78 lines
2.7 KiB
Diff
78 lines
2.7 KiB
Diff
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*) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher
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(CVE-2006-4339) [Ben Laurie; Google Security Team]
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openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa.h 1.55.2.4 -> 1.55.2.5
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--- openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa.h 2006/01/09 16:05:18 1.55.2.4
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+++ openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa.h 2006/09/05 08:25:42 1.55.2.5
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@@ -412,6 +412,7 @@
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#define RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q 127
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#define RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR 121
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#define RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 114
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+#define RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT 105
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#define RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME 128
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#define RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME 129
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#define RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED 130
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openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c 1.46.2.4 -> 1.46.2.5
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--- openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c 2006/06/14 08:51:40 1.46.2.4
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+++ openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c 2006/09/05 08:25:42 1.46.2.5
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@@ -640,6 +640,15 @@
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{
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case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
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r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
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+ /* Generally signatures should be at least 2/3 padding, though
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+ this isn't possible for really short keys and some standard
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+ signature schemes, so don't check if the unpadded data is
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+ small. */
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+ if(r > 42 && 3*8*r >= BN_num_bits(rsa->n))
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+ {
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+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT);
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+ goto err;
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+ }
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break;
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case RSA_X931_PADDING:
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r=RSA_padding_check_X931(to,num,buf,i,num);
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openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c 1.17.2.3 -> 1.17.2.4
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--- openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c 2006/01/09 16:05:18 1.17.2.3
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+++ openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c 2006/09/05 08:25:42 1.17.2.4
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@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@
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{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q) ,"n does not equal p q"},
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{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR) ,"oaep decoding error"},
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{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED) ,"padding check failed"},
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+{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT),"pkcs1 padding too short"},
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{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME) ,"p not prime"},
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{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME) ,"q not prime"},
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{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED),"rsa operations not supported"},
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openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c 1.21 -> 1.21.2.1
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--- openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c 2005/04/26 22:07:17 1.21
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+++ openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c 2006/09/05 08:25:42 1.21.2.1
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@@ -185,6 +185,23 @@
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sig=d2i_X509_SIG(NULL,&p,(long)i);
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if (sig == NULL) goto err;
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+
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+ /* Excess data can be used to create forgeries */
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+ if(p != s+i)
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+ {
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+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
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+ goto err;
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+ }
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+
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+ /* Parameters to the signature algorithm can also be used to
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+ create forgeries */
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+ if(sig->algor->parameter
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+ && ASN1_TYPE_get(sig->algor->parameter) != V_ASN1_NULL)
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+ {
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+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
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+ goto err;
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+ }
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+
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sigtype=OBJ_obj2nid(sig->algor->algorithm);
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