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fix locking and reseeding problems with FIPS drbg

This commit is contained in:
Tomas Mraz 2013-11-19 14:52:30 +01:00
parent c9a46cb3ac
commit ad237d19e6
2 changed files with 294 additions and 19 deletions
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308
openssl-1.0.1e-new-fips-reqs.patch
View File

@ -1,6 +1,57 @@
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_drbg_rand.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_drbg_rand.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_drbg_rand.c.fips-reqs 2013-11-15 16:54:49.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_drbg_rand.c 2013-11-19 14:48:38.935251819 +0100
@@ -77,7 +77,8 @@ static int fips_drbg_bytes(unsigned char
int rv = 0;
unsigned char *adin = NULL;
size_t adinlen = 0;
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ int locked;
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
do
{
size_t rcnt;
@@ -109,7 +110,8 @@ static int fips_drbg_bytes(unsigned char
while (count);
rv = 1;
err:
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
return rv;
}
@@ -141,8 +143,13 @@ static void fips_drbg_cleanup(void)
static int fips_drbg_seed(const void *seed, int seedlen)
{
DRBG_CTX *dctx = &ossl_dctx;
+ int locked;
+
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
if (dctx->rand_seed_cb)
return dctx->rand_seed_cb(dctx, seed, seedlen);
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
return 1;
}
@@ -150,8 +157,13 @@ static int fips_drbg_add(const void *see
double add_entropy)
{
DRBG_CTX *dctx = &ossl_dctx;
+ int locked;
+
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
if (dctx->rand_add_cb)
return dctx->rand_add_cb(dctx, seed, seedlen, add_entropy);
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
return 1;
}
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_rsa_selftest.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_rsa_selftest.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_rsa_selftest.c.fips-reqs 2013-11-15 16:38:18.378484894 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_rsa_selftest.c 2013-11-15 16:54:19.584570380 +0100
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_rsa_selftest.c.fips-reqs 2013-11-15 16:54:49.390224209 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_rsa_selftest.c 2013-11-15 16:54:49.427225021 +0100
@@ -340,6 +340,42 @@ static const unsigned char kat_RSA_X931_
0x60, 0x83, 0x18, 0x88, 0xA3, 0xF5, 0x59, 0xC3
};
@ -72,7 +123,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_rsa_selftest.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e
}
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/gcm128.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/gcm128.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/gcm128.c.fips-reqs 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/gcm128.c 2013-11-15 16:38:18.417485749 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/gcm128.c 2013-11-15 16:54:49.427225021 +0100
@@ -898,6 +898,10 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT
# endif
#endif
@ -96,8 +147,8 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/gcm128.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/mo
if (mlen>((U64(1)<<36)-32) || (sizeof(len)==8 && mlen<len))
return -1;
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h.fips-reqs 2013-11-15 16:38:17.984476250 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h 2013-11-15 16:38:18.417485749 +0100
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h.fips-reqs 2013-11-15 16:54:48.995215544 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h 2013-11-15 16:54:49.427225021 +0100
@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ struct gcm128_context {
unsigned int mres, ares;
block128_f block;
@ -106,9 +157,196 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto
};
struct xts128_context {
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/md_rand.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/md_rand.c.fips-reqs 2013-11-15 16:54:49.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/md_rand.c 2013-11-19 14:43:00.592829775 +0100
@@ -143,12 +143,6 @@ static long md_count[2]={0,0};
static double entropy=0;
static int initialized=0;
-static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; /* may be set only when a thread
- * holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND
- * (to prevent double locking) */
-/* access to lockin_thread is synchronized by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 */
-static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */
-
#ifdef PREDICT
int rand_predictable=0;
@@ -196,7 +190,7 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *
long md_c[2];
unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
EVP_MD_CTX m;
- int do_not_lock;
+ int locked;
/*
* (Based on the rand(3) manpage)
@@ -213,19 +207,8 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *
* hash function.
*/
- /* check if we already have the lock */
- if (crypto_lock_rand)
- {
- CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
- CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- }
- else
- do_not_lock = 0;
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
- if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
st_idx=state_index;
/* use our own copies of the counters so that even
@@ -257,7 +240,8 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *
md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0);
- if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m);
for (i=0; i<num; i+=MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)
@@ -308,7 +292,7 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *
}
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
- if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
/* Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that
* other thread's seeding remains without effect (except for
* the incremented counter). By XORing it we keep at least as
@@ -319,7 +303,8 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *
}
if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */
entropy += add;
- if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
#if !defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]);
@@ -344,6 +329,7 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned ch
pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
#endif
int do_stir_pool = 0;
+ int locked;
#ifdef PREDICT
if (rand_predictable)
@@ -381,13 +367,7 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned ch
* global 'md'.
*/
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
-
- /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- crypto_lock_rand = 1;
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
/* always poll for external entropy in FIPS mode, drbg provides the
* expansion
@@ -461,9 +441,8 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned ch
md_count[0] += 1;
- /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
- crypto_lock_rand = 0;
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
while (num > 0)
{
@@ -515,10 +494,11 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned ch
MD_Init(&m);
MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
MD_Final(&m,md);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
if (ok)
@@ -548,32 +528,10 @@ static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsi
static int ssleay_rand_status(void)
{
- CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
int ret;
- int do_not_lock;
+ int locked;
- CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
- /* check if we already have the lock
- * (could happen if a RAND_poll() implementation calls RAND_status()) */
- if (crypto_lock_rand)
- {
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- }
- else
- do_not_lock = 0;
-
- if (!do_not_lock)
- {
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
-
- /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&locking_threadid, &cur);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- crypto_lock_rand = 1;
- }
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
if (!initialized)
{
@@ -583,13 +541,8 @@ static int ssleay_rand_status(void)
ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED;
- if (!do_not_lock)
- {
- /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
- crypto_lock_rand = 0;
-
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
- }
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
return ret;
}
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand.h.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand.h
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand.h.fips-reqs 2013-11-19 14:32:25.182891113 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand.h 2013-11-19 14:32:03.546416472 +0100
@@ -124,6 +124,8 @@ void RAND_set_fips_drbg_type(int type, i
int RAND_init_fips(void);
#endif
+int private_RAND_lock(int lock);
+
/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
/* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
* made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h.fips-reqs 2013-11-15 16:38:18.110479014 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h 2013-11-15 16:38:18.417485749 +0100
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h.fips-reqs 2013-11-15 16:54:49.122218330 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h 2013-11-15 16:54:49.427225021 +0100
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@
#ifndef HEADER_RAND_LCL_H
#define HEADER_RAND_LCL_H
@ -120,27 +358,61 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/r
#if !defined(USE_MD5_RAND) && !defined(USE_SHA1_RAND) && !defined(USE_MDC2_RAND) && !defined(USE_MD2_RAND)
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c.fips-reqs 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c 2013-11-15 16:38:18.417485749 +0100
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
#include <openssl/fips.h>
#include <openssl/fips_rand.h>
+#include "../fips/fips_rand_lcl.h"
#endif
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c 2013-11-19 14:44:22.422624833 +0100
@@ -181,6 +181,41 @@ int RAND_status(void)
return 0;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
@@ -239,12 +240,14 @@ static int drbg_rand_add(DRBG_CTX *ctx,
+int private_RAND_lock(int lock)
+ {
+ static int crypto_lock_rand;
+ static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid;
+ int do_lock;
+
+ if (!lock)
+ {
+ crypto_lock_rand = 0;
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* check if we already have the lock */
+ if (crypto_lock_rand)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ do_lock = !!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ }
+ else
+ do_lock = 1;
+ if (do_lock)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ crypto_lock_rand = 1;
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ }
+ return do_lock;
+ }
+
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
/* FIPS DRBG initialisation code. This sets up the DRBG for use by the
@@ -239,12 +274,14 @@ static int drbg_rand_add(DRBG_CTX *ctx,
double entropy)
{
RAND_SSLeay()->add(in, inlen, entropy);
+ ctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_RESEED;
+ FIPS_drbg_reseed(ctx, NULL, 0);
return 1;
}
static int drbg_rand_seed(DRBG_CTX *ctx, const void *in, int inlen)
{
RAND_SSLeay()->seed(in, inlen);
+ ctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_RESEED;
+ FIPS_drbg_reseed(ctx, NULL, 0);
return 1;
}

5
openssl.spec
View File

@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
Name: openssl
Version: 1.0.1e
Release: 33%{?dist}
Release: 34%{?dist}
Epoch: 1
# We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source
# tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below.
@ -462,6 +462,9 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/fipscanister.*
%postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
%changelog
* Tue Nov 19 2013 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1e-34
- fix locking and reseeding problems with FIPS drbg
* Fri Nov 15 2013 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1e-33
- additional changes required for FIPS validation