list[] = {
+ 	/* prime field curves */
+ 	/* secg curves */
+	{ NID_secp256k1, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_256K1.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 256 bit prime field" },
+ 	/* SECG secp256r1 is the same as X9.62 prime256v1 and hence omitted */
+ 	{ NID_secp384r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_384.h, 0, "NIST/SECG curve over a 384 bit prime field" },
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/t1_lib.c.secp256k1 openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/t1_lib.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/t1_lib.c.secp256k1	2015-08-13 08:03:17.401589785 -0400
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/t1_lib.c	2015-08-13 08:05:44.283292971 -0400
+@@ -218,6 +218,7 @@ static int pref_list[] =
+ 		NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
+ 		NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 
+ #endif
+		NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
+ 		NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ 		NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 
--- a/openssl.spec
+++ b/openssl.spec
@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
 Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
 Name: openssl
 Version: 1.0.1k
-Release: 7%{?dist}
+Release: 15%{?dist}
 Epoch: 1
 # We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source
 # tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below.
@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ Patch77: openssl-1.0.1e-weak-ciphers.patch
 Patch90: openssl-1.0.1e-enc-fail.patch
 Patch92: openssl-1.0.1h-system-cipherlist.patch
 Patch93: openssl-1.0.1h-disable-sslv2v3.patch
+Patch94: openssl-1.0.1k-secp256k1.patch
 # Backported fixes including security fixes
 Patch80: openssl-1.0.1j-evp-wrap.patch
 Patch81: openssl-1.0.1k-padlock64.patch
@ -96,6 +97,25 @@ Patch103: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0287.patch
 Patch104: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0288.patch
 Patch105: openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-0289.patch
 Patch106: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0293.patch
+Patch107: openssl-1.0.1k-alt-chains.patch
+Patch108: openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-4000.patch
+Patch109: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1789.patch
+Patch110: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1790.patch
+Patch111: openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-1791.patch
+Patch112: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1792.patch
+Patch113: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-3194.patch
+Patch114: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-3195.patch
+Patch115: openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-3196.patch
+Patch116: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-3197.patch
+Patch117: openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2016-0702.patch
+Patch118: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2016-0705.patch
+Patch119: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2016-0797.patch
+Patch120: openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2016-0799.patch
+Patch121: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2016-2105.patch
+Patch122: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2016-2106.patch
+Patch123: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2016-2107.patch
+Patch124: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2016-2108.patch
+Patch125: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2016-2109.patch

 License: OpenSSL
 Group: System Environment/Libraries
@ -212,6 +232,7 @@ cp %{SOURCE12} %{SOURCE13} crypto/ec/
 %patch90 -p1 -b .enc-fail
 %patch92 -p1 -b .system
 %patch93 -p1 -b .v2v3
+%patch94 -p1 -b .secp256k1

 %patch80 -p1 -b .wrap
 %patch81 -p1 -b .padlock64
@ -225,6 +246,25 @@ cp %{SOURCE12} %{SOURCE13} crypto/ec/
 %patch104 -p1 -b .req-null-deref
 %patch105 -p1 -b .pkcs7-null-deref
 %patch106 -p1 -b .ssl2-assert
+%patch107 -p1 -b .alt-chains
+%patch108 -p1 -b .logjam
+%patch109 -p1 -b .oob-read
+%patch110 -p1 -b .missing-content
+%patch111 -p1 -b .ticket-race
+%patch112 -p1 -b .unknown-hash
+%patch113 -p1 -b .pss-check
+%patch114 -p1 -b .combine-leak
+%patch115 -p1 -b .psk-identity
+%patch116 -p1 -b .ssl2-ciphers
+%patch117 -p1 -b .rsa-const
+%patch118 -p1 -b .dsa-doublefree
+%patch119 -p1 -b .bn-hex
+%patch120 -p1 -b .bio-printf
+%patch121 -p1 -b .b64-overflow
+%patch122 -p1 -b .enc-overflow
+%patch123 -p1 -b .padding-check
+%patch124 -p1 -b .asn1-negative
+%patch125 -p1 -b .asn1-bio-dos

 sed -i 's/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "1.0.0"/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "%{version}"/' crypto/opensslv.h

@ -301,6 +341,11 @@ make rehash
 # Overwrite FIPS README
 cp -f %{SOURCE11} .

+# Clean up the .pc files
+for i in libcrypto.pc libssl.pc openssl.pc ; do
+  sed -i '/^Libs.private:/{s/-L[^ ]* //;s/-Wl[^ ]* //}' $i
+done
+
 %check
 # Verify that what was compiled actually works.

@ -492,6 +537,47 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/fipscanister.*
 %postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig

 %changelog
+* Tue May  3 2016 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1e-15
+- fix CVE-2016-2105 - possible overflow in base64 encoding
+- fix CVE-2016-2106 - possible overflow in EVP_EncryptUpdate()
+- fix CVE-2016-2107 - padding oracle in stitched AES-NI CBC-MAC
+- fix CVE-2016-2108 - memory corruption in ASN.1 encoder
+- fix CVE-2016-2109 - possible DoS when reading ASN.1 data from BIO
+
+* Wed Mar  2 2016 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1e-14
+- fix CVE-2016-0702 - side channel attack on modular exponentiation
+- fix CVE-2016-0705 - double-free in DSA private key parsing
+- fix CVE-2016-0797 - heap corruption in BN_hex2bn and BN_dec2bn
+- fix CVE-2015-3197 - SSLv2 ciphersuite enforcement
+- fix CVE-2015-7575 - disallow use of MD5 in TLS1.2
+- fix CVE-2016-0799 - memory issues in BIO_*printf functions
+
+* Fri Dec  4 2015 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1k-13
+- fix CVE-2015-3194 - certificate verify crash with missing PSS parameter
+- fix CVE-2015-3195 - X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak
+- fix CVE-2015-3196 - race condition when handling PSK identity hint
+- filter out unwanted link options from the .pc files (#1257836)
+
+* Thu Aug 13 2015 Tom Callaway <spot@fedoraproject.org> 1.0.1k-12
+- enable secp256k1 (bz1021898)
+
+* Thu Jul  9 2015 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1k-11
+- fix CVE-2015-1793 - certificate verification forgery
+
+* Mon Jun 15 2015 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1k-10
+- fix CVE-2015-1789 - out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time
+- fix CVE-2015-1790 - PKCS7 crash with missing EncryptedContent
+- fix CVE-2015-1791 - race condition handling NewSessionTicket
+- fix CVE-2015-1792 - CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function
+- add missing parts of CVE-2015-0209 fix for corectness although unexploitable
+
+* Fri May 29 2015 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1k-9
+- fix CVE-2015-4000 - prevent the logjam attack on client - restrict
+  the DH key size to at least 768 bits (limit will be increased in future)
+
+* Thu Apr 30 2015 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1k-8
+- try to find alternative cert chains (#1166614)
+
 * Thu Apr  9 2015 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1k-7
 - drop the AES-GCM restriction of 2^32 operations because the IV is
  always 96 bits (32 bit fixed field + 64 bit invocation field)
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Tomas Mraz	bfc1772d6e	Multiple security issues fixed. - fix CVE-2016-2105 - possible overflow in base64 encoding - fix CVE-2016-2106 - possible overflow in EVP_EncryptUpdate() - fix CVE-2016-2107 - padding oracle in stitched AES-NI CBC-MAC - fix CVE-2016-2108 - memory corruption in ASN.1 encoder - fix CVE-2016-2109 - possible DoS when reading ASN.1 data from BIO	2016-05-03 18:29:16 +02:00
Tomas Mraz	94b1a89708	Add missing file.	2016-03-02 11:05:10 +01:00
Tomas Mraz	0fa091c0ff	Fix multiple security issues. - fix CVE-2016-0702 - side channel attack on modular exponentiation - fix CVE-2016-0705 - double-free in DSA private key parsing - fix CVE-2016-0797 - heap corruption in BN_hex2bn and BN_dec2bn - fix CVE-2015-3197 - SSLv2 ciphersuite enforcement - fix CVE-2015-7575 - disallow use of MD5 in TLS1.2 - fix CVE-2016-0799 - memory issues in BIO_*printf functions	2016-03-02 11:00:13 +01:00
Tomas Mraz	85a2d8a93c	Multiple security issues fixed - fix CVE-2015-3194 - certificate verify crash with missing PSS parameter - fix CVE-2015-3195 - X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak - fix CVE-2015-3196 - race condition when handling PSK identity hint - filter out unwanted link options from the .pc files (#1257836)	2015-12-04 16:38:05 +01:00
Tom Callaway	1c2ab61fa1	enable secp256k1	2015-08-13 08:09:25 -04:00
Tomas Mraz	929846e5d1	fix CVE-2015-1793 - certificate verification forgery	2015-07-09 15:36:41 +02:00
Tomas Mraz	546bf977b5	Fix multiple security issues. - fix CVE-2015-1789 - out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time - fix CVE-2015-1790 - PKCS7 crash with missing EncryptedContent - fix CVE-2015-1791 - race condition handling NewSessionTicket - fix CVE-2015-1792 - CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function - add missing parts of CVE-2015-0209 fix for corectness although unexploitable	2015-06-15 17:09:29 +02:00
Tomas Mraz	a3963e794f	fix CVE-2015-4000 - prevent the logjam attack on client - restrict the DH key size to at least 768 bits (limit will be increased in future)	2015-05-29 16:07:30 +02:00
Tomas Mraz	fc6854bd38	try to find alternative cert chains (#1166614 )	2015-04-30 15:08:45 +02:00