openssl/openssl-1.0.1e-backports.patch

diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pem/pem_info.c.backports openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pem/pem_info.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pem/pem_info.c.backports	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/pem/pem_info.c	2013-08-16 15:31:35.726003892 +0200
@@ -167,6 +167,7 @@ start:
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
 			if (strcmp(name,PEM_STRING_RSA) == 0)
 			{
+			d2i=(D2I_OF(void))d2i_RSAPrivateKey;
 			if (xi->x_pkey != NULL) 
 				{
 				if (!sk_X509_INFO_push(ret,xi)) goto err;
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c.backports openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c.backports	2013-08-16 15:31:35.697003256 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c	2013-08-16 15:33:37.770673918 +0200
@@ -582,6 +582,8 @@ static int pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CT
 			pm = RSA_NO_PADDING;
 		else if (!strcmp(value, "oeap"))
 			pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
+		else if (!strcmp(value, "oaep"))
+			pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
 		else if (!strcmp(value, "x931"))
 			pm = RSA_X931_PADDING;
 		else if (!strcmp(value, "pss"))
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.backports openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.backports	2013-08-16 15:31:35.721003782 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c	2013-08-16 15:31:35.726003892 +0200
@@ -696,6 +696,7 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ct
 	X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
 	X509 *x;
 	int ok, cnum;
+	unsigned int last_reasons;
 	cnum = ctx->error_depth;
 	x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
 	ctx->current_cert = x;
@@ -704,6 +705,7 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ct
 	ctx->current_reasons = 0;
 	while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
 		{
+		last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
 		/* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
 		if (ctx->get_crl)
 			ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
@@ -747,6 +749,15 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ct
 		X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
 		crl = NULL;
 		dcrl = NULL;
+		/* If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by
+		 * another iteration, so exit loop.
+		 */
+		if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons)
+			{
+			ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
+			ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+			goto err;
+			}
 		}
 	err:
 	X509_CRL_free(crl);
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x_all.c.backports openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x_all.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x_all.c.backports	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x_all.c	2013-08-16 15:33:25.247399940 +0200
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ int X509_sign(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, c
 
 int X509_sign_ctx(X509 *x, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
 	{
+	x->cert_info->enc.modified = 1;
 	return ASN1_item_sign_ctx(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CINF),
 		x->cert_info->signature,
 		x->sig_alg, x->signature, x->cert_info, ctx);
@@ -123,6 +124,7 @@ int X509_CRL_sign(X509_CRL *x, EVP_PKEY
 
 int X509_CRL_sign_ctx(X509_CRL *x, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
 	{
+	x->crl->enc.modified = 1;
 	return ASN1_item_sign_ctx(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL_INFO),
 		x->crl->sig_alg, x->sig_alg, x->signature, x->crl, ctx);
 	}
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod.backports openssl-1.0.1e/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod
--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod.backports	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod	2013-08-16 15:31:35.727003914 +0200
@@ -278,6 +278,8 @@ happen if extended CRL checking is enabl
 an application specific error. This will never be returned unless explicitly
 set by an application.
 
+=back
+
 =head1 NOTES
 
 The above functions should be used instead of directly referencing the fields
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod.backports openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod
--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod.backports	2013-02-11 16:02:48.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod	2013-08-16 15:31:35.727003914 +0200
@@ -44,17 +44,17 @@ The following return values can occur:
 
 =over 4
 
-=item 1
-
-The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
-established.
-
 =item 0
 
 The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful but was shut down controlled and
 by the specifications of the TLS/SSL protocol. Call SSL_get_error() with the
 return value B<ret> to find out the reason.
 
+=item 1
+
+The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
+established.
+
 =item E<lt>0
 
 The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful because a fatal error occurred either
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod.backports openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod
--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod.backports	2013-02-11 16:02:48.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod	2013-08-16 15:31:35.727003914 +0200
@@ -41,17 +41,17 @@ The following return values can occur:
 
 =over 4
 
-=item 1
-
-The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
-established.
-
 =item 0
 
 The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful but was shut down controlled and
 by the specifications of the TLS/SSL protocol. Call SSL_get_error() with the
 return value B<ret> to find out the reason.
 
+=item 1
+
+The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
+established.
+
 =item E<lt>0
 
 The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful, because a fatal error occurred either
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod.backports openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod
--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod.backports	2013-02-11 16:02:48.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod	2013-08-16 15:31:35.727003914 +0200
@@ -66,16 +66,16 @@ values:
 
 =over 4
 
-=item 1
-
-The operation succeeded.
-
 =item 0
 
 A failure while manipulating the STACK_OF(X509_NAME) object occurred or
 the X509_NAME could not be extracted from B<cacert>. Check the error stack
 to find out the reason.
 
+=item 1
+
+The operation succeeded.
+
 =back
 
 =head1 EXAMPLES
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod.backports openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod
--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod.backports	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod	2013-08-16 15:31:35.727003914 +0200
@@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint() and SSL_
 
 Return values from the server callback are interpreted as follows:
 
+=over 4
+
 =item > 0
 
 PSK identity was found and the server callback has provided the PSK
@@ -99,4 +101,6 @@ completely.
 PSK identity was not found. An "unknown_psk_identity" alert message
 will be sent and the connection setup fails.
 
+=back
+
 =cut
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod.backports openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod
--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod.backports	2013-02-11 16:02:48.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod	2013-08-16 15:31:35.727003914 +0200
@@ -45,17 +45,17 @@ The following return values can occur:
 
 =over 4
 
-=item 1
-
-The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
-established.
-
 =item 0
 
 The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful but was shut down controlled and
 by the specifications of the TLS/SSL protocol. Call SSL_get_error() with the
 return value B<ret> to find out the reason.
 
+=item 1
+
+The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
+established.
+
 =item E<lt>0
 
 The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful because a fatal error occurred either
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod.backports openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod
--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod.backports	2013-02-11 16:02:48.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod	2013-08-16 15:31:35.728003935 +0200
@@ -92,11 +92,6 @@ The following return values can occur:
 
 =over 4
 
-=item 1
-
-The shutdown was successfully completed. The "close notify" alert was sent
-and the peer's "close notify" alert was received.
-
 =item 0
 
 The shutdown is not yet finished. Call SSL_shutdown() for a second time,
@@ -104,6 +99,11 @@ if a bidirectional shutdown shall be per
 The output of L<SSL_get_error(3)|SSL_get_error(3)> may be misleading, as an
 erroneous SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL may be flagged even though no error occurred.
 
+=item 1
+
+The shutdown was successfully completed. The "close notify" alert was sent
+and the peer's "close notify" alert was received.
+
 =item -1
 
 The shutdown was not successful because a fatal error occurred either
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_lib.c.backports openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_lib.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_lib.c.backports	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_lib.c	2013-08-16 15:33:33.306576363 +0200
@@ -196,6 +196,7 @@ void dtls1_free(SSL *s)
 	pqueue_free(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
 
 	OPENSSL_free(s->d1);
+	s->d1 = NULL;
 	}
 
 void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_pkt.c.backports openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_pkt.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_pkt.c.backports	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_pkt.c	2013-08-16 15:31:35.728003935 +0200
@@ -847,6 +847,12 @@ start:
 			}
 		}
 
+	if (s->d1->listen && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+		{
+		rr->length = 0;
+		goto start;
+		}
+
 	/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
 
 	if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
@@ -1051,6 +1057,7 @@ start:
 			!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
 			!s->s3->renegotiate)
 			{
+			s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
 			s->new_session = 1;
 			ssl3_renegotiate(s);
 			if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_srvr.c.backports openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_srvr.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_srvr.c.backports	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_srvr.c	2013-08-16 15:31:35.728003935 +0200
@@ -276,10 +276,11 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
 
 			s->shutdown=0;
+			dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
 			dtls1_start_timer(s);
 			ret=dtls1_send_hello_request(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
+			s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
 			s->init_num=0;
 
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_cbc.c.backports openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_cbc.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_cbc.c.backports	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_cbc.c	2013-08-16 15:31:35.729003956 +0200
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s
 	unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i;
 	const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
 	/* Check if version requires explicit IV */
-	if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
+	if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
 		{
 		/* These lengths are all public so we can test them in
 		 * non-constant time.
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_lib.c.backports openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_lib.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_lib.c.backports	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_lib.c	2013-08-16 15:31:35.729003956 +0200
@@ -1797,7 +1797,9 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *m
 	CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data);
 
 	ret->extra_certs=NULL;
-	ret->comp_methods=SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
+	/* No compression for DTLS */
+	if (meth->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+		ret->comp_methods=SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
 
 	ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
 
@@ -2792,9 +2794,7 @@ void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s)
 /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
 X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s)
 	{
-	if (s->server)
-		return(ssl_get_server_send_cert(s));
-	else if (s->cert != NULL)
+	if (s->cert != NULL)
 		return(s->cert->key->x509);
 	else
 		return(NULL);