disable ZLIB loading by default (due to CRIME attack)

openssl-0.9.8j-env-nozlib.patch

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-Do not implicitly load the zlib support if OPENSSL_NO_DEFAULT_ZLIB is set.
-diff -up openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/ssl_ciph.c.env-nozlib openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
---- openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/ssl_ciph.c.env-nozlib	2009-01-05 15:43:07.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-0.9.8j/ssl/ssl_ciph.c	2009-01-14 17:47:46.000000000 +0100
-@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ static void load_builtin_compressions(vo
- 
- 			MemCheck_off();
- 			ssl_comp_methods=sk_SSL_COMP_new(sk_comp_cmp);
--			if (ssl_comp_methods != NULL)
-+			if (ssl_comp_methods != NULL && getenv("OPENSSL_NO_DEFAULT_ZLIB") == NULL)
- 				{
- 				comp=(SSL_COMP *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_COMP));
- 				if (comp != NULL)

openssl-1.0.1e-env-zlib.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_COMP_add_compression_method.pod.env-zlib openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_COMP_add_compression_method.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_COMP_add_compression_method.pod.env-zlib	2013-02-11 16:02:48.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_COMP_add_compression_method.pod	2013-02-19 16:32:51.000000000 +0100
+@@ -47,6 +47,13 @@ Once the identities of the compression m
+ been standardized, the compression API will most likely be changed. Using
+ it in the current state is not recommended.
+ 
++It is also not recommended to use compression if data transfered contain
++untrusted parts that can be manipulated by an attacker as he could then
++get information about the encrypted data. See the CRIME attack. For
++that reason the default loading of the zlib compression method is
++disabled and enabled only if the environment variable B<OPENSSL_DEFAULT_ZLIB>
++is present during the library initialization.
++
+ =head1 RETURN VALUES
+ 
+ SSL_COMP_add_compression_method() may return the following values:
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_ciph.c.env-zlib openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_ciph.c.env-zlib	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_ciph.c	2013-02-19 16:37:36.163545085 +0100
+@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@
+  * OTHERWISE.
+  */
+ 
++/* for secure_getenv */
++#define _GNU_SOURCE
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <openssl/objects.h>
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+@@ -455,7 +457,7 @@ static void load_builtin_compressions(vo
+ 
+ 			MemCheck_off();
+ 			ssl_comp_methods=sk_SSL_COMP_new(sk_comp_cmp);
+-			if (ssl_comp_methods != NULL)
++			if (ssl_comp_methods != NULL && secure_getenv("OPENSSL_DEFAULT_ZLIB") != NULL)
+ 				{
+ 				comp=(SSL_COMP *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_COMP));
+ 				if (comp != NULL)

openssl.spec

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implem
 Name: openssl
 Version: 1.0.1e
 # Do not forget to bump SHLIB_VERSION on version upgrades
-Release: 1%{?dist}
+Release: 2%{?dist}
 Epoch: 1
 # We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source
 # tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below.
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ Patch36: openssl-1.0.0e-doc-noeof.patch
 Patch38: openssl-1.0.1-beta2-ssl-op-all.patch
 Patch39: openssl-1.0.1c-ipv6-apps.patch
 Patch40: openssl-1.0.1e-fips.patch
-Patch45: openssl-0.9.8j-env-nozlib.patch
+Patch45: openssl-1.0.1e-env-zlib.patch
 Patch47: openssl-1.0.0-beta5-readme-warning.patch
 Patch49: openssl-1.0.1a-algo-doc.patch
 Patch50: openssl-1.0.1-beta2-dtls1-abi.patch
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ from other formats to the formats used by the OpenSSL toolkit.
 %patch38 -p1 -b .op-all
 %patch39 -p1 -b .ipv6-apps
 %patch40 -p1 -b .fips
-%patch45 -p1 -b .env-nozlib
+%patch45 -p1 -b .env-zlib
 %patch47 -p1 -b .warning
 %patch49 -p1 -b .algo-doc
 %patch50 -p1 -b .dtls1-abi
@@ -430,6 +430,9 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/fipscanister.*
 %postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
 
 %changelog
+* Tue Feb 19 2013 Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1e-2
+- disable ZLIB loading by default (due to CRIME attack)
+
 * Tue Feb 19 2013 Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1e-1
 - new upstream version