Merge branch 'f22' into f21
This commit is contained in:
Tomas Mraz
commit
20c4fd7c9c
|
|
@ -1034,42 +1034,6 @@ diff -up openssl-1.0.1i/crypto/fips/Makefile.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1i/crypto/fip
|
|||
|
||||
LIBCRYPTO=-L.. -lcrypto
|
||||
|
||||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1i/crypto/modes/gcm128.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1i/crypto/modes/gcm128.c
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1i/crypto/modes/gcm128.c.fips-reqs 2014-08-13 19:58:06.740830781 +0200
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1i/crypto/modes/gcm128.c 2014-08-13 19:58:06.820832624 +0200
|
||||
@@ -931,6 +931,10 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT
|
||||
# endif
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
+ ctx->totlen += len;
|
||||
+ if (ctx->totlen>(U64(1)<<36) || (sizeof(len)==8 && ctx->totlen<len))
|
||||
+ return -1;
|
||||
+
|
||||
#if 0
|
||||
n = (unsigned int)mlen%16; /* alternative to ctx->mres */
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
@@ -1294,6 +1298,10 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(GCM128_C
|
||||
# endif
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
+ ctx->totlen += len;
|
||||
+ if (ctx->totlen>(U64(1)<<36) || (sizeof(len)==8 && ctx->totlen<len))
|
||||
+ return -1;
|
||||
+
|
||||
mlen += len;
|
||||
if (mlen>((U64(1)<<36)-32) || (sizeof(len)==8 && mlen<len))
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1i/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1i/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1i/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h.fips-reqs 2014-08-13 19:58:06.410823180 +0200
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1i/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h 2014-08-13 19:58:06.820832624 +0200
|
||||
@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ struct gcm128_context {
|
||||
unsigned int mres, ares;
|
||||
block128_f block;
|
||||
void *key;
|
||||
+ u64 totlen;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
struct xts128_context {
|
||||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1i/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1i/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1i/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h.fips-reqs 2014-08-13 19:58:06.525825829 +0200
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1i/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h 2014-08-13 19:58:06.820832624 +0200
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
|
|||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/apps/apps.c.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/apps/apps.c
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1k/apps/apps.c.alt-chains 2015-04-30 14:14:40.000000000 +0200
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/apps/apps.c 2015-04-30 14:25:49.220873338 +0200
|
||||
@@ -2365,6 +2365,8 @@ int args_verify(char ***pargs, int *parg
|
||||
flags |= X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY;
|
||||
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-check_ss_sig"))
|
||||
flags |= X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE;
|
||||
+ else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no_alt_chains"))
|
||||
+ flags |= X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS;
|
||||
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-trusted_first"))
|
||||
flags |= X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST;
|
||||
else
|
||||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/apps/cms.c.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/apps/cms.c
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1k/apps/cms.c.alt-chains 2015-04-30 14:14:40.000000000 +0200
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/apps/cms.c 2015-04-30 14:27:12.129773347 +0200
|
||||
@@ -642,6 +642,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
|
||||
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-text include or delete text MIME headers\n");
|
||||
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CApath dir trusted certificates directory\n");
|
||||
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CAfile file trusted certificates file\n");
|
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+ BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_alt_chains only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
|
||||
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-trusted_first use trusted certificates first when building the trust chain\n");
|
||||
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-crl_check check revocation status of signer's certificate using CRLs\n");
|
||||
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-crl_check_all check revocation status of signer's certificate chain using CRLs\n");
|
||||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/apps/ocsp.c.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/apps/ocsp.c
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1k/apps/ocsp.c.alt-chains 2015-04-30 14:14:40.000000000 +0200
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/apps/ocsp.c 2015-04-30 14:28:12.975167730 +0200
|
||||
@@ -605,6 +605,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
|
||||
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-path path to use in OCSP request\n");
|
||||
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CApath dir trusted certificates directory\n");
|
||||
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CAfile file trusted certificates file\n");
|
||||
+ BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_alt_chains only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
|
||||
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-trusted_first use trusted certificates first when building the trust chain\n");
|
||||
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-VAfile file validator certificates file\n");
|
||||
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-validity_period n maximum validity discrepancy in seconds\n");
|
||||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/apps/s_client.c.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/apps/s_client.c
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1k/apps/s_client.c.alt-chains 2015-04-30 14:14:40.000000000 +0200
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/apps/s_client.c 2015-04-30 14:29:33.254006312 +0200
|
||||
@@ -299,6 +299,7 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
|
||||
BIO_printf(bio_err," -pass arg - private key file pass phrase source\n");
|
||||
BIO_printf(bio_err," -CApath arg - PEM format directory of CA's\n");
|
||||
BIO_printf(bio_err," -CAfile arg - PEM format file of CA's\n");
|
||||
+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_alt_chains - only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
|
||||
BIO_printf(bio_err," -trusted_first - Use trusted CA's first when building the trust chain\n");
|
||||
BIO_printf(bio_err," -reconnect - Drop and re-make the connection with the same Session-ID\n");
|
||||
BIO_printf(bio_err," -pause - sleep(1) after each read(2) and write(2) system call\n");
|
||||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/apps/smime.c.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/apps/smime.c
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1k/apps/smime.c.alt-chains 2015-04-30 14:14:40.000000000 +0200
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/apps/smime.c 2015-04-30 14:30:44.456633094 +0200
|
||||
@@ -479,6 +479,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
|
||||
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-text include or delete text MIME headers\n");
|
||||
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CApath dir trusted certificates directory\n");
|
||||
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CAfile file trusted certificates file\n");
|
||||
+ BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_alt_chains only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
|
||||
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-trusted_first use trusted certificates first when building the trust chain\n");
|
||||
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-crl_check check revocation status of signer's certificate using CRLs\n");
|
||||
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-crl_check_all check revocation status of signer's certificate chain using CRLs\n");
|
||||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/apps/s_server.c.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/apps/s_server.c
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1k/apps/s_server.c.alt-chains 2015-04-30 14:14:40.000000000 +0200
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/apps/s_server.c 2015-04-30 14:30:06.420764081 +0200
|
||||
@@ -502,6 +502,7 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
|
||||
BIO_printf(bio_err," -state - Print the SSL states\n");
|
||||
BIO_printf(bio_err," -CApath arg - PEM format directory of CA's\n");
|
||||
BIO_printf(bio_err," -CAfile arg - PEM format file of CA's\n");
|
||||
+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_alt_chains - only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
|
||||
BIO_printf(bio_err," -trusted_first - Use trusted CA's first when building the trust chain\n");
|
||||
BIO_printf(bio_err," -nocert - Don't use any certificates (Anon-DH)\n");
|
||||
BIO_printf(bio_err," -cipher arg - play with 'openssl ciphers' to see what goes here\n");
|
||||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/apps/verify.c.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/apps/verify.c
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1k/apps/verify.c.alt-chains 2015-04-30 14:14:40.000000000 +0200
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/apps/verify.c 2015-04-30 14:31:20.055446426 +0200
|
||||
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
|
||||
end:
|
||||
if (ret == 1) {
|
||||
BIO_printf(bio_err,"usage: verify [-verbose] [-CApath path] [-CAfile file] [-trusted_first] [-purpose purpose] [-crl_check]");
|
||||
- BIO_printf(bio_err," [-attime timestamp]");
|
||||
+ BIO_printf(bio_err," [-no_alt_chains] [-attime timestamp]");
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
||||
BIO_printf(bio_err," [-engine e]");
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.alt-chains 2015-04-30 14:14:40.000000000 +0200
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c 2015-04-30 14:22:37.183472452 +0200
|
||||
@@ -154,11 +154,11 @@ static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X5
|
||||
|
||||
int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
|
||||
+ X509 *x,*xtmp,*xtmp2,*chain_ss=NULL;
|
||||
int bad_chain = 0;
|
||||
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
|
||||
int depth,i,ok=0;
|
||||
- int num;
|
||||
+ int num, j, retry;
|
||||
int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
|
||||
STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
|
||||
if (ctx->cert == NULL)
|
||||
@@ -247,10 +247,14 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
|
||||
+ j = num;
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
|
||||
* certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
|
||||
* if possible, otherwise we complain. */
|
||||
|
||||
+ do {
|
||||
/* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
|
||||
* is self signed.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@@ -294,6 +298,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx
|
||||
chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
|
||||
ctx->last_untrusted--;
|
||||
num--;
|
||||
+ j--;
|
||||
x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -322,7 +327,42 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx
|
||||
num++;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * If we haven't got a least one certificate from our store then check
|
||||
+ * if there is an alternative chain that could be used. We only do this
|
||||
+ * if the user hasn't switched off alternate chain checking
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ retry = 0;
|
||||
+ if (j == ctx->last_untrusted &&
|
||||
+ !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
|
||||
+ while (j-- > 1) {
|
||||
+ xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
|
||||
+ ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
|
||||
+ if (ok < 0)
|
||||
+ goto end;
|
||||
+ /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
|
||||
+ if (ok > 0) {
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ X509_free(xtmp);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
|
||||
+ * alternate chain
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ while (num > j) {
|
||||
+ xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
|
||||
+ X509_free(xtmp);
|
||||
+ num--;
|
||||
+ ctx->last_untrusted--;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ retry = 1;
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ } while (retry);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
|
||||
if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
|
||||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h.alt-chains 2015-04-30 14:14:40.000000000 +0200
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h 2015-04-30 14:16:56.818672373 +0200
|
||||
@@ -391,7 +391,12 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE
|
||||
#define X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE 0x4000
|
||||
/* Use trusted store first */
|
||||
#define X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST 0x8000
|
||||
-
|
||||
+/*
|
||||
+ * If the initial chain is not trusted, do not attempt to build an alternative
|
||||
+ * chain. Alternate chain checking was introduced in 1.0.1n/1.0.2b. Setting
|
||||
+ * this flag will force the behaviour to match that of previous versions.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+#define X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS 0x100000
|
||||
|
||||
#define X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT 0x1
|
||||
#define X509_VP_FLAG_OVERWRITE 0x2
|
||||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/cms.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/cms.pod
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/cms.pod.alt-chains 2015-04-30 14:32:50.736518235 +0200
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/cms.pod 2015-04-30 14:36:11.989116293 +0200
|
||||
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ B<openssl> B<cms>
|
||||
[B<-print>]
|
||||
[B<-CAfile file>]
|
||||
[B<-CApath dir>]
|
||||
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]
|
||||
[B<-trusted_first>]
|
||||
[B<-md digest>]
|
||||
[B<-[cipher]>]
|
||||
@@ -413,7 +414,7 @@ portion of a message so they may be incl
|
||||
then many S/MIME mail clients check the signers certificate's email
|
||||
address matches that specified in the From: address.
|
||||
|
||||
-=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig>
|
||||
+=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig -no_alt_chains>
|
||||
|
||||
Set various certificate chain valiadition option. See the
|
||||
L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.
|
||||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/ocsp.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/ocsp.pod
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/ocsp.pod.alt-chains 2015-04-30 14:14:40.000000000 +0200
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/ocsp.pod 2015-04-30 14:34:40.398023692 +0200
|
||||
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ B<openssl> B<ocsp>
|
||||
[B<-path>]
|
||||
[B<-CApath dir>]
|
||||
[B<-CAfile file>]
|
||||
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]]
|
||||
[B<-trusted_first>]
|
||||
[B<-VAfile file>]
|
||||
[B<-validity_period n>]
|
||||
@@ -143,6 +144,10 @@ connection timeout to the OCSP responder
|
||||
file or pathname containing trusted CA certificates. These are used to verify
|
||||
the signature on the OCSP response.
|
||||
|
||||
+=item B<-no_alt_chains>
|
||||
+
|
||||
+See L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.
|
||||
+
|
||||
=item B<-trusted_first>
|
||||
|
||||
Use certificates in CA file or CA directory over certificates provided
|
||||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/s_client.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/s_client.pod
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/s_client.pod.alt-chains 2015-04-30 14:14:40.000000000 +0200
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/s_client.pod 2015-04-30 14:35:23.284003518 +0200
|
||||
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_client>
|
||||
[B<-pass arg>]
|
||||
[B<-CApath directory>]
|
||||
[B<-CAfile filename>]
|
||||
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]
|
||||
[B<-trusted_first>]
|
||||
[B<-reconnect>]
|
||||
[B<-pause>]
|
||||
@@ -122,7 +123,7 @@ also used when building the client certi
|
||||
A file containing trusted certificates to use during server authentication
|
||||
and to use when attempting to build the client certificate chain.
|
||||
|
||||
-=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig, -trusted_first>
|
||||
+=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig -no_alt_chains>
|
||||
|
||||
Set various certificate chain valiadition option. See the
|
||||
L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.
|
||||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/smime.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/smime.pod
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/smime.pod.alt-chains 2015-04-30 14:14:40.000000000 +0200
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/smime.pod 2015-04-30 14:37:58.832557366 +0200
|
||||
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ B<openssl> B<smime>
|
||||
[B<-in file>]
|
||||
[B<-CAfile file>]
|
||||
[B<-CApath dir>]
|
||||
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]
|
||||
[B<-trusted_first>]
|
||||
[B<-certfile file>]
|
||||
[B<-signer file>]
|
||||
@@ -268,7 +269,7 @@ portion of a message so they may be incl
|
||||
then many S/MIME mail clients check the signers certificate's email
|
||||
address matches that specified in the From: address.
|
||||
|
||||
-=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig>
|
||||
+=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig -no_alt_chains>
|
||||
|
||||
Set various options of certificate chain verification. See
|
||||
L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.
|
||||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/s_server.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/s_server.pod
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/s_server.pod.alt-chains 2015-04-30 14:14:40.000000000 +0200
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/s_server.pod 2015-04-30 14:37:02.850278328 +0200
|
||||
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_server>
|
||||
[B<-state>]
|
||||
[B<-CApath directory>]
|
||||
[B<-CAfile filename>]
|
||||
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]
|
||||
[B<-trusted_first>]
|
||||
[B<-nocert>]
|
||||
[B<-cipher cipherlist>]
|
||||
@@ -179,6 +180,10 @@ and to use when attempting to build the
|
||||
is also used in the list of acceptable client CAs passed to the client when
|
||||
a certificate is requested.
|
||||
|
||||
+=item B<-no_alt_chains>
|
||||
+
|
||||
+See the L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.
|
||||
+
|
||||
=item B<-trusted_first>
|
||||
|
||||
Use certificates in CA file or CA directory before other certificates
|
||||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/verify.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/verify.pod
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/verify.pod.alt-chains 2015-04-30 14:14:40.000000000 +0200
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/apps/verify.pod 2015-04-30 14:38:32.853334645 +0200
|
||||
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ B<openssl> B<verify>
|
||||
[B<-extended_crl>]
|
||||
[B<-use_deltas>]
|
||||
[B<-policy_print>]
|
||||
+[B<-no_alt_chains>]
|
||||
[B<-untrusted file>]
|
||||
[B<-help>]
|
||||
[B<-issuer_checks>]
|
||||
@@ -115,6 +116,14 @@ Set policy variable inhibit-any-policy (
|
||||
|
||||
Set policy variable inhibit-policy-mapping (see RFC5280).
|
||||
|
||||
+=item B<-no_alt_chains>
|
||||
+
|
||||
+When building a certificate chain, if the first certificate chain found is not
|
||||
+trusted, then OpenSSL will continue to check to see if an alternative chain can
|
||||
+be found that is trusted. With this option that behaviour is suppressed so that
|
||||
+only the first chain found is ever used. Using this option will force the
|
||||
+behaviour to match that of previous OpenSSL versions.
|
||||
+
|
||||
=item B<-policy_print>
|
||||
|
||||
Print out diagnostics related to policy processing.
|
||||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod.alt-chains openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod.alt-chains 2014-10-15 14:51:06.000000000 +0200
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod 2015-04-30 14:39:34.951753420 +0200
|
||||
@@ -133,6 +133,12 @@ verification. If this flag is set then a
|
||||
to the verification callback and it B<must> be prepared to handle such cases
|
||||
without assuming they are hard errors.
|
||||
|
||||
+The B<X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS> flag suppresses checking for alternative
|
||||
+chains. By default, when building a certificate chain, if the first certificate
|
||||
+chain found is not trusted, then OpenSSL will continue to check to see if an
|
||||
+alternative chain can be found that is trusted. With this flag set the behaviour
|
||||
+will match that of OpenSSL versions prior to 1.0.1n and 1.0.2b.
|
||||
+
|
||||
=head1 NOTES
|
||||
|
||||
The above functions should be used to manipulate verification parameters
|
||||
@@ -166,6 +172,6 @@ L<X509_verify_cert(3)|X509_verify_cert(3
|
||||
|
||||
=head1 HISTORY
|
||||
|
||||
-TBA
|
||||
+The B<X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS> flag was added in upstream OpenSSL 1.0.1n and 1.0.2b
|
||||
|
||||
=cut
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
|
|||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod.logjam openssl-1.0.1k/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1k/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod.logjam 2015-05-29 16:02:33.335187143 +0200
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod 2015-05-29 16:05:16.611940775 +0200
|
||||
@@ -61,12 +61,12 @@ negotiation is being saved.
|
||||
|
||||
If "strong" primes were used to generate the DH parameters, it is not strictly
|
||||
necessary to generate a new key for each handshake but it does improve forward
|
||||
-secrecy. If it is not assured, that "strong" primes were used (see especially
|
||||
-the section about DSA parameters below), SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE must be used
|
||||
-in order to prevent small subgroup attacks. Always using SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
|
||||
-has an impact on the computer time needed during negotiation, but it is not
|
||||
-very large, so application authors/users should consider to always enable
|
||||
-this option.
|
||||
+secrecy. If it is not assured that "strong" primes were used,
|
||||
+SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE must be used in order to prevent small subgroup
|
||||
+attacks. Always using SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE has an impact on the
|
||||
+computer time needed during negotiation, but it is not very large, so
|
||||
+application authors/users should consider always enabling this option.
|
||||
+The option is required to implement perfect forward secrecy (PFS).
|
||||
|
||||
As generating DH parameters is extremely time consuming, an application
|
||||
should not generate the parameters on the fly but supply the parameters.
|
||||
@@ -74,82 +74,62 @@ DH parameters can be reused, as the actu
|
||||
the negotiation. The risk in reusing DH parameters is that an attacker
|
||||
may specialize on a very often used DH group. Applications should therefore
|
||||
generate their own DH parameters during the installation process using the
|
||||
-openssl L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application. In order to reduce the computer
|
||||
-time needed for this generation, it is possible to use DSA parameters
|
||||
-instead (see L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)>), but in this case SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
|
||||
-is mandatory.
|
||||
+openssl L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application. This application
|
||||
+guarantees that "strong" primes are used.
|
||||
|
||||
-Application authors may compile in DH parameters. Files dh512.pem,
|
||||
-dh1024.pem, dh2048.pem, and dh4096.pem in the 'apps' directory of current
|
||||
+Files dh2048.pem, and dh4096.pem in the 'apps' directory of the current
|
||||
version of the OpenSSL distribution contain the 'SKIP' DH parameters,
|
||||
which use safe primes and were generated verifiably pseudo-randomly.
|
||||
These files can be converted into C code using the B<-C> option of the
|
||||
-L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application.
|
||||
-Authors may also generate their own set of parameters using
|
||||
-L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)>, but a user may not be sure how the parameters were
|
||||
-generated. The generation of DH parameters during installation is therefore
|
||||
-recommended.
|
||||
+L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application. Generation of custom DH
|
||||
+parameters during installation should still be preferred to stop an
|
||||
+attacker from specializing on a commonly used group. Files dh1024.pem
|
||||
+and dh512.pem contain old parameters that must not be used by
|
||||
+applications.
|
||||
|
||||
An application may either directly specify the DH parameters or
|
||||
-can supply the DH parameters via a callback function. The callback approach
|
||||
-has the advantage, that the callback may supply DH parameters for different
|
||||
-key lengths.
|
||||
-
|
||||
-The B<tmp_dh_callback> is called with the B<keylength> needed and
|
||||
-the B<is_export> information. The B<is_export> flag is set, when the
|
||||
-ephemeral DH key exchange is performed with an export cipher.
|
||||
+can supply the DH parameters via a callback function.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+Previous versions of the callback used B<is_export> and B<keylength>
|
||||
+parameters to control parameter generation for export and non-export
|
||||
+cipher suites. Modern servers that do not support export ciphersuites
|
||||
+are advised to either use SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() in combination with
|
||||
+SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE, or alternatively, use the callback but ignore
|
||||
+B<keylength> and B<is_export> and simply supply at least 2048-bit
|
||||
+parameters in the callback.
|
||||
|
||||
=head1 EXAMPLES
|
||||
|
||||
-Handle DH parameters for key lengths of 512 and 1024 bits. (Error handling
|
||||
+Setup DH parameters with a key length of 2048 bits. (Error handling
|
||||
partly left out.)
|
||||
|
||||
- ...
|
||||
- /* Set up ephemeral DH stuff */
|
||||
- DH *dh_512 = NULL;
|
||||
- DH *dh_1024 = NULL;
|
||||
- FILE *paramfile;
|
||||
+ Command-line parameter generation:
|
||||
+ $ openssl dhparam -out dh_param_2048.pem 2048
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Code for setting up parameters during server initialization:
|
||||
|
||||
...
|
||||
- /* "openssl dhparam -out dh_param_512.pem -2 512" */
|
||||
- paramfile = fopen("dh_param_512.pem", "r");
|
||||
+ SSL_CTX ctx = SSL_CTX_new();
|
||||
+ ...
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* Set up ephemeral DH parameters. */
|
||||
+ DH *dh_2048 = NULL;
|
||||
+ FILE *paramfile;
|
||||
+ paramfile = fopen("dh_param_2048.pem", "r");
|
||||
if (paramfile) {
|
||||
- dh_512 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
||||
+ dh_2048 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
||||
fclose(paramfile);
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
+ /* Error. */
|
||||
}
|
||||
- /* "openssl dhparam -out dh_param_1024.pem -2 1024" */
|
||||
- paramfile = fopen("dh_param_1024.pem", "r");
|
||||
- if (paramfile) {
|
||||
- dh_1024 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
||||
- fclose(paramfile);
|
||||
+ if (dh_2048 == NULL) {
|
||||
+ /* Error. */
|
||||
}
|
||||
- ...
|
||||
-
|
||||
- /* "openssl dhparam -C -2 512" etc... */
|
||||
- DH *get_dh512() { ... }
|
||||
- DH *get_dh1024() { ... }
|
||||
-
|
||||
- DH *tmp_dh_callback(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength)
|
||||
- {
|
||||
- DH *dh_tmp=NULL;
|
||||
-
|
||||
- switch (keylength) {
|
||||
- case 512:
|
||||
- if (!dh_512)
|
||||
- dh_512 = get_dh512();
|
||||
- dh_tmp = dh_512;
|
||||
- break;
|
||||
- case 1024:
|
||||
- if (!dh_1024)
|
||||
- dh_1024 = get_dh1024();
|
||||
- dh_tmp = dh_1024;
|
||||
- break;
|
||||
- default:
|
||||
- /* Generating a key on the fly is very costly, so use what is there */
|
||||
- setup_dh_parameters_like_above();
|
||||
+ if (SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh_2048) != 1) {
|
||||
+ /* Error. */
|
||||
}
|
||||
- return(dh_tmp);
|
||||
- }
|
||||
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
|
||||
+ ...
|
||||
|
||||
=head1 RETURN VALUES
|
||||
|
||||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_err.c.logjam openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_err.c
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_err.c.logjam 2015-01-08 15:00:36.000000000 +0100
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl_err.c 2015-05-29 16:02:33.336187166 +0200
|
||||
@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG) ,"data length too long"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED) ,"decryption failed"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC),"decryption failed or bad record mac"},
|
||||
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL) ,"dh key too small"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG),"dh public value length is wrong"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED) ,"digest check failed"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG) ,"dtls message too big"},
|
||||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl.h.logjam openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl.h
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl.h.logjam 2015-05-29 16:02:19.210862433 +0200
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/ssl.h 2015-05-29 16:02:33.337187189 +0200
|
||||
@@ -2317,6 +2317,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
|
||||
#define SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 146
|
||||
#define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED 147
|
||||
#define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC 281
|
||||
+#define SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL 372
|
||||
#define SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG 148
|
||||
#define SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED 149
|
||||
#define SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG 334
|
||||
diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_clnt.c.logjam openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_clnt.c
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_clnt.c.logjam 2015-01-08 15:00:56.000000000 +0100
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.1k/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2015-05-29 16:02:33.338187212 +0200
|
||||
@@ -3393,24 +3393,34 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
||||
- if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) &&
|
||||
- !(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL)))
|
||||
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) && dh == NULL)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
|
||||
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
||||
goto f_err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_RSA))
|
||||
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_RSA))
|
||||
{
|
||||
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
|
||||
goto f_err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
||||
- else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_DSA))
|
||||
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_DSA))
|
||||
{
|
||||
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
|
||||
goto f_err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
+ /* Check DHE only: static DH not implemented. */
|
||||
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ int dh_size = BN_num_bits(dh->p);
|
||||
+ if ((!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 768)
|
||||
+ || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 512))
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
|
||||
+ goto f_err;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PKT_EXP))
|
||||
17
openssl.spec
17
openssl.spec
|
|
@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
|
|||
Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
|
||||
Name: openssl
|
||||
Version: 1.0.1k
|
||||
Release: 6%{?dist}
|
||||
Release: 9%{?dist}
|
||||
Epoch: 1
|
||||
# We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source
|
||||
# tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below.
|
||||
|
|
@ -96,6 +96,8 @@ Patch103: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0287.patch
|
|||
Patch104: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0288.patch
|
||||
Patch105: openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-0289.patch
|
||||
Patch106: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0293.patch
|
||||
Patch107: openssl-1.0.1k-alt-chains.patch
|
||||
Patch108: openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-4000.patch
|
||||
|
||||
License: OpenSSL
|
||||
Group: System Environment/Libraries
|
||||
|
|
@ -225,6 +227,8 @@ cp %{SOURCE12} %{SOURCE13} crypto/ec/
|
|||
%patch104 -p1 -b .req-null-deref
|
||||
%patch105 -p1 -b .pkcs7-null-deref
|
||||
%patch106 -p1 -b .ssl2-assert
|
||||
%patch107 -p1 -b .alt-chains
|
||||
%patch108 -p1 -b .logjam
|
||||
|
||||
sed -i 's/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "1.0.0"/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "%{version}"/' crypto/opensslv.h
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -492,6 +496,17 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/fipscanister.*
|
|||
%postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
|
||||
|
||||
%changelog
|
||||
* Fri May 29 2015 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1k-9
|
||||
- fix CVE-2015-4000 - prevent the logjam attack on client - restrict
|
||||
the DH key size to at least 768 bits (limit will be increased in future)
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Apr 30 2015 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1k-8
|
||||
- try to find alternative cert chains (#1166614)
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Apr 9 2015 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1k-7
|
||||
- drop the AES-GCM restriction of 2^32 operations because the IV is
|
||||
always 96 bits (32 bit fixed field + 64 bit invocation field)
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Mar 19 2015 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1k-6
|
||||
- fix CVE-2015-0209 - potential use after free in d2i_ECPrivateKey()
|
||||
- fix CVE-2015-0286 - improper handling of ASN.1 boolean comparison
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue