- update to latest upstream release, SONAME bumped to 7

2007-12-03 14:24:08 +00:00 · 2007-12-03 14:24:08 +00:00 · 3849a1678a
parent 96585a061a
commit 3849a1678a
24 changed files with 161 additions and 4504 deletions
--- a/.cvsignore
+++ b/.cvsignore
@ -1 +1 @@
-openssl-0.9.8b-usa.tar.bz2
+openssl-0.9.8g-usa.tar.bz2
--- a/openssl-0.9.7a-ssl-strict-matching.patch
+++ b/openssl-0.9.7a-ssl-strict-matching.patch
@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
-*) In the SSL/TLS server implementation, be strict about session ID
-   context matching (which matters if an application uses a single
-   external cache for different purposes).  Previously,
-   out-of-context reuse was forbidden only if SSL_VERIFY_PEER was
-   set.  This did ensure strict client verification, but meant that,
-   with applications using a single external cache for quite
-   different requirements, clients could circumvent ciphersuite
-   restrictions for a given session ID context by starting a session
-   in a different context.
-diff -up openssl-0.9.7a/ssl/ssl_sess.c.strict-matching openssl-0.9.7a/ssl/ssl_sess.c
--- openssl-0.9.7a/ssl/ssl_sess.c.strict-matching	2002-11-28 09:09:03.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-0.9.7a/ssl/ssl_sess.c	2007-08-02 16:17:29.000000000 +0200
-@@ -322,33 +322,35 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigne
- 
- 	/* Now ret is non-NULL, and we own one of its reference counts. */
- 
-	if((s->verify_mode&SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
-	   && (!s->sid_ctx_length || ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length
-	       || memcmp(ret->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,ret->sid_ctx_length)))
-	    {
-+	if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length
-+	    || memcmp(ret->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,ret->sid_ctx_length))
-+		{
- 		/* We've found the session named by the client, but we don't
- 		 * want to use it in this context. */
-		
-		if (s->sid_ctx_length == 0)
-			{
-			/* application should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context
-			 * -- we could tolerate this and just pretend we never heard
-			 * of this session, but then applications could effectively
-			 * disable the session cache by accident without anyone noticing */
- 
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
-			fatal = 1;
-			goto err;
-			}
-		else
-			{
- #if 0 /* The client cannot always know when a session is not appropriate,
-	   * so we shouldn't generate an error message. */
-+       * so we shouldn't generate an error message. */
- 
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
-+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
- #endif
-			goto err; /* treat like cache miss */
-			}
-+		goto err; /* treat like cache miss */
-+		}
-+	
-+	if((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && s->sid_ctx_length == 0)
-+		{
-+		/* We can't be sure if this session is being used out of
-+		 * context, which is especially important for SSL_VERIFY_PEER.
-+		 * The application should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context.
-+		 *
-+		 * For this error case, we generate an error instead of treating
-+		 * the event like a cache miss (otherwise it would be easy for
-+		 * applications to effectively disable the session cache by
-+		 * accident without anyone noticing).
-+		 */
-+		
-+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
-+		fatal = 1;
-+		goto err;
- 		}
- 
- 	if (ret->cipher == NULL)
--- a/openssl-0.9.8a-padlock.patch
+++ b/openssl-0.9.8a-padlock.patch
@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
--- openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/engine/eng_all.c.padlock	2005-04-19 15:24:44.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/engine/eng_all.c	2006-06-21 19:57:29.000000000 +0200
-@@ -69,6 +69,9 @@
- 	ENGINE_load_openssl();
- #endif
- 	ENGINE_load_dynamic();
-+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HW) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HW_PADLOCK)
-+	ENGINE_load_padlock();
-+#endif
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_4758_CCA
-@@ -95,9 +98,6 @@
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_UBSEC
- 	ENGINE_load_ubsec();
- #endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PADLOCK
-	ENGINE_load_padlock();
-#endif
- #endif
- #if defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__FreeBSD__)
- 	ENGINE_load_cryptodev();
--- a/openssl-0.9.8a-use-poll.patch
+++ b/openssl-0.9.8a-use-poll.patch
@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
--- openssl-0.9.8a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c.use-poll	2005-08-29 01:20:48.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-0.9.8a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c	2005-11-08 01:28:35.000000000 +0100
-@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@
- #include <fcntl.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
- #include <time.h>
-+#include <sys/poll.h>
- 
- #ifdef __OpenBSD__
- int RAND_poll(void)
-@@ -157,6 +158,7 @@
- 	struct stat randomstats[sizeof(randomfiles)/sizeof(randomfiles[0])];
- 	int fd;
- 	size_t i;
-+	struct pollfd pfd;
- #endif
- #ifdef DEVRANDOM_EGD
- 	static const char *egdsockets[] = { DEVRANDOM_EGD, NULL };
-@@ -184,11 +186,10 @@
- #endif
- 			)) >= 0)
- 			{
-			struct timeval t = { 0, 10*1000 }; /* Spend 10ms on
-+			int t = 10;                        /* Spend 10ms on
- 							      each file. */
- 			int r;
- 			size_t j;
-			fd_set fset;
- 			struct stat *st=&randomstats[i];
- 
- 			/* Avoid using same input... Used to be O_NOFOLLOW
-@@ -204,30 +205,25 @@
- 
- 			do
- 				{
-				FD_ZERO(&fset);
-				FD_SET(fd, &fset);
-				r = -1;
-
-				if (select(fd+1,&fset,NULL,NULL,&t) < 0)
-					t.tv_usec=0;
-				else if (FD_ISSET(fd, &fset))
-+				pfd.fd = fd;
-+				pfd.events = POLLIN;
-+				pfd.revents = 0;
-+				
-+				if ((r=poll(&pfd,1,t)) == 0)
-+					t = 0;
-+				else if (r > 0 && (pfd.revents & POLLIN))
- 					{
- 					r=read(fd,(unsigned char *)tmpbuf+n,
- 					       ENTROPY_NEEDED-n);
- 					if (r > 0)
- 						n += r;
- 					}
-
-				/* Some Unixen will update t, some
-				   won't.  For those who won't, give
-				   up here, otherwise, we will do
-				   this once again for the remaining
-				   time. */
-				if (t.tv_usec == 10*1000)
-					t.tv_usec=0;
-+				/* we don't know how big part of the timeout elapsed
-+				    wait half the original timeout next time */
-+				t >>= 1; 
- 				}
- 			while ((r > 0 || (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN))
-				&& t.tv_usec != 0 && n < ENTROPY_NEEDED);
-+				&& t != 0 && n < ENTROPY_NEEDED);
- 
- 			close(fd);
- 			}
--- a/openssl-0.9.8b-aes-cachecol.patch
+++ b/openssl-0.9.8b-aes-cachecol.patch
@ -1,777 +0,0 @@
-openssl/crypto/aes/aes_core.c     1.7 -> 1.7.2.1
-
--- openssl/crypto/aes/aes_core.c 2005/01/24 14:22:05 1.7
-+++ openssl/crypto/aes/aes_core.c 2006/06/28 08:58:15 1.7.2.1
-@@ -44,22 +44,14 @@
- Te1[x] = S [x].[03, 02, 01, 01];
- Te2[x] = S [x].[01, 03, 02, 01];
- Te3[x] = S [x].[01, 01, 03, 02];
-Te4[x] = S [x].[01, 01, 01, 01];
- 
- Td0[x] = Si[x].[0e, 09, 0d, 0b];
- Td1[x] = Si[x].[0b, 0e, 09, 0d];
- Td2[x] = Si[x].[0d, 0b, 0e, 09];
- Td3[x] = Si[x].[09, 0d, 0b, 0e];
-Td4[x] = Si[x].[01, 01, 01, 01];
-+Td4[x] = Si[x].[01];
- */
- 
-#ifdef AES_ASM
-extern const u32 AES_Te[5][256];
-#define Te0 AES_Te[0]
-#define Te1 AES_Te[1]
-#define Te2 AES_Te[2]
-#define Te3 AES_Te[3]
-#else
- static const u32 Te0[256] = {
-     0xc66363a5U, 0xf87c7c84U, 0xee777799U, 0xf67b7b8dU,
-     0xfff2f20dU, 0xd66b6bbdU, 0xde6f6fb1U, 0x91c5c554U,
-@@ -324,81 +316,7 @@
-     0x4141c382U, 0x9999b029U, 0x2d2d775aU, 0x0f0f111eU,
-     0xb0b0cb7bU, 0x5454fca8U, 0xbbbbd66dU, 0x16163a2cU,
- };
-#endif
-static const u32 Te4[256] = {
-    0x63636363U, 0x7c7c7c7cU, 0x77777777U, 0x7b7b7b7bU,
-    0xf2f2f2f2U, 0x6b6b6b6bU, 0x6f6f6f6fU, 0xc5c5c5c5U,
-    0x30303030U, 0x01010101U, 0x67676767U, 0x2b2b2b2bU,
-    0xfefefefeU, 0xd7d7d7d7U, 0xababababU, 0x76767676U,
-    0xcacacacaU, 0x82828282U, 0xc9c9c9c9U, 0x7d7d7d7dU,
-    0xfafafafaU, 0x59595959U, 0x47474747U, 0xf0f0f0f0U,
-    0xadadadadU, 0xd4d4d4d4U, 0xa2a2a2a2U, 0xafafafafU,
-    0x9c9c9c9cU, 0xa4a4a4a4U, 0x72727272U, 0xc0c0c0c0U,
-    0xb7b7b7b7U, 0xfdfdfdfdU, 0x93939393U, 0x26262626U,
-    0x36363636U, 0x3f3f3f3fU, 0xf7f7f7f7U, 0xccccccccU,
-    0x34343434U, 0xa5a5a5a5U, 0xe5e5e5e5U, 0xf1f1f1f1U,
-    0x71717171U, 0xd8d8d8d8U, 0x31313131U, 0x15151515U,
-    0x04040404U, 0xc7c7c7c7U, 0x23232323U, 0xc3c3c3c3U,
-    0x18181818U, 0x96969696U, 0x05050505U, 0x9a9a9a9aU,
-    0x07070707U, 0x12121212U, 0x80808080U, 0xe2e2e2e2U,
-    0xebebebebU, 0x27272727U, 0xb2b2b2b2U, 0x75757575U,
-    0x09090909U, 0x83838383U, 0x2c2c2c2cU, 0x1a1a1a1aU,
-    0x1b1b1b1bU, 0x6e6e6e6eU, 0x5a5a5a5aU, 0xa0a0a0a0U,
-    0x52525252U, 0x3b3b3b3bU, 0xd6d6d6d6U, 0xb3b3b3b3U,
-    0x29292929U, 0xe3e3e3e3U, 0x2f2f2f2fU, 0x84848484U,
-    0x53535353U, 0xd1d1d1d1U, 0x00000000U, 0xededededU,
-    0x20202020U, 0xfcfcfcfcU, 0xb1b1b1b1U, 0x5b5b5b5bU,
-    0x6a6a6a6aU, 0xcbcbcbcbU, 0xbebebebeU, 0x39393939U,
-    0x4a4a4a4aU, 0x4c4c4c4cU, 0x58585858U, 0xcfcfcfcfU,
-    0xd0d0d0d0U, 0xefefefefU, 0xaaaaaaaaU, 0xfbfbfbfbU,
-    0x43434343U, 0x4d4d4d4dU, 0x33333333U, 0x85858585U,
-    0x45454545U, 0xf9f9f9f9U, 0x02020202U, 0x7f7f7f7fU,
-    0x50505050U, 0x3c3c3c3cU, 0x9f9f9f9fU, 0xa8a8a8a8U,
-    0x51515151U, 0xa3a3a3a3U, 0x40404040U, 0x8f8f8f8fU,
-    0x92929292U, 0x9d9d9d9dU, 0x38383838U, 0xf5f5f5f5U,
-    0xbcbcbcbcU, 0xb6b6b6b6U, 0xdadadadaU, 0x21212121U,
-    0x10101010U, 0xffffffffU, 0xf3f3f3f3U, 0xd2d2d2d2U,
-    0xcdcdcdcdU, 0x0c0c0c0cU, 0x13131313U, 0xececececU,
-    0x5f5f5f5fU, 0x97979797U, 0x44444444U, 0x17171717U,
-    0xc4c4c4c4U, 0xa7a7a7a7U, 0x7e7e7e7eU, 0x3d3d3d3dU,
-    0x64646464U, 0x5d5d5d5dU, 0x19191919U, 0x73737373U,
-    0x60606060U, 0x81818181U, 0x4f4f4f4fU, 0xdcdcdcdcU,
-    0x22222222U, 0x2a2a2a2aU, 0x90909090U, 0x88888888U,
-    0x46464646U, 0xeeeeeeeeU, 0xb8b8b8b8U, 0x14141414U,
-    0xdedededeU, 0x5e5e5e5eU, 0x0b0b0b0bU, 0xdbdbdbdbU,
-    0xe0e0e0e0U, 0x32323232U, 0x3a3a3a3aU, 0x0a0a0a0aU,
-    0x49494949U, 0x06060606U, 0x24242424U, 0x5c5c5c5cU,
-    0xc2c2c2c2U, 0xd3d3d3d3U, 0xacacacacU, 0x62626262U,
-    0x91919191U, 0x95959595U, 0xe4e4e4e4U, 0x79797979U,
-    0xe7e7e7e7U, 0xc8c8c8c8U, 0x37373737U, 0x6d6d6d6dU,
-    0x8d8d8d8dU, 0xd5d5d5d5U, 0x4e4e4e4eU, 0xa9a9a9a9U,
-    0x6c6c6c6cU, 0x56565656U, 0xf4f4f4f4U, 0xeaeaeaeaU,
-    0x65656565U, 0x7a7a7a7aU, 0xaeaeaeaeU, 0x08080808U,
-    0xbabababaU, 0x78787878U, 0x25252525U, 0x2e2e2e2eU,
-    0x1c1c1c1cU, 0xa6a6a6a6U, 0xb4b4b4b4U, 0xc6c6c6c6U,
-    0xe8e8e8e8U, 0xddddddddU, 0x74747474U, 0x1f1f1f1fU,
-    0x4b4b4b4bU, 0xbdbdbdbdU, 0x8b8b8b8bU, 0x8a8a8a8aU,
-    0x70707070U, 0x3e3e3e3eU, 0xb5b5b5b5U, 0x66666666U,
-    0x48484848U, 0x03030303U, 0xf6f6f6f6U, 0x0e0e0e0eU,
-    0x61616161U, 0x35353535U, 0x57575757U, 0xb9b9b9b9U,
-    0x86868686U, 0xc1c1c1c1U, 0x1d1d1d1dU, 0x9e9e9e9eU,
-    0xe1e1e1e1U, 0xf8f8f8f8U, 0x98989898U, 0x11111111U,
-    0x69696969U, 0xd9d9d9d9U, 0x8e8e8e8eU, 0x94949494U,
-    0x9b9b9b9bU, 0x1e1e1e1eU, 0x87878787U, 0xe9e9e9e9U,
-    0xcecececeU, 0x55555555U, 0x28282828U, 0xdfdfdfdfU,
-    0x8c8c8c8cU, 0xa1a1a1a1U, 0x89898989U, 0x0d0d0d0dU,
-    0xbfbfbfbfU, 0xe6e6e6e6U, 0x42424242U, 0x68686868U,
-    0x41414141U, 0x99999999U, 0x2d2d2d2dU, 0x0f0f0f0fU,
-    0xb0b0b0b0U, 0x54545454U, 0xbbbbbbbbU, 0x16161616U,
-};
- 
-#ifdef AES_ASM
-extern const u32 AES_Td[5][256];
-#define Td0 AES_Td[0]
-#define Td1 AES_Td[1]
-#define Td2 AES_Td[2]
-#define Td3 AES_Td[3]
-#else
- static const u32 Td0[256] = {
-     0x51f4a750U, 0x7e416553U, 0x1a17a4c3U, 0x3a275e96U,
-     0x3bab6bcbU, 0x1f9d45f1U, 0xacfa58abU, 0x4be30393U,
-@@ -663,72 +581,39 @@
-     0xa8017139U, 0x0cb3de08U, 0xb4e49cd8U, 0x56c19064U,
-     0xcb84617bU, 0x32b670d5U, 0x6c5c7448U, 0xb85742d0U,
- };
-#endif
-static const u32 Td4[256] = {
-    0x52525252U, 0x09090909U, 0x6a6a6a6aU, 0xd5d5d5d5U,
-    0x30303030U, 0x36363636U, 0xa5a5a5a5U, 0x38383838U,
-    0xbfbfbfbfU, 0x40404040U, 0xa3a3a3a3U, 0x9e9e9e9eU,
-    0x81818181U, 0xf3f3f3f3U, 0xd7d7d7d7U, 0xfbfbfbfbU,
-    0x7c7c7c7cU, 0xe3e3e3e3U, 0x39393939U, 0x82828282U,
-    0x9b9b9b9bU, 0x2f2f2f2fU, 0xffffffffU, 0x87878787U,
-    0x34343434U, 0x8e8e8e8eU, 0x43434343U, 0x44444444U,
-    0xc4c4c4c4U, 0xdedededeU, 0xe9e9e9e9U, 0xcbcbcbcbU,
-    0x54545454U, 0x7b7b7b7bU, 0x94949494U, 0x32323232U,
-    0xa6a6a6a6U, 0xc2c2c2c2U, 0x23232323U, 0x3d3d3d3dU,
-    0xeeeeeeeeU, 0x4c4c4c4cU, 0x95959595U, 0x0b0b0b0bU,
-    0x42424242U, 0xfafafafaU, 0xc3c3c3c3U, 0x4e4e4e4eU,
-    0x08080808U, 0x2e2e2e2eU, 0xa1a1a1a1U, 0x66666666U,
-    0x28282828U, 0xd9d9d9d9U, 0x24242424U, 0xb2b2b2b2U,
-    0x76767676U, 0x5b5b5b5bU, 0xa2a2a2a2U, 0x49494949U,
-    0x6d6d6d6dU, 0x8b8b8b8bU, 0xd1d1d1d1U, 0x25252525U,
-    0x72727272U, 0xf8f8f8f8U, 0xf6f6f6f6U, 0x64646464U,
-    0x86868686U, 0x68686868U, 0x98989898U, 0x16161616U,
-    0xd4d4d4d4U, 0xa4a4a4a4U, 0x5c5c5c5cU, 0xccccccccU,
-    0x5d5d5d5dU, 0x65656565U, 0xb6b6b6b6U, 0x92929292U,
-    0x6c6c6c6cU, 0x70707070U, 0x48484848U, 0x50505050U,
-    0xfdfdfdfdU, 0xededededU, 0xb9b9b9b9U, 0xdadadadaU,
-    0x5e5e5e5eU, 0x15151515U, 0x46464646U, 0x57575757U,
-    0xa7a7a7a7U, 0x8d8d8d8dU, 0x9d9d9d9dU, 0x84848484U,
-    0x90909090U, 0xd8d8d8d8U, 0xababababU, 0x00000000U,
-    0x8c8c8c8cU, 0xbcbcbcbcU, 0xd3d3d3d3U, 0x0a0a0a0aU,
-    0xf7f7f7f7U, 0xe4e4e4e4U, 0x58585858U, 0x05050505U,
-    0xb8b8b8b8U, 0xb3b3b3b3U, 0x45454545U, 0x06060606U,
-    0xd0d0d0d0U, 0x2c2c2c2cU, 0x1e1e1e1eU, 0x8f8f8f8fU,
-    0xcacacacaU, 0x3f3f3f3fU, 0x0f0f0f0fU, 0x02020202U,
-    0xc1c1c1c1U, 0xafafafafU, 0xbdbdbdbdU, 0x03030303U,
-    0x01010101U, 0x13131313U, 0x8a8a8a8aU, 0x6b6b6b6bU,
-    0x3a3a3a3aU, 0x91919191U, 0x11111111U, 0x41414141U,
-    0x4f4f4f4fU, 0x67676767U, 0xdcdcdcdcU, 0xeaeaeaeaU,
-    0x97979797U, 0xf2f2f2f2U, 0xcfcfcfcfU, 0xcecececeU,
-    0xf0f0f0f0U, 0xb4b4b4b4U, 0xe6e6e6e6U, 0x73737373U,
-    0x96969696U, 0xacacacacU, 0x74747474U, 0x22222222U,
-    0xe7e7e7e7U, 0xadadadadU, 0x35353535U, 0x85858585U,
-    0xe2e2e2e2U, 0xf9f9f9f9U, 0x37373737U, 0xe8e8e8e8U,
-    0x1c1c1c1cU, 0x75757575U, 0xdfdfdfdfU, 0x6e6e6e6eU,
-    0x47474747U, 0xf1f1f1f1U, 0x1a1a1a1aU, 0x71717171U,
-    0x1d1d1d1dU, 0x29292929U, 0xc5c5c5c5U, 0x89898989U,
-    0x6f6f6f6fU, 0xb7b7b7b7U, 0x62626262U, 0x0e0e0e0eU,
-    0xaaaaaaaaU, 0x18181818U, 0xbebebebeU, 0x1b1b1b1bU,
-    0xfcfcfcfcU, 0x56565656U, 0x3e3e3e3eU, 0x4b4b4b4bU,
-    0xc6c6c6c6U, 0xd2d2d2d2U, 0x79797979U, 0x20202020U,
-    0x9a9a9a9aU, 0xdbdbdbdbU, 0xc0c0c0c0U, 0xfefefefeU,
-    0x78787878U, 0xcdcdcdcdU, 0x5a5a5a5aU, 0xf4f4f4f4U,
-    0x1f1f1f1fU, 0xddddddddU, 0xa8a8a8a8U, 0x33333333U,
-    0x88888888U, 0x07070707U, 0xc7c7c7c7U, 0x31313131U,
-    0xb1b1b1b1U, 0x12121212U, 0x10101010U, 0x59595959U,
-    0x27272727U, 0x80808080U, 0xececececU, 0x5f5f5f5fU,
-    0x60606060U, 0x51515151U, 0x7f7f7f7fU, 0xa9a9a9a9U,
-    0x19191919U, 0xb5b5b5b5U, 0x4a4a4a4aU, 0x0d0d0d0dU,
-    0x2d2d2d2dU, 0xe5e5e5e5U, 0x7a7a7a7aU, 0x9f9f9f9fU,
-    0x93939393U, 0xc9c9c9c9U, 0x9c9c9c9cU, 0xefefefefU,
-    0xa0a0a0a0U, 0xe0e0e0e0U, 0x3b3b3b3bU, 0x4d4d4d4dU,
-    0xaeaeaeaeU, 0x2a2a2a2aU, 0xf5f5f5f5U, 0xb0b0b0b0U,
-    0xc8c8c8c8U, 0xebebebebU, 0xbbbbbbbbU, 0x3c3c3c3cU,
-    0x83838383U, 0x53535353U, 0x99999999U, 0x61616161U,
-    0x17171717U, 0x2b2b2b2bU, 0x04040404U, 0x7e7e7e7eU,
-    0xbabababaU, 0x77777777U, 0xd6d6d6d6U, 0x26262626U,
-    0xe1e1e1e1U, 0x69696969U, 0x14141414U, 0x63636363U,
-    0x55555555U, 0x21212121U, 0x0c0c0c0cU, 0x7d7d7d7dU,
-+static const u8 Td4[256] = {
-+    0x52U, 0x09U, 0x6aU, 0xd5U, 0x30U, 0x36U, 0xa5U, 0x38U,
-+    0xbfU, 0x40U, 0xa3U, 0x9eU, 0x81U, 0xf3U, 0xd7U, 0xfbU,
-+    0x7cU, 0xe3U, 0x39U, 0x82U, 0x9bU, 0x2fU, 0xffU, 0x87U,
-+    0x34U, 0x8eU, 0x43U, 0x44U, 0xc4U, 0xdeU, 0xe9U, 0xcbU,
-+    0x54U, 0x7bU, 0x94U, 0x32U, 0xa6U, 0xc2U, 0x23U, 0x3dU,
-+    0xeeU, 0x4cU, 0x95U, 0x0bU, 0x42U, 0xfaU, 0xc3U, 0x4eU,
-+    0x08U, 0x2eU, 0xa1U, 0x66U, 0x28U, 0xd9U, 0x24U, 0xb2U,
-+    0x76U, 0x5bU, 0xa2U, 0x49U, 0x6dU, 0x8bU, 0xd1U, 0x25U,
-+    0x72U, 0xf8U, 0xf6U, 0x64U, 0x86U, 0x68U, 0x98U, 0x16U,
-+    0xd4U, 0xa4U, 0x5cU, 0xccU, 0x5dU, 0x65U, 0xb6U, 0x92U,
-+    0x6cU, 0x70U, 0x48U, 0x50U, 0xfdU, 0xedU, 0xb9U, 0xdaU,
-+    0x5eU, 0x15U, 0x46U, 0x57U, 0xa7U, 0x8dU, 0x9dU, 0x84U,
-+    0x90U, 0xd8U, 0xabU, 0x00U, 0x8cU, 0xbcU, 0xd3U, 0x0aU,
-+    0xf7U, 0xe4U, 0x58U, 0x05U, 0xb8U, 0xb3U, 0x45U, 0x06U,
-+    0xd0U, 0x2cU, 0x1eU, 0x8fU, 0xcaU, 0x3fU, 0x0fU, 0x02U,
-+    0xc1U, 0xafU, 0xbdU, 0x03U, 0x01U, 0x13U, 0x8aU, 0x6bU,
-+    0x3aU, 0x91U, 0x11U, 0x41U, 0x4fU, 0x67U, 0xdcU, 0xeaU,
-+    0x97U, 0xf2U, 0xcfU, 0xceU, 0xf0U, 0xb4U, 0xe6U, 0x73U,
-+    0x96U, 0xacU, 0x74U, 0x22U, 0xe7U, 0xadU, 0x35U, 0x85U,
-+    0xe2U, 0xf9U, 0x37U, 0xe8U, 0x1cU, 0x75U, 0xdfU, 0x6eU,
-+    0x47U, 0xf1U, 0x1aU, 0x71U, 0x1dU, 0x29U, 0xc5U, 0x89U,
-+    0x6fU, 0xb7U, 0x62U, 0x0eU, 0xaaU, 0x18U, 0xbeU, 0x1bU,
-+    0xfcU, 0x56U, 0x3eU, 0x4bU, 0xc6U, 0xd2U, 0x79U, 0x20U,
-+    0x9aU, 0xdbU, 0xc0U, 0xfeU, 0x78U, 0xcdU, 0x5aU, 0xf4U,
-+    0x1fU, 0xddU, 0xa8U, 0x33U, 0x88U, 0x07U, 0xc7U, 0x31U,
-+    0xb1U, 0x12U, 0x10U, 0x59U, 0x27U, 0x80U, 0xecU, 0x5fU,
-+    0x60U, 0x51U, 0x7fU, 0xa9U, 0x19U, 0xb5U, 0x4aU, 0x0dU,
-+    0x2dU, 0xe5U, 0x7aU, 0x9fU, 0x93U, 0xc9U, 0x9cU, 0xefU,
-+    0xa0U, 0xe0U, 0x3bU, 0x4dU, 0xaeU, 0x2aU, 0xf5U, 0xb0U,
-+    0xc8U, 0xebU, 0xbbU, 0x3cU, 0x83U, 0x53U, 0x99U, 0x61U,
-+    0x17U, 0x2bU, 0x04U, 0x7eU, 0xbaU, 0x77U, 0xd6U, 0x26U,
-+    0xe1U, 0x69U, 0x14U, 0x63U, 0x55U, 0x21U, 0x0cU, 0x7dU,
- };
- static const u32 rcon[] = {
- 	0x01000000, 0x02000000, 0x04000000, 0x08000000,
-@@ -768,10 +653,10 @@
- 		while (1) {
- 			temp  = rk[3];
- 			rk[4] = rk[0] ^
-				(Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^
-				(Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
-				(Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
-				(Te4[(temp >> 24)       ] & 0x000000ff) ^
-+				(Te2[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^
-+				(Te3[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
-+				(Te0[(temp      ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
-+				(Te1[(temp >> 24)       ] & 0x000000ff) ^
- 				rcon[i];
- 			rk[5] = rk[1] ^ rk[4];
- 			rk[6] = rk[2] ^ rk[5];
-@@ -788,10 +673,10 @@
- 		while (1) {
- 			temp = rk[ 5];
- 			rk[ 6] = rk[ 0] ^
-				(Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^
-				(Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
-				(Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
-				(Te4[(temp >> 24)       ] & 0x000000ff) ^
-+				(Te2[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^
-+				(Te3[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
-+				(Te0[(temp      ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
-+				(Te1[(temp >> 24)       ] & 0x000000ff) ^
- 				rcon[i];
- 			rk[ 7] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 6];
- 			rk[ 8] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 7];
-@@ -810,10 +695,10 @@
- 		while (1) {
- 			temp = rk[ 7];
- 			rk[ 8] = rk[ 0] ^
-				(Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^
-				(Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
-				(Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
-				(Te4[(temp >> 24)       ] & 0x000000ff) ^
-+				(Te2[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^
-+				(Te3[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
-+				(Te0[(temp      ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
-+				(Te1[(temp >> 24)       ] & 0x000000ff) ^
- 				rcon[i];
- 			rk[ 9] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 8];
- 			rk[10] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 9];
-@@ -823,10 +708,10 @@
- 			}
- 			temp = rk[11];
- 			rk[12] = rk[ 4] ^
-				(Te4[(temp >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
-				(Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
-				(Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
-				(Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff);
-+				(Te2[(temp >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
-+				(Te3[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
-+				(Te0[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
-+				(Te1[(temp      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff);
- 			rk[13] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[12];
- 			rk[14] = rk[ 6] ^ rk[13];
- 			rk[15] = rk[ 7] ^ rk[14];
-@@ -865,25 +750,25 @@
- 	for (i = 1; i < (key->rounds); i++) {
- 		rk += 4;
- 		rk[0] =
-			Td0[Te4[(rk[0] >> 24)       ] & 0xff] ^
-			Td1[Te4[(rk[0] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
-			Td2[Te4[(rk[0] >>  8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
-			Td3[Te4[(rk[0]      ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
-+			Td0[Te1[(rk[0] >> 24)       ] & 0xff] ^
-+			Td1[Te1[(rk[0] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
-+			Td2[Te1[(rk[0] >>  8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
-+			Td3[Te1[(rk[0]      ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
- 		rk[1] =
-			Td0[Te4[(rk[1] >> 24)       ] & 0xff] ^
-			Td1[Te4[(rk[1] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
-			Td2[Te4[(rk[1] >>  8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
-			Td3[Te4[(rk[1]      ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
-+			Td0[Te1[(rk[1] >> 24)       ] & 0xff] ^
-+			Td1[Te1[(rk[1] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
-+			Td2[Te1[(rk[1] >>  8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
-+			Td3[Te1[(rk[1]      ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
- 		rk[2] =
-			Td0[Te4[(rk[2] >> 24)       ] & 0xff] ^
-			Td1[Te4[(rk[2] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
-			Td2[Te4[(rk[2] >>  8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
-			Td3[Te4[(rk[2]      ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
-+			Td0[Te1[(rk[2] >> 24)       ] & 0xff] ^
-+			Td1[Te1[(rk[2] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
-+			Td2[Te1[(rk[2] >>  8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
-+			Td3[Te1[(rk[2]      ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
- 		rk[3] =
-			Td0[Te4[(rk[3] >> 24)       ] & 0xff] ^
-			Td1[Te4[(rk[3] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
-			Td2[Te4[(rk[3] >>  8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
-			Td3[Te4[(rk[3]      ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
-+			Td0[Te1[(rk[3] >> 24)       ] & 0xff] ^
-+			Td1[Te1[(rk[3] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
-+			Td2[Te1[(rk[3] >>  8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
-+			Td3[Te1[(rk[3]      ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
- 	}
- 	return 0;
- }
-@@ -1051,31 +936,31 @@
- 	 * map cipher state to byte array block:
- 	 */
- 	s0 =
-		(Te4[(t0 >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
-		(Te4[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
-		(Te4[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
-		(Te4[(t3      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
-+		(Te2[(t0 >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
-+		(Te3[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
-+		(Te0[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
-+		(Te1[(t3      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
- 		rk[0];
- 	PUTU32(out     , s0);
- 	s1 =
-		(Te4[(t1 >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
-		(Te4[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
-		(Te4[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
-		(Te4[(t0      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
-+		(Te2[(t1 >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
-+		(Te3[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
-+		(Te0[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
-+		(Te1[(t0      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
- 		rk[1];
- 	PUTU32(out +  4, s1);
- 	s2 =
-		(Te4[(t2 >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
-		(Te4[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
-		(Te4[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
-		(Te4[(t1      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
-+		(Te2[(t2 >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
-+		(Te3[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
-+		(Te0[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
-+		(Te1[(t1      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
- 		rk[2];
- 	PUTU32(out +  8, s2);
- 	s3 =
-		(Te4[(t3 >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
-		(Te4[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
-		(Te4[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
-		(Te4[(t2      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
-+		(Te2[(t3 >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
-+		(Te3[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
-+		(Te0[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
-+		(Te1[(t2      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
- 		rk[3];
- 	PUTU32(out + 12, s3);
- }
-@@ -1242,31 +1127,31 @@
- 	 * map cipher state to byte array block:
- 	 */
-    	s0 =
-   		(Td4[(t0 >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
-   		(Td4[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
-   		(Td4[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
-   		(Td4[(t1      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
-+   		(Td4[(t0 >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
-+   		(Td4[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
-+   		(Td4[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
-+   		(Td4[(t1      ) & 0xff])       ^
-    		rk[0];
- 	PUTU32(out     , s0);
-    	s1 =
-   		(Td4[(t1 >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
-   		(Td4[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
-   		(Td4[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
-   		(Td4[(t2      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
-+   		(Td4[(t1 >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
-+   		(Td4[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
-+   		(Td4[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
-+   		(Td4[(t2      ) & 0xff])       ^
-    		rk[1];
- 	PUTU32(out +  4, s1);
-    	s2 =
-   		(Td4[(t2 >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
-   		(Td4[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
-   		(Td4[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
-   		(Td4[(t3      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
-+   		(Td4[(t2 >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
-+   		(Td4[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
-+   		(Td4[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
-+   		(Td4[(t3      ) & 0xff])       ^
-    		rk[2];
- 	PUTU32(out +  8, s2);
-    	s3 =
-   		(Td4[(t3 >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
-   		(Td4[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
-   		(Td4[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
-   		(Td4[(t0      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
-+   		(Td4[(t3 >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
-+   		(Td4[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
-+   		(Td4[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
-+   		(Td4[(t0      ) & 0xff])       ^
-    		rk[3];
- 	PUTU32(out + 12, s3);
- }
-openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl     1.11 -> 1.11.2.1
-
--- openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl 2005/05/09 21:48:00 1.11
-+++ openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl 2006/06/28 09:01:40 1.11.2.1
-@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
- # forms are granted according to the OpenSSL license.
- # ====================================================================
- #
-# Version 3.4.
-+# Version 3.6.
- #
- # You might fail to appreciate this module performance from the first
- # try. If compared to "vanilla" linux-ia32-icc target, i.e. considered
-@@ -66,6 +66,13 @@
- # stack. This unfortunately has rather strong impact on small block CBC
- # performance, ~2x deterioration on 16-byte block if compared to 3.3.
- #
-+# Version 3.5 checks if there is L1 cache aliasing between user-supplied
-+# key schedule and S-boxes and abstains from copying the former if
-+# there is no. This allows end-user to consciously retain small block
-+# performance by aligning key schedule in specific manner.
-+#
-+# Version 3.6 compresses Td4 to 256 bytes and prefetches it in ECB.
-+#
- # Current ECB performance numbers for 128-bit key in CPU cycles per
- # processed byte [measure commonly used by AES benchmarkers] are:
- #
-@@ -505,28 +512,27 @@
- 	if($i==3)   {	&mov	($key,&DWP(12,"esp"));		}
- 	else        {	&mov	($out,$s[0]);			}
- 			&and	($out,0xFF);
-			&mov	($out,&DWP(2048,$td,$out,4));
-			&and	($out,0x000000ff);
-+			&movz	($out,&DWP(2048,$td,$out,1));
- 
- 	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[1];				}
- 			&movz	($tmp,&HB($s[1]));
-			&mov	($tmp,&DWP(2048,$td,$tmp,4));
-			&and	($tmp,0x0000ff00);
-+			&movz	($tmp,&DWP(2048,$td,$tmp,1));
-+			&shl	($tmp,8);
- 			&xor	($out,$tmp);
- 
- 	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[2]; &mov ($s[1],$acc);		}
- 	else        {	mov	($tmp,$s[2]);			}
- 			&shr	($tmp,16);
- 			&and	($tmp,0xFF);
-			&mov	($tmp,&DWP(2048,$td,$tmp,4));
-			&and	($tmp,0x00ff0000);
-+			&movz	($tmp,&DWP(2048,$td,$tmp,1));
-+			&shl	($tmp,16);
- 			&xor	($out,$tmp);
- 
- 	if ($i==3)  {	$tmp=$s[3]; &mov ($s[2],&DWP(8,"esp"));	}
- 	else        {	&mov	($tmp,$s[3]);			}
- 			&shr	($tmp,24);
-			&mov	($tmp,&DWP(2048,$td,$tmp,4));
-			&and	($tmp,0xff000000);
-+			&movz	($tmp,&DWP(2048,$td,$tmp,1));
-+			&shl	($tmp,24);
- 			&xor	($out,$tmp);
- 	if ($i<2)   {	&mov	(&DWP(4+4*$i,"esp"),$out);	}
- 	if ($i==3)  {	&mov	($s[3],&DWP(4,"esp"));		}
-@@ -687,70 +693,38 @@
- 	&_data_word(0x7101a839, 0xdeb30c08, 0x9ce4b4d8, 0x90c15664);
- 	&_data_word(0x6184cb7b, 0x70b632d5, 0x745c6c48, 0x4257b8d0);
- #Td4:
-	&data_word(0x52525252, 0x09090909, 0x6a6a6a6a, 0xd5d5d5d5);
-	&data_word(0x30303030, 0x36363636, 0xa5a5a5a5, 0x38383838);
-	&data_word(0xbfbfbfbf, 0x40404040, 0xa3a3a3a3, 0x9e9e9e9e);
-	&data_word(0x81818181, 0xf3f3f3f3, 0xd7d7d7d7, 0xfbfbfbfb);
-	&data_word(0x7c7c7c7c, 0xe3e3e3e3, 0x39393939, 0x82828282);
-	&data_word(0x9b9b9b9b, 0x2f2f2f2f, 0xffffffff, 0x87878787);
-	&data_word(0x34343434, 0x8e8e8e8e, 0x43434343, 0x44444444);
-	&data_word(0xc4c4c4c4, 0xdededede, 0xe9e9e9e9, 0xcbcbcbcb);
-	&data_word(0x54545454, 0x7b7b7b7b, 0x94949494, 0x32323232);
-	&data_word(0xa6a6a6a6, 0xc2c2c2c2, 0x23232323, 0x3d3d3d3d);
-	&data_word(0xeeeeeeee, 0x4c4c4c4c, 0x95959595, 0x0b0b0b0b);
-	&data_word(0x42424242, 0xfafafafa, 0xc3c3c3c3, 0x4e4e4e4e);
-	&data_word(0x08080808, 0x2e2e2e2e, 0xa1a1a1a1, 0x66666666);
-	&data_word(0x28282828, 0xd9d9d9d9, 0x24242424, 0xb2b2b2b2);
-	&data_word(0x76767676, 0x5b5b5b5b, 0xa2a2a2a2, 0x49494949);
-	&data_word(0x6d6d6d6d, 0x8b8b8b8b, 0xd1d1d1d1, 0x25252525);
-	&data_word(0x72727272, 0xf8f8f8f8, 0xf6f6f6f6, 0x64646464);
-	&data_word(0x86868686, 0x68686868, 0x98989898, 0x16161616);
-	&data_word(0xd4d4d4d4, 0xa4a4a4a4, 0x5c5c5c5c, 0xcccccccc);
-	&data_word(0x5d5d5d5d, 0x65656565, 0xb6b6b6b6, 0x92929292);
-	&data_word(0x6c6c6c6c, 0x70707070, 0x48484848, 0x50505050);
-	&data_word(0xfdfdfdfd, 0xedededed, 0xb9b9b9b9, 0xdadadada);
-	&data_word(0x5e5e5e5e, 0x15151515, 0x46464646, 0x57575757);
-	&data_word(0xa7a7a7a7, 0x8d8d8d8d, 0x9d9d9d9d, 0x84848484);
-	&data_word(0x90909090, 0xd8d8d8d8, 0xabababab, 0x00000000);
-	&data_word(0x8c8c8c8c, 0xbcbcbcbc, 0xd3d3d3d3, 0x0a0a0a0a);
-	&data_word(0xf7f7f7f7, 0xe4e4e4e4, 0x58585858, 0x05050505);
-	&data_word(0xb8b8b8b8, 0xb3b3b3b3, 0x45454545, 0x06060606);
-	&data_word(0xd0d0d0d0, 0x2c2c2c2c, 0x1e1e1e1e, 0x8f8f8f8f);
-	&data_word(0xcacacaca, 0x3f3f3f3f, 0x0f0f0f0f, 0x02020202);
-	&data_word(0xc1c1c1c1, 0xafafafaf, 0xbdbdbdbd, 0x03030303);
-	&data_word(0x01010101, 0x13131313, 0x8a8a8a8a, 0x6b6b6b6b);
-	&data_word(0x3a3a3a3a, 0x91919191, 0x11111111, 0x41414141);
-	&data_word(0x4f4f4f4f, 0x67676767, 0xdcdcdcdc, 0xeaeaeaea);
-	&data_word(0x97979797, 0xf2f2f2f2, 0xcfcfcfcf, 0xcececece);
-	&data_word(0xf0f0f0f0, 0xb4b4b4b4, 0xe6e6e6e6, 0x73737373);
-	&data_word(0x96969696, 0xacacacac, 0x74747474, 0x22222222);
-	&data_word(0xe7e7e7e7, 0xadadadad, 0x35353535, 0x85858585);
-	&data_word(0xe2e2e2e2, 0xf9f9f9f9, 0x37373737, 0xe8e8e8e8);
-	&data_word(0x1c1c1c1c, 0x75757575, 0xdfdfdfdf, 0x6e6e6e6e);
-	&data_word(0x47474747, 0xf1f1f1f1, 0x1a1a1a1a, 0x71717171);
-	&data_word(0x1d1d1d1d, 0x29292929, 0xc5c5c5c5, 0x89898989);
-	&data_word(0x6f6f6f6f, 0xb7b7b7b7, 0x62626262, 0x0e0e0e0e);
-	&data_word(0xaaaaaaaa, 0x18181818, 0xbebebebe, 0x1b1b1b1b);
-	&data_word(0xfcfcfcfc, 0x56565656, 0x3e3e3e3e, 0x4b4b4b4b);
-	&data_word(0xc6c6c6c6, 0xd2d2d2d2, 0x79797979, 0x20202020);
-	&data_word(0x9a9a9a9a, 0xdbdbdbdb, 0xc0c0c0c0, 0xfefefefe);
-	&data_word(0x78787878, 0xcdcdcdcd, 0x5a5a5a5a, 0xf4f4f4f4);
-	&data_word(0x1f1f1f1f, 0xdddddddd, 0xa8a8a8a8, 0x33333333);
-	&data_word(0x88888888, 0x07070707, 0xc7c7c7c7, 0x31313131);
-	&data_word(0xb1b1b1b1, 0x12121212, 0x10101010, 0x59595959);
-	&data_word(0x27272727, 0x80808080, 0xecececec, 0x5f5f5f5f);
-	&data_word(0x60606060, 0x51515151, 0x7f7f7f7f, 0xa9a9a9a9);
-	&data_word(0x19191919, 0xb5b5b5b5, 0x4a4a4a4a, 0x0d0d0d0d);
-	&data_word(0x2d2d2d2d, 0xe5e5e5e5, 0x7a7a7a7a, 0x9f9f9f9f);
-	&data_word(0x93939393, 0xc9c9c9c9, 0x9c9c9c9c, 0xefefefef);
-	&data_word(0xa0a0a0a0, 0xe0e0e0e0, 0x3b3b3b3b, 0x4d4d4d4d);
-	&data_word(0xaeaeaeae, 0x2a2a2a2a, 0xf5f5f5f5, 0xb0b0b0b0);
-	&data_word(0xc8c8c8c8, 0xebebebeb, 0xbbbbbbbb, 0x3c3c3c3c);
-	&data_word(0x83838383, 0x53535353, 0x99999999, 0x61616161);
-	&data_word(0x17171717, 0x2b2b2b2b, 0x04040404, 0x7e7e7e7e);
-	&data_word(0xbabababa, 0x77777777, 0xd6d6d6d6, 0x26262626);
-	&data_word(0xe1e1e1e1, 0x69696969, 0x14141414, 0x63636363);
-	&data_word(0x55555555, 0x21212121, 0x0c0c0c0c, 0x7d7d7d7d);
-+	&data_byte(0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38);
-+	&data_byte(0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 0xd7, 0xfb);
-+	&data_byte(0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87);
-+	&data_byte(0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 0xe9, 0xcb);
-+	&data_byte(0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d);
-+	&data_byte(0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x4e);
-+	&data_byte(0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2);
-+	&data_byte(0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0x25);
-+	&data_byte(0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16);
-+	&data_byte(0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 0xb6, 0x92);
-+	&data_byte(0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda);
-+	&data_byte(0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0x84);
-+	&data_byte(0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a);
-+	&data_byte(0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x45, 0x06);
-+	&data_byte(0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02);
-+	&data_byte(0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8a, 0x6b);
-+	&data_byte(0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea);
-+	&data_byte(0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe6, 0x73);
-+	&data_byte(0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85);
-+	&data_byte(0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 0xdf, 0x6e);
-+	&data_byte(0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89);
-+	&data_byte(0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 0xbe, 0x1b);
-+	&data_byte(0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20);
-+	&data_byte(0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xf4);
-+	&data_byte(0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31);
-+	&data_byte(0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xec, 0x5f);
-+	&data_byte(0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d);
-+	&data_byte(0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0xef);
-+	&data_byte(0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0);
-+	&data_byte(0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61);
-+	&data_byte(0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26);
-+	&data_byte(0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0c, 0x7d);
- &function_end_B("_x86_AES_decrypt");
- 
- # void AES_decrypt (const void *inp,void *out,const AES_KEY *key);
-@@ -770,6 +744,18 @@
- 	&blindpop("ebp");
- 	&lea    ("ebp",&DWP(&label("AES_Td")."-".&label("pic_point"),"ebp"));
- 
-+	# prefetch Td4
-+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP(2048+128,"ebp"));
-+	&mov	($s0,&DWP(0-128,"ebp"));
-+	&mov	($s1,&DWP(32-128,"ebp"));
-+	&mov	($s2,&DWP(64-128,"ebp"));
-+	&mov	($s3,&DWP(96-128,"ebp"));
-+	&mov	($s0,&DWP(128-128,"ebp"));
-+	&mov	($s1,&DWP(160-128,"ebp"));
-+	&mov	($s2,&DWP(192-128,"ebp"));
-+	&mov	($s3,&DWP(224-128,"ebp"));
-+	&lea	("ebp",&DWP(-2048-128,"ebp"));
-+
- 	&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,$acc));		# load input data
- 	&mov	($s1,&DWP(4,$acc));
- 	&mov	($s2,&DWP(8,$acc));
-@@ -805,6 +791,7 @@
- my $_tmp=&DWP(40,"esp");	#volatile variable
- my $ivec=&DWP(44,"esp");	#ivec[16]
- my $aes_key=&DWP(60,"esp");	#copy of aes_key
-+my $mark=&DWP(60+240,"esp");	#copy of aes_key->rounds
- 
- &public_label("AES_Te");
- &public_label("AES_Td");
-@@ -865,18 +852,27 @@
- 	&mov	($_key,$s3);		# save copy of key
- 	&mov	($_ivp,$acc);		# save copy of ivp
- 
-+	&mov	($mark,0);		# copy of aes_key->rounds = 0;
- 	if ($compromise) {
- 		&cmp	($s2,$compromise);
- 		&jb	(&label("skip_ecopy"));
- 	}
-	# copy key schedule to stack
-	&mov	("ecx",244/4);
-+	# do we copy key schedule to stack?
-+	&mov	($s1 eq "ebx" ? $s1 : "",$s3);
-+	&mov	($s2 eq "ecx" ? $s2 : "",244/4);
-+	&sub	($s1,"ebp");
- 	&mov	("esi",$s3);
-+	&and	($s1,0xfff);
- 	&lea	("edi",$aes_key);
-	&mov	($_key,"edi");
-+	&cmp	($s1,2048);
-+	&jb	(&label("do_ecopy"));
-+	&cmp	($s1,4096-244);
-+	&jb	(&label("skip_ecopy"));
- 	&align	(4);
-	&data_word(0xF689A5F3);	# rep movsd
-	&set_label("skip_ecopy") if ($compromise);
-+	&set_label("do_ecopy");
-+		&mov	($_key,"edi");
-+		&data_word(0xA5F3F689);	# rep movsd
-+	&set_label("skip_ecopy");
- 
- 	&mov	($acc,$s0);
- 	&mov	($key,16);
-@@ -942,18 +938,16 @@
- 	&mov	(&DWP(8,$acc),$s2);
- 	&mov	(&DWP(12,$acc),$s3);
- 
-+	&cmp	($mark,0);		# was the key schedule copied?
- 	&mov	("edi",$_key);
- 	&mov	("esp",$_esp);
-	if ($compromise) {
-		&cmp	(&wparam(2),$compromise);
-		&jb	(&label("skip_ezero"));
-	}
-+	&je	(&label("skip_ezero"));
- 	# zero copy of key schedule
- 	&mov	("ecx",240/4);
- 	&xor	("eax","eax");
- 	&align	(4);
-	&data_word(0xF689ABF3);	# rep stosd
-	&set_label("skip_ezero") if ($compromise);
-+	&data_word(0xABF3F689);	# rep stosd
-+	&set_label("skip_ezero")
- 	&popf	();
-     &set_label("enc_out");
- 	&function_end_A();
-@@ -968,7 +962,7 @@
- 	&cmp	($key,$acc);			# compare with inp
- 	&je	(&label("enc_in_place"));
- 	&align	(4);
-	&data_word(0xF689A4F3);	# rep movsb	# copy input
-+	&data_word(0xA4F3F689);	# rep movsb	# copy input
- 	&jmp	(&label("enc_skip_in_place"));
-     &set_label("enc_in_place");
- 	&lea	($key,&DWP(0,$key,$s2));
-@@ -976,7 +970,7 @@
- 	&mov	($s2,$s1);
- 	&xor	($s0,$s0);
- 	&align	(4);
-	&data_word(0xF689AAF3);	# rep stosb	# zero tail
-+	&data_word(0xAAF3F689);	# rep stosb	# zero tail
- 	&pop	($key);				# pop ivp
- 
- 	&mov	($acc,$_out);			# output as input
-@@ -996,10 +990,10 @@
- 
- 	# ... and make sure it doesn't alias with AES_Td modulo 4096
- 	&mov	($s0,"ebp");
-	&lea	($s1,&DWP(3072,"ebp"));
-+	&lea	($s1,&DWP(2048+256,"ebp"));
- 	&mov	($s3,$key);
- 	&and	($s0,0xfff);		# s = %ebp&0xfff
-	&and	($s1,0xfff);		# e = (%ebp+3072)&0xfff
-+	&and	($s1,0xfff);		# e = (%ebp+2048+256)&0xfff
- 	&and	($s3,0xfff);		# p = %esp&0xfff
- 
- 	&cmp	($s3,$s1);		# if (p>=e) %esp =- (p-e);
-@@ -1030,21 +1024,30 @@
- 	&mov	($_key,$s3);		# save copy of key
- 	&mov	($_ivp,$acc);		# save copy of ivp
- 
-+	&mov	($mark,0);		# copy of aes_key->rounds = 0;
- 	if ($compromise) {
- 		&cmp	($s2,$compromise);
- 		&jb	(&label("skip_dcopy"));
- 	}
-	# copy key schedule to stack
-	&mov	("ecx",244/4);
-+	# do we copy key schedule to stack?
-+	&mov	($s1 eq "ebx" ? $s1 : "",$s3);
-+	&mov	($s2 eq "ecx" ? $s2 : "",244/4);
-+	&sub	($s1,"ebp");
- 	&mov	("esi",$s3);
-+	&and	($s1,0xfff);
- 	&lea	("edi",$aes_key);
-	&mov	($_key,"edi");
-+	&cmp	($s1,2048+256);
-+	&jb	(&label("do_dcopy"));
-+	&cmp	($s1,4096-244);
-+	&jb	(&label("skip_dcopy"));
- 	&align	(4);
-	&data_word(0xF689A5F3);	# rep movsd
-	&set_label("skip_dcopy") if ($compromise);
-+	&set_label("do_dcopy");
-+		&mov	($_key,"edi");
-+		&data_word(0xA5F3F689);	# rep movsd
-+	&set_label("skip_dcopy");
- 
- 	&mov	($acc,$s0);
-	&mov	($key,24);
-+	&mov	($key,18);
- 	&align	(4);
- 	&set_label("prefetch_td");
- 		&mov	($s0,&DWP(0,"ebp"));
-@@ -1054,7 +1057,7 @@
- 		&lea	("ebp",&DWP(128,"ebp"));
- 		&dec	($key);
- 	&jnz	(&label("prefetch_td"));
-	&sub	("ebp",3072);
-+	&sub	("ebp",2048+256);
- 
- 	&cmp	($acc,$_out);
- 	&je	(&label("dec_in_place"));	# in-place processing...
-@@ -1121,7 +1124,7 @@
- 	&lea	($s2 eq "ecx" ? $s2 : "",&DWP(16,$acc));
- 	&mov	($acc eq "esi" ? $acc : "",$key);
- 	&mov	($key eq "edi" ? $key : "",$_out);	# load out
-	&data_word(0xF689A4F3);	# rep movsb		# copy output
-+	&data_word(0xA4F3F689);	# rep movsb		# copy output
- 	&mov	($key,$_inp);				# use inp as temp ivp
- 	&jmp	(&label("dec_end"));
- 
-@@ -1188,22 +1191,20 @@
- 	&lea	($key,&DWP(0,$key,$s2));
- 	&lea	($acc,&DWP(16,$acc,$s2));
- 	&neg	($s2 eq "ecx" ? $s2 : "");
-	&data_word(0xF689A4F3);	# rep movsb	# restore tail
-+	&data_word(0xA4F3F689);	# rep movsb	# restore tail
- 
-     &align	(4);
-     &set_label("dec_out");
-+    &cmp	($mark,0);		# was the key schedule copied?
-     &mov	("edi",$_key);
-     &mov	("esp",$_esp);
-    if ($compromise) {
-	&cmp	(&wparam(2),$compromise);
-	&jb	(&label("skip_dzero"));
-    }
-+    &je		(&label("skip_dzero"));
-     # zero copy of key schedule
-     &mov	("ecx",240/4);
-     &xor	("eax","eax");
-     &align	(4);
-    &data_word(0xF689ABF3);	# rep stosd
-    &set_label("skip_dzero") if ($compromise);
-+    &data_word(0xABF3F689);	# rep stosd
-+    &set_label("skip_dzero")
-     &popf	();
- &function_end("AES_cbc_encrypt");
- }
--- a/openssl-0.9.8b-block-padding.patch
+++ b/openssl-0.9.8b-block-padding.patch
@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c     1.35.2.1 -> 1.35.2.2
-
--- openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c 2005/09/30 23:38:20 1.35.2.1
-+++ openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c 2006/05/07 12:27:48 1.35.2.2
-@@ -628,7 +628,15 @@
- 			{
- 			ii=i=rec->data[l-1]; /* padding_length */
- 			i++;
-			if (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
-+			/* NB: if compression is in operation the first packet
-+			 * may not be of even length so the padding bug check
-+			 * cannot be performed. This bug workaround has been
-+			 * around since SSLeay so hopefully it is either fixed
-+			 * now or no buggy implementation supports compression 
-+			 * [steve]
-+			 */
-+			if ( (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
-+				&& !s->expand)
- 				{
- 				/* First packet is even in size, so check */
- 				if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence,
-
--- a/openssl-0.9.8b-bn-threadsafety.patch
+++ b/openssl-0.9.8b-bn-threadsafety.patch
@ -1,447 +0,0 @@
--- openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c.bn-threadsafe	2005-09-23 01:32:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c	2006-07-20 13:41:44.000000000 +0200
-@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
-  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
-  */
- /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
-  *
-  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -238,40 +238,63 @@
- 	return(r);
- 	}
- 
-static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM **r, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
-+static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
- {
- 	BN_BLINDING *ret;
-+	int got_write_lock = 0;
-+
-+	CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- 
- 	if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
- 		{
-+		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
-+		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
-+		got_write_lock = 1;
-+
- 		if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
-			{
-			CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
-			if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
-				rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
-			CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
-			}
-+			rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
- 		}
- 
- 	ret = rsa->blinding;
- 	if (ret == NULL)
-		return NULL;
-+		goto err;
- 
-	if (BN_BLINDING_get_thread_id(ret) != CRYPTO_thread_id())
-+	if (BN_BLINDING_get_thread_id(ret) == CRYPTO_thread_id())
- 		{
-		*local = 0;
-+		/* rsa->blinding is ours! */
-+
-+		*local = 1;
-+		}
-+	else
-+		{
-+		/* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */
-+
-+		*local = 0; /* instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert()
-+		             * that the BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses
-+		             * require locks, and that the blinding factor must be
-+		             * stored outside the BN_BLINDING
-+		             */
-+
- 		if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
- 			{
-			CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
-+			if (!got_write_lock)
-+				{
-+				CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
-+				CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
-+				got_write_lock = 1;
-+				}
-+			
- 			if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
- 				rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
-			CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- 			}
- 		ret = rsa->mt_blinding;
- 		}
-	else
-		*local = 1;
- 
-+ err:
-+	if (got_write_lock)
-+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
-+	else
-+		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
-@@ -358,7 +381,7 @@
- 
- 	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
- 		{
-		blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &br, &local_blinding, ctx);
-+		blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
- 		if (blinding == NULL)
- 			{
- 			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-@@ -479,7 +502,7 @@
- 
- 	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
- 		{
-		blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &br, &local_blinding, ctx);
-+		blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
- 		if (blinding == NULL)
- 			{
- 			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
--- openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c.bn-threadsafe	2005-11-11 13:59:39.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c	2006-07-20 13:42:07.000000000 +0200
-@@ -55,6 +55,59 @@
-  * copied and put under another distribution licence
-  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
-  */
-+/* ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ *    distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ *    acknowledgment:
-+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
-+ */
- 
- /*
-  * Details about Montgomery multiplication algorithms can be found at
-@@ -353,18 +406,32 @@
- BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(BN_MONT_CTX **pmont, int lock,
- 					const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx)
- 	{
-	if (*pmont)
-		return *pmont;
-	CRYPTO_w_lock(lock);
-+	int got_write_lock = 0;
-+	BN_MONT_CTX *ret;
-+
-+	CRYPTO_r_lock(lock);
- 	if (!*pmont)
- 		{
-		BN_MONT_CTX *mtmp;
-		mtmp = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
-		if (mtmp && !BN_MONT_CTX_set(mtmp, mod, ctx))
-			BN_MONT_CTX_free(mtmp);
-		else
-			*pmont = mtmp;
-+		CRYPTO_r_unlock(lock);
-+		CRYPTO_w_lock(lock);
-+		got_write_lock = 1;
-+
-+		if (!*pmont)
-+			{
-+			ret = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
-+			if (ret && !BN_MONT_CTX_set(ret, mod, ctx))
-+				BN_MONT_CTX_free(ret);
-+			else
-+				*pmont = ret;
-+			}
- 		}
-	CRYPTO_w_unlock(lock);
-	return *pmont;
-+	
-+	ret = *pmont;
-+	
-+	if (got_write_lock)
-+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(lock);
-+	else
-+		CRYPTO_r_unlock(lock);
-+		
-+	return ret;
- 	}
--- openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/err/err.c.bn-threadsafe	2006-02-08 20:16:16.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/err/err.c	2006-07-20 13:41:44.000000000 +0200
-@@ -548,9 +548,20 @@
- 	int i;
- 	static int init = 1;
- 
-	if (!init) return;
-
-+	CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ERR);
-+	if (!init)
-+		{
-+		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ERR);
-+		return;
-+		}
-+	
-+	CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ERR);
- 	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ERR);
-+	if (!init)
-+		{
-+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ERR);
-+		return;
-+		}
- 
- 	for (i = 1; i <= NUM_SYS_STR_REASONS; i++)
- 		{
--- openssl-0.9.8b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c.bn-threadsafe	2006-04-15 02:22:34.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-0.9.8b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c	2006-07-20 13:41:44.000000000 +0200
-@@ -56,6 +56,59 @@
-  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
-  */
- /* ====================================================================
-+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
-+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
-+ *    distribution.
-+ *
-+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
-+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
-+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
-+ *
-+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
-+ *
-+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-+ *    acknowledgment:
-+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
-+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
-+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
-+ */
-+/* ====================================================================
-  * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
-  * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by 
-  * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
-@@ -203,36 +256,46 @@
- 
- static void load_builtin_compressions(void)
- 	{
-	if (ssl_comp_methods != NULL)
-		return;
-+	int got_write_lock = 0;
- 
-	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
-+	CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
- 	if (ssl_comp_methods == NULL)
- 		{
-		SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
-
-		MemCheck_off();
-		ssl_comp_methods=sk_SSL_COMP_new(sk_comp_cmp);
-		if (ssl_comp_methods != NULL)
-+		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
-+		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
-+		got_write_lock = 1;
-+		
-+		if (ssl_comp_methods == NULL)
- 			{
-			comp=(SSL_COMP *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_COMP));
-			if (comp != NULL)
-+			SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
-+
-+			MemCheck_off();
-+			ssl_comp_methods=sk_SSL_COMP_new(sk_comp_cmp);
-+			if (ssl_comp_methods != NULL)
- 				{
-				comp->method=COMP_zlib();
-				if (comp->method
-					&& comp->method->type == NID_undef)
-					OPENSSL_free(comp);
-				else
-+				comp=(SSL_COMP *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_COMP));
-+				if (comp != NULL)
- 					{
-					comp->id=SSL_COMP_ZLIB_IDX;
-					comp->name=comp->method->name;
-					sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods,comp);
-+					comp->method=COMP_zlib();
-+					if (comp->method
-+						&& comp->method->type == NID_undef)
-+						OPENSSL_free(comp);
-+					else
-+						{
-+						comp->id=SSL_COMP_ZLIB_IDX;
-+						comp->name=comp->method->name;
-+						sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods,comp);
-+						}
- 					}
- 				}
-+			MemCheck_on();
- 			}
-		MemCheck_on();
- 		}
-	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
-+	
-+	if (got_write_lock)
-+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
-+	else
-+		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
- 	}
- #endif
- 
--- openssl-0.9.8b/ssl/ssl_cert.c.bn-threadsafe	2006-02-24 18:58:35.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-0.9.8b/ssl/ssl_cert.c	2006-07-20 13:41:44.000000000 +0200
-@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
-  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
-  */
- /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
-  *
-  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -73,12 +73,12 @@
-  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
-  *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
-  *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
-  *
-  * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
-  *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-  *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
-+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
-  *
-  * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
-  *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
-@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@
-  * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
-  *    acknowledgment:
-  *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
-+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
-  *
-  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
-  * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-@@ -102,6 +102,11 @@
-  * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-  * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-  * ====================================================================
-+ *
-+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
-+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
-+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
-+ *
-  */
- /* ====================================================================
-  * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
-@@ -130,21 +135,28 @@
- int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void)
- 	{
- 	static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx= -1;
-+	int got_write_lock = 0;
-+
-+	CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- 
- 	if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0)
- 		{
-		/* any write lock will do; usually this branch
-		 * will only be taken once anyway */
-+		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- 		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-+		got_write_lock = 1;
- 		
- 		if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0)
- 			{
- 			ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx=X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(
- 				0,"SSL for verify callback",NULL,NULL,NULL);
- 			}
-		
-		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- 		}
-+
-+	if (got_write_lock)
-+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-+	else
-+		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-+	
- 	return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx;
- 	}
- 
--- a/openssl-0.9.8b-cve-2006-2937.patch
+++ b/openssl-0.9.8b-cve-2006-2937.patch
@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-Dr S N Henson of the OpenSSL core team and Open Network Security
-recently developed an ASN1 test suite for NISCC (www.niscc.gov.uk). When
-the test suite was run against OpenSSL two denial of service
-vulnerabilities were discovered.
-
-During the parsing of certain invalid ASN1 structures an error
-condition is mishandled. This can result in an infinite loop which
-consumes system memory.  CVE-2006-2938
-
-Any code which uses OpenSSL to parse ASN1 data from untrusted sources is
-affected. This includes SSL servers which enable client authentication
-and S/MIME applications.
-
-This issue affects 0.9.7 and 0.9.8 but not 0.9.6 and earlier
-
--- openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c.asn1-error	2006-02-19 14:45:22.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c	2006-09-25 12:01:14.000000000 +0200
-@@ -832,6 +832,7 @@
- 		}
- 	else if (ret == -1)
- 		return -1;
-+	ret = 0;
- 	/* SEQUENCE, SET and "OTHER" are left in encoded form */
- 	if ((utype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
- 		|| (utype == V_ASN1_SET) || (utype == V_ASN1_OTHER))
--- a/openssl-0.9.8b-cve-2006-2940.patch
+++ b/openssl-0.9.8b-cve-2006-2940.patch
@ -1,215 +0,0 @@
-Dr S N Henson of the OpenSSL core team and Open Network Security
-recently developed an ASN1 test suite for NISCC (www.niscc.gov.uk). When
-the test suite was run against OpenSSL two denial of service
-vulnerabilities were discovered.
-
-Certain types of public key can take disproportionate amounts of time
-to process. This could be used by an attacker in a denial of service attack.
-CVE-2006-2940
-
-Any code which uses OpenSSL to parse ASN1 data from untrusted sources is
-affected. This includes SSL servers which enable client authentication,
-and S/MIME applications.
-
-
-diff -u -r1.37.2.2 dh.h
--- crypto/dh/dh.h	9 Jan 2006 16:05:22 -0000	1.37.2.2
-+++ crypto/dh/dh.h	15 Sep 2006 13:59:47 -0000
-@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #endif
- 	
-+#define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS	10000
-+
- #define DH_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P     0x01
- #define DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME 0x02 /* new with 0.9.7h; the built-in DH
-                                        * implementation now uses constant time
-@@ -221,6 +223,7 @@
- /* Reason codes. */
- #define DH_R_BAD_GENERATOR				 101
- #define DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY				 102
-+#define DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE				 103
- #define DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE				 100
- 
- #ifdef  __cplusplus
-diff -u -r1.11.2.2 dh_err.c
--- crypto/dh/dh_err.c	9 Jan 2006 16:05:22 -0000	1.11.2.2
-+++ crypto/dh/dh_err.c	15 Sep 2006 13:59:47 -0000
-@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@
- 	{
- {ERR_REASON(DH_R_BAD_GENERATOR)          ,"bad generator"},
- {ERR_REASON(DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY)         ,"invalid public key"},
-+{ERR_REASON(DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE)      ,"modulus too large"},
- {ERR_REASON(DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE)       ,"no private value"},
- {0,NULL}
- 	};
-diff -u -r1.24.2.3 dh_key.c
--- crypto/dh/dh_key.c	13 Mar 2006 23:12:06 -0000	1.24.2.3
-+++ crypto/dh/dh_key.c	15 Sep 2006 13:59:47 -0000
-@@ -179,6 +179,12 @@
- 	int ret= -1;
-         int check_result;
- 
-+	if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
-+		{
-+		DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY,DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
-+		return -1;
-+		}
-+
- 	ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- 	if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
- 	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-diff -u -r1.39 dsa.h
--- crypto/dsa/dsa.h	16 May 2005 01:43:30 -0000	1.39
-+++ crypto/dsa/dsa.h	15 Sep 2006 13:59:47 -0000
-@@ -84,6 +84,8 @@
- #endif
- #endif
- 
-+#define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS	10000
-+
- #define DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P	0x01
- #define DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME       0x02 /* new with 0.9.7h; the built-in DSA
-                                               * implementation now uses constant time
-@@ -270,8 +272,10 @@
- #define DSA_F_SIG_CB					 114
- 
- /* Reason codes. */
-+#define DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE				 102
- #define DSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE		 100
- #define DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS			 101
-+#define DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE				 103
- 
- #ifdef  __cplusplus
- }
-diff -u -r1.13 dsa_err.c
--- crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c	12 Apr 2005 16:15:12 -0000	1.13
-+++ crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c	15 Sep 2006 13:59:47 -0000
-@@ -89,8 +89,10 @@
- 
- static ERR_STRING_DATA DSA_str_reasons[]=
- 	{
-+{ERR_REASON(DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE)           ,"bad q value"},
- {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE),"data too large for key size"},
- {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS)    ,"missing parameters"},
-+{ERR_REASON(DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE)     ,"modulus too large"},
- {0,NULL}
- 	};
- 
-diff -u -r1.24.2.1 dsa_ossl.c
--- crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c	26 May 2005 04:40:57 -0000	1.24.2.1
-+++ crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c	15 Sep 2006 13:59:47 -0000
-@@ -304,6 +304,18 @@
- 		return -1;
- 		}
- 
-+	if (BN_num_bits(dsa->q) != 160)
-+		{
-+		DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY,DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE);
-+		return -1;
-+		}
-+
-+	if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
-+		{
-+		DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY,DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
-+		return -1;
-+		}
-+
- 	BN_init(&u1);
- 	BN_init(&u2);
- 	BN_init(&t1);
-diff -u -r1.55.2.6 rsa.h
--- crypto/rsa/rsa.h	6 Sep 2006 06:43:25 -0000	1.55.2.6
-+++ crypto/rsa/rsa.h	15 Sep 2006 13:59:48 -0000
-@@ -159,6 +159,11 @@
- 	BN_BLINDING *mt_blinding;
- 	};
- 
-+#define OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS	16384
-+
-+#define OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS	3072
-+#define OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS	64 /* exponent limit enforced for "small" modulus only */
-+
- #define RSA_3	0x3L
- #define RSA_F4	0x10001L
- 
-@@ -407,6 +412,7 @@
- #define RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q			 126
- #define RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL			 120
- #define RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID			 134
-+#define RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE				 105
- #define RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT			 140
- #define RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING			 113
- #define RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q			 127
-diff -u -r1.46.2.6 rsa_eay.c
--- crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c	6 Sep 2006 06:43:25 -0000	1.46.2.6
-+++ crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c	15 Sep 2006 13:59:48 -0000
-@@ -168,6 +168,28 @@
- 	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
- 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
- 
-+	if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
-+		{
-+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
-+		return -1;
-+		}
-+
-+	if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
-+		{
-+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
-+		return -1;
-+		}
-+
-+	/* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
-+	if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
-+		{
-+		if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
-+			{
-+			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
-+			return -1;
-+			}
-+		}
-+	
- 	if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
- 	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- 	f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-@@ -597,6 +619,28 @@
- 	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
- 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
- 
-+	if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
-+		{
-+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
-+		return -1;
-+		}
-+
-+	if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
-+		{
-+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
-+		return -1;
-+		}
-+
-+	/* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
-+	if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
-+		{
-+		if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
-+			{
-+			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
-+			return -1;
-+			}
-+		}
-+	
- 	if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
- 	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- 	f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-diff -u -r1.17.2.5 rsa_err.c
--- crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c	6 Sep 2006 06:43:26 -0000	1.17.2.5
-+++ crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c	15 Sep 2006 13:59:48 -0000
-@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@
- {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q) ,"iqmp not inverse of q"},
- {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL)    ,"key size too small"},
- {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID)    ,"last octet invalid"},
-+{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE)     ,"modulus too large"},
- {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT)    ,"no public exponent"},
- {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING),"null before block missing"},
- {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q)  ,"n does not equal p q"},
--- a/openssl-0.9.8b-cve-2006-3738.patch
+++ b/openssl-0.9.8b-cve-2006-3738.patch
@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry of the Google Security Team discovered a buffer 
-overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers utility function, used by some 
-applications such as exim and mysql.  An attacker could send a list of 
-ciphers that would overrun a buffer CVE-2006-3738
-
--- ssl/ssl_lib.c	2005-10-01 00:38:20.000000000 +0100
-+++ ssl/ssl_lib.c	2006-08-28 19:08:37.401404000 +0100
-@@ -1219,7 +1219,7 @@ char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *
- 		c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
- 		for (cp=c->name; *cp; )
- 			{
-			if (len-- == 0)
-+			if (len-- <= 0)
- 				{
- 				*p='\0';
- 				return(buf);
--- ssl/s3_srvr.c	2005-10-01 00:38:20.000000000 +0100
-+++ ssl/s3_srvr.c	2006-08-28 19:16:39.313556000 +0100
-@@ -2017,7 +2017,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
- 
-                 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
-                         {
-                        int len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
-+                        size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
-                         if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH ) 
-                                 {
-                                 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
--- a/openssl-0.9.8b-cve-2006-4339.patch
+++ b/openssl-0.9.8b-cve-2006-4339.patch
@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-*) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher
-(CVE-2006-4339)  [Ben Laurie; Google Security Team]
-openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa.h     1.55.2.4 -> 1.55.2.5
-
--- openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa.h 2006/01/09 16:05:18 1.55.2.4
-+++ openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa.h 2006/09/05 08:25:42 1.55.2.5
-@@ -412,6 +412,7 @@
- #define RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q			 127
- #define RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR			 121
- #define RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED			 114
-+#define RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT			 105
- #define RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME				 128
- #define RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME				 129
- #define RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED		 130
-
-openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c     1.46.2.4 -> 1.46.2.5
-
--- openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c 2006/06/14 08:51:40 1.46.2.4
-+++ openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c 2006/09/05 08:25:42 1.46.2.5
-@@ -640,6 +640,15 @@
- 		{
- 	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- 		r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
-+		/* Generally signatures should be at least 2/3 padding, though
-+		   this isn't possible for really short keys and some standard
-+		   signature schemes, so don't check if the unpadded data is
-+		   small. */
-+		if(r > 42 && 3*8*r >= BN_num_bits(rsa->n))
-+			{
-+			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT);
-+			goto err;
-+			}
- 		break;
- 	case RSA_X931_PADDING:
- 		r=RSA_padding_check_X931(to,num,buf,i,num);
-
-openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c     1.17.2.3 -> 1.17.2.4
-
--- openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c 2006/01/09 16:05:18 1.17.2.3
-+++ openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c 2006/09/05 08:25:42 1.17.2.4
-@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@
- {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q)  ,"n does not equal p q"},
- {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR)   ,"oaep decoding error"},
- {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED)  ,"padding check failed"},
-+{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT),"pkcs1 padding too short"},
- {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME)           ,"p not prime"},
- {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME)           ,"q not prime"},
- {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED),"rsa operations not supported"},
-
-openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c     1.21 -> 1.21.2.1
-
--- openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c 2005/04/26 22:07:17 1.21
-+++ openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c 2006/09/05 08:25:42 1.21.2.1
-@@ -185,6 +185,23 @@
- 		sig=d2i_X509_SIG(NULL,&p,(long)i);
- 
- 		if (sig == NULL) goto err;
-+
-+		/* Excess data can be used to create forgeries */
-+		if(p != s+i)
-+			{
-+			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
-+			goto err;
-+			}
-+
-+		/* Parameters to the signature algorithm can also be used to
-+		   create forgeries */
-+		if(sig->algor->parameter
-+		   && ASN1_TYPE_get(sig->algor->parameter) != V_ASN1_NULL)
-+			{
-+			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
-+			goto err;
-+			}
-+
- 		sigtype=OBJ_obj2nid(sig->algor->algorithm);
- 
- 
--- a/openssl-0.9.8b-cve-2006-4343.patch
+++ b/openssl-0.9.8b-cve-2006-4343.patch
@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry of the Google Security Team discovered a 
-possible DoS in the sslv2 client code.  Where a client application uses 
-OpenSSL to make a SSLv2 connection to a malicious server that server 
-could cause the client to crash.  CVE-2006-4343
-
--- ssl/s2_clnt.c	2005-08-06 00:52:07.000000000 +0100
-+++ ssl/s2_clnt.c	2006-08-28 19:14:59.398605000 +0100
-@@ -520,7 +520,8 @@ static int get_server_hello(SSL *s)
- 		CRYPTO_add(&s->session->peer->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- 		}
- 
-	if (s->session->peer != s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->x509)
-+	if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL 
-+      || s->session->peer != s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->x509)
- 		/* can't happen */
- 		{
- 		ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
--- a/openssl-0.9.8b-cve-2007-3108.patch
+++ b/openssl-0.9.8b-cve-2007-3108.patch
@ -1,934 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/rsa/rsa.h.no-branch openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
--- openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/rsa/rsa.h.no-branch	2007-08-03 13:58:54.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/rsa/rsa.h	2007-08-03 13:58:58.000000000 +0200
-@@ -189,13 +189,17 @@ struct rsa_st
-                                                 * default (ignoring RSA_FLAG_BLINDING),
-                                                 * but other engines might not need it
-                                                 */
-#define RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME	0x0100 /* new with 0.9.7h; the built-in RSA
-                                                * implementation now uses constant time
-                                                * modular exponentiation for secret exponents
-                                                * by default. This flag causes the
-                                                * faster variable sliding window method to
-                                                * be used for all exponents.
-                                                */
-+#define RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME		0x0100 /* new with 0.9.8f; the built-in RSA
-+						* implementation now uses constant time
-+						* operations by default in private key operations,
-+						* e.g., constant time modular exponentiation, 
-+                                                * modular inverse without leaking branches, 
-+                                                * division without leaking branches. This 
-+                                                * flag disables these constant time 
-+                                                * operations and results in faster RSA 
-+                                                * private key operations.
-+                                                */ 
-+#define RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME /* deprecated name for the flag*/
- 
- #define RSA_PKCS1_PADDING	1
- #define RSA_SSLV23_PADDING	2
-diff -up openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c.no-branch openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
--- openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c.no-branch	2005-11-25 15:26:12.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c	2007-08-03 13:58:58.000000000 +0200
-@@ -361,7 +361,8 @@ err:
- 
- BN_BLINDING *RSA_setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *in_ctx)
- {
-	BIGNUM *e;
-+	BIGNUM local_n;
-+	BIGNUM *e,*n;
- 	BN_CTX *ctx;
- 	BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
- 
-@@ -400,7 +401,16 @@ BN_BLINDING *RSA_setup_blinding(RSA *rsa
- 		RAND_add(rsa->d->d, rsa->d->dmax * sizeof rsa->d->d[0], 0.0);
- 		}
- 
-	ret = BN_BLINDING_create_param(NULL, e, rsa->n, ctx,
-+	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
-+		{
-+		/* Set BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */
-+		n = &local_n;
-+		BN_with_flags(n, rsa->n, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-+		}
-+	else
-+		n = rsa->n;
-+
-+	ret = BN_BLINDING_create_param(NULL, e, n, ctx,
- 			rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp, rsa->_method_mod_n);
- 	if (ret == NULL)
- 		{
-diff -up openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c.no-branch openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
--- openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c.no-branch	2006-03-14 00:12:08.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c	2007-08-03 13:58:58.000000000 +0200
-@@ -85,6 +85,8 @@ int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bi
- static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
- 	{
- 	BIGNUM *r0=NULL,*r1=NULL,*r2=NULL,*r3=NULL,*tmp;
-+	BIGNUM local_r0,local_d,local_p;
-+	BIGNUM *pr0,*d,*p;
- 	int bitsp,bitsq,ok= -1,n=0;
- 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
- 
-@@ -165,16 +167,39 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, 
- 	if (!BN_sub(r1,rsa->p,BN_value_one())) goto err;	/* p-1 */
- 	if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->q,BN_value_one())) goto err;	/* q-1 */
- 	if (!BN_mul(r0,r1,r2,ctx)) goto err;	/* (p-1)(q-1) */
-	if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d,rsa->e,r0,ctx)) goto err;	/* d */
-+	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
-+		{
-+		  pr0 = &local_r0;
-+		  BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-+		}
-+	else
-+	  pr0 = r0;
-+	if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d,rsa->e,pr0,ctx)) goto err;	/* d */
-+
-+	/* set up d for correct BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */
-+	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
-+		{
-+		d = &local_d;
-+		BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-+		}
-+	else
-+		d = rsa->d;
- 
- 	/* calculate d mod (p-1) */
-	if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1,rsa->d,r1,ctx)) goto err;
-+	if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1,d,r1,ctx)) goto err;
- 
- 	/* calculate d mod (q-1) */
-	if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1,rsa->d,r2,ctx)) goto err;
-+	if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1,d,r2,ctx)) goto err;
- 
- 	/* calculate inverse of q mod p */
-	if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp,rsa->q,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
-+	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
-+		{
-+		p = &local_p;
-+		BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-+		}
-+	else
-+		p = rsa->p;
-+	if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp,rsa->q,p,ctx)) goto err;
- 
- 	ok=1;
- err:
-diff -up openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c.no-branch openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
--- openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c.no-branch	2007-08-03 13:58:54.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c	2007-08-03 13:58:58.000000000 +0200
-@@ -429,11 +429,11 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int f
- 		BIGNUM local_d;
- 		BIGNUM *d = NULL;
- 		
-		if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME))
-+		if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- 			{
- 			BN_init(&local_d);
- 			d = &local_d;
-			BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
-+			BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- 			}
- 		else
- 			d = rsa->d;
-@@ -551,10 +551,10 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int f
- 		BIGNUM local_d;
- 		BIGNUM *d = NULL;
- 		
-		if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME))
-+		if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- 			{
- 			d = &local_d;
-			BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
-+			BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- 			}
- 		else
- 			d = rsa->d;
-@@ -724,8 +724,9 @@ err:
- static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
- 	{
- 	BIGNUM *r1,*m1,*vrfy;
-	BIGNUM local_dmp1, local_dmq1;
-	BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1;
-+	BIGNUM local_dmp1,local_dmq1,local_c,local_r1;
-+	BIGNUM *dmp1,*dmq1,*c,*pr1;
-+	int bn_flags;
- 	int ret=0;
- 
- 	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-@@ -733,26 +734,72 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, c
- 	m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- 	vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- 
-+	/* Make sure mod_inverse in montgomerey intialization use correct 
-+	 * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag.
-+	 */
-+	bn_flags = rsa->p->flags;
-+	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
-+		{
-+		rsa->p->flags |= BN_FLG_CONSTTIME;
-+		}
- 	MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, p, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
-+	/* We restore bn_flags back */
-+	rsa->p->flags = bn_flags;
-+
-+        /* Make sure mod_inverse in montgomerey intialization use correct
-+         * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag.
-+         */
-+	bn_flags = rsa->q->flags;
-+	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
-+		{
-+		rsa->q->flags |= BN_FLG_CONSTTIME;
-+		}
- 	MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, q, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
-+	/* We restore bn_flags back */
-+	rsa->q->flags = bn_flags;	
-+
- 	MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
- 
-	if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
-	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME))
-+	/* compute I mod q */
-+	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
-+		{
-+		c = &local_c;
-+		BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-+		if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
-+		}
-+	else
-+		{
-+		if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
-+		}
-+
-+	/* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
-+	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- 		{
- 		dmq1 = &local_dmq1;
-		BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
-+		BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- 		}
- 	else
- 		dmq1 = rsa->dmq1;
- 	if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1,r1,dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
- 		rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
- 
-	if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
-	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME))
-+	/* compute I mod p */
-+	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
-+		{
-+		c = &local_c;
-+		BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-+		if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
-+		}
-+	else
-+		{
-+		if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
-+		}
-+
-+	/* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
-+	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- 		{
- 		dmp1 = &local_dmp1;
-		BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
-+		BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- 		}
- 	else
- 		dmp1 = rsa->dmp1;
-@@ -766,7 +813,17 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, c
- 		if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
- 
- 	if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
-	if (!BN_mod(r0,r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
-+
-+	/* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
-+	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
-+		{
-+		pr1 = &local_r1;
-+		BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-+		}
-+	else
-+		pr1 = r1;
-+	if (!BN_mod(r0,pr1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
-+
- 	/* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
-          * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
- 	 * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
-@@ -799,10 +856,10 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, c
- 			BIGNUM local_d;
- 			BIGNUM *d = NULL;
- 		
-			if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME))
-+			if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- 				{
- 				d = &local_d;
-				BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
-+				BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- 				}
- 			else
- 				d = rsa->d;
-diff -up openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.c.no-branch openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.c
--- openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.c.no-branch	2005-05-16 03:43:31.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.c	2007-08-03 13:58:58.000000000 +0200
-@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
- 	clen = key3(key, ctext_ex);
- 	break;
- 	}
-	if (v/3 > 1) key->flags |= RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME;
-+	if (v/3 >= 1) key->flags |= RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME;
- 
- 	num = RSA_public_encrypt(plen, ptext_ex, ctext, key,
- 				 RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
-diff -up openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/bn/bn.h.no-branch openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/bn/bn.h
--- openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/bn/bn.h.no-branch	2007-08-03 13:58:54.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/bn/bn.h	2007-08-03 13:58:58.000000000 +0200
-@@ -245,8 +245,15 @@ extern "C" {
- 
- #define BN_FLG_MALLOCED		0x01
- #define BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA	0x02
-#define BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME	0x04 /* avoid leaking exponent information through timings
-                            	      * (BN_mod_exp_mont() will call BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime) */
-+#define BN_FLG_CONSTTIME	0x04 /* avoid leaking exponent information through timing,
-+                                      * BN_mod_exp_mont() will call BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime,
-+                                      * BN_div() will call BN_div_no_branch,
-+                                      * BN_mod_inverse() will call BN_mod_inverse_no_branch.
-+                                      */
-+#define BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME BN_FLG_CONSTTIME /* deprecated name for the flag */
-+                                      /* avoid leaking exponent information through timings
-+                                      * (BN_mod_exp_mont() will call BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime) */
-+
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
- #define BN_FLG_FREE		0x8000	/* used for debuging */
- #endif
-@@ -534,7 +541,7 @@ BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(BN_M
- #define	BN_BLINDING_NO_UPDATE	0x00000001
- #define	BN_BLINDING_NO_RECREATE	0x00000002
- 
-BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, BIGNUM *mod);
-+BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, /* const */ BIGNUM *mod);
- void BN_BLINDING_free(BN_BLINDING *b);
- int BN_BLINDING_update(BN_BLINDING *b,BN_CTX *ctx);
- int BN_BLINDING_convert(BIGNUM *n, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
-@@ -546,7 +553,7 @@ void BN_BLINDING_set_thread_id(BN_BLINDI
- unsigned long BN_BLINDING_get_flags(const BN_BLINDING *);
- void BN_BLINDING_set_flags(BN_BLINDING *, unsigned long);
- BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_create_param(BN_BLINDING *b,
-	const BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
-+	const BIGNUM *e, /* const */ BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
- 	int (*bn_mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
- 			  const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx),
- 	BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
-diff -up openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c.no-branch openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
--- openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c.no-branch	2007-08-03 13:58:54.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c	2007-08-03 13:58:58.000000000 +0200
-@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *ret, cons
- 	BIGNUM *n,*r;
- 	BN_ULONG *ap,*np,*rp,n0,v,*nrp;
- 	int al,nl,max,i,x,ri;
-+	size_t m1,m2;
- 
- 	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- 	if ((r = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err;
-@@ -176,7 +177,6 @@ int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *ret, cons
- 
- 	max=(nl+al+1); /* allow for overflow (no?) XXX */
- 	if (bn_wexpand(r,max) == NULL) goto err;
-	if (bn_wexpand(ret,max) == NULL) goto err;
- 
- 	r->neg=a->neg^n->neg;
- 	np=n->d;
-@@ -228,37 +228,58 @@ int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *ret, cons
- 		}
- 	bn_correct_top(r);
- 	
-	/* mont->ri will be a multiple of the word size */
-#if 0
-	BN_rshift(ret,r,mont->ri);
-#else
-+	/* mont->ri will be a multiple of the word size and below code
-+	 * is kind of BN_rshift(ret,r,mont->ri) equivalent */
-+	if (r->top <= ri)
-+		{
-+		ret->top=0;
-+		retn=1;
-+		goto err;
-+		}
-+	al=r->top-ri;
-+	if (bn_wexpand(ret,ri) == NULL) goto err;
-+	x=0-(((al-ri)>>(sizeof(al)*8-1))&1);
-+	ret->top=x=(ri&~x)|(al&x);	/* min(ri,al) */
- 	ret->neg = r->neg;
-	x=ri;
-+
- 	rp=ret->d;
-	ap= &(r->d[x]);
-	if (r->top < x)
-		al=0;
-	else
-		al=r->top-x;
-	ret->top=al;
-	al-=4;
-	for (i=0; i<al; i+=4)
-+	ap=&(r->d[ri]);
-+
-+	v=bn_sub_words(rp,ap,np,ri);
-+	/* this -----------------------^^ works even in al<ri case
-+	 * thanks to zealous zeroing of top of the vector in the
-+	 * beginning. */
-+
-+	/* if (al==ri && !v) || al>ri) nrp=rp; else nrp=ap; */
-+	/* in other words if subtraction result is real, then
-+	 * trick unconditional memcpy below to perform in-place
-+	 * "refresh" instead of actual copy. */
-+	m1=0-(size_t)(((al-ri)>>(sizeof(al)*8-1))&1);	/* al<ri */
-+	m2=0-(size_t)(((ri-al)>>(sizeof(al)*8-1))&1);	/* al>ri */
-+	m1|=m2;			/* (al!=ri) */
-+	m1|=(0-(size_t)v);	/* (al!=ri || v) */
-+	m1&=~m2;		/* (al!=ri || v) && !al>ri */
-+	nrp=(BN_ULONG *)(((size_t)rp&~m1)|((size_t)ap&m1));
-+
-+	/* 'i<ri' is chosen to eliminate dependency on input data, even
-+	 * though it results in redundant copy in al<ri case. */
-+	for (i=0,ri-=4; i<ri; i+=4)
- 		{
- 		BN_ULONG t1,t2,t3,t4;
- 		
-		t1=ap[i+0];
-		t2=ap[i+1];
-		t3=ap[i+2];
-		t4=ap[i+3];
-		rp[i+0]=t1;
-		rp[i+1]=t2;
-+		t1=nrp[i+0];
-+		t2=nrp[i+1];
-+		t3=nrp[i+2];	ap[i+0]=0;
-+		t4=nrp[i+3];	ap[i+1]=0;
-+		rp[i+0]=t1;	ap[i+2]=0;
-+		rp[i+1]=t2;	ap[i+3]=0;
- 		rp[i+2]=t3;
- 		rp[i+3]=t4;
- 		}
-	al+=4;
-	for (; i<al; i++)
-		rp[i]=ap[i];
-#endif
-+	for (ri+=4; i<ri; i++)
-+		rp[i]=nrp[i], ap[i]=0;
-+	bn_correct_top(r);
-+	bn_correct_top(ret);
- #else /* !MONT_WORD */ 
- 	BIGNUM *t1,*t2;
- 
-@@ -276,12 +297,12 @@ int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *ret, cons
- 	if (!BN_mul(t1,t2,&mont->N,ctx)) goto err;
- 	if (!BN_add(t2,a,t1)) goto err;
- 	if (!BN_rshift(ret,t2,mont->ri)) goto err;
-#endif /* MONT_WORD */
- 
- 	if (BN_ucmp(ret, &(mont->N)) >= 0)
- 		{
- 		if (!BN_usub(ret,ret,&(mont->N))) goto err;
- 		}
-+#endif /* MONT_WORD */
- 	retn=1;
- 	bn_check_top(ret);
-  err:
-diff -up openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c.no-branch openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
--- openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c.no-branch	2005-05-03 22:27:00.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c	2007-08-03 13:58:58.000000000 +0200
-@@ -763,7 +763,7 @@ int BN_is_bit_set(const BIGNUM *a, int n
- 	i=n/BN_BITS2;
- 	j=n%BN_BITS2;
- 	if (a->top <= i) return 0;
-	return((a->d[i]&(((BN_ULONG)1)<<j))?1:0);
-+	return(((a->d[i])>>j)&((BN_ULONG)1));
- 	}
- 
- int BN_mask_bits(BIGNUM *a, int n)
-diff -up openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c.no-branch openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
--- openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c.no-branch	2005-05-26 06:30:48.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c	2007-08-03 13:58:58.000000000 +0200
-@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ struct bn_blinding_st
- 			  BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
- 	};
- 
-BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, BIGNUM *mod)
-+BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, /* const */ BIGNUM *mod)
- 	{
- 	BN_BLINDING *ret=NULL;
- 
-@@ -151,7 +151,12 @@ BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNU
- 		{
- 		if ((ret->Ai = BN_dup(Ai)) == NULL) goto err;
- 		}
-	ret->mod = mod;
-+
-+	/* save a copy of mod in the BN_BLINDING structure */
-+	if ((ret->mod = BN_dup(mod)) == NULL) goto err;
-+	if (BN_get_flags(mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)
-+		BN_set_flags(ret->mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-+
- 	ret->counter = BN_BLINDING_COUNTER;
- 	return(ret);
- err:
-@@ -167,6 +172,7 @@ void BN_BLINDING_free(BN_BLINDING *r)
- 	if (r->A  != NULL) BN_free(r->A );
- 	if (r->Ai != NULL) BN_free(r->Ai);
- 	if (r->e  != NULL) BN_free(r->e );
-+	if (r->mod != NULL) BN_free(r->mod); 
- 	OPENSSL_free(r);
- 	}
- 
-@@ -278,7 +284,7 @@ void BN_BLINDING_set_flags(BN_BLINDING *
- 	}
- 
- BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_create_param(BN_BLINDING *b,
-	const BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
-+	const BIGNUM *e, /* const */ BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
- 	int (*bn_mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
- 			  const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx),
- 	BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
-diff -up openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/bn/bn_div.c.no-branch openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
--- openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/bn/bn_div.c.no-branch	2005-08-29 01:20:43.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/bn/bn_div.c	2007-08-03 13:58:58.000000000 +0200
-@@ -169,13 +169,15 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, cons
- #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ASM */
- 
- 
-/* BN_div computes  dv := num / divisor,  rounding towards zero, and sets up
- * rm  such that  dv*divisor + rm = num  holds.
-+/* BN_div[_no_branch] computes  dv := num / divisor,  rounding towards
-+ * zero, and sets up rm  such that  dv*divisor + rm = num  holds.
-  * Thus:
-  *     dv->neg == num->neg ^ divisor->neg  (unless the result is zero)
-  *     rm->neg == num->neg                 (unless the remainder is zero)
-  * If 'dv' or 'rm' is NULL, the respective value is not returned.
-  */
-+static int BN_div_no_branch(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num,
-+        const BIGNUM *divisor, BN_CTX *ctx);
- int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, const BIGNUM *divisor,
- 	   BN_CTX *ctx)
- 	{
-@@ -185,6 +187,11 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const
- 	BN_ULONG d0,d1;
- 	int num_n,div_n;
- 
-+	if (BN_get_flags(num, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)
-+		{
-+		return BN_div_no_branch(dv, rm, num, divisor, ctx);
-+		}
-+
- 	bn_check_top(dv);
- 	bn_check_top(rm);
- 	bn_check_top(num);
-@@ -397,4 +404,229 @@ err:
- 	return(0);
- 	}
- 
-+
-+/* BN_div_no_branch is a special version of BN_div. It does not contain
-+ * branches that may leak sensitive information.
-+ */
-+static int BN_div_no_branch(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, 
-+	const BIGNUM *divisor, BN_CTX *ctx)
-+	{
-+	int norm_shift,i,loop;
-+	BIGNUM *tmp,wnum,*snum,*sdiv,*res;
-+	BN_ULONG *resp,*wnump;
-+	BN_ULONG d0,d1;
-+	int num_n,div_n;
-+
-+	bn_check_top(dv);
-+	bn_check_top(rm);
-+	bn_check_top(num);
-+	bn_check_top(divisor);
-+
-+	if (BN_is_zero(divisor))
-+		{
-+		BNerr(BN_F_BN_DIV,BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO);
-+		return(0);
-+		}
-+
-+	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-+	tmp=BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-+	snum=BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-+	sdiv=BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-+	if (dv == NULL)
-+		res=BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-+	else	res=dv;
-+	if (sdiv == NULL || res == NULL) goto err;
-+
-+	/* First we normalise the numbers */
-+	norm_shift=BN_BITS2-((BN_num_bits(divisor))%BN_BITS2);
-+	if (!(BN_lshift(sdiv,divisor,norm_shift))) goto err;
-+	sdiv->neg=0;
-+	norm_shift+=BN_BITS2;
-+	if (!(BN_lshift(snum,num,norm_shift))) goto err;
-+	snum->neg=0;
-+
-+	/* Since we don't know whether snum is larger than sdiv,
-+	 * we pad snum with enough zeroes without changing its
-+	 * value. 
-+	 */
-+	if (snum->top <= sdiv->top+1) 
-+		{
-+		if (bn_wexpand(snum, sdiv->top + 2) == NULL) goto err;
-+		for (i = snum->top; i < sdiv->top + 2; i++) snum->d[i] = 0;
-+		snum->top = sdiv->top + 2;
-+		}
-+	else
-+		{
-+		if (bn_wexpand(snum, snum->top + 1) == NULL) goto err;
-+		snum->d[snum->top] = 0;
-+		snum->top ++;
-+		}
-+
-+	div_n=sdiv->top;
-+	num_n=snum->top;
-+	loop=num_n-div_n;
-+	/* Lets setup a 'window' into snum
-+	 * This is the part that corresponds to the current
-+	 * 'area' being divided */
-+	wnum.neg   = 0;
-+	wnum.d     = &(snum->d[loop]);
-+	wnum.top   = div_n;
-+	/* only needed when BN_ucmp messes up the values between top and max */
-+	wnum.dmax  = snum->dmax - loop; /* so we don't step out of bounds */
-+
-+	/* Get the top 2 words of sdiv */
-+	/* div_n=sdiv->top; */
-+	d0=sdiv->d[div_n-1];
-+	d1=(div_n == 1)?0:sdiv->d[div_n-2];
-+
-+	/* pointer to the 'top' of snum */
-+	wnump= &(snum->d[num_n-1]);
-+
-+	/* Setup to 'res' */
-+	res->neg= (num->neg^divisor->neg);
-+	if (!bn_wexpand(res,(loop+1))) goto err;
-+	res->top=loop-1;
-+	resp= &(res->d[loop-1]);
-+
-+	/* space for temp */
-+	if (!bn_wexpand(tmp,(div_n+1))) goto err;
-+
-+	/* if res->top == 0 then clear the neg value otherwise decrease
-+	 * the resp pointer */
-+	if (res->top == 0)
-+		res->neg = 0;
-+	else
-+		resp--;
-+
-+	for (i=0; i<loop-1; i++, wnump--, resp--)
-+		{
-+		BN_ULONG q,l0;
-+		/* the first part of the loop uses the top two words of
-+		 * snum and sdiv to calculate a BN_ULONG q such that
-+		 * | wnum - sdiv * q | < sdiv */
-+#if defined(BN_DIV3W) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM)
-+		BN_ULONG bn_div_3_words(BN_ULONG*,BN_ULONG,BN_ULONG);
-+		q=bn_div_3_words(wnump,d1,d0);
-+#else
-+		BN_ULONG n0,n1,rem=0;
-+
-+		n0=wnump[0];
-+		n1=wnump[-1];
-+		if (n0 == d0)
-+			q=BN_MASK2;
-+		else 			/* n0 < d0 */
-+			{
-+#ifdef BN_LLONG
-+			BN_ULLONG t2;
-+
-+#if defined(BN_LLONG) && defined(BN_DIV2W) && !defined(bn_div_words)
-+			q=(BN_ULONG)(((((BN_ULLONG)n0)<<BN_BITS2)|n1)/d0);
-+#else
-+			q=bn_div_words(n0,n1,d0);
-+#ifdef BN_DEBUG_LEVITTE
-+			fprintf(stderr,"DEBUG: bn_div_words(0x%08X,0x%08X,0x%08\
-+X) -> 0x%08X\n",
-+				n0, n1, d0, q);
-+#endif
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifndef REMAINDER_IS_ALREADY_CALCULATED
-+			/*
-+			 * rem doesn't have to be BN_ULLONG. The least we
-+			 * know it's less that d0, isn't it?
-+			 */
-+			rem=(n1-q*d0)&BN_MASK2;
-+#endif
-+			t2=(BN_ULLONG)d1*q;
-+
-+			for (;;)
-+				{
-+				if (t2 <= ((((BN_ULLONG)rem)<<BN_BITS2)|wnump[-2]))
-+					break;
-+				q--;
-+				rem += d0;
-+				if (rem < d0) break; /* don't let rem overflow */
-+				t2 -= d1;
-+				}
-+#else /* !BN_LLONG */
-+			BN_ULONG t2l,t2h,ql,qh;
-+
-+			q=bn_div_words(n0,n1,d0);
-+#ifdef BN_DEBUG_LEVITTE
-+			fprintf(stderr,"DEBUG: bn_div_words(0x%08X,0x%08X,0x%08\
-+X) -> 0x%08X\n",
-+				n0, n1, d0, q);
-+#endif
-+#ifndef REMAINDER_IS_ALREADY_CALCULATED
-+			rem=(n1-q*d0)&BN_MASK2;
-+#endif
-+
-+#if defined(BN_UMULT_LOHI)
-+			BN_UMULT_LOHI(t2l,t2h,d1,q);
-+#elif defined(BN_UMULT_HIGH)
-+			t2l = d1 * q;
-+			t2h = BN_UMULT_HIGH(d1,q);
-+#else
-+			t2l=LBITS(d1); t2h=HBITS(d1);
-+			ql =LBITS(q);  qh =HBITS(q);
-+			mul64(t2l,t2h,ql,qh); /* t2=(BN_ULLONG)d1*q; */
-+#endif
-+
-+			for (;;)
-+				{
-+				if ((t2h < rem) ||
-+					((t2h == rem) && (t2l <= wnump[-2])))
-+					break;
-+				q--;
-+				rem += d0;
-+				if (rem < d0) break; /* don't let rem overflow */
-+				if (t2l < d1) t2h--; t2l -= d1;
-+				}
-+#endif /* !BN_LLONG */
-+			}
-+#endif /* !BN_DIV3W */
-+
-+		l0=bn_mul_words(tmp->d,sdiv->d,div_n,q);
-+		tmp->d[div_n]=l0;
-+		wnum.d--;
-+		/* ingore top values of the bignums just sub the two 
-+		 * BN_ULONG arrays with bn_sub_words */
-+		if (bn_sub_words(wnum.d, wnum.d, tmp->d, div_n+1))
-+			{
-+			/* Note: As we have considered only the leading
-+			 * two BN_ULONGs in the calculation of q, sdiv * q
-+			 * might be greater than wnum (but then (q-1) * sdiv
-+			 * is less or equal than wnum)
-+			 */
-+			q--;
-+			if (bn_add_words(wnum.d, wnum.d, sdiv->d, div_n))
-+				/* we can't have an overflow here (assuming
-+				 * that q != 0, but if q == 0 then tmp is
-+				 * zero anyway) */
-+				(*wnump)++;
-+			}
-+		/* store part of the result */
-+		*resp = q;
-+		}
-+	bn_correct_top(snum);
-+	if (rm != NULL)
-+		{
-+		/* Keep a copy of the neg flag in num because if rm==num
-+		 * BN_rshift() will overwrite it.
-+		 */
-+		int neg = num->neg;
-+		BN_rshift(rm,snum,norm_shift);
-+		if (!BN_is_zero(rm))
-+			rm->neg = neg;
-+		bn_check_top(rm);
-+		}
-+	bn_correct_top(res);
-+	BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-+	return(1);
-+err:
-+	bn_check_top(rm);
-+	BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-+	return(0);
-+	}
-+
- #endif
-diff -up openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c.no-branch openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c
--- openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c.no-branch	2005-08-29 01:20:43.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c	2007-08-03 13:58:58.000000000 +0200
-@@ -203,6 +203,8 @@ err:
- 
- 
- /* solves ax == 1 (mod n) */
-+static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
-+        const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx);
- BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in,
- 	const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx)
- 	{
-@@ -210,6 +212,11 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in,
- 	BIGNUM *ret=NULL;
- 	int sign;
- 
-+	if (BN_get_flags(n, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)
-+		{
-+		return BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(in, a, n, ctx);
-+		}
-+
- 	bn_check_top(a);
- 	bn_check_top(n);
- 
-@@ -491,3 +498,157 @@ err:
- 	bn_check_top(ret);
- 	return(ret);
- 	}
-+
-+
-+/* BN_mod_inverse_no_branch is a special version of BN_mod_inverse. 
-+ * It does not contain branches that may leak sensitive information.
-+ */
-+static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
-+	const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx)
-+	{
-+	BIGNUM *A,*B,*X,*Y,*M,*D,*T,*R=NULL;
-+	BIGNUM local_A, local_B;
-+	BIGNUM *pA, *pB;
-+	BIGNUM *ret=NULL;
-+	int sign;
-+
-+	bn_check_top(a);
-+	bn_check_top(n);
-+
-+	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-+	A = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-+	B = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-+	X = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-+	D = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-+	M = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-+	Y = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-+	T = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-+	if (T == NULL) goto err;
-+
-+	if (in == NULL)
-+		R=BN_new();
-+	else
-+		R=in;
-+	if (R == NULL) goto err;
-+
-+	BN_one(X);
-+	BN_zero(Y);
-+	if (BN_copy(B,a) == NULL) goto err;
-+	if (BN_copy(A,n) == NULL) goto err;
-+	A->neg = 0;
-+
-+	if (B->neg || (BN_ucmp(B, A) >= 0))
-+		{
-+		/* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on, so that when BN_div is invoked,
-+	 	 * BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually.
-+	 	 */
-+		pB = &local_B;
-+		BN_with_flags(pB, B, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);	
-+		if (!BN_nnmod(B, pB, A, ctx)) goto err;
-+		}
-+	sign = -1;
-+	/* From  B = a mod |n|,  A = |n|  it follows that
-+	 *
-+	 *      0 <= B < A,
-+	 *     -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
-+	 *      sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|).
-+	 */
-+
-+	while (!BN_is_zero(B))
-+		{
-+		BIGNUM *tmp;
-+		
-+		/*
-+		 *      0 < B < A,
-+		 * (*) -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
-+		 *      sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|)
-+		 */
-+
-+		/* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on, so that when BN_div is invoked,
-+	 	 * BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually.
-+	 	 */
-+		pA = &local_A;
-+		BN_with_flags(pA, A, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);	
-+		
-+		/* (D, M) := (A/B, A%B) ... */		
-+		if (!BN_div(D,M,pA,B,ctx)) goto err;
-+		
-+		/* Now
-+		 *      A = D*B + M;
-+		 * thus we have
-+		 * (**)  sign*Y*a  ==  D*B + M   (mod |n|).
-+		 */
-+		
-+		tmp=A; /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not matter */
-+		
-+		/* (A, B) := (B, A mod B) ... */
-+		A=B;
-+		B=M;
-+		/* ... so we have  0 <= B < A  again */
-+		
-+		/* Since the former  M  is now  B  and the former  B  is now  A,
-+		 * (**) translates into
-+		 *       sign*Y*a  ==  D*A + B    (mod |n|),
-+		 * i.e.
-+		 *       sign*Y*a - D*A  ==  B    (mod |n|).
-+		 * Similarly, (*) translates into
-+		 *      -sign*X*a  ==  A          (mod |n|).
-+		 *
-+		 * Thus,
-+		 *   sign*Y*a + D*sign*X*a  ==  B  (mod |n|),
-+		 * i.e.
-+		 *        sign*(Y + D*X)*a  ==  B  (mod |n|).
-+		 *
-+		 * So if we set  (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign),  we arrive back at
-+		 *      -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
-+		 *       sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|).
-+		 * Note that  X  and  Y  stay non-negative all the time.
-+		 */
-+			
-+		if (!BN_mul(tmp,D,X,ctx)) goto err;
-+		if (!BN_add(tmp,tmp,Y)) goto err;
-+
-+		M=Y; /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not matter */
-+		Y=X;
-+		X=tmp;
-+		sign = -sign;
-+		}
-+		
-+	/*
-+	 * The while loop (Euclid's algorithm) ends when
-+	 *      A == gcd(a,n);
-+	 * we have
-+	 *       sign*Y*a  ==  A  (mod |n|),
-+	 * where  Y  is non-negative.
-+	 */
-+
-+	if (sign < 0)
-+		{
-+		if (!BN_sub(Y,n,Y)) goto err;
-+		}
-+	/* Now  Y*a  ==  A  (mod |n|).  */
-+
-+	if (BN_is_one(A))
-+		{
-+		/* Y*a == 1  (mod |n|) */
-+		if (!Y->neg && BN_ucmp(Y,n) < 0)
-+			{
-+			if (!BN_copy(R,Y)) goto err;
-+			}
-+		else
-+			{
-+			if (!BN_nnmod(R,Y,n,ctx)) goto err;
-+			}
-+		}
-+	else
-+		{
-+		BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_INVERSE,BN_R_NO_INVERSE);
-+		goto err;
-+		}
-+	ret=R;
-+err:
-+	if ((ret == NULL) && (in == NULL)) BN_free(R);
-+	BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-+	bn_check_top(ret);
-+	return(ret);
-+	}
--- a/openssl-0.9.8b-cve-2007-4995.patch
+++ b/openssl-0.9.8b-cve-2007-4995.patch
--- a/openssl-0.9.8b-cve-2007-5135.patch
+++ b/openssl-0.9.8b-cve-2007-5135.patch
@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-Possible one byte buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers.
-CVE-2007-5135
-diff -up openssl-0.9.8b/ssl/ssl_lib.c.orig openssl-0.9.8b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
--- openssl-0.9.8b/ssl/ssl_lib.c.orig	2007-10-08 10:20:42.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-0.9.8b/ssl/ssl_lib.c	2007-10-08 17:32:29.000000000 +0200
-@@ -1201,7 +1201,6 @@ int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s,const cha
- char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s,char *buf,int len)
- 	{
- 	char *p;
-	const char *cp;
- 	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
- 	SSL_CIPHER *c;
- 	int i;
-@@ -1214,20 +1213,21 @@ char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *
- 	sk=s->session->ciphers;
- 	for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
- 		{
-		/* Decrement for either the ':' or a '\0' */
-		len--;
-+		int n;
-+
- 		c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
-		for (cp=c->name; *cp; )
-+		n=strlen(c->name);
-+		if (n+1 > len)
- 			{
-			if (len-- <= 0)
-				{
-				*p='\0';
-				return(buf);
-				}
-			else
-				*(p++)= *(cp++);
-+			if (p != buf)
-+				--p;
-+			*p='\0';
-+			return buf;
- 			}
-+		strcpy(p,c->name);
-+		p+=n;
- 		*(p++)=':';
-+		len-=n+1;
- 		}
- 	p[-1]='\0';
- 	return(buf);
--- a/openssl-0.9.8b-enc-bufsize.patch
+++ b/openssl-0.9.8b-enc-bufsize.patch
@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
--- openssl-0.9.8a/apps/enc.c.orig	2006-07-27 18:37:05.000000000 -0500
-+++ openssl-0.9.8a/apps/enc.c	2006-07-27 18:38:30.000000000 -0500
-@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@
- 			}
- 
- 		/* It must be large enough for a base64 encoded line */
-		if (n < 80) n=80;
-+		if (base64 && n < 80) n=80;
- 
- 		bsize=(int)n;
- 		if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err,"bufsize=%d\n",bsize);
-@@ -370,7 +370,11 @@
- 		}
- 
- 	if (inf == NULL)
-+	        {
-+		if (bufsize != NULL)
-+			setvbuf(stdin, (char *)NULL, _IONBF, 0);
- 		BIO_set_fp(in,stdin,BIO_NOCLOSE);
-+	        }
- 	else
- 		{
- 		if (BIO_read_filename(in,inf) <= 0)
-@@ -421,6 +425,8 @@
- 	if (outf == NULL)
- 		{
- 		BIO_set_fp(out,stdout,BIO_NOCLOSE);
-+		if (bufsize != NULL)
-+			setvbuf(stdout, (char *)NULL, _IONBF, 0);
- #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- 		{
- 		BIO *tmpbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_linebuffer());
--- a/openssl-0.9.8b-pkcs12-fix.patch
+++ b/openssl-0.9.8b-pkcs12-fix.patch
@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c     1.23.2.1 -> 1.23.2.2
-
--- openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c 2005/06/30 11:34:27 1.23.2.1
-+++ openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c 2006/05/17 18:20:27 1.23.2.2
-@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
- {
- 	const EVP_MD *md_type;
- 	HMAC_CTX hmac;
-	unsigned char key[PKCS12_MAC_KEY_LENGTH], *salt;
-+	unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *salt;
- 	int saltlen, iter;
- 
- 	if (!PKCS7_type_is_data(p12->authsafes))
-@@ -88,12 +88,12 @@
- 		return 0;
- 	}
- 	if(!PKCS12_key_gen (pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, PKCS12_MAC_ID, iter,
-				 PKCS12_MAC_KEY_LENGTH, key, md_type)) {
-+				 EVP_MD_size(md_type), key, md_type)) {
- 		PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC,PKCS12_R_KEY_GEN_ERROR);
- 		return 0;
- 	}
- 	HMAC_CTX_init(&hmac);
-	HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac, key, PKCS12_MAC_KEY_LENGTH, md_type, NULL);
-+	HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac, key, EVP_MD_size(md_type), md_type, NULL);
-     	HMAC_Update(&hmac, p12->authsafes->d.data->data,
- 					 p12->authsafes->d.data->length);
-     	HMAC_Final(&hmac, mac, maclen);
-openssl/apps/pkcs12.c     1.79.2.1 -> 1.79.2.2
-
--- openssl/apps/pkcs12.c 2005/05/31 17:31:50 1.79.2.1
-+++ openssl/apps/pkcs12.c 2006/05/17 18:25:59 1.79.2.2
-@@ -825,12 +825,14 @@
- 	PBEPARAM *pbe;
- 	const unsigned char *p;
- 	p = alg->parameter->value.sequence->data;
-	pbe = d2i_PBEPARAM (NULL, &p, alg->parameter->value.sequence->length);
-+	pbe = d2i_PBEPARAM(NULL, &p, alg->parameter->value.sequence->length);
-+	if (!pbe)
-+		return 1;
- 	BIO_printf (bio_err, "%s, Iteration %ld\n", 
- 		OBJ_nid2ln(OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm)),
- 		ASN1_INTEGER_get(pbe->iter));
- 	PBEPARAM_free (pbe);
-	return 0;
-+	return 1;
- }
- 
- /* Load all certificates from a given file */
--- a/openssl-0.9.8b-pkcs7-leak.patch
+++ b/openssl-0.9.8b-pkcs7-leak.patch
@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
--- openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c.pk7-leak	2005-08-05 00:10:05.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c	2006-07-20 13:53:16.000000000 +0200
-@@ -127,6 +127,8 @@
- 		}
- 	}
- 
-+	if(flags & PKCS7_DETACHED) PKCS7_set_detached(p7, 1);
-+
- 	if (flags & PKCS7_STREAM)
- 		return p7;
- 
-@@ -138,8 +140,6 @@
- 
- 	SMIME_crlf_copy(data, p7bio, flags);
- 
-	if(flags & PKCS7_DETACHED)PKCS7_set_detached(p7, 1);
-
-         if (!PKCS7_dataFinal(p7,p7bio)) {
- 		PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGN,PKCS7_R_PKCS7_DATASIGN);
- 		PKCS7_free(p7);
--- a/openssl-0.9.8b-x509-add-dir.patch
+++ b/openssl-0.9.8b-x509-add-dir.patch
@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
--- openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/x509/by_dir.c.add-dir	2005-07-03 15:15:53.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-0.9.8b/crypto/x509/by_dir.c	2006-10-03 15:14:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@
- 
- 	s=dir;
- 	p=s;
-	for (;;)
-+	for (;;p++)
- 		{
- 		if ((*p == LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR) || (*p == '\0'))
- 			{
-@@ -198,8 +198,11 @@
- 			len=(int)(p-ss);
- 			if (len == 0) continue;
- 			for (j=0; j<ctx->num_dirs; j++)
-				if (strncmp(ctx->dirs[j],ss,(unsigned int)len) == 0)
-					continue;
-+				if (strlen(ctx->dirs[j]) == len &&
-+				    strncmp(ctx->dirs[j],ss,(unsigned int)len) == 0)
-+					break;
-+			if (j<ctx->num_dirs)
-+				continue;
- 			if (ctx->num_dirs_alloced < (ctx->num_dirs+1))
- 				{
- 				ctx->num_dirs_alloced+=10;
-@@ -231,7 +234,6 @@
- 			ctx->num_dirs++;
- 			}
- 		if (*p == '\0') break;
-		p++;
- 		}
- 	return(1);
- 	}
--- a/openssl-0.9.8g-ipv6-apps.patch
+++ b/openssl-0.9.8g-ipv6-apps.patch
@ -1,103 +1,7 @@
-diff --exclude-from=exclude-diff-openssl-0.9.8b -bru openssl-0.9.8b.orig/apps/s_apps.h openssl-0.9.8b/apps/s_apps.h
--- openssl-0.9.8b.orig/apps/s_apps.h	2006-07-11 16:14:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-0.9.8b/apps/s_apps.h	2006-07-13 08:44:29.000000000 +0200
-@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@
- #define PORT_STR        "4433"
- #define PROTOCOL        "tcp"
- 
-int do_server(int port, int type, int *ret, int (*cb) (char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context), unsigned char *context);
-+int do_server(char *port, int type, int *ret, int (*cb) (char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context), unsigned char *context);
- #ifdef HEADER_X509_H
- int MS_CALLBACK verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
- #endif
-@@ -156,10 +156,9 @@
- int set_cert_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *cert_file, char *key_file);
- int set_cert_key_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, EVP_PKEY *key);
- #endif
-int init_client(int *sock, char *server, int port, int type);
-+int init_client(int *sock, char *server, char *port, int type);
- int should_retry(int i);
-int extract_port(char *str, short *port_ptr);
-int extract_host_port(char *str,char **host_ptr,unsigned char *ip,short *p);
-+int extract_host_port(char *str,char **host_ptr,char **port_ptr);
- 
- long MS_CALLBACK bio_dump_callback(BIO *bio, int cmd, const char *argp,
- 	int argi, long argl, long ret);
-diff --exclude-from=exclude-diff-openssl-0.9.8b -bru openssl-0.9.8b.orig/apps/s_client.c openssl-0.9.8b/apps/s_client.c
--- openssl-0.9.8b.orig/apps/s_client.c	2005-11-25 14:46:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-0.9.8b/apps/s_client.c	2006-07-13 08:44:29.000000000 +0200
-@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@
- 	int cbuf_len,cbuf_off;
- 	int sbuf_len,sbuf_off;
- 	fd_set readfds,writefds;
-	short port=PORT;
-+	char *port_str = PORT_STR;
- 	int full_log=1;
- 	char *host=SSL_HOST_NAME;
- 	char *cert_file=NULL,*key_file=NULL;
-@@ -330,13 +330,12 @@
- 		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-port") == 0)
- 			{
- 			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
-			port=atoi(*(++argv));
-			if (port == 0) goto bad;
-+			port_str= *(++argv);
- 			}
- 		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-connect") == 0)
- 			{
- 			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
-			if (!extract_host_port(*(++argv),&host,NULL,&port))
-+			if (!extract_host_port(*(++argv),&host,&port_str))
- 				goto bad;
- 			}
- 		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-verify") == 0)
-@@ -619,7 +618,7 @@
- 
- re_start:
- 
-	if (init_client(&s,host,port,sock_type) == 0)
-+	if (init_client(&s,host,port_str,sock_type) == 0)
- 		{
- 		BIO_printf(bio_err,"connect:errno=%d\n",get_last_socket_error());
- 		SHUTDOWN(s);
-diff --exclude-from=exclude-diff-openssl-0.9.8b -bru openssl-0.9.8b.orig/apps/s_server.c openssl-0.9.8b/apps/s_server.c
--- openssl-0.9.8b.orig/apps/s_server.c	2005-09-02 14:27:02.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-0.9.8b/apps/s_server.c	2006-07-13 08:44:29.000000000 +0200
-@@ -532,7 +532,7 @@
- 	{
- 	X509_STORE *store = NULL;
- 	int vflags = 0;
-	short port=PORT;
-+	char *port_str = PORT_STR;
- 	char *CApath=NULL,*CAfile=NULL;
- 	unsigned char *context = NULL;
- 	char *dhfile = NULL;
-@@ -597,8 +597,7 @@
- 			 (strcmp(*argv,"-accept") == 0))
- 			{
- 			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
-			if (!extract_port(*(++argv),&port))
-				goto bad;
-+			port_str= *(++argv);
- 			}
- 		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-verify") == 0)
- 			{
-@@ -1086,9 +1085,9 @@
- 
- 	BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"ACCEPT\n");
- 	if (www)
-		do_server(port,sock_type,&accept_socket,www_body, context);
-+		do_server(port_str,sock_type,&accept_socket,www_body, context);
- 	else
-		do_server(port,sock_type,&accept_socket,sv_body, context);
-+		do_server(port_str,sock_type,&accept_socket,sv_body, context);
- 	print_stats(bio_s_out,ctx);
- 	ret=0;
- end:
-diff --exclude-from=exclude-diff-openssl-0.9.8b -bru openssl-0.9.8b.orig/apps/s_socket.c openssl-0.9.8b/apps/s_socket.c
--- openssl-0.9.8b.orig/apps/s_socket.c	2005-06-13 05:21:00.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-0.9.8b/apps/s_socket.c	2006-07-13 08:44:29.000000000 +0200
-@@ -96,9 +96,7 @@
+diff -up openssl-0.9.8g/apps/s_socket.c.ipv6-apps openssl-0.9.8g/apps/s_socket.c
+--- openssl-0.9.8g/apps/s_socket.c.ipv6-apps	2005-06-13 05:21:00.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-0.9.8g/apps/s_socket.c	2007-12-03 13:28:42.000000000 +0100
+@@ -96,9 +96,7 @@ static struct hostent *GetHostByName(cha
 static void ssl_sock_cleanup(void);
 #endif
 static int ssl_sock_init(void);
@ -108,7 +12,7 @@ diff --exclude-from=exclude-diff-openssl-0.9.8b -bru openssl-0.9.8b.orig/apps/s_
 static int do_accept(int acc_sock, int *sock, char **host);
 static int host_ip(char *str, unsigned char ip[4]);
 
-@@ -228,60 +226,69 @@
+@@ -228,60 +226,69 @@ static int ssl_sock_init(void)
 	return(1);
 	}
 
@ -208,17 +112,17 @@ diff --exclude-from=exclude-diff-openssl-0.9.8b -bru openssl-0.9.8b.orig/apps/s_
 +		res = res->ai_next;
 +		}
 +	freeaddrinfo(res0);
-+
+ 
+-int do_server(int port, int type, int *ret, int (*cb)(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context), unsigned char *context)
 +	perror(failed_call);
 +	return(0);
 +	}
- 
-int do_server(int port, int type, int *ret, int (*cb)(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context), unsigned char *context)
+
 +int do_server(char *port, int type, int *ret, int (*cb)(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context), unsigned char *context)
 	{
 	int sock;
 	char *name = NULL;
-@@ -319,33 +326,38 @@
+@@ -319,33 +326,38 @@ int do_server(int port, int type, int *r
 		}
 	}
 
@ -248,15 +152,14 @@ diff --exclude-from=exclude-diff-openssl-0.9.8b -bru openssl-0.9.8b.orig/apps/s_
 -#else
 -		memcpy(&server.sin_addr,ip,4);
 -#endif
-	
+	memset(&hints, '\0', sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_socktype = type;
+	hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE | AI_ADDRCONFIG;
+ 	
 -		if (type == SOCK_STREAM)
 -			s=socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,SOCKET_PROTOCOL);
 -		else /* type == SOCK_DGRAM */
 -			s=socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM,IPPROTO_UDP);
-+	memset(&hints, '\0', sizeof(hints));
-+	hints.ai_socktype = type;
-+	hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE | AI_ADDRCONFIG;
-+	
 +	e = getaddrinfo(NULL, port, &hints, &res);
 +	if (e)
 +		{
@ -279,7 +182,7 @@ diff --exclude-from=exclude-diff-openssl-0.9.8b -bru openssl-0.9.8b.orig/apps/s_
 #if defined SOL_SOCKET && defined SO_REUSEADDR
 		{
 		int j = 1;
-@@ -353,36 +365,39 @@
+@@ -353,36 +365,39 @@ static int init_server_long(int *sock, i
 			   (void *) &j, sizeof j);
 		}
 #endif
@ -339,7 +242,7 @@ diff --exclude-from=exclude-diff-openssl-0.9.8b -bru openssl-0.9.8b.orig/apps/s_
 	int len;
 /*	struct linger ling; */
 
-@@ -427,137 +442,62 @@
+@@ -427,137 +442,62 @@ redoit:
 	if (i < 0) { perror("keepalive"); return(0); }
 */
 
@ -353,14 +256,14 @@ diff --exclude-from=exclude-diff-openssl-0.9.8b -bru openssl-0.9.8b.orig/apps/s_
 -		sizeof(struct in_addr),AF_INET);
 -#endif
 -	if (h1 == NULL)
-+	if (host == NULL)
- 		{
+-		{
 -		BIO_printf(bio_err,"bad gethostbyaddr\n");
 -		*host=NULL;
 -		/* return(0); */
 -		}
 -	else
-		{
+	if (host == NULL)
+ 		{
 -		if ((*host=(char *)OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(h1->h_name)+1)) == NULL)
 -			{
 -			perror("OPENSSL_malloc");
@ -506,3 +409,99 @@ diff --exclude-from=exclude-diff-openssl-0.9.8b -bru openssl-0.9.8b.orig/apps/s_
 	return(1);
 	}
 
+diff -up openssl-0.9.8g/apps/s_server.c.ipv6-apps openssl-0.9.8g/apps/s_server.c
+--- openssl-0.9.8g/apps/s_server.c.ipv6-apps	2007-08-23 14:16:02.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-0.9.8g/apps/s_server.c	2007-12-03 13:31:14.000000000 +0100
+@@ -592,7 +592,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
+ 	{
+ 	X509_STORE *store = NULL;
+ 	int vflags = 0;
+-	short port=PORT;
+	char *port_str = PORT_STR;
+ 	char *CApath=NULL,*CAfile=NULL;
+ 	unsigned char *context = NULL;
+ 	char *dhfile = NULL;
+@@ -662,8 +662,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
+ 			 (strcmp(*argv,"-accept") == 0))
+ 			{
+ 			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
+-			if (!extract_port(*(++argv),&port))
+-				goto bad;
+			port_str= *(++argv);
+ 			}
+ 		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-verify") == 0)
+ 			{
+@@ -1332,9 +1331,9 @@ bad:
+ 		}
+ 	BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"ACCEPT\n");
+ 	if (www)
+-		do_server(port,socket_type,&accept_socket,www_body, context);
+		do_server(port_str,socket_type,&accept_socket,www_body, context);
+ 	else
+-		do_server(port,socket_type,&accept_socket,sv_body, context);
+		do_server(port_str,socket_type,&accept_socket,sv_body, context);
+ 	print_stats(bio_s_out,ctx);
+ 	ret=0;
+ end:
+diff -up openssl-0.9.8g/apps/s_client.c.ipv6-apps openssl-0.9.8g/apps/s_client.c
+--- openssl-0.9.8g/apps/s_client.c.ipv6-apps	2007-08-23 14:20:56.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-0.9.8g/apps/s_client.c	2007-12-03 13:28:42.000000000 +0100
+@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	int cbuf_len,cbuf_off;
+ 	int sbuf_len,sbuf_off;
+ 	fd_set readfds,writefds;
+-	short port=PORT;
+	char *port_str = PORT_STR;
+ 	int full_log=1;
+ 	char *host=SSL_HOST_NAME;
+ 	char *cert_file=NULL,*key_file=NULL;
+@@ -377,13 +377,12 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
+ 		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-port") == 0)
+ 			{
+ 			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
+-			port=atoi(*(++argv));
+-			if (port == 0) goto bad;
+			port_str= *(++argv);
+ 			}
+ 		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-connect") == 0)
+ 			{
+ 			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
+-			if (!extract_host_port(*(++argv),&host,NULL,&port))
+			if (!extract_host_port(*(++argv),&host,&port_str))
+ 				goto bad;
+ 			}
+ 		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-verify") == 0)
+@@ -739,7 +738,7 @@ bad:
+ 
+ re_start:
+ 
+-	if (init_client(&s,host,port,sock_type) == 0)
+	if (init_client(&s,host,port_str,sock_type) == 0)
+ 		{
+ 		BIO_printf(bio_err,"connect:errno=%d\n",get_last_socket_error());
+ 		SHUTDOWN(s);
+diff -up openssl-0.9.8g/apps/s_apps.h.ipv6-apps openssl-0.9.8g/apps/s_apps.h
+--- openssl-0.9.8g/apps/s_apps.h.ipv6-apps	2007-12-03 13:28:42.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-0.9.8g/apps/s_apps.h	2007-12-03 13:28:42.000000000 +0100
+@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ typedef fd_mask fd_set;
+ #define PORT_STR        "4433"
+ #define PROTOCOL        "tcp"
+ 
+-int do_server(int port, int type, int *ret, int (*cb) (char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context), unsigned char *context);
+int do_server(char *port, int type, int *ret, int (*cb) (char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context), unsigned char *context);
+ #ifdef HEADER_X509_H
+ int MS_CALLBACK verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ #endif
+@@ -156,10 +156,9 @@ int MS_CALLBACK verify_callback(int ok, 
+ int set_cert_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *cert_file, char *key_file);
+ int set_cert_key_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, EVP_PKEY *key);
+ #endif
+-int init_client(int *sock, char *server, int port, int type);
+int init_client(int *sock, char *server, char *port, int type);
+ int should_retry(int i);
+-int extract_port(char *str, short *port_ptr);
+-int extract_host_port(char *str,char **host_ptr,unsigned char *ip,short *p);
+int extract_host_port(char *str,char **host_ptr,char **port_ptr);
+ 
+ long MS_CALLBACK bio_dump_callback(BIO *bio, int cmd, const char *argp,
+ 	int argi, long argl, long ret);
--- a/openssl-0.9.8g-redhat.patch
+++ b/openssl-0.9.8g-redhat.patch
@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
--- openssl-0.9.8a/Configure.redhat	2005-11-08 01:50:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-0.9.8a/Configure	2005-11-08 10:23:38.000000000 +0100
-@@ -313,29 +313,29 @@
+diff -up openssl-0.9.8g/Configure.redhat openssl-0.9.8g/Configure
+--- openssl-0.9.8g/Configure.redhat	2007-09-16 14:24:17.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-0.9.8g/Configure	2007-12-03 13:16:08.000000000 +0100
+@@ -313,28 +313,28 @@ my %table=(
 ####
 # *-generic* is endian-neutral target, but ./config is free to
 # throw in -D[BL]_ENDIAN, whichever appropriate...
@ -16,10 +17,9 @@
 +"linux-aout",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_out_asm}",
 ####
 -"linux-generic64","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-+"linux-generic64","gcc:-DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:\$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER)",
- # -bpowerpc64-linux is transient option, -m64 should be the one to use...
-"linux-ppc64",	"gcc:-bpowerpc64-linux -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL::linux_ppc64.o::::::::::dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-bpowerpc64-linux:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+-"linux-ppc64",	"gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL::linux_ppc64.o::::::::::dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 -"linux-ia64",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"linux-generic64","gcc:-DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:\$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER)",
 +"linux-ppc64",	"gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL::linux_ppc64.o::::::::::dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:\$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER)",
 +"linux-ia64",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:\$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER)",
 "linux-ia64-ecc","ecc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
@ -36,12 +36,12 @@
 -"linux-sparcv9","gcc:-m32 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -Wa,-Av8plus -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR::sparcv8plus.o:des_enc-sparc.o fcrypt_b.o:::md5-sparcv8plus.o::::::dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 +"linux-sparcv9","gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -Wall -Wa,-Av8plus -DBN_DIV2W \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR::sparcv8plus.o:des_enc-sparc.o fcrypt_b.o:::md5-sparcv8plus.o::::::dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:\$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER)",
 # GCC 3.1 is a requirement
-"linux64-sparcv9","gcc:-m64 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:::des_enc-sparc.o fcrypt_b.o:::md5-sparcv9.o::::::dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+-"linux64-sparcv9","gcc:-m64 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR::::::md5-sparcv9.o::::::dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 +"linux64-sparcv9","gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -Wall \$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS)::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:::des_enc-sparc.o fcrypt_b.o:::md5-sparcv9.o::::::dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:\$(RPM_OPT_FLAGS):.so.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER)",
 #### Alpha Linux with GNU C and Compaq C setups
 # Special notes:
 # - linux-alpha+bwx-gcc is ment to be used from ./config only. If you
-@@ -349,8 +349,8 @@
+@@ -348,8 +348,8 @@ my %table=(
 #
 #					<appro@fy.chalmers.se>
 #
--- a/openssl-0.9.8g-soversion.patch
+++ b/openssl-0.9.8g-soversion.patch
@ -3,17 +3,30 @@ compatibility, we have to increment the soname in order to allow
 this version to co-exist with another versions and have everything
 work right.

--- openssl-0.9.8b/Makefile.org.soversion	2006-05-11 11:53:26.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-0.9.8b/Makefile.org	2006-05-11 12:14:05.000000000 +0200
-@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
+diff -up openssl-0.9.8g/Configure.soversion openssl-0.9.8g/Configure
+--- openssl-0.9.8g/Configure.soversion	2007-12-03 14:41:19.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-0.9.8g/Configure	2007-12-03 14:41:19.000000000 +0100
+@@ -1371,7 +1371,7 @@ while (<IN>)
+ 	elsif ($shared_extension ne "" && $shared_extension =~ /^\.s([ol])\.[^\.]*\.[^\.]*$/)
+ 		{
+ 		my $sotmp = $1;
+-		s/^SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.*/SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.s$sotmp.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR) .s$sotmp/;
+		s/^SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.*/SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.s$sotmp.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER) .s$sotmp/;
+ 		}
+ 	elsif ($shared_extension ne "" && $shared_extension =~ /^\.[^\.]*\.[^\.]*\.dylib$/)
+ 		{
+diff -up openssl-0.9.8g/Makefile.org.soversion openssl-0.9.8g/Makefile.org
+--- openssl-0.9.8g/Makefile.org.soversion	2007-12-03 14:41:19.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-0.9.8g/Makefile.org	2007-12-03 14:41:19.000000000 +0100
+@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=
 SHLIB_MAJOR=
 SHLIB_MINOR=
 SHLIB_EXT=
-+SHLIB_SONAMEVER=6
+SHLIB_SONAMEVER=7
 PLATFORM=dist
 OPTIONS=
 CONFIGURE_ARGS=
-@@ -277,10 +278,9 @@
+@@ -277,10 +278,9 @@ clean-shared:
 link-shared:
 	@ set -e; for i in ${SHLIBDIRS}; do \
 		$(MAKE) -f $(HERE)/Makefile.shared -e $(BUILDENV) \
@ -25,7 +38,7 @@ work right.
 	done
 
 build-shared: do_$(SHLIB_TARGET) link-shared
-@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@
+@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ do_$(SHLIB_TARGET):
 			libs="$(LIBKRB5) $$libs"; \
 		fi; \
 		$(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -f Makefile.shared -e $(BUILDENV) \
@ -34,14 +47,3 @@ work right.
 			LIBCOMPATVERSIONS=";${SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY}" \
 			LIBDEPS="$$libs $(EX_LIBS)" \
 			link_a.$(SHLIB_TARGET); \
--- openssl-0.9.8b/Configure.soversion	2006-05-11 11:53:26.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-0.9.8b/Configure	2006-05-11 11:53:26.000000000 +0200
-@@ -1327,7 +1327,7 @@
- 	elsif ($shared_extension ne "" && $shared_extension =~ /^\.s([ol])\.[^\.]*\.[^\.]*$/)
- 		{
- 		my $sotmp = $1;
-		s/^SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.*/SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.s$sotmp.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR) .s$sotmp/;
-+		s/^SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.*/SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.s$sotmp.\$(SHLIB_SONAMEVER) .s$sotmp/;
- 		}
- 	elsif ($shared_extension ne "" && $shared_extension =~ /^\.[^\.]*\.[^\.]*\.dylib$/)
- 		{
--- a/openssl.spec
+++ b/openssl.spec
@ -6,7 +6,8 @@
 # 0.9.7a soversion = 4
 # 0.9.7ef soversion = 5
 # 0.9.8ab soversion = 6
-%define soversion 6
+# 0.9.8g soversion = 7
+%define soversion 7

 # Number of threads to spawn when testing some threading fixes.
 %define thread_test_threads %{?threads:%{threads}}%{!?threads:1}
@ -20,8 +21,8 @@

 Summary: The OpenSSL toolkit
 Name: openssl
-Version: 0.9.8b
-Release: 17%{?dist}
+Version: 0.9.8g
+Release: 1%{?dist}
 Source: openssl-%{version}-usa.tar.bz2
 Source1: hobble-openssl
 Source2: Makefile.certificate
@ -33,41 +34,25 @@ Source8: openssl-thread-test.c
 Source9: opensslconf-new.h
 Source10: opensslconf-new-warning.h
 # Build changes
-Patch0: openssl-0.9.8a-redhat.patch
+Patch0: openssl-0.9.8g-redhat.patch
 Patch1: openssl-0.9.8a-defaults.patch
 Patch2: openssl-0.9.8a-link-krb5.patch
-Patch3: openssl-0.9.8b-soversion.patch
+Patch3: openssl-0.9.8g-soversion.patch
 Patch4: openssl-0.9.8a-enginesdir.patch
 Patch5: openssl-0.9.8a-no-rpath.patch
-Patch24: openssl-0.9.8a-padlock.patch
+Patch6: openssl-0.9.8b-test-use-localhost.patch
+# Bug fixes
+Patch21: openssl-0.9.8b-aliasing-bug.patch
+Patch22: openssl-0.9.8b-x509-name-cmp.patch
 # Functionality changes
 Patch32: openssl-0.9.7-beta6-ia64.patch
 Patch33: openssl-0.9.7f-ca-dir.patch
 Patch34: openssl-0.9.6-x509.patch
 Patch35: openssl-0.9.7-beta5-version-add-engines.patch
-Patch36: openssl-0.9.8a-use-poll.patch
 Patch38: openssl-0.9.8a-reuse-cipher-change.patch
-Patch39: openssl-0.9.8b-ipv6-apps.patch
-Patch40: openssl-0.9.8b-enc-bufsize.patch
+Patch39: openssl-0.9.8g-ipv6-apps.patch
 # Backported fixes including security fixes
-Patch51: openssl-0.9.8b-block-padding.patch
-Patch52: openssl-0.9.8b-pkcs12-fix.patch
-Patch53: openssl-0.9.8b-bn-threadsafety.patch
-Patch54: openssl-0.9.8b-aes-cachecol.patch
-Patch55: openssl-0.9.8b-pkcs7-leak.patch
-Patch56: openssl-0.9.8b-cve-2006-4339.patch
-Patch57: openssl-0.9.8b-cve-2006-2937.patch
-Patch58: openssl-0.9.8b-cve-2006-2940.patch
-Patch59: openssl-0.9.8b-cve-2006-3738.patch
-Patch60: openssl-0.9.8b-cve-2006-4343.patch
-Patch61: openssl-0.9.8b-aliasing-bug.patch
-Patch62: openssl-0.9.8b-x509-name-cmp.patch
-Patch63: openssl-0.9.8b-x509-add-dir.patch
-Patch64: openssl-0.9.8b-test-use-localhost.patch
-Patch65: openssl-0.9.8b-cve-2007-3108.patch
-Patch66: openssl-0.9.7a-ssl-strict-matching.patch
-Patch67: openssl-0.9.8b-cve-2007-4995.patch
-Patch68: openssl-0.9.8b-cve-2007-5135.patch
+# None yet

 License: OpenSSL
 Group: System Environment/Libraries
@ -116,36 +101,17 @@ from other formats to the formats used by the OpenSSL toolkit.
 %patch3 -p1 -b .soversion
 %patch4 -p1 -b .enginesdir
 %patch5 -p1 -b .no-rpath
+%patch6 -p1 -b .use-localhost

-%patch24 -p1 -b .padlock
+%patch21 -p1 -b .aliasing-bug
+%patch22 -p1 -b .name-cmp

 %patch32 -p1 -b .ia64
 #patch33 is applied after make test
 %patch34 -p1 -b .x509
 %patch35 -p1 -b .version-add-engines
-%patch36 -p1 -b .use-poll
 %patch38 -p1 -b .cipher-change
 %patch39 -p1 -b .ipv6-apps
-%patch40 -p1 -b .enc-bufsize
-
-%patch51 -p1 -b .block-padding
-%patch52 -p1 -b .pkcs12-fix
-%patch53 -p1 -b .bn-threadsafety
-%patch54 -p1 -b .cachecol
-%patch55 -p1 -b .pkcs7-leak
-%patch56 -p1 -b .short-padding
-%patch57 -p1 -b .asn1-error
-%patch58 -p0 -b .parasitic
-%patch59 -p0 -b .shared-ciphers
-%patch60 -p0 -b .client-dos
-%patch61 -p1 -b .aliasing-bug
-%patch62 -p1 -b .name-cmp
-%patch63 -p1 -b .add-dir
-%patch64 -p1 -b .use-localhost
-%patch65 -p1 -b .no-branch
-%patch66 -p1 -b .strict-matching
-%patch67 -p1 -b .dtls-fixes
-%patch68 -p1 -b .shciphers

 # Modify the various perl scripts to reference perl in the right location.
 perl util/perlpath.pl `dirname %{__perl}`
@ -386,6 +352,9 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/openssl_fips_fingerprint
 %postun -p /sbin/ldconfig

 %changelog
+* Mon Nov  3 2007 Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> 0.9.8g-1
+- update to latest upstream release, SONAME bumped to 7
+
 * Mon Oct 15 2007 Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com> 0.9.8b-17
 - update to new CA bundle from mozilla.org

--- a/2
+++ b/2
@ -1 +1 @@
-c99f8df9f19fdd38ee784b0ac06c2221  openssl-0.9.8b-usa.tar.bz2
+3208630e1965e9b801a21831995ad537  openssl-0.9.8g-usa.tar.bz2