* Drop unaccepted (unapplying) coverity patches * Drop server support for SSH1 (server) * Workaround #2641 for systemd * UseLogin is gone * Drop upstream commit 28652bca * Tighten seccomp filter (cache credentials before entering sandbox) (#1395288)
3001 lines
93 KiB
Diff
3001 lines
93 KiB
Diff
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth2.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/auth2.c
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--- openssh-7.4p1/auth2.c.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.685300997 +0100
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+++ openssh-7.4p1/auth2.c 2016-12-23 13:38:53.725301005 +0100
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@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd;
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extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
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extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
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#ifdef GSSAPI
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+extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex;
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extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
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#endif
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@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
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&method_none,
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&method_pubkey,
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#ifdef GSSAPI
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+ &method_gsskeyex,
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&method_gssapi,
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#endif
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&method_passwd,
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diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth2-gss.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/auth2-gss.c
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--- openssh-7.4p1/auth2-gss.c.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.685300997 +0100
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+++ openssh-7.4p1/auth2-gss.c 2016-12-23 13:38:53.725301005 +0100
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@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <stdarg.h>
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+#include <string.h>
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#include "xmalloc.h"
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#include "key.h"
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@@ -53,6 +54,40 @@ static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_
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static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
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static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
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+/*
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+ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
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+ */
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+static int
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+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
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+{
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+ int authenticated = 0;
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+ Buffer b;
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+ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
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+ u_int len;
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+
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+ mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
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+ mic.length = len;
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+
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+ packet_check_eom();
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+
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+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
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+ "gssapi-keyex");
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+
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+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
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+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
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+
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+ /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
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+ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
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+ &gssbuf, &mic))))
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+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
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+ authctxt->pw));
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+
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+ buffer_free(&b);
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+ free(mic.value);
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+
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+ return (authenticated);
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+}
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+
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/*
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* We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
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* how to check local user kuserok and the like)
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@@ -238,7 +273,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type,
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packet_check_eom();
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- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
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+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
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+ authctxt->pw));
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authctxt->postponed = 0;
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dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
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@@ -281,7 +317,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
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gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
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if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
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- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
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+ authenticated =
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+ PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw));
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else
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logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
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@@ -299,6 +336,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
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return 0;
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}
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+Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
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+ "gssapi-keyex",
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+ userauth_gsskeyex,
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+ &options.gss_authentication
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+};
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+
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Authmethod method_gssapi = {
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"gssapi-with-mic",
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userauth_gssapi,
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diff -up openssh-7.4p1/clientloop.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/clientloop.c
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--- openssh-7.4p1/clientloop.c.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
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+++ openssh-7.4p1/clientloop.c 2016-12-23 13:38:53.725301005 +0100
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@@ -113,6 +113,10 @@
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#include "ssherr.h"
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#include "hostfile.h"
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+#ifdef GSSAPI
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+#include "ssh-gss.h"
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+#endif
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+
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/* import options */
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extern Options options;
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@@ -1664,9 +1668,18 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_cha
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break;
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/* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
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- if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state))
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+ if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state)) {
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channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
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+#ifdef GSSAPI
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+ if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
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+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(NULL)) {
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+ debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey");
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+ need_rekeying = 1;
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+ }
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+#endif
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+ }
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+
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/* Buffer input from the connection. */
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client_process_net_input(readset);
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diff -up openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac
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--- openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.716301003 +0100
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+++ openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac 2016-12-23 13:38:53.726301005 +0100
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@@ -623,6 +623,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("
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[Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
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AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
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[Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
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+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have the Security Authorization Session API)
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+ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <Security/AuthSession.h>],
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+ [SessionCreate(0, 0);],
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+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes"
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+ AC_DEFINE(USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API, 1,
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+ [platform has the Security Authorization Session API])
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+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
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+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
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+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no"
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+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)])
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+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have an in-memory credentials cache)
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+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
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+ [#include <Kerberos/Kerberos.h>],
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+ [cc_context_t c;
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+ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);],
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+ [AC_DEFINE(USE_CCAPI, 1,
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+ [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache])
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+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
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+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
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+ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then
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+ AC_MSG_ERROR(*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***)
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+ fi],
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+ [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]
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+ )
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m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv])
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AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [],
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AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
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diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-genr.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/gss-genr.c
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--- openssh-7.4p1/gss-genr.c.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
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+++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-genr.c 2016-12-23 13:38:53.726301005 +0100
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@@ -40,12 +40,167 @@
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#include "buffer.h"
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#include "log.h"
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#include "ssh2.h"
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+#include "cipher.h"
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+#include "key.h"
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+#include "kex.h"
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+#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include "ssh-gss.h"
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extern u_char *session_id2;
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extern u_int session_id2_len;
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+typedef struct {
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+ char *encoded;
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+ gss_OID oid;
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+} ssh_gss_kex_mapping;
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+
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+/*
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+ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the
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+ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines
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+ */
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+
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+Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL;
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+
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+static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL;
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+
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+int
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+ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() {
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+ return (gss_enc2oid != NULL);
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+}
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+
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+/*
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+ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program
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+ *
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+ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting
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+ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism
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+ */
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+
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+char *
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+ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) {
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+ gss_OID_set gss_supported;
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+ OM_uint32 min_status;
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+
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+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported)))
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+ return NULL;
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+
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+ return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
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+ host, client));
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+}
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+
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+char *
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+ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
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+ const char *host, const char *client) {
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+ Buffer buf;
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+ size_t i;
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+ int oidpos, enclen;
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+ char *mechs, *encoded;
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+ u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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+ char deroid[2];
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+ const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
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+ EVP_MD_CTX md;
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+
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+ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
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+ for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
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+ free(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded);
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+ free(gss_enc2oid);
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+ }
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+
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+ gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) *
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+ (gss_supported->count + 1));
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+
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+ buffer_init(&buf);
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+
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+ oidpos = 0;
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+ for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
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+ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
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+ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
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+
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+ deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
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+ deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
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+
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+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
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+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2);
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+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,
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+ gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
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+ gss_supported->elements[i].length);
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+ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
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+
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+ encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
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+ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
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+ encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
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+
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+ if (oidpos != 0)
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+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
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+
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+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
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+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1);
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+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
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+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
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+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
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+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1);
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+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
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+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
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+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
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+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1);
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+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
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+
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+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
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+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
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+ oidpos++;
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+ }
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+ }
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+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
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+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
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+
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+ buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0');
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+
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+ mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf));
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+ buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf));
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+ buffer_free(&buf);
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+
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+ if (strlen(mechs) == 0) {
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+ free(mechs);
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+ mechs = NULL;
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+ }
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+
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+ return (mechs);
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+}
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+
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+gss_OID
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+ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) {
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+ int i = 0;
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+
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+ switch (kex_type) {
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+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
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+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID))
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+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
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+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1;
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+ break;
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+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
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+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID))
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+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
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+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1;
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+ break;
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+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
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+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID))
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+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
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+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1;
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+ break;
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+ default:
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+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
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+ }
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+
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+ while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL &&
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+ strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0)
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+ i++;
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+
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+ if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL)
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+ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid);
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+
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+ return gss_enc2oid[i].oid;
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+}
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+
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/* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
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int
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ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
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@@ -198,7 +353,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int de
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}
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ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
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- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
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+ ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
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GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
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0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
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|
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|
@@ -228,8 +383,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, con
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}
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|
|
|
OM_uint32
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+ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name)
|
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+{
|
|
+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
|
|
+ gss_name_t gssname;
|
|
+ OM_uint32 status;
|
|
+ gss_OID_set oidset;
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+
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+ gssbuf.value = (void *) name;
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+ gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
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|
+
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+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
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+ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
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+
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|
+ ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf,
|
|
+ GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname);
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (!ctx->major)
|
|
+ ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
|
|
+ gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE,
|
|
+ &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL);
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|
+
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+ gss_release_name(&status, &gssname);
|
|
+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (ctx->major)
|
|
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
|
|
+
|
|
+ return(ctx->major);
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+OM_uint32
|
|
ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
|
|
{
|
|
+ if (ctx == NULL)
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
+
|
|
if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
|
|
GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
|
|
ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
|
|
@@ -237,6 +426,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer
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|
return (ctx->major);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
+/* Priviledged when used by server */
|
|
+OM_uint32
|
|
+ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ if (ctx == NULL)
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
+
|
|
+ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
|
|
+ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
|
|
+
|
|
+ return (ctx->major);
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
void
|
|
ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
|
|
const char *context)
|
|
@@ -250,11 +452,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const cha
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
-ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
|
|
+ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host,
|
|
+ const char *client)
|
|
{
|
|
gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
|
|
OM_uint32 major, minor;
|
|
gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
|
|
+ Gssctxt *intctx = NULL;
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (ctx == NULL)
|
|
+ ctx = &intctx;
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
|
|
if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length &&
|
|
@@ -264,6 +471,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx
|
|
ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
|
|
ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
|
|
major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client)
|
|
+ major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
|
|
+
|
|
if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
|
|
major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token,
|
|
NULL);
|
|
@@ -273,10 +484,66 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx
|
|
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
|
|
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL)
|
|
ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
|
|
|
|
return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
+int
|
|
+ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) {
|
|
+ static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
|
|
+ static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0;
|
|
+ static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
|
|
+ static gss_name_t name;
|
|
+ static OM_uint32 last_call = 0;
|
|
+ OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor;
|
|
+ int equal;
|
|
+
|
|
+ now = time(NULL);
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (ctxt) {
|
|
+ debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions");
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
|
|
+ gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name);
|
|
+
|
|
+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
|
|
+ &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL);
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
|
|
+ saved_mech = ctxt->oid;
|
|
+ saved_lifetime+= now;
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
+ /* Handle the error */
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (now - last_call < 10)
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
+
|
|
+ last_call = now;
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID)
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
+
|
|
+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
|
|
+ &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL);
|
|
+ if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED)
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
+ else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
+
|
|
+ major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal);
|
|
+ gss_release_name(&minor, &name);
|
|
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10))
|
|
+ return 1;
|
|
+
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
#endif /* GSSAPI */
|
|
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv.c
|
|
--- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv.c.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
|
|
+++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv.c 2016-12-23 13:38:53.727301005 +0100
|
|
@@ -45,17 +45,19 @@
|
|
#include "session.h"
|
|
#include "misc.h"
|
|
#include "servconf.h"
|
|
+#include "uidswap.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "ssh-gss.h"
|
|
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
|
|
|
|
extern ServerOptions options;
|
|
|
|
static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
|
|
- { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
|
|
- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}};
|
|
+ { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
|
|
+ GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
|
|
|
|
ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
|
|
- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
|
|
+ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
|
|
|
|
#ifdef KRB5
|
|
extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
|
|
@@ -142,6 +144,28 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Unprivileged */
|
|
+char *
|
|
+ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() {
|
|
+ if (supported_oids == NULL)
|
|
+ ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
|
|
+ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported_oids,
|
|
+ &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech, NULL, NULL));
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+/* Unprivileged */
|
|
+int
|
|
+ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data,
|
|
+ const char *dummy) {
|
|
+ Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
|
|
+ int res;
|
|
+
|
|
+ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
|
|
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
|
|
+
|
|
+ return (res);
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+/* Unprivileged */
|
|
void
|
|
ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
|
|
{
|
|
@@ -151,7 +176,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *o
|
|
gss_OID_set supported;
|
|
|
|
gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
|
|
- gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported)))
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
|
while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
|
|
if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
|
|
@@ -277,8 +304,48 @@ OM_uint32
|
|
ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
|
|
{
|
|
int i = 0;
|
|
+ int equal = 0;
|
|
+ gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
|
|
+ gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
|
|
+ if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
|
|
+ (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
|
|
+ ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
|
|
+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
|
|
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
|
|
+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name,
|
|
+ NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
|
|
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
|
|
+ return (ctx->major);
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
- gss_buffer_desc ename;
|
|
+ ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name,
|
|
+ new_name, &equal);
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
|
|
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
|
|
+ return (ctx->major);
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (!equal) {
|
|
+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name");
|
|
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
|
|
+
|
|
+ gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
|
|
+ gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
|
|
+ client->name = new_name;
|
|
+ client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
|
|
+ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
|
|
+ client->updated = 1;
|
|
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
client->mech = NULL;
|
|
|
|
@@ -293,6 +360,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g
|
|
if (client->mech == NULL)
|
|
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
|
|
|
|
+ if (ctx->client_creds &&
|
|
+ (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
|
|
+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
|
|
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
|
|
+ return (ctx->major);
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
|
|
&client->displayname, NULL))) {
|
|
ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
|
|
@@ -310,6 +384,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g
|
|
return (ctx->major);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
+ gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
|
|
+
|
|
/* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
|
|
client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
|
|
ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
|
|
@@ -320,11 +396,20 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g
|
|
void
|
|
ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
|
|
{
|
|
- if (gssapi_client.store.filename != NULL) {
|
|
- /* Unlink probably isn't sufficient */
|
|
- debug("removing gssapi cred file\"%s\"",
|
|
- gssapi_client.store.filename);
|
|
- unlink(gssapi_client.store.filename);
|
|
+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
|
|
+ krb5_error_code problem;
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (gssapi_client.store.data != NULL) {
|
|
+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(gssapi_client.store.data, gssapi_client.store.envval, &ccache))) {
|
|
+ debug("%s: krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", __func__,
|
|
+ krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem));
|
|
+ } else if ((problem = krb5_cc_destroy(gssapi_client.store.data, ccache))) {
|
|
+ debug("%s: krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", __func__,
|
|
+ krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem));
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
+ krb5_free_context(gssapi_client.store.data);
|
|
+ gssapi_client.store.data = NULL;
|
|
+ }
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
@@ -357,7 +442,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int
|
|
|
|
/* Privileged */
|
|
int
|
|
-ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
|
|
+ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
|
|
{
|
|
OM_uint32 lmin;
|
|
|
|
@@ -367,9 +452,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
|
|
- if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
|
|
+ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
|
|
+ gssapi_client.used = 1;
|
|
+ gssapi_client.store.owner = pw;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
- else {
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
/* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
|
|
gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
|
|
gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
|
|
@@ -383,14 +470,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
-/* Privileged */
|
|
-OM_uint32
|
|
-ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
|
|
+/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running
|
|
+ * as the user, the monitor is root.
|
|
+ *
|
|
+ * In the child, we want to :
|
|
+ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify
|
|
+ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update
|
|
+ */
|
|
+
|
|
+/* Stuff for PAM */
|
|
+
|
|
+#ifdef USE_PAM
|
|
+static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg,
|
|
+ struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
|
|
{
|
|
- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
|
|
- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
|
|
+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
|
|
+}
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
|
- return (ctx->major);
|
|
+void
|
|
+ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() {
|
|
+ int ok;
|
|
+ int ret;
|
|
+#ifdef USE_PAM
|
|
+ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
|
|
+ struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
|
|
+ char *envstr;
|
|
+#endif
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
|
|
+ gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
|
|
+ gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
|
|
+ return;
|
|
+
|
|
+ ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (!ok)
|
|
+ return;
|
|
+
|
|
+ debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully");
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will
|
|
+ * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options
|
|
+ * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
|
|
+ */
|
|
+#ifdef USE_PAM
|
|
+ if (!use_privsep) {
|
|
+ debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
|
|
+ return;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
|
|
+ &pamconv, &pamh);
|
|
+ if (ret)
|
|
+ return;
|
|
+
|
|
+ xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
|
|
+ gssapi_client.store.envval);
|
|
+
|
|
+ ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr);
|
|
+ if (!ret)
|
|
+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
|
|
+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
|
|
+#endif
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+int
|
|
+ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) {
|
|
+ int ok = 0;
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* Check we've got credentials to store */
|
|
+ if (!gssapi_client.updated)
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
+
|
|
+ gssapi_client.updated = 0;
|
|
+
|
|
+ temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner);
|
|
+ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)
|
|
+ ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client);
|
|
+ else
|
|
+ debug("No update function for this mechanism");
|
|
+
|
|
+ restore_uid();
|
|
+
|
|
+ return ok;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
|
|
--- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
|
|
+++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c 2016-12-23 13:38:53.727301005 +0100
|
|
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
|
|
krb5_error_code problem;
|
|
krb5_principal princ;
|
|
OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
|
|
- int len;
|
|
+ const char *new_ccname, *new_cctype;
|
|
const char *errmsg;
|
|
|
|
if (client->creds == NULL) {
|
|
@@ -181,11 +181,26 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
|
|
+ new_cctype = krb5_cc_get_type(krb_context, ccache);
|
|
+ new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
|
|
+
|
|
client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
|
|
- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
|
|
- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
|
|
- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
|
|
+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
|
|
+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
|
|
+ client->store.filename = NULL;
|
|
+#else
|
|
+ if (new_ccname[0] == ':')
|
|
+ new_ccname++;
|
|
+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "%s:%s", new_cctype, new_ccname);
|
|
+ if (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0) {
|
|
+ char *p;
|
|
+ p = strrchr(client->store.envval, '/');
|
|
+ if (p)
|
|
+ *p = '\0';
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ if ((strcmp(new_cctype, "FILE") == 0) || (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0))
|
|
+ client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_PAM
|
|
if (options.use_pam)
|
|
@@ -194,9 +209,76 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
|
|
|
|
krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
|
|
|
|
+ client->store.data = krb_context;
|
|
+
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
+int
|
|
+ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,
|
|
+ ssh_gssapi_client *client)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
|
|
+ krb5_principal principal = NULL;
|
|
+ char *name = NULL;
|
|
+ krb5_error_code problem;
|
|
+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
|
|
+
|
|
+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) {
|
|
+ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
|
|
+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */
|
|
+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache,
|
|
+ &principal))) {
|
|
+ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s",
|
|
+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
|
|
+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) {
|
|
+ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s",
|
|
+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
|
|
+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
|
|
+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) {
|
|
+ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing");
|
|
+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
|
|
+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
|
|
+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */
|
|
+
|
|
+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) {
|
|
+ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s",
|
|
+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
|
|
+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
|
|
+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
|
|
+
|
|
+ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds,
|
|
+ ccache))) {
|
|
+ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!");
|
|
+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ return 1;
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
|
|
"toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
|
|
"Kerberos",
|
|
@@ -204,7 +286,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
|
|
NULL,
|
|
&ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
|
|
+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
|
|
+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif /* KRB5 */
|
|
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/kex.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/kex.c
|
|
--- openssh-7.4p1/kex.c.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
|
|
+++ openssh-7.4p1/kex.c 2016-12-23 13:39:56.064313151 +0100
|
|
@@ -54,6 +54,10 @@
|
|
#include "sshbuf.h"
|
|
#include "digest.h"
|
|
|
|
+#ifdef GSSAPI
|
|
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
|
|
+#endif
|
|
+
|
|
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
|
|
# if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
|
|
# define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256
|
|
@@ -111,6 +115,11 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
|
|
{ KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
|
|
{ KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256_OLD, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
|
|
#endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */
|
|
+#ifdef GSSAPI
|
|
+ { KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
|
|
+ { KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
|
|
+ { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
|
|
+#endif
|
|
{ NULL, -1, -1, -1},
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
@@ -144,6 +153,12 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
|
|
for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
|
|
if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
|
|
return k;
|
|
+#ifdef GSSAPI
|
|
+ if (strncmp(name, "gss-", 4) == 0) {
|
|
+ if (strncmp(k->name, name, strlen(k->name)) == 0)
|
|
+ return k;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+#endif
|
|
}
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/kexgssc.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/kexgssc.c
|
|
--- openssh-7.4p1/kexgssc.c.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.727301005 +0100
|
|
+++ openssh-7.4p1/kexgssc.c 2016-12-23 13:38:53.727301005 +0100
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
|
|
+/*
|
|
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
|
|
+ *
|
|
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
+ * are met:
|
|
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
|
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
|
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
|
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
|
+ *
|
|
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
|
|
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
|
|
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
|
|
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
|
|
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
|
|
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
|
|
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
|
|
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
|
|
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
|
|
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
|
+ */
|
|
+
|
|
+#include "includes.h"
|
|
+
|
|
+#ifdef GSSAPI
|
|
+
|
|
+#include "includes.h"
|
|
+
|
|
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
|
|
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
|
|
+
|
|
+#include <string.h>
|
|
+
|
|
+#include "xmalloc.h"
|
|
+#include "buffer.h"
|
|
+#include "ssh2.h"
|
|
+#include "key.h"
|
|
+#include "cipher.h"
|
|
+#include "kex.h"
|
|
+#include "log.h"
|
|
+#include "packet.h"
|
|
+#include "dh.h"
|
|
+#include "digest.h"
|
|
+
|
|
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
|
|
+
|
|
+int
|
|
+kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) {
|
|
+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
|
|
+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr;
|
|
+ Gssctxt *ctxt;
|
|
+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
|
|
+ u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, strlen;
|
|
+ DH *dh;
|
|
+ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
|
|
+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
|
|
+ BIGNUM *p = NULL;
|
|
+ BIGNUM *g = NULL;
|
|
+ u_char *kbuf;
|
|
+ u_char *serverhostkey = NULL;
|
|
+ u_char *empty = "";
|
|
+ char *msg;
|
|
+ char *lang;
|
|
+ int type = 0;
|
|
+ int first = 1;
|
|
+ int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
|
|
+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
|
|
+ size_t hashlen;
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */
|
|
+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
|
|
+ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, ssh->kex->name, ssh->kex->kex_type)
|
|
+ == GSS_C_NO_OID)
|
|
+ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, ssh->kex->gss_host))
|
|
+ fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (ssh->kex->gss_client &&
|
|
+ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, ssh->kex->gss_client))
|
|
+ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
|
|
+
|
|
+ switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
|
|
+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
|
|
+ dh = dh_new_group1();
|
|
+ break;
|
|
+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
|
|
+ dh = dh_new_group14();
|
|
+ break;
|
|
+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
|
|
+ debug("Doing group exchange\n");
|
|
+ nbits = dh_estimate(ssh->kex->we_need * 8);
|
|
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
|
|
+ packet_put_int(min);
|
|
+ packet_put_int(nbits);
|
|
+ packet_put_int(max);
|
|
+
|
|
+ packet_send();
|
|
+
|
|
+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
|
|
+
|
|
+ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
|
|
+ fatal("BN_new() failed");
|
|
+ packet_get_bignum2(p);
|
|
+ if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
|
|
+ fatal("BN_new() failed");
|
|
+ packet_get_bignum2(g);
|
|
+ packet_check_eom();
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
|
|
+ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
|
|
+ min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
|
|
+
|
|
+ dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
|
|
+ break;
|
|
+ default:
|
|
+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */
|
|
+ dh_gen_key(dh, ssh->kex->we_need * 8);
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */
|
|
+ dh_server_pub = BN_new();
|
|
+ if (dh_server_pub == NULL)
|
|
+ fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
|
|
+
|
|
+ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
|
|
+
|
|
+ do {
|
|
+ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
|
|
+
|
|
+ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
|
|
+ ssh->kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
|
|
+ &ret_flags);
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
|
|
+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
|
|
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
|
|
+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
|
|
+ send_tok.length);
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ fatal("gss_init_context failed");
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
|
|
+ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
|
|
+ free(recv_tok.value);
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
|
|
+ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
|
|
+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
|
|
+ fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
|
|
+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
|
|
+ fatal("Integrity check failed");
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ /*
|
|
+ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
|
|
+ * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
|
|
+ */
|
|
+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
|
|
+ if (first) {
|
|
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT);
|
|
+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
|
|
+ send_tok.length);
|
|
+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
|
|
+ first = 0;
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
|
|
+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
|
|
+ send_tok.length);
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ packet_send();
|
|
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
|
|
+ do {
|
|
+ type = packet_read();
|
|
+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
|
|
+ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
|
|
+ if (serverhostkey)
|
|
+ fatal("Server host key received more than once");
|
|
+ serverhostkey =
|
|
+ packet_get_string(&slen);
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
|
|
+
|
|
+ switch (type) {
|
|
+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
|
|
+ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
|
|
+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
|
|
+ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
|
|
+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
|
|
+ recv_tok.length = strlen;
|
|
+ break;
|
|
+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
|
|
+ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
|
|
+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
|
|
+ msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
|
|
+ msg_tok.length = strlen;
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* Is there a token included? */
|
|
+ if (packet_get_char()) {
|
|
+ recv_tok.value=
|
|
+ packet_get_string(&strlen);
|
|
+ recv_tok.length = strlen;
|
|
+ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */
|
|
+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
|
|
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete");
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
+ /* No token included */
|
|
+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
|
|
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token");
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ break;
|
|
+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
|
|
+ debug("Received Error");
|
|
+ maj_status = packet_get_int();
|
|
+ min_status = packet_get_int();
|
|
+ msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
|
|
+ lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
|
|
+ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg);
|
|
+ default:
|
|
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
|
|
+ type);
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ token_ptr = &recv_tok;
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
+ /* No data, and not complete */
|
|
+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
|
|
+ fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
|
|
+
|
|
+ /*
|
|
+ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
|
|
+ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok
|
|
+ */
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
|
|
+ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */
|
|
+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
|
|
+ packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* compute K=f^x mod p */
|
|
+ klen = DH_size(dh);
|
|
+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
|
|
+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
|
|
+ if ((int)kout < 0)
|
|
+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
|
|
+
|
|
+ shared_secret = BN_new();
|
|
+ if (shared_secret == NULL)
|
|
+ fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed");
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
|
|
+ fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
|
|
+
|
|
+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
|
|
+ free(kbuf);
|
|
+
|
|
+ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
|
|
+ switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
|
|
+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
|
|
+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
|
|
+ kex_dh_hash(ssh->kex->hash_alg, ssh->kex->client_version_string,
|
|
+ ssh->kex->server_version_string,
|
|
+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
|
|
+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
|
|
+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
|
|
+ dh->pub_key, /* e */
|
|
+ dh_server_pub, /* f */
|
|
+ shared_secret, /* K */
|
|
+ hash, &hashlen
|
|
+ );
|
|
+ break;
|
|
+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
|
|
+ kexgex_hash(
|
|
+ ssh->kex->hash_alg,
|
|
+ ssh->kex->client_version_string,
|
|
+ ssh->kex->server_version_string,
|
|
+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
|
|
+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
|
|
+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
|
|
+ min, nbits, max,
|
|
+ dh->p, dh->g,
|
|
+ dh->pub_key,
|
|
+ dh_server_pub,
|
|
+ shared_secret,
|
|
+ hash, &hashlen
|
|
+ );
|
|
+ break;
|
|
+ default:
|
|
+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ gssbuf.value = hash;
|
|
+ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
|
|
+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
|
|
+ packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify");
|
|
+
|
|
+ free(msg_tok.value);
|
|
+
|
|
+ DH_free(dh);
|
|
+ if (serverhostkey)
|
|
+ free(serverhostkey);
|
|
+ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* save session id */
|
|
+ if (ssh->kex->session_id == NULL) {
|
|
+ ssh->kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
|
|
+ ssh->kex->session_id = xmalloc(ssh->kex->session_id_len);
|
|
+ memcpy(ssh->kex->session_id, hash, ssh->kex->session_id_len);
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (ssh->kex->gss_deleg_creds)
|
|
+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
|
|
+ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
|
|
+ else
|
|
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
|
|
+
|
|
+ kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
|
|
+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
|
|
+ return kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
|
|
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/kexgsss.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/kexgsss.c
|
|
--- openssh-7.4p1/kexgsss.c.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.728301005 +0100
|
|
+++ openssh-7.4p1/kexgsss.c 2016-12-23 13:38:53.728301005 +0100
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
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+/*
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+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
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+ *
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+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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+ * are met:
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+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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+ *
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+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
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+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
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+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
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+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
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+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
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+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
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+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
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+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
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+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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+ */
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+
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+#include "includes.h"
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+
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+#ifdef GSSAPI
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+
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+#include <string.h>
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+
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+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
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+#include <openssl/bn.h>
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+
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+#include "xmalloc.h"
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+#include "buffer.h"
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+#include "ssh2.h"
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+#include "key.h"
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+#include "cipher.h"
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+#include "kex.h"
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+#include "log.h"
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+#include "packet.h"
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+#include "dh.h"
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+#include "ssh-gss.h"
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+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
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+#include "misc.h" /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
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+#include "servconf.h"
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+#include "ssh-gss.h"
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+#include "digest.h"
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+
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+extern ServerOptions options;
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+
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+int
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+kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
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+{
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+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
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+
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+ /*
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+ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
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+ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific
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+ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently
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+ * activating this non-standard behaviour.
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+ */
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+
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+ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
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+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
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+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
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+ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
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+ u_int slen, klen, kout;
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+ u_char *kbuf;
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+ DH *dh;
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+ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
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+ int cmin = -1, cmax = -1; /* client proposal */
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+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
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+ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
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+ int type = 0;
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+ gss_OID oid;
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+ char *mechs;
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+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
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+ size_t hashlen;
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+
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+ /* Initialise GSSAPI */
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+
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+ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures
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+ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
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+ * into life
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+ */
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+ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok())
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+ if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms()))
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+ free(mechs);
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+
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+ debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, ssh->kex->name);
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+ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, ssh->kex->name, ssh->kex->kex_type);
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+ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
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+ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
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+
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+ debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
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+
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+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
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+ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
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+
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+ switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
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+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
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+ dh = dh_new_group1();
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+ break;
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+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
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+ dh = dh_new_group14();
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+ break;
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+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
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+ debug("Doing group exchange");
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+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
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+ /* store client proposal to provide valid signature */
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+ cmin = packet_get_int();
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+ nbits = packet_get_int();
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+ cmax = packet_get_int();
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+ min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, cmin);
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+ max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, cmax);
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+ packet_check_eom();
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+ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
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+ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
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+ min, nbits, max);
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+ dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
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+ if (dh == NULL)
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+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found");
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+
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+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
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+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
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+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
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+ packet_send();
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+
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+ packet_write_wait();
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+ break;
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+ default:
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+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
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+ }
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+
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+ dh_gen_key(dh, ssh->kex->we_need * 8);
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+
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+ do {
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+ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
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+ type = packet_read();
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+ switch(type) {
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+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
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+ if (dh_client_pub != NULL)
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+ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
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+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
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+ recv_tok.length = slen;
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+
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+ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
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+ fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
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+
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+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
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+
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+ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
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+ break;
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+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
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+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
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+ recv_tok.length = slen;
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+ break;
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+ default:
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+ packet_disconnect(
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+ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
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+ type);
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+ }
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+
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+ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
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+ &send_tok, &ret_flags));
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+
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+ free(recv_tok.value);
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+
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+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
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+ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
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+
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+ if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
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+ fatal("No client public key");
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+
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+ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
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+ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
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+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
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+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
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+ packet_send();
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+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
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+ }
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+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
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+
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+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
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+ if (send_tok.length > 0) {
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+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
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+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
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+ packet_send();
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+ }
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+ fatal("accept_ctx died");
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+ }
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+
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+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
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+ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
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+
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+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
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+ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
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+
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+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
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+ packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
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+
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+ klen = DH_size(dh);
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+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
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+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
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+ if ((int)kout < 0)
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+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
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+
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+ shared_secret = BN_new();
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+ if (shared_secret == NULL)
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+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed");
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+
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+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
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+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
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+
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+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
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+ free(kbuf);
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+
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+ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
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+ switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
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+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
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+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
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+ kex_dh_hash(ssh->kex->hash_alg,
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+ ssh->kex->client_version_string, ssh->kex->server_version_string,
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+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
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+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
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+ NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */
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+ dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret,
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+ hash, &hashlen
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+ );
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+ break;
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+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
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+ kexgex_hash(
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+ ssh->kex->hash_alg,
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+ ssh->kex->client_version_string, ssh->kex->server_version_string,
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+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
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+ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
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+ NULL, 0,
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+ cmin, nbits, cmax,
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+ dh->p, dh->g,
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+ dh_client_pub,
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+ dh->pub_key,
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+ shared_secret,
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+ hash, &hashlen
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+ );
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+ break;
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+ default:
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+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
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+ }
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+
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+ BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
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+
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+ if (ssh->kex->session_id == NULL) {
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+ ssh->kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
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+ ssh->kex->session_id = xmalloc(ssh->kex->session_id_len);
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+ memcpy(ssh->kex->session_id, hash, ssh->kex->session_id_len);
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+ }
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+
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+ gssbuf.value = hash;
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+ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
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+
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+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok))))
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+ fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
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+
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+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE);
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+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
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+ packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length);
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+
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+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
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+ packet_put_char(1); /* true */
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+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
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+ } else {
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+ packet_put_char(0); /* false */
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+ }
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+ packet_send();
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+
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+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
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+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
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+
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+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
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+ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
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+ else
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+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
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+
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+ DH_free(dh);
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+
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+ kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
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+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
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+ kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
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+
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+ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
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+ * just exchanged. */
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+ if (options.gss_store_rekey)
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+ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
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+ return 0;
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+}
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+#endif /* GSSAPI */
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diff -up openssh-7.4p1/kex.h.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/kex.h
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--- openssh-7.4p1/kex.h.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
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+++ openssh-7.4p1/kex.h 2016-12-23 13:38:53.728301005 +0100
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@@ -99,6 +99,11 @@ enum kex_exchange {
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KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
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KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
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KEX_C25519_SHA256,
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+#ifdef GSSAPI
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+ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
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+ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
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+ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
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+#endif
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KEX_MAX
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};
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@@ -147,6 +152,12 @@ struct kex {
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u_int flags;
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int hash_alg;
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int ec_nid;
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+#ifdef GSSAPI
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+ int gss_deleg_creds;
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+ int gss_trust_dns;
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+ char *gss_host;
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+ char *gss_client;
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+#endif
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char *client_version_string;
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char *server_version_string;
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char *failed_choice;
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@@ -196,6 +207,10 @@ int kexecdh_client(struct ssh *);
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int kexecdh_server(struct ssh *);
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int kexc25519_client(struct ssh *);
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int kexc25519_server(struct ssh *);
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+#ifdef GSSAPI
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+int kexgss_client(struct ssh *);
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+int kexgss_server(struct ssh *);
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+#endif
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int kex_dh_hash(int, const char *, const char *,
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const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t,
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diff -up openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in
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--- openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.723301004 +0100
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+++ openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in 2016-12-23 13:40:32.226320197 +0100
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@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
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readpass.o rsa.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addrmatch.o \
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atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o utf8.o \
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monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
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+ kexgssc.o \
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msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
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ssh-pkcs11.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
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poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \
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@@ -112,7 +113,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passw
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auth-skey.o auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
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auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
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monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
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- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
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+ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
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loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
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sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
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sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
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diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
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--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.687300997 +0100
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+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c 2016-12-23 13:45:49.347381091 +0100
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@@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer
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int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
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int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
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int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
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+int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *);
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+int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *);
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#endif
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#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
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@@ -236,11 +238,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
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{MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
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{MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok},
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{MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
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+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
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#endif
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{0, 0, NULL}
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};
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struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
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+#ifdef GSSAPI
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+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
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+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
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+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
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+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
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+#endif
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#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
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{MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
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#endif
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@@ -307,6 +316,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
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/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
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monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
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monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
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+#ifdef GSSAPI
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+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
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+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
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+#endif
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/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
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while (!authenticated) {
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@@ -406,6 +419,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *p
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monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
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monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
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monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
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+#ifdef GSSAPI
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+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
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+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
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+#endif
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if (!no_pty_flag) {
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monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
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@@ -1633,6 +1650,13 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *p
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# endif
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#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
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kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
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+#ifdef GSSAPI
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+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
|
|
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
|
|
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
|
|
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+#endif
|
|
kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
|
|
kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
|
|
kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
|
|
@@ -1712,7 +1736,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer
|
|
OM_uint32 major;
|
|
u_int len;
|
|
|
|
- if (!options.gss_authentication)
|
|
+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
|
|
fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
|
|
|
|
goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
|
|
@@ -1742,7 +1766,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffe
|
|
OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
|
|
u_int len;
|
|
|
|
- if (!options.gss_authentication)
|
|
+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
|
|
fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
|
|
|
|
in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
|
|
@@ -1762,6 +1786,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffe
|
|
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
|
|
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
|
|
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
|
|
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
@@ -1773,7 +1798,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer
|
|
OM_uint32 ret;
|
|
u_int len;
|
|
|
|
- if (!options.gss_authentication)
|
|
+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
|
|
fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
|
|
|
|
gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
|
|
@@ -1802,10 +1827,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m
|
|
{
|
|
int authenticated;
|
|
|
|
- if (!options.gss_authentication)
|
|
+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
|
|
fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
|
|
|
|
- authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
|
|
+ authenticated = authctxt->valid &&
|
|
+ ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw);
|
|
|
|
buffer_clear(m);
|
|
buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
|
|
@@ -1818,5 +1844,73 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m
|
|
/* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
|
|
return (authenticated);
|
|
}
|
|
+
|
|
+int
|
|
+mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ gss_buffer_desc data;
|
|
+ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
|
|
+ OM_uint32 major, minor;
|
|
+ u_int len;
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
|
|
+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
|
|
+
|
|
+ data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
|
|
+ data.length = len;
|
|
+ if (data.length != 20)
|
|
+ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__,
|
|
+ (int) data.length);
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */
|
|
+ if (session_id2_len == 0) {
|
|
+ session_id2_len = data.length;
|
|
+ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
|
|
+ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
|
|
+
|
|
+ free(data.value);
|
|
+
|
|
+ buffer_clear(m);
|
|
+ buffer_put_int(m, major);
|
|
+ buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
|
|
+
|
|
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
|
|
+
|
|
+ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
|
|
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */
|
|
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1);
|
|
+
|
|
+ return (0);
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+int
|
|
+mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) {
|
|
+ ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
|
|
+ int ok;
|
|
+
|
|
+ store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
|
|
+ store.envvar = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
|
|
+ store.envval = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
|
|
+
|
|
+ ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
|
|
+
|
|
+ free(store.filename);
|
|
+ free(store.envvar);
|
|
+ free(store.envval);
|
|
+
|
|
+ buffer_clear(m);
|
|
+ buffer_put_int(m, ok);
|
|
+
|
|
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
|
|
+
|
|
+ return(0);
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
#endif /* GSSAPI */
|
|
|
|
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h
|
|
--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.687300997 +0100
|
|
+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h 2016-12-23 13:38:53.729301005 +0100
|
|
@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
|
|
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
|
|
MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 80,
|
|
#endif
|
|
+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 82, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 83,
|
|
+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 84, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 85,
|
|
|
|
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
|
|
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
|
|
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
|
|
--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.687300997 +0100
|
|
+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c 2016-12-23 13:38:53.729301005 +0100
|
|
@@ -943,7 +943,7 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
-mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
|
|
+mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
|
|
{
|
|
Buffer m;
|
|
int authenticated = 0;
|
|
@@ -960,5 +960,50 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
|
|
debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
|
|
return (authenticated);
|
|
}
|
|
+
|
|
+OM_uint32
|
|
+mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ Buffer m;
|
|
+ OM_uint32 major;
|
|
+ u_int len;
|
|
+
|
|
+ buffer_init(&m);
|
|
+ buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length);
|
|
+
|
|
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m);
|
|
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m);
|
|
+
|
|
+ major = buffer_get_int(&m);
|
|
+ hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
|
|
+ hash->length = len;
|
|
+
|
|
+ buffer_free(&m);
|
|
+
|
|
+ return(major);
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+int
|
|
+mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ Buffer m;
|
|
+ int ok;
|
|
+
|
|
+ buffer_init(&m);
|
|
+
|
|
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : "");
|
|
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : "");
|
|
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : "");
|
|
+
|
|
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
|
|
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
|
|
+
|
|
+ ok = buffer_get_int(&m);
|
|
+
|
|
+ buffer_free(&m);
|
|
+
|
|
+ return (ok);
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
#endif /* GSSAPI */
|
|
|
|
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h
|
|
--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.687300997 +0100
|
|
+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h 2016-12-23 13:38:53.729301005 +0100
|
|
@@ -58,8 +58,10 @@ int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int
|
|
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
|
|
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
|
|
gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
|
|
-int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
|
|
+int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *);
|
|
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
|
|
+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
|
|
+int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_PAM
|
|
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/readconf.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/readconf.c
|
|
--- openssh-7.4p1/readconf.c.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
|
|
+++ openssh-7.4p1/readconf.c 2016-12-23 13:38:53.730301005 +0100
|
|
@@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ typedef enum {
|
|
oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
|
|
oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
|
|
oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
|
|
+ oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
|
|
+ oGssServerIdentity,
|
|
oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
|
|
oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
|
|
oHashKnownHosts,
|
|
@@ -205,10 +207,19 @@ static struct {
|
|
{ "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
|
|
#if defined(GSSAPI)
|
|
{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
|
|
+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx },
|
|
{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
|
|
+ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
|
|
+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
|
|
+ { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity },
|
|
+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
|
|
#else
|
|
{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
|
|
+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
|
|
{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
|
|
+ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
|
|
+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported },
|
|
+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported },
|
|
#endif
|
|
{ "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
|
|
{ "usersh", oDeprecated },
|
|
@@ -961,10 +972,30 @@ parse_time:
|
|
intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
|
|
goto parse_flag;
|
|
|
|
+ case oGssKeyEx:
|
|
+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
|
|
+ goto parse_flag;
|
|
+
|
|
case oGssDelegateCreds:
|
|
intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
|
|
goto parse_flag;
|
|
|
|
+ case oGssTrustDns:
|
|
+ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
|
|
+ goto parse_flag;
|
|
+
|
|
+ case oGssClientIdentity:
|
|
+ charptr = &options->gss_client_identity;
|
|
+ goto parse_string;
|
|
+
|
|
+ case oGssServerIdentity:
|
|
+ charptr = &options->gss_server_identity;
|
|
+ goto parse_string;
|
|
+
|
|
+ case oGssRenewalRekey:
|
|
+ intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
|
|
+ goto parse_flag;
|
|
+
|
|
case oBatchMode:
|
|
intptr = &options->batch_mode;
|
|
goto parse_flag;
|
|
@@ -1776,7 +1807,12 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
|
|
options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
|
|
options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
|
|
options->gss_authentication = -1;
|
|
+ options->gss_keyex = -1;
|
|
options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
|
|
+ options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
|
|
+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
|
|
+ options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
|
|
+ options->gss_server_identity = NULL;
|
|
options->password_authentication = -1;
|
|
options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
|
|
options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
|
|
@@ -1920,8 +1956,14 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
|
|
options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
|
|
if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
|
|
options->gss_authentication = 0;
|
|
+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
|
|
+ options->gss_keyex = 0;
|
|
if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
|
|
options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
|
|
+ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
|
|
+ options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
|
|
+ if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
|
|
+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
|
|
if (options->password_authentication == -1)
|
|
options->password_authentication = 1;
|
|
if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
|
|
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/readconf.h.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/readconf.h
|
|
--- openssh-7.4p1/readconf.h.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
|
|
+++ openssh-7.4p1/readconf.h 2016-12-23 13:38:53.730301005 +0100
|
|
@@ -45,7 +45,12 @@ typedef struct {
|
|
int challenge_response_authentication;
|
|
/* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
|
|
int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */
|
|
+ int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */
|
|
int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */
|
|
+ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
|
|
+ int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */
|
|
+ char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
|
|
+ char *gss_server_identity; /* GSSAPI target principal */
|
|
int password_authentication; /* Try password
|
|
* authentication. */
|
|
int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
|
|
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/regress/cert-hostkey.sh.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/regress/cert-hostkey.sh
|
|
--- openssh-7.4p1/regress/cert-hostkey.sh.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
|
|
+++ openssh-7.4p1/regress/cert-hostkey.sh 2016-12-23 13:38:53.731301006 +0100
|
|
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ touch $OBJ/host_revoked_plain
|
|
touch $OBJ/host_revoked_cert
|
|
cat $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub $OBJ/host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/host_revoked_ca
|
|
|
|
-PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/g;s/^ssh-//'`
|
|
+PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | grep -v null | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/g;s/^ssh-//'`
|
|
|
|
if echo "$PLAIN_TYPES" | grep '^rsa$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
|
|
PLAIN_TYPES="$PLAIN_TYPES rsa-sha2-256 rsa-sha2-512"
|
|
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh
|
|
--- openssh-7.4p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
|
|
+++ openssh-7.4p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh 2016-12-23 13:38:53.731301006 +0100
|
|
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/us
|
|
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
|
|
cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
|
|
|
|
-PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'`
|
|
+PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | grep -v null | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'`
|
|
|
|
if echo "$PLAIN_TYPES" | grep '^rsa$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
|
|
PLAIN_TYPES="$PLAIN_TYPES rsa-sha2-256 rsa-sha2-512"
|
|
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/regress/kextype.sh.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/regress/kextype.sh
|
|
--- openssh-7.4p1/regress/kextype.sh.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
|
|
+++ openssh-7.4p1/regress/kextype.sh 2016-12-23 13:38:53.731301006 +0100
|
|
@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ echo "KexAlgorithms=$KEXOPT" >> $OBJ/ssh
|
|
|
|
tries="1 2 3 4"
|
|
for k in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do
|
|
+ if [ $k = "gss-gex-sha1-" -o $k = "gss-group1-sha1-" -o $k = "gss-group14-sha1-" ]; then
|
|
+ continue
|
|
+ fi
|
|
verbose "kex $k"
|
|
for i in $tries; do
|
|
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o KexAlgorithms=$k x true
|
|
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/regress/rekey.sh.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/regress/rekey.sh
|
|
--- openssh-7.4p1/regress/rekey.sh.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
|
|
+++ openssh-7.4p1/regress/rekey.sh 2016-12-23 13:38:53.731301006 +0100
|
|
@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@ increase_datafile_size 300
|
|
|
|
opts=""
|
|
for i in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do
|
|
+ if [ $i = "gss-gex-sha1-" -o $i = "gss-group1-sha1-" -o $i = "gss-group14-sha1-" ]; then
|
|
+ continue
|
|
+ fi
|
|
opts="$opts KexAlgorithms=$i"
|
|
done
|
|
for i in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do
|
|
@@ -56,6 +59,9 @@ done
|
|
if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep '^.*$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
|
|
for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher-auth`; do
|
|
for kex in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do
|
|
+ if [ $kex = "gss-gex-sha1-" -o $kex = "gss-group1-sha1-" -o $kex = "gss-group14-sha1-" ]; then
|
|
+ continue
|
|
+ fi
|
|
verbose "client rekey $c $kex"
|
|
ssh_data_rekeying "KexAlgorithms=$kex" -oRekeyLimit=256k -oCiphers=$c
|
|
done
|
|
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
|
|
--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.717301003 +0100
|
|
+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c 2016-12-23 13:38:53.732301006 +0100
|
|
@@ -113,8 +113,10 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
|
|
options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
|
|
options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
|
|
options->gss_authentication=-1;
|
|
+ options->gss_keyex = -1;
|
|
options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
|
|
options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
|
|
+ options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
|
|
options->password_authentication = -1;
|
|
options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
|
|
options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
|
|
@@ -268,10 +270,14 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
|
|
options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
|
|
if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
|
|
options->gss_authentication = 0;
|
|
+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
|
|
+ options->gss_keyex = 0;
|
|
if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
|
|
options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
|
|
if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
|
|
options->gss_strict_acceptor = 0;
|
|
+ if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
|
|
+ options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
|
|
if (options->password_authentication == -1)
|
|
options->password_authentication = 1;
|
|
if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
|
|
@@ -410,7 +416,7 @@ typedef enum {
|
|
sHostKeyAlgorithms,
|
|
sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
|
|
sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
|
|
- sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
|
|
+ sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
|
|
sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
|
|
sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
|
|
sHostCertificate,
|
|
@@ -484,11 +490,17 @@ static struct {
|
|
{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
|
|
{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
|
|
{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
|
|
+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
|
|
+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
|
|
#else
|
|
{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
|
|
{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
|
|
{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
|
|
+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
|
|
+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
|
|
#endif
|
|
+ { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
|
|
+ { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
|
|
{ "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
|
|
{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
|
|
{ "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
|
|
@@ -1211,6 +1223,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
|
|
intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
|
|
goto parse_flag;
|
|
|
|
+ case sGssKeyEx:
|
|
+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
|
|
+ goto parse_flag;
|
|
+
|
|
case sGssCleanupCreds:
|
|
intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
|
|
goto parse_flag;
|
|
@@ -1219,6 +1235,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
|
|
intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
|
|
goto parse_flag;
|
|
|
|
+ case sGssStoreRekey:
|
|
+ intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
|
|
+ goto parse_flag;
|
|
+
|
|
case sPasswordAuthentication:
|
|
intptr = &options->password_authentication;
|
|
goto parse_flag;
|
|
@@ -2257,6 +2277,9 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
|
|
#ifdef GSSAPI
|
|
dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
|
|
dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
|
|
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
|
|
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
|
|
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
|
|
#endif
|
|
dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
|
|
dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
|
|
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
|
|
--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.717301003 +0100
|
|
+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h 2016-12-23 13:38:53.732301006 +0100
|
|
@@ -112,8 +112,10 @@ typedef struct {
|
|
int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if
|
|
* authenticated with Kerberos. */
|
|
int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
|
|
+ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
|
|
int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
|
|
int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
|
|
+ int gss_store_rekey;
|
|
int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
|
|
* authentication. */
|
|
int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
|
|
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5
|
|
--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.732301006 +0100
|
|
+++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5 2016-12-23 13:48:00.502331870 +0100
|
|
@@ -748,10 +748,40 @@ The default is
|
|
Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
|
|
The default is
|
|
.Cm no .
|
|
+.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity
|
|
+If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when
|
|
+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default
|
|
+identity will be used.
|
|
.It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
|
|
Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
|
|
The default is
|
|
.Cm no .
|
|
+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
|
|
+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
|
|
+GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
|
|
+The default is
|
|
+.Dq no .
|
|
+.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
|
|
+If set to
|
|
+.Dq yes
|
|
+then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the
|
|
+ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed
|
|
+credentials to a session on the server.
|
|
+The default is
|
|
+.Dq no .
|
|
+.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity
|
|
+If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when
|
|
+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the
|
|
+expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target
|
|
+hostname.
|
|
+.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
|
|
+Set to
|
|
+.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
|
|
+the name of the host being connected to. If
|
|
+.Dq no, the hostname entered on the
|
|
+command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
|
|
+The default is
|
|
+.Dq no .
|
|
.It Cm HashKnownHosts
|
|
Indicates that
|
|
.Xr ssh 1
|
|
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config
|
|
--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.708301001 +0100
|
|
+++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config 2016-12-23 13:38:53.733301006 +0100
|
|
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
|
|
# HostbasedAuthentication no
|
|
# GSSAPIAuthentication no
|
|
# GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
|
|
+# GSSAPIKeyExchange no
|
|
+# GSSAPITrustDNS no
|
|
# BatchMode no
|
|
# CheckHostIP yes
|
|
# AddressFamily any
|
|
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c
|
|
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
|
|
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c 2016-12-23 13:38:53.733301006 +0100
|
|
@@ -162,9 +162,34 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
|
|
struct kex *kex;
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
+#ifdef GSSAPI
|
|
+ char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL;
|
|
+ char *gss_host = NULL;
|
|
+#endif
|
|
+
|
|
xxx_host = host;
|
|
xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
|
|
|
|
+#ifdef GSSAPI
|
|
+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
|
|
+ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
|
|
+ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
|
|
+ orig = options.kex_algorithms;
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (options.gss_trust_dns)
|
|
+ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(active_state, 1);
|
|
+ else
|
|
+ gss_host = host;
|
|
+
|
|
+ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity);
|
|
+ if (gss) {
|
|
+ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
|
|
+ xasprintf(&options.kex_algorithms,
|
|
+ "%s,%s", gss, orig);
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ }
|
|
+#endif
|
|
+
|
|
if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL)
|
|
fatal("%s: kex_names_cat", __func__);
|
|
myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(s);
|
|
@@ -192,6 +217,17 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
|
|
order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
+#ifdef GSSAPI
|
|
+ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
|
|
+ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
|
|
+ if (options.gss_keyex && gss) {
|
|
+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
|
|
+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
|
|
+ "%s,null", orig);
|
|
+ free(gss);
|
|
+ }
|
|
+#endif
|
|
+
|
|
if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
|
|
packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
|
|
(time_t)options.rekey_interval);
|
|
@@ -212,11 +248,31 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
|
|
kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client;
|
|
# endif
|
|
#endif
|
|
+#ifdef GSSAPI
|
|
+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
|
|
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
|
|
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
|
|
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+#endif
|
|
kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client;
|
|
kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
|
|
kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
|
|
kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
|
|
|
|
+#ifdef GSSAPI
|
|
+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
|
|
+ kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
|
|
+ kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
|
|
+ kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity;
|
|
+ if (options.gss_server_identity) {
|
|
+ kex->gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
+ kex->gss_host = gss_host;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ }
|
|
+#endif
|
|
+
|
|
dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, active_state);
|
|
|
|
/* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */
|
|
@@ -311,6 +367,7 @@ int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32
|
|
int input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
|
|
int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
|
|
int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
|
|
+int userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
void userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
|
|
@@ -327,6 +384,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
|
|
|
|
Authmethod authmethods[] = {
|
|
#ifdef GSSAPI
|
|
+ {"gssapi-keyex",
|
|
+ userauth_gsskeyex,
|
|
+ NULL,
|
|
+ &options.gss_authentication,
|
|
+ NULL},
|
|
{"gssapi-with-mic",
|
|
userauth_gssapi,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
@@ -652,19 +714,31 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
|
|
static u_int mech = 0;
|
|
OM_uint32 min;
|
|
int ok = 0;
|
|
+ const char *gss_host;
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (options.gss_server_identity)
|
|
+ gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
|
|
+ else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
|
|
+ gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(active_state, 1);
|
|
+ else
|
|
+ gss_host = authctxt->host;
|
|
|
|
/* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
|
|
* once. */
|
|
|
|
if (gss_supported == NULL)
|
|
- gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported);
|
|
+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) {
|
|
+ gss_supported = NULL;
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
/* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
|
|
while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
|
|
/* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
|
|
if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
|
|
ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
|
|
- &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
|
|
+ &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host,
|
|
+ options.gss_client_identity)) {
|
|
ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
|
|
} else {
|
|
mech++;
|
|
@@ -761,8 +835,8 @@ input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_
|
|
{
|
|
Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
|
|
Gssctxt *gssctxt;
|
|
- int oidlen;
|
|
- char *oidv;
|
|
+ u_int oidlen;
|
|
+ u_char *oidv;
|
|
|
|
if (authctxt == NULL)
|
|
fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
|
|
@@ -875,6 +949,48 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t p
|
|
free(lang);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
+
|
|
+int
|
|
+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ Buffer b;
|
|
+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
|
|
+ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
|
|
+ OM_uint32 ms;
|
|
+
|
|
+ static int attempt = 0;
|
|
+ if (attempt++ >= 1)
|
|
+ return (0);
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
|
|
+ debug("No valid Key exchange context");
|
|
+ return (0);
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
|
|
+ "gssapi-keyex");
|
|
+
|
|
+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
|
|
+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
|
|
+ buffer_free(&b);
|
|
+ return (0);
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
|
|
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
|
|
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
|
|
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
|
|
+ packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
|
|
+ packet_send();
|
|
+
|
|
+ buffer_free(&b);
|
|
+ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
|
|
+
|
|
+ return (1);
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
#endif /* GSSAPI */
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
diff -up openssh-7.2p1/sshd.c.gsskex openssh-7.2p1/sshd.c
|
|
--- openssh-7.2p1/sshd.c.gsskex 2016-02-19 10:01:04.860969328 +0100
|
|
+++ openssh-7.2p1/sshd.c 2016-02-19 10:01:04.872969321 +0100
|
|
@@ -547,7 +547,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
|
|
|
|
#ifdef GSSAPI
|
|
/* Cache supported mechanism OIDs for later use */
|
|
- if (options.gss_authentication)
|
|
+ if (options.gss_authentication || options.gss_keyex)
|
|
ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
@@ -974,8 +974,9 @@ notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
|
|
}
|
|
debug3("%s: sent %d hostkeys", __func__, nkeys);
|
|
if (nkeys == 0)
|
|
- fatal("%s: no hostkeys", __func__);
|
|
- packet_send();
|
|
+ debug3("%s: no hostkeys", __func__);
|
|
+ else
|
|
+ packet_send();
|
|
sshbuf_free(buf);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
@@ -1739,7 +1740,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
|
|
key ? "private" : "agent", i, sshkey_ssh_name(pubkey), fp);
|
|
free(fp);
|
|
}
|
|
- if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
|
|
+ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
|
|
+ if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key && !options.gss_keyex) {
|
|
logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
@@ -2196,6 +2198,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
|
|
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
|
|
list_hostkey_types());
|
|
|
|
+#ifdef GSSAPI
|
|
+ {
|
|
+ char *orig;
|
|
+ char *gss = NULL;
|
|
+ char *newstr = NULL;
|
|
+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
|
|
+
|
|
+ /*
|
|
+ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
|
|
+ * the other key exchange algorithms
|
|
+ */
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
|
|
+ orig = NULL;
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (options.gss_keyex)
|
|
+ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
|
|
+ else
|
|
+ gss = NULL;
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (gss && orig)
|
|
+ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
|
|
+ else if (gss)
|
|
+ newstr = gss;
|
|
+ else if (orig)
|
|
+ newstr = orig;
|
|
+
|
|
+ /*
|
|
+ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
|
|
+ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
|
|
+ * host key algorithm we support
|
|
+ */
|
|
+ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
|
|
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (newstr)
|
|
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
|
|
+ else
|
|
+ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
|
|
+ }
|
|
+#endif
|
|
+
|
|
/* start key exchange */
|
|
if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0)
|
|
fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r));
|
|
@@ -2213,6 +2257,13 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
|
|
# endif
|
|
#endif
|
|
kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
|
|
+#ifdef GSSAPI
|
|
+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
|
|
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
|
|
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
|
|
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+#endif
|
|
kex->server = 1;
|
|
kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
|
|
kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
|
|
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
|
|
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.734301006 +0100
|
|
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 2016-12-23 13:48:57.825310358 +0100
|
|
@@ -628,6 +628,11 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
|
|
on logout.
|
|
The default is
|
|
.Cm yes .
|
|
+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
|
|
+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
|
|
+doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
|
|
+The default is
|
|
+.Dq no .
|
|
.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
|
|
Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
|
|
a client authenticates against.
|
|
@@ -642,6 +647,11 @@ machine's default store.
|
|
This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines.
|
|
The default is
|
|
.Cm yes .
|
|
+.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey
|
|
+Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a
|
|
+successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed
|
|
+or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is
|
|
+.Dq no .
|
|
.It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
|
|
Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication
|
|
as a comma-separated pattern list.
|
|
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
|
|
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.719301003 +0100
|
|
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config 2016-12-23 13:38:53.734301006 +0100
|
|
@@ -77,6 +77,8 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
|
|
# GSSAPI options
|
|
GSSAPIAuthentication yes
|
|
GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
|
|
+#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
|
|
+#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
|
|
|
|
# Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
|
|
# and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
|
|
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-gss.h.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/ssh-gss.h
|
|
--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-gss.h.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
|
|
+++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-gss.h 2016-12-23 13:38:53.734301006 +0100
|
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.11 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */
|
|
/*
|
|
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
|
|
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
|
|
*
|
|
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
@@ -61,10 +61,22 @@
|
|
|
|
#define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
|
|
|
|
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30
|
|
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31
|
|
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32
|
|
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33
|
|
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34
|
|
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40
|
|
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41
|
|
+#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-"
|
|
+#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-"
|
|
+#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-"
|
|
+
|
|
typedef struct {
|
|
char *filename;
|
|
char *envvar;
|
|
char *envval;
|
|
+ struct passwd *owner;
|
|
void *data;
|
|
} ssh_gssapi_ccache;
|
|
|
|
@@ -72,8 +84,11 @@ typedef struct {
|
|
gss_buffer_desc displayname;
|
|
gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
|
|
gss_cred_id_t creds;
|
|
+ gss_name_t name;
|
|
struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
|
|
ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
|
|
+ int used;
|
|
+ int updated;
|
|
} ssh_gssapi_client;
|
|
|
|
typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
|
|
@@ -84,6 +99,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
|
|
int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
|
|
int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
|
|
void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
|
|
+ int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
|
|
} ssh_gssapi_mech;
|
|
|
|
typedef struct {
|
|
@@ -94,10 +110,11 @@ typedef struct {
|
|
gss_OID oid; /* client */
|
|
gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */
|
|
gss_name_t client; /* server */
|
|
- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */
|
|
+ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */
|
|
} Gssctxt;
|
|
|
|
extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
|
|
+extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context;
|
|
|
|
int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
|
|
void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
|
|
@@ -119,16 +136,32 @@ void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **);
|
|
void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
|
|
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
|
|
void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
|
|
-int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
|
|
+int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
|
|
+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
|
|
+int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
|
|
|
|
/* In the server */
|
|
+typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *,
|
|
+ const char *);
|
|
+char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *);
|
|
+char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
|
|
+ const char *);
|
|
+gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
|
|
+int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *,
|
|
+ const char *);
|
|
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
|
|
-int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
|
|
+int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *);
|
|
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
|
|
void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
|
|
void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
|
|
void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
|
|
|
|
+char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
|
|
+int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok();
|
|
+
|
|
+int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store);
|
|
+
|
|
+void ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void);
|
|
#endif /* GSSAPI */
|
|
|
|
#endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
|
|
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.c
|
|
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.c.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
|
|
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.c 2016-12-23 13:38:53.735301006 +0100
|
|
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] =
|
|
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
|
|
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
|
|
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
|
|
+ { "null", "null", KEY_NULL, 0, 0, 1 },
|
|
{ NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0 }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.h.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.h
|
|
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.h.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
|
|
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.h 2016-12-23 13:38:53.735301006 +0100
|
|
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ enum sshkey_types {
|
|
KEY_DSA_CERT,
|
|
KEY_ECDSA_CERT,
|
|
KEY_ED25519_CERT,
|
|
+ KEY_NULL,
|
|
KEY_UNSPEC
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/auth.c
|
|
--- openssh-7.4p1/auth.c.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
|
|
+++ openssh-7.4p1/auth.c 2016-12-23 13:38:53.735301006 +0100
|
|
@@ -372,6 +372,7 @@ auth_root_allowed(const char *method)
|
|
case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
|
|
if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
|
|
strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
|
|
+ strcmp(method, "gssapi-keyex") == 0 ||
|
|
strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
@@ -795,99 +796,6 @@ fakepw(void)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
- * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
|
|
- * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
|
|
- * called.
|
|
- * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
|
|
- * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
|
|
- * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
|
|
- * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
|
|
- */
|
|
-
|
|
-static char *
|
|
-remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
|
|
-{
|
|
- struct sockaddr_storage from;
|
|
- socklen_t fromlen;
|
|
- struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
|
|
- char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
|
|
- const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
|
|
-
|
|
- /* Get IP address of client. */
|
|
- fromlen = sizeof(from);
|
|
- memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
|
|
- if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
|
|
- (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
|
|
- debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
|
|
- return strdup(ntop);
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
|
|
- if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
|
|
- fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
|
|
-
|
|
- debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
|
|
- /* Map the IP address to a host name. */
|
|
- if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
|
|
- NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
|
|
- /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */
|
|
- return strdup(ntop);
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- /*
|
|
- * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
|
|
- * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
|
|
- * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5
|
|
- */
|
|
- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
|
|
- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
|
|
- hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
|
|
- if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
|
|
- logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
|
|
- name, ntop);
|
|
- freeaddrinfo(ai);
|
|
- return strdup(ntop);
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- /* Names are stored in lowercase. */
|
|
- lowercase(name);
|
|
-
|
|
- /*
|
|
- * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
|
|
- * address actually is an address of this host. This is
|
|
- * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
|
|
- * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
|
|
- * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
|
|
- * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
|
|
- * the domain).
|
|
- */
|
|
- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
|
|
- hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
|
|
- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
|
|
- if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
|
|
- logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
|
|
- "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
|
|
- return strdup(ntop);
|
|
- }
|
|
- /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
|
|
- for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
|
|
- if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
|
|
- sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
|
|
- (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
|
|
- break;
|
|
- }
|
|
- freeaddrinfo(aitop);
|
|
- /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
|
|
- if (ai == NULL) {
|
|
- /* Address not found for the host name. */
|
|
- logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
|
|
- "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
|
|
- return strdup(ntop);
|
|
- }
|
|
- return strdup(name);
|
|
-}
|
|
-
|
|
-/*
|
|
* Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
|
|
* connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
|
|
* several times.
|
|
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
|
|
--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.688300997 +0100
|
|
+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2016-12-23 13:38:53.735301006 +0100
|
|
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@
|
|
#include "log.h"
|
|
#include "xmalloc.h"
|
|
#include "port-linux.h"
|
|
+#include "canohost.h"
|
|
+#include "misc.h"
|
|
|
|
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
|
|
#include <selinux/selinux.h>
|
|
@@ -279,4 +281,121 @@ oom_adjust_restore(void)
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* LINUX_OOM_ADJUST */
|
|
+
|
|
+/**************** XXX moved from auth.c ****************/
|
|
+
|
|
+/*
|
|
+ * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
|
|
+ * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
|
|
+ * called.
|
|
+ * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
|
|
+ * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
|
|
+ * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
|
|
+ * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
|
|
+ */
|
|
+
|
|
+char *
|
|
+remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ struct sockaddr_storage from;
|
|
+ socklen_t fromlen;
|
|
+ struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
|
|
+ char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
|
|
+ const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* Get IP address of client. */
|
|
+ fromlen = sizeof(from);
|
|
+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
|
|
+ if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
|
|
+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
|
|
+ debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
|
|
+ return strdup(ntop);
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
|
|
+ if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
|
|
+ fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
|
|
+
|
|
+ debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
|
|
+ /* Map the IP address to a host name. */
|
|
+ if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
|
|
+ NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
|
|
+ /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */
|
|
+ return strdup(ntop);
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ /*
|
|
+ * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
|
|
+ * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
|
|
+ * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5
|
|
+ */
|
|
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
|
|
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
|
|
+ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
|
|
+ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
|
|
+ logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
|
|
+ name, ntop);
|
|
+ freeaddrinfo(ai);
|
|
+ return strdup(ntop);
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* Names are stored in lowercase. */
|
|
+ lowercase(name);
|
|
+
|
|
+ /*
|
|
+ * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
|
|
+ * address actually is an address of this host. This is
|
|
+ * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
|
|
+ * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
|
|
+ * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
|
|
+ * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
|
|
+ * the domain).
|
|
+ */
|
|
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
|
|
+ hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
|
|
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
|
|
+ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
|
|
+ logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
|
|
+ "[%s] failed - POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!", name, ntop);
|
|
+ return strdup(ntop);
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
|
|
+ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
|
|
+ if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
|
|
+ sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
|
|
+ (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
|
|
+ break;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ freeaddrinfo(aitop);
|
|
+ /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
|
|
+ if (ai == NULL) {
|
|
+ /* Address not found for the host name. */
|
|
+ logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
|
|
+ "map back to the address - POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!",
|
|
+ ntop, name);
|
|
+ return strdup(ntop);
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ return strdup(name);
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+/*
|
|
+ * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
|
|
+ * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
|
|
+ * several times.
|
|
+ */
|
|
+
|
|
+const char *
|
|
+get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ static char *dnsname;
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (!use_dns)
|
|
+ return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
|
|
+ else if (dnsname != NULL)
|
|
+ return dnsname;
|
|
+ else {
|
|
+ dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh);
|
|
+ return dnsname;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+}
|
|
#endif /* WITH_SELINUX || LINUX_OOM_ADJUST */
|
|
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
|
|
--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.712301002 +0100
|
|
+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h 2016-12-23 13:38:53.735301006 +0100
|
|
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
|
|
|
|
#ifndef _PORT_LINUX_H
|
|
#define _PORT_LINUX_H
|
|
+#include "packet.h"
|
|
|
|
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
|
|
int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
|
|
@@ -36,4 +37,8 @@ void oom_adjust_setup(void);
|
|
|
|
void linux_seed(void);
|
|
|
|
+const char *get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *, int);
|
|
+char *remote_hostname(struct ssh *);
|
|
+
|
|
+
|
|
#endif /* ! _PORT_LINUX_H */
|