Merge branch 'f22' into f21

- fix CVE-2015-1789 - out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time
- fix CVE-2015-1790 - PKCS7 crash with missing EncryptedContent
- fix CVE-2015-1791 - race condition handling NewSessionTicket
- fix CVE-2015-1792 - CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function
- add missing parts of CVE-2015-0209 fix for corectness although unexploitable

openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1789.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.oob-read openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.oob-read	2015-05-25 12:03:41.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c	2015-06-09 15:01:51.688640453 +0200
+@@ -1702,49 +1702,92 @@ int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm,
+ 	ASN1_TIME atm;
+ 	long offset;
+ 	char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
+-	int i,j;
++	int i, j, remaining;
+ 
+ 	p=buff1;
+-	i=ctm->length;
++	remaining=ctm->length;
+ 	str=(char *)ctm->data;
++	/*
++	 * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
++	 * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
++	 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
++	 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
++	 */
+ 	if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
+ 		{
+-		if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
++		/* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
++		int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
++		int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
++		if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
++			return 0;
+ 		memcpy(p,str,10);
+ 		p+=10;
+ 		str+=10;
++		remaining -= 10;
+ 		}
+ 	else
+ 		{
+-		if (i < 13) return 0;
++		/* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
++		int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
++		int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
++		if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
++			return 0;
+ 		memcpy(p,str,12);
+ 		p+=12;
+ 		str+=12;
++		remaining -= 12;
+ 		}
+ 
+ 	if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
+ 		{ *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
+ 	else
+ 		{ 
++		/* SS (seconds) */
++		if (remaining < 2)
++			return 0;
+ 		*(p++)= *(str++);
+ 		*(p++)= *(str++);
+-		/* Skip any fractional seconds... */
+-		if (*str == '.')
++		remaining -= 2;
++		/*
++		 * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
++		 * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
++		 * Can we just kill them altogether?
++		 */
++		if (remaining && *str == '.')
+ 			{
+ 			str++;
+-			while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
++			remaining--;
++			for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--)
++				{
++				if (*str < '0' || *str > '9')
++					break;
++				}
+ 			}
+ 		
+ 		}
+ 	*(p++)='Z';
+ 	*(p++)='\0';
+ 
++	/* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
++	if (!remaining)
++		return 0;
+ 	if (*str == 'Z')
++		{
++		if (remaining != 1)
++			return 0;
+ 		offset=0;
++		}
+ 	else
+ 		{
++	        /* (+-)HHMM */
+ 		if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
+ 			return 0;
++		/* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
++		if (remaining != 5)
++			return 0;
++		if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' ||
++			str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9')
++			return 0;
+ 		offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
+ 		offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
+ 		if (*str == '-')

openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1790.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c.missing-content openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c.missing-content	2015-05-25 12:03:41.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c	2015-06-09 15:21:21.377951520 +0200
+@@ -472,6 +472,12 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
+ 	switch (i)
+ 		{
+ 	case NID_pkcs7_signed:
++		/*
++		 * p7->d.sign->contents is a PKCS7 structure consisting of a contentType
++		 * field and optional content.
++		 * data_body is NULL if that structure has no (=detached) content
++		 * or if the contentType is wrong (i.e., not "data").
++		 */
+ 		data_body=PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.sign->contents);
+ 		if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7) && data_body == NULL)
+ 			{
+@@ -484,6 +490,7 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
+ 	case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
+ 		rsk=p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->recipientinfo;
+ 		md_sk=p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->md_algs;
++		/* data_body is NULL if the optional EncryptedContent is missing. */
+ 		data_body=p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
+ 		enc_alg=p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
+ 		evp_cipher=EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
+@@ -496,6 +503,7 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
+ 	case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
+ 		rsk=p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo;
+ 		enc_alg=p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
++		/* data_body is NULL if the optional EncryptedContent is missing. */
+ 		data_body=p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
+ 		evp_cipher=EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
+ 		if (evp_cipher == NULL)
+@@ -509,6 +517,13 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
+ 	        goto err;
+ 		}
+ 
++	/* Detached content must be supplied via in_bio instead. */
++	if (data_body == NULL && in_bio == NULL)
++		{
++		PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
+ 	/* We will be checking the signature */
+ 	if (md_sk != NULL)
+ 		{
+@@ -665,7 +680,7 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
+ 		}
+ 
+ #if 1
+-	if (PKCS7_is_detached(p7) || (in_bio != NULL))
++	if (in_bio != NULL)
+ 		{
+ 		bio=in_bio;
+ 		}

openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1792.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c.unknown-hash openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c.unknown-hash	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c	2015-06-09 16:07:16.001516190 +0200
+@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ static void do_free_upto(BIO *f, BIO *up
+ 			BIO_free(f);
+ 			f = tbio;
+ 			}
+-		while (f != upto);
++		while (f && f != upto);
+ 		}
+ 	else
+ 		BIO_free_all(f);

openssl-1.0.1h-disable-sslv2v3.patch

@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1h/ssl/ssl_lib.c.v2v3 openssl-1.0.1h/ssl/ssl_lib.c
  	 */
  	ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT;
  
-+	/* Disable SSLv2 and SSLv3 by default (affects the SSLv23_method() only) */
-+	ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
++	/* Disable SSLv2 by default (affects the SSLv23_method() only) */
++	ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
 +
  	return(ret);
  err:

openssl-1.0.1k-alt-chains.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,407 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/apps/apps.c.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/apps/apps.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/apps/apps.c.alt-chains	2015-07-09 14:58:55.949753674 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1k/apps/apps.c	2015-07-09 14:58:55.970754174 +0200
+@@ -2365,6 +2365,8 @@ int args_verify(char ***pargs, int *parg
+ 		flags |= X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY;
+ 	else if (!strcmp(arg, "-check_ss_sig"))
+ 		flags |= X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE;
++	else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no_alt_chains"))
++		flags |= X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS;
+ 	else if (!strcmp(arg, "-trusted_first"))
+ 		flags |= X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST;
+ 	else
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/apps/cms.c.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/apps/cms.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/apps/cms.c.alt-chains	2015-07-09 14:58:55.949753674 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1k/apps/cms.c	2015-07-09 14:58:55.970754174 +0200
+@@ -642,6 +642,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-text          include or delete text MIME headers\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CApath dir    trusted certificates directory\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CAfile file   trusted certificates file\n");
++		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_alt_chains only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-trusted_first use trusted certificates first when building the trust chain\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-crl_check     check revocation status of signer's certificate using CRLs\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-crl_check_all check revocation status of signer's certificate chain using CRLs\n");
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/apps/ocsp.c.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/apps/ocsp.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/apps/ocsp.c.alt-chains	2015-07-09 14:58:55.949753674 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1k/apps/ocsp.c	2015-07-09 14:58:55.971754198 +0200
+@@ -605,6 +605,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-path                path to use in OCSP request\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CApath dir          trusted certificates directory\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CAfile file         trusted certificates file\n");
++		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_alt_chains       only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-trusted_first       use trusted certificates first when building the trust chain\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-VAfile file         validator certificates file\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-validity_period n   maximum validity discrepancy in seconds\n");
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/apps/s_client.c.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/apps/s_client.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/apps/s_client.c.alt-chains	2015-07-09 14:58:55.956753841 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1k/apps/s_client.c	2015-07-09 14:58:55.971754198 +0200
+@@ -299,6 +299,7 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -pass arg     - private key file pass phrase source\n");
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -CApath arg   - PEM format directory of CA's\n");
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -CAfile arg   - PEM format file of CA's\n");
++	BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_alt_chains - only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -trusted_first - Use trusted CA's first when building the trust chain\n");
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -reconnect    - Drop and re-make the connection with the same Session-ID\n");
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -pause        - sleep(1) after each read(2) and write(2) system call\n");
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/apps/smime.c.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/apps/smime.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/apps/smime.c.alt-chains	2015-07-09 14:58:55.950753698 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1k/apps/smime.c	2015-07-09 14:58:55.971754198 +0200
+@@ -479,6 +479,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-text          include or delete text MIME headers\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CApath dir    trusted certificates directory\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CAfile file   trusted certificates file\n");
++		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_alt_chains only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-trusted_first use trusted certificates first when building the trust chain\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-crl_check     check revocation status of signer's certificate using CRLs\n");
+ 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-crl_check_all check revocation status of signer's certificate chain using CRLs\n");
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/apps/s_server.c.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/apps/s_server.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/apps/s_server.c.alt-chains	2015-07-09 14:58:55.950753698 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1k/apps/s_server.c	2015-07-09 14:58:55.971754198 +0200
+@@ -502,6 +502,7 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -state        - Print the SSL states\n");
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -CApath arg   - PEM format directory of CA's\n");
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -CAfile arg   - PEM format file of CA's\n");
++	BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_alt_chains - only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -trusted_first - Use trusted CA's first when building the trust chain\n");
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -nocert       - Don't use any certificates (Anon-DH)\n");
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -cipher arg   - play with 'openssl ciphers' to see what goes here\n");
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/apps/verify.c.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/apps/verify.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/apps/verify.c.alt-chains	2015-07-09 14:58:55.951753722 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1k/apps/verify.c	2015-07-09 14:58:55.972754221 +0200
+@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
+ end:
+ 	if (ret == 1) {
+ 		BIO_printf(bio_err,"usage: verify [-verbose] [-CApath path] [-CAfile file] [-trusted_first] [-purpose purpose] [-crl_check]");
+-		BIO_printf(bio_err," [-attime timestamp]");
++		BIO_printf(bio_err," [-no_alt_chains] [-attime timestamp]");
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ 		BIO_printf(bio_err," [-engine e]");
+ #endif
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.alt-chains	2015-07-09 14:58:55.951753722 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c	2015-07-09 15:28:03.630442145 +0200
+@@ -154,11 +154,11 @@ static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X5
+ 
+ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+ 	{
+-	X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
++	X509 *x,*xtmp,*xtmp2,*chain_ss=NULL;
+ 	int bad_chain = 0;
+ 	X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
+ 	int depth,i,ok=0;
+-	int num;
++	int num, j, retry;
+ 	int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
+ 	STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
+ 	if (ctx->cert == NULL)
+@@ -167,21 +167,27 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx
+ 		return -1;
+ 		}
+ 
++        if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
++            /*
++             * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
++             * cannot do another one.
++             */
++            X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
++            return -1;
++        }
++ 
+ 	cb=ctx->verify_cb;
+ 
+ 	/* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
+ 	 * present and that the first entry is in place */
+-	if (ctx->chain == NULL)
++	if (	((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
++		(!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
+ 		{
+-		if (	((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
+-			(!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
+-			{
+-			X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+-			goto end;
+-			}
+-		CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+-		ctx->last_untrusted=1;
++		X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++		goto end;
+ 		}
++	CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
++	ctx->last_untrusted=1;
+ 
+ 	/* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
+ 	if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
+@@ -247,10 +253,14 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx
+ 		break;
+ 		}
+ 
++	/* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
++	j = num;
++
+ 	/* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
+ 	 * certificates.  We now need to add at least one trusted one,
+ 	 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
+ 
++	do {
+ 	/* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
+  	 * is self signed.
+  	 */
+@@ -294,6 +304,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx
+ 			chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
+ 			ctx->last_untrusted--;
+ 			num--;
++			j--;
+ 			x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
+ 			}
+ 		}
+@@ -322,7 +333,42 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx
+ 		num++;
+ 		}
+ 
+-	/* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
++        /*
++         * If we haven't got a least one certificate from our store then check
++         * if there is an alternative chain that could be used.  We only do this
++         * if the user hasn't switched off alternate chain checking
++         */
++        retry = 0;
++        if (num == ctx->last_untrusted &&
++            !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
++            while (j-- > 1) {
++                xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
++                ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
++                if (ok < 0)
++                    goto end;
++                /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
++                if (ok > 0) {
++                    /*
++                     * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
++                     */
++                    X509_free(xtmp);
++
++                    /*
++                     * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
++                     * alternate chain
++                     */
++                    while (num > j) {
++                        xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
++                        X509_free(xtmp);
++                        num--;
++                    }
++                    ctx->last_untrusted = j;
++                    retry = 1;
++                    break;
++                }
++            }
++        }
++	} while (retry);
+ 
+ 	/* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
+ 	if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h.alt-chains	2015-07-09 14:58:55.951753722 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h	2015-07-09 14:58:55.972754221 +0200
+@@ -391,7 +391,12 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE
+ #define X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE		0x4000
+ /* Use trusted store first */
+ #define X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST		0x8000
+-
++/*
++ * If the initial chain is not trusted, do not attempt to build an alternative
++ * chain. Alternate chain checking was introduced in 1.0.1n/1.0.2b. Setting
++ * this flag will force the behaviour to match that of previous versions.
++ */
++#define X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS               0x100000
+ 
+ #define X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT			0x1
+ #define X509_VP_FLAG_OVERWRITE			0x2
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/cms.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/cms.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/cms.pod.alt-chains	2015-07-09 14:58:55.951753722 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/cms.pod	2015-07-09 14:58:55.972754221 +0200
+@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ B<openssl> B<cms>
+ [B<-print>]
+ [B<-CAfile file>]
+ [B<-CApath dir>]
++[B<-no_alt_chains>]
+ [B<-trusted_first>]
+ [B<-md digest>]
+ [B<-[cipher]>]
+@@ -413,7 +414,7 @@ portion of a message so they may be incl
+ then many S/MIME mail clients check the signers certificate's email
+ address matches that specified in the From: address.
+ 
+-=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig>
++=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig -no_alt_chains>
+ 
+ Set various certificate chain valiadition option. See the
+ L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/ocsp.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/ocsp.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/ocsp.pod.alt-chains	2015-07-09 14:58:55.951753722 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/ocsp.pod	2015-07-09 14:58:55.973754245 +0200
+@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ B<openssl> B<ocsp>
+ [B<-path>]
+ [B<-CApath dir>]
+ [B<-CAfile file>]
++[B<-no_alt_chains>]]
+ [B<-trusted_first>]
+ [B<-VAfile file>]
+ [B<-validity_period n>]
+@@ -143,6 +144,10 @@ connection timeout to the OCSP responder
+ file or pathname containing trusted CA certificates. These are used to verify
+ the signature on the OCSP response.
+ 
++=item B<-no_alt_chains>
++
++See L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.
++
+ =item B<-trusted_first>
+ 
+ Use certificates in CA file or CA directory over certificates provided
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/s_client.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/s_client.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/s_client.pod.alt-chains	2015-07-09 14:58:55.952753746 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/s_client.pod	2015-07-09 14:58:55.973754245 +0200
+@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_client>
+ [B<-pass arg>]
+ [B<-CApath directory>]
+ [B<-CAfile filename>]
++[B<-no_alt_chains>]
+ [B<-trusted_first>]
+ [B<-reconnect>]
+ [B<-pause>]
+@@ -122,7 +123,7 @@ also used when building the client certi
+ A file containing trusted certificates to use during server authentication
+ and to use when attempting to build the client certificate chain.
+ 
+-=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig, -trusted_first>
++=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig -no_alt_chains>
+ 
+ Set various certificate chain valiadition option. See the
+ L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/smime.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/smime.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/smime.pod.alt-chains	2015-07-09 14:58:55.952753746 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/smime.pod	2015-07-09 14:58:55.973754245 +0200
+@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ B<openssl> B<smime>
+ [B<-in file>]
+ [B<-CAfile file>]
+ [B<-CApath dir>]
++[B<-no_alt_chains>]
+ [B<-trusted_first>]
+ [B<-certfile file>]
+ [B<-signer file>]
+@@ -268,7 +269,7 @@ portion of a message so they may be incl
+ then many S/MIME mail clients check the signers certificate's email
+ address matches that specified in the From: address.
+ 
+-=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig>
++=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig -no_alt_chains>
+ 
+ Set various options of certificate chain verification. See
+ L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/s_server.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/s_server.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/s_server.pod.alt-chains	2015-07-09 14:58:55.952753746 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/s_server.pod	2015-07-09 14:58:55.973754245 +0200
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_server>
+ [B<-state>]
+ [B<-CApath directory>]
+ [B<-CAfile filename>]
++[B<-no_alt_chains>]
+ [B<-trusted_first>]
+ [B<-nocert>]
+ [B<-cipher cipherlist>]
+@@ -179,6 +180,10 @@ and to use when attempting to build the
+ is also used in the list of acceptable client CAs passed to the client when
+ a certificate is requested.
+ 
++=item B<-no_alt_chains>
++
++See the L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.
++
+ =item B<-trusted_first>
+ 
+ Use certificates in CA file or CA directory before other certificates 
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/verify.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/verify.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/verify.pod.alt-chains	2015-07-09 14:58:55.952753746 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/verify.pod	2015-07-09 14:58:55.973754245 +0200
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ B<openssl> B<verify>
+ [B<-extended_crl>]
+ [B<-use_deltas>]
+ [B<-policy_print>]
++[B<-no_alt_chains>]
+ [B<-untrusted file>]
+ [B<-help>]
+ [B<-issuer_checks>]
+@@ -115,6 +116,14 @@ Set policy variable inhibit-any-policy (
+ 
+ Set policy variable inhibit-policy-mapping (see RFC5280).
+ 
++=item B<-no_alt_chains>
++
++When building a certificate chain, if the first certificate chain found is not
++trusted, then OpenSSL will continue to check to see if an alternative chain can
++be found that is trusted. With this option that behaviour is suppressed so that
++only the first chain found is ever used. Using this option will force the
++behaviour to match that of previous OpenSSL versions.
++
+ =item B<-policy_print>
+ 
+ Print out diagnostics related to policy processing.
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod.alt-chains	2014-10-15 15:49:15.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod	2015-07-09 15:29:16.461174414 +0200
+@@ -39,10 +39,15 @@ X509_STORE_CTX_free() completely frees u
+ is no longer valid.
+ 
+ X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets up B<ctx> for a subsequent verification operation.
+-The trusted certificate store is set to B<store>, the end entity certificate
+-to be verified is set to B<x509> and a set of additional certificates (which
+-will be untrusted but may be used to build the chain) in B<chain>. Any or
+-all of the B<store>, B<x509> and B<chain> parameters can be B<NULL>.
++It must be called before each call to X509_verify_cert(), i.e. a B<ctx> is only
++good for one call to X509_verify_cert(); if you want to verify a second
++certificate with the same B<ctx> then you must call X509_XTORE_CTX_cleanup()
++and then X509_STORE_CTX_init() again before the second call to
++X509_verify_cert(). The trusted certificate store is set to B<store>, the end
++entity certificate to be verified is set to B<x509> and a set of additional
++certificates (which will be untrusted but may be used to build the chain) in
++B<chain>. Any or all of the B<store>, B<x509> and B<chain> parameters can be
++B<NULL>.
+ 
+ X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack() sets the set of trusted certificates of B<ctx>
+ to B<sk>. This is an alternative way of specifying trusted certificates 
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod.alt-chains	2014-10-15 15:49:15.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod	2015-07-09 15:29:16.461174414 +0200
+@@ -32,7 +32,8 @@ OpenSSL internally for certificate valid
+ SSL/TLS code.
+ 
+ The negative return value from X509_verify_cert() can only occur if no
+-certificate is set in B<ctx> (due to a programming error) or if a retry
++certificate is set in B<ctx> (due to a programming error); if X509_verify_cert()
++twice without reinitialising B<ctx> in between; or if a retry
+ operation is requested during internal lookups (which never happens with
+ standard lookup methods). It is however recommended that application check
+ for <= 0 return value on error.
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod.alt-chains	2015-01-08 15:00:36.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod	2015-07-09 14:58:55.973754245 +0200
+@@ -133,6 +133,12 @@ verification. If this flag is set then a
+ to the verification callback and it B<must> be prepared to handle such cases
+ without assuming they are hard errors.
+ 
++The B<X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS> flag suppresses checking for alternative
++chains. By default, when building a certificate chain, if the first certificate
++chain found is not trusted, then OpenSSL will continue to check to see if an
++alternative chain can be found that is trusted. With this flag set the behaviour
++will match that of OpenSSL versions prior to 1.0.1n and 1.0.2b.
++
+ =head1 NOTES
+ 
+ The above functions should be used to manipulate verification parameters
+@@ -166,6 +172,6 @@ L<X509_verify_cert(3)|X509_verify_cert(3
+ 
+ =head1 HISTORY
+ 
+-TBA
++The B<X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS> flag was added in upstream OpenSSL 1.0.1n and 1.0.2b
+ 
+ =cut

openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-0209.patch

@@ -1,3 +1,34 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c.use-after-free openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c.use-after-free	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c	2015-06-11 11:14:52.581856349 +0200
+@@ -170,8 +170,14 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsig
+ {
+ 	const unsigned char *q;
+ 	X509 *ret;
++	int freeret = 0;
++
+ 	/* Save start position */
+ 	q = *pp;
++
++	if(!a || *a == NULL) {
++		freeret = 1;
++	}
+ 	ret = d2i_X509(a, pp, length);
+ 	/* If certificate unreadable then forget it */
+ 	if(!ret) return NULL;
+@@ -181,7 +187,11 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsig
+ 	if(!d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, pp, length)) goto err;
+ 	return ret;
+ 	err:
+-	X509_free(ret);
++	if(freeret) {
++		X509_free(ret);
++		if (a)
++			*a = NULL;
++	}
+ 	return NULL;
+ }
+ 
 diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c.use-after-free openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
 --- openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c.use-after-free	2014-10-15 15:49:54.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c	2015-03-19 17:28:03.349627040 +0100
@@ -25,3 +56,27 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c.use-after-free openssl-1.0.1k/crypto
  			EC_KEY_free(ret);
  		ret = NULL;
  		}
+@@ -1377,8 +1377,6 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECParameters(EC_KEY **a, con
+ 			ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ 			return NULL;
+ 			}
+-		if (a)
+-			*a = ret;
+ 		}
+ 	else
+ 		ret = *a;
+@@ -1386,9 +1384,14 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECParameters(EC_KEY **a, con
+ 	if (!d2i_ECPKParameters(&ret->group, in, len))
+ 		{
+ 		ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
++		if (a == NULL || *a != ret)
++			EC_KEY_free(ret);
+ 		return NULL;
+ 		}
+ 
++	if (a)
++		*a = ret;
++
+ 	return ret;
+ 	}
+ 

openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-1791.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_err.c.ticket-race openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_err.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_err.c.ticket-race	2015-06-15 17:06:22.699702477 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_err.c	2015-06-15 17:06:22.704702592 +0200
+@@ -245,6 +245,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_READ),	"SSL_read"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT),	"SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT),	"SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT"},
++{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP),	"ssl_session_dup"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW),	"SSL_SESSION_new"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP),	"SSL_SESSION_print_fp"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT),	"SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context"},
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl.h.ticket-race openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl.h
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl.h.ticket-race	2015-06-15 17:06:22.700702500 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl.h	2015-06-15 17:06:22.704702592 +0200
+@@ -2203,6 +2203,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
+ #define SSL_F_SSL_READ					 223
+ #define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT			 187
+ #define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT			 188
++#define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP				 348
+ #define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW				 189
+ #define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP			 190
+ #define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT		 312
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_locl.h.ticket-race openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_locl.h.ticket-race	2015-06-15 17:06:22.543698865 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_locl.h	2015-06-15 17:06:22.705702616 +0200
+@@ -831,6 +831,7 @@ void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc);
+ int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *c, int type);
+ int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session);
+ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session,int len, const unsigned char *limit);
++SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket);
+ int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a,const SSL_CIPHER *b);
+ DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER,
+ 				  ssl_cipher_id);
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_sess.c.ticket-race openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_sess.c.ticket-race	2015-01-08 15:00:56.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_sess.c	2015-06-15 17:06:22.705702616 +0200
+@@ -224,6 +224,146 @@ SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void)
+ 	return(ss);
+ 	}
+ 
++/*
++ * Create a new SSL_SESSION and duplicate the contents of |src| into it. If
++ * ticket == 0 then no ticket information is duplicated, otherwise it is.
++ */
++SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
++{
++	SSL_SESSION *dest;
++
++	dest = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*src));
++	if (dest == NULL)
++		{
++		goto err;
++		}
++	memcpy(dest, src, sizeof(*dest));
++
++	/*
++	 * Set the various pointers to NULL so that we can call SSL_SESSION_free in
++	 * the case of an error whilst halfway through constructing dest
++	 */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
++	dest->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
++	dest->psk_identity = NULL;
++#endif
++	dest->ciphers = NULL;
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
++	dest->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
++# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
++	dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
++	dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
++# endif
++#endif
++	dest->tlsext_tick = NULL;
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
++	dest->srp_username = NULL;
++#endif
++	memset(&dest->ex_data, 0, sizeof(dest->ex_data));
++
++	/* We deliberately don't copy the prev and next pointers */
++	dest->prev = NULL;
++	dest->next = NULL;
++
++	dest->references = 1;
++
++	if (src->sess_cert != NULL)
++		CRYPTO_add(&src->sess_cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT);
++
++	if (src->peer != NULL)
++		CRYPTO_add(&src->peer->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
++	if (src->psk_identity_hint)
++		{
++		dest->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(src->psk_identity_hint);
++		if (dest->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
++			{
++			goto err;
++			}
++		}
++	if (src->psk_identity)
++		{
++		dest->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(src->psk_identity);
++		if (dest->psk_identity == NULL)
++			{
++			goto err;
++			}
++		}
++#endif
++
++	if(src->ciphers != NULL)
++		{
++		dest->ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(src->ciphers);
++		if (dest->ciphers == NULL)
++			goto err;
++		}
++
++	if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION,
++				&dest->ex_data, &src->ex_data))
++		{
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
++	if (src->tlsext_hostname)
++		{
++		dest->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(src->tlsext_hostname);
++		if (dest->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
++			{
++			goto err;
++			}
++		}
++# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
++	if (src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
++		{
++		dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
++			BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
++				src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
++		if (dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist == NULL)
++			goto err;
++		}
++	if (src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
++		{
++		dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
++			BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
++				src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
++		if (dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist == NULL)
++			goto err;
++		}
++# endif
++#endif
++
++	if (ticket != 0)
++		{
++		dest->tlsext_tick = BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_tick, src->tlsext_ticklen);
++        	if(dest->tlsext_tick == NULL)
++			goto err;
++		}
++	else
++		{
++		dest->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = 0;
++		dest->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
++		}
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
++	if (src->srp_username)
++		{
++		dest->srp_username = BUF_strdup(src->srp_username);
++		if (dest->srp_username == NULL)
++			{
++			goto err;
++			}
++		}
++#endif
++
++	return dest;
++err:
++	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++	SSL_SESSION_free(dest);
++	return NULL;
++}
++
+ const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len)
+ 	{
+ 	if(len)
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_clnt.c.ticket-race openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_clnt.c.ticket-race	2015-06-15 17:06:22.700702500 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_clnt.c	2015-06-15 17:06:37.434043557 +0200
+@@ -2191,6 +2191,44 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
+ 		}
+ 
+ 	p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
++
++	if (s->session->session_id_length > 0)
++		{
++		int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
++		SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
++		/*
++		 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
++		 * one
++		 */
++		if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT)
++			{
++			/*
++			 * Remove the old session from the cache
++			 */
++			if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)
++				{
++				if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
++					s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx,
++						s->session);
++				}
++			else
++				{
++				/* We carry on if this fails */
++				SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
++				}
++			}
++
++		if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0)
++			{
++			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++			goto f_err;
++			}
++
++		SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
++		s->session = new_sess;
++		}
++
+ 	n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
+ 	n2s(p, ticklen);
+ 	/* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */

openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-4000.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod.logjam openssl-1.0.1k/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod.logjam	2015-05-29 16:02:33.335187143 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod	2015-05-29 16:05:16.611940775 +0200
+@@ -61,12 +61,12 @@ negotiation is being saved.
+ 
+ If "strong" primes were used to generate the DH parameters, it is not strictly
+ necessary to generate a new key for each handshake but it does improve forward
+-secrecy. If it is not assured, that "strong" primes were used (see especially
+-the section about DSA parameters below), SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE must be used
+-in order to prevent small subgroup attacks. Always using SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
+-has an impact on the computer time needed during negotiation, but it is not
+-very large, so application authors/users should consider to always enable
+-this option.
++secrecy. If it is not assured that "strong" primes were used,
++SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE must be used in order to prevent small subgroup
++attacks. Always using SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE has an impact on the
++computer time needed during negotiation, but it is not very large, so
++application authors/users should consider always enabling this option.
++The option is required to implement perfect forward secrecy (PFS).
+ 
+ As generating DH parameters is extremely time consuming, an application
+ should not generate the parameters on the fly but supply the parameters.
+@@ -74,82 +74,62 @@ DH parameters can be reused, as the actu
+ the negotiation. The risk in reusing DH parameters is that an attacker
+ may specialize on a very often used DH group. Applications should therefore
+ generate their own DH parameters during the installation process using the
+-openssl L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application. In order to reduce the computer
+-time needed for this generation, it is possible to use DSA parameters
+-instead (see L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)>), but in this case SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
+-is mandatory.
++openssl L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application. This application
++guarantees that "strong" primes are used.
+ 
+-Application authors may compile in DH parameters. Files dh512.pem,
+-dh1024.pem, dh2048.pem, and dh4096.pem in the 'apps' directory of current
++Files dh2048.pem, and dh4096.pem in the 'apps' directory of the current
+ version of the OpenSSL distribution contain the 'SKIP' DH parameters,
+ which use safe primes and were generated verifiably pseudo-randomly.
+ These files can be converted into C code using the B<-C> option of the
+-L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application.
+-Authors may also generate their own set of parameters using
+-L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)>, but a user may not be sure how the parameters were
+-generated. The generation of DH parameters during installation is therefore
+-recommended.
++L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application. Generation of custom DH
++parameters during installation should still be preferred to stop an
++attacker from specializing on a commonly used group. Files dh1024.pem
++and dh512.pem contain old parameters that must not be used by
++applications.
+ 
+ An application may either directly specify the DH parameters or
+-can supply the DH parameters via a callback function. The callback approach
+-has the advantage, that the callback may supply DH parameters for different
+-key lengths.
+-
+-The B<tmp_dh_callback> is called with the B<keylength> needed and
+-the B<is_export> information. The B<is_export> flag is set, when the
+-ephemeral DH key exchange is performed with an export cipher.
++can supply the DH parameters via a callback function.
++
++Previous versions of the callback used B<is_export> and B<keylength>
++parameters to control parameter generation for export and non-export
++cipher suites. Modern servers that do not support export ciphersuites
++are advised to either use SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() in combination with
++SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE, or alternatively, use the callback but ignore
++B<keylength> and B<is_export> and simply supply at least 2048-bit
++parameters in the callback.
+ 
+ =head1 EXAMPLES
+ 
+-Handle DH parameters for key lengths of 512 and 1024 bits. (Error handling
++Setup DH parameters with a key length of 2048 bits. (Error handling
+ partly left out.)
+ 
+- ...
+- /* Set up ephemeral DH stuff */
+- DH *dh_512 = NULL;
+- DH *dh_1024 = NULL;
+- FILE *paramfile;
++ Command-line parameter generation:
++ $ openssl dhparam -out dh_param_2048.pem 2048
++
++ Code for setting up parameters during server initialization:
+ 
+  ...
+- /* "openssl dhparam -out dh_param_512.pem -2 512" */
+- paramfile = fopen("dh_param_512.pem", "r");
++ SSL_CTX ctx = SSL_CTX_new();
++ ...
++
++ /* Set up ephemeral DH parameters. */
++ DH *dh_2048 = NULL;
++ FILE *paramfile;
++ paramfile = fopen("dh_param_2048.pem", "r");
+  if (paramfile) {
+-   dh_512 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
++   dh_2048 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    fclose(paramfile);
++ } else {
++   /* Error. */
+  }
+- /* "openssl dhparam -out dh_param_1024.pem -2 1024" */
+- paramfile = fopen("dh_param_1024.pem", "r");
+- if (paramfile) {
+-   dh_1024 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+-   fclose(paramfile);
++ if (dh_2048 == NULL) {
++  /* Error. */
+  }
+- ...
+-
+- /* "openssl dhparam -C -2 512" etc... */
+- DH *get_dh512() { ... }
+- DH *get_dh1024() { ... }
+-
+- DH *tmp_dh_callback(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength)
+- {
+-    DH *dh_tmp=NULL;
+-
+-    switch (keylength) {
+-    case 512:
+-      if (!dh_512)
+-        dh_512 = get_dh512();
+-      dh_tmp = dh_512;
+-      break;
+-    case 1024:
+-      if (!dh_1024)
+-        dh_1024 = get_dh1024();
+-      dh_tmp = dh_1024;
+-      break;
+-    default:
+-      /* Generating a key on the fly is very costly, so use what is there */
+-      setup_dh_parameters_like_above();
++ if (SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh_2048) != 1) {
++   /* Error. */
+     }
+-    return(dh_tmp);
+- }
++ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
++ ...
+ 
+ =head1 RETURN VALUES
+ 
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_err.c.logjam openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_err.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_err.c.logjam	2015-01-08 15:00:36.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_err.c	2015-05-29 16:02:33.336187166 +0200
+@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG)  ,"data length too long"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED)     ,"decryption failed"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC),"decryption failed or bad record mac"},
++{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL)      ,"dh key too small"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG),"dh public value length is wrong"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED)   ,"digest check failed"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG)  ,"dtls message too big"},
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl.h.logjam openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl.h
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl.h.logjam	2015-05-29 16:02:19.210862433 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl.h	2015-05-29 16:02:33.337187189 +0200
+@@ -2317,6 +2317,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
+ #define SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG			 146
+ #define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED				 147
+ #define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC	 281
++#define SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL                           372
+ #define SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG		 148
+ #define SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED			 149
+ #define SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG			 334
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_clnt.c.logjam openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_clnt.c.logjam	2015-01-08 15:00:56.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_clnt.c	2015-05-29 16:02:33.338187212 +0200
+@@ -3393,24 +3393,34 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s
+ 		}
+ #endif
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+-	if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) &&
+-		!(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL)))
++	if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) && dh == NULL)
+ 		{
+-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
++		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ 		goto f_err;
+ 		}
+-	else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_RSA))
++	if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_RSA))
+ 		{
+ 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
+ 		goto f_err;
+ 		}
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+-	else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_DSA))
++	if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_DSA))
+ 		{
+ 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
+ 		goto f_err;
+ 		}
+ #endif
++	/* Check DHE only: static DH not implemented. */
++	if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
++		{
++		int dh_size = BN_num_bits(dh->p);
++		if ((!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 768)
++		    || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 512))
++			{
++			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
++			goto f_err;
++			}
++		}
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PKT_EXP))

openssl-1.0.1k-secp256k1.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c.secp256k1 openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c.secp256k1	2015-08-13 07:47:37.890966462 -0400
++++ openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c	2015-08-13 08:01:31.697866786 -0400
+@@ -82,6 +82,36 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	unsigned int cofactor;	/* promoted to BN_ULONG */
+ } EC_CURVE_DATA;
+ 
++static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0+32*6]; }
++	_EC_SECG_PRIME_256K1 = {
++	{ NID_X9_62_prime_field,0,32,1 },
++	{							/* no seed */
++	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,	/* p */
++	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,
++	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFE,0xFF,0xFF,
++	  0xFC,0x2F,
++	  0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,	/* a */
++	  0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
++	  0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
++	  0x00,0x00,
++	  0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,	/* b */
++	  0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,    
++	  0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
++	  0x00,0x07,
++	  0x79,0xBE,0x66,0x7E,0xF9,0xDC,0xBB,0xAC,0x55,0xA0,	/* x */
++	  0x62,0x95,0xCE,0x87,0x0B,0x07,0x02,0x9B,0xFC,0xDB,
++	  0x2D,0xCE,0x28,0xD9,0x59,0xF2,0x81,0x5B,0x16,0xF8,
++	  0x17,0x98,
++	  0x48,0x3a,0xda,0x77,0x26,0xa3,0xc4,0x65,0x5d,0xa4,	/* y */
++	  0xfb,0xfc,0x0e,0x11,0x08,0xa8,0xfd,0x17,0xb4,0x48,
++	  0xa6,0x85,0x54,0x19,0x9c,0x47,0xd0,0x8f,0xfb,0x10,
++	  0xd4,0xb8,
++	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,	/* order */
++	  0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFF,0xFE,0xBA,0xAE,0xDC,0xE6,
++	  0xAF,0x48,0xA0,0x3B,0xBF,0xD2,0x5E,0x8C,0xD0,0x36,
++	  0x41,0x41 }
++	};
++
+ static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20+48*6]; }
+ 	_EC_NIST_PRIME_384 = {
+ 	{ NID_X9_62_prime_field,20,48,1 },
+@@ -212,6 +242,7 @@ typedef struct _ec_list_element_st {
+ static const ec_list_element curve_list[] = {
+ 	/* prime field curves */
+ 	/* secg curves */
++	{ NID_secp256k1, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_256K1.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 256 bit prime field" },
+ 	/* SECG secp256r1 is the same as X9.62 prime256v1 and hence omitted */
+ 	{ NID_secp384r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_384.h, 0, "NIST/SECG curve over a 384 bit prime field" },
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/t1_lib.c.secp256k1 openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/t1_lib.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/t1_lib.c.secp256k1	2015-08-13 08:03:17.401589785 -0400
++++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/t1_lib.c	2015-08-13 08:05:44.283292971 -0400
+@@ -218,6 +218,7 @@ static int pref_list[] =
+ 		NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
+ 		NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 
+ #endif
++		NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
+ 		NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ 		NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 

openssl.spec

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
 Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
 Name: openssl
 Version: 1.0.1k
-Release: 7%{?dist}
+Release: 12%{?dist}
 Epoch: 1
 # We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source
 # tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below.
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ Patch77: openssl-1.0.1e-weak-ciphers.patch
 Patch90: openssl-1.0.1e-enc-fail.patch
 Patch92: openssl-1.0.1h-system-cipherlist.patch
 Patch93: openssl-1.0.1h-disable-sslv2v3.patch
+Patch94: openssl-1.0.1k-secp256k1.patch
 # Backported fixes including security fixes
 Patch80: openssl-1.0.1j-evp-wrap.patch
 Patch81: openssl-1.0.1k-padlock64.patch
@@ -96,6 +97,12 @@ Patch103: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0287.patch
 Patch104: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0288.patch
 Patch105: openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-0289.patch
 Patch106: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0293.patch
+Patch107: openssl-1.0.1k-alt-chains.patch
+Patch108: openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-4000.patch
+Patch109: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1789.patch
+Patch110: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1790.patch
+Patch111: openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-1791.patch
+Patch112: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1792.patch
 
 License: OpenSSL
 Group: System Environment/Libraries
@@ -212,6 +219,7 @@ cp %{SOURCE12} %{SOURCE13} crypto/ec/
 %patch90 -p1 -b .enc-fail
 %patch92 -p1 -b .system
 %patch93 -p1 -b .v2v3
+%patch94 -p1 -b .secp256k1
 
 %patch80 -p1 -b .wrap
 %patch81 -p1 -b .padlock64
@@ -225,6 +233,12 @@ cp %{SOURCE12} %{SOURCE13} crypto/ec/
 %patch104 -p1 -b .req-null-deref
 %patch105 -p1 -b .pkcs7-null-deref
 %patch106 -p1 -b .ssl2-assert
+%patch107 -p1 -b .alt-chains
+%patch108 -p1 -b .logjam
+%patch109 -p1 -b .oob-read
+%patch110 -p1 -b .missing-content
+%patch111 -p1 -b .ticket-race
+%patch112 -p1 -b .unknown-hash
 
 sed -i 's/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "1.0.0"/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "%{version}"/' crypto/opensslv.h
 
@@ -492,6 +506,26 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/fipscanister.*
 %postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
 
 %changelog
+* Thu Aug 13 2015 Tom Callaway <spot@fedoraproject.org> 1.0.1k-12
+- enable secp256k1 (bz1021898)
+
+* Thu Jul  9 2015 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1k-11
+- fix CVE-2015-1793 - certificate verification forgery
+
+* Mon Jun 15 2015 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1k-10
+- fix CVE-2015-1789 - out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time
+- fix CVE-2015-1790 - PKCS7 crash with missing EncryptedContent
+- fix CVE-2015-1791 - race condition handling NewSessionTicket
+- fix CVE-2015-1792 - CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function
+- add missing parts of CVE-2015-0209 fix for corectness although unexploitable
+
+* Fri May 29 2015 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1k-9
+- fix CVE-2015-4000 - prevent the logjam attack on client - restrict
+  the DH key size to at least 768 bits (limit will be increased in future)
+
+* Thu Apr 30 2015 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1k-8
+- try to find alternative cert chains (#1166614)
+
 * Thu Apr  9 2015 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1k-7
 - drop the AES-GCM restriction of 2^32 operations because the IV is
   always 96 bits (32 bit fixed field + 64 bit invocation field)
@@ -520,11 +554,6 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/fipscanister.*
 * Fri Jan  9 2015 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1k-1
 - new upstream release fixing multiple security issues
 
-* Thu Nov 20 2014 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1j-3
-- disable SSLv3 by default again (mail servers and possibly
-  LDAP servers should probably allow it explicitly for legacy
-  clients)
-
 * Tue Oct 21 2014 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1j-2
 - update the FIPS RSA keygen to be FIPS 186-4 compliant