Merge branch 'f22' into f21
This commit is contained in:
Tomas Mraz
commit
c0a499bb31
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
|
|||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.oob-read openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.oob-read 2015-05-25 12:03:41.000000000 +0200
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c 2015-06-09 15:01:51.688640453 +0200
|
||||
@@ -1702,49 +1702,92 @@ int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm,
|
||||
ASN1_TIME atm;
|
||||
long offset;
|
||||
char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
|
||||
- int i,j;
|
||||
+ int i, j, remaining;
|
||||
|
||||
p=buff1;
|
||||
- i=ctm->length;
|
||||
+ remaining=ctm->length;
|
||||
str=(char *)ctm->data;
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
|
||||
+ * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
|
||||
+ * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
|
||||
+ * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
|
||||
+ /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
|
||||
+ int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
|
||||
+ int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
|
||||
+ if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
memcpy(p,str,10);
|
||||
p+=10;
|
||||
str+=10;
|
||||
+ remaining -= 10;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
- if (i < 13) return 0;
|
||||
+ /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
|
||||
+ int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
|
||||
+ int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
|
||||
+ if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
memcpy(p,str,12);
|
||||
p+=12;
|
||||
str+=12;
|
||||
+ remaining -= 12;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
|
||||
{ *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ /* SS (seconds) */
|
||||
+ if (remaining < 2)
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
*(p++)= *(str++);
|
||||
*(p++)= *(str++);
|
||||
- /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
|
||||
- if (*str == '.')
|
||||
+ remaining -= 2;
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
|
||||
+ * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
|
||||
+ * Can we just kill them altogether?
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ if (remaining && *str == '.')
|
||||
{
|
||||
str++;
|
||||
- while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
|
||||
+ remaining--;
|
||||
+ for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ if (*str < '0' || *str > '9')
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
*(p++)='Z';
|
||||
*(p++)='\0';
|
||||
|
||||
+ /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
|
||||
+ if (!remaining)
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
if (*str == 'Z')
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ if (remaining != 1)
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
offset=0;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ /* (+-)HHMM */
|
||||
if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
+ /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
|
||||
+ if (remaining != 5)
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+ if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' ||
|
||||
+ str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9')
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
|
||||
offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
|
||||
if (*str == '-')
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
|
|||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c.missing-content openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c.missing-content 2015-05-25 12:03:41.000000000 +0200
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c 2015-06-09 15:21:21.377951520 +0200
|
||||
@@ -472,6 +472,12 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
|
||||
switch (i)
|
||||
{
|
||||
case NID_pkcs7_signed:
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * p7->d.sign->contents is a PKCS7 structure consisting of a contentType
|
||||
+ * field and optional content.
|
||||
+ * data_body is NULL if that structure has no (=detached) content
|
||||
+ * or if the contentType is wrong (i.e., not "data").
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
data_body=PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.sign->contents);
|
||||
if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7) && data_body == NULL)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -484,6 +490,7 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
|
||||
case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
|
||||
rsk=p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->recipientinfo;
|
||||
md_sk=p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->md_algs;
|
||||
+ /* data_body is NULL if the optional EncryptedContent is missing. */
|
||||
data_body=p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
|
||||
enc_alg=p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
|
||||
evp_cipher=EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
|
||||
@@ -496,6 +503,7 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
|
||||
case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
|
||||
rsk=p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo;
|
||||
enc_alg=p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
|
||||
+ /* data_body is NULL if the optional EncryptedContent is missing. */
|
||||
data_body=p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
|
||||
evp_cipher=EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
|
||||
if (evp_cipher == NULL)
|
||||
@@ -509,6 +517,13 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ /* Detached content must be supplied via in_bio instead. */
|
||||
+ if (data_body == NULL && in_bio == NULL)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
|
||||
+ goto err;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* We will be checking the signature */
|
||||
if (md_sk != NULL)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -665,7 +680,7 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#if 1
|
||||
- if (PKCS7_is_detached(p7) || (in_bio != NULL))
|
||||
+ if (in_bio != NULL)
|
||||
{
|
||||
bio=in_bio;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
|
|||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c.unknown-hash openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c.unknown-hash 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c 2015-06-09 16:07:16.001516190 +0200
|
||||
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ static void do_free_upto(BIO *f, BIO *up
|
||||
BIO_free(f);
|
||||
f = tbio;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- while (f != upto);
|
||||
+ while (f && f != upto);
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
BIO_free_all(f);
|
||||
|
|
@ -1,3 +1,34 @@
|
|||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c.use-after-free openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c.use-after-free 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c 2015-06-11 11:14:52.581856349 +0200
|
||||
@@ -170,8 +170,14 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsig
|
||||
{
|
||||
const unsigned char *q;
|
||||
X509 *ret;
|
||||
+ int freeret = 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* Save start position */
|
||||
q = *pp;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if(!a || *a == NULL) {
|
||||
+ freeret = 1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
ret = d2i_X509(a, pp, length);
|
||||
/* If certificate unreadable then forget it */
|
||||
if(!ret) return NULL;
|
||||
@@ -181,7 +187,11 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsig
|
||||
if(!d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, pp, length)) goto err;
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
err:
|
||||
- X509_free(ret);
|
||||
+ if(freeret) {
|
||||
+ X509_free(ret);
|
||||
+ if (a)
|
||||
+ *a = NULL;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c.use-after-free openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c.use-after-free 2014-10-15 15:49:54.000000000 +0200
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c 2015-03-19 17:28:03.349627040 +0100
|
||||
|
|
@ -25,3 +56,27 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c.use-after-free openssl-1.0.1k/crypto
|
|||
EC_KEY_free(ret);
|
||||
ret = NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1377,8 +1377,6 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECParameters(EC_KEY **a, con
|
||||
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- if (a)
|
||||
- *a = ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
ret = *a;
|
||||
@@ -1386,9 +1384,14 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECParameters(EC_KEY **a, con
|
||||
if (!d2i_ECPKParameters(&ret->group, in, len))
|
||||
{
|
||||
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
||||
+ if (a == NULL || *a != ret)
|
||||
+ EC_KEY_free(ret);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (a)
|
||||
+ *a = ret;
|
||||
+
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
|
|||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_err.c.ticket-race openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_err.c
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_err.c.ticket-race 2015-06-15 17:06:22.699702477 +0200
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_err.c 2015-06-15 17:06:22.704702592 +0200
|
||||
@@ -245,6 +245,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_READ), "SSL_read"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT), "SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT), "SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT"},
|
||||
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP), "ssl_session_dup"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW), "SSL_SESSION_new"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP), "SSL_SESSION_print_fp"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT), "SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context"},
|
||||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl.h.ticket-race openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl.h
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl.h.ticket-race 2015-06-15 17:06:22.700702500 +0200
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl.h 2015-06-15 17:06:22.704702592 +0200
|
||||
@@ -2203,6 +2203,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
|
||||
#define SSL_F_SSL_READ 223
|
||||
#define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT 187
|
||||
#define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT 188
|
||||
+#define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP 348
|
||||
#define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW 189
|
||||
#define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP 190
|
||||
#define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT 312
|
||||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_locl.h.ticket-race openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_locl.h
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_locl.h.ticket-race 2015-06-15 17:06:22.543698865 +0200
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_locl.h 2015-06-15 17:06:22.705702616 +0200
|
||||
@@ -831,6 +831,7 @@ void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc);
|
||||
int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *c, int type);
|
||||
int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session);
|
||||
int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session,int len, const unsigned char *limit);
|
||||
+SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket);
|
||||
int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a,const SSL_CIPHER *b);
|
||||
DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER,
|
||||
ssl_cipher_id);
|
||||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_sess.c.ticket-race openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_sess.c
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_sess.c.ticket-race 2015-01-08 15:00:56.000000000 +0100
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_sess.c 2015-06-15 17:06:22.705702616 +0200
|
||||
@@ -224,6 +224,146 @@ SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void)
|
||||
return(ss);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+/*
|
||||
+ * Create a new SSL_SESSION and duplicate the contents of |src| into it. If
|
||||
+ * ticket == 0 then no ticket information is duplicated, otherwise it is.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ SSL_SESSION *dest;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ dest = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*src));
|
||||
+ if (dest == NULL)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ goto err;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ memcpy(dest, src, sizeof(*dest));
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * Set the various pointers to NULL so that we can call SSL_SESSION_free in
|
||||
+ * the case of an error whilst halfway through constructing dest
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
||||
+ dest->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
|
||||
+ dest->psk_identity = NULL;
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+ dest->ciphers = NULL;
|
||||
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
||||
+ dest->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
|
||||
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
||||
+ dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
|
||||
+ dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
|
||||
+# endif
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+ dest->tlsext_tick = NULL;
|
||||
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
||||
+ dest->srp_username = NULL;
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+ memset(&dest->ex_data, 0, sizeof(dest->ex_data));
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* We deliberately don't copy the prev and next pointers */
|
||||
+ dest->prev = NULL;
|
||||
+ dest->next = NULL;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ dest->references = 1;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (src->sess_cert != NULL)
|
||||
+ CRYPTO_add(&src->sess_cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (src->peer != NULL)
|
||||
+ CRYPTO_add(&src->peer->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
||||
+ if (src->psk_identity_hint)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ dest->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(src->psk_identity_hint);
|
||||
+ if (dest->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ goto err;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (src->psk_identity)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ dest->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(src->psk_identity);
|
||||
+ if (dest->psk_identity == NULL)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ goto err;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if(src->ciphers != NULL)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ dest->ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(src->ciphers);
|
||||
+ if (dest->ciphers == NULL)
|
||||
+ goto err;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION,
|
||||
+ &dest->ex_data, &src->ex_data))
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ goto err;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
||||
+ if (src->tlsext_hostname)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ dest->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(src->tlsext_hostname);
|
||||
+ if (dest->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ goto err;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
||||
+ if (src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
|
||||
+ BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
|
||||
+ src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
|
||||
+ if (dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist == NULL)
|
||||
+ goto err;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
|
||||
+ BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
|
||||
+ src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
|
||||
+ if (dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist == NULL)
|
||||
+ goto err;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+# endif
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (ticket != 0)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ dest->tlsext_tick = BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_tick, src->tlsext_ticklen);
|
||||
+ if(dest->tlsext_tick == NULL)
|
||||
+ goto err;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ else
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ dest->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = 0;
|
||||
+ dest->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
||||
+ if (src->srp_username)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ dest->srp_username = BUF_strdup(src->srp_username);
|
||||
+ if (dest->srp_username == NULL)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ goto err;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return dest;
|
||||
+err:
|
||||
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
+ SSL_SESSION_free(dest);
|
||||
+ return NULL;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if(len)
|
||||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_clnt.c.ticket-race openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_clnt.c
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_clnt.c.ticket-race 2015-06-15 17:06:22.700702500 +0200
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2015-06-15 17:06:37.434043557 +0200
|
||||
@@ -2191,6 +2191,44 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (s->session->session_id_length > 0)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
|
||||
+ SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
|
||||
+ * one
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * Remove the old session from the cache
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
|
||||
+ s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx,
|
||||
+ s->session);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ else
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ /* We carry on if this fails */
|
||||
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
||||
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
+ goto f_err;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
|
||||
+ s->session = new_sess;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
|
||||
n2s(p, ticklen);
|
||||
/* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
|
||||
17
openssl.spec
17
openssl.spec
|
|
@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
|
|||
Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
|
||||
Name: openssl
|
||||
Version: 1.0.1k
|
||||
Release: 9%{?dist}
|
||||
Release: 10%{?dist}
|
||||
Epoch: 1
|
||||
# We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source
|
||||
# tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below.
|
||||
|
|
@ -98,6 +98,10 @@ Patch105: openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-0289.patch
|
|||
Patch106: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0293.patch
|
||||
Patch107: openssl-1.0.1k-alt-chains.patch
|
||||
Patch108: openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-4000.patch
|
||||
Patch109: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1789.patch
|
||||
Patch110: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1790.patch
|
||||
Patch111: openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-1791.patch
|
||||
Patch112: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1792.patch
|
||||
|
||||
License: OpenSSL
|
||||
Group: System Environment/Libraries
|
||||
|
|
@ -229,6 +233,10 @@ cp %{SOURCE12} %{SOURCE13} crypto/ec/
|
|||
%patch106 -p1 -b .ssl2-assert
|
||||
%patch107 -p1 -b .alt-chains
|
||||
%patch108 -p1 -b .logjam
|
||||
%patch109 -p1 -b .oob-read
|
||||
%patch110 -p1 -b .missing-content
|
||||
%patch111 -p1 -b .ticket-race
|
||||
%patch112 -p1 -b .unknown-hash
|
||||
|
||||
sed -i 's/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "1.0.0"/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "%{version}"/' crypto/opensslv.h
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -496,6 +504,13 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/fipscanister.*
|
|||
%postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
|
||||
|
||||
%changelog
|
||||
* Mon Jun 15 2015 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1k-10
|
||||
- fix CVE-2015-1789 - out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time
|
||||
- fix CVE-2015-1790 - PKCS7 crash with missing EncryptedContent
|
||||
- fix CVE-2015-1791 - race condition handling NewSessionTicket
|
||||
- fix CVE-2015-1792 - CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function
|
||||
- add missing parts of CVE-2015-0209 fix for corectness although unexploitable
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri May 29 2015 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1k-9
|
||||
- fix CVE-2015-4000 - prevent the logjam attack on client - restrict
|
||||
the DH key size to at least 768 bits (limit will be increased in future)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue