Fix malformed patch

This only version does incorrectly reports server_sig_algorithms
extension and in Fedora 33 with disabled SHA1, clients are unable
to connect to Debian servers

.gitignore

@@ -12,3 +12,36 @@ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2.tar.bz2
 /openssh-6.2p2.tar.gz
 /openssh-6.3p1.tar.gz
 /openssh-6.4p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-6.6p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-6.7p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-6.8p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-6.9p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.0p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.1p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.1p2.tar.gz
+/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2.tar.bz2
+/openssh-7.2p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.2p2.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.3p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.4p1.tar.gz
+/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3.tar.bz2
+/openssh-7.5p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.6p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.7p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.7p1.tar.gz.asc
+/DJM-GPG-KEY.gpg
+/openssh-7.8p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.8p1.tar.gz.asc
+/openssh-7.9p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.9p1.tar.gz.asc
+/openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz.asc
+/openssh-8.1p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-8.1p1.tar.gz.asc
+/openssh-8.2p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-8.2p1.tar.gz.asc
+/openssh-8.3p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-8.3p1.tar.gz.asc
+/openssh-8.4p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-8.4p1.tar.gz.asc
+/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4.tar.gz

openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
---- openssh-4.3p2/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info	2006-07-17 15:10:11.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-4.3p2/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2006-07-17 15:25:04.000000000 +0200
-@@ -65,9 +65,12 @@
- 	err = gtk_message_dialog_new(NULL, 0,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info	2016-12-23 13:31:22.645213115 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2016-12-23 13:31:40.997216691 +0100
+@@ -65,9 +65,12 @@ report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_wi
+ 	err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
  				     GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR,
  				     GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
 -				     "Could not grab %s. "
@@ -14,5 +15,5 @@
 +				     "Either close the application which grabs the %s or "
 +				     "log out and log in again to prevent this from happening.", what, what);
  	gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
- 	gtk_label_set_line_wrap(GTK_LABEL((GTK_MESSAGE_DIALOG(err))->label),
- 				TRUE);
+ 
+ 	gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(err));

openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch

@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
---- openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress	2008-07-23 19:05:26.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2008-07-23 19:05:26.000000000 +0200
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2016-12-23 13:31:16.545211926 +0100
 @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
- #include <string.h>
  #include <unistd.h>
+ 
  #include <X11/Xlib.h>
 +#include <glib.h>
  #include <gtk/gtk.h>
  #include <gdk/gdkx.h>
- 
-@@ -83,13 +84,24 @@ ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dia
- 	gtk_dialog_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
+ #include <gdk/gdkkeysyms.h>
+@@ -81,14 +82,25 @@ ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dia
+ 	return 1;
  }
  
 +static void
@@ -25,55 +25,59 @@ diff -up openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-5.1p1/contr
 +}
 +
  static int
- passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+ passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
  {
  	const char *failed;
  	char *passphrase, *local;
  	int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer;
--	GtkWidget *dialog, *entry;
-+	GtkWidget *dialog, *entry, *progress, *hbox;
+ 	int buttons, default_response;
+-	GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry;
++	GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry, *progress, *hbox;
  	GdkGrabStatus status;
+ 	GdkColor fg, bg;
+ 	int fg_set = 0, bg_set = 0;
+@@ -104,14 +116,19 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+ 		gtk_widget_modify_bg(dialog, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
  
- 	grab_server = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER") != NULL);
-@@ -102,13 +114,31 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
- 					"%s",
- 					message);
- 
-+	hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
-+	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE,
-+	    FALSE, 0);
-+	gtk_widget_show(hbox);
+ 	if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY || prompt_type == PROMPT_NONE) {
++		hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
++		gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE,
++		    FALSE, 0);
++		gtk_widget_show(hbox);
 +
- 	entry = gtk_entry_new();
--	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), entry, FALSE,
-+	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(hbox), entry, TRUE,
- 	    FALSE, 0);
-+	gtk_entry_set_width_chars(GTK_ENTRY(entry), 2);
- 	gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
- 	gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
- 	gtk_widget_show(entry);
- 
-+	hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
-+	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE,
-+	    FALSE, 8);
-+	gtk_widget_show(hbox);
+		entry = gtk_entry_new();
+		if (fg_set)
+			gtk_widget_modify_fg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &fg);
+		if (bg_set)
+			gtk_widget_modify_bg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
+		gtk_box_pack_start(
+-		    GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))),
+-		    entry, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
++		    GTK_BOX(hbox), entry, TRUE, FALSE, 0);
++		gtk_entry_set_width_chars(GTK_ENTRY(entry), 2);
+ 		gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
+ 		gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
+ 		if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY) {
+@@ -130,6 +145,22 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+ 			g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "key_press_event",
+ 			                 G_CALLBACK(check_none), dialog);
+ 		}
 +
-+	progress = gtk_progress_bar_new();
-+	
-+	gtk_progress_bar_set_text(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress), "Passphrase length hidden intentionally");
-+	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(hbox), progress, TRUE,
-+	    TRUE, 5);
-+	gtk_widget_show(progress);
++		hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
++		gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox),
++		    hbox, FALSE, FALSE, 8);
++		gtk_widget_show(hbox);
 +
- 	gtk_window_set_title(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), "OpenSSH");
- 	gtk_window_set_position (GTK_WINDOW(dialog), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
- 	gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
-@@ -119,6 +149,8 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
- 	gtk_dialog_set_default_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
- 	g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "activate",
- 			 G_CALLBACK(ok_dialog), dialog);
-+	g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "changed",
-+			 G_CALLBACK(move_progress), progress);
- 
- 	gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
++		progress = gtk_progress_bar_new();
++
++		gtk_progress_bar_set_text(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress),
++		    "Passphrase length hidden intentionally");
++		gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(hbox), progress, TRUE,
++		    TRUE, 5);
++		gtk_widget_show(progress);
++		g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "changed",
++				 G_CALLBACK(move_progress), progress);
++
+ 	}
  
+ 	/* Grab focus */

openssh-5.1p1-scp-manpage.patch

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.1p1/scp.1.manpage openssh-5.1p1/scp.1
---- openssh-5.1p1/scp.1.manpage	2008-07-12 09:12:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.1p1/scp.1	2008-07-23 19:18:15.000000000 +0200
-@@ -66,6 +66,14 @@ treating file names containing
- as host specifiers.
- Copies between two remote hosts are also permitted.
- .Pp
-+When copying a source file to a target file which already exists,
-+.Nm 
-+will replace the contents of the target file (keeping the inode).
-+.Pp
-+If the target file does not yet exist, an empty file with the target
-+file name is created, then filled with the source file contents.
-+No attempt is made at "near-atomic" transfer using temporary files.
-+.Pp
- The options are as follows:
- .Bl -tag -width Ds
- .It Fl 1

openssh-5.2p1-allow-ip-opts.patch

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.2p1/canohost.c.ip-opts openssh-5.2p1/canohost.c
---- openssh-5.2p1/canohost.c.ip-opts	2009-02-14 06:28:21.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.2p1/canohost.c	2009-09-01 15:31:29.000000000 +0200
-@@ -169,12 +169,27 @@ check_ip_options(int sock, char *ipaddr)
- 	option_size = sizeof(options);
- 	if (getsockopt(sock, ipproto, IP_OPTIONS, options,
- 	    &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
--		text[0] = '\0';
--		for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
--			snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
--			    " %2.2x", options[i]);
--		fatal("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s",
--		    ipaddr, text);
-+		i = 0;
-+		do {
-+			switch (options[i]) {
-+				case 0:
-+				case 1:
-+					++i;
-+					break;
-+				case 131:
-+				case 137:
-+				/* Fail, fatally, if we detect either loose or strict
-+			 	 * source routing options. */
-+					text[0] = '\0';
-+					for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
-+						snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
-+							" %2.2x", options[i]);
-+					fatal("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s",
-+						ipaddr, text);
-+				default:
-+					i += options[i + 1];
-+			}
-+		} while (i < option_size);
- 	}
- #endif /* IP_OPTIONS */
- }

openssh-5.6p1-exit-deadlock.patch

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.6p1/channels.c.exit-deadlock openssh-5.6p1/channels.c
---- openssh-5.6p1/channels.c.exit-deadlock	2010-08-05 15:09:48.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.6p1/channels.c	2010-08-23 12:41:43.000000000 +0200
-@@ -1647,6 +1647,10 @@ channel_handle_wfd(Channel *c, fd_set *r
- 	u_int dlen, olen = 0;
- 	int len;
- 
-+	if(c->wfd != -1 && buffer_len(&c->output) > 0 && c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
-+		debug("channel %d: forcing write", c->self);
-+		FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset);
-+	}
- 	/* Send buffered output data to the socket. */
- 	if (c->wfd != -1 &&
- 	    FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) &&

openssh-5.8p1-getaddrinfo.patch

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.6p1/channels.c.getaddrinfo openssh-5.6p1/channels.c
---- openssh-5.6p1/channels.c.getaddrinfo	2012-02-14 16:12:54.427852524 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.6p1/channels.c	2012-02-14 16:13:22.818928690 +0100
-@@ -3275,6 +3275,9 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
- 		memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- 		hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
- 		hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE;
-+#ifdef AI_ADDRCONFIG
-+		hints.ai_flags |= AI_ADDRCONFIG;
-+#endif
- 		hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
- 		snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
- 		if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(NULL, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
-diff -up openssh-5.6p1/sshconnect.c.getaddrinfo openssh-5.6p1/sshconnect.c
---- openssh-5.6p1/sshconnect.c.getaddrinfo	2012-02-14 16:09:25.057964291 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.6p1/sshconnect.c	2012-02-14 16:09:25.106047007 +0100
-@@ -343,6 +343,7 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct soc
- 	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- 	hints.ai_family = family;
- 	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
-+	hints.ai_flags = AI_V4MAPPED | AI_ADDRCONFIG;
- 	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port);
- 	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: Could not resolve hostname %.100s: %s", __progname,

openssh-5.8p1-glob.patch

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.8p1/sftp-glob.c.glob openssh-5.8p1/sftp-glob.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/sftp-glob.c.glob	2011-03-07 20:17:34.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1/sftp-glob.c	2011-03-07 20:18:47.000000000 +0100
-@@ -145,5 +145,5 @@ remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
- 	memset(&cur, 0, sizeof(cur));
- 	cur.conn = conn;
- 
--	return(glob(pattern, flags | GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC, errfunc, pglob));
-+	return(glob(pattern, flags | GLOB_LIMIT | GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC, errfunc, pglob));
- }

openssh-5.8p1-keyperm.patch

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.8p1/authfile.c.keyperm openssh-5.8p1/authfile.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/authfile.c.keyperm	2010-12-01 02:03:39.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1/authfile.c	2011-04-21 16:43:36.859648916 +0200
-@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
- #include <stdlib.h>
- #include <string.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
-+#include <grp.h>
- 
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "cipher.h"
-@@ -600,6 +612,13 @@ key_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename
- #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
- 	if (check_ntsec(filename))
- #endif
-+	if (st.st_mode & 040) {
-+		struct group *gr;
-+
-+		if ((gr = getgrnam("ssh_keys")) && (st.st_gid == gr->gr_gid))
-+			st.st_mode &= ~040;
-+	}
-+
- 	if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
- 		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
- 		error("@         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @");

openssh-5.8p1-localdomain.patch

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config.localdomain openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config
---- openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config.localdomain	2011-04-22 11:37:49.273648812 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config	2011-04-22 11:39:31.758648401 +0200
-@@ -130,6 +130,10 @@ X11Forwarding yes
- # override default of no subsystems
- Subsystem	sftp	/usr/libexec/sftp-server
- 
-+# Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain
-+#Host *.local
-+#	CheckHostIP no
-+
- # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
- #Match User anoncvs
- #	X11Forwarding no

openssh-5.8p1-packet.patch

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.8p1/packet.c.packet openssh-5.8p1/packet.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/packet.c.packet	2011-04-05 13:29:06.998648899 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.8p1/packet.c	2011-04-05 13:30:32.967648596 +0200
-@@ -294,6 +294,8 @@ packet_connection_is_on_socket(void)
- 	struct sockaddr_storage from, to;
- 	socklen_t fromlen, tolen;
- 
-+	if (!active_state)
-+		return 0;
- 	/* filedescriptors in and out are the same, so it's a socket */
- 	if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out)
- 		return 1;

openssh-5.8p2-remove-stale-control-socket.patch

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.8p2/mux.c.remove_stale openssh-5.8p2/mux.c
---- openssh-5.8p2/mux.c.remove_stale	2011-01-14 02:01:32.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p2/mux.c	2011-06-09 15:27:42.556360291 +0200
-@@ -1867,6 +1867,9 @@ muxclient(const char *path)
- 			unlink(path);
- 		} else if (errno == ENOENT) {
- 			debug("Control socket \"%.100s\" does not exist", path);
-+		} else if (errno == ECONNREFUSED) {
-+			debug("Removing stale control socket \"%.100s\"", path);
-+			unlink(path);
- 		} else {
- 			error("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path,
- 			    strerror(errno));

openssh-5.9p1-edns.patch

@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/dns.c.edns openssh-5.9p1/dns.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/dns.c.edns	2010-08-31 14:41:14.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/dns.c	2011-09-09 08:05:27.782440497 +0200
-@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname
- {
- 	u_int counter;
- 	int result;
-+	unsigned int rrset_flags = 0;
- 	struct rrsetinfo *fingerprints = NULL;
- 
- 	u_int8_t hostkey_algorithm;
-@@ -200,8 +201,19 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- 
-+	/*
-+	 * Original getrrsetbyname function, found on OpenBSD for example,
-+	 * doesn't accept any flag and prerequisite for obtaining AD bit in
-+	 * DNS response is set by "options edns0" in resolv.conf.
-+	 *
-+	 * Our version is more clever and use RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 flag.
-+	 */
-+#ifndef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME
-+	rrset_flags |= RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0;
-+#endif
- 	result = getrrsetbyname(hostname, DNS_RDATACLASS_IN,
--	    DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, 0, &fingerprints);
-+	    DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, rrset_flags, &fingerprints);
-+
- 	if (result) {
- 		verbose("DNS lookup error: %s", dns_result_totext(result));
- 		return -1;
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c.edns openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c.edns	2009-07-13 03:38:23.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c	2011-09-09 15:03:39.930500801 +0200
-@@ -209,8 +209,8 @@ getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, uns
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
- 
--	/* don't allow flags yet, unimplemented */
--	if (flags) {
-+	/* Allow RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 flag only. */
-+	if ((flags & ~RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0) != 0) {
- 		result = ERRSET_INVAL;
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
-@@ -226,9 +226,9 @@ getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, uns
- #endif /* DEBUG */
- 
- #ifdef RES_USE_DNSSEC
--	/* turn on DNSSEC if EDNS0 is configured */
--	if (_resp->options & RES_USE_EDNS0)
--		_resp->options |= RES_USE_DNSSEC;
-+	/* turn on DNSSEC if required  */
-+	if (flags & RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0)
-+		_resp->options |= (RES_USE_EDNS0|RES_USE_DNSSEC);
- #endif /* RES_USE_DNSEC */
- 
- 	/* make query */
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h.edns openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
---- openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h.edns	2007-10-26 08:26:50.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h	2011-09-09 08:05:27.965438689 +0200
-@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
- #ifndef RRSET_VALIDATED
- # define RRSET_VALIDATED	1
- #endif
-+#ifndef RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0
-+# define RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0	0x0001
-+#endif
- 
- /*
-  * Return codes for getrrsetbyname()

openssh-5.9p1-randclean.patch

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.9p0/entropy.c.randclean openssh-5.9p0/entropy.c
---- openssh-5.9p0/entropy.c.randclean	2011-08-30 13:52:45.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p0/entropy.c	2011-08-30 13:57:44.630111338 +0200
-@@ -217,6 +217,9 @@ seed_rng(void)
- 		fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you "
- 		    "have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay());
- 
-+	/* clean the PRNG status when exiting the program */
-+	atexit(RAND_cleanup);
-+
- #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
- 	if (RAND_status() == 1) {
- 		debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding");

openssh-5.9p1-wIm.patch

@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in.wIm openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in
---- openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in.wIm	2011-08-05 22:15:18.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in	2011-09-12 16:24:18.643674014 +0200
-@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=acss.o authfd.o authfile.o b
- 	cipher-bf1.o cipher-ctr.o cipher-3des1.o cleanup.o \
- 	compat.o compress.o crc32.o deattack.o fatal.o hostfile.o \
- 	log.o match.o md-sha256.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o \
--	readpass.o rsa.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addrmatch.o \
-+	readpass.o rsa.o ttymodes.o whereIam.o xmalloc.o addrmatch.o \
- 	atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
- 	monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
- 	kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/log.h.wIm openssh-5.9p1/log.h
---- openssh-5.9p1/log.h.wIm	2011-06-20 06:42:23.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/log.h	2011-09-12 16:34:52.984674326 +0200
-@@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ void     verbose(const char *, ...) __at
- void     debug(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
- void     debug2(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
- void     debug3(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
-+void	 _debug_wIm_body(const char *, int, const char *, const char *, int);
-+#define	debug_wIm(a,b) _debug_wIm_body(a,b,__func__,__FILE__,__LINE__)
- 
- 
- void	 set_log_handler(log_handler_fn *, void *);
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c.wIm openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c.wIm	2011-06-23 11:45:51.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c	2011-09-12 16:38:35.787816490 +0200
-@@ -140,6 +140,9 @@ int deny_severity;
- 
- extern char *__progname;
- 
-+/* trace of fork processes */
-+extern int whereIam;
-+
- /* Server configuration options. */
- ServerOptions options;
- 
-@@ -666,6 +669,7 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 		return 1;
- 	} else {
- 		/* child */
-+		whereIam = 1;
- 		close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
- 		close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
- 
-@@ -715,6 +719,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 
- 	/* child */
- 
-+	whereIam = 2;
- 	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
- 	pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
- 
-@@ -1325,6 +1330,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	Key *key;
- 	Authctxt *authctxt;
- 
-+	whereIam = 0;
-+
- #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
- 	(void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
- #endif
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/whereIam.c.wIm openssh-5.9p1/whereIam.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/whereIam.c.wIm	2011-09-12 16:24:18.722674167 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/whereIam.c	2011-09-12 16:24:18.724674418 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
-+
-+int whereIam = -1;
-+
-+void _debug_wIm_body(const char *txt, int val, const char *func, const char *file, int line)
-+{
-+	if (txt)
-+		debug("%s=%d, %s(%s:%d) wIm = %d, uid=%d, euid=%d", txt, val, func, file, line, whereIam, getuid(), geteuid());
-+	else
-+		debug("%s(%s:%d) wIm = %d, uid=%d, euid=%d", func, file, line, whereIam, getuid(), geteuid());
-+}
-+
-+

openssh-6.1p1-askpass-ld.patch

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/contrib/Makefile.askpass-ld openssh-6.1p1/contrib/Makefile
---- openssh-6.1p1/contrib/Makefile.askpass-ld	2012-05-19 07:24:37.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/contrib/Makefile	2012-09-14 20:35:47.565704718 +0200
-@@ -4,12 +4,12 @@ all:
- 	@echo "Valid targets: gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass2"
- 
- gnome-ssh-askpass1: gnome-ssh-askpass1.c
--	$(CC) `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \
-+	$(CC) ${CFLAGS} `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \
- 		gnome-ssh-askpass1.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass1 \
- 		`gnome-config --libs gnome gnomeui`
- 
- gnome-ssh-askpass2: gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
--	$(CC) `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags gtk+-2.0` \
-+	$(CC) ${CFLAGS} `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags gtk+-2.0` \
- 		gnome-ssh-askpass2.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass2 \
- 		`$(PKG_CONFIG) --libs gtk+-2.0 x11`
- 

openssh-6.1p1-gssapi-canohost.patch

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c.canohost openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c.canohost	2012-10-30 10:52:59.593301692 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c	2012-10-30 11:01:12.870301632 +0100
-@@ -699,12 +699,15 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 	static u_int mech = 0;
- 	OM_uint32 min;
- 	int ok = 0;
--	const char *gss_host;
-+	const char *gss_host = NULL;
- 
- 	if (options.gss_server_identity)
- 		gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
--	else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
-+	else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
- 		gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1);
-+		if ( strcmp( gss_host, "UNKNOWN" )  == 0 )
-+			gss_host = authctxt->host;
-+	}
- 	else
- 		gss_host = authctxt->host;
- 

openssh-6.2p1-entropy.patch

@@ -1,271 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/entropy.c.entropy openssh-6.2p1/entropy.c
---- openssh-6.2p1/entropy.c.entropy	2013-03-25 19:31:42.737611051 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/entropy.c	2013-03-25 19:31:42.797611433 +0100
-@@ -237,6 +237,9 @@ seed_rng(void)
- 	memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
- 
- #endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
-+#ifdef __linux__
-+	linux_seed();
-+#endif /* __linux__ */
- 	if (RAND_status() != 1)
- 		fatal("PRNG is not seeded");
- }
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.entropy openssh-6.2p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
---- openssh-6.2p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.entropy	2013-03-25 19:31:42.798611440 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in	2013-03-25 19:33:02.042116876 +0100
-@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bindresvport
- 
- COMPAT=bsd-arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o
- 
--PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux_part_2.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
-+PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux_part_2.o port-linux-prng.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
- 
- .c.o:
- 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c.entropy openssh-6.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
---- openssh-6.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c.entropy	2013-03-25 19:31:42.798611440 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c	2013-03-25 19:31:42.798611440 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
-+/* $Id: port-linux.c,v 1.11.4.2 2011/02/04 00:43:08 djm Exp $ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
-+ *
-+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
-+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
-+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
-+ *
-+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
-+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
-+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
-+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
-+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
-+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
-+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
-+ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * Linux-specific portability code - prng support
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#include <errno.h>
-+#include <stdarg.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <openssl/rand.h>
-+
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "servconf.h"
-+#include "port-linux.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "hostfile.h"
-+#include "auth.h"
-+
-+void
-+linux_seed(void)
-+{
-+	int len;
-+	char *env = getenv("SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG");
-+	char *random = "/dev/random";
-+	size_t ienv, randlen = 14;
-+
-+	if (!env || !strcmp(env, "0"))
-+		random = "/dev/urandom";
-+	else if ((ienv = atoi(env)) > randlen)
-+		randlen = ienv;
-+
-+	errno = 0;
-+	if ((len = RAND_load_file(random, randlen)) != randlen) {
-+		if (errno)
-+			fatal ("cannot read from %s, %s", random, strerror(errno));
-+		else
-+			fatal ("EOF reading %s", random);
-+	}
-+}
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ssh-add.0.entropy openssh-6.2p1/ssh-add.0
---- openssh-6.2p1/ssh-add.0.entropy	2013-03-22 00:38:29.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/ssh-add.0	2013-03-25 19:31:42.799611446 +0100
-@@ -82,6 +82,16 @@ ENVIRONMENT
-              Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to communicate
-              with the agent.
- 
-+     SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+             The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done
-+             from /dev/urandom.  If the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG environment vari-
-+             able is set to value other than 0 the OpenSSL random generator is
-+             reseeded from /dev/random.  The number of bytes read is defined
-+             by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.  Minimum is 14 bytes.  This set-
-+             ting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+             random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connec-
-+             tion to be blocked until enough entropy is available.
-+
- FILES
-      ~/.ssh/identity
-              Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ssh-add.1.entropy openssh-6.2p1/ssh-add.1
---- openssh-6.2p1/ssh-add.1.entropy	2012-12-07 03:06:13.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/ssh-add.1	2013-03-25 19:31:42.799611446 +0100
-@@ -160,6 +160,20 @@ to make this work.)
- Identifies the path of a
- .Ux Ns -domain
- socket used to communicate with the agent.
-+.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm /dev/urandom .
-+If the 
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm /dev/random .
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
-+Minimum is 14 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
- .El
- .Sh FILES
- .Bl -tag -width Ds
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ssh-agent.1.entropy openssh-6.2p1/ssh-agent.1
---- openssh-6.2p1/ssh-agent.1.entropy	2010-12-01 01:50:35.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/ssh-agent.1	2013-03-25 19:31:42.800611452 +0100
-@@ -198,6 +198,24 @@ sockets used to contain the connection t
- These sockets should only be readable by the owner.
- The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits.
- .El
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-+.Pp
-+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm /dev/urandom .
-+If the 
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm /dev/random .
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
-+Minimum is 14 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
-+.El
- .Sh SEE ALSO
- .Xr ssh 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/sshd.8.entropy openssh-6.2p1/sshd.8
---- openssh-6.2p1/sshd.8.entropy	2013-03-25 19:31:42.752611146 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/sshd.8	2013-03-25 19:31:42.800611452 +0100
-@@ -945,6 +945,24 @@ concurrently for different ports, this c
- started last).
- The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
- .El
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-+.Pp
-+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm /dev/urandom .
-+If the 
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm /dev/random .
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
-+Minimum is 14 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
-+.El
- .Sh IPV6
- IPv6 address can be used everywhere where IPv4 address. In all entries must be the IPv6 address enclosed in square brackets. Note: The square brackets are metacharacters for the shell and must be escaped in shell.
- .Sh SEE ALSO
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ssh-keygen.1.entropy openssh-6.2p1/ssh-keygen.1
---- openssh-6.2p1/ssh-keygen.1.entropy	2013-01-20 12:35:06.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/ssh-keygen.1	2013-03-25 19:31:42.801611459 +0100
-@@ -806,6 +806,24 @@ Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for
- The file format is described in
- .Xr moduli 5 .
- .El
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-+.Pp
-+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm /dev/urandom .
-+If the 
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm /dev/random .
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
-+Minimum is 14 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
-+.El
- .Sh SEE ALSO
- .Xr ssh 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ssh-keysign.8.entropy openssh-6.2p1/ssh-keysign.8
---- openssh-6.2p1/ssh-keysign.8.entropy	2010-08-31 14:41:14.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/ssh-keysign.8	2013-03-25 19:31:42.801611459 +0100
-@@ -78,6 +78,24 @@ must be set-uid root if host-based authe
- If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate
- information corresponding with the private keys above.
- .El
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-+.Pp
-+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm /dev/urandom .
-+If the 
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm /dev/random .
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
-+Minimum is 14 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
-+.El
- .Sh SEE ALSO
- .Xr ssh 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ssh.1.entropy openssh-6.2p1/ssh.1
---- openssh-6.2p1/ssh.1.entropy	2013-03-25 19:31:42.752611146 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/ssh.1	2013-03-25 19:31:42.799611446 +0100
-@@ -1277,6 +1277,23 @@ For more information, see the
- .Cm PermitUserEnvironment
- option in
- .Xr sshd_config 5 .
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-+.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm /dev/urandom .
-+If the 
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm /dev/random .
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
-+Minimum is 14 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
-+.El
- .Sh FILES
- .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
- .It Pa ~/.rhosts

openssh-6.2p1-vendor.patch

@@ -1,158 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/configure.ac.vendor openssh-6.2p1/configure.ac
---- openssh-6.2p1/configure.ac.vendor	2013-03-25 19:34:01.277495179 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/configure.ac	2013-03-25 19:34:01.377495818 +0100
-@@ -4420,6 +4420,12 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([lastlog],
- 		fi
- 	]
- )
-+AC_ARG_ENABLE(vendor-patchlevel,
-+  [  --enable-vendor-patchlevel=TAG  specify a vendor patch level],
-+  [AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL,[SSH_RELEASE "-" "$enableval"],[Define to your vendor patch level, if it has been modified from the upstream source release.])
-+   SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL="$enableval"],
-+  [AC_DEFINE(SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL,SSH_RELEASE,[Define to your vendor patch level, if it has been modified from the upstream source release.])
-+   SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL=none])
- 
- dnl lastlog, [uw]tmpx? detection
- dnl  NOTE: set the paths in the platform section to avoid the
-@@ -4681,6 +4687,7 @@ echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack
- echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
- echo "              Random number source: $RAND_MSG"
- echo "             Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE"
-+echo "                Vendor patch level: $SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL"
- 
- echo ""
- 
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/servconf.c.vendor openssh-6.2p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-6.2p1/servconf.c.vendor	2013-03-25 19:34:01.197494668 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/servconf.c	2013-03-25 19:34:01.379495831 +0100
-@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
- 	options->max_authtries = -1;
- 	options->max_sessions = -1;
- 	options->banner = NULL;
-+	options->show_patchlevel = -1;
- 	options->use_dns = -1;
- 	options->client_alive_interval = -1;
- 	options->client_alive_count_max = -1;
-@@ -287,6 +288,9 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
- 		options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_THROUGHPUT;
- 	if (options->version_addendum == NULL)
- 		options->version_addendum = xstrdup("");
-+	if (options->show_patchlevel == -1)
-+		options->show_patchlevel = 0;
-+
- 	/* Turn privilege separation on by default */
- 	if (use_privsep == -1)
- 		use_privsep = PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX;
-@@ -324,7 +328,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sProtocol, sPidFile,
- 	sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem,
- 	sMaxStartups, sMaxAuthTries, sMaxSessions,
--	sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
-+	sBanner, sShowPatchLevel, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
- 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
- 	sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
- 	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
-@@ -439,6 +443,7 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "maxauthtries", sMaxAuthTries, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "maxsessions", sMaxSessions, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "banner", sBanner, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+	{ "showpatchlevel", sShowPatchLevel, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "usedns", sUseDNS, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "verifyreversemapping", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1163,6 +1168,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 		multistate_ptr = multistate_privsep;
- 		goto parse_multistate;
- 
-+	case sShowPatchLevel:
-+		intptr = &options->show_patchlevel;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
- 	case sAllowUsers:
- 		while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
- 			if (options->num_allow_users >= MAX_ALLOW_USERS)
-@@ -1950,6 +1959,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseLogin, o->use_login);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sCompression, o->compression);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGatewayPorts, o->gateway_ports);
-+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sShowPatchLevel, o->show_patchlevel);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep);
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/servconf.h.vendor openssh-6.2p1/servconf.h
---- openssh-6.2p1/servconf.h.vendor	2013-01-09 05:56:45.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/servconf.h	2013-03-25 19:34:01.379495831 +0100
-@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ typedef struct {
- 	int	max_authtries;
- 	int	max_sessions;
- 	char   *banner;			/* SSH-2 banner message */
-+	int	show_patchlevel;	/* Show vendor patch level to clients */
- 	int	use_dns;
- 	int	client_alive_interval;	/*
- 					 * poke the client this often to
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.vendor openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config
---- openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.vendor	2013-03-25 19:34:01.380495837 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config	2013-03-25 19:44:43.471296362 +0100
-@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox		# Defaul
- #Compression delayed
- #ClientAliveInterval 0
- #ClientAliveCountMax 3
-+#ShowPatchLevel no
- #UseDNS yes
- #PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid
- #MaxStartups 10:30:100
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.0.vendor openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.0
---- openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.0.vendor	2013-03-25 19:34:01.361495716 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.0	2013-03-25 19:34:01.381495844 +0100
-@@ -595,6 +595,11 @@ DESCRIPTION
-              Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1
-              server key.  The minimum value is 512, and the default is 1024.
- 
-+     ShowPatchLevel
-+	     Specifies whether sshd will display the specific patch level of
-+	     the binary in the server identification string.  The patch level
-+	     is set at compile-time.  The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
-+
-      StrictModes
-              Specifies whether sshd(8) should check file modes and ownership
-              of the user's files and home directory before accepting login.
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.5.vendor openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.5.vendor	2013-03-25 19:34:01.362495722 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.5	2013-03-25 19:34:01.382495850 +0100
-@@ -1019,6 +1019,14 @@ This option applies to protocol version
- .It Cm ServerKeyBits
- Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key.
- The minimum value is 512, and the default is 1024.
-+.It Cm ShowPatchLevel 
-+Specifies whether 
-+.Nm sshd 
-+will display the patch level of the binary in the identification string. 
-+The patch level is set at compile-time. 
-+The default is 
-+.Dq no . 
-+This option applies to protocol version 1 only. 
- .It Cm StrictModes
- Specifies whether
- .Xr sshd 8
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c.vendor openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c.vendor	2013-03-25 19:34:01.332495531 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c	2013-03-25 19:44:11.864112092 +0100
-@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in
- 	}
- 
- 	xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s",
--	    major, minor, SSH_VERSION,
-+	    major, minor, (options.show_patchlevel == 1) ? SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL : SSH_VERSION,
- 	    *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
- 	    options.version_addendum, newline);
- 
-@@ -1675,7 +1675,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		exit(1);
- 	}
- 
--	debug("sshd version %s, %s", SSH_VERSION,
-+	debug("sshd version %s, %s",
-+	    (options.show_patchlevel == 1) ? SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL : SSH_VERSION,
- 	    SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
- 
- 	/* Store privilege separation user for later use if required. */

openssh-6.3p1-coverity.patch

@@ -1,788 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth-pam.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/auth-pam.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/auth-pam.c.coverity	2013-06-02 00:07:32.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth-pam.c	2013-10-07 13:20:36.288298063 +0200
-@@ -216,7 +216,12 @@ pthread_join(sp_pthread_t thread, void *
- 	if (sshpam_thread_status != -1)
- 		return (sshpam_thread_status);
- 	signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig);
--	waitpid(thread, &status, 0);
-+	while (waitpid(thread, &status, 0) < 0) {                     
-+		if (errno == EINTR)                                
-+			continue;
-+		fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,         
-+				strerror(errno));                      
-+	}
- 	return (status);
- }
- #endif
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/channels.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/channels.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/channels.c.coverity	2013-09-13 08:19:31.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/channels.c	2013-10-07 13:20:36.289298058 +0200
-@@ -233,11 +233,11 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd
- 	channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, wfd);
- 	channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, efd);
- 
--	if (rfd != -1)
-+	if (rfd >= 0)
- 		fcntl(rfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
--	if (wfd != -1 && wfd != rfd)
-+	if (wfd >= 0 && wfd != rfd)
- 		fcntl(wfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
--	if (efd != -1 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
-+	if (efd >= 0 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
- 		fcntl(efd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
- 
- 	c->rfd = rfd;
-@@ -255,11 +255,11 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd
- 
- 	/* enable nonblocking mode */
- 	if (nonblock) {
--		if (rfd != -1)
-+		if (rfd >= 0)
- 			set_nonblock(rfd);
--		if (wfd != -1)
-+		if (wfd >= 0)
- 			set_nonblock(wfd);
--		if (efd != -1)
-+		if (efd >= 0)
- 			set_nonblock(efd);
- 	}
- }
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/clientloop.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/clientloop.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/clientloop.c.coverity	2013-06-10 05:07:12.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/clientloop.c	2013-10-07 13:20:36.289298058 +0200
-@@ -2068,14 +2068,15 @@ client_input_global_request(int type, u_
- 	char *rtype;
- 	int want_reply;
- 	int success = 0;
-+/* success is still 0 the packet is allways SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, isn't it? */
- 
- 	rtype = packet_get_string(NULL);
- 	want_reply = packet_get_char();
- 	debug("client_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d",
- 	    rtype, want_reply);
- 	if (want_reply) {
--		packet_start(success ?
--		    SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
-+		packet_start(/*success ?
-+		    SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS :*/ SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
- 		packet_send();
- 		packet_write_wait();
- 	}
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/key.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/key.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/key.c.coverity	2013-06-01 23:41:51.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/key.c	2013-10-07 13:20:36.290298054 +0200
-@@ -807,8 +807,10 @@ key_read(Key *ret, char **cpp)
- 		success = 1;
- /*XXXX*/
- 		key_free(k);
-+/*XXXX
- 		if (success != 1)
- 			break;
-+XXXX*/
- 		/* advance cp: skip whitespace and data */
- 		while (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t')
- 			cp++;
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c.coverity	2013-07-20 05:21:53.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/monitor.c	2013-10-07 13:54:36.761314042 +0200
-@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
- 	mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
- 
- 	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
--	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
-+	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
- 		;
- 
- 	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
-@@ -1202,6 +1202,10 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m
- 			break;
- 		}
- 	}
-+
-+	debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
-+	    __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
-+
- 	if (key != NULL)
- 		key_free(key);
- 
-@@ -1223,9 +1227,6 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m
- 		free(chost);
- 	}
- 
--	debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
--	    __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
--
- 	buffer_clear(m);
- 	buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
- 	buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity	2013-06-02 00:07:32.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/monitor_wrap.c	2013-10-07 13:20:36.291298049 +0200
-@@ -710,10 +710,10 @@ mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd,
- 	if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
- 	    (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
- 		error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__);
--		if (tmp1 > 0)
-+		if (tmp1 >= 0)
- 			close(tmp1);
--		if (tmp2 > 0)
--			close(tmp2);
-+		/*DEAD CODE if (tmp2 >= 0)
-+			close(tmp2);*/
- 		return 0;
- 	}
- 	close(tmp1);
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity	2010-12-03 00:50:26.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c	2013-10-07 13:20:36.291298049 +0200
-@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr
- 	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
- 	u_int16_t *portp;
- 	u_int16_t port;
--	socklen_t salen;
-+	socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
- 	int i;
- 
- 	if (sa == NULL) {
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/packet.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/packet.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/packet.c.coverity	2013-07-18 08:12:45.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/packet.c	2013-10-07 13:20:36.291298049 +0200
-@@ -1199,6 +1199,7 @@ packet_read_poll1(void)
- 		case DEATTACK_DETECTED:
- 			packet_disconnect("crc32 compensation attack: "
- 			    "network attack detected");
-+			break;
- 		case DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED:
- 			packet_disconnect("deattack denial of "
- 			    "service detected");
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/progressmeter.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/progressmeter.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/progressmeter.c.coverity	2013-06-02 15:46:24.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/progressmeter.c	2013-10-07 13:42:32.377850691 +0200
-@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static void update_progress_meter(int);
- 
- static time_t start;		/* start progress */
- static time_t last_update;	/* last progress update */
--static char *file;		/* name of the file being transferred */
-+static const char *file;	/* name of the file being transferred */
- static off_t end_pos;		/* ending position of transfer */
- static off_t cur_pos;		/* transfer position as of last refresh */
- static volatile off_t *counter;	/* progress counter */
-@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ update_progress_meter(int ignore)
- }
- 
- void
--start_progress_meter(char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr)
-+start_progress_meter(const char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr)
- {
- 	start = last_update = monotime();
- 	file = f;
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/progressmeter.h.coverity openssh-6.3p1/progressmeter.h
---- openssh-6.3p1/progressmeter.h.coverity	2006-03-26 05:30:02.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/progressmeter.h	2013-10-07 13:20:36.292298044 +0200
-@@ -23,5 +23,5 @@
-  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-  */
- 
--void	start_progress_meter(char *, off_t, off_t *);
-+void	start_progress_meter(const char *, off_t, off_t *);
- void	stop_progress_meter(void);
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/scp.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/scp.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/scp.c.coverity	2013-07-18 08:11:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/scp.c	2013-10-07 13:20:36.292298044 +0200
-@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
- {
- 	if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
- 		kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
--		waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
-+		(void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
- 	}
- 
- 	if (signo)
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c.coverity	2013-07-20 05:21:53.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c	2013-10-07 13:20:36.293298039 +0200
-@@ -1323,7 +1323,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.",
- 			    filename, linenum);
- 		if (!*activep) {
--			arg = strdelim(&cp);
-+			/*arg =*/ (void) strdelim(&cp);
- 			break;
- 		}
- 		for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++)
-@@ -1414,8 +1414,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
- 			*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
- 			/* increase optional counter */
--			if (intptr != NULL)
--				*intptr = *intptr + 1;
-+			/* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;)
-+  			 if (intptr != NULL)
-+				*intptr = *intptr + 1; */
- 		}
- 		break;
- 
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/serverloop.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/serverloop.c.coverity	2013-07-18 08:12:45.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/serverloop.c	2013-10-07 13:43:36.620537138 +0200
-@@ -147,13 +147,13 @@ notify_setup(void)
- static void
- notify_parent(void)
- {
--	if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
- 		(void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
- }
- static void
- notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
- {
--	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
- 		FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
- }
- static void
-@@ -161,8 +161,8 @@ notify_done(fd_set *readset)
- {
- 	char c;
- 
--	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
--		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
-+		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
- 			debug2("notify_done: reading");
- }
- 
-@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **rea
- 		 * If we have buffered data, try to write some of that data
- 		 * to the program.
- 		 */
--		if (fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0)
-+		if (fdin >= 0 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0)
- 			FD_SET(fdin, *writesetp);
- 	}
- 	notify_prepare(*readsetp);
-@@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ process_output(fd_set *writeset)
- 	int len;
- 
- 	/* Write buffered data to program stdin. */
--	if (!compat20 && fdin != -1 && FD_ISSET(fdin, writeset)) {
-+	if (!compat20 && fdin >= 0 && FD_ISSET(fdin, writeset)) {
- 		data = buffer_ptr(&stdin_buffer);
- 		dlen = buffer_len(&stdin_buffer);
- 		len = write(fdin, data, dlen);
-@@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int
- 	set_nonblock(fdin);
- 	set_nonblock(fdout);
- 	/* we don't have stderr for interactive terminal sessions, see below */
--	if (fderr != -1)
-+	if (fderr >= 0)
- 		set_nonblock(fderr);
- 
- 	if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG) && isatty(fdin))
-@@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int
- 	max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out);
- 	max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdin);
- 	max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdout);
--	if (fderr != -1)
-+	if (fderr >= 0)
- 		max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fderr);
- #endif
- 
-@@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int
- 		 * If we have received eof, and there is no more pending
- 		 * input data, cause a real eof by closing fdin.
- 		 */
--		if (stdin_eof && fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) {
-+		if (stdin_eof && fdin >= 0 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) {
- 			if (fdin != fdout)
- 				close(fdin);
- 			else
-@@ -739,15 +739,15 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int
- 	buffer_free(&stderr_buffer);
- 
- 	/* Close the file descriptors. */
--	if (fdout != -1)
-+	if (fdout >= 0)
- 		close(fdout);
- 	fdout = -1;
- 	fdout_eof = 1;
--	if (fderr != -1)
-+	if (fderr >= 0)
- 		close(fderr);
- 	fderr = -1;
- 	fderr_eof = 1;
--	if (fdin != -1)
-+	if (fdin >= 0)
- 		close(fdin);
- 	fdin = -1;
- 
-@@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ server_input_window_size(int type, u_int
- 
- 	debug("Window change received.");
- 	packet_check_eom();
--	if (fdin != -1)
-+	if (fdin >= 0)
- 		pty_change_window_size(fdin, row, col, xpixel, ypixel);
- }
- 
-@@ -1006,7 +1006,7 @@ server_request_tun(void)
- 	}
- 
- 	tun = packet_get_int();
--	if (forced_tun_device != -1) {
-+	if (forced_tun_device >= 0) {
- 		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY && forced_tun_device != tun)
- 			goto done;
- 		tun = forced_tun_device;
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sftp-client.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/sftp-client.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/sftp-client.c.coverity	2013-07-26 00:40:00.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/sftp-client.c	2013-10-07 13:48:45.885027420 +0200
-@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ get_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, Buffer *
- }
- 
- static void
--send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, char *s,
-+send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, const char *s,
-     u_int len)
- {
- 	Buffer msg;
-@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *co
- 
- static void
- send_string_attrs_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code,
--    char *s, u_int len, Attrib *a)
-+    const char *s, u_int len, Attrib *a)
- {
- 	Buffer msg;
- 
-@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *con
- }
- 
- int
--do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len)
-+do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *handle, u_int handle_len)
- {
- 	u_int id, status;
- 	Buffer msg;
-@@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *h
- 
- 
- static int
--do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int printflag,
-+do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int printflag,
-     SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
- {
- 	Buffer msg;
-@@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, cha
- }
- 
- int
--do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
-+do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
- {
- 	return(do_lsreaddir(conn, path, 0, dir));
- }
-@@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **s)
- }
- 
- int
--do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
-+do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
- {
- 	u_int status, id;
- 
-@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path
- }
- 
- int
--do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, Attrib *a, int printflag)
-+do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a, int printflag)
- {
- 	u_int status, id;
- 
-@@ -621,7 +621,7 @@ do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *p
- }
- 
- int
--do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
-+do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
- {
- 	u_int status, id;
- 
-@@ -637,7 +637,7 @@ do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *p
- }
- 
- Attrib *
--do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int quiet)
-+do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet)
- {
- 	u_int id;
- 
-@@ -651,7 +651,7 @@ do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *pa
- }
- 
- Attrib *
--do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int quiet)
-+do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet)
- {
- 	u_int id;
- 
-@@ -685,7 +685,7 @@ do_fstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *h
- #endif
- 
- int
--do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, Attrib *a)
-+do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a)
- {
- 	u_int status, id;
- 
-@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char
- }
- 
- int
--do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len,
-+do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *handle, u_int handle_len,
-     Attrib *a)
- {
- 	u_int status, id;
-@@ -719,7 +719,7 @@ do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char
- }
- 
- char *
--do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
-+do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
- {
- 	Buffer msg;
- 	u_int type, expected_id, count, id;
-@@ -768,7 +768,7 @@ do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, char
- }
- 
- int
--do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath)
-+do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath)
- {
- 	Buffer msg;
- 	u_int status, id;
-@@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *
- }
- 
- int
--do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath)
-+do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath)
- {
- 	Buffer msg;
- 	u_int status, id;
-@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char
- }
- 
- int
--do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath)
-+do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath)
- {
- 	Buffer msg;
- 	u_int status, id;
-@@ -987,7 +987,7 @@ send_read_request(struct sftp_conn *conn
- }
- 
- int
--do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path, char *local_path,
-+do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *remote_path, const char *local_path,
-     Attrib *a, int pflag, int resume)
- {
- 	Attrib junk;
-@@ -1255,7 +1255,7 @@ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, char
- }
- 
- static int
--download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst,
-+download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
-     Attrib *dirattrib, int pflag, int printflag, int depth, int resume)
- {
- 	int i, ret = 0;
-@@ -1345,7 +1345,7 @@ download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *
- }
- 
- int
--download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst,
-+download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
-     Attrib *dirattrib, int pflag, int printflag, int resume)
- {
- 	char *src_canon;
-@@ -1363,7 +1363,7 @@ download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, cha
- }
- 
- int
--do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *local_path, char *remote_path,
-+do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *local_path, const char *remote_path,
-     int pflag)
- {
- 	int local_fd;
-@@ -1548,7 +1548,7 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *
- }
- 
- static int
--upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst,
-+upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
-     int pflag, int printflag, int depth)
- {
- 	int ret = 0, status;
-@@ -1639,7 +1639,7 @@ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *co
- }
- 
- int
--upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, int printflag,
-+upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, int printflag,
-     int pflag)
- {
- 	char *dst_canon;
-@@ -1656,7 +1656,7 @@ upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char
- }
- 
- char *
--path_append(char *p1, char *p2)
-+path_append(const char *p1, const char *p2)
- {
- 	char *ret;
- 	size_t len = strlen(p1) + strlen(p2) + 2;
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sftp-client.h.coverity openssh-6.3p1/sftp-client.h
---- openssh-6.3p1/sftp-client.h.coverity	2013-07-25 03:56:52.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/sftp-client.h	2013-10-07 13:45:10.108080813 +0200
-@@ -56,49 +56,49 @@ struct sftp_conn *do_init(int, int, u_in
- u_int sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *);
- 
- /* Close file referred to by 'handle' */
--int do_close(struct sftp_conn *, char *, u_int);
-+int do_close(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, u_int);
- 
- /* Read contents of 'path' to NULL-terminated array 'dir' */
--int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, SFTP_DIRENT ***);
-+int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, SFTP_DIRENT ***);
- 
- /* Frees a NULL-terminated array of SFTP_DIRENTs (eg. from do_readdir) */
- void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **);
- 
- /* Delete file 'path' */
--int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *, char *);
-+int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
- 
- /* Create directory 'path' */
--int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, Attrib *, int);
-+int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, Attrib *, int);
- 
- /* Remove directory 'path' */
--int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *);
-+int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
- 
- /* Get file attributes of 'path' (follows symlinks) */
--Attrib *do_stat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, int);
-+Attrib *do_stat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int);
- 
- /* Get file attributes of 'path' (does not follow symlinks) */
--Attrib *do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, int);
-+Attrib *do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int);
- 
- /* Set file attributes of 'path' */
--int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, Attrib *);
-+int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, Attrib *);
- 
- /* Set file attributes of open file 'handle' */
--int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, u_int, Attrib *);
-+int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, u_int, Attrib *);
- 
- /* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */
--char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, char *);
-+char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
- 
- /* Get statistics for filesystem hosting file at "path" */
- int do_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, struct sftp_statvfs *, int);
- 
- /* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
--int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *);
-+int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *);
- 
- /* Link 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
--int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *);
-+int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *);
- 
--/* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
--int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *);
-+/* Symlink 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
-+int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *);
- 
- /* XXX: add callbacks to do_download/do_upload so we can do progress meter */
- 
-@@ -106,27 +106,27 @@ int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, char
-  * Download 'remote_path' to 'local_path'. Preserve permissions and times
-  * if 'pflag' is set
-  */
--int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, Attrib *, int, int);
-+int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *, int, int);
- 
- /*
-  * Recursively download 'remote_directory' to 'local_directory'. Preserve 
-  * times if 'pflag' is set
-  */
--int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, Attrib *, int, int, int);
-+int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *, int, int, int);
- 
- /*
-  * Upload 'local_path' to 'remote_path'. Preserve permissions and times
-  * if 'pflag' is set
-  */
--int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, int);
-+int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int);
- 
- /*
-  * Recursively upload 'local_directory' to 'remote_directory'. Preserve 
-  * times if 'pflag' is set
-  */
--int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, int, int);
-+int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int);
- 
- /* Concatenate paths, taking care of slashes. Caller must free result. */
--char *path_append(char *, char *);
-+char *path_append(const char *, const char *);
- 
- #endif
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sftp.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/sftp.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/sftp.c.coverity	2013-07-25 03:56:52.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/sftp.c	2013-10-07 13:49:47.322727449 +0200
-@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
- {
- 	if (sshpid > 1) {
- 		kill(sshpid, SIGTERM);
--		waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
-+		(void) waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
- 	}
- 
- 	_exit(1);
-@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ local_do_ls(const char *args)
- 
- /* Strip one path (usually the pwd) from the start of another */
- static char *
--path_strip(char *path, char *strip)
-+path_strip(const char *path, const char *strip)
- {
- 	size_t len;
- 
-@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ path_strip(char *path, char *strip)
- }
- 
- static char *
--make_absolute(char *p, char *pwd)
-+make_absolute(char *p, const char *pwd)
- {
- 	char *abs_str;
- 
-@@ -493,7 +493,7 @@ parse_df_flags(const char *cmd, char **a
- }
- 
- static int
--is_dir(char *path)
-+is_dir(const char *path)
- {
- 	struct stat sb;
- 
-@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ is_dir(char *path)
- }
- 
- static int
--remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
-+remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
- {
- 	Attrib *a;
- 
-@@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, ch
- 
- /* Check whether path returned from glob(..., GLOB_MARK, ...) is a directory */
- static int
--pathname_is_dir(char *pathname)
-+pathname_is_dir(const char *pathname)
- {
- 	size_t l = strlen(pathname);
- 
-@@ -527,7 +527,7 @@ pathname_is_dir(char *pathname)
- }
- 
- static int
--process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, char *pwd,
-+process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, const char *pwd,
-     int pflag, int rflag, int resume)
- {
- 	char *abs_src = NULL;
-@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ out:
- }
- 
- static int
--process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, char *pwd,
-+process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, const char *pwd,
-     int pflag, int rflag)
- {
- 	char *tmp_dst = NULL;
-@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ sdirent_comp(const void *aa, const void
- 
- /* sftp ls.1 replacement for directories */
- static int
--do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path, int lflag)
-+do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, const char *strip_path, int lflag)
- {
- 	int n;
- 	u_int c = 1, colspace = 0, columns = 1;
-@@ -794,7 +794,7 @@ do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *
- 
- /* sftp ls.1 replacement which handles path globs */
- static int
--do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path,
-+do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, const char *strip_path,
-     int lflag)
- {
- 	char *fname, *lname;
-@@ -875,7 +875,7 @@ do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, ch
- }
- 
- static int
--do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int hflag, int iflag)
-+do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int hflag, int iflag)
- {
- 	struct sftp_statvfs st;
- 	char s_used[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/ssh-agent.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity	2013-07-20 05:22:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh-agent.c	2013-10-07 13:20:36.296298024 +0200
-@@ -1143,8 +1143,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	sanitise_stdfd();
- 
- 	/* drop */
--	setegid(getgid());
--	setgid(getgid());
-+	(void) setegid(getgid());
-+	(void) setgid(getgid());
- 
- #if defined(HAVE_PRCTL) && defined(PR_SET_DUMPABLE)
- 	/* Disable ptrace on Linux without sgid bit */
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c.coverity	2013-07-20 05:21:53.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c	2013-10-07 13:20:36.296298024 +0200
-@@ -699,8 +699,10 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 		if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
- 			privsep_preauth_child();
- 		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
--		if (box != NULL)
-+		if (box != NULL) {
- 			ssh_sandbox_child(box);
-+			free(box);
-+		}
- 
- 		return 0;
- 	}
-@@ -1345,6 +1347,9 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
- 		if (num_listen_socks < 0)
- 			break;
- 	}
-+
-+	if (fdset != NULL)
-+		free(fdset);
- }
- 
- 

openssh-6.3p1-fingerprint.patch

@@ -1,406 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth-rsa.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/auth-rsa.c
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/auth.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/auth.c.fingerprint	2013-10-07 14:02:36.998968153 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth.c	2013-10-07 15:42:05.243812405 +0200
-@@ -685,9 +685,10 @@ auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key)
- 	case 1:
-  revoked:
- 		/* Key revoked */
--		key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+		key_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
- 		error("WARNING: authentication attempt with a revoked "
--		    "%s key %s ", key_type(key), key_fp);
-+		    "%s key %s%s ", key_type(key),
-+		    key_fingerprint_prefix(), key_fp);
- 		free(key_fp);
- 		return 1;
- 	}
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c.fingerprint	2013-10-07 14:02:36.998968153 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2-hostbased.c	2013-10-07 15:43:49.747355927 +0200
-@@ -200,16 +200,18 @@ hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw,
- 
- 	if (host_status == HOST_OK) {
- 		if (key_is_cert(key)) {
--			fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
--			    SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
-+			    SSH_FP_HEX);		
- 			verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by "
--			    "%s CA %s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id,
--			    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp,
-+			    "%s CA %s%s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id,
-+			    key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
-+			    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp,
- 			    cuser, lookup);
- 		} else {
--			fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
--			verbose("Accepted %s public key %s from %s@%s",
--			    key_type(key), fp, cuser, lookup);
-+			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+			verbose("Accepted %s public key %s%s from %s@%s",
-+			    key_type(key), key_fingerprint_prefix(),
-+			    fp, cuser, lookup);
- 		}
- 		free(fp);
- 	}
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.fingerprint	2013-07-18 08:10:10.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c	2013-10-07 15:50:44.617495624 +0200
-@@ -359,10 +359,10 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file,
- 				continue;
- 			if (!key_is_cert_authority)
- 				continue;
--			fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5,
--			    SSH_FP_HEX);
--			debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s",
--			    file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
-+			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+			debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s%s",
-+			    file, linenum, key_type(found),
-+			    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
- 			/*
- 			 * If the user has specified a list of principals as
- 			 * a key option, then prefer that list to matching
-@@ -400,9 +400,9 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file,
- 			if (key_is_cert_authority)
- 				continue;
- 			found_key = 1;
--			fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
--			debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
--			    file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
-+			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+			verbose("Found matching %s key: %s%s",
-+			    key_type(found), key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
- 			free(fp);
- 			break;
- 		}
-@@ -425,13 +425,13 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw,
- 	if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
- 		return 0;
- 
--	ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
--	    SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	ca_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
- 
- 	if (key_in_file(key->cert->signature_key,
- 	    options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1) != 1) {
--		debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s", __func__,
--		    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
-+		debug2("%s: CA %s%s %s is not listed in %s", __func__,
-+		    key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
-+		    key_fingerprint_prefix(), ca_fp,
- 		    options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/key.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/key.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/key.c.fingerprint	2013-10-07 14:02:36.971968285 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/key.c	2013-10-07 14:02:36.999968148 +0200
-@@ -598,6 +598,34 @@ key_fingerprint(const Key *k, enum fp_ty
- 	return retval;
- }
- 
-+enum fp_type
-+key_fingerprint_selection(void)
-+{
-+	static enum fp_type rv;
-+	static char rv_defined = 0;
-+	char *env;
-+
-+	if (!rv_defined) {
-+		env = getenv("SSH_FINGERPRINT_TYPE");
-+		rv = (env && !strcmp (env, "sha")) ?
-+			SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
-+		rv_defined = 1;
-+	}
-+	return rv;
-+}
-+
-+char *
-+key_selected_fingerprint(Key *k, enum fp_rep dgst_rep)
-+{
-+	return key_fingerprint(k, key_fingerprint_selection(), dgst_rep);
-+}
-+
-+char *
-+key_fingerprint_prefix(void)
-+{
-+	return key_fingerprint_selection() == SSH_FP_SHA1 ? "sha1:" : "";
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Reads a multiple-precision integer in decimal from the buffer, and advances
-  * the pointer.  The integer must already be initialized.  This function is
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/key.h.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/key.h
---- openssh-6.3p1/key.h.fingerprint	2013-10-07 14:02:36.999968148 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/key.h	2013-10-07 15:44:17.574233450 +0200
-@@ -97,6 +97,9 @@ int		 key_equal_public(const Key *, cons
- int		 key_equal(const Key *, const Key *);
- char		*key_fingerprint(const Key *, enum fp_type, enum fp_rep);
- u_char		*key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *, enum fp_type, u_int *);
-+enum fp_type	 key_fingerprint_selection(void);
-+char		*key_selected_fingerprint(Key *, enum fp_rep);
-+char		*key_fingerprint_prefix(void);
- const char	*key_type(const Key *);
- const char	*key_cert_type(const Key *);
- int		 key_write(const Key *, FILE *);
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-add.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/ssh-add.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/ssh-add.c.fingerprint	2013-10-07 14:02:37.000968143 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh-add.c	2013-10-07 14:44:57.466515766 +0200
-@@ -326,10 +326,10 @@ list_identities(AuthenticationConnection
- 		    key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, version)) {
- 			had_identities = 1;
- 			if (do_fp) {
--				fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5,
--				    SSH_FP_HEX);
--				printf("%d %s %s (%s)\n",
--				    key_size(key), fp, comment, key_type(key));
-+				fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+				printf("%d %s%s %s (%s)\n",
-+				    key_size(key), key_fingerprint_prefix(),
-+				    fp, comment, key_type(key));
- 				free(fp);
- 			} else {
- 				if (!key_write(key, stdout))
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-agent.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/ssh-agent.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/ssh-agent.c.fingerprint	2013-10-07 14:02:37.000968143 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh-agent.c	2013-10-07 15:41:11.627044336 +0200
-@@ -198,9 +198,9 @@ confirm_key(Identity *id)
- 	char *p;
- 	int ret = -1;
- 
--	p = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
--	if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.",
--	    id->comment, p))
-+	p = key_selected_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s%s.",
-+	    id->comment, key_fingerprint_prefix(), p))
- 		ret = 0;
- 	free(p);
- 
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keygen.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keygen.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keygen.c.fingerprint	2013-07-20 05:22:32.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keygen.c	2013-10-07 14:25:52.864145038 +0200
-@@ -767,13 +767,14 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
- {
- 	FILE *f;
- 	Key *public;
--	char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024], *fp, *ra;
-+	char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024], *fp, *ra, *pfx;
- 	int i, skip = 0, num = 0, invalid = 1;
- 	enum fp_rep rep;
- 	enum fp_type fptype;
- 	struct stat st;
- 
--	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
-+	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fingerprint_selection();
-+	pfx =	 print_bubblebabble ? "" : key_fingerprint_prefix();
- 	rep =    print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
- 
- 	if (!have_identity)
-@@ -785,8 +786,8 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
- 	public = key_load_public(identity_file, &comment);
- 	if (public != NULL) {
- 		fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
--		ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
--		printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, comment,
-+		ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+		printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp, comment,
- 		    key_type(public));
- 		if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
- 			printf("%s\n", ra);
-@@ -851,8 +852,8 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
- 		}
- 		comment = *cp ? cp : comment;
- 		fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
--		ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
--		printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp,
-+		ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+		printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp,
- 		    comment ? comment : "no comment", key_type(public));
- 		if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
- 			printf("%s\n", ra);
-@@ -970,13 +971,15 @@ printhost(FILE *f, const char *name, Key
- 	if (print_fingerprint) {
- 		enum fp_rep rep;
- 		enum fp_type fptype;
--		char *fp, *ra;
-+		char *fp, *ra, *pfx;
- 
--		fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
-+		fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fingerprint_selection();
-+		pfx =	 print_bubblebabble ? "" : key_fingerprint_prefix();
- 		rep =    print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
-+
- 		fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
--		ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
--		printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, name,
-+		ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+		printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp, name,
- 		    key_type(public));
- 		if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
- 			printf("%s\n", ra);
-@@ -1855,16 +1858,17 @@ do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw)
- 		fatal("%s is not a certificate", identity_file);
- 	v00 = key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT_V00 || key->type == KEY_DSA_CERT_V00;
- 
--	key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
--	ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
--	    SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	key_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	ca_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
- 
- 	printf("%s:\n", identity_file);
- 	printf("        Type: %s %s certificate\n", key_ssh_name(key),
- 	    key_cert_type(key));
--	printf("        Public key: %s %s\n", key_type(key), key_fp);
--	printf("        Signing CA: %s %s\n",
--	    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp);
-+	printf("        Public key: %s %s%s\n", key_type(key),
-+	    key_fingerprint_prefix(), key_fp);
-+	printf("        Signing CA: %s %s%s\n",
-+	    key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
-+	    key_fingerprint_prefix(), ca_fp);
- 	printf("        Key ID: \"%s\"\n", key->cert->key_id);
- 	if (!v00) {
- 		printf("        Serial: %llu\n",
-@@ -2655,13 +2659,12 @@ passphrase_again:
- 	fclose(f);
- 
- 	if (!quiet) {
--		char *fp = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
--		char *ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5,
--		    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+		char *fp = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+		char *ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- 		printf("Your public key has been saved in %s.\n",
- 		    identity_file);
- 		printf("The key fingerprint is:\n");
--		printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment);
-+		printf("%s%s %s\n", key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, comment);
- 		printf("The key's randomart image is:\n");
- 		printf("%s\n", ra);
- 		free(ra);
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect.c.fingerprint	2013-06-01 23:31:19.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect.c	2013-10-07 14:43:54.859822036 +0200
-@@ -830,10 +830,10 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
- 				    "key for IP address '%.128s' to the list "
- 				    "of known hosts.", type, ip);
- 		} else if (options.visual_host_key) {
--			fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
--			ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5,
--			    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
--			logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s\n", fp, ra);
-+			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+			ra = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+			logit("Host key fingerprint is %s%s\n%s\n",
-+			    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, ra);
- 			free(ra);
- 			free(fp);
- 		}
-@@ -871,9 +871,8 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
- 			else
- 				snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), ".");
- 			/* The default */
--			fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
--			ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5,
--			    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+			ra = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- 			msg2[0] = '\0';
- 			if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
- 				if (matching_host_key_dns)
-@@ -888,10 +887,11 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
- 			snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
- 			    "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be "
- 			    "established%s\n"
--			    "%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s"
-+			    "%s key fingerprint is %s%s.%s%s\n%s"
- 			    "Are you sure you want to continue connecting "
- 			    "(yes/no)? ",
--			    host, ip, msg1, type, fp,
-+			    host, ip, msg1, type,
-+			    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp,
- 			    options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "",
- 			    options.visual_host_key ? ra : "",
- 			    msg2);
-@@ -1136,8 +1136,9 @@ verify_host_key(char *host, struct socka
- 	int flags = 0;
- 	char *fp;
- 
--	fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
--	debug("Server host key: %s %s", key_type(host_key), fp);
-+	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	debug("Server host key: %s %s%s", key_type(host_key),
-+	    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
- 	free(fp);
- 
- 	/* XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS */
-@@ -1238,14 +1239,15 @@ show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkey
- 			continue;
- 		if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i], &found))
- 			continue;
--		fp = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
--		ra = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+		fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+		ra = key_selected_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- 		logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n"
- 		    "in %s:%lu\n"
--		    "%s key fingerprint %s.",
-+		    "%s key fingerprint %s%s.",
- 		    key_type(found->key),
- 		    found->host, found->file, found->line,
--		    key_type(found->key), fp);
-+		    key_type(found->key),
-+		    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
- 		if (options.visual_host_key)
- 			logit("%s", ra);
- 		free(ra);
-@@ -1260,7 +1262,7 @@ warn_changed_key(Key *host_key)
- {
- 	char *fp;
- 
--	fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
- 
- 	error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
- 	error("@    WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED!     @");
-@@ -1268,8 +1270,8 @@ warn_changed_key(Key *host_key)
- 	error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!");
- 	error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!");
- 	error("It is also possible that a host key has just been changed.");
--	error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.",
--	    key_type(host_key), fp);
-+	error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s%s.",
-+	    key_type(host_key),key_fingerprint_prefix(),  fp);
- 	error("Please contact your system administrator.");
- 
- 	free(fp);
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c.fingerprint openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c.fingerprint	2013-10-07 14:02:37.001968139 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c	2013-10-07 15:20:09.403234714 +0200
-@@ -590,8 +590,9 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t
- 		    key->type, pktype);
- 		goto done;
- 	}
--	fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
--	debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp);
-+	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s%s",
-+	    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
- 	free(fp);
- 
- 	/*
-@@ -1202,8 +1203,9 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt,
- 	int have_sig = 1;
- 	char *fp;
- 
--	fp = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
--	debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s", key_type(id->key), fp);
-+	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s%s", key_type(id->key),
-+	    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
- 	free(fp);
- 
- 	if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {

openssh-6.3p1-fips.patch

@@ -1,611 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in.fips openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in
---- openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in.fips	2013-10-11 22:24:32.850031186 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in	2013-10-11 22:24:32.870031092 +0200
-@@ -147,25 +147,25 @@ libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS)
- 	$(RANLIB) $@
- 
- ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS)
--	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS)
-+	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS)
- 
- sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a	$(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS)
--	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS)
-+	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS)
- 
- scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
- 
- ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-add.o
--	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
- 
- ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o
--	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
- 
- ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o
--	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
- 
- ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o roaming_dummy.o readconf.o
--	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
- 
- ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS)
- 
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o
--	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
- 
- sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth-rsa.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/auth-rsa.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/auth-rsa.c.fips	2013-10-24 15:43:46.019999906 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth-rsa.c	2013-10-24 15:44:09.262890686 +0200
-@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ rsa_key_allowed_in_file(struct passwd *p
- 			    "actual %d vs. announced %d.",
- 			    file, linenum, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
- 
--		fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+		fp = key_fingerprint(key, FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- 		debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
- 		    file, linenum, key_type(key), fp);
- 		free(fp);
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.fips	2013-10-24 15:39:05.008319990 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c	2013-10-24 15:39:05.029319892 +0200
-@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, con
- 
- 	if (key_is_cert(key)) {
- 		fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
--		    SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+		    FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- 		auth_info(authctxt, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s", 
- 		    key_type(key), key->cert->key_id,
- 		    (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
-@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, con
- 		    extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
- 		free(fp);
- 	} else {
--		fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+		fp = key_fingerprint(key, FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- 		auth_info(authctxt, "%s %s%s%s", key_type(key), fp,
- 		    extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
- 		free(fp);
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/authfile.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/authfile.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/authfile.c.fips	2013-10-11 22:24:32.857031153 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/authfile.c	2013-10-11 22:24:32.870031092 +0200
-@@ -148,8 +148,14 @@ key_private_rsa1_to_blob(Key *key, Buffe
- 	/* Allocate space for the private part of the key in the buffer. */
- 	cp = buffer_append_space(&encrypted, buffer_len(&buffer));
- 
--	cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase,
--	    CIPHER_ENCRYPT);
-+	if (cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase,
-+	    CIPHER_ENCRYPT) < 0) {
-+		error("cipher_set_key_string failed.");
-+		buffer_free(&encrypted);
-+		buffer_free(&buffer);
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+
- 	cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, cp,
- 	    buffer_ptr(&buffer), buffer_len(&buffer), 0, 0);
- 	cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext);
-@@ -472,8 +478,13 @@ key_parse_private_rsa1(Buffer *blob, con
- 	cp = buffer_append_space(&decrypted, buffer_len(&copy));
- 
- 	/* Rest of the buffer is encrypted.  Decrypt it using the passphrase. */
--	cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase,
--	    CIPHER_DECRYPT);
-+	if (cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase,
-+	    CIPHER_DECRYPT) < 0) {
-+		error("cipher_set_key_string failed.");
-+		buffer_free(&decrypted);
-+		goto fail;
-+	}
-+
- 	cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, cp,
- 	    buffer_ptr(&copy), buffer_len(&copy), 0, 0);
- 	cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext);
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/cipher-ctr.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips	2013-06-02 00:07:32.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/cipher-ctr.c	2013-10-11 22:24:32.870031092 +0200
-@@ -138,7 +138,8 @@ evp_aes_128_ctr(void)
- 	aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr;
- #ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
- 	aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH |
--	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV;
-+	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV |
-+	    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS;
- #endif
- 	return (&aes_ctr);
- }
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/cipher.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/cipher.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/cipher.c.fips	2013-10-11 22:24:32.820031327 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/cipher.c	2013-10-11 22:24:32.871031087 +0200
-@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
- #include <sys/types.h>
- 
- #include <openssl/md5.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- 
- #include <string.h>
- #include <stdarg.h>
-@@ -86,6 +87,27 @@ static const struct Cipher ciphers[] = {
- 	{ NULL,		SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
- };
- 
-+static const struct Cipher fips_ciphers[] = {
-+	{ "none",	SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null },
-+	{ "des",	SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc },
-+	{ "3des",	SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_3des },
-+	{ "3des-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
-+	{ "aes128-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_128_cbc },
-+	{ "aes192-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_192_cbc },
-+	{ "aes256-cbc",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
-+	{ "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se",
-+			SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
-+	{ "aes128-ctr",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_ctr },
-+	{ "aes192-ctr",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_192_ctr },
-+	{ "aes256-ctr",	SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_ctr },
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM
-+	{ "aes128-gcm@openssh.com",
-+			SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_gcm },
-+	{ "aes256-gcm@openssh.com",
-+			SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_gcm },
-+#endif
-+	{ NULL,		SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
-+};
- /*--*/
- 
- /* Returns a comma-separated list of supported ciphers. */
-@@ -96,7 +118,7 @@ cipher_alg_list(void)
- 	size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
- 	const Cipher *c;
- 
--	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) {
-+	for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) {
- 		if (c->number != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2)
- 			continue;
- 		if (ret != NULL)
-@@ -161,7 +183,7 @@ const Cipher *
- cipher_by_name(const char *name)
- {
- 	const Cipher *c;
--	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
-+	for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
- 		if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0)
- 			return c;
- 	return NULL;
-@@ -171,7 +193,7 @@ const Cipher *
- cipher_by_number(int id)
- {
- 	const Cipher *c;
--	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
-+	for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
- 		if (c->number == id)
- 			return c;
- 	return NULL;
-@@ -215,7 +237,7 @@ cipher_number(const char *name)
- 	const Cipher *c;
- 	if (name == NULL)
- 		return -1;
--	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
-+	for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
- 		if (strcasecmp(c->name, name) == 0)
- 			return c->number;
- 	return -1;
-@@ -374,14 +396,15 @@ cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *cc)
-  * passphrase and using the resulting 16 bytes as the key.
-  */
- 
--void
-+int
- cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *cc, const Cipher *cipher,
-     const char *passphrase, int do_encrypt)
- {
- 	MD5_CTX md;
- 	u_char digest[16];
- 
--	MD5_Init(&md);
-+	if (MD5_Init(&md) <= 0)
-+		return -1;
- 	MD5_Update(&md, (const u_char *)passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
- 	MD5_Final(digest, &md);
- 
-@@ -389,6 +412,7 @@ cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *cc,
- 
- 	memset(digest, 0, sizeof(digest));
- 	memset(&md, 0, sizeof(md));
-+	return 0;
- }
- 
- /*
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/cipher.h.fips openssh-6.3p1/cipher.h
---- openssh-6.3p1/cipher.h.fips	2013-10-11 22:24:32.820031327 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/cipher.h	2013-10-11 22:24:32.871031087 +0200
-@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ void	 cipher_init(CipherContext *, const
- void	 cipher_crypt(CipherContext *, u_char *, const u_char *,
-     u_int, u_int, u_int);
- void	 cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *);
--void	 cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *, const Cipher *, const char *, int);
-+int	 cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *, const Cipher *, const char *, int);
- u_int	 cipher_blocksize(const Cipher *);
- u_int	 cipher_keylen(const Cipher *);
- u_int	 cipher_authlen(const Cipher *);
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/key.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/key.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/key.c.fips	2013-10-11 22:24:32.821031322 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/key.c	2013-10-11 22:24:32.871031087 +0200
-@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
- #include <sys/types.h>
- 
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- #include <openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h>
- 
- #include <stdarg.h>
-@@ -606,9 +607,13 @@ key_fingerprint_selection(void)
- 	char *env;
- 
- 	if (!rv_defined) {
--		env = getenv("SSH_FINGERPRINT_TYPE");
--		rv = (env && !strcmp (env, "sha")) ?
--			SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
-+		if (FIPS_mode())
-+			rv = SSH_FP_SHA1;
-+		else {
-+			env = getenv("SSH_FINGERPRINT_TYPE");
-+			rv = (env && !strcmp (env, "sha")) ?
-+				SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
-+		}
- 		rv_defined = 1;
- 	}
- 	return rv;
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/mac.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/mac.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/mac.c.fips	2013-10-11 22:24:32.821031322 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/mac.c	2013-10-11 22:25:35.394737186 +0200
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
- #include <sys/types.h>
- 
- #include <openssl/hmac.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- 
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <string.h>
-@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ struct macalg {
- 	int		etm;		/* Encrypt-then-MAC */
- };
- 
--static const struct macalg macs[] = {
-+static const struct macalg all_macs[] = {
- 	/* Encrypt-and-MAC (encrypt-and-authenticate) variants */
- 	{ "hmac-sha1",				SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
- 	{ "hmac-sha1-96",			SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 96, 0, 0, 0 },
-@@ -91,6 +92,18 @@ static const struct macalg macs[] = {
- 	{ NULL,					0, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
- };
- 
-+static const struct macalg fips_macs[] = {
-+	{ "hmac-sha1",				SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
-+	{ "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com",		SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
-+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
-+	{ "hmac-sha2-256",			SSH_EVP, EVP_sha256, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
-+	{ "hmac-sha2-512",			SSH_EVP, EVP_sha512, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
-+	{ "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com",	SSH_EVP, EVP_sha256, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
-+	{ "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com",	SSH_EVP, EVP_sha512, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
-+#endif
-+	{ NULL,					0, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
-+};
-+
- /* Returns a comma-separated list of supported MACs. */
- char *
- mac_alg_list(void)
-@@ -99,7 +112,7 @@ mac_alg_list(void)
- 	size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
- 	const struct macalg *m;
- 
--	for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
-+	for (m = FIPS_mode() ? fips_macs : all_macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
- 		if (ret != NULL)
- 			ret[rlen++] = '\n';
- 		nlen = strlen(m->name);
-@@ -136,7 +149,7 @@ mac_setup(Mac *mac, char *name)
- {
- 	const struct macalg *m;
- 
--	for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
-+	for (m = FIPS_mode() ? fips_macs : all_macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
- 		if (strcmp(name, m->name) != 0)
- 			continue;
- 		if (mac != NULL)
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-6.3p1/myproposal.h
---- openssh-6.3p1/myproposal.h.fips	2013-06-11 04:10:02.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/myproposal.h	2013-10-11 22:24:32.872031082 +0200
-@@ -114,6 +114,19 @@
- #define	KEX_DEFAULT_COMP	"none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib"
- #define	KEX_DEFAULT_LANG	""
- 
-+#define	KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \
-+	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
-+	"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \
-+	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se"
-+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
-+#define	KEX_FIPS_MAC \
-+	"hmac-sha1," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-256," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-512"
-+#else
-+#define	KEX_FIPS_MAC \
-+	"hmac-sha1"
-+#endif
- 
- static char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {
- 	KEX_DEFAULT_KEX,
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c.fips	2010-03-25 22:52:02.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c	2013-10-11 22:24:32.872031082 +0200
-@@ -37,25 +37,18 @@
- #define REKEY_BYTES	(1 << 24)
- 
- static int rc4_ready = 0;
--static RC4_KEY rc4;
- 
- unsigned int
- arc4random(void)
- {
- 	unsigned int r = 0;
--	static int first_time = 1;
-+	void *rp = &r;
- 
--	if (rc4_ready <= 0) {
--		if (first_time)
--			seed_rng();
--		first_time = 0;
-+	if (!rc4_ready) {
- 		arc4random_stir();
- 	}
-+	RAND_bytes(rp, sizeof(r));
- 
--	RC4(&rc4, sizeof(r), (unsigned char *)&r, (unsigned char *)&r);
--
--	rc4_ready -= sizeof(r);
--	
- 	return(r);
- }
- 
-@@ -63,24 +56,11 @@ void
- arc4random_stir(void)
- {
- 	unsigned char rand_buf[SEED_SIZE];
--	int i;
- 
--	memset(&rc4, 0, sizeof(rc4));
- 	if (RAND_bytes(rand_buf, sizeof(rand_buf)) <= 0)
- 		fatal("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error %ld)",
- 		    ERR_get_error());
--	RC4_set_key(&rc4, sizeof(rand_buf), rand_buf);
--
--	/*
--	 * Discard early keystream, as per recommendations in:
--	 * http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~itsik/RC4/Papers/Rc4_ksa.ps
--	 */
--	for(i = 0; i <= 256; i += sizeof(rand_buf))
--		RC4(&rc4, sizeof(rand_buf), rand_buf, rand_buf);
--
--	memset(rand_buf, 0, sizeof(rand_buf));
--
--	rc4_ready = REKEY_BYTES;
-+	rc4_ready = 1;
- }
- #endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */
- 
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keygen.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips	2013-10-24 15:45:06.055623916 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keygen.c	2013-10-24 15:45:36.906478986 +0200
-@@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ do_download(struct passwd *pw)
- 	enum fp_type fptype;
- 	char *fp, *ra;
- 
--	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
-+	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : (FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5);
- 	rep =    print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
- 
- 	pkcs11_init(0);
-@@ -740,7 +740,7 @@ do_download(struct passwd *pw)
- 	for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
- 		if (print_fingerprint) {
- 			fp = key_fingerprint(keys[i], fptype, rep);
--			ra = key_fingerprint(keys[i], SSH_FP_MD5,
-+			ra = key_fingerprint(keys[i], FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5,
- 			    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- 			printf("%u %s %s (PKCS11 key)\n", key_size(keys[i]),
- 			    fp, key_type(keys[i]));
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/ssh.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/ssh.c.fips	2013-07-25 03:55:53.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh.c	2013-10-11 22:24:32.872031082 +0200
-@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@
- 
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
-+#include <fipscheck.h>
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- 
-@@ -253,6 +255,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	sanitise_stdfd();
- 
- 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
-+        SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
-+	if (access("/etc/system-fips", F_OK) == 0)
-+		if (! FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL))
-+			if (FIPS_mode())
-+				fatal("FIPS integrity verification test failed.");
-+			else
-+				logit("FIPS integrity verification test failed.");
- 
- #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
- 	/* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
-@@ -330,6 +339,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	    "ACD:E:F:I:KL:MNO:PQ:R:S:TVw:W:XYy")) != -1) {
- 		switch (opt) {
- 		case '1':
-+			if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+				fatal("Protocol 1 not allowed in the FIPS mode.");
-+			}
- 			options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_1;
- 			break;
- 		case '2':
-@@ -647,7 +659,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	if (!host)
- 		usage();
- 
--	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
- 	ERR_load_crypto_strings();
- 
- 	/* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */
-@@ -748,6 +759,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 
- 	seed_rng();
- 
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		logit("FIPS mode initialized");
-+	}
-+
- 	if (options.user == NULL)
- 		options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
- 
-@@ -816,6 +831,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 
- 	timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000;
- 
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		options.protocol &= SSH_PROTO_2;
-+		if (options.protocol == 0)
-+			fatal("Protocol 2 disabled by configuration but required in the FIPS mode.");
-+	}
-+
- 	/* Open a connection to the remote host. */
- 	if (ssh_connect(host, &hostaddr, options.port,
- 	    options.address_family, options.connection_attempts, &timeout_ms,
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c.fips	2013-10-11 22:24:32.810031374 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshconnect2.c	2013-10-11 22:24:32.873031077 +0200
-@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@
- #include <vis.h>
- #endif
- 
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
-+
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- 
- #include "xmalloc.h"
-@@ -170,6 +172,10 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
- 	if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers;
-+	} else if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT;
-+
- 	}
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- 	    compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
-@@ -185,7 +191,11 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
- 	if (options.macs != NULL) {
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
-+	} else if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_MAC;
- 	}
-+
- 	if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL)
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
- 		    options.hostkeyalgorithms;
-diff -up openssh-6.4p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-6.4p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-6.4p1/sshd.c.fips	2014-01-27 16:20:12.751358484 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.4p1/sshd.c	2014-01-27 16:21:12.961052163 +0100
-@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/md5.h>
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
-+#include <fipscheck.h>
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- 
- #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
-@@ -1450,6 +1452,18 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- #endif
- 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
- 
-+        SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
-+	if (access("/etc/system-fips", F_OK) == 0)
-+		if (! FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)) {
-+			openlog(__progname, LOG_PID, LOG_AUTHPRIV);
-+			if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+				syslog(LOG_CRIT, "FIPS integrity verification test failed.");
-+				cleanup_exit(255);
-+			}
-+			else
-+				syslog(LOG_INFO, "FIPS integrity verification test failed.");
-+			closelog();
-+		}
- 	/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
- 	saved_argc = ac;
- 	rexec_argc = ac;
-@@ -1601,8 +1615,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	else
- 		closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD);
- 
--	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
--
- 	/* If requested, redirect the logs to the specified logfile. */
- 	if (logfile != NULL) {
- 		log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile);
-@@ -1773,6 +1785,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		debug("private host key: #%d type %d %s", i, keytype,
- 		    key_type(key ? key : pubkey));
- 	}
-+	if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && FIPS_mode()) {
-+		logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Not allowed in the FIPS mode.");
-+		options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
-+	}
- 	if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) {
- 		logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
- 		options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
-@@ -1936,6 +1952,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	/* Initialize the random number generator. */
- 	arc4random_stir();
- 
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		logit("FIPS mode initialized");
-+	}
-+
- 	/* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
- 	   unmounted if desired. */
- 	if (chdir("/") == -1)
-@@ -2498,6 +2518,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
- 	if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers;
-+	} else if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT;
- 	}
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- 	    compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
-@@ -2507,6 +2530,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
- 	if (options.macs != NULL) {
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
-+	} else if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_MAC;
- 	}
- 	if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) {
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =

openssh-6.3p1-increase-size-of-DF-groups.patch

@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
-diff -U0 openssh-6.3p1/ChangeLog.df openssh-6.3p1/ChangeLog
---- openssh-6.3p1/ChangeLog.df	2013-10-23 22:38:03.476272461 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/ChangeLog	2013-10-23 22:39:46.051788366 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
-+20131010
-+ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/08 11:42:13
-+   [dh.c dh.h]
-+   Increase the size of the Diffie-Hellman groups requested for a each
-+   symmetric key size.  New values from NIST Special Publication 800-57 with
-+   the upper limit specified by RFC4419.  Pointed out by Peter Backes, ok
-+   djm@.
-+
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/dh.c.df openssh-6.3p1/dh.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/dh.c.df	2013-07-18 08:12:07.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/dh.c	2013-10-23 22:38:03.476272461 +0200
-@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
--/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.51 2013/07/02 12:31:43 markus Exp $ */
-+/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.52 2013/10/08 11:42:13 dtucker Exp $ */
- /*
-  * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
-  *
-@@ -352,17 +352,20 @@ dh_new_group14(void)
- 
- /*
-  * Estimates the group order for a Diffie-Hellman group that has an
-- * attack complexity approximately the same as O(2**bits).  Estimate
-- * with:  O(exp(1.9223 * (ln q)^(1/3) (ln ln q)^(2/3)))
-+ * attack complexity approximately the same as O(2**bits).
-+ * Values from NIST Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation for Key
-+ * Management Part 1 (rev 3) limited by the recommended maximum value
-+ * from RFC4419 section 3.
-  */
- 
- int
- dh_estimate(int bits)
- {
--
-+	if (bits <= 112)
-+		return 2048;
- 	if (bits <= 128)
--		return (1024);	/* O(2**86) */
-+		return 3072;
- 	if (bits <= 192)
--		return (2048);	/* O(2**116) */
--	return (4096);		/* O(2**156) */
-+		return 7680;
-+	return 8192;
- }
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/dh.h.df openssh-6.3p1/dh.h
---- openssh-6.3p1/dh.h.df	2008-06-29 14:47:04.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/dh.h	2013-10-23 22:38:03.476272461 +0200
-@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
--/* $OpenBSD: dh.h,v 1.10 2008/06/26 09:19:40 djm Exp $ */
-+/* $OpenBSD: dh.h,v 1.11 2013/10/08 11:42:13 dtucker Exp $ */
- 
- /*
-  * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
-@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ int	 dh_pub_is_valid(DH *, BIGNUM *);
- 
- int	 dh_estimate(int);
- 
-+/* Min and max values from RFC4419. */
- #define DH_GRP_MIN	1024
- #define DH_GRP_MAX	8192
- 

openssh-6.3p1-krb5-use-default_ccache_name.patch

@@ -1,247 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name	2013-10-23 22:03:52.322950759 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c	2013-10-23 22:04:24.295799873 +0200
-@@ -50,7 +50,9 @@
- #include <errno.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
- #include <string.h>
-+#include <sys/stat.h>
- #include <krb5.h>
-+#include <profile.h>
- 
- extern ServerOptions	 options;
- 
-@@ -91,6 +93,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
- #endif
- 	krb5_error_code problem;
- 	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
-+	const char *ccache_type;
- 	int len;
- 	char *client, *platform_client;
- 	const char *errmsg;
-@@ -191,12 +194,30 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
- 		goto out;
- #endif
- 
-+	ccache_type = krb5_cc_get_type(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
- 	authctxt->krb5_ticket_file = (char *)krb5_cc_get_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
- 
--	len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
-+	if (authctxt->krb5_ticket_file[0] == ':')
-+		authctxt->krb5_ticket_file++;
-+
-+	len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + strlen(ccache_type);
- 	authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
--	snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
-+
-+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
-+	snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s",
- 	    authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
-+#else
-+	snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "%s:%s",
-+	    ccache_type, authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
-+#endif
-+
-+	if (strcmp(ccache_type, "DIR") == 0) {
-+		char *p;
-+		p = strrchr(authctxt->krb5_ccname, '/');
-+		if (p)
-+			*p = '\0';
-+	}
-+
- 
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- 	if (options.use_pam)
-@@ -235,10 +256,34 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
- void
- krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
- {
-+	struct stat krb5_ccname_stat;
-+	char krb5_ccname[128], *krb5_ccname_dir_start, *krb5_ccname_dir_end;
-+
- 	debug("krb5_cleanup_proc called");
- 	if (authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache) {
- 		krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
- 		authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache = NULL;
-+
-+		strncpy(krb5_ccname, authctxt->krb5_ccname, sizeof(krb5_ccname) - 10);
-+		krb5_ccname_dir_start = strchr(krb5_ccname, ':') + 1;
-+		*krb5_ccname_dir_start++ = '\0';
-+		if (strcmp(krb5_ccname, "DIR") == 0) {
-+
-+			strcat(krb5_ccname_dir_start, "/primary");
-+
-+			if (stat(krb5_ccname_dir_start, &krb5_ccname_stat) == 0) {
-+				if (unlink(krb5_ccname_dir_start) == 0) {
-+					krb5_ccname_dir_end = strrchr(krb5_ccname_dir_start, '/');
-+					*krb5_ccname_dir_end = '\0';
-+					if (rmdir(krb5_ccname_dir_start) == -1)
-+						debug("cache dir '%s' remove failed: %s", krb5_ccname_dir_start, strerror(errno));
-+				}
-+				else
-+					debug("cache primary file '%s', remove failed: %s",
-+						krb5_ccname_dir_start, strerror(errno)
-+						);
-+			}
-+		}
- 	}
- 	if (authctxt->krb5_user) {
- 		krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user);
-@@ -250,34 +295,139 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 	}
- }
- 
-+int
-+ssh_asprintf_append(char **dsc, const char *fmt, ...) {
-+	char *src, *old;
-+	va_list ap;
-+	int i;
-+
-+	va_start(ap, fmt);
-+	i = vasprintf(&src, fmt, ap);
-+	va_end(ap);
-+
-+	if (i == -1 || src == NULL)
-+		return -1;
-+
-+	old = *dsc;
-+
-+	i = asprintf(dsc, "%s%s", *dsc, src);
-+	if (i == -1 || src == NULL) {
-+		free(src);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
-+	free(old);
-+	free(src);
-+
-+	return i;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+ssh_krb5_expand_template(char **result, const char *template) {
-+	char *p_n, *p_o, *r, *tmp_template;
-+
-+	if (template == NULL)
-+		return -1;
-+
-+	tmp_template = p_n = p_o = xstrdup(template);
-+	r = xstrdup("");
-+
-+	while ((p_n = strstr(p_o, "%{")) != NULL) {
-+
-+		*p_n++ = '\0';
-+		if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%s", p_o) == -1)
-+			goto cleanup;
-+
-+		if (strncmp(p_n, "{uid}", 5) == 0 || strncmp(p_n, "{euid}", 6) == 0 ||
-+			strncmp(p_n, "{USERID}", 8) == 0) {
-+			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
-+			if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%d", geteuid()) == -1)
-+				goto cleanup;
-+			continue;
-+		}
-+		else if (strncmp(p_n, "{TEMP}", 6) == 0) {
-+			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
-+			if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "/tmp") == -1)
-+				goto cleanup;
-+			continue;
-+		} else {
-+			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
-+			p_o = '\0';
-+			debug("%s: unsupported token %s in %s", __func__, p_n, template);
-+			/* unknown token, fallback to the default */
-+			goto cleanup;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%s", p_o) == -1)
-+		goto cleanup;
-+
-+	*result = r;
-+	free(tmp_template);
-+	return 0;
-+
-+cleanup:
-+	free(r);
-+	free(tmp_template);
-+	return -1;
-+}
-+
-+krb5_error_code
-+ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(krb5_context ctx, char **ccname) {
-+	profile_t p;
-+	int ret = 0;
-+	char *value = NULL;
-+
-+	ret = krb5_get_profile(ctx, &p);
-+	if (ret)
-+		return ret;
-+
-+	ret = profile_get_string(p, "libdefaults", "default_ccache_name", NULL, NULL, &value);
-+	if (ret)
-+		return ret;
-+
-+	ret = ssh_krb5_expand_template(ccname, value);
-+
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
- #ifndef HEIMDAL
- krb5_error_code
- ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
- 	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
--	char ccname[40];
-+	char *ccname;
-+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
-+	char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d";
-+#else
- 	mode_t old_umask;
-+	char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX";
- 
--	ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
--	    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
--	if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
--		return ENOMEM;
--
--	old_umask = umask(0177);
--	tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
--	oerrno = errno;
--	umask(old_umask);
--	if (tmpfd == -1) {
--		logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
--		return oerrno;
--	}
-+#endif
-+
-+	ret = ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(ctx, &ccname);
- 
--	if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
-+	if (ret) {
-+		ret = asprintf(&ccname, cctemplate, geteuid());
-+		if (ret == -1)
-+			return ENOMEM;
-+		old_umask = umask(0177);
-+		tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
- 		oerrno = errno;
--		logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
-+		umask(old_umask);
-+		if (tmpfd == -1) {
-+			logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
-+			return oerrno;
-+		}
-+
-+		if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
-+			oerrno = errno;
-+			logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
-+			close(tmpfd);
-+			return oerrno;
-+		}
- 		close(tmpfd);
--		return oerrno;
- 	}
--	close(tmpfd);
-+	debug("%s: Setting ccname to %s", __func__, ccname);
- 
- 	return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
- }

openssh-6.3p1-kuserok.patch

@@ -1,167 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok	2013-10-11 21:41:42.889087613 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth-krb5.c	2013-10-11 21:41:42.905087537 +0200
-@@ -55,6 +55,20 @@
- 
- extern ServerOptions	 options;
- 
-+int
-+ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context krb5_ctx, krb5_principal krb5_user, const char *client)
-+{
-+	if (options.use_kuserok)
-+		return krb5_kuserok(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, client);
-+	else {
-+		char kuser[65];
-+
-+		if (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, sizeof(kuser), kuser))
-+			return 0;
-+		return strcmp(kuser, client) == 0;
-+	}
-+}
-+
- static int
- krb5_init(void *context)
- {
-@@ -159,7 +173,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
- 	if (problem)
- 		goto out;
- 
--	if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, client)) {
-+	if (!ssh_krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, client)) {
- 		problem = -1;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok	2013-10-11 21:41:42.901087556 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2013-10-11 21:46:42.898673597 +0200
-@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_pr
-     int);
- 
- static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
-+extern int ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context, krb5_principal, const char *);
- 
- /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
- 
-@@ -116,7 +117,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client
- 	/* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user,
- 	 * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials
- 	 * to access these files aren't available yet. */
--	if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) {
-+	if (ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) {
- 		retval = 1;
- 		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
- 		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c.kuserok	2013-10-11 21:41:42.896087580 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/servconf.c	2013-10-11 21:48:24.664194016 +0200
-@@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
- 	options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
- 	options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
- 	options->version_addendum = NULL;
-+	options->use_kuserok = -1;
- }
- 
- void
-@@ -310,6 +311,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
- 		options->version_addendum = xstrdup("");
- 	if (options->show_patchlevel == -1)
- 		options->show_patchlevel = 0;
-+	if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
-+		options->use_kuserok = 1;
- 
- 	/* Turn privilege separation on by default */
- 	if (use_privsep == -1)
-@@ -336,7 +339,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
- 	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
- 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
--	sKerberosGetAFSToken,
-+	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUseKuserok,
- 	sKerberosTgtPassing, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
- 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
- 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
-@@ -409,11 +412,13 @@ static struct {
- #else
- 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #endif
-+	{ "kerberosusekuserok", sKerberosUseKuserok, SSHCFG_ALL },
- #else
- 	{ "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "kerberosusekuserok", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- #endif
- 	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1515,6 +1520,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 		*activep = value;
- 		break;
- 
-+	case sKerberosUseKuserok:
-+		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
- 	case sPermitOpen:
- 		arg = strdelim(&cp);
- 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
-@@ -1815,6 +1824,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(max_authtries);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
-+	M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
- 
-@@ -2055,6 +2065,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep);
-+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
- 
- 	/* string arguments */
- 	dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file);
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/servconf.h.kuserok openssh-6.3p1/servconf.h
---- openssh-6.3p1/servconf.h.kuserok	2013-10-11 21:41:42.896087580 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/servconf.h	2013-10-11 21:41:42.907087528 +0200
-@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ typedef struct {
- 
- 	int	num_permitted_opens;
- 
-+	int	use_kuserok;
- 	char   *chroot_directory;
- 	char   *revoked_keys_file;
- 	char   *trusted_user_ca_keys;
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok	2013-10-11 21:41:42.898087571 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5	2013-10-11 21:41:42.907087528 +0200
-@@ -675,6 +675,10 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
- file on logout.
- The default is
- .Dq yes .
-+.It Cm KerberosUseKuserok
-+Specifies whether to look at .k5login file for user's aliases.
-+The default is
-+.Dq yes .
- .It Cm KexAlgorithms
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
-@@ -833,6 +837,7 @@ Available keywords are
- .Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly ,
- .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication ,
- .Cm KerberosAuthentication ,
-+.Cm KerberosUseKuserok ,
- .Cm MaxAuthTries ,
- .Cm MaxSessions ,
- .Cm PasswordAuthentication ,
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.kuserok openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config
---- openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.kuserok	2013-10-11 21:41:42.898087571 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config	2013-10-11 21:41:42.907087528 +0200
-@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
- #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
- #KerberosTicketCleanup yes
- #KerberosGetAFSToken no
-+#KerberosUseKuserok yes
- 
- # GSSAPI options
- #GSSAPIAuthentication no

openssh-6.3p1-privsep-selinux.patch

@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.privsep-selinux openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.privsep-selinux	2013-10-10 14:58:20.634762245 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2013-10-10 15:13:57.864306950 +0200
-@@ -503,6 +503,25 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *n
- 	free(newctx);
- }
- 
-+void
-+ssh_selinux_copy_context(void)
-+{
-+	security_context_t *ctx;
-+
-+	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
-+		return;
-+
-+	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
-+		logit("%s: getcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror (errno));
-+		return;
-+	}
-+	if (ctx != NULL) {
-+		if (setcon(ctx) != 0)
-+			logit("%s: setcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror (errno));
-+		freecon(ctx);
-+	}
-+}
-+
- #endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
- 
- #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
---- openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux	2011-01-25 02:16:18.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2013-10-10 14:58:20.634762245 +0200
-@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
- void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
- void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
-+void ssh_selinux_copy_context(void);
- void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
- #endif
- 
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/session.c.privsep-selinux openssh-6.3p1/session.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/session.c.privsep-selinux	2013-10-10 14:58:20.617762326 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/session.c	2013-10-10 15:13:16.520503590 +0200
-@@ -1522,6 +1522,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
- 			    pw->pw_uid);
- 			chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
- 			    "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+			ssh_selinux_copy_context();
-+#endif
- 			safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
- 			free(tmp);
- 			free(chroot_path);
-@@ -1544,6 +1547,12 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
- 		/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
- 		permanently_set_uid(pw);
- #endif
-+
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+		if (options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
-+		    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0)
-+			ssh_selinux_copy_context();
-+#endif
- 	} else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
- 	    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
- 		fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory");
-@@ -1808,9 +1817,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
- 		argv[i] = NULL;
- 		optind = optreset = 1;
- 		__progname = argv[0];
--#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--		ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
--#endif
- 		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
- 	}
- 
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux	2013-10-10 14:58:20.632762255 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd.c	2013-10-10 14:58:20.635762241 +0200
-@@ -668,6 +668,10 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
- 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
- 	demote_sensitive_data();
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t");
-+#endif
-+
- 	/* Change our root directory */
- 	if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
- 		fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,
-@@ -811,6 +815,13 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 	do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
- 
-  skip:
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	/* switch SELinux content for root too */
-+	if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) {
-+		ssh_selinux_copy_context();
-+	}
-+#endif
-+
- 	/* It is safe now to apply the key state */
- 	monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
- 

openssh-6.3p1-redhat.patch

@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh_config.redhat openssh-6.3p1/ssh_config
---- openssh-6.3p1/ssh_config.redhat	2013-10-11 14:51:18.345876648 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh_config	2013-10-11 15:13:05.429829266 +0200
-@@ -46,3 +46,14 @@
- #   VisualHostKey no
- #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
- #   RekeyLimit 1G 1h
-+Host *
-+	GSSAPIAuthentication yes
-+# If this option is set to yes then remote X11 clients will have full access
-+# to the original X11 display. As virtually no X11 client supports the untrusted
-+# mode correctly we set this to yes.
-+	ForwardX11Trusted yes
-+# Send locale-related environment variables
-+	SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
-+	SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
-+	SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
-+	SendEnv XMODIFIERS
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.0
---- openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.0.redhat	2013-09-13 08:20:43.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.0	2013-10-11 14:51:18.345876648 +0200
-@@ -653,9 +653,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
- 
-      SyslogFacility
-              Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
--             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0,
--             LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.  The
--             default is AUTH.
-+             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV,
-+             LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
-+             The default is AUTH.
- 
-      TCPKeepAlive
-              Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5.redhat	2013-07-20 05:21:53.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.5	2013-10-11 14:51:18.346876643 +0200
-@@ -1095,7 +1095,7 @@ Note that this option applies to protoco
- .It Cm SyslogFacility
- Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
- .Xr sshd 8 .
--The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
-+The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
- LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
- The default is AUTH.
- .It Cm TCPKeepAlive
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.redhat openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config
---- openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config.redhat	2013-10-11 14:51:18.343876657 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd_config	2013-10-11 14:51:18.346876643 +0200
-@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@
- # possible, but leave them commented.  Uncommented options override the
- # default value.
- 
-+# If you want to change the port on a SELinux system, you have to tell
-+# SELinux about this change.
-+# semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER
-+#
- #Port 22
- #AddressFamily any
- #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
-@@ -21,9 +25,9 @@
- # HostKey for protocol version 1
- #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
- # HostKeys for protocol version 2
--#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
-+HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
- #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
--#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
-+HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
- 
- # Lifetime and size of ephemeral version 1 server key
- #KeyRegenerationInterval 1h
-@@ -35,6 +39,7 @@
- # Logging
- # obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging
- #SyslogFacility AUTH
-+SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
- #LogLevel INFO
- 
- # Authentication:
-@@ -70,9 +75,11 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
- # To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
- #PasswordAuthentication yes
- #PermitEmptyPasswords no
-+PasswordAuthentication yes
- 
- # Change to no to disable s/key passwords
- #ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes
-+ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
- 
- # Kerberos options
- #KerberosAuthentication no
-@@ -82,7 +89,9 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
- 
- # GSSAPI options
- #GSSAPIAuthentication no
-+GSSAPIAuthentication yes
- #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
-+GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
- 
- # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, 
- # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will 
-@@ -94,11 +103,13 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
- # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
- # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
- #UsePAM no
-+UsePAM yes
- 
- #AllowAgentForwarding yes
- #AllowTcpForwarding yes
- #GatewayPorts no
- #X11Forwarding no
-+X11Forwarding yes
- #X11DisplayOffset 10
- #X11UseLocalhost yes
- #PrintMotd yes
-@@ -120,6 +131,12 @@ UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox		# Defaul
- # no default banner path
- #Banner none
- 
-+# Accept locale-related environment variables
-+AcceptEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
-+AcceptEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
-+AcceptEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
-+AcceptEnv XMODIFIERS
-+
- # override default of no subsystems
- Subsystem	sftp	/usr/libexec/sftp-server
- 

openssh-6.4p1-FIPS-mode-SP800-131A.patch

@@ -1,206 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/dh.h b/dh.h
-index 48f7b68..9ff39f4 100644
---- a/dh.h
-+++ b/dh.h
-@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ int	 dh_estimate(int);
- 
- /* Min and max values from RFC4419. */
- #define DH_GRP_MIN	1024
-+#define DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS	2048
- #define DH_GRP_MAX	8192
- 
- /*
-diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
-index a468805..3a0eb16 100644
---- a/kex.c
-+++ b/kex.c
-@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
- #include <string.h>
- 
- #include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- 
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
-@@ -93,6 +94,20 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
- 	{ NULL, -1, -1, NULL},
- };
- 
-+static const struct kexalg kexalgs_fips[] = {
-+	{ KEX_DH14, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, 0, EVP_sha1 },
-+	{ KEX_DHGEX_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, 0, EVP_sha1 },
-+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
-+	{ KEX_DHGEX_SHA256, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, 0, EVP_sha256 },
-+#endif
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-+	{ KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, EVP_sha256 },
-+	{ KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp384r1, EVP_sha384 },
-+	{ KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp521r1, EVP_sha512 },
-+#endif
-+	{ NULL, -1, -1, NULL},
-+};
-+
- char *
- kex_alg_list(void)
- {
-@@ -116,7 +131,7 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
- {
- 	const struct kexalg *k;
- 
--	for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
-+	for (k = (FIPS_mode() ? kexalgs_fips : kexalgs); k->name != NULL; k++) {
- 		if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
- 			return k;
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-@@ -141,7 +156,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
- 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
- 	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
- 		if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
--			error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
-+			if (FIPS_mode())
-+				error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p);
-+			else
-+				error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
- 			free(s);
- 			return 0;
- 		}
-diff --git a/kexecdhc.c b/kexecdhc.c
-index 6193836..d435f1f 100644
---- a/kexecdhc.c
-+++ b/kexecdhc.c
-@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ kexecdh_client(Kex *kex)
- 
- 	kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
- 	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
-+	memset(hash, 0, hashlen);
- 	kex_finish(kex);
- }
- #else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
-diff --git a/kexecdhs.c b/kexecdhs.c
-index 3a580aa..9a06905 100644
---- a/kexecdhs.c
-+++ b/kexecdhs.c
-@@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ kexecdh_server(Kex *kex)
- 
- 	kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
- 	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
-+	memset(hash, 0, hashlen);
- 	kex_finish(kex);
- }
- #else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
-diff --git a/kexgexc.c b/kexgexc.c
-index 5a3be20..a931b6e 100644
---- a/kexgexc.c
-+++ b/kexgexc.c
-@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
- 
- #include "includes.h"
- 
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
-+
- #include <sys/types.h>
- 
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
-@@ -64,13 +66,13 @@ kexgex_client(Kex *kex)
- 		/* Old GEX request */
- 		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD);
- 		packet_put_int(nbits);
--		min = DH_GRP_MIN;
-+		min = FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN;
- 		max = DH_GRP_MAX;
- 
- 		debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD(%u) sent", nbits);
- 	} else {
- 		/* New GEX request */
--		min = DH_GRP_MIN;
-+		min = FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN;
- 		max = DH_GRP_MAX;
- 		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST);
- 		packet_put_int(min);
-diff --git a/kexgexs.c b/kexgexs.c
-index 4e473fc..2ed49bd 100644
---- a/kexgexs.c
-+++ b/kexgexs.c
-@@ -76,16 +76,16 @@ kexgex_server(Kex *kex)
- 		omin = min = packet_get_int();
- 		onbits = nbits = packet_get_int();
- 		omax = max = packet_get_int();
--		min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
-+		min = MAX(FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN, min);
- 		max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
--		nbits = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits);
-+		nbits = MAX(FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN, nbits);
- 		nbits = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits);
- 		break;
- 	case SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD:
- 		debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD received");
- 		onbits = nbits = packet_get_int();
- 		/* unused for old GEX */
--		omin = min = DH_GRP_MIN;
-+		omin = min = FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN;
- 		omax = max = DH_GRP_MAX;
- 		break;
- 	default:
-diff --git a/myproposal.h b/myproposal.h
-index ee69ea2..1b68c5b 100644
---- a/myproposal.h
-+++ b/myproposal.h
-@@ -72,6 +72,12 @@
- 	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1," \
- 	"diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
- 
-+#define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS		\
-+	KEX_ECDH_METHODS \
-+	KEX_SHA256_METHODS \
-+	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \
-+	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
-+
- #define	KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG	\
- 	HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
- 	"ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
-index cac6762..2569016 100644
---- a/ssh-keygen.c
-+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
-@@ -183,8 +183,14 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, u_int32_t *bitsp)
- 		fprintf(stderr, "key bits exceeds maximum %d\n", maxbits);
- 		exit(1);
- 	}
--	if (type == KEY_DSA && *bitsp != 1024)
-+	if (type == KEY_DSA && FIPS_mode())
-+		fatal("DSA keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+	else if (type == KEY_DSA && *bitsp != 1024)
- 		fatal("DSA keys must be 1024 bits");
-+	else if (type == KEY_RSA && bits < DEFAULT_BITS && FIPS_mode()) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "RSA keys must be at least %d bits in FIPS mode\n", DEFAULT_BITS);
-+		exit(1);
-+	}
- 	else if (type != KEY_ECDSA && *bitsp < 768)
- 		fatal("Key must at least be 768 bits");
- 	else if (type == KEY_ECDSA && key_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(*bitsp) == -1)
-diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
-index 7e48880..3179d82 100644
---- a/sshconnect2.c
-+++ b/sshconnect2.c
-@@ -231,6 +231,8 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
- 	}
- 	if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL)
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms;
-+	else if (FIPS_mode())
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS;
- 
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- 	/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index 11adbf6..f5e98bc 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -2605,6 +2605,8 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
- 	}
- 	if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL)
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms;
-+	else if (FIPS_mode())
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS;
- 
- 	if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
- 		packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,

openssh-6.4p1-legacy-ssh-copy-id.patch

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1.legacy-ssh-copy-id openssh-6.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1
---- openssh-6.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1.legacy-ssh-copy-id	2013-03-22 00:17:37.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1	2014-01-28 17:12:49.197542425 +0100
-@@ -180,6 +180,19 @@ should prove enlightening (N.B. the mode
- .Fl W
- option, rather than
- .Xr nc 1 ) .
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds
-+.Pp
-+.It Pa SSH_COPY_ID_LEGACY
-+If the 
-+.Cm SSH_COPY_ID_LEGACY
-+environment variable is set, the
-+.Nm
-+is run in a legacy mode. In this mode, the 
-+.Nm
-+doesn't check an existence of a private key and doesn't do remote checks
-+of the remote server versions or if public keys are already installed.
-+.El
- .Sh "SEE ALSO"
- .Xr ssh 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
-diff -up openssh-6.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.legacy-ssh-copy-id openssh-6.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id
---- openssh-6.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.legacy-ssh-copy-id	2013-06-05 14:48:45.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id	2014-01-28 17:11:51.538833032 +0100
-@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ use_id_file() {
-     PUB_ID_FILE="$L_ID_FILE.pub"
-   fi
- 
--  PRIV_ID_FILE=$(dirname "$PUB_ID_FILE")/$(basename "$PUB_ID_FILE" .pub)
-+  [ "x$SSH_COPY_ID_LEGACY" != "x" ] || PRIV_ID_FILE=$(dirname "$PUB_ID_FILE")/$(basename "$PUB_ID_FILE" .pub)
- 
-   # check that the files are readable
-   for f in $PUB_ID_FILE $PRIV_ID_FILE ; do
-@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ populate_new_ids() {
-   printf '%s: INFO: %d key(s) remain to be installed -- if you are prompted now it is to install the new keys\n' "$0" "$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)" >&2
- }
- 
--REMOTE_VERSION=$(ssh -v -o PreferredAuthentications=',' "$@" 2>&1 |
-+[ "x$SSH_COPY_ID_LEGACY" != "x" ] || REMOTE_VERSION=$(ssh -v -o PreferredAuthentications=',' "$@" 2>&1 |
-                  sed -ne 's/.*remote software version //p')
- 
- case "$REMOTE_VERSION" in
-@@ -268,7 +268,11 @@ case "$REMOTE_VERSION" in
-     ;;
-   *)
-     # Assuming that the remote host treats ~/.ssh/authorized_keys as one might expect
--    populate_new_ids 0
-+    if [ "x$SSH_COPY_ID_LEGACY" != "x" ]; then
-+      NEW_IDS=`eval "$GET_ID"`
-+    else
-+      populate_new_ids 0
-+    fi
-     [ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | ssh "$@" "
- 		umask 077 ;
- 		mkdir -p .ssh && cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys || exit 1 ;

openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/log.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100
+@@ -250,6 +250,11 @@ debug3(const char *fmt,...)
+ void
+ log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr)
+ {
++	log_init_handler(av0, level, facility, on_stderr, 1);
++}
++
++void
++log_init_handler(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr, int reset_handler) {
+ #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
+ 	struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
+ #endif
+@@ -273,8 +278,10 @@ log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, Sysl
+ 		exit(1);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	log_handler = NULL;
+-	log_handler_ctx = NULL;
++	if (reset_handler) {
++		log_handler = NULL;
++		log_handler_ctx = NULL;
++	}
+ 
+ 	log_on_stderr = on_stderr;
+ 	if (on_stderr)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/log.h.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/log.h	2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100
+@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, const char *, void *);
+ 
+ void     log_init(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
++void     log_init_handler(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int, int);
+ LogLevel log_level_get(void);
+ int      log_change_level(LogLevel);
+ int      log_is_on_stderr(void);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.311168085 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c	2016-12-23 15:16:42.154193100 +0100
+@@ -307,6 +307,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
+ 		close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
+ 	pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
+ 
++	pmonitor->m_state = "preauth";
++
+ 	authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
+ 	memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
+ 	ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
+@@ -405,6 +407,8 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *p
+ 	close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
+ 	pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
+ 
++	pmonitor->m_state = "postauth";
++
+ 	monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
+ 	ssh_signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
+ 	ssh_signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
+@@ -472,7 +476,7 @@ monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonito
+ 	if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
+ 		fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
+ 		    __func__, level);
+-	do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
++	do_log2(level, "%s [%s]", msg, pmonitor->m_state);
+ 
+ 	sshbuf_free(logmsg);
+ 	free(msg);
+@@ -1719,13 +1723,28 @@ monitor_init(void)
+ 	mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
+ 	monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
+ 
++	mon->m_state = "";
++
+ 	return mon;
+ }
+ 
+ void
+-monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
++monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon, const char *chroot_dir)
+ {
+-	monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
++	struct stat dev_log_stat;
++	char *dev_log_path;
++	int do_logfds = 0;
++
++	if (chroot_dir != NULL) {
++		xasprintf(&dev_log_path, "%s/dev/log", chroot_dir);
++
++		if (stat(dev_log_path, &dev_log_stat) != 0) {
++			debug("%s: /dev/log doesn't exist in %s chroot - will try to log via monitor using [postauth] suffix", __func__, chroot_dir);
++			do_logfds = 1;
++		}
++		free(dev_log_path);
++	}
++	monitor_openfds(mon, do_logfds);
+ }
+ 
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h	2016-12-23 15:16:28.372190424 +0100
+@@ -83,10 +83,11 @@ struct monitor {
+ 	int			 m_log_sendfd;
+ 	struct kex		**m_pkex;
+ 	pid_t			 m_pid;
++	char		*m_state;
+ };
+ 
+ struct monitor *monitor_init(void);
+-void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *);
++void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *, const char *);
+ 
+ struct Authctxt;
+ void monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *, struct monitor *);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.319168086 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 15:18:18.742211853 +0100
+@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ login_cap_t *lc;
+ 
+ static int is_child = 0;
+ static int in_chroot = 0;
++static int have_dev_log = 1;
+ 
+ /* File containing userauth info, if ExposeAuthInfo set */
+ static char *auth_info_file = NULL;
+@@ -619,6 +620,7 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 	int ret;
+ 	const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL;
+ 	char session_type[1024];
++	struct stat dev_log_stat;
+ 
+ 	if (options.adm_forced_command) {
+ 		original_command = command;
+@@ -676,6 +678,10 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 			tty += 5;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (lstat("/dev/log", &dev_log_stat) != 0) {
++		have_dev_log = 0;
++	}
++
+ 	verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
+ 	    session_type,
+ 	    tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
+@@ -1486,14 +1492,6 @@ child_close_fds(void)
+ 
+ 	/* Stop directing logs to a high-numbered fd before we close it */
+ 	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
+-	 * hanging around in clients.  Note that we want to do this after
+-	 * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
+-	 * descriptors open.
+-	 */
+-	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -1629,8 +1627,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+ 			exit(1);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+-
+ 	do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell);
+ 
+ 	/* restore SIGPIPE for child */
+@@ -1653,9 +1649,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+ 		argv[i] = NULL;
+ 		optind = optreset = 1;
+ 		__progname = argv[0];
+-		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
++		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw, have_dev_log));
+ 	}
+ 
++	/*
++	 * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
++	 * hanging around in clients.  Note that we want to do this after
++	 * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
++	 * descriptors open.
++	 */
++	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
++
+ 	fflush(NULL);
+ 
+ 	/* Get the last component of the shell name. */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h	2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100
+@@ -97,5 +97,5 @@
+ 
+ struct passwd;
+ 
+-int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *);
++int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *, int);
+ void	sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100
+@@ -1497,7 +1497,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
++sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handler)
+ {
+ 	fd_set *rset, *wset;
+ 	int i, r, in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
+@@ -1511,7 +1511,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+ 	extern char *__progname;
+ 
+ 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+-	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
++	log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler);
+ 
+ 	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
+ 
+@@ -1582,7 +1582,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+-	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
++	log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler);
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * On platforms where we can, avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps}
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100
+@@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 		return 1;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
++	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw, 0));
+ }
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.328168088 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.332168088 +0100
+@@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* New socket pair */
+-	monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
++	monitor_reinit(pmonitor, options.chroot_directory);
+ 
+ 	pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
+ 	if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
+@@ -668,6 +668,11 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 
+ 	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+ 	pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
++	close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
++	pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
++
++	if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd != -1)
++		set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
+ 
+ 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
+ 	demote_sensitive_data();

openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+--- a/scp.c	
++++ a/scp.c	
+@@ -1084,6 +1084,10 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
+ 			free(vect[0]);
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
++		if (buf[0] == 'C' && ! exists && np[strlen(np)-1] == '/') {
++			errno = ENOTDIR;
++			goto bad;
++		}
+ 		omode = mode;
+ 		mode |= S_IWUSR;
+ 		if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) == -1) {
+-- 

openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
+ #include "misc.h"      /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
+ #include "servconf.h"
+ #include "port-linux.h"
++#include "misc.h"
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "hostfile.h"
+ #include "auth.h"
+@@ -445,7 +446,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+ void
+ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
+ {
+-	security_context_t *ctx;
++	char *ctx;
+ 
+ 	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
+ 		return;
+@@ -461,6 +462,72 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
++void
++sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void)
++{
++	int len;
++	char line[1024], *preauth_context = NULL, *cp, *arg;
++	const char *contexts_path;
++	FILE *contexts_file;
++	struct stat sb;
++
++	contexts_path = selinux_openssh_contexts_path();
++	if (contexts_path == NULL) {
++		debug3("%s: Failed to get the path to SELinux context", __func__);
++		return;
++	}
++
++	if ((contexts_file = fopen(contexts_path, "r")) == NULL) {
++		debug("%s: Failed to open SELinux context file", __func__);
++		return;
++	}
++
++	if (fstat(fileno(contexts_file), &sb) != 0 ||
++	    sb.st_uid != 0 || (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
++		logit("%s: SELinux context file needs to be owned by root"
++		    " and not writable by anyone else", __func__);
++		fclose(contexts_file);
++		return;
++	}
++
++	while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), contexts_file)) {
++		/* Strip trailing whitespace */
++		for (len = strlen(line) - 1; len > 0; len--) {
++			if (strchr(" \t\r\n", line[len]) == NULL)
++				break;
++			line[len] = '\0';
++		}
++
++		if (line[0] == '\0')
++			continue;
++
++		cp = line;
++		arg = strdelim(&cp);
++		if (arg && *arg == '\0')
++			arg = strdelim(&cp);
++
++		if (arg && strcmp(arg, "privsep_preauth") == 0) {
++			arg = strdelim(&cp);
++			if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
++				debug("%s: privsep_preauth is empty", __func__);
++				fclose(contexts_file);
++				return;
++			}
++			preauth_context = xstrdup(arg);
++		}
++	}
++	fclose(contexts_file);
++
++	if (preauth_context == NULL) {
++		debug("%s: Unable to find 'privsep_preauth' option in"
++		    " SELinux context file", __func__);
++		return;
++	}
++
++	ssh_selinux_change_context(preauth_context);
++	free(preauth_context);
++}
++
+ #endif
+ #endif
+ 
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+index 22ea8ef..1fc963d 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname)
+ 	strlcpy(newctx + len, newname, newlen - len);
+ 	if ((cx = index(cx + 1, ':')))
+ 		strlcat(newctx, cx, newlen);
+-	debug3("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
++	debug("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
+ 	    oldctx, newctx);
+ 	if (setcon(newctx) < 0)
+ 		switchlog("%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s", __func__,
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+index cb51f99..8b7cda2 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
++void sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 2871fe9..39b9c08 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
+ 	demote_sensitive_data();
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-	ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t");
++	sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context();
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	/* Demote the child */

openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.615216100 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2016-12-23 15:18:40.628216102 +0100
+@@ -279,7 +279,6 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
+ 	FILE *fp;
+ 	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
+ 	char *line = NULL;
+-	char kuser[65]; /* match krb5_kuserok() */
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
+ 	int found_principal = 0;
+@@ -288,7 +287,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
+ 
+ 	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
+ 	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
+-	if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) {
++	if ( !options.enable_k5users || (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1))) {
+                 return ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, principal, luser,
+                                         k5login_exists);
+ 	}
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.615216100 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 15:35:36.354401156 +0100
+@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ 	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
+ 	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
+ 	options->use_kuserok = -1;
++	options->enable_k5users = -1;
+ 	options->password_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+@@ -345,6 +346,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ #endif
+ 	if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
+ 		options->use_kuserok = 1;
++	if (options->enable_k5users == -1)
++		options->enable_k5users = 0;
+ 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->password_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+@@ -418,7 +421,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes,
+ 	sHostKeyAlgorithms,
+ 	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
+-	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
++	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+ 	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
+ 	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+ 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+@@ -497,14 +500,16 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #else
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gssapienablek5users", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1653,6 +1658,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case sGssEnablek5users:
++		intptr = &options->enable_k5users;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case sPermitListen:
+ 	case sPermitOpen:
+ 		if (opcode == sPermitListen) {
+@@ -2026,6 +2035,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok);
++	M_CP_INTOPT(enable_k5users);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
+@@ -2320,6 +2330,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ # endif
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssEnablek5users, o->enable_k5users);
+ #endif
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.616216100 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2016-12-23 15:18:40.629216102 +0100
+@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ typedef struct {
+	int     kerberos_unique_ccache;		/* If true, the acquired ticket will
+						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
+ 	int	use_kuserok;
++	int		enable_k5users;
+ 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
+ 	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
+ 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.630216103 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2016-12-23 15:36:21.607408435 +0100
+@@ -628,6 +628,12 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
+ on logout.
+ The default is
+ .Cm yes .
++.It Cm GSSAPIEnablek5users
++Specifies whether to look at .k5users file for GSSAPI authentication
++access control. Further details are described in
++.Xr ksu 1 .
++The default is
++.Cm no .
+ .It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
+ Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
+ doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.616216100 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config	2016-12-23 15:18:40.631216103 +0100
+@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ GSSAPIAuthentication yes
+ #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
+ #GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
+ #GSSAPIKeyExchange no
++#GSSAPIEnablek5users no
+ 
+ # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will

openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c
+--- openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts	2016-07-25 13:58:48.998507834 +0200
++++ openssh/sshd.c	2016-07-25 14:01:28.346469878 +0200
+@@ -1507,12 +1507,29 @@ check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 
+ 	if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts,
+ 	    &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
+-		text[0] = '\0';
+-		for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
+-			snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
+-			    " %2.2x", opts[i]);
+-		fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP opts: %.800s",
+-		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text);
++		i = 0;
++		do {
++			switch (opts[i]) {
++				case 0:
++				case 1:
++					++i;
++					break;
++				case 130:
++				case 133:
++				case 134:
++					i += opts[i + 1];
++					break;
++				default:
++				/* Fail, fatally, if we detect either loose or strict
++			 	 * source routing options. */
++					text[0] = '\0';
++					for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
++						snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
++							" %2.2x", opts[i]);
++					fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP options:%.800s",
++						ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text);
++			}
++		} while (i < option_size);
+ 	}
+ 	return;
+ #endif /* IP_OPTIONS */

openssh-6.6p1-ctr-cavstest.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,45 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-6.2p1/ctr-cavstest.c
---- openssh-6.2p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs	2013-03-25 21:35:52.512586671 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/ctr-cavstest.c	2013-03-25 21:35:52.512586671 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs	2015-03-18 11:22:05.493289018 +0100
++++ openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in	2015-03-18 11:22:44.504196316 +0100
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
+ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
+ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
+ SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
++CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest
+ SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+ SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
+@@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+ 
+ .SUFFIXES: .lo
+ 
+-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
++TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
+ 
+ XMSS_OBJS=\
+ 	ssh-xmss.o \
+@@ -194,6 +195,9 @@ ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) l
+ ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS)
+ 
++ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o
++	$(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
++
+ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 
+@@ -326,6 +330,7 @@ install-files:
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
++	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
+diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c
+--- openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs	2015-03-18 11:22:05.521288952 +0100
++++ openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c	2015-03-18 11:22:05.521288952 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
 +/*
 + *
 + * invocation (all of the following are equal):
@@ -22,6 +60,7 @@ diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-6.2p1/ctr-cavstest.c
 +
 +#include "xmalloc.h"
 +#include "log.h"
++#include "ssherr.h"
 +#include "cipher.h"
 +
 +/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
@@ -95,7 +134,7 @@ diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-6.2p1/ctr-cavstest.c
 +                        break;
 +
 +                total += n;
-+                buf = xrealloc(buf, total + READ_CHUNK, 1);
++                buf = xreallocarray(buf, total + READ_CHUNK, 1);
 +        } while(total < MAX_READ_SIZE);
 +        return buf;
 +}
@@ -103,14 +142,14 @@ diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-6.2p1/ctr-cavstest.c
 +int main (int argc, char *argv[])
 +{
 +
-+        Cipher *c;
-+        CipherContext cc;
++        const struct sshcipher *c;
++        struct sshcipher_ctx *cc;
 +        char *algo = "aes128-ctr";
 +        char *hexkey = NULL;
 +        char *hexiv = "00000000000000000000000000000000";
 +        char *hexdata = NULL;
 +        char *p;
-+        int i;
++        int i, r;
 +        int encrypt = 1;
 +        void *key;
 +        size_t keylen;
@@ -148,7 +187,7 @@ diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-6.2p1/ctr-cavstest.c
 +                usage();
 +        }
 +
-+	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
++	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
 +
 +	c = cipher_by_name(algo);
 +	if (c == NULL) {
@@ -183,10 +222,13 @@ diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-6.2p1/ctr-cavstest.c
 +		return 2;
 +	}
 +
-+	cipher_init(&cc, c, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, encrypt);
++	if ((r = cipher_init(&cc, c, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, encrypt)) != 0) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "Error: cipher_init failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
++		return 2;
++	}
 +
-+        free(key);
-+        free(iv);
++	free(key);
++	free(iv);
 +
 +	outdata = malloc(datalen);
 +	if(outdata == NULL) {
@@ -194,11 +236,14 @@ diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-6.2p1/ctr-cavstest.c
 +		return 2;
 +	}
 +
-+	cipher_crypt(&cc, outdata, data, datalen, 0, 0);
++	if ((r = cipher_crypt(cc, 0, outdata, data, datalen, 0, 0)) != 0) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "Error: cipher_crypt failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
++		return 2;
++	}
 +
-+        free(data);
++	free(data);
 +
-+	cipher_cleanup(&cc);
++	cipher_free(cc);
 +
 +        for (p = outdata; datalen > 0; ++p, --datalen) {
 +		printf("%02X", (unsigned char)*p);
@@ -210,41 +255,3 @@ diff -up openssh-6.2p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-6.2p1/ctr-cavstest.c
 +        return 0;
 +}
 +
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs openssh-6.2p1/Makefile.in
---- openssh-6.2p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs	2013-03-25 21:35:52.451586280 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/Makefile.in	2013-03-25 21:37:14.956114584 +0100
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
- SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper
- SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper
- SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
-+CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest
- SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
- PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
- SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
-@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
- MANFMT=@MANFMT@
- INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@
- 
--TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
- 
- LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
- 	canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o \
-@@ -174,6 +175,9 @@ ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) l
- ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS)
- 
-+ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
-+
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
- 
-@@ -281,6 +285,7 @@ install-files:
- 		$(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \
- 	fi
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
-+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1

openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb	2013-10-11 18:58:51.553948159 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2013-10-11 21:40:49.972337025 +0200
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+index 413b845..54dd383 100644
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
 @@ -32,7 +32,9 @@
  #include <sys/types.h>
  
@@ -10,21 +11,16 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
 +#include <unistd.h>
  
  #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "key.h"
-@@ -40,10 +42,12 @@
- #include "auth.h"
- #include "log.h"
- #include "servconf.h"
-+#include "misc.h"
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+@@ -45,6 +47,7 @@
  
- #include "buffer.h"
  #include "ssh-gss.h"
  
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
  extern ServerOptions options;
  
  #ifdef HEIMDAL
-@@ -55,6 +59,13 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
+@@ -56,6 +59,13 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
  # include <gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h>
  #endif
  
@@ -38,7 +34,7 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
  
  /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
-@@ -87,6 +98,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client
+@@ -88,6 +98,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
  	krb5_principal princ;
  	int retval;
  	const char *errmsg;
@@ -46,7 +42,7 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  
  	if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0)
  		return 0;
-@@ -98,10 +110,22 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client
+@@ -99,10 +110,22 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
  		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
  		return 0;
  	}
@@ -70,7 +66,7 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  	} else
  		retval = 0;
  
-@@ -109,6 +133,135 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client
+@@ -110,6 +133,137 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
  	return retval;
  }
  
@@ -101,13 +97,14 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
 +{
 +	FILE *fp;
 +	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
-+	char line[BUFSIZ];
++	char *line = NULL;
 +	char kuser[65]; /* match krb5_kuserok() */
 +	struct stat st;
 +	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
 +	int found_principal = 0;
 +	int ncommands = 0, allcommands = 0;
-+	u_long linenum;
++	u_long linenum = 0;
++	size_t linesize = 0;
 +
 +	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
 +	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
@@ -151,9 +148,9 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
 +	k5users_allowed_cmds = xcalloc(++ncommands,
 +	    sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds));
 +
-+	/* Check each line.  ksu allows unlimited length lines.  We don't. */
-+	while (!allcommands && read_keyfile_line(fp, file, line, sizeof(line),
-+	    &linenum) != -1) {
++	/* Check each line.  ksu allows unlimited length lines. */
++	while (!allcommands && getline(&line, &linesize, fp) != -1) {
++		linenum++;
 +		char *token;
 +
 +		/* we parse just like ksu, even though we could do better */
@@ -167,7 +164,7 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
 +				k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] =
 +				    xstrdup(pw->pw_shell);
 +				k5users_allowed_cmds =
-+				    xrealloc(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands,
++				    xreallocarray(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands,
 +					sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds));
 +				break;
 +			}
@@ -180,12 +177,13 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
 +				k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] =
 +				    xstrdup(token);
 +				k5users_allowed_cmds =
-+				    xrealloc(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands,
++				    xreallocarray(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands,
 +					sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds));
 +				token = strtok(NULL, " \t\n");
 +			}
 +		}
 +       }
++	free(line);
 +	if (k5users_allowed_cmds) {
 +		/* terminate vector */
 +		k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] = NULL;
@@ -206,19 +204,20 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  
  /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
   * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/session.c.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/session.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/session.c.force_krb	2013-10-11 18:58:51.487948468 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/session.c	2013-10-11 18:58:51.563948112 +0200
-@@ -823,6 +823,29 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
- 		debug("Forced command (key option) '%.900s'", command);
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index 28659ec..9c94d8e 100644
+--- a/session.c
++++ b/session.c
+@@ -789,6 +789,29 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 		command = auth_opts->force_command;
+ 		forced = "(key-option)";
  	}
- 
 +#ifdef GSSAPI
 +#ifdef KRB5 /* k5users_allowed_cmds only available w/ GSSAPI+KRB5 */
 +	else if (k5users_allowed_cmds) {
 +		const char *match = command;
 +		int allowed = 0, i = 0;
-+ 
++
 +		if (!match)
 +			match = s->pw->pw_shell;
 +		while (k5users_allowed_cmds[i]) {
@@ -236,12 +235,13 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/session.c.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/session.c
 +#endif
 +#endif
 +
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- 	if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1)
- 		fatal("do_exec: command already set");
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-gss.h.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/ssh-gss.h
---- openssh-6.3p1/ssh-gss.h.force_krb	2013-10-11 18:58:51.558948136 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh-gss.h	2013-10-11 18:58:51.563948112 +0200
+ 	s->forced = 0;
+ 	if (forced != NULL) {
+ 		s->forced = 1;
+diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
+index 0374c88..509109a 100644
+--- a/ssh-gss.h
++++ b/ssh-gss.h
 @@ -49,6 +49,10 @@
  #  endif /* !HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_... */
  
@@ -253,10 +253,11 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-gss.h.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/ssh-gss.h
  #endif /* KRB5 */
  
  /* draft-ietf-secsh-gsskeyex-06 */
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd.8.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/sshd.8
---- openssh-6.3p1/sshd.8.force_krb	2013-10-11 18:58:51.537948234 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/sshd.8	2013-10-11 18:58:51.563948112 +0200
-@@ -326,6 +326,7 @@ Finally, the server and the client enter
+diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
+index adcaaf9..824163b 100644
+--- a/sshd.8
++++ b/sshd.8
+@@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.
  The client tries to authenticate itself using
  host-based authentication,
  public key authentication,
@@ -264,7 +265,7 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/sshd.8.force_krb openssh-6.3p1/sshd.8
  challenge-response authentication,
  or password authentication.
  .Pp
-@@ -797,6 +798,12 @@ This file is used in exactly the same wa
+@@ -800,6 +801,12 @@ This file is used in exactly the same way as
  but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
  rlogin/rsh.
  .Pp

openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch

@@ -1,6 +1,24 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh-6.3p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
---- openssh-6.3p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat	2013-10-10 15:16:33.445566916 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat	2013-10-10 15:16:33.445566916 +0200
+diff -up openssh/auth.c.keycat openssh/misc.c
+--- openssh/auth.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.158849606 +0200
++++ openssh/auth.c	2015-06-24 11:04:23.989868638 +0200
+@@ -966,6 +966,14 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
+ 			_exit(1);
+ 		}
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
++			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
++			    strerror(errno));
++			_exit(127);
++		}
++#endif
++
+ 		execve(av[0], av, child_env);
+ 		error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno));
+ 		_exit(127);
+diff -up openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
+--- openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
++++ openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
 @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
 +The ssh-keycat retrieves the content of the ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
 +of an user in any environment. This includes environments with
@@ -14,75 +32,100 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh-6.3p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
 +        PubkeyAuthentication yes
 +
 +
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in.keycat openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in
---- openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in.keycat	2013-10-10 15:16:33.442566930 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/Makefile.in	2013-10-10 15:16:33.445566916 +0200
+diff -up openssh/Makefile.in.keycat openssh/Makefile.in
+--- openssh/Makefile.in.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.152849621 +0200
++++ openssh/Makefile.in	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
 @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
+ ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
+ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
  SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
- SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper
- SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper
 +SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
  SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+ SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
  PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
- SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
-@@ -64,7 +65,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
- MANFMT=@MANFMT@
- INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@
+@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
+ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
+ GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
+ SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
++KEYCATLIBS=@KEYCATLIBS@
+ LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
+ LIBFIDO2=@LIBFIDO2@
+ AR=@AR@
+@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
  
--TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT)
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
+ .SUFFIXES: .lo
  
- LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
- 	canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o \
-@@ -172,6 +173,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT)
- ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT)
++TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
  
-+ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS)
+ XMSS_OBJS=\
+ 	ssh-xmss.o \
+@@ -190,6 +191,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT)
+ ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SKHELPER_OBJS)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2)
+ 
++ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o
++	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS)
 +
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
  
-@@ -279,6 +283,7 @@ install-files:
- 		$(INSTALL) -m 0700 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-ldap-helper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_HELPER) ; \
- 		$(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \
- 	fi
+@@ -321,6 +325,7 @@ install-files:
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
 +	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
  	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
  	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
  	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.keycat openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.keycat	2013-10-10 15:16:33.429566992 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c	2013-10-10 15:16:33.445566916 +0200
-@@ -606,6 +606,14 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd
- 			_exit(1);
- 		}
+diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.150849626 +0200
++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2015-06-24 10:57:50.160849601 +0200
+@@ -25,8 +25,10 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
  
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+		if (ssh_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
-+			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
-+			    strerror(errno));
-+			_exit(127);
-+		}
-+#endif
++int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
++int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.150849626 +0200
++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2015-06-24 10:57:50.159849603 +0200
+@@ -54,6 +54,20 @@ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+ extern int inetd_flag;
+ extern int rexeced_flag;
+ 
++/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
++int
++sshd_selinux_enabled(void)
++{
++	static int enabled = -1;
 +
- 		execl(options.authorized_keys_command,
- 		    options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, NULL);
- 
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.keycat openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.keycat	2013-10-10 15:16:33.435566964 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2013-10-10 15:32:19.946065189 +0200
-@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
++	if (enabled == -1) {
++		enabled = (is_selinux_enabled() == 1);
++		debug("SELinux support %s", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled");
++	}
++
++	return (enabled);
++}
++
+ /* Send audit message */
+ static int
+ sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context,
+@@ -308,7 +322,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
  
  /* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
  static int
--ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
-+ssh_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(const char *, const char *))
+-sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
++sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *))
  {
  	const char *reqlvl;
  	char *role;
-@@ -324,16 +324,16 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+@@ -319,16 +333,16 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
  
  	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
  
@@ -102,35 +145,65 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.keycat openssh-6.3p1/openbsd-
  
  	if (role != NULL)
  		free(role);
-@@ -341,6 +341,24 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+@@ -336,6 +350,24 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
  	return rv;
  }
  
 +static int
-+ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
++sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
 +{
-+	return ssh_selinux_setup_variables(do_pam_putenv);
++	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_pam_putenv);
 +}
 +
 +static int
-+do_setenv(char *name, char *value)
++do_setenv(char *name, const char *value)
 +{
 +	return setenv(name, value, 1);
 +}
 +
 +int
-+ssh_selinux_setup_env_variables(void)
++sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void)
 +{
-+	return ssh_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv);
++	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv);
 +}
 +
  /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
  void
- ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
-diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keycat.c
---- openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keycat.c.keycat	2013-10-10 15:16:33.446566911 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keycat.c	2013-10-10 15:16:33.446566911 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+@@ -344,7 +376,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
+ 	int r = 0;
+ 	security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
+ 
+-	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
++	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
+ 		return;
+ 
+ 	if (options.use_pam) {
+@@ -415,7 +447,7 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
+ {
+ 	security_context_t *ctx;
+ 
+-	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
++	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
+ 		return;
+ 
+ 	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
+diff -up openssh/platform.c.keycat openssh/platform.c
+--- openssh/platform.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.147849633 +0200
++++ openssh/platform.c	2015-06-24 10:57:50.160849601 +0200
+@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *p
+ {
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ 	/* Cache selinux status for later use */
+-	(void)ssh_selinux_enabled();
++	(void)sshd_selinux_enabled();
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS
+diff -up openssh/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh/ssh-keycat.c
+--- openssh/ssh-keycat.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.161849599 +0200
++++ openssh/ssh-keycat.c	2015-06-24 10:57:50.161849599 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
 +/*
 + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -180,6 +253,9 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keycat.c
 +#include <pwd.h>
 +#include <fcntl.h>
 +#include <unistd.h>
++#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
++#include <stdint.h>
++#endif
 +
 +#include <security/pam_appl.h>
 +
@@ -369,3 +445,41 @@ diff -up openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh-6.3p1/ssh-keycat.c
 +	}
 +	return ev;
 +}
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 3bbccfd..6481f1f 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -2952,6 +2952,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
+ 			PAM_MSG="yes"
+ 
+ 			SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam"
++			KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -lpam"
+ 			AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1],
+ 				[Define if you want to enable PAM support])
+ 
+@@ -3105,6 +3106,7 @@
+ 					;;
+ 				*)
+ 					SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl"
++					KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -ldl"
+ 					;;
+ 				esac
+ 			fi
+@@ -4042,6 +4044,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
+ 	fi ]
+ )
+ AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
++AC_SUBST([KEYCATLIBS])
+ 
+ # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
+ KRB5_MSG="no"
+@@ -5031,6 +5034,9 @@ fi
+ if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then
+ echo "         +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}"
+ fi
++if test ! -z "${KEYCATLIBS}"; then
++echo "   +for ssh-keycat: ${KEYCATLIBS}"
++fi
+ 
+ echo ""
+ 

openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c.keyperm openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c
+--- openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c.keyperm	2020-02-14 01:40:54.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c	2020-02-17 11:55:12.841729758 +0100
+@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <fcntl.h>
++#include <grp.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+@@ -101,7 +102,19 @@ sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filen
+ #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ 	if (check_ntsec(filename))
+ #endif
++
+ 	if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
++		if (st.st_mode & 040) {
++			struct group *gr;
++
++			if ((gr = getgrnam("ssh_keys")) && (st.st_gid == gr->gr_gid)) {
++				/* The only additional bit is read
++				 * for ssh_keys group, which is fine */
++				if ((st.st_mode & 077) == 040 ) {
++					return 0;
++				}
++			}
++		}
+ 		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+ 		error("@         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @");
+ 		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");

openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.640465939 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c	2016-12-23 14:36:07.644465936 +0100
+@@ -56,6 +56,21 @@
+ 
+ extern ServerOptions	 options;
+ 
++int
++ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context krb5_ctx, krb5_principal krb5_user, const char *client,
++                 int k5login_exists)
++{
++	if (options.use_kuserok || !k5login_exists)
++		return krb5_kuserok(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, client);
++	else {
++		char kuser[65];
++
++		if (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, sizeof(kuser), kuser))
++			return 0;
++		return strcmp(kuser, client) == 0;
++	}
++}
++
+ static int
+ krb5_init(void *context)
+ {
+@@ -160,8 +175,9 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+ 	if (problem)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+-	if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
+-	    authctxt->pw->pw_name)) {
++	/* Use !options.use_kuserok here to make ssh_krb5_kuserok() not
++	 * depend on the existance of .k5login */
++	if (!ssh_krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, authctxt->pw->pw_name, !options.use_kuserok)) {
+ 		problem = -1;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.640465939 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2016-12-23 14:36:07.644465936 +0100
+@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_pr
+     int);
+ 
+ static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
++extern int ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context, krb5_principal, const char *, int);
+ 
+ /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
+ 
+@@ -92,6 +93,103 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
+  * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0
+  */
+ 
++/* The purpose of the function is to find out if a Kerberos principal is
++ * allowed to log in as the given local user. This is a general problem with
++ * Kerberized services because by design the Kerberos principals are
++ * completely independent from the local user names. This is one of the
++ * reasons why Kerberos is working well on different operating systems like
++ * Windows and UNIX/Linux. Nevertheless a relationship between a Kerberos
++ * principal and a local user name must be established because otherwise every
++ * access would be granted for every principal with a valid ticket.
++ *
++ * Since it is a general issue libkrb5 provides some functions for
++ * applications to find out about the relationship between the Kerberos
++ * principal and a local user name. They are krb5_kuserok() and
++ * krb5_aname_to_localname().
++ *
++ * krb5_kuserok() can be used to "Determine if a principal is authorized to
++ * log in as a local user" (from the MIT Kerberos documentation of this
++ * function). Which is exactly what we are looking for and should be the
++ * preferred choice. It accepts the Kerberos principal and a local user name
++ * and let libkrb5 or its plugins determine if they relate to each other or
++ * not.
++ *
++ * krb5_aname_to_localname() can use used to "Convert a principal name to a
++ * local name" (from the MIT Kerberos documentation of this function). It
++ * accepts a Kerberos principle and returns a local name and it is up to the
++ * application to do any additional checks. There are two issues using
++ * krb5_aname_to_localname(). First, since POSIX user names are case
++ * sensitive, the calling application in general has no other choice than
++ * doing a case-sensitive string comparison between the name returned by
++ * krb5_aname_to_localname() and the name used at the login prompt. When the
++ * users are provided by a case in-sensitive server, e.g. Active Directory,
++ * this might lead to login failures because the user typing the name at the
++ * login prompt might not be aware of the right case. Another issue might be
++ * caused if there are multiple alias names available for a single user. E.g.
++ * the canonical name of a user is user@group.department.example.com but there
++ * exists a shorter login name, e.g. user@example.com, to safe typing at the
++ * login prompt. Here krb5_aname_to_localname() can only return the canonical
++ * name, but if the short alias is used at the login prompt authentication
++ * will fail as well. All this can be avoided by using krb5_kuserok() and
++ * configuring krb5.conf or using a suitable plugin to meet the needs of the
++ * given environment.
++ *
++ * The Fedora and RHEL version of openssh contain two patches which modify the
++ * access control behavior:
++ *  - openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
++ *  - openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
++ *
++ * openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch adds a new option KerberosUseKuserok for
++ * sshd_config which controls if krb5_kuserok() is used to check if the
++ * principle is authorized or if krb5_aname_to_localname() should be used.
++ * The reason to add this patch was that krb5_kuserok() by default checks if
++ * a .k5login file exits in the users home-directory. With this the user can
++ * give access to his account for any given principal which might be
++ * in violation with company policies and it would be useful if this can be
++ * rejected. Nevertheless the patch ignores the fact that krb5_kuserok() does
++ * no only check .k5login but other sources as well and checking .k5login can
++ * be disabled for all applications in krb5.conf as well. With this new
++ * option KerberosUseKuserok set to 'no' (and this is the default for RHEL7
++ * and Fedora 21) openssh can only use krb5_aname_to_localname() with the
++ * restrictions mentioned above.
++ *
++ * openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch adds a ksu like behaviour to ssh, i.e. when
++ * using GSSAPI authentication only commands configured in the .k5user can be
++ * executed. Here the wrong assumption that krb5_kuserok() only checks
++ * .k5login is made as well. In contrast ksu checks .k5login directly and
++ * does not use krb5_kuserok() which might be more useful for the given
++ * purpose. Additionally this patch is not synced with
++ * openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch.
++ *
++ * The current patch tries to restore the usage of krb5_kuserok() so that e.g.
++ * localauth plugins can be used. It does so by adding a forth parameter to
++ * ssh_krb5_kuserok() which indicates whether .k5login exists or not. If it
++ * does not exists krb5_kuserok() is called even if KerberosUseKuserok is set
++ * to 'no' because the intent of the option is to not check .k5login and if it
++ * does not exists krb5_kuserok() returns a result without checking .k5login.
++ * If .k5login does exists and KerberosUseKuserok is 'no' we fall back to
++ * krb5_aname_to_localname(). This is in my point of view an acceptable
++ * limitation and does not break the current behaviour.
++ *
++ * Additionally with this patch ssh_krb5_kuserok() is called in
++ * ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok() instead of only krb5_aname_to_localname() is
++ * neither .k5login nor .k5users exists to allow plugin evaluation via
++ * krb5_kuserok() as well.
++ *
++ * I tried to keep the patch as minimal as possible, nevertheless I see some
++ * areas for improvement which, if they make sense, have to be evaluated
++ * carefully because they might change existing behaviour and cause breaks
++ * during upgrade:
++ * - I wonder if disabling .k5login usage make sense in sshd or if it should
++ *   be better disabled globally in krb5.conf
++ * - if really needed openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch should be fixed to really
++ *   only disable checking .k5login and maybe .k5users
++ * - the ksu behaviour should be configurable and maybe check the .k5login and
++ *   .k5users files directly like ksu itself does
++ * - to make krb5_aname_to_localname() more useful an option for sshd to use
++ *   the canonical name (the one returned by getpwnam()) instead of the name
++ *   given at the login prompt might be useful */
++
+ static int
+ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+ {
+@@ -116,7 +214,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client
+ 	/* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user,
+ 	 * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials
+ 	 * to access these files aren't available yet. */
+-	if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) {
++	if (ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)
++			&& k5login_exists) {
+ 		retval = 1;
+ 		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
+ 		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
+@@ -190,9 +289,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
+ 	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
+ 	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
+ 	if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) {
+-		return (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb_context, principal,
+-		    sizeof(kuser), kuser) == 0) &&
+-		    (strcmp(kuser, luser) == 0);
++                return ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, principal, luser,
++                                        k5login_exists);
+ 	}
+ 	if ((fp = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL) {
+ 		int saved_errno = errno;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.630465944 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 15:11:52.278133344 +0100
+@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ 	options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
+ 	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
+ 	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
++	options->use_kuserok = -1;
+ 	options->password_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+@@ -278,6 +279,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 	if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
+ 		options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX);
+ #endif
++	if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
++		options->use_kuserok = 1;
+ 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->password_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+@@ -399,7 +402,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
+ 	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
+ 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
+-	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache,
++	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok,
+ 	sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
+ 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+ 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+@@ -478,12 +481,14 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "kerberosuniqueccache", sKerberosUniqueCCache, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "kerberosusekuserok", sKerberosUseKuserok, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #else
+ 	{ "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "kerberosuniqueccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "kerberosusekuserok", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1644,6 +1649,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 		*inc_flags &= ~SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY;
+ 		break;
+ 
++	case sKerberosUseKuserok:
++		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case sPermitListen:
+ 	case sPermitOpen:
+ 		if (opcode == sPermitListen) {
+@@ -2016,6 +2025,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_interval);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
++	M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
+@@ -2309,6 +2319,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
+ # endif
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
+ #endif
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.630465944 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2016-12-23 14:36:07.645465936 +0100
+@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
+ 	int     kerberos_unique_ccache;		/* If true, the acquired ticket will
+ 						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
++	int	use_kuserok;
+ 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
+ 	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
+ 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.637465940 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2016-12-23 15:14:03.117162222 +0100
+@@ -850,6 +850,10 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
+ .Cm no
+ can lead to overwriting previous tickets by subseqent connections to the same
+ user account.
++.It Cm KerberosUseKuserok
++Specifies whether to look at .k5login file for user's aliases.
++The default is
++.Cm yes .
+ .It Cm KexAlgorithms
+ Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
+ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+@@ -1078,6 +1082,7 @@ Available keywords are
+ .Cm IPQoS ,
+ .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication ,
+ .Cm KerberosAuthentication ,
++.Cm KerberosUseKuserok ,
+ .Cm LogLevel ,
+ .Cm MaxAuthTries ,
+ .Cm MaxSessions ,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.631465943 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config	2016-12-23 14:36:07.646465935 +0100
+@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
+ #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
+ #KerberosTicketCleanup yes
+ #KerberosGetAFSToken no
++#KerberosUseKuserok yes
+ 
+ # GSSAPI options
+ #GSSAPIAuthentication no

openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.972122201 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+ 
++void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
+@@ -419,6 +419,28 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
+ 	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+ }
+ 
++void
++sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
++{
++	security_context_t *ctx;
++
++	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
++		return;
++
++	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
++		logit("%s: getexeccon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++		return;
++	}
++	if (ctx != NULL) {
++		/* unset exec context before we will lose this capabililty */
++		if (setexeccon(NULL) != 0)
++			fatal("%s: setexeccon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++		if (setcon(ctx) != 0)
++			fatal("%s: setcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++		freecon(ctx);
++	}
++}
++
+ #endif
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/session.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
+@@ -1331,7 +1331,7 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+ 
+ 	platform_setusercontext(pw);
+ 
+-	if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) {
++	if (platform_privileged_uidswap() && (!is_child || !use_privsep)) {
+ #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ 		if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
+ 		    (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) {
+@@ -1361,6 +1361,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+			    (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
+			chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
+			    "u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++			sshd_selinux_copy_context();
++#endif
+ 			safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
+ 			free(tmp);
+ 			free(chroot_path);
+@@ -1396,6 +1399,11 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+ 		/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
+ 		permanently_set_uid(pw);
+ #endif
++
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++		if (in_chroot == 0)
++			sshd_selinux_copy_context();
++#endif
+ 	} else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
+ 	    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
+ 		fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory");
+@@ -1413,9 +1421,6 @@ do_pwchange(Session *s)
+ 	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+ 		fprintf(stderr,
+ 		    "You must change your password now and login again!\n");
+-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-		setexeccon(NULL);
+-#endif
+ #ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME
+ 		execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name,
+ 		    (char *)NULL);
+@@ -1625,9 +1630,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+ 		argv[i] = NULL;
+ 		optind = optreset = 1;
+ 		__progname = argv[0];
+-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-		ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
+-#endif
+ 		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
+ 	}
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 18:59:13.808124269 +0100
+@@ -540,6 +540,10 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
+ 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
+ 	demote_sensitive_data();
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t");
++#endif
++
+ 	/* Demote the child */
+ 	if (privsep_chroot) {
+ 		/* Change our root directory */
+@@ -633,6 +637,9 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ {
+ #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
+ 	if (1) {
++#elif defined(WITH_SELINUX)
++	if (0) {
++		/* even root user can be confined by SELinux */
+ #else
+ 	if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) {
+ #endif

openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.881788686 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c	2016-12-23 16:42:36.244818763 +0100
+@@ -288,11 +288,11 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd
+ 
+ 	/* enable nonblocking mode */
+ 	if (nonblock) {
+-		if (rfd != -1)
++		if (rfd >= 0)
+ 			set_nonblock(rfd);
+-		if (wfd != -1)
++		if (wfd >= 0)
+ 			set_nonblock(wfd);
+-		if (efd != -1)
++		if (efd >= 0)
+ 			set_nonblock(efd);
+ 	}
+ }
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.888788688 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
+@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
+ 	mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
+ 
+ 	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
+-	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
++	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
+ 		;
+ 
+ 	if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.892788689 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
+@@ -525,10 +525,10 @@ mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd,
+ 	if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
+ 	    (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
+ 		error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__);
+-		if (tmp1 > 0)
++		if (tmp1 >= 0)
+ 			close(tmp1);
+-		if (tmp2 > 0)
+-			close(tmp2);
++		/*DEAD CODE if (tmp2 >= 0)
++			close(tmp2);*/
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 	close(tmp1);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
+@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr
+ 	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
+ 	u_int16_t *portp;
+ 	u_int16_t port;
+-	socklen_t salen;
++	socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
+ 	int i;
+ 
+ 	if (sa == NULL) {
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/scp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/scp.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/scp.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.856788681 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/scp.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
+@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
+ {
+ 	if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
+ 		kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
+-		waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
++		(void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (signo)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.896788690 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
+@@ -1547,7 +1547,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.",
+ 			    filename, linenum);
+ 		if (!*activep) {
+-			arg = strdelim(&cp);
++			/*arg =*/ (void) strdelim(&cp);
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+ 		for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++)
+@@ -1638,8 +1638,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
+ 			*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
+ 			/* increase optional counter */
+-			if (intptr != NULL)
+-				*intptr = *intptr + 1;
++			/* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;)
++  			 if (intptr != NULL)
++				*intptr = *intptr + 1; */
+ 		}
+ 		break;
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.902788691 +0100
+@@ -125,13 +125,13 @@ notify_setup(void)
+ static void
+ notify_parent(void)
+ {
+-	if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
+ 		(void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
+ }
+ static void
+ notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
+ {
+-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
+ 		FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
+ }
+ static void
+@@ -139,8 +139,8 @@ notify_done(fd_set *readset)
+ {
+ 	char c;
+ 
+-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
+-		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
++		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
+ 			debug2("%s: reading", __func__);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ server_request_tun(void)
+ 		debug("%s: invalid tun", __func__);
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
+-	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) {
++	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device >= 0) {
+ 		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY &&
+ 		    auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun)
+ 			goto done;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
+@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
+ 	pid = sshpid;
+ 	if (pid > 1) {
+ 		kill(pid, SIGTERM);
+-		waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
++		(void) waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	_exit(1);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
+@@ -1220,8 +1220,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	sanitise_stdfd();
+ 
+ 	/* drop */
+-	setegid(getgid());
+-	setgid(getgid());
++	(void) setegid(getgid());
++	(void) setgid(getgid());
+ 
+ 	platform_disable_tracing(0);	/* strict=no */
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.897788690 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.904788692 +0100
+@@ -691,8 +691,10 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 
+ 		privsep_preauth_child(ssh);
+ 		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
+-		if (box != NULL)
++		if (box != NULL) {
+ 			ssh_sandbox_child(box);
++			free(box);
++		}
+ 
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+@@ -1386,6 +1388,9 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
+ 			explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+ 		}
+ 	}
++
++	if (fdset != NULL)
++		free(fdset);
+ }
+ 
+ /*

openssh-6.7p1-kdf-cavs.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,618 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.kdf-cavs	2015-03-18 11:23:46.346049359 +0100
++++ openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in	2015-03-18 11:24:20.395968445 +0100
+@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-h
+ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
+ SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
+ CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest
++SSH_CAVS=$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs
+ SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+ SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
+@@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+ 
+ .SUFFIXES: .lo
+ 
+-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
++TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT)
+ 
+ XMSS_OBJS=\
+ 	ssh-xmss.o \
+@@ -198,6 +199,9 @@ ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHD
+ ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 
++ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-cavs.o $(SKOBJS)
++	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-cavs.o $(SKOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
++
+ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 
+@@ -331,6 +335,8 @@ install-files:
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
++	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT)
++	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-cavs_driver.pl $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs_driver.pl
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
+diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c
+--- openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c.kdf-cavs	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
++++ openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
++ *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
++ *    products derived from this software without specific prior
++ *    written permission.
++ *
++ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
++ * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2
++ * are required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
++ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
++ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
++ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
++ * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
++ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
++ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
++ * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
++ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
++ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
++ * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
++ * DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <errno.h>
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <string.h>
++
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "sshbuf.h"
++#include "sshkey.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "kex.h"
++#include "packet.h"
++#include "digest.h"
++
++static int bin_char(unsigned char hex)
++{
++	if (48 <= hex && 57 >= hex)
++		return (hex - 48);
++	if (65 <= hex && 70 >= hex)
++		return (hex - 55);
++	if (97 <= hex && 102 >= hex)
++		return (hex - 87);
++	return 0;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Convert hex representation into binary string
++ * @hex input buffer with hex representation
++ * @hexlen length of hex
++ * @bin output buffer with binary data
++ * @binlen length of already allocated bin buffer (should be at least
++ *	   half of hexlen -- if not, only a fraction of hexlen is converted)
++ */
++static void hex2bin(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
++		    unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen)
++{
++	size_t i = 0;
++	size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
++		bin[i] = bin_char(hex[(i*2)]) << 4;
++		bin[i] |= bin_char(hex[((i*2)+1)]);
++	}
++}
++
++/*
++ * Allocate sufficient space for binary representation of hex
++ * and convert hex into bin
++ *
++ * Caller must free bin
++ * @hex input buffer with hex representation
++ * @hexlen length of hex
++ * @bin return value holding the pointer to the newly allocated buffer
++ * @binlen return value holding the allocated size of bin
++ *
++ * return: 0 on success, !0 otherwise
++ */
++static int hex2bin_alloc(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
++			 unsigned char **bin, size_t *binlen)
++{
++	unsigned char *out = NULL;
++	size_t outlen = 0;
++
++	if (!hexlen)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	outlen = (hexlen + 1) / 2;
++
++	out = calloc(1, outlen);
++	if (!out)
++		return -errno;
++
++	hex2bin(hex, hexlen, out, outlen);
++	*bin = out;
++	*binlen = outlen;
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static char hex_char_map_l[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
++				 '8', '9', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f' };
++static char hex_char_map_u[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
++				 '8', '9', 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F' };
++static char hex_char(unsigned int bin, int u)
++{
++	if (bin < sizeof(hex_char_map_l))
++		return (u) ? hex_char_map_u[bin] : hex_char_map_l[bin];
++	return 'X';
++}
++
++/*
++ * Convert binary string into hex representation
++ * @bin input buffer with binary data
++ * @binlen length of bin
++ * @hex output buffer to store hex data
++ * @hexlen length of already allocated hex buffer (should be at least
++ *	   twice binlen -- if not, only a fraction of binlen is converted)
++ * @u case of hex characters (0=>lower case, 1=>upper case)
++ */
++static void bin2hex(const unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen,
++		    char *hex, size_t hexlen, int u)
++{
++	size_t i = 0;
++	size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
++		hex[(i*2)] = hex_char((bin[i] >> 4), u);
++		hex[((i*2)+1)] = hex_char((bin[i] & 0x0f), u);
++	}
++}
++
++struct kdf_cavs {
++	unsigned char *K;
++	size_t Klen;
++	unsigned char *H;
++	size_t Hlen;
++	unsigned char *session_id;
++	size_t session_id_len;
++
++	unsigned int iv_len;
++	unsigned int ek_len;
++	unsigned int ik_len;
++};
++
++static int sshkdf_cavs(struct kdf_cavs *test)
++{
++	int ret = 0;
++	struct kex kex;
++	struct sshbuf *Kb = NULL;
++	BIGNUM *Kbn = NULL;
++	int mode = 0;
++	struct newkeys *ctoskeys;
++	struct newkeys *stockeys;
++	struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
++
++#define HEXOUTLEN 500
++	char hex[HEXOUTLEN];
++
++	memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(struct kex));
++
++	Kbn = BN_new();
++	BN_bin2bn(test->K, test->Klen, Kbn);
++	if (!Kbn) {
++		printf("cannot convert K into bignum\n");
++		ret = 1;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	Kb = sshbuf_new();
++	if (!Kb) {
++		printf("cannot convert K into sshbuf\n");
++		ret = 1;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	sshbuf_put_bignum2(Kb, Kbn);
++
++	kex.session_id = test->session_id;
++	kex.session_id_len = test->session_id_len;
++
++	/* setup kex */
++
++	/* select the right hash based on struct ssh_digest digests */
++	switch (test->ik_len) {
++		case 20:
++			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
++			break;
++		case 32:
++			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA256;
++			break;
++		case 48:
++			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA384;
++			break;
++		case 64:
++			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA512;
++			break;
++		default:
++			printf("Wrong hash type %u\n", test->ik_len);
++			ret = 1;
++			goto out;
++	}
++
++	/* implement choose_enc */
++	for (mode = 0; mode < 2; mode++) {
++		kex.newkeys[mode] = calloc(1, sizeof(struct newkeys));
++		if (!kex.newkeys[mode]) {
++			printf("allocation of newkeys failed\n");
++			ret = 1;
++			goto out;
++		}
++		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.iv_len = test->iv_len;
++		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.key_len = test->ek_len;
++		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.block_size = (test->iv_len == 64) ? 8 : 16;
++		kex.newkeys[mode]->mac.key_len = test->ik_len;
++	}
++
++	/* implement kex_choose_conf */
++	kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.key_len;
++	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size)
++		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size;
++	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len)
++		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len;
++	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len)
++		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len;
++
++	/* MODE_OUT (1) -> server to client
++	 * MODE_IN (0) -> client to server */
++	kex.server = 1;
++
++	/* do it */
++	if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, -1, -1)) == NULL){
++		printf("Allocation error\n");
++		goto out;
++	}
++	ssh->kex = &kex;
++	kex_derive_keys(ssh, test->H, test->Hlen, Kb);
++
++	ctoskeys = kex.newkeys[0];
++	stockeys = kex.newkeys[1];
++
++	/* get data */
++	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
++	bin2hex(ctoskeys->enc.iv, (size_t)ctoskeys->enc.iv_len,
++		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
++	printf("Initial IV (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
++	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
++	bin2hex(stockeys->enc.iv, (size_t)stockeys->enc.iv_len,
++		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
++	printf("Initial IV (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
++
++	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
++	bin2hex(ctoskeys->enc.key, (size_t)ctoskeys->enc.key_len,
++		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
++	printf("Encryption key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
++	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
++	bin2hex(stockeys->enc.key, (size_t)stockeys->enc.key_len,
++		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
++	printf("Encryption key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
++
++	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
++	bin2hex(ctoskeys->mac.key, (size_t)ctoskeys->mac.key_len,
++		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
++	printf("Integrity key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
++	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
++	bin2hex(stockeys->mac.key, (size_t)stockeys->mac.key_len,
++		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
++	printf("Integrity key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
++
++out:
++	if (Kbn)
++		BN_free(Kbn);
++	if (Kb)
++		sshbuf_free(Kb);
++	if (ssh)
++		ssh_packet_close(ssh);
++	return ret;
++}
++
++static void usage(void)
++{
++	fprintf(stderr, "\nOpenSSH KDF CAVS Test\n\n");
++	fprintf(stderr, "Usage:\n");
++	fprintf(stderr, "\t-K\tShared secret string\n");
++	fprintf(stderr, "\t-H\tHash string\n");
++	fprintf(stderr, "\t-s\tSession ID string\n");
++	fprintf(stderr, "\t-i\tIV length to be generated\n");
++	fprintf(stderr, "\t-e\tEncryption key length to be generated\n");
++	fprintf(stderr, "\t-m\tMAC key length to be generated\n");
++}
++
++/*
++ * Test command example:
++ * ./ssh-cavs -K 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 -H d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -s d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -i 8 -e 24 -m 20
++ *
++ * Initial IV (client to server) = 4bb320d1679dfd3a
++ * Initial IV (server to client) = 43dea6fdf263a308
++ * Encryption key (client to server) = 13048cc600b9d3cf9095aa6cf8e2ff9cf1c54ca0520c89ed
++ * Encryption key (server to client) = 1e483c5134e901aa11fc4e0a524e7ec7b75556148a222bb0
++ * Integrity key (client to server) = ecef63a092b0dcc585bdc757e01b2740af57d640
++ * Integrity key (server to client) = 7424b05f3c44a72b4ebd281fb71f9cbe7b64d479
++ */
++int main(int argc, char *argv[])
++{
++	struct kdf_cavs test;
++	int ret = 1;
++	int opt = 0;
++
++	memset(&test, 0, sizeof(struct kdf_cavs));
++	while((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "K:H:s:i:e:m:")) != -1)
++	{
++		size_t len = 0;
++		switch(opt)
++		{
++			/*
++			 * CAVS K is MPINT
++			 * we want a hex (i.e. the caller must ensure the
++			 * following transformations already happened):
++			 * 	1. cut off first four bytes
++			 * 	2. if most significant bit of value is
++			 *	   1, prepend 0 byte
++			 */
++			case 'K':
++				len = strlen(optarg);
++				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
++						    &test.K, &test.Klen);
++				if (ret)
++					goto out;
++				break;
++			case 'H':
++				len = strlen(optarg);
++				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
++						    &test.H, &test.Hlen);
++				if (ret)
++					goto out;
++				break;
++			case 's':
++				len = strlen(optarg);
++				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
++						    &test.session_id,
++						    &test.session_id_len);
++				if (ret)
++					goto out;
++				break;
++			case 'i':
++				test.iv_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
++				break;
++			case 'e':
++				test.ek_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
++				break;
++			case 'm':
++				test.ik_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
++				break;
++			default:
++				usage();
++				goto out;
++		}
++	}
++
++	ret = sshkdf_cavs(&test);
++
++out:
++	if (test.session_id)
++		free(test.session_id);
++	if (test.K)
++		free(test.K);
++	if (test.H)
++		free(test.H);
++	return ret;
++
++}
+diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl
+--- openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl.kdf-cavs	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
++++ openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
++#!/usr/bin/env perl
++#
++# CAVS test driver for OpenSSH
++#
++# Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
++#
++# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
++# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
++# in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
++# to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
++# copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
++# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
++#
++# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
++# all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
++#
++#                            NO WARRANTY
++#
++#    BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO WARRANTY
++#    FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW.  EXCEPT WHEN
++#    OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES
++#    PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED
++#    OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
++#    MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  THE ENTIRE RISK AS
++#    TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU.  SHOULD THE
++#    PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING,
++#    REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
++#
++#    IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING
++#    WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MAY MODIFY AND/OR
++#    REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES,
++#    INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING
++#    OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED
++#    TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY
++#    YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER
++#    PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE
++#    POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
++#
++use strict;
++use warnings;
++use IPC::Open2;
++
++# Executing a program by feeding STDIN and retrieving
++# STDOUT
++# $1: data string to be piped to the app on STDIN
++# rest: program and args
++# returns: STDOUT of program as string
++sub pipe_through_program($@) {
++	my $in = shift;
++	my @args = @_;
++
++	my ($CO, $CI);
++	my $pid = open2($CO, $CI, @args);
++
++	my $out = "";
++	my $len = length($in);
++	my $first = 1;
++	while (1) {
++		my $rin = "";
++		my $win = "";
++		# Output of prog is FD that we read
++		vec($rin,fileno($CO),1) = 1;
++		# Input of prog is FD that we write
++		# check for $first is needed because we can have NULL input
++		# that is to be written to the app
++		if ( $len > 0 || $first) {
++			(vec($win,fileno($CI),1) = 1);
++			$first=0;
++		}
++		# Let us wait for 100ms
++		my $nfound = select(my $rout=$rin, my $wout=$win, undef, 0.1);
++		if ( $wout ) {
++			my $written = syswrite($CI, $in, $len);
++			die "broken pipe" if !defined $written;
++			$len -= $written;
++			substr($in, 0, $written) = "";
++			if ($len <= 0) {
++				close $CI or die "broken pipe: $!";
++			}
++		}
++		if ( $rout ) {
++			my $tmp_out = "";
++			my $bytes_read = sysread($CO, $tmp_out, 4096);
++			$out .= $tmp_out;
++			last if ($bytes_read == 0);
++		}
++	}
++	close $CO or die "broken pipe: $!";
++	waitpid $pid, 0;
++
++	return $out;
++}
++
++# Parser of CAVS test vector file
++# $1: Test vector file
++# $2: Output file for test results
++# return: nothing
++sub parse($$) {
++	my $infile = shift;
++	my $outfile = shift;
++
++	my $out = "";
++
++	my $K = "";
++	my $H = "";
++	my $session_id = "";
++	my $ivlen = 0;
++	my $eklen = "";
++	my $iklen = "";
++
++	open(IN, "<$infile");
++	while(<IN>) {
++
++		my $line = $_;
++		chomp($line);
++		$line =~ s/\r//;
++
++		if ($line =~ /\[SHA-1\]/) {
++			$iklen = 20;
++		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-256\]/) {
++			$iklen = 32;
++		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-384\]/) {
++			$iklen = 48;
++		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-512\]/) {
++			$iklen = 64;
++		} elsif ($line =~ /^\[IV length\s*=\s*(.*)\]/) {
++			$ivlen = $1;
++			$ivlen = $ivlen / 8;
++		} elsif ($line =~ /^\[encryption key length\s*=\s*(.*)\]/) {
++			$eklen = $1;
++			$eklen = $eklen / 8;
++		} elsif ($line =~ /^K\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
++			$K = $1;
++			$K = substr($K, 8);
++			$K = "00" . $K;
++		} elsif ($line =~ /^H\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
++			$H = $1;
++		} elsif ($line =~ /^session_id\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
++			$session_id = $1;
++		}
++		$out .= $line . "\n";
++
++		if ($K ne "" && $H ne "" && $session_id ne "" &&
++		    $ivlen ne "" && $eklen ne "" && $iklen > 0) {
++			$out .= pipe_through_program("", "./ssh-cavs -H $H -K $K -s $session_id -i $ivlen -e $eklen -m $iklen");
++
++			$K = "";
++			$H = "";
++			$session_id = "";
++		}
++	}
++	close IN;
++	$out =~ s/\n/\r\n/g; # make it a dos file
++	open(OUT, ">$outfile") or die "Cannot create output file $outfile: $?";
++	print OUT $out;
++	close OUT;
++}
++
++############################################################
++#
++# let us pretend to be C :-)
++sub main() {
++
++	my $infile=$ARGV[0];
++	die "Error: Test vector file $infile not found" if (! -f $infile);
++
++	my $outfile = $infile;
++	# let us add .rsp regardless whether we could strip .req
++	$outfile =~ s/\.req$//;
++	$outfile .= ".rsp";
++	if (-f $outfile) {
++		die "Output file $outfile could not be removed: $?"
++			unless unlink($outfile);
++	}
++	print STDERR "Performing tests from source file $infile with results stored in destination file $outfile\n";
++
++	# Do the job
++	parse($infile, $outfile);
++}
++
++###########################################
++# Call it
++main();
++1;

openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8
+--- openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode	2016-03-09 19:04:48.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8	2016-06-23 16:18:20.463854117 +0200
+@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
+ .Op Fl P Ar denied_requests
+ .Op Fl p Ar allowed_requests
+ .Op Fl u Ar umask
++.Op Fl m Ar force_file_perms
+ .Ek
+ .Nm
+ .Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
+@@ -138,6 +139,12 @@ Sets an explicit
+ .Xr umask 2
+ to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the
+ user's default mask.
++.It Fl m Ar force_file_perms
++Sets explicit file permissions to be applied to newly-created files instead
++of the default or client requested mode.  Numeric values include:
++777, 755, 750, 666, 644, 640, etc.  Using both -m and -u switches makes the
++umask (-u) effective only for newly created directories and explicit mode (-m)
++for newly created files.
+ .El
+ .Pp
+ On some systems,
+diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
+--- openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode	2016-06-23 16:18:20.446854128 +0200
++++ openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c	2016-06-23 16:20:37.950766082 +0200
+@@ -69,6 +69,10 @@ struct sshbuf *oqueue;
+ /* Version of client */
+ static u_int version;
+ 
++/* Force file permissions */
++int permforce = 0;
++long permforcemode;
++
+ /* SSH2_FXP_INIT received */
+ static int init_done;
+ 
+@@ -683,6 +687,7 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+ 	Attrib a;
+ 	char *name;
+ 	int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
++	mode_t old_umask = 0;
+ 
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */
+@@ -692,6 +697,10 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+ 	debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
+ 	flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
+ 	mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
++	if (permforce == 1) {   /* Force perm if -m is set */
++		mode = permforcemode;
++		old_umask = umask(0); /* so umask does not interfere */
++	}	
+ 	logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
+ 	    name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
+ 	if (readonly &&
+@@ -713,6 +722,8 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 	}
++	if (permforce == 1)
++		(void) umask(old_umask); /* restore umask to something sane */
+ 	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ 		send_status(id, status);
+ 	free(name);
+@@ -1494,7 +1505,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
+ 	fprintf(stderr,
+ 	    "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
+ 	    "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P denied_requests] "
+-	    "[-p allowed_requests] [-u umask]\n"
++	    "[-p allowed_requests] [-u umask] [-m force_file_perms]\n"
+ 	    "       %s -Q protocol_feature\n",
+ 	    __progname, __progname);
+ 	exit(1);
+@@ -1520,7 +1531,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+ 	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
+ 
+ 	while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
+-	    "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:cehR")) != -1) {
++	    "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:m:cehR")) != -1) {
+ 		switch (ch) {
+ 		case 'Q':
+ 			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) {
+@@ -1580,6 +1591,15 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+ 				fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
+ 			(void)umask((mode_t)mask);
+ 			break;
++		case 'm':
++			/* Force permissions on file received via sftp */
++			permforce = 1;
++			permforcemode = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8);
++			if (permforcemode < 0 || permforcemode > 0777 ||
++			    *cp != '\0' || (permforcemode == 0 &&
++			    errno != 0))
++				fatal("Invalid file mode \"%s\"", optarg);
++			break;
+ 		case 'h':
+ 		default:
+ 			sftp_server_usage();

openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -up openssh/servconf.c.sshdt openssh/servconf.c
+--- openssh/servconf.c.sshdt	2015-06-24 11:42:29.041078704 +0200
++++ openssh/servconf.c	2015-06-24 11:44:39.734745802 +0200
+@@ -2317,7 +2317,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs);
+-	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner);
++	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner != NULL ? o->banner : "none");
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys);

openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race	2016-12-23 16:35:52.694685771 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c	2016-12-23 16:35:52.697685772 +0100
+@@ -1107,4 +1107,50 @@ mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const ch
+ 	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m);
+ 	sshbuf_free(m);
+ }
++
++int mm_forward_audit_messages(int fdin)
++{
++	u_char buf[4];
++	u_int blen, msg_len;
++	struct sshbuf *m;
++	int r, ret = 0;
++
++	debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
++	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++ 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
++	do {
++		blen = atomicio(read, fdin, buf, sizeof(buf));
++		if (blen == 0) /* closed pipe */
++			break;
++		if (blen != sizeof(buf)) {
++			error("%s: Failed to read the buffer from child", __func__);
++			ret = -1;
++			break;
++		}
++
++		msg_len = get_u32(buf);
++		if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
++			fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len);
++		sshbuf_reset(m);
++		if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, NULL)) != 0)
++			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		if (atomicio(read, fdin, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
++			error("%s: Failed to read the the buffer content from the child", __func__);
++			ret = -1;
++			break;
++		}
++		if (atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, buf, blen) != blen || 
++		    atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
++			error("%s: Failed to write the message to the monitor", __func__);
++			ret = -1;
++			break;
++		}
++	} while (1);
++	sshbuf_free(m);
++	return ret;
++}
++void mm_set_monitor_pipe(int fd)
++{
++	pmonitor->m_recvfd = fd;
++}
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race	2016-12-23 16:35:52.694685771 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h	2016-12-23 16:35:52.698685772 +0100
+@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
+ void mm_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+ void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int, pid_t, uid_t);
+ void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
++int mm_forward_audit_messages(int);
++void mm_set_monitor_pipe(int);
+ #endif
+ 
+ struct Session;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race	2016-12-23 16:35:52.695685771 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 16:37:26.339730596 +0100
+@@ -162,6 +162,10 @@ static Session *sessions = NULL;
+ login_cap_t *lc;
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++int paudit[2];
++#endif
++
+ static int is_child = 0;
+ static int in_chroot = 0;
+ static int have_dev_log = 1;
+@@ -289,6 +293,8 @@ xauth_valid_string(const char *s)
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
++void child_destory_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh);
++
+ #define USE_PIPES 1
+ /*
+  * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty.  This
+@@ -424,6 +430,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *c
+ 		close(err[0]);
+ #endif
+ 
++		child_destory_sensitive_data(ssh);
++
+ 		/* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */
+ 		do_child(ssh, s, command);
+ 		/* NOTREACHED */
+@@ -547,6 +555,9 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm
+ 		/* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */
+ 		close(ttyfd);
+ 
++		/* Do this early, so we will not block large MOTDs */
++		child_destory_sensitive_data(ssh);
++
+ 		/* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */
+ #ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+ 		do_login(ssh, s, command);
+@@ -717,6 +728,8 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 	}
+ 	if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1)
+ 		s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(ssh, s->command));
++	if (pipe(paudit) < 0)
++		fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+ #endif
+ 	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+ 		ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command);
+@@ -732,6 +745,20 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 	 */
+ 	sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
+ 
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	close(paudit[1]);
++	if (use_privsep && ret == 0) {
++		/*
++		 * Read the audit messages from forked child and send them
++		 * back to monitor. We don't want to communicate directly,
++		 * because the messages might get mixed up.
++		 * Continue after the pipe gets closed (all messages sent).
++		 */
++		ret = mm_forward_audit_messages(paudit[0]);
++	}
++	close(paudit[0]);
++#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
++
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1538,6 +1565,34 @@ child_close_fds(void)
+ 	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
+ }
+ 
++void
++child_destory_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	int pparent = paudit[1];
++	close(paudit[0]);
++	/* Hack the monitor pipe to avoid race condition with parent */
++	if (use_privsep)
++		mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent);
++#endif
++
++	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
++	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, use_privsep);
++	/*
++	 * We can audit this, because we hacked the pipe to direct the
++	 * messages over postauth child. But this message requires answer
++	 * which we can't do using one-way pipe.
++	 */
++	packet_destroy_all(ssh, 0, 1);
++	/* XXX this will clean the rest but should not audit anymore */
++	/* packet_clear_keys(ssh); */
++
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	/* Notify parent that we are done */
++	close(pparent);
++#endif
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the
+  * environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group
+@@ -1554,13 +1608,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+ 
+ 	sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
+ 
+-	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
+-	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1);
+-	ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
+-	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
+-	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
+-	packet_destroy_all(ssh, 0, 1);
+-
+ 	/* Force a password change */
+ 	if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
+ 		do_setusercontext(pw);

openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
+index 2b02a04..19b9364 100644
+--- a/auth-krb5.c
++++ b/auth-krb5.c
+@@ -375,5 +375,21 @@ cleanup:
+ 		return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
+ 	}
+ }
++
++/*
++ * Reads  k5login_directory  option from the  krb5.conf
++ */
++krb5_error_code
++ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb5_context ctx, char **k5login_directory) {
++	profile_t p;
++	int ret = 0;
++
++	ret = krb5_get_profile(ctx, &p);
++	if (ret)
++		return ret;
++
++	return profile_get_string(p, "libdefaults", "k5login_directory", NULL, NULL,
++		k5login_directory);
++}
+ #endif /* !HEIMDAL */
+ #endif /* KRB5 */
+diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
+index f9d191c..c432d2f 100644
+--- a/auth.h
++++ b/auth.h
+@@ -222,6 +222,8 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
+ 
+ #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
+ krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
++krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb5_context ctx,
++	char **k5login_directory);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #endif /* AUTH_H */
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+@@ -244,8 +244,27 @@ ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists()
+ {
+ 	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
+ 	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
++	char *k5login_directory = NULL;
++	int ret = 0;
++
++	ret = ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb_context, &k5login_directory);
++	debug3("%s: k5login_directory = %s (rv=%d)", __func__, k5login_directory, ret);
++	if (k5login_directory == NULL || ret != 0) {
++		/* If not set, the library will look for  k5login
++		 * files in the user's home directory, with the filename  .k5login.
++		 */
++		snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir);
++	} else {
++		/* If set, the library will look for a local user's k5login file
++		 * within the named directory, with a filename corresponding to the
++		 * local username.
++		 */
++		snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s%s%s", k5login_directory, 
++			k5login_directory[strlen(k5login_directory)-1] != '/' ? "/" : "",
++			pw->pw_name);
++	}
++	debug("%s: Checking existence of file %s", __func__, file);
+ 
+-	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir);
+ 	return access(file, F_OK) == 0;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
+index 5c4f15b..135e290 100644
+--- a/sshd.8
++++ b/sshd.8
+@@ -806,6 +806,10 @@ rlogin/rsh.
+ These files enforce GSSAPI/Kerberos authentication access control.
+ Further details are described in
+ .Xr ksu 1 .
++The location of the k5login file depends on the configuration option
++.Cm k5login_directory
++in the
++.Xr krb5.conf 5 .
+ .Pp
+ .It Pa ~/.ssh/
+ This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration

openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+Zseries only: Leave the hardware filedescriptors open.
+
+All filedescriptors above 2 are getting closed when a new
+sshd process to handle a new client connection is
+spawned. As the process also chroot into an empty filesystem
+without any device nodes, there is no chance to reopen the
+files. This patch filters out the reqired fds in the
+closefrom function so these are skipped in the close loop.
+
+Author: Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>
+
+---
+ openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c |   26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
+@@ -82,7 +82,33 @@ closefrom(int lowfd)
+ 	    fd = strtol(dent->d_name, &endp, 10);
+ 	    if (dent->d_name != endp && *endp == '\0' &&
+ 		fd >= 0 && fd < INT_MAX && fd >= lowfd && fd != dirfd(dirp))
++#ifdef __s390__
++		{
++		    /*
++		     * the filedescriptors used to communicate with
++		     * the device drivers to provide hardware support
++		     * should survive. HF <freude@de.ibm.com>
++		     */
++		    char fpath[PATH_MAX], lpath[PATH_MAX];
++		    len = snprintf(fpath, sizeof(fpath), "%s/%s",
++				   fdpath, dent->d_name);
++		    if (len > 0 && (size_t)len <= sizeof(fpath)) {
++			len = readlink(fpath, lpath, sizeof(lpath));
++			if (len > 0) {
++			    lpath[len] = 0;
++			    if (strstr(lpath, "dev/z90crypt")
++				|| strstr(lpath, "dev/zcrypt")
++				|| strstr(lpath, "dev/prandom")
++				|| strstr(lpath, "dev/shm/icastats"))
++				fd = -1;
++			}
++		    }
++		    if (fd >= 0)
++			(void) close((int) fd);
++		}
++#else
+ 		(void) close((int) fd);
++#endif
+ 	}
+ 	(void) closedir(dirp);
+ 	return;
+

openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.3p1/channels.c.bz595935 openssh-5.3p1/channels.c
---- openssh-5.3p1/channels.c.bz595935	2010-08-12 14:19:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.3p1/channels.c	2010-08-12 14:33:51.000000000 +0200
-@@ -3185,7 +3185,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
+--- openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11	2016-03-09 19:04:48.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.2p2/channels.c	2016-06-03 10:42:04.775164520 +0200
+@@ -3990,21 +3990,24 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
  }
  
  static int
@@ -10,14 +10,16 @@ diff -up openssh-5.3p1/channels.c.bz595935 openssh-5.3p1/channels.c
  {
  	int sock;
  	struct sockaddr_un addr;
-@@ -3195,11 +3195,14 @@ connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *p
+ 
++	if (len <= 0)
++		return -1;
+ 	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ 	if (sock == -1)
  		error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
  	memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
  	addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
 -	strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path);
 -	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0)
-+	if (len <= 0)
-+		return -1;
 +	if (len > sizeof addr.sun_path)
 +		len = sizeof addr.sun_path;
 +	memcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, len);
@@ -28,16 +30,13 @@ diff -up openssh-5.3p1/channels.c.bz595935 openssh-5.3p1/channels.c
  	return -1;
  }
  
-@@ -3207,8 +3210,21 @@ static int
+@@ -4012,8 +4015,18 @@ static int
  connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
  {
  	char buf[1024];
 -	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr);
 -	return connect_local_xsocket_path(buf);
-+	int len;
-+#ifdef linux
-+	int ret;
-+#endif
++	int len, ret;
 +	len = snprintf(buf + 1, sizeof (buf) - 1, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr);
 +#ifdef linux
 +	/* try abstract socket first */
@@ -51,4 +50,4 @@ diff -up openssh-5.3p1/channels.c.bz595935 openssh-5.3p1/channels.c
 +	return -1;
  }
  
- int
+ #ifdef __APPLE__

openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.071506625 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c	2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100
+@@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ static int all_opens_permitted = 0;
+ #define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST	"*"
+ 
+ /* -- X11 forwarding */
+-/* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
+-#define MAX_DISPLAYS  1000
++/* Minimum port number for X11 forwarding */
++#define X11_PORT_MIN 6000
+ 
+ /* Per-channel callback for pre/post select() actions */
+ typedef void chan_fn(struct ssh *, Channel *c,
+@@ -4228,7 +4228,7 @@ channel_send_window_changes(void)
+  */
+ int
+ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
+-    int x11_use_localhost, int single_connection,
++    int x11_use_localhost, int x11_max_displays, int single_connection,
+     u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids)
+ {
+ 	Channel *nc = NULL;
+@@ -4240,10 +4241,15 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+ 	if (chanids == NULL)
+ 		return -1;
+ 
++	/* Try to bind ports starting at 6000+X11DisplayOffset */
++	x11_max_displays = x11_max_displays + x11_display_offset;
++
+ 	for (display_number = x11_display_offset;
+-	    display_number < MAX_DISPLAYS;
++	    display_number < x11_max_displays;
+ 	    display_number++) {
+-		port = 6000 + display_number;
++		port = X11_PORT_MIN + display_number;
++		if (port < X11_PORT_MIN) /* overflow */
++			break;
+ 		memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ 		hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
+ 		hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE;
+@@ -4295,7 +4301,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+ 		if (num_socks > 0)
+ 			break;
+ 	}
+-	if (display_number >= MAX_DISPLAYS) {
++	if (display_number >= x11_max_displays || port < X11_PORT_MIN ) {
+ 		error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket.");
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+@@ -4441,7 +4447,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
+ 	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ 	hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
+ 	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+-	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number);
++	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", X11_PORT_MIN + display_number);
+ 	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
+ 		error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf,
+ 		ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+@@ -4457,7 +4463,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
+ 		/* Connect it to the display. */
+ 		if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
+ 			debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
+-			    6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
++			    X11_PORT_MIN + display_number, strerror(errno));
+ 			close(sock);
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
+@@ -4466,8 +4472,8 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
+ 	}
+ 	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+ 	if (!ai) {
+-		error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
+-		    6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
++		error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
++		    X11_PORT_MIN + display_number, strerror(errno));
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 	set_nodelay(sock);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.h	2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100
+@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ int	 permitopen_port(const char *);
+ 
+ void	 channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, u_int);
+ int	 x11_connect_display(struct ssh *);
+-int	 x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
++int	 x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
+ void	 x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(struct ssh *, int,
+ 	    const char *, const char *, const char *, int);
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.133506635 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 15:47:27.320519121 +0100
+@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ 	options->print_lastlog = -1;
+ 	options->x11_forwarding = -1;
+ 	options->x11_display_offset = -1;
++	options->x11_max_displays = -1;
+ 	options->x11_use_localhost = -1;
+ 	options->permit_tty = -1;
+ 	options->permit_user_rc = -1;
+@@ -243,6 +244,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 		options->x11_forwarding = 0;
+ 	if (options->x11_display_offset == -1)
+ 		options->x11_display_offset = 10;
++	if (options->x11_max_displays == -1)
++		options->x11_max_displays = DEFAULT_MAX_DISPLAYS;
+ 	if (options->x11_use_localhost == -1)
+ 		options->x11_use_localhost = 1;
+ 	if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
+@@ -419,7 +422,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+ 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+ 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+-	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
++	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11MaxDisplays, sX11UseLocalhost,
+ 	sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
+ 	sPermitUserEnvironment, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
+ 	sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups,
+@@ -540,6 +543,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "x11maxdisplays", sX11MaxDisplays, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1316,6 +1320,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 			*intptr = value;
+ 		break;
+ 
++	case sX11MaxDisplays:
++		intptr = &options->x11_max_displays;
++		goto parse_int;
++
+ 	case sX11UseLocalhost:
+ 		intptr = &options->x11_use_localhost;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -2063,6 +2071,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_display_offset);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_forwarding);
++	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_max_displays);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_use_localhost);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tty);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_user_rc);
+@@ -2315,6 +2324,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ #endif
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset);
++	dump_cfg_int(sX11MaxDisplays, o->x11_max_displays);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.133506635 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2016-12-23 15:46:32.140506636 +0100
+@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
+ 
+ #define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX	6	/* Default for MaxAuthTries */
+ #define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX	10	/* Default for MaxSessions */
++#define DEFAULT_MAX_DISPLAYS	1000 /* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
+ 
+ /* Magic name for internal sftp-server */
+ #define INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME	"internal-sftp"
+@@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	int     x11_forwarding;	/* If true, permit inet (spoofing) X11 fwd. */
+ 	int     x11_display_offset;	/* What DISPLAY number to start
+ 					 * searching at */
++	int 	x11_max_displays; /* Number of displays to search */
+ 	int     x11_use_localhost;	/* If true, use localhost for fake X11 server. */
+ 	char   *xauth_location;	/* Location of xauth program */
+ 	int	permit_tty;	/* If false, deny pty allocation */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/session.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.136506636 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 15:46:32.141506636 +0100
+@@ -2518,8 +2518,9 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+	if (x11_create_display_inet(ssh, options.x11_display_offset,
+-	    options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection,
+-	    &s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
++	    options.x11_use_localhost, options.x11_max_displays,
++	    s->single_connection, &s->display_number,
++	    &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
+ 		debug("x11_create_display_inet failed.");
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.134506635 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2016-12-23 15:46:32.141506636 +0100
+@@ -1133,6 +1133,7 @@ Available keywords are
+ .Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink ,
+ .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys ,
+ .Cm X11DisplayOffset ,
++.Cm X11MaxDisplays ,
+ .Cm X11Forwarding
+ and
+ .Cm X11UseLocalhost .
+@@ -1566,6 +1567,12 @@ Specifies the first display number avail
+ X11 forwarding.
+ This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers.
+ The default is 10.
++.It Cm X11MaxDisplays
++Specifies the maximum number of displays available for
++.Xr sshd 8 Ns 's
++X11 forwarding.
++This prevents sshd from exhausting local ports.
++The default is 1000.
+ .It Cm X11Forwarding
+ Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted.
+ The argument must be

openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+commit 0e22b79bfde45a7cf7a2e51a68ec11c4285f3b31
+Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date:   Mon Nov 21 15:04:06 2016 +0100
+
+    systemd stuff
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 2ffc369..162ce92 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -4265,6 +4265,30 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
+ AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
+ AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
+ 
++# Check whether user wants systemd support
++SYSTEMD_MSG="no"
++AC_ARG_WITH(systemd,
++	[  --with-systemd          Enable systemd support],
++	[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
++		AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
++		if test "$PKGCONFIG" != "no"; then
++			AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libsystemd])
++			if $PKGCONFIG --exists libsystemd; then
++				SYSTEMD_CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags libsystemd`
++				SYSTEMD_LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libsystemd`
++				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $SYSTEMD_CFLAGS"
++				SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $SYSTEMD_LIBS"
++				AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
++				AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYSTEMD, 1, [Define if you want systemd support.])
++				SYSTEMD_MSG="yes"
++			else
++				AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
++			fi
++		fi
++	fi ]
++)
++
++
+ # Looking for programs, paths and files
+ 
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
+@@ -5097,6 +5121,7 @@ echo "                   libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
+ echo "  Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
+ echo "           Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
+ echo "         Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
++echo "                   systemd support: $SYSTEMD_MSG"
+ echo "       IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
+ echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
+ echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
+diff --git a/contrib/sshd.service b/contrib/sshd.service
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..e0d4923
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/contrib/sshd.service
+@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
++[Unit]
++Description=OpenSSH server daemon
++Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
++After=network.target
++
++[Service]
++Type=notify
++ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS
++ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
++KillMode=process
++Restart=on-failure
++RestartPreventExitStatus=255
++
++[Install]
++WantedBy=multi-user.target
++
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 816611c..b8b9d13 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@
+ #include <prot.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
++#include <systemd/sd-daemon.h>
++#endif
++
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "ssh.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+@@ -1888,6 +1892,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 
++#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
++		/* Signal systemd that we are ready to accept connections */
++		sd_notify(0, "READY=1");
++#endif
++
+ 		/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
+ 		server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
+ 		    &newsock, config_s);

openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+In order to use the OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11 engine it is needed to allow flock
+and ipc calls, because this engine calls OpenCryptoki (a PKCS#11
+implementation) which calls the libraries that will communicate with the
+crypto cards. OpenCryptoki makes use of flock and ipc and, as of now,
+this is only need on s390 architecture.
+
+Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
+---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index ca75cc7..6e7de31 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -166,6 +166,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_exit_group
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group),
+ #endif
++#if defined(__NR_flock) && defined(__s390__)
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_flock),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_futex
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_futex),
+ #endif
+@@ -178,6 +181,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday),
+ #endif
++#if defined(__NR_ipc) && defined(__s390__)
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_ipc),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getuid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
+ #endif
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
+getuid and geteuid are needed when using an openssl engine that calls a
+crypto card, e.g. ICA (libica).
+Those syscalls are also needed by the distros for audit code.
+
+Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
+---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index 6e7de31..e86aa2c 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -175,6 +175,18 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_getpid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_getuid
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_getuid32
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_geteuid
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getrandom
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
+ #endif
+-- 1.9.1
+1.9.1
+diff -up openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+--- openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox	2017-12-12 13:59:30.563874059 +0100
++++ openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2017-12-12 13:59:14.842784083 +0100
+@@ -190,6 +190,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+ #ifdef __NR_geteuid32
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_gettid
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettid),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getrandom
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
+ #endif
+

openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
+diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
+--- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.188821236 +0200
++++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
+@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+ extern u_char *session_id2;
+ extern u_int session_id2_len;
++extern int inetd_flag;
++extern int rexeced_flag;
++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+ 
+ static char *
+ format_key(const struct sshkey *key)
+@@ -511,7 +514,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct ssh *ssh
+ 
+ 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", runas_pw, command,
+ 	    ac, av, &f,
+-	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
++	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
++	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+ 	uid_swapped = 1;
+@@ -981,7 +985,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct ssh *ss
+ 
+ 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", runas_pw, command,
+ 	    ac, av, &f,
+-	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
++	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
++	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+ 	uid_swapped = 1;
+diff -up openssh/auth.c.refactor openssh/auth.c
+--- openssh/auth.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.235821686 +0200
++++ openssh/auth.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
+@@ -756,7 +756,8 @@ auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *
+  */
+ pid_t
+ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command,
+-    int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags)
++    int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags, int inetd,
++    void *the_authctxt)
+ {
+ 	FILE *f = NULL;
+ 	struct stat st;
+@@ -872,7 +873,7 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
+ 		}
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
++		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(inetd, the_authctxt) < 0) {
+ 			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
+ 			    strerror(errno));
+ 			_exit(127);
+diff -up openssh/auth.h.refactor openssh/auth.h
+--- openssh/auth.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.251821839 +0200
++++ openssh/auth.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
+@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ struct passwd *fakepw(void);
+ #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE  (1<<1)  /* Redirect stdout */
+ #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD  (1<<2)  /* Discard stderr */
+ pid_t	subprocess(const char *, struct passwd *,
+-    const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int flags);
++    const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int flags, int, void *);
+ 
+ int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
+ 
+diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200
++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
+@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const ch
+ 
+ int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
+-void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+-int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
++void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *, int, int(char *, const char *), void *, int);
++int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(int inetd, void *);
+ void sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void);
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200
++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
+@@ -49,11 +49,6 @@
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+-extern ServerOptions options;
+-extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+-extern int inetd_flag;
+-extern int rexeced_flag;
+-
+ /* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
+ int
+ sshd_selinux_enabled(void)
+@@ -223,7 +218,8 @@ get_user_context(const char *sename, con
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+-ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level)
++ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level,
++    Authctxt *the_authctxt)
+ {
+ 	*role = NULL;
+ 	*level = NULL;
+@@ -241,8 +237,8 @@ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role,
+ 
+ /* Return the default security context for the given username */
+ static int
+-sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+-	security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc)
++sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, security_context_t *default_sc,
++    security_context_t *user_sc, int inetd, Authctxt *the_authctxt)
+ {
+ 	char *sename, *lvl;
+ 	char *role;
+@@ -250,7 +246,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+ 	int r = 0;
+ 	context_t con = NULL;
+ 
+-	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
++	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl, the_authctxt);
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+ 	if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) {
+@@ -272,7 +268,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+ 
+ 	if (r == 0) {
+ 		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
+-		if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
++		if (inetd) {
+ 			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
+ 
+ 			if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
+@@ -333,7 +329,8 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+ 
+ /* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
+ static int
+-sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *))
++sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *), int inetd,
++    Authctxt *the_authctxt)
+ {
+ 	const char *reqlvl;
+ 	char *role;
+@@ -342,11 +339,11 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it
+ 
+ 	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+ 
+-	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
++	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl, the_authctxt);
+ 
+ 	rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
+ 
+-	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
++	if (inetd) {
+ 		use_current = "1";
+ 	} else {
+ 		use_current = "";
+@@ -362,9 +359,10 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
++sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(int inetd,
++    int(pam_setenv)(char *, const char *), Authctxt *the_authctxt)
+ {
+-	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_pam_putenv);
++	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(pam_setenv, inetd, the_authctxt);
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+@@ -374,25 +372,28 @@ do_setenv(char *name, const char *value)
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void)
++sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(int inetd, void *the_authctxt)
+ {
+-	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv);
++	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *) the_authctxt;
++	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv, inetd, authctxt);
+ }
+ 
+ /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
+ void
+-sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
++sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname, int inetd,
++    int(pam_setenv)(char *, const char *), void *the_authctxt, int use_pam)
+ {
+ 	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+ 	int r = 0;
+ 	security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
++	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *) the_authctxt;
+ 
+ 	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
+ 		return;
+ 
+-	if (options.use_pam) {
++	if (use_pam) {
+ 		/* do not compute context, just setup environment for pam_selinux */
+-		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) {
++		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(inetd, pam_setenv, authctxt)) {
+ 			switch (security_getenforce()) {
+ 			case -1:
+ 				fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+@@ -410,7 +411,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
+ 
+ 	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+ 
+-	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
++	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx, inetd, authctxt);
+ 	if (r >= 0) {
+ 		r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
+ 		if (r < 0) {
+diff -up openssh/platform.c.refactor openssh/platform.c
+--- openssh/platform.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.204821389 +0200
++++ openssh/platform.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.277822088 +0200
+@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@
+ 
+ extern int use_privsep;
+ extern ServerOptions options;
++extern int inetd_flag;
++extern int rexeced_flag;
++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+ 
+ void
+ platform_pre_listen(void)
+@@ -183,7 +186,9 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru
+ 	}
+ #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
++	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name,
++	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
++	    options.use_pam);
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+diff -up openssh/sshd.c.refactor openssh/sshd.c
+--- openssh/sshd.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.275822068 +0200
++++ openssh/sshd.c	2019-04-04 13:19:51.270195262 +0200
+@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ int debug_flag = 0;
+ static int test_flag = 0;
+ 
+ /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
+-static int inetd_flag = 0;
++int inetd_flag = 0;
+ 
+ /* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
+ static int no_daemon_flag = 0;
+@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ static char **saved_argv;
+ static int saved_argc;
+ 
+ /* re-exec */
+-static int rexeced_flag = 0;
++int rexeced_flag = 0;
+ static int rexec_flag = 1;
+ static int rexec_argc = 0;
+ static char **rexec_argv;
+@@ -2192,7 +2192,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
++	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name,
++	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
++	    options.use_pam);
+ #endif
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	if (options.use_pam) {

openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,457 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/cipher-ctr.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.326525641 +0200
++++ openssh-8.0p1/cipher-ctr.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.401526401 +0200
+@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ evp_aes_128_ctr(void)
+ 	aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr;
+ #ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
+ 	aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH |
+-	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV;
++	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV |
++	    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS;
+ #endif
+ 	return (&aes_ctr);
+ }
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/dh.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/dh.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/dh.c.fips	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.0p1/dh.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.401526401 +0200
+@@ -152,6 +152,12 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max
+ 	int best, bestcount, which, linenum;
+ 	struct dhgroup dhg;
+ 
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		logit("Using arbitrary primes is not allowed in FIPS mode."
++		    " Falling back to known groups.");
++		return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
++	}
++
+ 	if ((f = fopen(_PATH_DH_MODULI, "r")) == NULL) {
+ 		logit("WARNING: could not open %s (%s), using fixed modulus",
+ 		    _PATH_DH_MODULI, strerror(errno));
+@@ -489,4 +495,38 @@ dh_estimate(int bits)
+ 	return 8192;
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * Compares the received DH parameters with known-good groups,
++ * which might be either from group14, group16 or group18.
++ */
++int
++dh_is_known_group(const DH *dh)
++{
++	const BIGNUM *p, *g;
++	const BIGNUM *known_p, *known_g;
++	DH *known = NULL;
++	int bits = 0, rv = 0;
++
++	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, &g);
++	bits = BN_num_bits(p);
++
++	if (bits <= 3072) {
++		known = dh_new_group14();
++	} else if (bits <= 6144) {
++		known = dh_new_group16();
++	} else {
++		known = dh_new_group18();
++	}
++
++	DH_get0_pqg(known, &known_p, NULL, &known_g);
++
++	if (BN_cmp(g, known_g) == 0 &&
++	    BN_cmp(p, known_p) == 0) {
++		rv = 1;
++	}
++
++	DH_free(known);
++	return rv;
++}
++
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/dh.h.fips openssh-8.0p1/dh.h
+--- openssh-8.0p1/dh.h.fips	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.0p1/dh.h	2019-07-23 14:55:45.401526401 +0200
+@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ DH	*dh_new_group_fallback(int);
+ 
+ int	 dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
+ int	 dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *, const BIGNUM *);
++int	 dh_is_known_group(const DH *);
+ 
+ u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/kex.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/kex.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/kex.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.395526340 +0200
++++ openssh-8.0p1/kex.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.402526411 +0200
+@@ -199,7 +199,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
+ 	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+ 		if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
+-			error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
++			if (FIPS_mode())
++				error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p);
++			else
++				error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
+ 			free(s);
+ 			return 0;
+ 		}
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/kexgexc.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/kexgexc.c.fips	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.0p1/kexgexc.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.402526411 +0200
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ 
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ 
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+@@ -113,6 +114,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
++	if (FIPS_mode() && dh_is_known_group(kex->dh) == 0) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		goto out;
++	}
+ 	p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
+ 
+ 	/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h
+--- openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h.fips	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h	2019-07-23 14:55:45.402526411 +0200
+@@ -111,6 +111,20 @@
+ 	"rsa-sha2-256," \
+ 	"ssh-rsa"
+ 
++#define	KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG	\
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521," \
++	"rsa-sha2-512," \
++	"rsa-sha2-256," \
++	"ssh-rsa"
++
+ #define	KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
+ 	"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
+ 	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
+@@ -134,6 +142,27 @@
+ 
+ #define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
+ 
++#define	KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \
++	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
++	"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \
++	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se," \
++	"aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
++#define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS		\
++	"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
++	"ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \
++	"ecdh-sha2-nistp521," \
++	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," \
++	"diffie-hellman-group16-sha512," \
++	"diffie-hellman-group18-sha512," \
++	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha256"
++#define KEX_FIPS_MAC \
++	"hmac-sha1," \
++	"hmac-sha2-256," \
++	"hmac-sha2-512," \
++	"hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
++	"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
++	"hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
++
+ /* Not a KEX value, but here so all the algorithm defaults are together */
+ #define	SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS	\
+ 	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.334525723 +0200
++++ openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.402526411 +0200
+@@ -2179,11 +2179,16 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
+ 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
+ 	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
+-	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
+-	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_MAC, all_mac);
+-	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_KEX, all_kex);
+-	def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
+-	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
++	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT), all_cipher);
++	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_CLIENT_MAC), all_mac);
++	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_CLIENT_KEX), all_kex);
++	def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key);
++	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig);
+ #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
+ 	do { \
+ 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.373526117 +0200
++++ openssh-8.0p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.402526411 +0200
+@@ -137,6 +137,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+ #ifdef __NR_open
+ 	SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_socket
++	SC_DENY(__NR_socket, EACCES),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_openat
+ 	SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES),
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.361525996 +0200
++++ openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.403526421 +0200
+@@ -208,11 +208,16 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
+ 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
+ 	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
+-	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
+-	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac);
+-	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex);
+-	def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
+-	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
++	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT), all_cipher);
++	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_SERVER_MAC), all_mac);
++	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_SERVER_KEX), all_kex);
++	def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key);
++	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig);
+ #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
+ 	do { \
+ 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.378526168 +0200
++++ openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.403526421 +0200
+@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+ #endif
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ 
+@@ -614,6 +626,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		dump_client_config(&options, host);
+ 		exit(0);
+ 	}
++
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
++	}
+ 
+ 	/* Expand SecurityKeyProvider if it refers to an environment variable */
+ 	if (options.sk_provider != NULL && *options.sk_provider == '$' &&
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.336525743 +0200
++++ openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.403526421 +0200
+@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@
+ #include <vis.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ 
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+@@ -198,36 +203,41 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+ 
+ #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+ 	if (options.gss_keyex) {
+-		/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
+-		 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
+-		orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+-
+-		if (options.gss_server_identity) {
+-			gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
+-		} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
+-			gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
+-			/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
+-			 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
+-			if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
+-				free(gss_host);
+-				gss_host = xstrdup(host);
+-			}
+-		} else {
+-			gss_host = xstrdup(host);
+-		}
+-
+-		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
+-		    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
+-		if (gss) {
+-			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
+-			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+-			    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+-
+-			/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
+-			 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
+-			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
+-			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+-			    "%s,null", orig);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
++			options.gss_keyex = 0;
++		} else {
++			/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
++			 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
++			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
++
++			if (options.gss_server_identity) {
++				gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
++			} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
++				gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
++				/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
++				 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
++				if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
++					free(gss_host);
++					gss_host = xstrdup(host);
++				}
++			} else {
++				gss_host = xstrdup(host);
++			}
++
++			gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
++			    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
++			if (gss) {
++				debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
++				xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
++				    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
++
++				/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
++				 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
++				orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
++				xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
++				    "%s,null", orig);
++			}
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.398526371 +0200
++++ openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.403526421 +0200
+@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
+ #include <grp.h>
+ #include <pwd.h>
+ #include <signal.h>
++#include <syslog.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/rand.h>
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -1529,6 +1532,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ #endif
+ 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
+ 
++	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+ 	/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
+ 	saved_argc = ac;
+ 	rexec_argc = ac;
+@@ -1992,6 +2007,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	/* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
+ 	log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+ 
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
++	}
++
+ 	/* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
+ 	   unmounted if desired. */
+ 	if (chdir("/") == -1)
+@@ -2382,10 +2401,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
+ 		orig = NULL;
+ 
+-	if (options.gss_keyex)
+-		gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
+-	else
+-		gss = NULL;
++	if (options.gss_keyex) {
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
++			options.gss_keyex = 0;
++		} else {
++			gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
++		}
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (gss && orig)
+ 		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshkey.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/sshkey.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.398526371 +0200
++++ openssh-8.0p1/sshkey.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.404526431 +0200
+@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+ #include <openssl/pem.h>
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+ #include "crypto_api.h"
+@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@
+ #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "match.h"
++#include "log.h"
+ #include "ssh-sk.h"
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_XMSS
+@@ -1591,6 +1593,8 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA
+ 	}
+ 	if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) ||
+ 	    !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) {
++			if (FIPS_mode())
++				logit("%s: the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method", __func__);
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.391526300 +0200
++++ openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c	2019-07-23 14:57:54.118830056 +0200
+@@ -199,6 +199,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *na
+ #endif
+ 	}
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		if (type == KEY_DSA)
++			fatal("DSA keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		if (type == KEY_ED25519)
++			fatal("ED25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	}
+ 	switch (type) {
+ 	case KEY_DSA:
+ 		if (*bitsp != 1024)
+@@ -1029,9 +1035,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
+ 			first = 1;
+ 			printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
+ 		}
++		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
++
++		/* Skip the keys that are not supported in FIPS mode */
++		if (FIPS_mode() && (type == KEY_DSA || type == KEY_ED25519)) {
++			logit("Skipping %s key in FIPS mode",
++			    key_types[i].key_type_display);
++			goto next;
++		}
++
+ 		printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display);
+ 		fflush(stdout);
+-		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
+ 		if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
+ 			error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s",
+			    prv_tmp, strerror(errno));

openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,647 @@
+diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
+index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
+--- a/auth-krb5.c
++++ b/auth-krb5.c
+@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <krb5.h>
++#include <profile.h>
+ 
+ extern ServerOptions	 options;
+ 
+@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+ #endif
+ 	krb5_error_code problem;
+ 	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
+-	int len;
++	char *ticket_name = NULL;
+ 	char *client, *platform_client;
+ 	const char *errmsg;
+ 
+@@ -163,7 +164,8 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
++	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
++	     &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, &authctxt->krb5_set_env);
+ 	if (problem)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+@@ -172,21 +174,20 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+ 	if (problem)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+-	problem= krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache,
++	problem = krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache,
+ 				 &creds);
+ 	if (problem)
+ 		goto out;
+ #endif
+ 
+-	authctxt->krb5_ticket_file = (char *)krb5_cc_get_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
++	problem = krb5_cc_get_full_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
++	    authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, &ticket_name);
+ 
+-	len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
+-	authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
+-	snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
+-	    authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
++	authctxt->krb5_ccname = xstrdup(ticket_name);
++	krb5_free_string(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ticket_name);
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+-	if (options.use_pam)
++	if (options.use_pam && authctxt->krb5_set_env)
+ 		do_pam_putenv("KRB5CCNAME", authctxt->krb5_ccname);
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -222,11 +223,54 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+ void
+ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ {
++	struct stat krb5_ccname_stat;
++	char krb5_ccname[128], *krb5_ccname_dir_start, *krb5_ccname_dir_end;
++
+ 	debug("krb5_cleanup_proc called");
+ 	if (authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache) {
+-		krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
++		krb5_context ctx = authctxt->krb5_ctx;
++		krb5_cccol_cursor cursor;
++		krb5_ccache ccache;
++		int ret;
++
++		krb5_cc_destroy(ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+ 		authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache = NULL;
++
++		ret = krb5_cccol_cursor_new(ctx, &cursor);
++		if (ret)
++			goto out;
++
++		ret = krb5_cccol_cursor_next(ctx, cursor, &ccache);
++		if (ret == 0 && ccache != NULL) {
++			/* There is at least one other ccache in collection
++			 * we can switch to */
++			krb5_cc_switch(ctx, ccache);
++		} else if (authctxt->krb5_ccname != NULL) {
++			/* Clean up the collection too */
++			strncpy(krb5_ccname, authctxt->krb5_ccname, sizeof(krb5_ccname) - 10);
++			krb5_ccname_dir_start = strchr(krb5_ccname, ':') + 1;
++			*krb5_ccname_dir_start++ = '\0';
++			if (strcmp(krb5_ccname, "DIR") == 0) {
++
++				strcat(krb5_ccname_dir_start, "/primary");
++
++				if (stat(krb5_ccname_dir_start, &krb5_ccname_stat) == 0) {
++					if (unlink(krb5_ccname_dir_start) == 0) {
++						krb5_ccname_dir_end = strrchr(krb5_ccname_dir_start, '/');
++						*krb5_ccname_dir_end = '\0';
++						if (rmdir(krb5_ccname_dir_start) == -1)
++							debug("cache dir '%s' remove failed: %s",
++							    krb5_ccname_dir_start, strerror(errno));
++					}
++					else
++						debug("cache primary file '%s', remove failed: %s",
++						    krb5_ccname_dir_start, strerror(errno));
++				}
++			}
++		}
++		krb5_cccol_cursor_free(ctx, &cursor);
+ 	}
++out:
+ 	if (authctxt->krb5_user) {
+ 		krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user);
+ 		authctxt->krb5_user = NULL;
+@@ -237,36 +281,188 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+-#ifndef HEIMDAL
++
++#if !defined(HEIMDAL)
++int
++ssh_asprintf_append(char **dsc, const char *fmt, ...) {
++	char *src, *old;
++	va_list ap;
++	int i;
++
++	va_start(ap, fmt);
++	i = vasprintf(&src, fmt, ap);
++	va_end(ap);
++
++	if (i == -1 || src == NULL)
++		return -1;
++
++	old = *dsc;
++
++	i = asprintf(dsc, "%s%s", *dsc, src);
++	if (i == -1 || src == NULL) {
++		free(src);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	free(old);
++	free(src);
++
++	return i;
++}
++
++int
++ssh_krb5_expand_template(char **result, const char *template) {
++	char *p_n, *p_o, *r, *tmp_template;
++
++	debug3("%s: called, template = %s", __func__, template);
++	if (template == NULL)
++		return -1;
++
++	tmp_template = p_n = p_o = xstrdup(template);
++	r = xstrdup("");
++
++	while ((p_n = strstr(p_o, "%{")) != NULL) {
++
++		*p_n++ = '\0';
++		if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%s", p_o) == -1)
++			goto cleanup;
++
++		if (strncmp(p_n, "{uid}", 5) == 0 || strncmp(p_n, "{euid}", 6) == 0 ||
++			strncmp(p_n, "{USERID}", 8) == 0) {
++			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
++			if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%d", geteuid()) == -1)
++				goto cleanup;
++			continue;
++		}
++		else if (strncmp(p_n, "{TEMP}", 6) == 0) {
++			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
++			if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "/tmp") == -1)
++				goto cleanup;
++			continue;
++		} else {
++			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
++			*p_o = '\0';
++			debug("%s: unsupported token %s in %s", __func__, p_n, template);
++			/* unknown token, fallback to the default */
++			goto cleanup;
++		}
++	}
++
++	if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%s", p_o) == -1)
++		goto cleanup;
++
++	*result = r;
++	free(tmp_template);
++	return 0;
++
++cleanup:
++	free(r);
++	free(tmp_template);
++	return -1;
++}
++
+ krb5_error_code
+-ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+-	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
+-	char ccname[40];
++ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(krb5_context ctx, char **ccname) {
++	profile_t p;
++	int ret = 0;
++	char *value = NULL;
++
++	debug3("%s: called", __func__);
++	ret = krb5_get_profile(ctx, &p);
++	if (ret)
++		return ret;
++
++	ret = profile_get_string(p, "libdefaults", "default_ccache_name", NULL, NULL, &value);
++	if (ret || !value)
++		return ret;
++
++	ret = ssh_krb5_expand_template(ccname, value);
++
++	debug3("%s: returning with ccname = %s", __func__, *ccname);
++	return ret;
++}
++
++krb5_error_code
++ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environment) {
++	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno, type_len;
++	char *ccname = NULL;
+ 	mode_t old_umask;
++	char *type = NULL, *colon = NULL;
+ 
+-	ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
+-	    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
+-	if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
+-		return ENOMEM;
+-
+-	old_umask = umask(0177);
+-	tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+-	oerrno = errno;
+-	umask(old_umask);
+-	if (tmpfd == -1) {
+-		logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+-		return oerrno;
+-	}
++	debug3("%s: called", __func__);
++	if (need_environment)
++		*need_environment = 0;
++	ret = ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(ctx, &ccname);
++	if (ret || !ccname || options.kerberos_unique_ccache) {
++		/* Otherwise, go with the old method */
++		if (ccname)
++			free(ccname);
++		ccname = NULL;
++
++		ret = asprintf(&ccname,
++		    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
++		if (ret < 0)
++			return ENOMEM;
+ 
+-	if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
++		old_umask = umask(0177);
++		tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+ 		oerrno = errno;
+-		logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
++		umask(old_umask);
++		if (tmpfd == -1) {
++			logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
++			return oerrno;
++		}
++
++		if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
++			oerrno = errno;
++			logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
++			close(tmpfd);
++			return oerrno;
++		}
++		/* make sure the KRB5CCNAME is set for non-standard location */
++		if (need_environment)
++			*need_environment = 1;
+ 		close(tmpfd);
+-		return oerrno;
+ 	}
+-	close(tmpfd);
+ 
+-	return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
++	debug3("%s: setting default ccname to %s", __func__, ccname);
++	/* set the default with already expanded user IDs */
++	ret = krb5_cc_set_default_name(ctx, ccname);
++	if (ret)
++		return ret;
++
++	if ((colon = strstr(ccname, ":")) != NULL) {
++		type_len = colon - ccname;
++		type = malloc((type_len + 1) * sizeof(char));
++		if (type == NULL)
++			return ENOMEM;
++		strncpy(type, ccname, type_len);
++		type[type_len] = 0;
++	} else {
++		type = strdup(ccname);
++	}
++
++	/* If we have a credential cache from krb5.conf, we need to switch
++	 * a primary cache for this collection, if it supports that (non-FILE)
++	 */
++	if (krb5_cc_support_switch(ctx, type)) {
++		debug3("%s: calling cc_new_unique(%s)", __func__, ccname);
++		ret = krb5_cc_new_unique(ctx, type, NULL, ccache);
++		free(type);
++		if (ret)
++			return ret;
++
++		debug3("%s: calling cc_switch()", __func__);
++		return krb5_cc_switch(ctx, *ccache);
++	} else {
++		/* Otherwise, we can not create a unique ccname here (either
++		 * it is already unique from above or the type does not support
++		 * collections
++		 */
++		free(type);
++		debug3("%s: calling cc_resolve(%s)", __func__, ccname);
++		return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
++	}
+ }
+ #endif /* !HEIMDAL */
+ #endif /* KRB5 */
+diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
+index 29491df9..fdab5040 100644
+--- a/auth.h
++++ b/auth.h
+@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
+ 	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
+ 	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
+ 	char		*krb5_ccname;
++	int		 krb5_set_env;
+ #endif
+ 	struct sshbuf	*loginmsg;
+ 
+@@ -238,7 +239,7 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
+ int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
+ 
+ #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
+-krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
++krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #endif /* AUTH_H */
+diff -up openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
+--- openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name	2019-03-01 15:17:42.708611802 +0100
++++ openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2019-03-01 15:17:42.713611844 +0100
+@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
+ /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
+  * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
+ 
+-static void
++static int
+ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ {
+ 	krb5_ccache ccache;
+@@ -276,14 +276,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+ 	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+ 	const char *new_ccname, *new_cctype;
+ 	const char *errmsg;
++	int set_env = 0;
+ 
+ 	if (client->creds == NULL) {
+ 		debug("No credentials stored");
+-		return;
++		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0)
+-		return;
++		return 0;
+ 
+ #ifdef HEIMDAL
+ # ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE
+@@ -297,14 +298,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+ 		krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+ # endif
+ 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
+-		return;
++		return 0;
+ 	}
+ #else
+-	if ((problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb_context, &ccache))) {
++	if ((problem = ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb_context, &ccache, &set_env)) != 0) {
+ 		errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem);
+-		logit("ssh_krb5_cc_gen(): %.100s", errmsg);
++		logit("ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(): %.100s", errmsg);
+ 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
+-		return;
++		return 0;
+ 	}
+ #endif	/* #ifdef HEIMDAL */
+ 
+@@ -313,7 +314,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+ 		errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem);
+ 		logit("krb5_parse_name(): %.100s", errmsg);
+ 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
+-		return;
++		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, princ))) {
+@@ -322,7 +323,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+ 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
+ 		krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
+ 		krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
+-		return;
++		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
+@@ -331,32 +332,21 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+ 	    client->creds, ccache))) {
+ 		logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed");
+ 		krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
+-		return;
++		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	new_cctype = krb5_cc_get_type(krb_context, ccache);
+ 	new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
+-
+-	client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
+-#ifdef USE_CCAPI
+-	xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
+-	client->store.filename = NULL;
+-#else
+-	if (new_ccname[0] == ':')
+-		new_ccname++;
+ 	xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "%s:%s", new_cctype, new_ccname);
+-	if (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0) {
+-		char *p;
+-		p = strrchr(client->store.envval, '/');
+-		if (p)
+-			*p = '\0';
++
++	if (set_env) {
++		client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
+ 	}
+ 	if ((strcmp(new_cctype, "FILE") == 0) || (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0))
+ 		client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
+-#endif
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+-	if (options.use_pam)
++	if (options.use_pam && set_env)
+ 		do_pam_putenv(client->store.envvar, client->store.envval);
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -361,7 +355,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+ 
+ 	client->store.data = krb_context;
+ 
+-	return;
++	return set_env;
+ }
+ 
+ int
+diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
+index 6cae720e..16e55cbc 100644
+--- a/gss-serv.c
++++ b/gss-serv.c
+@@ -320,13 +320,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ }
+ 
+ /* As user */
+-void
++int
+ ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
+ {
+ 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
+-		(*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
++		return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
+ 	} else
+ 		debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
++
++	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ /* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the child's environment based
+@@ -498,9 +500,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() {
+ 	char *envstr;
+ #endif
+ 
+-	if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
+-	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
+-	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
++	if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
+ 		return;
+ 
+ 	ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
+diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name	2019-03-01 15:17:42.704611768 +0100
++++ openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c	2019-03-01 15:17:42.713611844 +0100
+@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ 	options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1;
+ 	options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
+ 	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
++	options->kerberos_unique_ccache = -1;
+ 	options->gss_authentication=-1;
+ 	options->gss_keyex = -1;
+ 	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
+@@ -315,6 +316,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 		options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1;
+ 	if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1)
+ 		options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
++	if (options->kerberos_unique_ccache == -1)
++		options->kerberos_unique_ccache = 0;
+ 	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->gss_authentication = 0;
+ 	if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
+@@ -447,7 +450,8 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
+ 	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
+ 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
+-	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
++	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache,
++	sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
+ 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+ 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+ 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+@@ -526,11 +530,13 @@ static struct {
+ #else
+ 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
++	{ "kerberosuniqueccache", sKerberosUniqueCCache, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #else
+ 	{ "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "kerberosuniqueccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1437,6 +1443,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 		intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case sKerberosUniqueCCache:
++		intptr = &options->kerberos_unique_ccache;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case sGssAuthentication:
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -2507,6 +2517,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ # ifdef USE_AFS
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
+ # endif
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache);
+ #endif
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index db8362c6..4fa42d64 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
++++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ typedef struct {
+ 						 * file on logout. */
+ 	int     kerberos_get_afs_token;		/* If true, try to get AFS token if
+ 						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
++	int     kerberos_unique_ccache;		/* If true, the acquired ticket will
++						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
+ 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
+ 	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
+ 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index 85df6a27..480a5ead 100644
+--- a/session.c
++++ b/session.c
+@@ -1033,7 +1033,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
+ 	/* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter
+ 	 * the child's environment as they see fit
+ 	 */
+-	ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
++	if (s->authctxt->krb5_set_env)
++		ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	/* Set basic environment. */
+@@ -1105,7 +1106,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ #ifdef KRB5
+-	if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname)
++	if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname && s->authctxt->krb5_set_env)
+ 		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
+ 		    s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
+ #endif
+diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
+index 6593e422..245178af 100644
+--- a/ssh-gss.h
++++ b/ssh-gss.h
+@@ -83,7 +82,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+ 	int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ 	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
+ 	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
+-	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
++	int (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ 	int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ } ssh_gssapi_mech;
+ 
+@@ -127,7 +126,7 @@ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
+ void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
+-void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
++int ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
+ const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
+ 
+ char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index edbe815c..89514e8a 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -2162,7 +2162,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ 	if (options.gss_authentication) {
+ 		temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
+-		ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
++		authctxt->krb5_set_env = ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
+ 		restore_uid();
+ 	}
+ #endif
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index c0683d4a..2349f477 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -860,6 +860,14 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache
+ file on logout.
+ The default is
+ .Cm yes .
++.It Cm KerberosUniqueCCache
++Specifies whether to store the acquired tickets in the per-session credential
++cache under /tmp/ or whether to use per-user credential cache as configured in
++.Pa /etc/krb5.conf .
++The default value
++.Cm no
++can lead to overwriting previous tickets by subseqent connections to the same
++user account.
+ .It Cm KexAlgorithms
+ Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
+ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.

openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+diff -up openssh/ssh_config.redhat openssh/ssh_config
+--- openssh/ssh_config.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh/ssh_config	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
+@@ -43,3 +43,10 @@
+ #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
+ #   RekeyLimit 1G 1h
+ #   UserKnownHostsFile ~/.ssh/known_hosts.d/%k
++#
++# This system is following system-wide crypto policy.
++# To modify the crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...), create a  *.conf
++#  file under  /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/  which will be automatically
++# included below. For more information, see manual page for
++#  update-crypto-policies(8)  and  ssh_config(5).
++Include /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/*.conf
+diff -up openssh/ssh_config_redhat.redhat openssh/ssh_config_redhat
+--- openssh/ssh_config_redhat.redhat	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
++++ openssh/ssh_config_redhat	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
++# The options here are in the "Match final block" to be applied as the last
++# options and could be potentially overwritten by the user configuration
++Match final all
++	# Follow system-wide Crypto Policy, if defined:
++	Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config
++
++	GSSAPIAuthentication yes
++
++# If this option is set to yes then remote X11 clients will have full access
++# to the original X11 display. As virtually no X11 client supports the untrusted
++# mode correctly we set this to yes.
++	ForwardX11Trusted yes
++
++# Send locale-related environment variables
++	SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
++	SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
++	SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
++	SendEnv XMODIFIERS
++
++# Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain
++# Host *.local
+diff -up openssh/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh/sshd_config.0
+--- openssh/sshd_config.0.redhat	2020-02-12 14:30:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh/sshd_config.0	2020-02-13 18:13:39.181641855 +0100
+@@ -970,9 +970,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
+ 
+      SyslogFacility
+              Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+-             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0,
+-             LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.  The
+-             default is AUTH.
++             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV,
++             LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
++             The default is AUTH.
+ 
+      TCPKeepAlive
+              Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
+diff -up openssh/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh/sshd_config.5.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh/sshd_config.5	2020-02-13 18:13:39.181641855 +0100
+@@ -1614,7 +1614,7 @@ By default no subsystems are defined.
+ .It Cm SyslogFacility
+ Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+ .Xr sshd 8 .
+-The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
++The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
+ LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
+ The default is AUTH.
+ .It Cm TCPKeepAlive
+diff -up openssh/sshd_config.redhat openssh/sshd_config
+--- openssh/sshd_config.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh/sshd_config	2020-02-13 18:20:16.349913681 +0100
+@@ -10,6 +10,14 @@
+ # possible, but leave them commented.  Uncommented options override the
+ # default value.
+
++# To modify the system-wide sshd configuration, create a  *.conf  file under
++#  /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/  which will be automatically included below
++Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/*.conf
++
++# If you want to change the port on a SELinux system, you have to tell
++# SELinux about this change.
++# semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER
++#
+ #Port 22
+ #AddressFamily any
+ #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
+diff -up openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat openssh/sshd_config_redhat
+--- openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat	2020-02-13 18:14:02.268006439 +0100
++++ openssh/sshd_config_redhat	2020-02-13 18:19:20.765035947 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
++# This system is following system-wide crypto policy. The changes to
++# crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...) will not have any effect in
++# this or following included files. To override some configuration option,
++# write it before this block or include it before this file.
++# Please, see manual pages for update-crypto-policies(8) and sshd_config(5).
++Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config
++
++SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
++
++ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
++
++GSSAPIAuthentication yes
++GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
++
++UsePAM yes
++
++X11Forwarding yes
++
++# It is recommended to use pam_motd in /etc/pam.d/sshd instead of PrintMotd,
++# as it is more configurable and versatile than the built-in version.
++PrintMotd no
++
++# Accept locale-related environment variables
++AcceptEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
++AcceptEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
++AcceptEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
++AcceptEnv XMODIFIERS
++

openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch

@@ -1,26 +1,26 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no	2012-09-14 20:54:58.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c	2012-09-14 20:55:42.289477749 +0200
-@@ -1617,6 +1617,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -1701,6 +1701,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  	parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
- 	    &cfg, NULL);
+ 	    cfg, &includes, NULL);
  
 +	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora */
 +	if (! options.use_pam)
 +		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora and may cause several problems.");
 +
- 	seed_rng();
- 
  	/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config
---- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no	2012-09-14 20:54:58.514255748 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config	2012-09-14 20:54:58.551255954 +0200
-@@ -95,6 +95,8 @@ GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
+ 	fill_default_server_options(&options);
+ 
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+--- a/sshd_config
++++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
  # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
  # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
  # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
 +# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora and may cause several
 +# problems.
  #UsePAM no
- UsePAM yes
  
+ #AllowAgentForwarding yes

openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index 60682c68..9344806e 100644
+--- a/scp.c
++++ b/scp.c
+@@ -714,7 +714,9 @@ toremote(int argc, char **argv)
+ 			addargs(&alist, "%s", host);
+ 			addargs(&alist, "%s", cmd);
+ 			addargs(&alist, "%s", src);
+-			addargs(&alist, "%s%s%s:%s",
++			addargs(&alist,
++			    /* IPv6 address needs to be enclosed with sqare brackets */
++			    strchr(host, ':') != NULL ? "%s%s[%s]:%s" : "%s%s%s:%s",
+ 			    tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "",
+ 			    thost, targ);
+ 			if (do_local_cmd(&alist) != 0)
+

openssh-7.9p1-ssh-copy-id.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From 22bfdcf060b632b5a6ff603f8f42ff166c211a66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2020 10:02:45 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Fail hard on the first failed attempt to write the
+ authorized_keys_file
+
+---
+ ssh-copy-id | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
+index 392f64f..e69a23f 100755
+--- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
++++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
+@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ installkeys_sh() {
+ 	cd;
+ 	umask 077;
+ 	mkdir -p $(dirname "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}") &&
+-	  { [ -z \`tail -1c ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} 2>/dev/null\` ] || echo >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE}; } &&
++	  { [ -z \`tail -1c ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} 2>/dev/null\` ] || echo >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} || exit 1; } &&
+ 	  cat >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} ||
+ 	  exit 1;
+ 	if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+-- 
+GitLab
+
+

openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,502 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5
+--- openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies	2020-03-26 14:40:44.546775605 +0100
++++ openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5	2020-03-26 14:52:20.700649727 +0100
+@@ -359,17 +359,17 @@ or
+ .Qq *.c.example.com
+ domains.
+ .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
+ by certificate authorities (CAs).
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ .Xr ssh 1
+ will not accept host certificates signed using algorithms other than those
+ specified.
++.Pp
+ .It Cm CertificateFile
+ Specifies a file from which the user's certificate is read.
+ A corresponding private key must be provided separately in order
+@@ -424,20 +424,25 @@ If the option is set to
+ .Cm no ,
+ the check will not be executed.
+ .It Cm Ciphers
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference.
+ Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the built-in
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
++built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The supported ciphers are:
+ .Bd -literal -offset indent
+@@ -453,13 +458,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+ chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
+-aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
+-aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
+ .It Cm ClearAllForwardings
+@@ -812,6 +810,11 @@ command line will be passed untouched to
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+ .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI
+ key exchange. Possible values are
+ .Bd -literal -offset 3n
+@@ -824,10 +827,8 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-,
+ gss-curve25519-sha256-
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+-The default is
+-.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,
+-gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
+ This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
++.Pp
+ .It Cm HashKnownHosts
+ Indicates that
+ .Xr ssh 1
+@@ -1149,29 +1150,25 @@ it may be zero or more of:
+ and
+ .Cm pam .
+ .It Cm KexAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
+ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
+-ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
+-diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
+-diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,
+-diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
+-diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
+-.Ed
++built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q kex .
+@@ -1231,37 +1228,33 @@ The default is INFO.
+ DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
+ DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output.
+ .It Cm MACs
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms
+ in order of preference.
+ The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
+ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
++built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The algorithms that contain
+ .Qq -etm
+ calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac).
+ These are considered safer and their use recommended.
+ .Pp
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
+-hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
+-hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
+-umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
+-hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q mac .
+ .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+@@ -1394,36 +1387,25 @@ instead of continuing to execute and pas
+ The default is
+ .Cm no .
+ .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the key types that will be used for public key authentication
+ as a comma-separated list of patterns.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the key types after it will be appended to the default
+-instead of replacing it.
++character, then the key types after it will be appended to the built-in
++openssh default instead of replacing it.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
+-The default for this option is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-.Ed
++built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The list of available key types may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes .
+diff -up openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies	2020-03-26 14:40:44.530775355 +0100
++++ openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5	2020-03-26 14:48:56.732468099 +0100
+@@ -375,16 +375,16 @@ If the argument is
+ then no banner is displayed.
+ By default, no banner is displayed.
+ .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
+ by certificate authorities (CAs).
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ Certificates signed using other algorithms will not be accepted for
+ public key or host-based authentication.
++.Pp
+ .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+ Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
+ PAM or through authentication styles supported in
+@@ -446,20 +446,25 @@ The default is
+ indicating not to
+ .Xr chroot 2 .
+ .It Cm Ciphers
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the ciphers allowed.
+ Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the built-in
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
++built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The supported ciphers are:
+ .Pp
+@@ -486,13 +491,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+ chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
+ .El
+ .Pp
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
+-aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
+-aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
+ .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
+@@ -681,22 +679,24 @@ For this to work
+ .Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
+ needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client.
+ .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ The list of key exchange algorithms that are accepted by GSSAPI
+ key exchange. Possible values are
+ .Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-gss-gex-sha1-,
+-gss-group1-sha1-,
+-gss-group14-sha1-,
+-gss-group14-sha256-,
+-gss-group16-sha512-,
+-gss-nistp256-sha256-,
++gss-gex-sha1-
++gss-group1-sha1-
++gss-group14-sha1-
++gss-group14-sha256-
++gss-group16-sha512-
++gss-nistp256-sha256-
+ gss-curve25519-sha256-
+ .Ed
+-.Pp
+-The default is
+-.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,
+-gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
+ This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
++.Pp
+ .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
+ Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication
+ as a list of comma-separated patterns.
+@@ -793,25 +793,13 @@ is specified, the location of the socket
+ .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+ environment variable.
+ .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the host key algorithms
+ that the server offers.
+-The default for this option is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ The list of available key types may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
+ .It Cm IgnoreRhosts
+@@ -943,20 +931,25 @@ Specifies whether to look at .k5login fi
+ The default is
+ .Cm yes .
+ .It Cm KexAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
+ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ Alternately if the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
++built-in openssh default set.
+ The supported algorithms are:
+ .Pp
+ .Bl -item -compact -offset indent
+@@ -988,15 +981,6 @@ ecdh-sha2-nistp521
+ sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org
+ .El
+ .Pp
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
+-ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
+-diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
+-diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
+-diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q KexAlgorithms .
+ .It Cm ListenAddress
+@@ -1065,21 +1049,26 @@ DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
+ DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output.
+ Logging with a DEBUG level violates the privacy of users and is not recommended.
+ .It Cm MACs
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms.
+ The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
+ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
++built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The algorithms that contain
+ .Qq -etm
+@@ -1122,15 +1111,6 @@ umac-64-etm@openssh.com
+ umac-128-etm@openssh.com
+ .El
+ .Pp
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
+-hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
+-hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
+-umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
+-hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q mac .
+ .It Cm Match
+@@ -1480,36 +1460,25 @@ or equivalent.)
+ The default is
+ .Cm yes .
+ .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the key types that will be accepted for public key authentication
+ as a list of comma-separated patterns.
+ Alternately if the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified key types will be appended to the built-in
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
+-The default for this option is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-.Ed
++built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The list of available key types may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes .

openssh-8.0p1-openssl-evp.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,720 @@
+From ed7ec0cdf577ffbb0b15145340cf51596ca3eb89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 10:45:45 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Use high-level OpenSSL API for signatures
+
+---
+ digest-openssl.c |  16 ++++
+ digest.h         |   6 ++
+ ssh-dss.c        |  65 ++++++++++------
+ ssh-ecdsa.c      |  69 ++++++++++-------
+ ssh-rsa.c        | 193 +++++++++--------------------------------------
+ sshkey.c         |  77 +++++++++++++++++++
+ sshkey.h         |   4 +
+ 7 files changed, 221 insertions(+), 209 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/digest-openssl.c b/digest-openssl.c
+index da7ed72bc..6a21d8adb 100644
+--- a/digest-openssl.c
++++ b/digest-openssl.c
+@@ -63,6 +63,22 @@ const struct ssh_digest digests[] = {
+ 	{ -1,			NULL,		0,	NULL },
+ };
+ 
++const EVP_MD *
++ssh_digest_to_md(int digest_type)
++{
++	switch (digest_type) {
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
++		return EVP_sha1();
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
++		return EVP_sha256();
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
++		return EVP_sha384();
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
++		return EVP_sha512();
++	}
++	return NULL;
++}
++
+ static const struct ssh_digest *
+ ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg)
+ {
+diff --git a/digest.h b/digest.h
+index 274574d0e..c7ceeb36f 100644
+--- a/digest.h
++++ b/digest.h
+@@ -32,6 +32,12 @@
+ struct sshbuf;
+ struct ssh_digest_ctx;
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++/* Converts internal digest representation to the OpenSSL one */
++const EVP_MD *ssh_digest_to_md(int digest_type);
++#endif
++
+ /* Looks up a digest algorithm by name */
+ int ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name);
+ 
+diff --git a/ssh-dss.c b/ssh-dss.c
+index a23c383dc..ea45e7275 100644
+--- a/ssh-dss.c
++++ b/ssh-dss.c
+@@ -52,11 +52,15 @@ int
+ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
+ {
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ 	DSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+ 	const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
+-	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
+-	size_t rlen, slen, len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
++	u_char sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
++	size_t rlen, slen;
++	int len;
+ 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
++	u_char *sigb = NULL;
++	const u_char *psig = NULL;
+ 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 
+ 	if (lenp != NULL)
+@@ -67,17 +71,24 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ 	if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
+ 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+-	if (dlen == 0)
+-		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 
+-	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
+-	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
++	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1)
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &sigb, &len,
++	    data, datalen);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	if (ret < 0) {
+ 		goto out;
++	}
+ 
+-	if ((sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa)) == NULL) {
++	psig = sigb;
++	if ((sig = d2i_DSA_SIG(NULL, &psig, len)) == NULL) {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
++	free(sigb);
++	sigb = NULL;
+ 
+ 	DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s);
+ 	rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig_r);
+@@ -110,7 +121,7 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ 		*lenp = len;
+ 	ret = 0;
+  out:
+-	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
++	free(sigb);
+ 	DSA_SIG_free(sig);
+ 	sshbuf_free(b);
+ 	return ret;
+@@ -121,20 +132,20 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+     const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
+     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
+ {
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ 	DSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+ 	BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
+-	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob = NULL;
+-	size_t len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
++	u_char *sigblob = NULL;
++	size_t len, slen;
+ 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ 	char *ktype = NULL;
++	u_char *sigb = NULL, *psig = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
+ 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA ||
+ 	    signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+-	if (dlen == 0)
+-		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 
+ 	/* fetch signature */
+ 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
+@@ -176,25 +187,31 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 	}
+ 	sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
+ 
+-	/* sha1 the data */
+-	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
+-	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
++	if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(sig, NULL)) == 0) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+-
+-	switch (DSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->dsa)) {
+-	case 1:
+-		ret = 0;
+-		break;
+-	case 0:
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
++	}
++	if ((sigb = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+-	default:
++	}
++	psig = sigb;
++	if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(sig, &psig)) == 0) {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
++	    sigb, slen);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++
+  out:
+-	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
++	free(sigb);
+ 	DSA_SIG_free(sig);
+ 	BN_clear_free(sig_r);
+ 	BN_clear_free(sig_s);
+diff --git a/ssh-ecdsa.c b/ssh-ecdsa.c
+index 599c7199d..b036796e8 100644
+--- a/ssh-ecdsa.c
++++ b/ssh-ecdsa.c
+@@ -50,11 +50,13 @@ int
+ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
+ {
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ 	ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
++	unsigned char *sigb = NULL;
++	const unsigned char *psig;
+ 	const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
+ 	int hash_alg;
+-	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+-	size_t len, dlen;
++	int len;
+ 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL;
+ 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 
+@@ -67,18 +69,24 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 
+-	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
+-	    (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
++	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+-	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
+-	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
++
++	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1)
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sigb, &len, data,
++	    datalen);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	if (ret < 0) {
+ 		goto out;
++	}
+ 
+-	if ((sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->ecdsa)) == NULL) {
++	psig = sigb;
++	if ((sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &psig, len)) == NULL) {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-
+ 	if ((bb = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+@@ -102,7 +110,7 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ 		*lenp = len;
+ 	ret = 0;
+  out:
+-	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
++	free(sigb);
+ 	sshbuf_free(b);
+ 	sshbuf_free(bb);
+ 	ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
+@@ -115,22 +123,21 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+     const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
+     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
+ {
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ 	ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+ 	BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
+-	int hash_alg;
+-	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+-	size_t dlen;
++	int hash_alg, len;
+ 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL;
+ 	char *ktype = NULL;
++	unsigned char *sigb = NULL, *psig = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL ||
+ 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA ||
+ 	    signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 
+-	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
+-	    (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
++	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 
+ 	/* fetch signature */
+@@ -166,28 +173,36 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 	}
+ 	sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
+ 
+-	if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
++	/* Figure out the length */
++	if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, NULL)) == 0) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if ((sigb = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
+-	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
++	psig = sigb;
++	if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, &psig)) == 0) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
++	}
+ 
+-	switch (ECDSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->ecdsa)) {
+-	case 1:
+-		ret = 0;
+-		break;
+-	case 0:
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
++	if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
+ 		goto out;
+-	default:
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++	}
++
++	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1) {
++		ret =  SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
++	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, datalen, sigb, len);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ 
+  out:
+-	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
++	free(sigb);
+ 	sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
+ 	sshbuf_free(b);
+ 	ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
+diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
+index 9b14f9a9a..8ef3a6aca 100644
+--- a/ssh-rsa.c
++++ b/ssh-rsa.c
+@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
+ 
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ 
+-static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, RSA *);
++static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, const u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, EVP_PKEY *);
+ 
+ static const char *
+ rsa_hash_alg_ident(int hash_alg)
+@@ -90,21 +90,6 @@ rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(const char *alg)
+ 	return -1;
+ }
+ 
+-static int
+-rsa_hash_alg_nid(int type)
+-{
+-	switch (type) {
+-	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
+-		return NID_sha1;
+-	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
+-		return NID_sha256;
+-	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
+-		return NID_sha512;
+-	default:
+-		return -1;
+-	}
+-}
+-
+ int
+ ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(struct sshkey *key, const BIGNUM *iqmp)
+ {
+@@ -164,11 +149,10 @@ int
+ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg_ident)
+ {
+-	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
+-	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sig = NULL;
+-	size_t slen = 0;
+-	u_int dlen, len;
+-	int nid, hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++	u_char *sig = NULL;
++	int len, slen = 0;
++	int hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (lenp != NULL)
+@@ -180,33 +164,24 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ 		hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
+ 	else
+ 		hash_alg = rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(alg_ident);
++
+ 	if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || hash_alg == -1 ||
+ 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+-	RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
+-	if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
+-		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
+ 	slen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
+-	if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
+-		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+-
+-	/* hash the data */
+-	nid = rsa_hash_alg_nid(hash_alg);
+-	if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
+-		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+-	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
+-	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
+-		goto out;
++	if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
++		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
+ 
+-	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1)
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sig, &len, data,
++	    datalen);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	if (ret < 0) {
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa) != 1) {
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+-		goto out;
+-	}
+ 	if (len < slen) {
+ 		size_t diff = slen - len;
+ 		memmove(sig + diff, sig, len);
+@@ -215,6 +190,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
++
+ 	/* encode signature */
+ 	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+@@ -235,7 +211,6 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ 		*lenp = len;
+ 	ret = 0;
+  out:
+-	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
+ 	freezero(sig, slen);
+ 	sshbuf_free(b);
+ 	return ret;
+@@ -246,10 +221,10 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+     const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+     const char *alg)
+ {
+-	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ 	char *sigtype = NULL;
+ 	int hash_alg, want_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+-	size_t len = 0, diff, modlen, dlen;
++	size_t len = 0, diff, modlen;
+ 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ 	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *osigblob, *sigblob = NULL;
+ 
+@@ -257,8 +232,7 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA ||
+ 	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+-	RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
+-	if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
++	if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
+ 
+ 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
+@@ -310,16 +284,15 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 		explicit_bzero(sigblob, diff);
+ 		len = modlen;
+ 	}
+-	if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) {
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++
++	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
+-	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
+-		goto out;
++	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, data, datalen, sigblob, len, pkey);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ 
+-	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, digest, dlen, sigblob, len,
+-	    key->rsa);
+  out:
+ 	freezero(sigblob, len);
+ 	free(sigtype);
+@@ -328,122 +301,26 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-/*
+- * See:
+- * http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-1/
+- * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1.asn
+- */
+-
+-/*
+- * id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
+- *	oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 }
+- */
+-static const u_char id_sha1[] = {
+-	0x30, 0x21, /* type Sequence, length 0x21 (33) */
+-	0x30, 0x09, /* type Sequence, length 0x09 */
+-	0x06, 0x05, /* type OID, length 0x05 */
+-	0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, /* id-sha1 OID */
+-	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
+-	0x04, 0x14  /* Octet string, length 0x14 (20), followed by sha1 hash */
+-};
+-
+-/*
+- * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html
+- * id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840)
+- *      organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2)
+- *      id-sha256(1) }
+- */
+-static const u_char id_sha256[] = {
+-	0x30, 0x31, /* type Sequence, length 0x31 (49) */
+-	0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */
+-	0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */
+-	0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, /* id-sha256 */
+-	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
+-	0x04, 0x20  /* Octet string, length 0x20 (32), followed by sha256 hash */
+-};
+-
+-/*
+- * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html
+- * id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840)
+- *      organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2)
+- *      id-sha256(3) }
+- */
+-static const u_char id_sha512[] = {
+-	0x30, 0x51, /* type Sequence, length 0x51 (81) */
+-	0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */
+-	0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */
+-	0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, /* id-sha512 */
+-	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
+-	0x04, 0x40  /* Octet string, length 0x40 (64), followed by sha512 hash */
+-};
+-
+ static int
+-rsa_hash_alg_oid(int hash_alg, const u_char **oidp, size_t *oidlenp)
++openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
++    u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+ {
+-	switch (hash_alg) {
+-	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
+-		*oidp = id_sha1;
+-		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha1);
+-		break;
+-	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
+-		*oidp = id_sha256;
+-		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha256);
+-		break;
+-	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
+-		*oidp = id_sha512;
+-		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha512);
+-		break;
+-	default:
+-		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+-	}
+-	return 0;
+-}
++	size_t rsasize = 0;
++	const RSA *rsa;
++	int ret;
+ 
+-static int
+-openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, u_char *hash, size_t hashlen,
+-    u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa)
+-{
+-	size_t rsasize = 0, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0;
+-	int ret, len, oidmatch, hashmatch;
+-	const u_char *oid = NULL;
+-	u_char *decrypted = NULL;
+-
+-	if ((ret = rsa_hash_alg_oid(hash_alg, &oid, &oidlen)) != 0)
+-		return ret;
+-	ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+-	hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
+-	if (hashlen != hlen) {
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+-		goto done;
+-	}
++	rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey);
+ 	rsasize = RSA_size(rsa);
+ 	if (rsasize <= 0 || rsasize > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM ||
+ 	    siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
+-	if ((decrypted = malloc(rsasize)) == NULL) {
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+-		goto done;
+-	}
+-	if ((len = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sigbuf, decrypted, rsa,
+-	    RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) < 0) {
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+-		goto done;
+-	}
+-	if (len < 0 || (size_t)len != hlen + oidlen) {
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+-		goto done;
+-	}
+-	oidmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) == 0;
+-	hashmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) == 0;
+-	if (!oidmatch || !hashmatch) {
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+-		goto done;
+-	}
+-	ret = 0;
++
++	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, datalen,
++	    sigbuf, siglen);
++
+ done:
+-	freezero(decrypted, rsasize);
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
+index ad1957762..b95ed0b10 100644
+--- a/sshkey.c
++++ b/sshkey.c
+@@ -358,6 +358,83 @@ sshkey_type_plain(int type)
+ }
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++int
++sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, u_char **sigp,
++    int *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen)
++{
++	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	u_char *sig = NULL;
++	int ret, slen, len;
++
++	if (sigp == NULL || lenp == NULL) {
++		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	}
++
++	slen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
++	if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
++		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++
++	len = slen;
++	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	}
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto error;
++	}
++	if (EVP_SignInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
++	    EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0 ||
++	    EVP_SignFinal(ctx, sig, &len, pkey) <= 0) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto error;
++	}
++
++	*sigp = sig;
++	*lenp = len;
++	/* Now owned by the caller */
++	sig = NULL;
++	ret = 0;
++
++error:
++	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
++	free(sig);
++	return ret;
++}
++
++int
++sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, const u_char *data,
++    size_t datalen, u_char *sigbuf, int siglen)
++{
++	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	int ret;
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	}
++	if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
++	    EVP_VerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto done;
++	}
++	ret = EVP_VerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen, pkey);
++	switch (ret) {
++	case 1:
++		ret = 0;
++		break;
++	case 0:
++		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
++		break;
++	default:
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		break;
++	}
++
++done:
++	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
++	return ret;
++}
++
+ /* XXX: these are really begging for a table-driven approach */
+ int
+ sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name)
+diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
+index a91e60436..270901a87 100644
+--- a/sshkey.h
++++ b/sshkey.h
+@@ -179,6 +179,10 @@ const char	*sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *);
+ const char	*sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *);
+ int		 sshkey_names_valid2(const char *, int);
+ char		*sshkey_alg_list(int, int, int, char);
++int		 sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY*, int, u_char **,
++    int *, const u_char *, size_t);
++int		 sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *, int, const u_char *,
++    size_t, u_char *, int);
+ 
+ int	 sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **);
+ int	 sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **);
+

openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+commit 2c3ef499bfffce3cfd315edeebf202850ba4e00a
+Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date:   Tue Apr 16 15:35:18 2019 +0200
+
+    Use the new OpenSSL KDF
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 2a455e4e..e01c3d43 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -2712,6 +2712,7 @@ if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
+ 		HMAC_CTX_init \
+ 		RSA_generate_key_ex \
+ 		RSA_get_default_method \
++		EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id \
+ 	])
+ 
+ 	# OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms may be a macro.
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index b6f041f4..1fbce2bb 100644
+--- a/kex.c
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
++# ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID
++# include <openssl/kdf.h>
++# endif
+ #endif
+ 
+ #include "ssh.h"
+@@ -942,6 +945,95 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID
++static const EVP_MD *
++digest_to_md(int digest_type)
++{
++	switch (digest_type) {
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
++		return EVP_sha1();
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
++		return EVP_sha256();
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
++		return EVP_sha384();
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
++		return EVP_sha512();
++	}
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++static int
++derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
++    const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	u_char *key = NULL;
++	int r, key_len;
++
++	if ((key_len = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0)
++		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	key_len = ROUNDUP(need, key_len);
++	if ((key = calloc(1, key_len)) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_SSHKDF);
++	if (!ctx) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, digest_to_md(kex->hash_alg));
++	if (r != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY,
++	    sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret));
++	if (r != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_XCGHASH, hash, hashlen);
++	if (r != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_TYPE, id);
++	if (r != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID,
++	    kex->session_id, kex->session_id_len);
++	if (r != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	r = EVP_KDF_derive(ctx, key, key_len);
++	if (r != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
++	fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", id);
++	dump_digest("key", key, key_len);
++#endif
++	*keyp = key;
++	key = NULL;
++	r = 0;
++
++out:
++	free (key);
++	EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
++	if (r < 0) {
++		return r;
++	}
++	return 0;
++}
++#else
+ static int
+ derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
+     const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
+@@ -1004,6 +1096,7 @@ derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
+ 	ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
+ 	return r;
+ }
++#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID */
+ 
+ #define NKEYS	6
+ int
+

openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+diff --git a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
+index dca158de..afdcb1d2 100644
+--- a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
++++ b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
+@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+-uint32_t
++uint32_t __attribute__((visibility("default")))
+ sk_api_version(void)
+ {
+ 	return SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR;
+@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ check_options(struct sk_option **options)
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-int
++int __attribute__((visibility("default")))
+ sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
+     const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
+     struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response)
+@@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ sig_ed25519(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-int
++int __attribute__((visibility("default")))
+ sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen,
+     const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
+     uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-int
++int __attribute__((visibility("default")))
+ sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+     struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks)
+ {

openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
+--- a/channels.c
++++ b/channels.c
+@@ -3933,16 +3933,26 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+ 			if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
+ 				sock_set_v6only(sock);
+ 			if (x11_use_localhost)
+ 				set_reuseaddr(sock);
+ 			if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
+ 				debug2("%s: bind port %d: %.100s", __func__,
+ 				    port, strerror(errno));
+ 				close(sock);
++
++				/* do not remove successfully opened
++				 * sockets if the request failed because
++				 * the protocol IPv4/6 is not available
++				 * (e.g. IPv6 may be disabled while being
++				 * supported)
++				 */
++				if (EADDRNOTAVAIL == errno)
++    					continue;
++
+ 				for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++)
+ 					close(socks[n]);
+ 				num_socks = 0;
+ 				break;
+ 			}
+ 			socks[num_socks++] = sock;
+ 			if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS)
+ 				break;

openssh-8.4p1-debian-compat.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+--- compat.h.orig	2020-10-05 10:09:02.953505129 -0700
++++ compat.h	2020-10-05 10:10:17.587733113 -0700
+@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
+ 
+ #define SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE	0x00000001
+ #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE		0x00000002
+-/* #define unused		0x00000004 */
++#define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74	0x00000004
+ /* #define unused		0x00000008 */
+ #define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID	0x00000010
+ /* #define unused		0x00000020 */
+--- compat.c.orig	2020-10-05 10:25:02.088720562 -0700
++++ compat.c	2020-10-05 10:13:11.637282492 -0700
+@@ -65,11 +65,12 @@
+ 		{ "OpenSSH_6.5*,"
+ 		  "OpenSSH_6.6*",	SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|
+ 					SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE},
++		{ "OpenSSH_7.4*",	SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE|
++		  			SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74},
+ 		{ "OpenSSH_7.0*,"
+ 		  "OpenSSH_7.1*,"
+ 		  "OpenSSH_7.2*,"
+ 		  "OpenSSH_7.3*,"
+-		  "OpenSSH_7.4*,"
+ 		  "OpenSSH_7.5*,"
+ 		  "OpenSSH_7.6*,"
+ 		  "OpenSSH_7.7*",	SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE},
+--- sshconnect2.c.orig	2020-09-26 07:26:37.618010545 -0700
++++ sshconnect2.c	2020-10-05 10:47:22.116315148 -0700
+@@ -1305,6 +1305,26 @@
+ 			break;
+ 	}
+ 	free(oallowed);
++	/*
++	 * OpenSSH 7.4 supports SHA2 sig types, but fails to indicate its
++	 * support.  For that release, check the local policy against the
++	 * SHA2 signature types.
++	 */
++	if (alg == NULL &&
++	    (key->type == KEY_RSA && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74))) {
++		oallowed = allowed = xstrdup(options.pubkey_key_types);
++		while ((cp = strsep(&allowed, ",")) != NULL) {
++			if (sshkey_type_from_name(cp) != key->type)
++				continue;
++			tmp = match_list(sshkey_sigalg_by_name(cp), "rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-512", NULL);
++			if (tmp != NULL)
++				alg = xstrdup(cp);
++			free(tmp);
++			if (alg != NULL)
++				break;
++		}
++		free(oallowed);
++	}
+ 	return alg;
+ }
+ 
+

openssh-8.4p1-sandbox-seccomp.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index e0768c06..5065ae7e 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -267,6 +267,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_pselect6
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_pselect6_time64
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6_time64),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_read
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_read),
+ #endif

openssh-8.4p1-ssh-copy-id.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+From 66f16e5425eb881570e82bfef7baeac2e7accc0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Oleg <Fallmay@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2020 12:09:08 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix `EOF: command not found` error in ssh-copy-id
+
+---
+ contrib/ssh-copy-id | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
+index 392f64f94..a76907717 100644
+--- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
++++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
+@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ installkeys_sh() {
+   #    the -z `tail ...` checks for a trailing newline. The echo adds one if was missing
+   #    the cat adds the keys we're getting via STDIN
+   #    and if available restorecon is used to restore the SELinux context
+-  INSTALLKEYS_SH=$(tr '\t\n' ' ' <<-EOF)
++  INSTALLKEYS_SH=$(tr '\t\n' ' ' <<-EOF
+ 	cd;
+ 	umask 077;
+ 	mkdir -p $(dirname "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}") &&
+@@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ installkeys_sh() {
+ 	  restorecon -F .ssh ${AUTH_KEY_FILE};
+ 	fi
+ EOF
++  )
+ 
+   # to defend against quirky remote shells: use 'exec sh -c' to get POSIX;
+   printf "exec sh -c '%s'" "${INSTALLKEYS_SH}"
+
+From de59a431cdec833e3ec15691dd950402b4c052cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>
+Date: Sat, 3 Oct 2020 00:20:07 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] un-nest $() to make ksh cheerful
+
+---
+ ssh-copy-id | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+From 02ac2c3c3db5478a440dfb1b90d15f686f2cbfc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>
+Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2020 21:30:10 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ksh doesn't grok 'local'
+
+and AFAICT it's not actually doing anything useful in the code, so let's
+see how things go without it.
+---
+ ssh-copy-id | 11 +++++------
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
+index a769077..11c9463 100755
+--- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
++++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
+@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ quote() {
+ }
+ 
+ use_id_file() {
+-  local L_ID_FILE="$1"
++  L_ID_FILE="$1"
+ 
+   if [ -z "$L_ID_FILE" ] ; then
+     printf '%s: ERROR: no ID file found\n' "$0"
+@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ use_id_file() {
+   # check that the files are readable
+   for f in "$PUB_ID_FILE" ${PRIV_ID_FILE:+"$PRIV_ID_FILE"} ; do
+     ErrMSG=$( { : < "$f" ; } 2>&1 ) || {
+-      local L_PRIVMSG=""
++      L_PRIVMSG=""
+       [ "$f" = "$PRIV_ID_FILE" ] && L_PRIVMSG="	(to install the contents of '$PUB_ID_FILE' anyway, look at the -f option)"
+       printf "\\n%s: ERROR: failed to open ID file '%s': %s\\n" "$0" "$f" "$(printf '%s\n%s\n' "$ErrMSG" "$L_PRIVMSG" | sed -e 's/.*: *//')"
+       exit 1
+@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ fi
+ # populate_new_ids() uses several global variables ($USER_HOST, $SSH_OPTS ...)
+ # and has the side effect of setting $NEW_IDS
+ populate_new_ids() {
+-  local L_SUCCESS="$1"
++  L_SUCCESS="$1"
+ 
+   # shellcheck disable=SC2086
+   if [ "$FORCED" ] ; then
+@@ -181,13 +181,12 @@ populate_new_ids() {
+   eval set -- "$SSH_OPTS"
+ 
+   umask 0177
+-  local L_TMP_ID_FILE
+   L_TMP_ID_FILE=$(mktemp ~/.ssh/ssh-copy-id_id.XXXXXXXXXX)
+   if test $? -ne 0 || test "x$L_TMP_ID_FILE" = "x" ; then
+     printf '%s: ERROR: mktemp failed\n' "$0" >&2
+     exit 1
+   fi
+-  local L_CLEANUP="rm -f \"$L_TMP_ID_FILE\" \"${L_TMP_ID_FILE}.stderr\""
++  L_CLEANUP="rm -f \"$L_TMP_ID_FILE\" \"${L_TMP_ID_FILE}.stderr\""
+   # shellcheck disable=SC2064
+   trap "$L_CLEANUP" EXIT TERM INT QUIT
+   printf '%s: INFO: attempting to log in with the new key(s), to filter out any that are already installed\n' "$0" >&2
+@@ -237,7 +236,7 @@ populate_new_ids() {
+ #    produce a one-liner to add the keys to remote authorized_keys file
+ #    optionally takes an alternative path for authorized_keys
+ installkeys_sh() {
+-  local AUTH_KEY_FILE=${1:-.ssh/authorized_keys}
++  AUTH_KEY_FILE=${1:-.ssh/authorized_keys}
+ 
+   # In setting INSTALLKEYS_SH:
+   #    the tr puts it all on one line (to placate tcsh)
+-- 
+
+diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
+index 11c9463..ee3f637 100755
+--- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
++++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
+@@ -237,6 +237,7 @@ populate_new_ids() {
+ #    optionally takes an alternative path for authorized_keys
+ installkeys_sh() {
+   AUTH_KEY_FILE=${1:-.ssh/authorized_keys}
++  AUTH_KEY_DIR=$(dirname "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}")
+ 
+   # In setting INSTALLKEYS_SH:
+   #    the tr puts it all on one line (to placate tcsh)
+@@ -249,7 +250,7 @@ installkeys_sh() {
+   INSTALLKEYS_SH=$(tr '\t\n' ' ' <<-EOF
+ 	cd;
+ 	umask 077;
+-	mkdir -p $(dirname "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}") &&
++	mkdir -p "${AUTH_KEY_DIR}" &&
+ 	  { [ -z \`tail -1c ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} 2>/dev/null\` ] || echo >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} || exit 1; } &&
+ 	  cat >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} ||
+ 	  exit 1;
+-- 

openssh.rpmlintrc

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# I do not know about any better place where to put profile files
+addFilter(r'openssh-askpass.x86_64: W: non-conffile-in-etc /etc/profile.d/gnome-ssh-askpass.c?sh')
+
+# The ssh-keysign is not supposed to have standard permissions
+addFilter(r'openssh.x86_64: E: non-standard-executable-perm /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign 2555')
+addFilter(r'openssh.x86_64: E: setgid-binary /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign ssh_keys 2555')
+addFilter(r'openssh.x86_64: W: non-standard-gid /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign ssh_keys')
+
+# The -cavs subpackage is internal without documentation
+# The -askpass is not intended to be used directly so it is missing documentation
+addFilter(r'openssh-(askpass|cavs).x86_64: W: no-documentation')
+
+# sshd config and sysconfig is not supposed to be world readable
+addFilter(r'non-readable /etc/(ssh/sshd_config|sysconfig/sshd)')
+
+# The /var/empty/sshd is supposed to have the given permissions
+addFilter(r'non-standard-dir-perm /var/empty/sshd 711')
+addFilter(r'non-standard-dir-in-var empty')
+
+# Spelling false-positives
+addFilter(r'spelling-error (Summary\(en_US\)|.* en_US) (mls|su|sudo|rlogin|rsh|untrusted) ')

pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders

@@ -1,20 +1,36 @@
-atomicio.h
+authfd.c
 authfd.h
+atomicio.c
+atomicio.h
+bufaux.c
+bufbn.c
 buffer.h
+buffer.c
+cleanup.c
 cipher.h
 compat.h
-defines.h
+entropy.c
 entropy.h
+fatal.c
 includes.h
 kex.h
+key.c
 key.h
+log.c
 log.h
 match.h
+misc.c
 misc.h
 pathnames.h
 platform.h
 rsa.h
+ssh-dss.c
+ssh-rsa.c
 ssh.h
 ssh2.h
+uidswap.c
+uidswap.h
+uuencode.c
 uuencode.h
+xmalloc.c
 xmalloc.h

pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-compat.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,992 @@
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
+  * or implied, of Jamie Beverly.
+  */
+ 
++#include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+@@ -66,8 +67,8 @@ proc_pid_cmdline(char *** inargv)
+                 case EOF:
+                 case '\0':
+                     if (len > 0) { 
+-                        argv = pamsshagentauth_xrealloc(argv, count + 1, sizeof(*argv));
+-                        argv[count] = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof(*argv[count]));
++                        argv = xreallocarray(argv, count + 1, sizeof(*argv));
++                        argv[count] = xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof(*argv[count]));
+                         strncpy(argv[count++], argbuf, len);
+                         memset(argbuf, '\0', MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG + 1);
+                         len = 0;
+@@ -106,9 +107,9 @@ pamsshagentauth_free_command_line(char *
+ {
+     size_t i;
+     for (i = 0; i < n_args; i++)
+-        pamsshagentauth_xfree(argv[i]);
++        free(argv[i]);
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_xfree(argv);
++    free(argv);
+     return;
+ }
+ 
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+-#include "buffer.h"
+-#include "key.h"
++#include "sshbuf.h"
++#include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "authfd.h"
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ 
+@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ typedef struct idlist Idlist;
+ struct identity {
+     TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
+     AuthenticationConnection *ac;   /* set if agent supports key */
+-    Key *key;           /* public/private key */
++    struct sshkey *key;           /* public/private key */
+     char    *filename;      /* comment for agent-only keys */
+     int tried;
+     int isprivate;      /* key points to the private key */
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat	2020-09-23 10:52:16.421001434 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+-#include "buffer.h"
+-#include "key.h"
++#include "sshbuf.h"
++#include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "authfd.h"
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@
+ #include "get_command_line.h"
+ extern char **environ;
+ 
++#define PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1 101
++
+ /* 
+  * Added by Jamie Beverly, ensure socket fd points to a socket owned by the user 
+  * A cursory check is done, but to avoid race conditions, it is necessary 
+@@ -77,7 +79,7 @@ log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
+     if (count == 0)
+         return NULL;
+    
+-    buf = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc((count * MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG) + (count * 3), sizeof(*buf));
++    buf = xcalloc((count * MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG) + (count * 3), sizeof(*buf));
+     for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+         strcat(buf, (i > 0) ? " '" : "'");
+         strncat(buf, action[i], MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG);
+@@ -87,21 +89,25 @@ log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
+ }
+ 
+ void
+-agent_action(Buffer *buf, char ** action, size_t count)
++agent_action(struct sshbuf **buf, char ** action, size_t count)
+ {
+     size_t i;
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(buf);
++    int r;
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(buf, count);
++    if ((*buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++        fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
++    if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(*buf, count)) != 0)
++        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 
+     for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(buf, action[i]);
++        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*buf, action[i])) != 0)
++            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+     }
+ }
+ 
+ 
+-void
+-pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * session_id2, const char * user,
++static void
++pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(struct sshbuf ** session_id2, const char * user,
+                                 const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
+ {
+     u_char *cookie = NULL;
+@@ -114,22 +120,23 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
+     char ** reported_argv = NULL;
+     size_t count = 0;
+     char * action_logbuf = NULL;
+-    Buffer action_agentbuf;
++    struct sshbuf *action_agentbuf = NULL;
+     uint8_t free_logbuf = 0;
+     char * retc;
+     int32_t reti;
++    int r;
+ 
+-    rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
++    rnd = arc4random();
+     cookie_len = ((uint8_t) rnd);
+     while (cookie_len < 16) { 
+         cookie_len += 16;                                          /* Add 16 bytes to the size to ensure that while the length is random, the length is always reasonable; ticket #18 */
+     }
+ 
+-    cookie = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(1,cookie_len);
++    cookie = xcalloc(1, cookie_len);
+ 
+     for (i = 0; i < cookie_len; i++) {
+         if (i % 4 == 0) {
+-            rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
++            rnd = arc4random();
+         }
+         cookie[i] = (u_char) rnd;
+         rnd >>= 8;
+@@ -144,7 +151,8 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
+     }
+     else {
+         action_logbuf = "unknown on this platform";
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&action_agentbuf); /* stays empty, means unavailable */
++        if ((action_agentbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) /* stays empty, means unavailable */
++            fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+     }
+     
+     /*
+@@ -161,35 +169,39 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
+     retc = getcwd(pwd, sizeof(pwd) - 1);
+     time(&ts);
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(session_id2);
++    if ((*session_id2 = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++        fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(session_id2, PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1);
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("cookie: %s", pamsshagentauth_tohex(cookie, cookie_len)); */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(session_id2, cookie, cookie_len);
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("user: %s", user); */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, user);
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("ruser: %s", ruser); */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, ruser);
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("servicename: %s", servicename); */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, servicename);
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("pwd: %s", pwd); */
+-    if(retc)
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, pwd);
+-    else
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("action: %s", action_logbuf); */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(session_id2, action_agentbuf.buf + action_agentbuf.offset, action_agentbuf.end - action_agentbuf.offset);
++    if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(*session_id2, PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1)) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_string(*session_id2, cookie, cookie_len)) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, user)) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, ruser)) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, servicename)) != 0)
++        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++    if (retc) {
++        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, pwd)) != 0)
++            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++    } else {
++        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, "")) != 0)
++            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++    }
++    if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(*session_id2, action_agentbuf)) != 0)
++        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+     if (free_logbuf) { 
+-        pamsshagentauth_xfree(action_logbuf);
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&action_agentbuf);
++        free(action_logbuf);
++        sshbuf_free(action_agentbuf);
++    }
++    /* debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */
++    if (reti >= 0) {
++        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, hostname)) != 0)
++            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++    } else {
++        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, "")) != 0)
++            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+     }
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */
+-    if(reti >= 0)
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, hostname);
+-    else
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int64(session_id2, (uint64_t) ts);
++    /* debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */
++    if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(*session_id2, (uint64_t) ts)) != 0)
++        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 
+     free(cookie);
+     return;
+@@ -278,7 +290,8 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_ui
+ 
+ 	auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth));
+ 	auth->fd = sock;
+-	buffer_init(&auth->identities);
++	if ((auth->identities = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++           fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ 	auth->howmany = 0;
+ 
+ 	return auth;
+@@ -287,9 +300,9 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_ui
+ int
+ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(const char * user, const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
+ {
+-    Buffer session_id2 = { 0 };
++    struct sshbuf *session_id2 = NULL;
+     Identity *id;
+-    Key *key;
++    struct sshkey *key;
+     AuthenticationConnection *ac;
+     char *comment;
+     uint8_t retval = 0;
+@@ -299,31 +312,30 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
+     pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
+ 
+     if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
++        verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
+         for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) 
+         {
+             if(key != NULL) {
+-                id = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
++                id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
+                 id->key = key;
+                 id->filename = comment;
+                 id->ac = ac;
+-                if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, &session_id2)) {
++                if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, session_id2)) {
+                     retval = 1;
+                 }
+-                pamsshagentauth_xfree(id->filename);
+-                pamsshagentauth_key_free(id->key);
+-                pamsshagentauth_xfree(id);
++                free(id->filename);
++                key_free(id->key);
++                free(id);
+                 if(retval == 1)
+                     break;
+             }
+         }
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&session_id2);
++        sshbuf_free(session_id2);
+         ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
+     }
+     else {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
++        verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
+     }
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_xfree(session_id2); */
+     EVP_cleanup();
+     return retval;
+ }
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat	2020-09-23 10:52:16.423001461 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c	2020-09-23 10:53:10.631727657 +0200
+@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+  * a patch 8-)
+  */
+ #if ! HAVE___PROGNAME || HAVE_BUNDLE
+-    __progname = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup(servicename);
++    __progname = xstrdup(servicename);
+ #endif
+ 
+     for(i = argc, argv_ptr = (char **) argv; i > 0; ++argv_ptr, i--) {
+@@ -132,11 +132,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+ #endif
+     }
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_log_init(__progname, log_lvl, facility, getenv("PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_DEBUG") ? 1 : 0);
++    log_init(__progname, log_lvl, facility, getenv("PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_DEBUG") ? 1 : 0);
+     pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (void *) &user);
+     pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER, (void *) &ruser_ptr);
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_verbose("Beginning pam_ssh_agent_auth for user %s", user);
++    verbose("Beginning pam_ssh_agent_auth for user %s", user);
+ 
+     if(ruser_ptr) {
+         strncpy(ruser, ruser_ptr, sizeof(ruser) - 1);
+@@ -151,12 +151,12 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+ #ifdef ENABLE_SUDO_HACK
+         if( (strlen(sudo_service_name) > 0) && strncasecmp(servicename, sudo_service_name, sizeof(sudo_service_name) - 1) == 0 && getenv("SUDO_USER") ) {
+             strncpy(ruser, getenv("SUDO_USER"), sizeof(ruser) - 1 );
+-            pamsshagentauth_verbose( "Using environment variable SUDO_USER (%s)", ruser );
++            verbose( "Using environment variable SUDO_USER (%s)", ruser );
+         } else
+ #endif
+         {
+             if( ! getpwuid(getuid()) ) {
+-                pamsshagentauth_verbose("Unable to getpwuid(getuid())");
++                verbose("Unable to getpwuid(getuid())");
+                 goto cleanexit;
+             }
+             strncpy(ruser, getpwuid(getuid())->pw_name, sizeof(ruser) - 1);
+@@ -165,11 +165,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+ 
+     /* Might as well explicitely confirm the user exists here */
+     if(! getpwnam(ruser) ) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", ruser);
++        verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", ruser);
+         goto cleanexit;
+     }
+     if( ! getpwnam(user) ) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", user);
++        verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", user);
+         goto cleanexit;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -179,8 +179,8 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+          */
+         parse_authorized_key_file(user, authorized_keys_file_input);
+     } else {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys");
+-        authorized_keys_file = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys");
++        verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys");
++        authorized_keys_file = xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys");
+     }
+ 
+     /*
+@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+      */
+ 
+     if(user && strlen(ruser) > 0) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
++        verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+ 
+         /*
+          * Attempt to read data from the sshd if we're being called as an auth agent.
+@@ -197,10 +197,10 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+         const char* ssh_user_auth = pam_getenv(pamh, "SSH_AUTH_INFO_0");
+         int sshd_service = strncasecmp(servicename, sshd_service_name, sizeof(sshd_service_name) - 1);
+         if (sshd_service == 0 && ssh_user_auth != NULL) {
+-            pamsshagentauth_verbose("Got SSH_AUTH_INFO_0: `%.20s...'", ssh_user_auth);
++            verbose("Got SSH_AUTH_INFO_0: `%.20s...'", ssh_user_auth);
+             if (userauth_pubkey_from_pam(ruser, ssh_user_auth) > 0) {
+                 retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+-                pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated (sshd): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
++                logit("Authenticated (sshd): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+                 goto cleanexit;
+             }
+         }
+@@ -208,13 +208,13 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+          * this pw_uid is used to validate the SSH_AUTH_SOCK, and so must be the uid of the ruser invoking the program, not the target-user
+          */
+         if(pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(user, ruser, servicename)) { /* getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid)) { */
+-            pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated (agent): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
++            logit("Authenticated (agent): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+             retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+         } else {
+-            pamsshagentauth_logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
++            logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+         }
+     } else {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" );
++        logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" );
+     }
+ 
+ cleanexit:
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -66,8 +66,8 @@
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "match.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+-#include "buffer.h"
+-#include "key.h"
++#include "sshbuf.h"
++#include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ 
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+@@ -77,7 +77,6 @@
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+ #include "secure_filename.h"
+ 
+-#include "identity.h"
+ #include "pam_user_key_allowed2.h"
+ 
+ extern char *authorized_keys_file;
+@@ -117,12 +116,12 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
+         } else {
+             slash_ptr = strchr(auth_keys_file_buf, '/');
+             if(!slash_ptr)
+-                pamsshagentauth_fatal
++                fatal
+                     ("cannot expand tilde in path without a `/'");
+ 
+             owner_uname_len = slash_ptr - auth_keys_file_buf - 1;
+             if(owner_uname_len > (sizeof(owner_uname) - 1))
+-                pamsshagentauth_fatal("Username too long");
++                fatal("Username too long");
+ 
+             strncat(owner_uname, auth_keys_file_buf + 1, owner_uname_len);
+             if(!authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid)
+@@ -130,11 +129,11 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
+                     getpwnam(owner_uname)->pw_uid;
+         }
+         authorized_keys_file =
+-            pamsshagentauth_tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf,
++            tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf,
+                                                   authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid);
+         strncpy(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file,
+                 sizeof(auth_keys_file_buf) - 1);
+-        pamsshagentauth_xfree(authorized_keys_file)        /* when we
++        free(authorized_keys_file)        /* when we
+                                                               percent_expand
+                                                               later, we'd step
+                                                               on this, so free
+@@ -150,13 +149,13 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
+     strncat(hostname, fqdn, strcspn(fqdn, "."));
+ #endif
+     authorized_keys_file =
+-        pamsshagentauth_percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h",
++        percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h",
+                                        getpwnam(user)->pw_dir, "H", hostname,
+                                        "f", fqdn, "u", user, NULL);
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, Key * key)
++pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, struct sshkey * key)
+ {
+     return
+         pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid),
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
+ #define _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H
+ 
+ #include "identity.h"
+-int pam_user_key_allowed(const char *, Key *);
++int pam_user_key_allowed(const char *, struct sshkey *);
+ void parse_authorized_key_file(const char *, const char *);
+ 
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -45,44 +45,46 @@
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "ssh.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+-#include "buffer.h"
++#include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "compat.h"
+-#include "key.h"
++#include "digest.h"
++#include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "secure_filename.h"
+ #include "uidswap.h"
+-
+-#include "identity.h"
++#include <unistd.h>
+ 
+ /* return 1 if user allows given key */
+ /* Modified slightly from original found in auth2-pubkey.c */
+ static int
+-pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE * f, char *file, Key * key)
++pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE * f, char *file, struct sshkey * key)
+ {
+-    char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
++    char *line = NULL;
+     int found_key = 0;
+     u_long linenum = 0;
+-    Key *found;
++    struct sshkey *found;
+     char *fp;
++    size_t linesize = 0;
+ 
+     found_key = 0;
+-    found = pamsshagentauth_key_new(key->type);
++    found = sshkey_new(key->type);
+ 
+-    while(read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
++    while ((getline(&line, &linesize, f)) != -1) {
+         char *cp = NULL; /* *key_options = NULL; */
+ 
++        linenum++;
+         /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
+         for(cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++);
+         if(!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
+             continue;
+ 
+-        if(pamsshagentauth_key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
++        if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
+             /* no key? check if there are options for this key */
+             int quoted = 0;
+ 
+-            pamsshagentauth_verbose("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
++            verbose("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
+             /* key_options = cp; */
+             for(; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
+                 if(*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
+@@ -92,26 +94,27 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE
+             }
+             /* Skip remaining whitespace. */
+             for(; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++);
+-            if(pamsshagentauth_key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
+-                pamsshagentauth_verbose("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
++            if(sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
++                verbose("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
+                 /* still no key? advance to next line */
+                 continue;
+             }
+         }
+-        if(pamsshagentauth_key_equal(found, key)) {
++        if(sshkey_equal(found, key)) {
+             found_key = 1;
+-            pamsshagentauth_logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file,
++            logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file,
+                                   linenum);
+-            fp = pamsshagentauth_key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-            pamsshagentauth_logit("Found matching %s key: %s",
+-                                  pamsshagentauth_key_type(found), fp);
+-            pamsshagentauth_xfree(fp);
++            fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
++            logit("Found matching %s key: %s",
++                                  sshkey_type(found), fp);
++            free(fp);
+             break;
+         }
+     }
+-    pamsshagentauth_key_free(found);
++    free(line);
++    sshkey_free(found);
+     if(!found_key)
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("key not found");
++        verbose("key not found");
+     return found_key;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -120,19 +123,19 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE
+  * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
+  */
+ int
+-pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key * key, char *file)
++pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey * key, char *file)
+ {
+     FILE *f;
+     int found_key = 0;
+     struct stat st;
+-    char buf[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
++    char buf[256];
+ 
+     /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
+-    pamsshagentauth_verbose("trying public key file %s", file);
++    verbose("trying public key file %s", file);
+ 
+     /* Fail not so quietly if file does not exist */
+     if(stat(file, &st) < 0) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("File not found: %s", file);
++        verbose("File not found: %s", file);
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -144,7 +147,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct
+ 
+     if(pamsshagentauth_secure_filename(f, file, pw, buf, sizeof(buf)) != 0) {
+         fclose(f);
+-        pamsshagentauth_logit("Authentication refused: %s", buf);
++        logit("Authentication refused: %s", buf);
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -160,7 +163,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct
+ int
+ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *authorized_keys_command,
+                           char *authorized_keys_command_user,
+-                          struct passwd *user_pw, Key * key)
++                          struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey * key)
+ {
+     FILE *f;
+     int ok, found_key = 0;
+@@ -187,44 +190,44 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+     else {
+         pw = getpwnam(authorized_keys_command_user);
+         if(pw == NULL) {
+-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("authorized_keys_command_user \"%s\" not found: %s",
++            error("authorized_keys_command_user \"%s\" not found: %s",
+                  authorized_keys_command_user, strerror(errno));
+             return 0;
+         }
+     }
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_temporarily_use_uid(pw);
++    temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+ 
+     if(stat(authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror
++        error
+             ("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s",
+              authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
+         goto out;
+     }
+     if(pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path
+        (authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
++        error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
+         goto out;
+     }
+ 
+     /* open the pipe and read the keys */
+     if(pipe(p) != 0) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++        error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+         goto out;
+     }
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_debug("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\" with argument: \"%s\"",
++    debug("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\" with argument: \"%s\"",
+                           authorized_keys_command, pw->pw_name, username);
+ 
+     /* 
+      * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
+      * run cleanup_exit() code.
+      */
+-    pamsshagentauth_restore_uid();
++    restore_uid();
+ 
+     switch ((pid = fork())) {
+     case -1:                                              /* error */
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++        error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+         close(p[0]);
+         close(p[1]);
+         return 0;
+@@ -234,13 +237,13 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+ 
+         /* do this before the setresuid so thta they can be logged */
+         if((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
++            error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
+                                      strerror(errno));
+             _exit(1);
+         }
+         if(dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1
+            || dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
+-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++            error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+             _exit(1);
+         }
+ #if defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETRESGID)
+@@ -248,7 +251,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+ #else
+         if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) != 0 || setegid(pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
+ #endif
+-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid,
++            error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid,
+                                      strerror(errno));
+             _exit(1);
+         }
+@@ -258,7 +261,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+ #else
+         if (setuid(pw->pw_uid) != 0 || seteuid(pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
+ #endif
+-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid,
++            error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid,
+                                      strerror(errno));
+             _exit(1);
+         }
+@@ -270,18 +273,18 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+ 
+         /* pretty sure this will barf because we are now suid, but since we
+            should't reach this anyway, I'll leave it here */
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
++        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
+                                  authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
+         _exit(127);
+     default:                                              /* parent */
+         break;
+     }
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_temporarily_use_uid(pw);
++    temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+ 
+     close(p[1]);
+     if((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++        error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+         close(p[0]);
+         /* Don't leave zombie child */
+         while(waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR);
+@@ -292,22 +295,22 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+ 
+     while(waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
+         if(errno != EINTR) {
+-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,
++            error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,
+                                      strerror(errno));
+             goto out;
+         }
+     }
+     if(WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
++        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
+                                  authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status));
+         goto out;
+     } else if(WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
++        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
+                                  authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+         goto out;
+     }
+     found_key = ok;
+   out:
+-    pamsshagentauth_restore_uid();
++    restore_uid();
+     return found_key;
+ }
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
+ #define _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H
+ 
+ #include "identity.h"
+-int pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *, Key *, char *);
+-int pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *, char *, struct passwd *, Key *);
++int pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, char *);
++int pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *, char *, struct passwd *, struct sshkey *);
+ 
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -53,8 +53,8 @@
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "match.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+-#include "buffer.h"
+-#include "key.h"
++#include "sshbuf.h"
++#include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ 
+ 
+@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
+ 	int comparehome = 0;
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_verbose("auth_secure_filename: checking for uid: %u", uid);
++    verbose("auth_secure_filename: checking for uid: %u", uid);
+ 
+ 	if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
+ 		snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
+@@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
+ 			snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
+ 			return -1;
+ 		}
+-		pamsshagentauth_strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
++		strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
+ 
+-		pamsshagentauth_verbose("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
++		verbose("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
+ 		if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
+ 		    (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
+ 		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
+@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
+ 
+ 		/* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */
+ 		if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) {
+-			pamsshagentauth_verbose("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
++			verbose("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
+ 			    buf);
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -37,10 +37,11 @@
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "ssh.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+-#include "buffer.h"
++#include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "compat.h"
+-#include "key.h"
++#include "sshkey.h"
++#include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "secure_filename.h"
+@@ -48,54 +49,59 @@
+ #include "identity.h"
+ #include "pam_user_authorized_keys.h"
+ 
++#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST          54
++
+ /* extern u_char  *session_id2;
+ extern uint8_t  session_id_len;
+  */
+ 
+ int
+-userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruser, Identity * id, Buffer * session_id2)
++userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruser, Identity * id, struct sshbuf * session_id2)
+ {
+-    Buffer          b = { 0 };
++    struct sshbuf  *b = NULL;
+     char           *pkalg = NULL;
+     u_char         *pkblob = NULL, *sig = NULL;
+-    u_int           blen = 0, slen = 0;
+-    int             authenticated = 0;
++    size_t          blen = 0, slen = 0;
++    int             r, authenticated = 0;
+ 
+-    pkalg = (char *) key_ssh_name(id->key);
++    pkalg = (char *) sshkey_ssh_name(id->key);
+ 
+     /* first test if this key is even allowed */
+     if(! pam_user_key_allowed(ruser, id->key))
+-        goto user_auth_clean_exit;
++        goto user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer;
+ 
+-    if(pamsshagentauth_key_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) == 0)
+-        goto user_auth_clean_exit;
++    if(sshkey_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) != 0)
++        goto user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer;
+ 
+     /* construct packet to sign and test */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&b);
++    if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++        fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2->buf + session_id2->offset, session_id2->end - session_id2->offset);
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST); 
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, ruser);
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, "pam_ssh_agent_auth");
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&b, 1);
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
++    if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, sshbuf_ptr(session_id2), sshbuf_len(session_id2))) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, ruser)) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "pam_ssh_agent_auth")) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "publickey")) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 1)) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, pkalg)) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
++        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 
+-    if(ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, pamsshagentauth_buffer_ptr(&b), pamsshagentauth_buffer_len(&b)) != 0)
++    if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)) != 0)
+         goto user_auth_clean_exit;
+ 
+     /* test for correct signature */
+-    if(pamsshagentauth_key_verify(id->key, sig, slen, pamsshagentauth_buffer_ptr(&b), pamsshagentauth_buffer_len(&b)) == 1)
++    if (sshkey_verify(id->key, sig, slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0, NULL) == 0)
+         authenticated = 1;
+ 
+   user_auth_clean_exit:
+     /* if(&b != NULL) */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&b);
++    sshbuf_free(b);
++  user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer:
+     if(sig != NULL)
+-        pamsshagentauth_xfree(sig);
++        free(sig);
+     if(pkblob != NULL)
+-        pamsshagentauth_xfree(pkblob);
++        free(pkblob);
+     CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
+     return authenticated;
+ }
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
+ #ifndef _USERAUTH_PUBKEY_FROM_ID_H
+ #define _USERAUTH_PUBKEY_FROM_ID_H
+ 
+-#include <identity.h>
+-int userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *, Identity *, Buffer *);
++#include "identity.h"
++int userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *, Identity *, struct sshbuf *);
+ 
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_uudecode(const char *src
+ 	/* and remove trailing whitespace because __b64_pton needs this */
+ 	*p = '\0';
+ 	len = pamsshagentauth___b64_pton(encoded, target, targsize);
+-	pamsshagentauth_xfree(encoded);
++	xfree(encoded);
+ 	return len;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_dump_base64(FILE *fp, co
+ 		fprintf(fp, "dump_base64: len > 65536\n");
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+-	buf = pamsshagentauth_xmalloc(2*len);
++	buf = malloc(2*len);
+ 	n = pamsshagentauth_uuencode(data, len, buf, 2*len);
+ 	for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ 		fprintf(fp, "%c", buf[i]);
+@@ -79,5 +79,5 @@ pamsshagentauth_dump_base64(FILE *fp, co
+ 	}
+ 	if (i % 70 != 69)
+ 		fprintf(fp, "\n");
+-	pamsshagentauth_xfree(buf);
++	free(buf);
+ }
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_pam.c.compat	2020-09-23 11:32:30.783695267 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_pam.c	2020-09-23 11:33:21.383389036 +0200
+@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@
+ #include <string.h>
+ 
+ #include "defines.h"
+-#include "key.h"
++#include <includes.h>
++#include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ 
+ #include "pam_user_authorized_keys.h"
+@@ -42,28 +42,28 @@
+     int authenticated = 0;
+     const char method[] = "publickey ";
+ 
+-    char* ai = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup(ssh_auth_info);
++    char* ai = xstrdup(ssh_auth_info);
+     char* saveptr;
+ 
+     char* auth_line = strtok_r(ai, "\n", &saveptr);
+     while (auth_line != NULL) {
+         if (strncmp(auth_line, method, sizeof(method) - 1) == 0) {
+             char* key_str = auth_line + sizeof(method) - 1;
+-            Key* key = pamsshagentauth_key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
++            struct sshkey* key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+             if (key == NULL) {
+                 continue;
+             }
+-            int r = pamsshagentauth_key_read(key, &key_str);
++            int r = sshkey_read(key, &key_str);
+             if (r == 1) {
+                 if (pam_user_key_allowed(ruser, key)) {
+                     authenticated = 1;
+-                    pamsshagentauth_key_free(key);
++                    sshkey_free(key);
+                     break;
+                 }
+             } else {
+-                pamsshagentauth_verbose("Failed to create key for %s: %d", auth_line, r);
++                verbose("Failed to create key for %s: %d", auth_line, r);
+             }
+-            pamsshagentauth_key_free(key);
++            sshkey_free(key);
+         }
+         auth_line = strtok_r(NULL, "\n", &saveptr);
+     }

pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-dereference.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
+--- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
++++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
+@@ -158,11 +158,12 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *user,
+ int
+ pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, struct sshkey * key)
+ {
++    struct passwd *pw;
+     return
+-        pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid),
+-                                          key, authorized_keys_file)
+-        || pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(0), key,
+-                                             authorized_keys_file)
++        ( (pw = getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid)) &&
++            pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(pw, key, authorized_keys_file))
++        || ((pw = getpwuid(0)) &&
++            pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(pw, key, authorized_keys_file))
+         || pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(authorized_keys_command,
+                                                      authorized_keys_command_user,
+                                                      getpwnam(ruser), key);

pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-seteuid.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-seteuid openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-seteuid	2017-02-07 15:41:53.172334151 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2017-02-07 15:41:53.174334149 +0100
+@@ -238,17 +238,26 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(ui
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	errno = 0; 
+-	seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
+-	             above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
+-	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
++	/* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
++	   above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
++	if (seteuid(uid) == -1) {
+ 		close(sock);
+-        if(errno == EACCES)
+-		fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
++		error("seteuid(%lu) failed with error: %s",
++		    (unsigned long) uid, strerror(errno));
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
++	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
++		close(sock);
++		sock = -1;
++		if(errno == EACCES)
++			fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
++	}
+ 
+-	seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
+-
++	/* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
++	if (0 != seteuid(0)) {
++		fatal("setuid(0) failed with error: %s", strerror(errno));
++		return -1;
++	}
+ 	return sock;
+ }
+ 

pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-seteuid.patch

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.seteuid pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.seteuid	2010-09-08 08:54:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2010-11-22 08:38:05.000000000 +0100
-@@ -131,13 +131,18 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(ui
- 	}
- 
- 	errno = 0; 
--	seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
--	             above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
-+	/* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
-+	   above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
-+	if (seteuid(uid) == -1) {
-+		close(sock);
-+		error("seteuid(%lu) failed", (unsigned long) uid);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
- 	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
- 		close(sock);
--        if(errno == EACCES)
--		fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
--		return -1;
-+		sock = -1;
-+		if(errno == EACCES)
-+			fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
- 	}
- 
- 	seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */

pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.visibility pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.visibility	2009-12-21 20:57:34.000000000 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c	2012-06-21 20:01:31.356259429 +0200
-@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ char           *__progname;
+diff -up openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-visibility openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
+--- openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-visibility	2014-03-31 19:35:17.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c	2016-01-22 15:22:40.984469774 +0100
+@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ char           *__progname;
  extern char    *__progname;
  #endif
  
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.visibility pam_ssh_agent_
  pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
  {
      char          **argv_ptr;
-@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ cleanexit:
  }
  
  
@@ -18,4 +18,4 @@ diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.visibility pam_ssh_agent_
 +PAM_EXTERN int __attribute__ ((visibility ("default")))
  pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
  {
-     return PAM_SUCCESS;
+     UNUSED(pamh);

pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-agent_structure.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-agent	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h	2017-09-27 14:25:49.421739027 +0200
+@@ -38,6 +38,12 @@
+ typedef struct identity Identity;
+ typedef struct idlist Idlist;
+ 
++typedef struct {
++       int     fd;
++       struct sshbuf *identities;
++       int     howmany;
++}      AuthenticationConnection;
++
+ struct identity {
+     TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
+     AuthenticationConnection *ac;   /* set if agent supports key */
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-agent	2017-09-27 14:25:49.420739021 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2017-09-27 14:25:49.421739027 +0200
+@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "authfd.h"
++#include "ssherr.h"
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+@@ -291,36 +292,43 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
+ {
+     struct sshbuf *session_id2 = NULL;
+     Identity *id;
+-    struct sshkey *key;
+     AuthenticationConnection *ac;
+-    char *comment;
+     uint8_t retval = 0;
+     uid_t uid = getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid;
++    struct ssh_identitylist *idlist;
++    int r;
++    unsigned int i;
+ 
+     OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
+     pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
+ 
+     if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
+         verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
+-        for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) 
+-        {
+-            if(key != NULL) {
++        if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(ac->fd, &idlist)) != 0) {
++            if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES)
++               fprintf(stderr, "error fetching identities for "
++                               "protocol %d: %s\n", 2, ssh_err(r));
++        } else {
++            for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++)
++            {
++              if (idlist->keys[i] != NULL) {
+                 id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
+-                id->key = key;
+-                id->filename = comment;
++                id->key = idlist->keys[i];
++                id->filename = idlist->comments[i];
+                 id->ac = ac;
+                 if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, session_id2)) {
+                     retval = 1;
+                 }
+-                free(id->filename);
+-                key_free(id->key);
+                 free(id);
+                 if(retval == 1)
+                     break;
+-            }
+-        }
++              }
++            }
+-        sshbuf_free(session_id2);
+-        ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
++            sshbuf_free(session_id2);
++            ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
++        }
++        ssh_close_authentication_socket(ac->fd);
++        free(ac);
+     }
+     else {
+         verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-agent	2017-09-27 14:25:49.420739021 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c	2017-09-27 14:25:49.422739032 +0200
+@@ -84,7 +85,7 @@ userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruse
+         (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
+         fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 
+-    if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)) != 0)
++    if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac->fd, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0) != 0)
+         goto user_auth_clean_exit;
+ 
+     /* test for correct signature */

pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch

@@ -1,12 +1,11 @@
-diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build	2010-01-13 03:17:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2012-06-21 20:14:56.432527764 +0200
-@@ -37,7 +37,16 @@
- #include "buffer.h"
- #include "key.h"
- #include "authfd.h"
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2017-02-07 14:29:41.626116675 +0100
+@@ -43,12 +43,31 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
 +#include "ssh.h"
- #include <stdio.h>
 +#include <sys/types.h>
 +#include <sys/stat.h>
 +#include <sys/socket.h>
@@ -15,12 +14,11 @@ diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build pam_ssh_ag
 +#include <stdlib.h>
 +#include <errno.h>
 +#include <fcntl.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
  
  #include "userauth_pubkey_from_id.h"
-@@ -69,6 +78,96 @@ session_id2_gen()
-     return cookie;
- }
+ #include "identity.h"
+ #include "get_command_line.h"
+ extern char **environ;
  
 +/* 
 + * Added by Jamie Beverly, ensure socket fd points to a socket owned by the user 
@@ -32,7 +30,31 @@ diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build pam_ssh_ag
 + * race condition; so a more "direct" log message is generated.
 + */
 +
-+int
+ static char *
+ log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
+ {
+@@ -85,7 +104,7 @@ void
+ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * session_id2, const char * user,
+                                 const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
+ {
+-    char *cookie = NULL;
++    u_char *cookie = NULL;
+     uint8_t i = 0;
+     uint32_t rnd = 0;
+     uint8_t cookie_len;
+@@ -112,7 +131,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
+         if (i % 4 == 0) {
+             rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
+         }
+-        cookie[i] = (char) rnd;
++        cookie[i] = (u_char) rnd;
+         rnd >>= 8;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -177,6 +196,86 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
+ }
+ 
+ int
 +ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(uid_t uid)
 +{
 +	const char *authsocket;
@@ -112,56 +134,54 @@ diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build pam_ssh_ag
 +	return auth;
 +}
 +
- int
- find_authorized_keys(uid_t uid)
++int
+ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(const char * user, const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
  {
-@@ -81,7 +180,7 @@ find_authorized_keys(uid_t uid)
+     Buffer session_id2 = { 0 };
+@@ -190,7 +289,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
      OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
-     session_id2 = session_id2_gen();
+     pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
  
 -    if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection(uid))) {
 +    if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
-         verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", getpwuid(uid)->pw_name, uid);
+         pamsshagentauth_verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
          for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) 
          {
-@@ -109,3 +208,4 @@ find_authorized_keys(uid_t uid)
-     EVP_cleanup();
-     return retval;
- }
-+
-diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/Makefile.in
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build	2009-10-27 21:19:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/Makefile.in	2012-06-21 20:14:56.432527764 +0200
-@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ PATHS=
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in	2017-02-07 14:40:14.407566921 +0100
+@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ PATHS=
  CC=@CC@
  LD=@LD@
  CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
 -CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
-+CPPFLAGS=-I.. -I$(srcdir) -I/usr/include/nss3 -I/usr/include/nspr4 @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
++CPPFLAGS=-I.. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
  LIBS=@LIBS@
  AR=@AR@
  AWK=@AWK@
-@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ INSTALL=@INSTALL@
+@@ -61,8 +61,8 @@ INSTALL=@INSTALL@
  PERL=@PERL@
  SED=@SED@
  ENT=@ENT@
 -LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
+-LDFLAGS_SHARED = @LDFLAGS_SHARED@
 +LDFLAGS=-L.. -L../openbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
- LDFLAGS_SHARED = @LDFLAGS_SHARED@
++LDFLAGS_SHARED =-Wl,-z,defs @LDFLAGS_SHARED@
  EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
  
-@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ PAM_MODULES=pam_ssh_agent_auth.so
+ INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS=@INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS@
+@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ SSHOBJS=xmalloc.o atomicio.o authfd.o bu
  
- SSHOBJS=xmalloc.o atomicio.o authfd.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o cleanup.o entropy.o fatal.o key.o log.o misc.o secure_filename.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o uuencode.o compat.o
+ ED25519OBJS=ed25519-donna/ed25519.o
  
--PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o
-+PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o secure_filename.o
+-PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o get_command_line.o userauth_pubkey_from_pam.o
++PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o get_command_line.o userauth_pubkey_from_pam.o secure_filename.o
  
  
  MANPAGES_IN	= pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod
-@@ -67,13 +67,13 @@ $(PAM_MODULES): Makefile.in config.h
+@@ -94,13 +94,13 @@ $(PAM_MODULES): Makefile.in config.h
  .c.o:
- 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
+ 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
  
 -LIBCOMPAT=openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
 +LIBCOMPAT=../openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
@@ -169,11 +189,10 @@ diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.
  	(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE))
  always:
  
--pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHOBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS)  pam_ssh_agent_auth.o
--	$(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -lpam pam_ssh_agent_auth.o
-+pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS)  pam_ssh_agent_auth.o
-+	$(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -lpam -lnss3 pam_ssh_agent_auth.o
+-pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHOBJS) $(ED25519OBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS)  pam_ssh_agent_auth.o
+-	$(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(ED25519OBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lopenbsd-compat pam_ssh_agent_auth.o $(LIBS) -lpam
++pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS)  pam_ssh_agent_auth.o ../uidswap.o ../ssh-sk-client.o
++	$(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) ../ssh-sk-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat pam_ssh_agent_auth.o ../uidswap.o $(LIBS) -lpam
  
  $(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
- 	pod2man --section=8 --release=v0.8 --name=pam_ssh_agent_auth --official --center "PAM" pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod > pam_ssh_agent_auth.8
-diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-build pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
+ 	pod2man --section=8 --release=v0.10.3 --name=pam_ssh_agent_auth --official --center "PAM" pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod > pam_ssh_agent_auth.8

pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-no-xfree.patch

@@ -1,430 +0,0 @@
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/authfd.c	2013-10-30 17:14:26.013615342 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/authfd.c	2013-10-30 17:15:07.353327799 +0100
-@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ 
- {
- 	buffer_free(&auth->identities);
- 	close(auth->fd);
--	xfree(auth);
-+	free(auth);
- }
- 
- /* Lock/unlock agent */
-@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ 
- 		blob = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, &blen);
- 		*comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
- 		key = key_from_blob(blob, blen);
--		xfree(blob);
-+		free(blob);
- 		break;
- 	default:
- 		return NULL;
-@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ 
- 	buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
- 	buffer_put_string(&msg, data, datalen);
- 	buffer_put_int(&msg, flags);
--	xfree(blob);
-+	free(blob);
- 
- 	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
- 		buffer_free(&msg);
-@@ -612,7 +612,7 @@ 
- 		key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen);
- 		buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY);
- 		buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
--		xfree(blob);
-+		free(blob);
- 	} else {
- 		buffer_free(&msg);
- 		return 0;
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/bufaux.c	2013-10-30 17:14:26.014615310 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/bufaux.c	2013-10-30 17:15:07.354327768 +0100
-@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ 
- 	/* Get the string. */
- 	if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, value, len) == -1) {
- 		logerror("buffer_get_string_ret: buffer_get failed");
--		xfree(value);
-+		free(value);
- 		return (NULL);
- 	}
- 	/* Append a null character to make processing easier. */
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/bufbn.c	2013-10-30 17:14:26.014615310 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/bufbn.c	2013-10-30 17:15:07.354327768 +0100
-@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ 
- 	if (oi != bin_size) {
- 		logerror("buffer_put_bignum_ret: BN_bn2bin() failed: oi %d != bin_size %d",
- 		    oi, bin_size);
--		xfree(buf);
-+		free(buf);
- 		return (-1);
- 	}
- 
-@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ 
- 	buffer_append(buffer, buf, oi);
- 
- 	memset(buf, 0, bin_size);
--	xfree(buf);
-+	free(buf);
- 
- 	return (0);
- }
-@@ -167,13 +167,13 @@ 
- 	if (oi < 0 || (u_int)oi != bytes - 1) {
- 		logerror("buffer_put_bignum2_ret: BN_bn2bin() failed: "
- 		    "oi %d != bin_size %d", oi, bytes);
--		xfree(buf);
-+		free(buf);
- 		return (-1);
- 	}
- 	hasnohigh = (buf[1] & 0x80) ? 0 : 1;
- 	buffer_put_string(buffer, buf+hasnohigh, bytes-hasnohigh);
- 	memset(buf, 0, bytes);
--	xfree(buf);
-+	free(buf);
- 	return (0);
- }
- 
-@@ -197,21 +197,21 @@ 
- 
- 	if (len > 0 && (bin[0] & 0x80)) {
- 		logerror("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: negative numbers not supported");
--		xfree(bin);
-+		free(bin);
- 		return (-1);
- 	}
- 	if (len > 8 * 1024) {
- 		logerror("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: cannot handle BN of size %d",
- 		    len);
--		xfree(bin);
-+		free(bin);
- 		return (-1);
- 	}
- 	if (BN_bin2bn(bin, len, value) == NULL) {
- 		logerror("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: BN_bin2bn failed");
--		xfree(bin);
-+		free(bin);
- 		return (-1);
- 	}
--	xfree(bin);
-+	free(bin);
- 	return (0);
- }
- 
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/buffer.c	2013-10-30 17:14:26.014615310 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/buffer.c	2013-10-30 17:15:07.355327737 +0100
-@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ 
- 	if (buffer->alloc > 0) {
- 		memset(buffer->buf, 0, buffer->alloc);
- 		buffer->alloc = 0;
--		xfree(buffer->buf);
-+		free(buffer->buf);
- 	}
- }
- 
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2013-10-30 17:14:26.031614782 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2013-10-30 17:15:07.357327674 +0100
-@@ -197,9 +197,9 @@ 
-                 if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(id)) {
-                     retval = 1;
-                 }
--                xfree(id->filename);
-+                free(id->filename);
-                 key_free(id->key);
--                xfree(id);
-+                free(id);
-                 if(retval == 1)
-                     break;
-             }
-@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ 
-     else {
-         verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
-     }
--    xfree(session_id2);
-+    free(session_id2);
-     EVP_cleanup();
-     return retval;
- }
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/key.c	2013-10-30 17:14:26.017615218 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/key.c	2013-10-30 17:15:07.358327643 +0100
-@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ 
- 		fatal("key_free: bad key type %d", k->type);
- 		break;
- 	}
--	xfree(k);
-+	free(k);
- }
- 
- int
-@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ 
- 		EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, blob, len);
- 		EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, retval, dgst_raw_length);
- 		memset(blob, 0, len);
--		xfree(blob);
-+		free(blob);
- 	} else {
- 		fatal("key_fingerprint_raw: blob is null");
- 	}
-@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ 
- 		break;
- 	}
- 	memset(dgst_raw, 0, dgst_raw_len);
--	xfree(dgst_raw);
-+	free(dgst_raw);
- 	return retval;
- }
- 
-@@ -447,11 +447,11 @@ 
- 		n = uudecode(cp, blob, len);
- 		if (n < 0) {
- 			logerror("key_read: uudecode %s failed", cp);
--			xfree(blob);
-+			free(blob);
- 			return -1;
- 		}
- 		k = key_from_blob(blob, (u_int)n);
--		xfree(blob);
-+		free(blob);
- 		if (k == NULL) {
- 			logerror("key_read: key_from_blob %s failed", cp);
- 			return -1;
-@@ -526,8 +526,8 @@ 
- 			fprintf(f, "%s %s", key_ssh_name(key), uu);
- 			success = 1;
- 		}
--		xfree(blob);
--		xfree(uu);
-+		free(blob);
-+		free(uu);
- 	}
- 	return success;
- }
-@@ -673,12 +673,12 @@ 
- 		switch (key_type_from_name(p)) {
- 		case KEY_RSA1:
- 		case KEY_UNSPEC:
--			xfree(s);
-+			free(s);
- 			return 0;
- 		}
- 	}
- 	verbose("key names ok: [%s]", names);
--	xfree(s);
-+	free(s);
- 	return 1;
- }
- 
-@@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ 
- 		logerror("key_from_blob: remaining bytes in key blob %d", rlen);
-  out:
- 	if (ktype != NULL)
--		xfree(ktype);
-+		free(ktype);
- 	buffer_free(&b);
- 	return key;
- }
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/misc.c	2013-10-30 17:14:26.017615218 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/misc.c	2013-10-30 17:15:07.360327581 +0100
-@@ -251,13 +251,13 @@ 
- 		*remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY;
- 		sp = xstrdup(s);
- 		if ((ep = strchr(sp, ':')) == NULL) {
--			xfree(sp);
-+			free(sp);
- 			return (a2tun(s, NULL));
- 		}
- 		ep[0] = '\0'; ep++;
- 		*remote = a2tun(ep, NULL);
- 		tun = a2tun(sp, NULL);
--		xfree(sp);
-+		free(sp);
- 		return (*remote == SSH_TUNID_ERR ? *remote : tun);
- 	}
- 
-@@ -490,7 +490,7 @@ 
- 	if (which >= args->num)
- 		fatal("replacearg: tried to replace invalid arg %d >= %d",
- 		    which, args->num);
--	xfree(args->list[which]);
-+	free(args->list[which]);
- 	args->list[which] = cp;
- }
- 
-@@ -501,8 +501,8 @@ 
- 
- 	if (args->list != NULL) {
- 		for (i = 0; i < args->num; i++)
--			xfree(args->list[i]);
--		xfree(args->list);
-+			free(args->list[i]);
-+		free(args->list);
- 		args->nalloc = args->num = 0;
- 		args->list = NULL;
- 	}
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/pam_user_authorized_keys.c	2013-10-30 17:14:26.017615218 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/pam_user_authorized_keys.c	2013-10-30 17:15:07.361327550 +0100
-@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ 
-         }
-         authorized_keys_file = tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid);
-         strncpy(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file, sizeof(auth_keys_file_buf) - 1 );
--        xfree(authorized_keys_file) /* when we percent_expand later, we'd step on this, so free it immediately */;
-+        free(authorized_keys_file) /* when we percent_expand later, we'd step on this, so free it immediately */;
-     }
- 
-     if(strstr(auth_keys_file_buf, "%h")) {
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/pam_user_key_allowed2.c	2013-10-30 17:14:26.018615187 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/pam_user_key_allowed2.c	2013-10-30 17:15:07.361327550 +0100
-@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ 
- 			fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- 			logit("Found matching %s key: %s",
- 			    key_type(found), fp);
--			xfree(fp);
-+			free(fp);
- 			break;
- 		}
- 	}
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/ssh-dss.c	2013-10-30 17:14:26.014615310 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/ssh-dss.c	2013-10-30 17:15:07.361327550 +0100
-@@ -135,17 +135,17 @@ 
- 		if (strcmp("ssh-dss", ktype) != 0) {
- 			logerror("ssh_dss_verify: cannot handle type %s", ktype);
- 			buffer_free(&b);
--			xfree(ktype);
-+			free(ktype);
- 			return -1;
- 		}
--		xfree(ktype);
-+		free(ktype);
- 		sigblob = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
- 		rlen = buffer_len(&b);
- 		buffer_free(&b);
- 		if (rlen != 0) {
- 			logerror("ssh_dss_verify: "
- 			    "remaining bytes in signature %d", rlen);
--			xfree(sigblob);
-+			free(sigblob);
- 			return -1;
- 		}
- 	}
-@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ 
- 
- 	/* clean up */
- 	memset(sigblob, 0, len);
--	xfree(sigblob);
-+	free(sigblob);
- 
- 	/* sha1 the data */
- 	EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/ssh-rsa.c	2013-10-30 17:14:26.015615278 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/ssh-rsa.c	2013-10-30 17:15:07.362327518 +0100
-@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ 
- 
- 		logerror("ssh_rsa_sign: RSA_sign failed: %s",
- 		    ERR_error_string(ecode, NULL));
--		xfree(sig);
-+		free(sig);
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- 	if (len < slen) {
-@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ 
- 		memset(sig, 0, diff);
- 	} else if (len > slen) {
- 		logerror("ssh_rsa_sign: slen %u slen2 %u", slen, len);
--		xfree(sig);
-+		free(sig);
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- 	/* encode signature */
-@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ 
- 	}
- 	buffer_free(&b);
- 	memset(sig, 's', slen);
--	xfree(sig);
-+	free(sig);
- 
- 	return 0;
- }
-@@ -128,23 +128,23 @@ 
- 	if (strcmp("ssh-rsa", ktype) != 0) {
- 		logerror("ssh_rsa_verify: cannot handle type %s", ktype);
- 		buffer_free(&b);
--		xfree(ktype);
-+		free(ktype);
- 		return -1;
- 	}
--	xfree(ktype);
-+	free(ktype);
- 	sigblob = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
- 	rlen = buffer_len(&b);
- 	buffer_free(&b);
- 	if (rlen != 0) {
- 		logerror("ssh_rsa_verify: remaining bytes in signature %d", rlen);
--		xfree(sigblob);
-+		free(sigblob);
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- 	/* RSA_verify expects a signature of RSA_size */
- 	modlen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
- 	if (len > modlen) {
- 		logerror("ssh_rsa_verify: len %u > modlen %u", len, modlen);
--		xfree(sigblob);
-+		free(sigblob);
- 		return -1;
- 	} else if (len < modlen) {
- 		u_int diff = modlen - len;
-@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ 
- 	nid = (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) ? NID_md5 : NID_sha1;
- 	if ((evp_md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid)) == NULL) {
- 		logerror("ssh_rsa_verify: EVP_get_digestbynid %d failed", nid);
--		xfree(sigblob);
-+		free(sigblob);
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- 	EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
-@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ 
- 	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(nid, digest, dlen, sigblob, len, key->rsa);
- 	memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest));
- 	memset(sigblob, 's', len);
--	xfree(sigblob);
-+	free(sigblob);
- 	verbose("ssh_rsa_verify: signature %scorrect", (ret==0) ? "in" : "");
- 	return ret;
- }
-@@ -258,6 +258,6 @@ 
- 	ret = 1;
- done:
- 	if (decrypted)
--		xfree(decrypted);
-+		free(decrypted);
- 	return ret;
- }
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c	2013-10-30 17:14:26.014615310 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c	2013-10-30 17:15:07.362327518 +0100
-@@ -92,9 +92,9 @@ 
-     if(&b != NULL)
-         buffer_free(&b);
-     if(sig != NULL)
--        xfree(sig);
-+        free(sig);
-     if(pkblob != NULL)
--        xfree(pkblob);
-+        free(pkblob);
-     CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
-     return authenticated;
- }
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/uuencode.c	2013-10-30 17:14:26.015615278 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/uuencode.c	2013-10-30 17:15:07.362327518 +0100
-@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ 
- 	/* and remove trailing whitespace because __b64_pton needs this */
- 	*p = '\0';
- 	len = __b64_pton(encoded, target, targsize);
--	xfree(encoded);
-+	free(encoded);
- 	return len;
- }
- 
-@@ -79,5 +79,5 @@ 
- 	}
- 	if (i % 70 != 69)
- 		fprintf(fp, "\n");
--	xfree(buf);
-+	free(buf);
- }

sources

@@ -1,2 +1,4 @@
-9872ca1983e566ff5a89c240529e223d  pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.tar.bz2
-a62b88b884df0b09b8a8c5789ac9e51b  openssh-6.4p1.tar.gz
+SHA512 (openssh-8.4p1.tar.gz) = d65275b082c46c5efe7cf3264fa6794d6e99a36d4a54b50554fc56979d6c0837381587fd5399195e1db680d2a5ad1ef0b99a180eac2b4de5637906cb7a89e9ce
+SHA512 (openssh-8.4p1.tar.gz.asc) = 3d9a026db27729a5a56785db3824230ccf2a3beca4bb48ef465e44d869b944dbc5d443152a1b1be21bc9c213c465d3d7ca1f876a387d0a6b9682a0cfec3e6e32
+SHA512 (pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4.tar.gz) = caccf72174d15e43f4c86a459ac6448682e62116557cf1e1e828955f3d1731595b238df42adec57860e7f341e92daf5d8285020bcb5018f3b8a5145aa32ee1c2
+SHA512 (DJM-GPG-KEY.gpg) = db1191ed9b6495999e05eed2ef863fb5179bdb63e94850f192dad68eed8579836f88fbcfffd9f28524fe1457aff8cd248ee3e0afc112c8f609b99a34b80ecc0d

sshd-keygen

@@ -1,123 +1,40 @@
 #!/bin/bash
 
 # Create the host keys for the OpenSSH server.
-#
-# The creation is controlled by the $AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS environment
-# variable.
-AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS=NODSA
+KEYTYPE=$1
+case $KEYTYPE in
+	"dsa") ;& # disabled in FIPS
+	"ed25519")
+		FIPS=/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled
+		if [[ -r "$FIPS" && $(cat $FIPS) == "1" ]]; then
+			exit 0
+		fi ;;
+	"rsa") ;; # always ok
+	"ecdsa") ;;
+	*) # wrong argument
+		exit 12 ;;
+esac
+KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_${KEYTYPE}_key
 
-# source function library
-. /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions
-
-# Some functions to make the below more readable
 KEYGEN=/usr/bin/ssh-keygen
-RSA1_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
-RSA_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
-DSA_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
-ECDSA_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
-
-# pull in sysconfig settings
-[ -f /etc/sysconfig/sshd ] && . /etc/sysconfig/sshd
-
-fips_enabled() {
-	if [ -r /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled ]; then
-		cat /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled
-	else
-		echo 0
-	fi
-}
-
-do_rsa1_keygen() {
-	if [ ! -s $RSA1_KEY -a `fips_enabled` -eq 0 ]; then
-		echo -n $"Generating SSH1 RSA host key: "
-		rm -f $RSA1_KEY
-		if test ! -f $RSA1_KEY && $KEYGEN -q -t rsa1 -f $RSA1_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
-			chgrp ssh_keys $RSA1_KEY
-			chmod 640 $RSA1_KEY
-			chmod 644 $RSA1_KEY.pub
-			if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then
-			    /sbin/restorecon $RSA1_KEY.pub
-			fi
-			success $"RSA1 key generation"
-			echo
-		else
-			failure $"RSA1 key generation"
-			echo
-			exit 1
-		fi
-	fi
-}
-
-do_rsa_keygen() {
-	if [ ! -s $RSA_KEY ]; then
-		echo -n $"Generating SSH2 RSA host key: "
-		rm -f $RSA_KEY
-		if test ! -f $RSA_KEY && $KEYGEN -q -t rsa -f $RSA_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
-			chgrp ssh_keys $RSA_KEY
-			chmod 640 $RSA_KEY
-			chmod 644 $RSA_KEY.pub
-			if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then
-			    /sbin/restorecon $RSA_KEY.pub
-			fi
-			success $"RSA key generation"
-			echo
-		else
-			failure $"RSA key generation"
-			echo
-			exit 1
-		fi
-	fi
-}
-
-do_dsa_keygen() {
-	if [ ! -s $DSA_KEY ]; then
-		echo -n $"Generating SSH2 DSA host key: "
-		rm -f $DSA_KEY
-		if test ! -f $DSA_KEY && $KEYGEN -q -t dsa -f $DSA_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
-			chgrp ssh_keys $DSA_KEY
-			chmod 640 $DSA_KEY
-			chmod 644 $DSA_KEY.pub
-			if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then
-			    /sbin/restorecon $DSA_KEY.pub
-			fi
-			success $"DSA key generation"
-			echo
-		else
-			failure $"DSA key generation"
-			echo
-			exit 1
-		fi
-	fi
-}
-
-do_ecdsa_keygen() {
-	if [ ! -s $ECDSA_KEY ]; then
-		echo -n $"Generating SSH2 ECDSA host key: "
-		rm -f $ECDSA_KEY
-		if test ! -f $ECDSA_KEY && $KEYGEN -q -t ecdsa -f $ECDSA_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
-			chgrp ssh_keys $ECDSA_KEY
-			chmod 640 $ECDSA_KEY
-			chmod 644 $ECDSA_KEY.pub
-			if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then
-			    /sbin/restorecon $ECDSA_KEY.pub
-			fi
-			success $"ECDSA key generation"
-			echo
-		else
-			failure $"ECDSA key generation"
-			echo
-			exit 1
-		fi
-	fi
-}
-
-# Create keys if necessary
-if [ "x${AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS}" != xNO ]; then
-	do_rsa_keygen
-	if [ "x${AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS}" != xRSAONLY ]; then
-		do_ecdsa_keygen
-		if [ "x${AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS}" != xNODSA ]; then
-			do_dsa_keygen
-		fi
-	fi
+if [[ ! -x $KEYGEN ]]; then
+	exit 13
 fi
+
+# remove old keys
+rm -f $KEY{,.pub}
+
+# create new keys
+if ! $KEYGEN -q -t $KEYTYPE -f $KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+# sanitize permissions
+/usr/bin/chgrp ssh_keys $KEY
+/usr/bin/chmod 640 $KEY
+/usr/bin/chmod 644 $KEY.pub
+if [[ -x /usr/sbin/restorecon ]]; then
+	/usr/sbin/restorecon $KEY{,.pub}
+fi
+
+exit 0

sshd-keygen.service

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=OpenSSH Server Key Generation
-ConditionPathExists=|!/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
-ConditionPathExists=|!/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
-
-[Service]
-ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd-keygen
-Type=oneshot

sshd-keygen.target

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+[Unit]
+Wants=sshd-keygen@rsa.service
+Wants=sshd-keygen@ecdsa.service
+Wants=sshd-keygen@ed25519.service
+PartOf=sshd.service

sshd-keygen@.service

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=OpenSSH %i Server Key Generation
+ConditionFileNotEmpty=|!/etc/ssh/ssh_host_%i_key
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd
+ExecStart=/usr/libexec/openssh/sshd-keygen %i
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=sshd-keygen.target

sshd.init

@@ -1,184 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-#
-# sshd		Start up the OpenSSH server daemon
-#
-# chkconfig: 2345 55 25
-# description: SSH is a protocol for secure remote shell access. \
-#              This service starts up the OpenSSH server daemon.
-#
-# processname: sshd
-# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
-# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub
-# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_random_seed
-# config: /etc/ssh/sshd_config
-# pidfile: /var/run/sshd.pid
-
-### BEGIN INIT INFO
-# Provides: sshd
-# Required-Start: $local_fs $network $syslog
-# Required-Stop: $local_fs $syslog
-# Should-Start: $syslog
-# Should-Stop: $network $syslog
-# Default-Start: 2 3 4 5
-# Default-Stop: 0 1 6
-# Short-Description: Start up the OpenSSH server daemon
-# Description:       SSH is a protocol for secure remote shell access.
-#		     This service starts up the OpenSSH server daemon.
-### END INIT INFO
-
-# source function library
-. /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions
-
-# pull in sysconfig settings
-[ -f /etc/sysconfig/sshd ] && . /etc/sysconfig/sshd
-
-RETVAL=0
-prog="sshd"
-lockfile=/var/lock/subsys/$prog
-
-# Some functions to make the below more readable
-SSHD=/usr/sbin/sshd
-XPID_FILE=/var/run/sshd.pid
-PID_FILE=/var/run/sshd-s.pid
-
-runlevel=$(set -- $(runlevel); eval "echo \$$#" )
-
-do_restart_sanity_check()
-{
-	$SSHD -t
-	RETVAL=$?
-	if [ $RETVAL -ne  0 ]; then
-		failure $"Configuration file or keys are invalid"
-		echo
-	fi
-}
-
-start()
-{
-	[ -x $SSHD ] || exit 5
-	[ -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config ] || exit 6
-	# Create keys if necessary
-	/usr/sbin/sshd-keygen
-
-	echo -n $"Starting $prog: "
-	$SSHD $OPTIONS && success || failure
-	RETVAL=$?
-	[ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && touch $lockfile
-	[ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && cp -f $XPID_FILE $PID_FILE
-	echo
-	return $RETVAL
-}
-
-stop()
-{
-
-	echo -n $"Stopping $prog: "
-	if [ ! -f "$PID_FILE" ]; then
-		# not running; per LSB standards this is "ok"
-		action $"Stopping $prog: " /bin/true
-		return 0
-	fi
-	PID=`cat "$PID_FILE"`
-	if [ -n "$PID" ]; then
-		/bin/kill "$PID" >/dev/null 2>&1
-		RETVAL=$?
-		if [ $RETVAL -eq 0 ]; then
-			RETVAL=1
-			action $"Stopping $prog: " /bin/false
-		else
-			action $"Stopping $prog: " /bin/true
-		fi
-	else
-		 # failed to read pidfile
-		action $"Stopping $prog: " /bin/false
-		RETVAL=4
-	fi
-	# if we are in halt or reboot runlevel kill all running sessions
-	# so the TCP connections are closed cleanly
-	if [ "x$runlevel" = x0 -o "x$runlevel" = x6 ] ; then
-	    trap '' TERM
-	    killall $prog 2>/dev/null
-	    trap TERM
-	fi
-	[ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && rm -f $lockfile
-	rm -f "$PID_FILE"
-        return $RETVAL
-}
-
-reload()
-{
-	echo -n $"Reloading $prog: "
-	if [ -n "`pidfileofproc $SSHD`" ] ; then
-	    killproc $SSHD -HUP
-	else
-	    failure $"Reloading $prog"
-	fi
-	RETVAL=$?
-	echo
-}
-
-restart() {
-	stop
-	start
-}
-
-force_reload() {
-	restart
-}
-
-rh_status() {
-	status -p $PID_FILE openssh-daemon
-}
-
-rh_status_q() {
-	rh_status >/dev/null 2>&1
-}
-
-case "$1" in
-	start)
-		rh_status_q && exit 0
-		start
-		;;
-	stop)
-		if ! rh_status_q; then
-			rm -f $lockfile
-			exit 0
-		fi
-		stop
-		;;
-	restart)
-		restart
-		;;
-	reload)
-		rh_status_q || exit 7
-		reload
-		;;
-	force-reload)
-		force_reload
-		;;
-	condrestart|try-restart)
-		rh_status_q || exit 0
-		if [ -f $lockfile ] ; then
-			do_restart_sanity_check
-			if [ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] ; then
-				stop
-				# avoid race
-				sleep 3
-				start
-			else
-				RETVAL=6
-			fi
-		fi
-		;;
-	status)
-		rh_status
-		RETVAL=$?
-		if [ $RETVAL -eq 3 -a -f $lockfile ] ; then
-			RETVAL=2
-		fi
-		;;
-	*)
-		echo $"Usage: $0 {start|stop|restart|reload|force-reload|condrestart|try-restart|status}"
-		RETVAL=2
-esac
-exit $RETVAL

sshd.pam

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #%PAM-1.0
-auth	   required	pam_sepermit.so
 auth       substack     password-auth
 auth       include      postlogin
+account    required     pam_sepermit.so
 account    required     pam_nologin.so
 account    include      password-auth
 password   include      password-auth
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ session    required     pam_selinux.so close
 session    required     pam_loginuid.so
 # pam_selinux.so open should only be followed by sessions to be executed in the user context
 session    required     pam_selinux.so open env_params
+session    required     pam_namespace.so
 session    optional     pam_keyinit.so force revoke
+session    optional     pam_motd.so
 session    include      password-auth
 session    include      postlogin

sshd.service

@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
 [Unit]
 Description=OpenSSH server daemon
-After=syslog.target network.target auditd.service
+Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
+After=network.target sshd-keygen.target
+Wants=sshd-keygen.target
 
 [Service]
-EnvironmentFile=/etc/sysconfig/sshd
-ExecStartPre=/usr/sbin/sshd-keygen
+Type=notify
+EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd
 ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS
 ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
 KillMode=process

sshd.socket

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 [Unit]
 Description=OpenSSH Server Socket
+Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
 Conflicts=sshd.service
 
 [Socket]

sshd.sysconfig

@@ -1,17 +1,7 @@
 # Configuration file for the sshd service.
 
-# The server keys are automatically generated if they omitted
-# to change the automatic creation uncomment the appropriate
-# line. The default is NODSA which means rsa and ecdsa keys are
-# generated.
-
-# AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS=NODSA
-# AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS=RSAONLY
-# AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS=NO
-# AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS=YES
-
-# Do not change this option unless you have hardware random
-# generator and you REALLY know what you are doing
-
-SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG=0
-# SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG=1
+# The server keys are automatically generated if they are missing.
+# To change the automatic creation, adjust sshd.service options for
+# example using  systemctl enable sshd-keygen@dsa.service  to allow creation
+# of DSA key or  systemctl mask sshd-keygen@rsa.service  to disable RSA key
+# creation.

sshd.tmpfiles

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+d /var/empty/sshd 711 root root -

sshd@.service

@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
 [Unit]
 Description=OpenSSH per-connection server daemon
-Wants=sshd-keygen.service
-After=auditd.service sshd-keygen.service
+Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
+Wants=sshd-keygen.target
+After=sshd-keygen.target
 
 [Service]
 EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd

tests/pam_ssh_agent_auth/Makefile

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+# ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+#
+#   Makefile of /CoreOS/openssh/Sanity/pam_ssh_agent_auth
+#   Description: This is a basic sanity test for pam_ssh_agent_auth
+#   Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+#
+# ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+#
+#   Copyright (c) 2015 Red Hat, Inc.
+#
+#   This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or
+#   modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+#   published by the Free Software Foundation, either version 2 of
+#   the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+#
+#   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be
+#   useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied
+#   warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+#   PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License for more details.
+#
+#   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+#   along with this program. If not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/.
+#
+# ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+export TEST=/CoreOS/openssh/Sanity/pam_ssh_agent_auth
+export TESTVERSION=1.0
+
+BUILT_FILES=
+
+FILES=$(METADATA) runtest.sh Makefile PURPOSE pam_save_ssh_var.c
+
+.PHONY: all install download clean
+
+run: $(FILES) build
+	./runtest.sh
+
+build: $(BUILT_FILES)
+	test -x runtest.sh || chmod a+x runtest.sh
+
+clean:
+	rm -f *~ $(BUILT_FILES)
+
+
+-include /usr/share/rhts/lib/rhts-make.include
+
+$(METADATA): Makefile
+	@echo "Owner:           Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>" > $(METADATA)
+	@echo "Name:            $(TEST)" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "TestVersion:     $(TESTVERSION)" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "Path:            $(TEST_DIR)" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "Description:     This is basic sanity test for pam_ssh_agent_auth" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "Type:            Sanity" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "TestTime:        5m" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "RunFor:          openssh" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "Requires:        openssh pam_ssh_agent_auth pam-devel expect" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "RhtsRequires:    library(distribution/fips)" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "Priority:        Normal" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "License:         GPLv2+" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "Confidential:    no" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "Destructive:     no" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "Releases:        -RHEL4 -RHELClient5 -RHELServer5" >> $(METADATA)
+
+	rhts-lint $(METADATA)

tests/pam_ssh_agent_auth/PURPOSE

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+PURPOSE of /CoreOS/openssh/Sanity/pam_ssh_agent_auth
+Description: This is basic sanity test for pam_ssh_agent_auth
+Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+
+Created as a response to rhbz#1251777 and previous one rhbz#1225106.
+The code of pam module is outdated and compiled with current openssh
+version which went through quite enough refactoring.

tests/pam_ssh_agent_auth/pam_save_ssh_var.c

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/*
+This simple pam module saves the content of SSH_USER_AUTH variable to /tmp/SSH_USER_AUTH
+file.
+
+Setup:
+  - gcc -fPIC -DPIC -shared -rdynamic -o pam_save_ssh_var.o pam_save_ssh_var.c
+  - copy pam_save_ssh_var.o to /lib/security resp. /lib64/security
+  - add to /etc/pam.d/sshd
+	auth	requisite	pam_save_ssh_var.o
+*/
+
+/* Define which PAM interfaces we provide */
+#define PAM_SM_ACCOUNT
+#define PAM_SM_AUTH
+#define PAM_SM_PASSWORD
+#define PAM_SM_SESSION
+
+/* Include PAM headers */
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
+#include <security/pam_modules.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+int save_ssh_var(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *phase) {
+	FILE *fp;
+	const char *var;
+
+	fp = fopen("/tmp/SSH_USER_AUTH","a");
+	fprintf(fp, "BEGIN (%s)\n", phase);
+	var = pam_getenv(pamh, "SSH_USER_AUTH");
+	if (var != NULL) {
+		fprintf(fp, "SSH_USER_AUTH: '%s'\n", var);
+	}
+	fprintf(fp, "END (%s)\n", phase);
+	fclose(fp);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* PAM entry point for session creation */
+int pam_sm_open_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv) {
+	return(PAM_IGNORE);
+}
+
+/* PAM entry point for session cleanup */
+int pam_sm_close_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv) {
+	return(PAM_IGNORE);
+}
+
+/* PAM entry point for accounting */
+int pam_sm_acct_mgmt(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv) {
+	return(PAM_IGNORE);
+}
+
+/* PAM entry point for authentication verification */
+int pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv) {
+	save_ssh_var(pamh, "auth");
+	return(PAM_IGNORE);
+}
+
+/*
+   PAM entry point for setting user credentials (that is, to actually
+   establish the authenticated user's credentials to the service provider)
+ */
+int pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv) {
+	return(PAM_IGNORE);
+}
+
+/* PAM entry point for authentication token (password) changes */
+int pam_sm_chauthtok(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv) {
+	return(PAM_IGNORE);
+}
+

tests/pam_ssh_agent_auth/runtest.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# vim: dict+=/usr/share/beakerlib/dictionary.vim cpt=.,w,b,u,t,i,k
+# ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+#
+#   runtest.sh of /CoreOS/openssh/Sanity/pam_ssh_agent_auth
+#   Description: This is a basic sanity test for pam_ssh_agent_auth
+#   Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+#
+# ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+#
+#   Copyright (c) 2015 Red Hat, Inc.
+#
+#   This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or
+#   modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+#   published by the Free Software Foundation, either version 2 of
+#   the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+#
+#   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be
+#   useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied
+#   warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+#   PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License for more details.
+#
+#   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+#   along with this program. If not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/.
+#
+# ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+# Include Beaker environment
+. /usr/bin/rhts-environment.sh || exit 1
+. /usr/share/beakerlib/beakerlib.sh || exit 1
+
+PACKAGE="openssh"
+PAM_SUDO="/etc/pam.d/sudo"
+PAM_SSHD="/etc/pam.d/sshd"
+PAM_MODULE="pam_save_ssh_var"
+SUDOERS_CFG="/etc/sudoers.d/01_pam_ssh_auth"
+SSHD_CFG="/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
+USER="testuser$RANDOM"
+PASS="testpassxy4re.3298fhdsaf"
+AUTH_KEYS="/etc/security/authorized_keys"
+AK_COMMAND_BIN="/root/ak.sh"
+AK_COMMAND_KEYS="/root/akeys"
+declare -a KEYS=("rsa" "ecdsa")
+
+rlJournalStart
+    rlPhaseStartSetup
+        rlAssertRpm $PACKAGE
+        rlAssertRpm pam_ssh_agent_auth
+        rlImport distribution/fips
+        rlServiceStart sshd
+        rlRun "TmpDir=\$(mktemp -d)" 0 "Creating tmp directory"
+        rlRun "cp ${PAM_MODULE}.c $TmpDir/"
+        rlRun "pushd $TmpDir"
+        rlFileBackup --clean $PAM_SUDO /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/ /etc/security/ $AUTH_KEYS
+        rlRun "sed -i '1 a\
+auth       sufficient   pam_ssh_agent_auth.so file=$AUTH_KEYS' $PAM_SUDO"
+        rlRun "echo 'Defaults    env_keep += \"SSH_AUTH_SOCK\"' > $SUDOERS_CFG"
+        rlRun "echo 'Defaults    !requiretty' >> $SUDOERS_CFG"
+        grep '^%wheel' /etc/sudoers || \
+           rlRun "echo '%wheel        ALL=(ALL)       ALL' >> $SUDOERS_CFG"
+        rlRun "useradd $USER -G wheel"
+        rlRun "echo $PASS |passwd --stdin $USER"
+    rlPhaseEnd
+
+    if ! fipsIsEnabled; then
+        KEYS+=("dsa")
+    fi
+
+    for KEY in "${KEYS[@]}"; do
+        rlPhaseStartTest "Test with key type $KEY"
+            rlRun "su $USER -c 'ssh-keygen -t $KEY -f ~/.ssh/my_id_$KEY -N \"\"'" 0
+
+            # Without authorized_keys, the authentication should fail
+            rlRun -s "su $USER -c 'eval \`ssh-agent\`; sudo id; ssh-agent -k'" 0
+            rlAssertNotGrep "uid=0(root) gid=0(root)" $rlRun_LOG
+
+            # Append the keys only to make sure we can match also the non-first line
+            rlRun "cat ~$USER/.ssh/my_id_${KEY}.pub >> $AUTH_KEYS"
+            rlRun -s "su $USER -c 'eval \`ssh-agent\`; ssh-add ~/.ssh/my_id_$KEY; sudo id; ssh-agent -k'"
+            rlAssertGrep "uid=0(root) gid=0(root)" $rlRun_LOG
+        rlPhaseEnd
+    done
+
+    if rlIsRHEL '<6.8' || ( rlIsRHEL '<7.3' && rlIsRHEL 7 ) ; then
+        : # not available
+    else
+        rlPhaseStartSetup "Setup for authorized_keys_command"
+            rlFileBackup --namespace ak_command $PAM_SUDO
+            rlRun "rm -f $AUTH_KEYS"
+            cat >$AK_COMMAND_BIN <<_EOF
+#!/bin/bash
+cat $AK_COMMAND_KEYS
+_EOF
+            rlRun "chmod +x $AK_COMMAND_BIN"
+            rlRun "sed -i 's|.*pam_ssh_agent_auth.*|auth sufficient pam_ssh_agent_auth.so authorized_keys_command=$AK_COMMAND_BIN authorized_keys_command_user=root|' $PAM_SUDO"
+            rlRun "cat $PAM_SUDO"
+        rlPhaseEnd
+
+        for KEY in "${KEYS[@]}"; do
+            rlPhaseStartTest "Test authorized_keys_command with key type $KEY (bz1299555, bz1317858)"
+                rlRun "cat ~$USER/.ssh/my_id_${KEY}.pub >$AK_COMMAND_KEYS"
+                rlRun -s "su $USER -c 'eval \`ssh-agent\`; ssh-add ~/.ssh/my_id_$KEY; sudo id; ssh-agent -k'"
+                rlAssertGrep "uid=0(root) gid=0(root)" $rlRun_LOG
+            rlPhaseEnd
+        done
+
+        rlPhaseStartCleanup "Cleanup for authorized_keys_command"
+            rlFileRestore --namespace ak_command
+            rlRun "rm -f $AK_COMMAND_BIN $AK_COMMAND_KEYS"
+        rlPhaseEnd
+    fi
+
+    if rlIsRHEL '>=7.3'; then # not in Fedora anymore
+        rlPhaseStartTest "bz1312304 - Exposing information about succesful auth"
+            rlRun "rlFileBackup --namespace exposing $PAM_SSHD"
+            rlRun "rlFileBackup --namespace exposing $SSHD_CFG"
+            rlRun "rlFileBackup --namespace exposing /root/.ssh/"
+            rlRun "rm -f ~/.ssh/id_rsa*"
+            rlRun "ssh-keygen -f ~/.ssh/id_rsa -N \"\"" 0
+            rlRun "ssh-keyscan localhost >~/.ssh/known_hosts" 0
+            USER_AK_FILE=~$USER/.ssh/authorized_keys
+            rlRun "cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub >$USER_AK_FILE"
+            rlRun "chown $USER:$USER $USER_AK_FILE"
+            rlRun "chmod 0600 $USER_AK_FILE"
+            rlRun "gcc -fPIC -DPIC -shared -rdynamic -o $PAM_MODULE.o $PAM_MODULE.c"
+            rlRun "test -d /lib64/security && cp $PAM_MODULE.o /lib64/security/" 0,1
+            rlRun "test -d /lib/security && cp $PAM_MODULE.o /lib/security/" 0,1
+            rlRun "sed -i '1 i auth       optional         $PAM_MODULE.o' $PAM_SSHD"
+
+            # pam-and-env should expose information to both PAM and environmental variable;
+            # we will be testing only env variable here for the time being,
+            rlRun "echo 'ExposeAuthenticationMethods pam-and-env' >>$SSHD_CFG"
+            rlRun "sed -i '/^ChallengeResponseAuthentication/ d' $SSHD_CFG"
+            rlRun "service sshd restart"
+            rlWaitForSocket 22 -t 5
+            rlRun -s "ssh -i ~/.ssh/id_rsa $USER@localhost \"env|grep SSH_USER_AUTH\"" 0 \
+                "Environment variable SSH_USER_AUTH is set"
+            rlAssertGrep "^SSH_USER_AUTH=publickey:" $rlRun_LOG
+            rlRun "rm -f $rlRun_LOG"
+
+            # pam-only should expose information only to PAM and not to environment variable
+            rlRun "sed -i 's/pam-and-env/pam-only/' $SSHD_CFG"
+            rlRun "echo 'AuthenticationMethods publickey,keyboard-interactive:pam' >>$SSHD_CFG"
+            rlRun "service sshd restart"
+            rlWaitForSocket 22 -t 5
+ssh_with_pass() {
+    ssh_args=("-i /root/.ssh/id_rsa")
+    ssh_args+=("$USER@localhost")
+    cat >ssh.exp <<_EOF
+#!/usr/bin/expect -f
+
+set timeout 5
+spawn ssh ${ssh_args[*]} "echo CONNECTED; env|grep SSH_USER_AUTH"
+expect {
+    -re {.*[Pp]assword.*} { send -- "$PASS\r"; exp_continue }
+    timeout { exit 1 }
+    eof { exit 0 }
+}
+_EOF
+    rlRun -s "expect -f ssh.exp"
+}
+            #rlRun -s "ssh ${ssh_args[*]} \"echo CONNECTED; env|grep SSH_USER_AUTH\"" 1 \
+                #"Environment variable SSH_USER_AUTH is NOT set"
+            rlRun "ssh_with_pass"
+            rlRun "grep -q CONNECTED $rlRun_LOG" 0 "Connection was successful"
+            rlAssertGrep "^SSH_USER_AUTH: 'publickey:" /tmp/SSH_USER_AUTH
+            rlRun "cat /tmp/SSH_USER_AUTH"
+            rlRun "rm -f $rlRun_LOG /tmp/SSH_USER_AUTH"
+            for pm in /lib64/security/$PAM_MODULE.o /lib/security/$PAM_MODULE.o; do
+                rlRun "test -e $pm && rm -f $pm" 0,1
+            done
+            rlRun "rlFileRestore --namespace exposing"
+        rlPhaseEnd
+    fi
+
+    rlPhaseStartCleanup
+        rlRun "popd"
+        rlRun "rm -r $TmpDir" 0 "Removing tmp directory"
+        rlRun "userdel -fr $USER"
+        rlFileRestore
+        rlServiceRestore sshd
+    rlPhaseEnd
+rlJournalPrintText
+rlJournalEnd