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Fix multiple security issues.

Browse Source 
- fix CVE-2015-1789 - out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time
- fix CVE-2015-1790 - PKCS7 crash with missing EncryptedContent
- fix CVE-2015-1791 - race condition handling NewSessionTicket
- fix CVE-2015-1792 - CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function
- add missing parts of CVE-2015-0209 fix for corectness although unexploitable
This commit is contained in:
Tomas Mraz 2015-06-15 17:09:29 +02:00
parent a3963e794f
commit 546bf977b5
6 changed files with 472 additions and 1 deletions
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103
openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1789.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.oob-read openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.oob-read 2015-05-25 12:03:41.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c 2015-06-09 15:01:51.688640453 +0200
@@ -1702,49 +1702,92 @@ int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm,
ASN1_TIME atm;
long offset;
char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
- int i,j;
+ int i, j, remaining;
p=buff1;
- i=ctm->length;
+ remaining=ctm->length;
str=(char *)ctm->data;
+ /*
+ * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
+ * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
+ * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
+ * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
+ */
if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
{
- if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
+ /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
+ int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
+ int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
+ if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
+ return 0;
memcpy(p,str,10);
p+=10;
str+=10;
+ remaining -= 10;
}
else
{
- if (i < 13) return 0;
+ /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
+ int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
+ int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
+ if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
+ return 0;
memcpy(p,str,12);
p+=12;
str+=12;
+ remaining -= 12;
}
if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
{ *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
else
{
+ /* SS (seconds) */
+ if (remaining < 2)
+ return 0;
*(p++)= *(str++);
*(p++)= *(str++);
- /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
- if (*str == '.')
+ remaining -= 2;
+ /*
+ * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
+ * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
+ * Can we just kill them altogether?
+ */
+ if (remaining && *str == '.')
{
str++;
- while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
+ remaining--;
+ for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--)
+ {
+ if (*str < '0' || *str > '9')
+ break;
+ }
}
}
*(p++)='Z';
*(p++)='\0';
+ /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
+ if (!remaining)
+ return 0;
if (*str == 'Z')
+ {
+ if (remaining != 1)
+ return 0;
offset=0;
+ }
else
{
+ /* (+-)HHMM */
if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
return 0;
+ /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
+ if (remaining != 5)
+ return 0;
+ if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' ||
+ str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9')
+ return 0;
offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
if (*str == '-')

55
openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1790.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c.missing-content openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c.missing-content 2015-05-25 12:03:41.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c 2015-06-09 15:21:21.377951520 +0200
@@ -472,6 +472,12 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
switch (i)
{
case NID_pkcs7_signed:
+ /*
+ * p7->d.sign->contents is a PKCS7 structure consisting of a contentType
+ * field and optional content.
+ * data_body is NULL if that structure has no (=detached) content
+ * or if the contentType is wrong (i.e., not "data").
+ */
data_body=PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.sign->contents);
if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7) && data_body == NULL)
{
@@ -484,6 +490,7 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
rsk=p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->recipientinfo;
md_sk=p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->md_algs;
+ /* data_body is NULL if the optional EncryptedContent is missing. */
data_body=p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
enc_alg=p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
evp_cipher=EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
@@ -496,6 +503,7 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
rsk=p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo;
enc_alg=p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
+ /* data_body is NULL if the optional EncryptedContent is missing. */
data_body=p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
evp_cipher=EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
if (evp_cipher == NULL)
@@ -509,6 +517,13 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
goto err;
}
+ /* Detached content must be supplied via in_bio instead. */
+ if (data_body == NULL && in_bio == NULL)
+ {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
/* We will be checking the signature */
if (md_sk != NULL)
{
@@ -665,7 +680,7 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
}
#if 1
- if (PKCS7_is_detached(p7) || (in_bio != NULL))
+ if (in_bio != NULL)
{
bio=in_bio;
}

12
openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1792.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c.unknown-hash openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c.unknown-hash 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c 2015-06-09 16:07:16.001516190 +0200
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ static void do_free_upto(BIO *f, BIO *up
BIO_free(f);
f = tbio;
}
- while (f != upto);
+ while (f && f != upto);
}
else
BIO_free_all(f);

55
openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-0209.patch
View File

@ -1,3 +1,34 @@
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c.use-after-free openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c.use-after-free 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c 2015-06-11 11:14:52.581856349 +0200
@@ -170,8 +170,14 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsig
{
const unsigned char *q;
X509 *ret;
+ int freeret = 0;
+
/* Save start position */
q = *pp;
+
+ if(!a || *a == NULL) {
+ freeret = 1;
+ }
ret = d2i_X509(a, pp, length);
/* If certificate unreadable then forget it */
if(!ret) return NULL;
@@ -181,7 +187,11 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsig
if(!d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, pp, length)) goto err;
return ret;
err:
- X509_free(ret);
+ if(freeret) {
+ X509_free(ret);
+ if (a)
+ *a = NULL;
+ }
return NULL;
}
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c.use-after-free openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
--- openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c.use-after-free 2014-10-15 15:49:54.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c 2015-03-19 17:28:03.349627040 +0100
@ -25,3 +56,27 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c.use-after-free openssl-1.0.1k/crypto
EC_KEY_free(ret);
ret = NULL;
}
@@ -1377,8 +1377,6 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECParameters(EC_KEY **a, con
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
- if (a)
- *a = ret;
}
else
ret = *a;
@@ -1386,9 +1384,14 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECParameters(EC_KEY **a, con
if (!d2i_ECPKParameters(&ret->group, in, len))
{
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ if (a == NULL || *a != ret)
+ EC_KEY_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
+ if (a)
+ *a = ret;
+
return ret;
}

231
openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-1791.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_err.c.ticket-race openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_err.c
--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_err.c.ticket-race 2015-06-15 17:06:22.699702477 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_err.c 2015-06-15 17:06:22.704702592 +0200
@@ -245,6 +245,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_READ), "SSL_read"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT), "SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT), "SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP), "ssl_session_dup"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW), "SSL_SESSION_new"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP), "SSL_SESSION_print_fp"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT), "SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context"},
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl.h.ticket-race openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl.h
--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl.h.ticket-race 2015-06-15 17:06:22.700702500 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl.h 2015-06-15 17:06:22.704702592 +0200
@@ -2203,6 +2203,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
#define SSL_F_SSL_READ 223
#define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT 187
#define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT 188
+#define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP 348
#define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW 189
#define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP 190
#define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT 312
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_locl.h.ticket-race openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_locl.h
--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_locl.h.ticket-race 2015-06-15 17:06:22.543698865 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_locl.h 2015-06-15 17:06:22.705702616 +0200
@@ -831,6 +831,7 @@ void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc);
int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *c, int type);
int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session);
int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session,int len, const unsigned char *limit);
+SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket);
int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a,const SSL_CIPHER *b);
DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER,
ssl_cipher_id);
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_sess.c.ticket-race openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_sess.c
--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_sess.c.ticket-race 2015-01-08 15:00:56.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_sess.c 2015-06-15 17:06:22.705702616 +0200
@@ -224,6 +224,146 @@ SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void)
return(ss);
}
+/*
+ * Create a new SSL_SESSION and duplicate the contents of |src| into it. If
+ * ticket == 0 then no ticket information is duplicated, otherwise it is.
+ */
+SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
+{
+ SSL_SESSION *dest;
+
+ dest = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*src));
+ if (dest == NULL)
+ {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ memcpy(dest, src, sizeof(*dest));
+
+ /*
+ * Set the various pointers to NULL so that we can call SSL_SESSION_free in
+ * the case of an error whilst halfway through constructing dest
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ dest->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+ dest->psk_identity = NULL;
+#endif
+ dest->ciphers = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ dest->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
+ dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
+# endif
+#endif
+ dest->tlsext_tick = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ dest->srp_username = NULL;
+#endif
+ memset(&dest->ex_data, 0, sizeof(dest->ex_data));
+
+ /* We deliberately don't copy the prev and next pointers */
+ dest->prev = NULL;
+ dest->next = NULL;
+
+ dest->references = 1;
+
+ if (src->sess_cert != NULL)
+ CRYPTO_add(&src->sess_cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT);
+
+ if (src->peer != NULL)
+ CRYPTO_add(&src->peer->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (src->psk_identity_hint)
+ {
+ dest->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(src->psk_identity_hint);
+ if (dest->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+ {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (src->psk_identity)
+ {
+ dest->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(src->psk_identity);
+ if (dest->psk_identity == NULL)
+ {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if(src->ciphers != NULL)
+ {
+ dest->ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(src->ciphers);
+ if (dest->ciphers == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION,
+ &dest->ex_data, &src->ex_data))
+ {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (src->tlsext_hostname)
+ {
+ dest->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(src->tlsext_hostname);
+ if (dest->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
+ {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
+ {
+ dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
+ BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
+ src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
+ if (dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
+ {
+ dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
+ BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
+ src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
+ if (dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+# endif
+#endif
+
+ if (ticket != 0)
+ {
+ dest->tlsext_tick = BUF_memdup(src->tlsext_tick, src->tlsext_ticklen);
+ if(dest->tlsext_tick == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ dest->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = 0;
+ dest->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (src->srp_username)
+ {
+ dest->srp_username = BUF_strdup(src->srp_username);
+ if (dest->srp_username == NULL)
+ {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return dest;
+err:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(dest);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len)
{
if(len)
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_clnt.c.ticket-race openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_clnt.c
--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_clnt.c.ticket-race 2015-06-15 17:06:22.700702500 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2015-06-15 17:06:37.434043557 +0200
@@ -2191,6 +2191,44 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
}
p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ if (s->session->session_id_length > 0)
+ {
+ int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
+ SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
+ /*
+ * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
+ * one
+ */
+ if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Remove the old session from the cache
+ */
+ if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)
+ {
+ if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
+ s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx,
+ s->session);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* We carry on if this fails */
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0)
+ {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = new_sess;
+ }
+
n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
n2s(p, ticklen);
/* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */

17
openssl.spec
View File

@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
Name: openssl
Version: 1.0.1k
Release: 9%{?dist}
Release: 10%{?dist}
Epoch: 1
# We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source
# tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below.
@ -98,6 +98,10 @@ Patch105: openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-0289.patch
Patch106: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0293.patch
Patch107: openssl-1.0.1k-alt-chains.patch
Patch108: openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-4000.patch
Patch109: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1789.patch
Patch110: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1790.patch
Patch111: openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-1791.patch
Patch112: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-1792.patch
License: OpenSSL
Group: System Environment/Libraries
@ -229,6 +233,10 @@ cp %{SOURCE12} %{SOURCE13} crypto/ec/
%patch106 -p1 -b .ssl2-assert
%patch107 -p1 -b .alt-chains
%patch108 -p1 -b .logjam
%patch109 -p1 -b .oob-read
%patch110 -p1 -b .missing-content
%patch111 -p1 -b .ticket-race
%patch112 -p1 -b .unknown-hash
sed -i 's/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "1.0.0"/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "%{version}"/' crypto/opensslv.h
@ -496,6 +504,13 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/fipscanister.*
%postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
%changelog
* Mon Jun 15 2015 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1k-10
- fix CVE-2015-1789 - out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time
- fix CVE-2015-1790 - PKCS7 crash with missing EncryptedContent
- fix CVE-2015-1791 - race condition handling NewSessionTicket
- fix CVE-2015-1792 - CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function
- add missing parts of CVE-2015-0209 fix for corectness although unexploitable
* Fri May 29 2015 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1k-9
- fix CVE-2015-4000 - prevent the logjam attack on client - restrict
the DH key size to at least 768 bits (limit will be increased in future)