6.1p1-11 + 0.9.3-3

<john_florian@dart.biz> (#865803)

.gitignore

@@ -8,40 +8,3 @@ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2.tar.bz2
 /pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.tar.bz2
 /openssh-6.0p1-noacss.tar.bz2
 /openssh-6.1p1-noacss.tar.bz2
-/openssh-6.2p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-6.2p2.tar.gz
-/openssh-6.3p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-6.4p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-6.6p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-6.7p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-6.8p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-6.9p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-7.0p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-7.1p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-7.1p2.tar.gz
-/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2.tar.bz2
-/openssh-7.2p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-7.2p2.tar.gz
-/openssh-7.3p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-7.4p1.tar.gz
-/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3.tar.bz2
-/openssh-7.5p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-7.6p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-7.7p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-7.7p1.tar.gz.asc
-/DJM-GPG-KEY.gpg
-/openssh-7.8p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-7.8p1.tar.gz.asc
-/openssh-7.9p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-7.9p1.tar.gz.asc
-/openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz.asc
-/openssh-8.1p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-8.1p1.tar.gz.asc
-/openssh-8.2p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-8.2p1.tar.gz.asc
-/openssh-8.3p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-8.3p1.tar.gz.asc
-/openssh-8.4p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-8.4p1.tar.gz.asc
-/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4.tar.gz

openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch

@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info	2016-12-23 13:31:22.645213115 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2016-12-23 13:31:40.997216691 +0100
-@@ -65,9 +65,12 @@ report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_wi
- 	err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
+--- openssh-4.3p2/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info	2006-07-17 15:10:11.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-4.3p2/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2006-07-17 15:25:04.000000000 +0200
+@@ -65,9 +65,12 @@
+ 	err = gtk_message_dialog_new(NULL, 0,
  				     GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR,
  				     GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
 -				     "Could not grab %s. "
@@ -15,5 +14,5 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info openssh-7.4p1/cont
 +				     "Either close the application which grabs the %s or "
 +				     "log out and log in again to prevent this from happening.", what, what);
  	gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
- 
- 	gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(err));
+ 	gtk_label_set_line_wrap(GTK_LABEL((GTK_MESSAGE_DIALOG(err))->label),
+ 				TRUE);

openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch

@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2016-12-23 13:31:16.545211926 +0100
+diff -up openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+--- openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress	2008-07-23 19:05:26.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2008-07-23 19:05:26.000000000 +0200
 @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
+ #include <string.h>
  #include <unistd.h>
- 
  #include <X11/Xlib.h>
 +#include <glib.h>
  #include <gtk/gtk.h>
  #include <gdk/gdkx.h>
- #include <gdk/gdkkeysyms.h>
-@@ -81,14 +82,25 @@ ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dia
- 	return 1;
+ 
+@@ -83,13 +84,24 @@ ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dia
+ 	gtk_dialog_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
  }
  
 +static void
@@ -25,59 +25,55 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contr
 +}
 +
  static int
- passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
+ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
  {
  	const char *failed;
  	char *passphrase, *local;
  	int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer;
- 	int buttons, default_response;
--	GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry;
-+	GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry, *progress, *hbox;
+-	GtkWidget *dialog, *entry;
++	GtkWidget *dialog, *entry, *progress, *hbox;
  	GdkGrabStatus status;
- 	GdkColor fg, bg;
- 	int fg_set = 0, bg_set = 0;
-@@ -104,14 +116,19 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
- 		gtk_widget_modify_bg(dialog, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
  
- 	if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY || prompt_type == PROMPT_NONE) {
-+		hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
-+		gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE,
-+		    FALSE, 0);
-+		gtk_widget_show(hbox);
-+
-		entry = gtk_entry_new();
-		if (fg_set)
-			gtk_widget_modify_fg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &fg);
-		if (bg_set)
-			gtk_widget_modify_bg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
-		gtk_box_pack_start(
--		    GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))),
--		    entry, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
-+		    GTK_BOX(hbox), entry, TRUE, FALSE, 0);
-+		gtk_entry_set_width_chars(GTK_ENTRY(entry), 2);
- 		gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
- 		gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
- 		if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY) {
-@@ -130,6 +145,22 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
- 			g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "key_press_event",
- 			                 G_CALLBACK(check_none), dialog);
- 		}
-+
-+		hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
-+		gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox),
-+		    hbox, FALSE, FALSE, 8);
-+		gtk_widget_show(hbox);
-+
-+		progress = gtk_progress_bar_new();
-+
-+		gtk_progress_bar_set_text(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress),
-+		    "Passphrase length hidden intentionally");
-+		gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(hbox), progress, TRUE,
-+		    TRUE, 5);
-+		gtk_widget_show(progress);
-+		g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "changed",
-+				 G_CALLBACK(move_progress), progress);
-+
- 	}
+ 	grab_server = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER") != NULL);
+@@ -102,13 +114,31 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+ 					"%s",
+ 					message);
+ 
++	hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
++	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE,
++	    FALSE, 0);
++	gtk_widget_show(hbox);
++
+ 	entry = gtk_entry_new();
+-	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), entry, FALSE,
++	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(hbox), entry, TRUE,
+ 	    FALSE, 0);
++	gtk_entry_set_width_chars(GTK_ENTRY(entry), 2);
+ 	gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
+ 	gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
+ 	gtk_widget_show(entry);
+ 
++	hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
++	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE,
++	    FALSE, 8);
++	gtk_widget_show(hbox);
++
++	progress = gtk_progress_bar_new();
++	
++	gtk_progress_bar_set_text(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress), "Passphrase length hidden intentionally");
++	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(hbox), progress, TRUE,
++	    TRUE, 5);
++	gtk_widget_show(progress);
++
+ 	gtk_window_set_title(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), "OpenSSH");
+ 	gtk_window_set_position (GTK_WINDOW(dialog), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
+ 	gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
+@@ -119,6 +149,8 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+ 	gtk_dialog_set_default_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
+ 	g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "activate",
+ 			 G_CALLBACK(ok_dialog), dialog);
++	g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "changed",
++			 G_CALLBACK(move_progress), progress);
+ 
+ 	gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
  
- 	/* Grab focus */

openssh-5.1p1-scp-manpage.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.1p1/scp.1.manpage openssh-5.1p1/scp.1
+--- openssh-5.1p1/scp.1.manpage	2008-07-12 09:12:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.1p1/scp.1	2008-07-23 19:18:15.000000000 +0200
+@@ -66,6 +66,14 @@ treating file names containing
+ as host specifiers.
+ Copies between two remote hosts are also permitted.
+ .Pp
++When copying a source file to a target file which already exists,
++.Nm 
++will replace the contents of the target file (keeping the inode).
++.Pp
++If the target file does not yet exist, an empty file with the target
++file name is created, then filled with the source file contents.
++No attempt is made at "near-atomic" transfer using temporary files.
++.Pp
+ The options are as follows:
+ .Bl -tag -width Ds
+ .It Fl 1

openssh-5.2p1-allow-ip-opts.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/canohost.c.ip-opts openssh-5.2p1/canohost.c
+--- openssh-5.2p1/canohost.c.ip-opts	2009-02-14 06:28:21.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.2p1/canohost.c	2009-09-01 15:31:29.000000000 +0200
+@@ -169,12 +169,27 @@ check_ip_options(int sock, char *ipaddr)
+ 	option_size = sizeof(options);
+ 	if (getsockopt(sock, ipproto, IP_OPTIONS, options,
+ 	    &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
+-		text[0] = '\0';
+-		for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
+-			snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
+-			    " %2.2x", options[i]);
+-		fatal("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s",
+-		    ipaddr, text);
++		i = 0;
++		do {
++			switch (options[i]) {
++				case 0:
++				case 1:
++					++i;
++					break;
++				case 131:
++				case 137:
++				/* Fail, fatally, if we detect either loose or strict
++			 	 * source routing options. */
++					text[0] = '\0';
++					for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
++						snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
++							" %2.2x", options[i]);
++					fatal("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s",
++						ipaddr, text);
++				default:
++					i += options[i + 1];
++			}
++		} while (i < option_size);
+ 	}
+ #endif /* IP_OPTIONS */
+ }

openssh-5.5p1-x11.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
---- openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11	2016-03-09 19:04:48.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.2p2/channels.c	2016-06-03 10:42:04.775164520 +0200
-@@ -3990,21 +3990,24 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+diff -up openssh-5.3p1/channels.c.bz595935 openssh-5.3p1/channels.c
+--- openssh-5.3p1/channels.c.bz595935	2010-08-12 14:19:28.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.3p1/channels.c	2010-08-12 14:33:51.000000000 +0200
+@@ -3185,7 +3185,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
  }
  
  static int
@@ -10,16 +10,14 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
  {
  	int sock;
  	struct sockaddr_un addr;
- 
-+	if (len <= 0)
-+		return -1;
- 	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
- 	if (sock == -1)
+@@ -3195,11 +3195,14 @@ connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *p
  		error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
  	memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
  	addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
 -	strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path);
 -	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0)
++	if (len <= 0)
++		return -1;
 +	if (len > sizeof addr.sun_path)
 +		len = sizeof addr.sun_path;
 +	memcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, len);
@@ -30,13 +28,16 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
  	return -1;
  }
  
-@@ -4012,8 +4015,18 @@ static int
+@@ -3207,8 +3210,21 @@ static int
  connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
  {
  	char buf[1024];
 -	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr);
 -	return connect_local_xsocket_path(buf);
-+	int len, ret;
++	int len;
++#ifdef linux
++	int ret;
++#endif
 +	len = snprintf(buf + 1, sizeof (buf) - 1, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr);
 +#ifdef linux
 +	/* try abstract socket first */
@@ -50,4 +51,4 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
 +	return -1;
  }
  
- #ifdef __APPLE__
+ int

openssh-5.6p1-exit-deadlock.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.6p1/channels.c.exit-deadlock openssh-5.6p1/channels.c
+--- openssh-5.6p1/channels.c.exit-deadlock	2010-08-05 15:09:48.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.6p1/channels.c	2010-08-23 12:41:43.000000000 +0200
+@@ -1647,6 +1647,10 @@ channel_handle_wfd(Channel *c, fd_set *r
+ 	u_int dlen, olen = 0;
+ 	int len;
+ 
++	if(c->wfd != -1 && buffer_len(&c->output) > 0 && c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
++		debug("channel %d: forcing write", c->self);
++		FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset);
++	}
+ 	/* Send buffered output data to the socket. */
+ 	if (c->wfd != -1 &&
+ 	    FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) &&

openssh-5.8p1-audit0.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+Don't audit SSH_INVALID_USER twice.
+
+PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow()) a few lines above already did this.
+
+diff -ur openssh/auth2.c openssh-5.8p1/auth2.c
+--- openssh/auth2.c	2011-03-02 02:32:52.383773622 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1/auth2.c	2011-03-02 03:32:34.585110911 +0100
+@@ -250,9 +250,6 @@
+ 		} else {
+ 			logit("input_userauth_request: invalid user %s", user);
+ 			authctxt->pw = fakepw();
+-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+-			PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER));
+-#endif
+ 		}
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 		if (options.use_pam)

openssh-5.8p1-fingerprint.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,421 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c.fingerprint openssh-5.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c.fingerprint	2010-08-05 05:04:50.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c	2011-02-25 09:17:18.000000000 +0100
+@@ -196,16 +196,18 @@ hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw,
+ 
+ 	if (host_status == HOST_OK) {
+ 		if (key_is_cert(key)) {
+-			fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
+-			    SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
++			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
++			    SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 			verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by "
+-			    "%s CA %s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id,
+-			    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp,
++			    "%s CA %s%s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id,
++			    key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
++			    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp,
+ 			    cuser, lookup);
+ 		} else {
+-			fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-			verbose("Accepted %s public key %s from %s@%s",
+-			    key_type(key), fp, cuser, lookup);
++			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
++			verbose("Accepted %s public key %s%s from %s@%s",
++			    key_type(key), key_fingerprint_prefix(),
++			    fp, cuser, lookup);
+ 		}
+ 		xfree(fp);
+ 	}
+diff -up openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c.fingerprint openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c.fingerprint	2010-12-01 01:50:14.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c	2011-02-25 09:17:18.000000000 +0100
+@@ -319,10 +319,10 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key
+ 				continue;
+ 			if (!key_is_cert_authority)
+ 				continue;
+-			fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5,
+-			    SSH_FP_HEX);
+-			debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s",
+-			    file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
++			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_HEX);
++			debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s%s",
++			    file, linenum, key_type(found),
++			    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
+ 			/*
+ 			 * If the user has specified a list of principals as
+ 			 * a key option, then prefer that list to matching
+@@ -362,9 +362,9 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key
+ 			found_key = 1;
+ 			debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu",
+ 			    file, linenum);
+-			fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-			verbose("Found matching %s key: %s",
+-			    key_type(found), fp);
++			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_HEX);
++			verbose("Found matching %s key: %s%s",
++			    key_type(found), key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
+ 			xfree(fp);
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+@@ -388,13 +388,13 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, 
+ 	if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+-	ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
+-	    SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	ca_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 
+ 	if (key_in_file(key->cert->signature_key,
+ 	    options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1) != 1) {
+-		debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s", __func__,
+-		    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
++		debug2("%s: CA %s%s %s is not listed in %s", __func__,
++		    key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
++		    key_fingerprint_prefix(), ca_fp,
+ 		    options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+diff -up openssh-5.8p1/auth.c.fingerprint openssh-5.8p1/auth.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/auth.c.fingerprint	2010-12-01 02:21:51.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1/auth.c	2011-02-25 09:17:18.000000000 +0100
+@@ -639,9 +639,10 @@ auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key)
+ 		return 1;
+ 	case 1:
+ 		/* Key revoked */
+-		key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
++		key_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 		error("WARNING: authentication attempt with a revoked "
+-		    "%s key %s ", key_type(key), key_fp);
++		    "%s key %s%s ", key_type(key),
++		    key_fingerprint_prefix(), key_fp);
+ 		xfree(key_fp);
+ 		return 1;
+ 	}
+diff -up openssh-5.8p1/auth-rsa.c.fingerprint openssh-5.8p1/auth-rsa.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/auth-rsa.c.fingerprint	2010-12-04 23:01:47.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1/auth-rsa.c	2011-02-25 09:17:18.000000000 +0100
+@@ -318,9 +318,9 @@ auth_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, BIGNUM *cli
+ 	 * options; this will be reset if the options cause the
+ 	 * authentication to be rejected.
+ 	 */
+-	fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-	verbose("Found matching %s key: %s",
+-	    key_type(key), fp);
++	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	verbose("Found matching %s key: %s%s",
++	    key_type(key), key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
+ 	xfree(fp);
+ 	key_free(key);
+ 
+diff -up openssh-5.8p1/key.c.fingerprint openssh-5.8p1/key.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/key.c.fingerprint	2011-02-04 01:48:34.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1/key.c	2011-02-25 09:18:16.000000000 +0100
+@@ -594,6 +594,34 @@ key_fingerprint(Key *k, enum fp_type dgs
+ 	return retval;
+ }
+ 
++enum fp_type
++key_fingerprint_selection(void)
++{
++	static enum fp_type rv;
++	static char rv_defined = 0;
++	char *env;
++
++	if (!rv_defined) {
++		env = getenv("SSH_FINGERPRINT_TYPE");
++		rv = (env && !strcmp (env, "sha")) ?
++			SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
++		rv_defined = 1;
++	}
++	return rv;
++}
++
++char *
++key_selected_fingerprint(Key *k, enum fp_rep dgst_rep)
++{
++	return key_fingerprint(k, key_fingerprint_selection(), dgst_rep);
++}
++
++char *
++key_fingerprint_prefix(void)
++{
++	return key_fingerprint_selection() == SSH_FP_SHA1 ? "sha1:" : "";
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Reads a multiple-precision integer in decimal from the buffer, and advances
+  * the pointer.  The integer must already be initialized.  This function is
+diff -up openssh-5.8p1/key.h.fingerprint openssh-5.8p1/key.h
+--- openssh-5.8p1/key.h.fingerprint	2010-11-05 00:19:49.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1/key.h	2011-02-25 09:17:18.000000000 +0100
+@@ -96,6 +96,9 @@ int		 key_equal_public(const Key *, cons
+ int		 key_equal(const Key *, const Key *);
+ char		*key_fingerprint(Key *, enum fp_type, enum fp_rep);
+ u_char		*key_fingerprint_raw(Key *, enum fp_type, u_int *);
++enum fp_type	 key_fingerprint_selection(void);
++char		*key_selected_fingerprint(Key *, enum fp_rep);
++char		*key_fingerprint_prefix(void);
+ const char	*key_type(const Key *);
+ const char	*key_cert_type(const Key *);
+ int		 key_write(const Key *, FILE *);
+diff -up openssh-5.8p1/ssh-add.c.fingerprint openssh-5.8p1/ssh-add.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/ssh-add.c.fingerprint	2010-11-11 04:17:02.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1/ssh-add.c	2011-02-25 09:17:18.000000000 +0100
+@@ -280,10 +280,10 @@ list_identities(AuthenticationConnection
+ 		    key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, version)) {
+ 			had_identities = 1;
+ 			if (do_fp) {
+-				fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5,
+-				    SSH_FP_HEX);
+-				printf("%d %s %s (%s)\n",
+-				    key_size(key), fp, comment, key_type(key));
++				fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
++				printf("%d %s%s %s (%s)\n",
++				    key_size(key), key_fingerprint_prefix(),
++				    fp, comment, key_type(key));
+ 				xfree(fp);
+ 			} else {
+ 				if (!key_write(key, stdout))
+diff -up openssh-5.8p1/ssh-agent.c.fingerprint openssh-5.8p1/ssh-agent.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/ssh-agent.c.fingerprint	2010-12-01 01:50:35.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1/ssh-agent.c	2011-02-25 09:17:18.000000000 +0100
+@@ -199,9 +199,9 @@ confirm_key(Identity *id)
+ 	char *p;
+ 	int ret = -1;
+ 
+-	p = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-	if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.",
+-	    id->comment, p))
++	p = key_selected_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s%s.",
++	    id->comment, key_fingerprint_prefix(), p))
+ 		ret = 0;
+ 	xfree(p);
+ 
+diff -up openssh-5.8p1/sshconnect2.c.fingerprint openssh-5.8p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/sshconnect2.c.fingerprint	2010-12-01 02:21:51.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1/sshconnect2.c	2011-02-25 09:17:18.000000000 +0100
+@@ -590,8 +590,9 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t
+ 		    key->type, pktype);
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
+-	fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-	debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp);
++	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s%s",
++	    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
+ 	xfree(fp);
+ 
+ 	/*
+@@ -1203,8 +1204,9 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt,
+ 	int have_sig = 1;
+ 	char *fp;
+ 
+-	fp = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-	debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s", key_type(id->key), fp);
++	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s%s", key_type(id->key),
++	    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
+ 	xfree(fp);
+ 
+ 	if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {
+diff -up openssh-5.8p1/sshconnect.c.fingerprint openssh-5.8p1/sshconnect.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/sshconnect.c.fingerprint	2011-01-16 13:17:59.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1/sshconnect.c	2011-02-25 09:17:18.000000000 +0100
+@@ -798,10 +798,10 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
+ 				    "key for IP address '%.128s' to the list "
+ 				    "of known hosts.", type, ip);
+ 		} else if (options.visual_host_key) {
+-			fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-			ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5,
+-			    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+-			logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s\n", fp, ra);
++			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
++			ra = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
++			logit("Host key fingerprint is %s%s\n%s\n",
++			    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, ra);
+ 			xfree(ra);
+ 			xfree(fp);
+ 		}
+@@ -838,9 +838,8 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
+ 			else
+ 				snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), ".");
+ 			/* The default */
+-			fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-			ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5,
+-			    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
++			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
++			ra = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ 			msg2[0] = '\0';
+ 			if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
+ 				if (matching_host_key_dns)
+@@ -855,10 +854,11 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
+ 			snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
+ 			    "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be "
+ 			    "established%s\n"
+-			    "%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s"
++			    "%s key fingerprint is %s%s.%s%s\n%s"
+ 			    "Are you sure you want to continue connecting "
+ 			    "(yes/no)? ",
+-			    host, ip, msg1, type, fp,
++			    host, ip, msg1, type,
++			    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp,
+ 			    options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "",
+ 			    options.visual_host_key ? ra : "",
+ 			    msg2);
+@@ -1104,8 +1104,9 @@ verify_host_key(char *host, struct socka
+ 	int flags = 0;
+ 	char *fp;
+ 
+-	fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-	debug("Server host key: %s %s", key_type(host_key), fp);
++	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	debug("Server host key: %s %s%s", key_type(host_key),
++	    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
+ 	xfree(fp);
+ 
+ 	/* XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS */
+@@ -1214,14 +1215,15 @@ show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkey
+ 			continue;
+ 		if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i], &found))
+ 			continue;
+-		fp = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-		ra = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
++		fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_HEX);
++		ra = key_selected_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ 		logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n"
+ 		    "in %s:%lu\n"
+-		    "%s key fingerprint %s.",
++		    "%s key fingerprint %s%s.",
+ 		    key_type(found->key),
+ 		    found->host, found->file, found->line,
+-		    key_type(found->key), fp);
++		    key_type(found->key),
++		    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
+ 		if (options.visual_host_key)
+ 			logit("%s", ra);
+ 		xfree(ra);
+@@ -1236,7 +1238,7 @@ warn_changed_key(Key *host_key)
+ {
+ 	char *fp;
+ 
+-	fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 
+ 	error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+ 	error("@    WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED!     @");
+@@ -1244,8 +1246,8 @@ warn_changed_key(Key *host_key)
+ 	error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!");
+ 	error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!");
+ 	error("It is also possible that a host key has just been changed.");
+-	error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.",
+-	    key_type(host_key), fp);
++	error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s%s.",
++	    key_type(host_key),key_fingerprint_prefix(),  fp);
+ 	error("Please contact your system administrator.");
+ 
+ 	xfree(fp);
+diff -up openssh-5.8p1/ssh-keygen.c.fingerprint openssh-5.8p1/ssh-keygen.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/ssh-keygen.c.fingerprint	2011-01-11 07:20:31.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1/ssh-keygen.c	2011-02-25 09:17:18.000000000 +0100
+@@ -714,13 +714,14 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
+ {
+ 	FILE *f;
+ 	Key *public;
+-	char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024], *fp, *ra;
++	char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024], *fp, *ra, *pfx;
+ 	int i, skip = 0, num = 0, invalid = 1;
+ 	enum fp_rep rep;
+ 	enum fp_type fptype;
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 
+-	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
++	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fingerprint_selection();
++	pfx =	 print_bubblebabble ? "" : key_fingerprint_prefix();
+ 	rep =    print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
+ 
+ 	if (!have_identity)
+@@ -732,8 +733,8 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
+ 	public = key_load_public(identity_file, &comment);
+ 	if (public != NULL) {
+ 		fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
+-		ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+-		printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, comment,
++		ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
++		printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp, comment,
+ 		    key_type(public));
+ 		if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
+ 			printf("%s\n", ra);
+@@ -798,8 +799,8 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
+ 		}
+ 		comment = *cp ? cp : comment;
+ 		fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
+-		ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+-		printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp,
++		ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
++		printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp,
+ 		    comment ? comment : "no comment", key_type(public));
+ 		if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
+ 			printf("%s\n", ra);
+@@ -823,13 +824,15 @@ printhost(FILE *f, const char *name, Key
+ 	if (print_fingerprint) {
+ 		enum fp_rep rep;
+ 		enum fp_type fptype;
+-		char *fp, *ra;
++		char *fp, *ra, *pfx;
+ 
+-		fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
++		fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fingerprint_selection();
++		pfx =	 print_bubblebabble ? "" : key_fingerprint_prefix();
+ 		rep =    print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
++
+ 		fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
+-		ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+-		printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, name,
++		ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
++		printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp, name,
+ 		    key_type(public));
+ 		if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
+ 			printf("%s\n", ra);
+@@ -1695,16 +1698,17 @@ do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw)
+ 		fatal("%s is not a certificate", identity_file);
+ 	v00 = key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT_V00 || key->type == KEY_DSA_CERT_V00;
+ 
+-	key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-	ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
+-	    SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	key_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	ca_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 
+ 	printf("%s:\n", identity_file);
+ 	printf("        Type: %s %s certificate\n", key_ssh_name(key),
+ 	    key_cert_type(key));
+-	printf("        Public key: %s %s\n", key_type(key), key_fp);
+-	printf("        Signing CA: %s %s\n",
+-	    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp);
++	printf("        Public key: %s %s%s\n", key_type(key),
++	    key_fingerprint_prefix(), key_fp);
++	printf("        Signing CA: %s %s%s\n",
++	    key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
++	    key_fingerprint_prefix(), ca_fp);
+ 	printf("        Key ID: \"%s\"\n", key->cert->key_id);
+ 	if (!v00) {
+ 		printf("        Serial: %llu\n",
+@@ -2249,13 +2253,12 @@ passphrase_again:
+ 	fclose(f);
+ 
+ 	if (!quiet) {
+-		char *fp = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-		char *ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5,
+-		    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
++		char *fp = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_HEX);
++		char *ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ 		printf("Your public key has been saved in %s.\n",
+ 		    identity_file);
+ 		printf("The key fingerprint is:\n");
+-		printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment);
++		printf("%s%s %s\n", key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, comment);
+ 		printf("The key's randomart image is:\n");
+ 		printf("%s\n", ra);
+ 		xfree(ra);

openssh-5.8p1-getaddrinfo.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.6p1/channels.c.getaddrinfo openssh-5.6p1/channels.c
+--- openssh-5.6p1/channels.c.getaddrinfo	2012-02-14 16:12:54.427852524 +0100
++++ openssh-5.6p1/channels.c	2012-02-14 16:13:22.818928690 +0100
+@@ -3275,6 +3275,9 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+ 		memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ 		hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
+ 		hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE;
++#ifdef AI_ADDRCONFIG
++		hints.ai_flags |= AI_ADDRCONFIG;
++#endif
+ 		hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ 		snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
+ 		if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(NULL, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
+diff -up openssh-5.6p1/sshconnect.c.getaddrinfo openssh-5.6p1/sshconnect.c
+--- openssh-5.6p1/sshconnect.c.getaddrinfo	2012-02-14 16:09:25.057964291 +0100
++++ openssh-5.6p1/sshconnect.c	2012-02-14 16:09:25.106047007 +0100
+@@ -343,6 +343,7 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct soc
+ 	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ 	hints.ai_family = family;
+ 	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
++	hints.ai_flags = AI_V4MAPPED | AI_ADDRCONFIG;
+ 	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port);
+ 	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0)
+ 		fatal("%s: Could not resolve hostname %.100s: %s", __progname,

openssh-5.8p1-glob.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.8p1/sftp-glob.c.glob openssh-5.8p1/sftp-glob.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/sftp-glob.c.glob	2011-03-07 20:17:34.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1/sftp-glob.c	2011-03-07 20:18:47.000000000 +0100
+@@ -145,5 +145,5 @@ remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
+ 	memset(&cur, 0, sizeof(cur));
+ 	cur.conn = conn;
+ 
+-	return(glob(pattern, flags | GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC, errfunc, pglob));
++	return(glob(pattern, flags | GLOB_LIMIT | GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC, errfunc, pglob));
+ }

openssh-5.8p1-keyperm.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.8p1/authfile.c.keyperm openssh-5.8p1/authfile.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/authfile.c.keyperm	2010-12-01 02:03:39.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1/authfile.c	2011-04-21 16:43:36.859648916 +0200
+@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
++#include <grp.h>
+ 
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "cipher.h"
+@@ -600,6 +612,13 @@ key_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename
+ #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ 	if (check_ntsec(filename))
+ #endif
++	if (st.st_mode & 040) {
++		struct group *gr;
++
++		if ((gr = getgrnam("ssh_keys")) && (st.st_gid == gr->gr_gid))
++			st.st_mode &= ~040;
++	}
++
+ 	if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
+ 		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+ 		error("@         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @");

openssh-5.8p1-localdomain.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config.localdomain openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config.localdomain	2011-04-22 11:37:49.273648812 +0200
++++ openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config	2011-04-22 11:39:31.758648401 +0200
+@@ -130,6 +130,10 @@ X11Forwarding yes
+ # override default of no subsystems
+ Subsystem	sftp	/usr/libexec/sftp-server
+ 
++# Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain
++#Host *.local
++#	CheckHostIP no
++
+ # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
+ #Match User anoncvs
+ #	X11Forwarding no

openssh-5.8p1-packet.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.8p1/packet.c.packet openssh-5.8p1/packet.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/packet.c.packet	2011-04-05 13:29:06.998648899 +0200
++++ openssh-5.8p1/packet.c	2011-04-05 13:30:32.967648596 +0200
+@@ -294,6 +294,8 @@ packet_connection_is_on_socket(void)
+ 	struct sockaddr_storage from, to;
+ 	socklen_t fromlen, tolen;
+ 
++	if (!active_state)
++		return 0;
+ 	/* filedescriptors in and out are the same, so it's a socket */
+ 	if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out)
+ 		return 1;

openssh-5.8p2-force_krb.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
-diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-index 413b845..54dd383 100644
---- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
-+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+diff -up openssh-5.8p2/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb openssh-5.8p2/gss-serv-krb5.c
+--- openssh-5.8p2/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb	2006-09-01 07:38:36.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.8p2/gss-serv-krb5.c	2011-05-19 03:41:45.801109545 +0200
 @@ -32,7 +32,9 @@
  #include <sys/types.h>
  
@@ -11,19 +10,28 @@ index 413b845..54dd383 100644
 +#include <unistd.h>
  
  #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "sshkey.h"
-@@ -45,6 +47,7 @@
+ #include "key.h"
+@@ -40,12 +42,11 @@
+ #include "auth.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "servconf.h"
++#include "misc.h"
  
+ #include "buffer.h"
  #include "ssh-gss.h"
  
-+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
- extern ServerOptions options;
- 
+-extern ServerOptions options;
+-
  #ifdef HEIMDAL
-@@ -56,6 +59,13 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
- # include <gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h>
+ # include <krb5.h>
+ #else
+@@ -56,6 +57,16 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
+ # endif
  #endif
  
++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
++extern ServerOptions options;
++
 +/* all commands are allowed by default */
 +char **k5users_allowed_cmds = NULL;
 +
@@ -34,16 +42,21 @@ index 413b845..54dd383 100644
  static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
  
  /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
-@@ -88,6 +98,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+@@ -83,10 +94,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
+  */
+ 
+ static int
+-ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
++ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *luser)
+ {
  	krb5_principal princ;
  	int retval;
- 	const char *errmsg;
 +	int k5login_exists;
  
  	if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0)
  		return 0;
-@@ -99,10 +110,22 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
- 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
+@@ -97,10 +109,22 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client
+ 		    krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, retval));
  		return 0;
  	}
 -	if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name)) {
@@ -53,20 +66,21 @@ index 413b845..54dd383 100644
 +	/* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user,
 +	 * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials
 +	 * to access these files aren't available yet. */
-+	if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) {
++	if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, luser) && k5login_exists) {
  		retval = 1;
  		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
- 		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
+-		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
++		    luser, (char *)client->displayname.value);
 +	} else if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(princ, client->exportedname.value,
-+		name, k5login_exists)) {
++		luser, k5login_exists)) {
 +		retval = 1;
 +		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s "
 +		    "(ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok)",
-+		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
++		    luser, (char *)client->displayname.value);
  	} else
  		retval = 0;
  
-@@ -110,6 +133,137 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+@@ -108,6 +132,135 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client
  	return retval;
  }
  
@@ -97,14 +111,13 @@ index 413b845..54dd383 100644
 +{
 +	FILE *fp;
 +	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
-+	char *line = NULL;
++	char line[BUFSIZ];
 +	char kuser[65]; /* match krb5_kuserok() */
 +	struct stat st;
 +	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
 +	int found_principal = 0;
 +	int ncommands = 0, allcommands = 0;
-+	u_long linenum = 0;
-+	size_t linesize = 0;
++	u_long linenum;
 +
 +	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
 +	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
@@ -148,9 +161,9 @@ index 413b845..54dd383 100644
 +	k5users_allowed_cmds = xcalloc(++ncommands,
 +	    sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds));
 +
-+	/* Check each line.  ksu allows unlimited length lines. */
-+	while (!allcommands && getline(&line, &linesize, fp) != -1) {
-+		linenum++;
++	/* Check each line.  ksu allows unlimited length lines.  We don't. */
++	while (!allcommands && read_keyfile_line(fp, file, line, sizeof(line),
++	    &linenum) != -1) {
 +		char *token;
 +
 +		/* we parse just like ksu, even though we could do better */
@@ -164,7 +177,7 @@ index 413b845..54dd383 100644
 +				k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] =
 +				    xstrdup(pw->pw_shell);
 +				k5users_allowed_cmds =
-+				    xreallocarray(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands,
++				    xrealloc(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands,
 +					sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds));
 +				break;
 +			}
@@ -177,13 +190,12 @@ index 413b845..54dd383 100644
 +				k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] =
 +				    xstrdup(token);
 +				k5users_allowed_cmds =
-+				    xreallocarray(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands,
++				    xrealloc(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands,
 +					sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds));
 +				token = strtok(NULL, " \t\n");
 +			}
 +		}
 +       }
-+	free(line);
 +	if (k5users_allowed_cmds) {
 +		/* terminate vector */
 +		k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] = NULL;
@@ -204,20 +216,19 @@ index 413b845..54dd383 100644
  
  /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
   * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
-diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
-index 28659ec..9c94d8e 100644
---- a/session.c
-+++ b/session.c
-@@ -789,6 +789,29 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
- 		command = auth_opts->force_command;
- 		forced = "(key-option)";
+diff -up openssh-5.8p2/session.c.force_krb openssh-5.8p2/session.c
+--- openssh-5.8p2/session.c.force_krb	2011-05-19 03:41:41.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.8p2/session.c	2011-05-19 03:43:32.437173662 +0200
+@@ -820,6 +820,29 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 		debug("Forced command (key option) '%.900s'", command);
  	}
+ 
 +#ifdef GSSAPI
 +#ifdef KRB5 /* k5users_allowed_cmds only available w/ GSSAPI+KRB5 */
 +	else if (k5users_allowed_cmds) {
 +		const char *match = command;
 +		int allowed = 0, i = 0;
-+
++ 
 +		if (!match)
 +			match = s->pw->pw_shell;
 +		while (k5users_allowed_cmds[i]) {
@@ -235,29 +246,13 @@ index 28659ec..9c94d8e 100644
 +#endif
 +#endif
 +
- 	s->forced = 0;
- 	if (forced != NULL) {
- 		s->forced = 1;
-diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
-index 0374c88..509109a 100644
---- a/ssh-gss.h
-+++ b/ssh-gss.h
-@@ -49,6 +49,10 @@
- #  endif /* !HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_... */
- 
- # endif /* !HEIMDAL */
-+
-+/* .k5users support */
-+extern char **k5users_allowed_cmds;
-+
- #endif /* KRB5 */
- 
- /* draft-ietf-secsh-gsskeyex-06 */
-diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
-index adcaaf9..824163b 100644
---- a/sshd.8
-+++ b/sshd.8
-@@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ 	if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1)
+ 		fatal("do_exec: command already set");
+diff -up openssh-5.8p2/sshd.8.force_krb openssh-5.8p2/sshd.8
+--- openssh-5.8p2/sshd.8.force_krb	2011-05-19 03:41:30.582114401 +0200
++++ openssh-5.8p2/sshd.8	2011-05-19 03:41:46.159106308 +0200
+@@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ Finally, the server and the client enter
  The client tries to authenticate itself using
  host-based authentication,
  public key authentication,
@@ -265,7 +260,7 @@ index adcaaf9..824163b 100644
  challenge-response authentication,
  or password authentication.
  .Pp
-@@ -800,6 +801,12 @@ This file is used in exactly the same way as
+@@ -796,6 +797,12 @@ This file is used in exactly the same wa
  but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
  rlogin/rsh.
  .Pp
@@ -278,3 +273,17 @@ index adcaaf9..824163b 100644
  .It Pa ~/.ssh/
  This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
  and authentication information.
+diff -up openssh-5.8p2/ssh-gss.h.force_krb openssh-5.8p2/ssh-gss.h
+--- openssh-5.8p2/ssh-gss.h.force_krb	2007-06-12 15:40:39.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.8p2/ssh-gss.h	2011-05-19 03:41:46.302234118 +0200
+@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@
+ #define GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE gss_nt_service_name
+ #endif /* GSS_C_NT_... */
+ #endif /* !HEIMDAL */
++
++/* .k5users support */
++extern char **k5users_allowed_cmds;
++
+ #endif /* KRB5 */
+ 
+ /* draft-ietf-secsh-gsskeyex-06 */

openssh-5.8p2-remove-stale-control-socket.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.8p2/mux.c.remove_stale openssh-5.8p2/mux.c
+--- openssh-5.8p2/mux.c.remove_stale	2011-01-14 02:01:32.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p2/mux.c	2011-06-09 15:27:42.556360291 +0200
+@@ -1867,6 +1867,9 @@ muxclient(const char *path)
+ 			unlink(path);
+ 		} else if (errno == ENOENT) {
+ 			debug("Control socket \"%.100s\" does not exist", path);
++		} else if (errno == ECONNREFUSED) {
++			debug("Removing stale control socket \"%.100s\"", path);
++			unlink(path);
+ 		} else {
+ 			error("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path,
+ 			    strerror(errno));

openssh-5.9p1-audit2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.9p0/audit-bsm.c.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/audit-bsm.c
+--- openssh-5.9p0/audit-bsm.c.audit2	2011-08-30 10:55:35.281025258 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p0/audit-bsm.c	2011-08-30 10:55:37.500052231 +0200
+@@ -329,6 +329,12 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li
+ 	/* not implemented */
+ }
+ 
++int
++audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)
++{
++	/* not implemented */
++}
++
+ void
+ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ {
+diff -up openssh-5.9p0/audit-linux.c.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/audit-linux.c
+--- openssh-5.9p0/audit-linux.c.audit2	2011-08-30 10:55:35.385102905 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p0/audit-linux.c	2011-08-30 10:55:38.009088040 +0200
+@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@
+ #include "servconf.h"
+ #include "canohost.h"
+ 
++#define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 128
++
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+ extern u_int utmp_len;
+@@ -130,6 +132,37 @@ fatal_report:
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
++int
++audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)
++{
++	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
++	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
++
++	audit_fd = audit_open();
++	if (audit_fd < 0) {
++		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
++					 errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
++			return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */
++		else                                                                                                                                       
++			return 0; /* Must prevent login */
++	}
++	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth rport=%d", host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", get_remote_port());
++	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
++		buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv);
++	if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++		goto out;
++	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "key algo=%s size=%d fp=%s%s rport=%d",
++			type, bits, key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, get_remote_port());
++	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
++		buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv);
++out:
++	saved_errno = errno;
++	audit_close(audit_fd);
++	errno = saved_errno;
++	/* do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
++	return (rc >= 0) || ((rc == -EPERM) && (getuid() != 0));
++}
++
+ static int user_login_count = 0;
+ 
+ /* Below is the sshd audit API code */
+diff -up openssh-5.9p0/audit.c.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/audit.c
+--- openssh-5.9p0/audit.c.audit2	2011-08-30 10:55:35.523141273 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p0/audit.c	2011-08-30 10:55:37.658024710 +0200
+@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
+ #include "key.h"
+ #include "hostfile.h"
+ #include "auth.h"
++#include "xmalloc.h"
+ 
+ /*
+  * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when
+@@ -111,6 +112,22 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)
+ 	return(event_lookup[i].name);
+ }
+ 
++void
++audit_key(int host_user, int *rv, const Key *key)
++{
++	char *fp;
++	const char *crypto_name;
++
++	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	if (key->type == KEY_RSA1)
++		crypto_name = "ssh-rsa1";
++	else
++		crypto_name = key_ssh_name(key);
++	if (audit_keyusage(host_user, crypto_name, key_size(key), fp, *rv) == 0)
++		*rv = 0;
++	xfree(fp);
++}
++
+ # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ /*
+  * Null implementations of audit functions.
+@@ -209,5 +226,17 @@ audit_end_command(int handle, const char
+ 	    audit_username(), command);
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * This will be called when user is successfully autherized by the RSA1/RSA/DSA key.
++ *
++ * Type is the key type, len is the key length(byte) and fp is the fingerprint of the key.
++ */
++int
++audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)
++{
++	debug("audit %s key usage euid %d user %s key type %s key length %d fingerprint %s%s, result %d", 
++		host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(), type, bits,
++		key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, rv);
++}
+ # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff -up openssh-5.9p0/audit.h.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/audit.h
+--- openssh-5.9p0/audit.h.audit2	2011-08-30 10:55:35.723122290 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p0/audit.h	2011-08-30 10:55:37.905212176 +0200
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
+ # define _SSH_AUDIT_H
+ 
+ #include "loginrec.h"
++#include "key.h"
+ 
+ enum ssh_audit_event_type {
+ 	SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES,
+@@ -55,5 +56,7 @@ void	audit_session_close(struct logininf
+ int	audit_run_command(const char *);
+ void 	audit_end_command(int, const char *);
+ ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
++int	audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int);
++void	audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);
+ 
+ #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
+diff -up openssh-5.9p0/auth-rsa.c.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/auth-rsa.c
+--- openssh-5.9p0/auth-rsa.c.audit2	2011-08-30 10:55:33.120097071 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p0/auth-rsa.c	2011-08-30 10:55:38.729025376 +0200
+@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNU
+ {
+ 	u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16];
+ 	MD5_CTX md;
+-	int len;
++	int len, rv;
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	char *fp;
++#endif
+ 
+ 	/* don't allow short keys */
+ 	if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
+@@ -113,12 +116,18 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNU
+ 	MD5_Final(mdbuf, &md);
+ 
+ 	/* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */
+-	if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) {
+-		/* Wrong answer. */
+-		return (0);
++	rv = timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) == 0;
++
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	if (audit_keyusage(1, "ssh-rsa1", RSA_size(key->rsa) * 8, fp, rv) == 0) {
++		debug("unsuccessful audit");
++		rv = 0;
+ 	}
+-	/* Correct answer. */
+-	return (1);
++	xfree(fp);
++#endif
++
++	return rv;
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+diff -up openssh-5.9p0/auth.h.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/auth.h
+--- openssh-5.9p0/auth.h.audit2	2011-05-29 13:39:38.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p0/auth.h	2011-08-30 10:57:43.238087347 +0200
+@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ void	abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt
+ 
+ char	*expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw);
+ char	*authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *);
++int	 user_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
+ 
+ FILE	*auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
+ FILE	*auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
+@@ -185,6 +186,7 @@ Key	*get_hostkey_public_by_type(int);
+ Key	*get_hostkey_private_by_type(int);
+ int	 get_hostkey_index(Key *);
+ int	 ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *);
++int	 hostbased_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
+ 
+ /* debug messages during authentication */
+ void	 auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+diff -up openssh-5.9p0/auth2-hostbased.c.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/auth2-hostbased.c
+--- openssh-5.9p0/auth2-hostbased.c.audit2	2011-08-30 10:55:32.696212587 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p0/auth2-hostbased.c	2011-08-30 10:55:38.120068864 +0200
+@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	/* test for allowed key and correct signature */
+ 	authenticated = 0;
+ 	if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) &&
+-	    PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
++	    PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
+ 			buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
+ 		authenticated = 1;
+ 
+@@ -136,6 +136,18 @@ done:
+ 	return authenticated;
+ }
+ 
++int
++hostbased_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
++{
++	int rv;
++
++	rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen);
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	audit_key(0, &rv, key);
++#endif
++	return rv;
++}
++
+ /* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */
+ int
+ hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost,
+diff -up openssh-5.9p0/auth2-pubkey.c.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/auth2-pubkey.c
+--- openssh-5.9p0/auth2-pubkey.c.audit2	2011-08-30 10:55:32.803126151 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p0/auth2-pubkey.c	2011-08-30 10:55:38.426108672 +0200
+@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 		/* test for correct signature */
+ 		authenticated = 0;
+ 		if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) &&
+-		    PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
++		    PRIVSEP(user_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
+ 		    buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
+ 			authenticated = 1;
+ 		buffer_free(&b);
+@@ -177,6 +177,18 @@ done:
+ 	return authenticated;
+ }
+ 
++int
++user_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
++{
++	int rv;
++
++	rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen);
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	audit_key(1, &rv, key);
++#endif
++	return rv;
++}
++
+ static int
+ match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct KeyCert *cert)
+ {
+diff -up openssh-5.9p0/monitor.c.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/monitor.c
+--- openssh-5.9p0/monitor.c.audit2	2011-08-30 10:55:35.849023496 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p0/monitor.c	2011-08-30 10:55:38.848024600 +0200
+@@ -1318,9 +1318,11 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ 	Key *key;
+ 	u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
+ 	u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
++	int type = 0;
+ 	int verified = 0;
+ 	int valid_data = 0;
+ 
++	type = buffer_get_int(m);
+ 	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
+ 	signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
+ 	data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
+@@ -1328,6 +1330,8 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ 	if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
+ 	  !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
+ 		fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
++	if (type != key_blobtype)
++		fatal("%s: bad key type", __func__);
+ 
+ 	key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+ 	if (key == NULL)
+@@ -1348,7 +1352,17 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ 	if (!valid_data)
+ 		fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
+ 
+-	verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
++	switch (key_blobtype) {
++	case MM_USERKEY:
++		verified = user_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
++		break;
++	case MM_HOSTKEY:
++		verified = hostbased_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
++		break;
++	default:
++		verified = 0;
++		break;
++	}
+ 	debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
+ 	    __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
+ 
+diff -up openssh-5.9p0/monitor_wrap.c.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh-5.9p0/monitor_wrap.c.audit2	2011-08-30 10:55:36.431043533 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p0/monitor_wrap.c	2011-08-30 10:55:39.074038187 +0200
+@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, cha
+  */
+ 
+ int
+-mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
++mm_key_verify(enum mm_keytype type, Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+ {
+ 	Buffer m;
+ 	u_char *blob;
+@@ -445,6 +445,7 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_i
+ 		return (0);
+ 
+ 	buffer_init(&m);
++	buffer_put_int(&m, type);
+ 	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len);
+ 	buffer_put_string(&m, sig, siglen);
+ 	buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen);
+@@ -462,6 +463,19 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_i
+ 	return (verified);
+ }
+ 
++int
++mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
++{
++	return mm_key_verify(MM_HOSTKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen);
++}
++
++int
++mm_user_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
++{
++	return mm_key_verify(MM_USERKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen);
++}
++
++
+ /* Export key state after authentication */
+ Newkeys *
+ mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *blob, int blen)
+diff -up openssh-5.9p0/monitor_wrap.h.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/monitor_wrap.h
+--- openssh-5.9p0/monitor_wrap.h.audit2	2011-08-30 10:55:36.550088263 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p0/monitor_wrap.h	2011-08-30 10:55:39.282151179 +0200
+@@ -49,7 +49,8 @@ int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, char
+ int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);
+ int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
+ int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
+-int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
++int mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
++int mm_user_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
+ int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **);
+ int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char *);
+ BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);

openssh-5.9p1-audit3.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,528 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in.audit3 openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in.audit3	2011-08-05 22:15:18.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in	2011-09-14 07:05:58.337520327 +0200
+@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=acss.o authfd.o authfile.o b
+ 	monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
+ 	kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \
+ 	msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o jpake.o \
+-	schnorr.o ssh-pkcs11.o
++	schnorr.o ssh-pkcs11.o auditstub.o
+ 
+ SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
+ 	sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/audit-bsm.c.audit3 openssh-5.9p1/audit-bsm.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/audit-bsm.c.audit3	2011-09-14 07:05:56.719459048 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/audit-bsm.c	2011-09-14 07:05:58.430520147 +0200
+@@ -396,4 +396,16 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ 		debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
+ 	}
+ }
++
++void
++audit_unsupported_body(int what)
++{
++	/* not implemented */
++}
++
++void
++audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++	/* not implemented */
++}
+ #endif /* BSM */
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/audit-linux.c.audit3 openssh-5.9p1/audit-linux.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/audit-linux.c.audit3	2011-09-14 07:05:56.820460613 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/audit-linux.c	2011-09-14 07:07:29.651459660 +0200
+@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@
+ #include "auth.h"
+ #include "servconf.h"
+ #include "canohost.h"
++#include "packet.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
+ 
+ #define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 128
+ 
+@@ -269,4 +271,60 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
++void
++audit_unsupported_body(int what)
++{
++#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
++	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
++	const static char *name[] = { "cipher", "mac", "comp" };
++	char *s;
++	int audit_fd;
++
++	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=unsupported-%s direction=? cipher=? ksize=? rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
++		name[what], get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())),
++		get_local_port());
++	xfree(s);
++	audit_fd = audit_open();
++	if (audit_fd < 0)
++		/* no problem, the next instruction will be fatal() */
++		return;
++	audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION,
++			buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 0);
++	audit_close(audit_fd);
++#endif
++}
++
++void
++audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
++	       uid_t uid)
++{
++#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
++	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
++	int audit_fd, audit_ok;
++	const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
++	Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc);
++	char *s;
++
++	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=start direction=%s cipher=%s ksize=%d spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
++		direction[ctos], enc, cipher ? 8 * cipher->key_len : 0,
++		(intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid,
++		get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), get_local_port());
++	xfree(s);
++	audit_fd = audit_open();
++	if (audit_fd < 0) {
++		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
++					 errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
++			return; /* No audit support in kernel */
++		else                                                                                                                                       
++			fatal("cannot open audit"); /* Must prevent login */
++	}
++	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION,
++			buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1);
++	audit_close(audit_fd);
++	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
++	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++		fatal("cannot write into audit"); /* Must prevent login */
++#endif
++}
++
+ #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/audit.c.audit3 openssh-5.9p1/audit.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/audit.c.audit3	2011-09-14 07:05:56.937585272 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/audit.c	2011-09-14 07:05:58.646521393 +0200
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <string.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
+ 
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ 
+@@ -36,6 +37,8 @@
+ #include "key.h"
+ #include "hostfile.h"
+ #include "auth.h"
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -128,6 +131,18 @@ audit_key(int host_user, int *rv, const
+ 	xfree(fp);
+ }
+ 
++void
++audit_unsupported(int what)
++{
++	PRIVSEP(audit_unsupported_body(what));
++}
++
++void
++audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp)
++{
++	PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, getpid(), getuid()));
++}
++
+ # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ /*
+  * Null implementations of audit functions.
+@@ -238,5 +253,26 @@ audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char
+ 		host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(), type, bits,
+ 		key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, rv);
+ }
++
++/*
++ * This will be called when the protocol negotiation fails.
++ */
++void
++audit_unsupported_body(int what)
++{
++	debug("audit unsupported protocol euid %d type %d", geteuid(), what);
++}
++
++/*
++ * This will be called on succesfull protocol negotiation.
++ */
++void
++audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
++	       uid_t uid)
++{
++	debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s from pid %ld uid %u",
++		(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, (long)pid,
++	        (unsigned)uid);
++}
+ # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/audit.h.audit3 openssh-5.9p1/audit.h
+--- openssh-5.9p1/audit.h.audit3	2011-09-14 07:05:57.391522394 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/audit.h	2011-09-14 07:05:58.766586362 +0200
+@@ -58,5 +58,9 @@ void 	audit_end_command(int, const char
+ ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
+ int	audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int);
+ void	audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);
++void	audit_unsupported(int);
++void	audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *);
++void	audit_unsupported_body(int);
++void	audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+ 
+ #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/auditstub.c.audit3 openssh-5.9p1/auditstub.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/auditstub.c.audit3	2011-09-14 07:05:58.866461077 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/auditstub.c	2011-09-14 07:05:58.870569033 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
++/* $Id: auditstub.c,v 1.1 jfch Exp $ */
++
++/*
++ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc.  All rights reserved.
++ * Use is subject to license terms.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ *
++ * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
++ */
++
++void
++audit_unsupported(int n)
++{
++}
++
++void
++audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp)
++{
++}
++
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/cipher.c.audit3 openssh-5.9p1/cipher.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/cipher.c.audit3	2011-09-07 15:05:09.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/cipher.c	2011-09-14 07:05:58.955582581 +0200
+@@ -60,15 +60,7 @@ extern void ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX
+ extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_128_ctr(void);
+ extern void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, u_int);
+ 
+-struct Cipher {
+-	char	*name;
+-	int	number;		/* for ssh1 only */
+-	u_int	block_size;
+-	u_int	key_len;
+-	u_int	discard_len;
+-	u_int	cbc_mode;
+-	const EVP_CIPHER	*(*evptype)(void);
+-} ciphers[] = {
++struct Cipher ciphers[] = {
+ 	{ "none",		SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null },
+ 	{ "des",		SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc },
+ 	{ "3des",		SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_3des },
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/cipher.h.audit3 openssh-5.9p1/cipher.h
+--- openssh-5.9p1/cipher.h.audit3	2009-01-28 06:38:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.9p1/cipher.h	2011-09-14 07:05:59.063459363 +0200
+@@ -61,7 +61,16 @@
+ typedef struct Cipher Cipher;
+ typedef struct CipherContext CipherContext;
+ 
+-struct Cipher;
++struct Cipher {
++	char	*name;
++	int	number;		/* for ssh1 only */
++	u_int	block_size;
++	u_int	key_len;
++	u_int	discard_len;
++	u_int	cbc_mode;
++	const EVP_CIPHER	*(*evptype)(void);
++};
++
+ struct CipherContext {
+ 	int	plaintext;
+ 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX evp;
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/kex.c.audit3 openssh-5.9p1/kex.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/kex.c.audit3	2010-09-24 14:11:14.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/kex.c	2011-09-14 07:05:59.171457800 +0200
+@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
+ #include "dispatch.h"
+ #include "monitor.h"
+ #include "roaming.h"
++#include "audit.h"
+ 
+ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
+ # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
+@@ -286,9 +287,13 @@ static void
+ choose_enc(Enc *enc, char *client, char *server)
+ {
+ 	char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+-	if (name == NULL)
++	if (name == NULL) {
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++		audit_unsupported(0);
++#endif
+ 		fatal("no matching cipher found: client %s server %s",
+ 		    client, server);
++	}
+ 	if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL)
+ 		fatal("matching cipher is not supported: %s", name);
+ 	enc->name = name;
+@@ -303,9 +308,13 @@ static void
+ choose_mac(Mac *mac, char *client, char *server)
+ {
+ 	char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+-	if (name == NULL)
++	if (name == NULL) {
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++		audit_unsupported(1);
++#endif
+ 		fatal("no matching mac found: client %s server %s",
+ 		    client, server);
++	}
+ 	if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0)
+ 		fatal("unsupported mac %s", name);
+ 	/* truncate the key */
+@@ -320,8 +329,12 @@ static void
+ choose_comp(Comp *comp, char *client, char *server)
+ {
+ 	char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+-	if (name == NULL)
++	if (name == NULL) {
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++		audit_unsupported(2);
++#endif
+ 		fatal("no matching comp found: client %s server %s", client, server);
++	}
+ 	if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) {
+ 		comp->type = COMP_DELAYED;
+ 	} else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) {
+@@ -446,6 +459,9 @@ kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex)
+ 		    newkeys->enc.name,
+ 		    newkeys->mac.name,
+ 		    newkeys->comp.name);
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++		audit_kex(ctos, newkeys->enc.name, newkeys->mac.name, newkeys->comp.name);
++#endif
+ 	}
+ 	choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
+ 	choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/monitor.c.audit3 openssh-5.9p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/monitor.c.audit3	2011-09-14 07:05:57.952459820 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/monitor.c	2011-09-14 07:05:59.272520466 +0200
+@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+ #include "jpake.h"
+ #include "roaming.h"
++#include "audit.h"
+ 
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
+@@ -187,6 +188,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *
+ int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *);
++int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *);
++int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
+@@ -237,6 +240,8 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
+ #endif
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+ #endif
+ #ifdef BSD_AUTH
+     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
+@@ -275,6 +280,8 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+ #endif
+     {0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+@@ -306,6 +313,8 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[]
+ #endif
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+ #endif
+     {0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+@@ -318,6 +327,8 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+ #endif
+     {0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+@@ -2383,3 +2394,47 @@ mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int sock,
+ }
+ 
+ #endif /* JPAKE */
++
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++int
++mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
++{
++	int what;
++
++	what = buffer_get_int(m);
++
++	audit_unsupported_body(what);
++
++	buffer_clear(m);
++
++	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, m);
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int
++mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
++{
++	int ctos, len;
++	char *cipher, *mac, *compress;
++	pid_t pid;
++	uid_t uid;
++
++	ctos = buffer_get_int(m);
++	cipher = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
++	mac = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
++	compress = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
++	pid = buffer_get_int64(m);
++	uid = buffer_get_int64(m);
++
++	audit_kex_body(ctos, cipher, mac, compress, pid, uid);
++
++	xfree(cipher);
++	xfree(mac);
++	xfree(compress);
++	buffer_clear(m);
++
++	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, m);
++	return 0;
++}
++
++#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/monitor.h.audit3 openssh-5.9p1/monitor.h
+--- openssh-5.9p1/monitor.h.audit3	2011-09-14 07:05:55.510580908 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/monitor.h	2011-09-14 07:05:59.378647273 +0200
+@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND,
+ 	MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND,
++	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED,
++	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_TERM,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA,
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit3 openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit3	2011-09-14 07:05:58.059501118 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.c	2011-09-14 07:05:59.511503364 +0200
+@@ -1505,3 +1505,41 @@ mm_jpake_check_confirm(const BIGNUM *k,
+ 	return success;
+ }
+ #endif /* JPAKE */
++
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++void
++mm_audit_unsupported_body(int what)
++{
++	Buffer m;
++
++	buffer_init(&m);
++	buffer_put_int(&m, what);
++
++	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, &m);
++	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED,
++				  &m);
++
++	buffer_free(&m);
++}
++
++void
++mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
++		  uid_t uid)
++{
++	Buffer m;
++
++	buffer_init(&m);
++	buffer_put_int(&m, ctos);
++	buffer_put_cstring(&m, cipher);
++	buffer_put_cstring(&m, mac);
++	buffer_put_cstring(&m, compress);
++	buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
++	buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
++
++	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, &m);
++	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX,
++				  &m);
++
++	buffer_free(&m);
++}
++#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit3 openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.h
+--- openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit3	2011-09-14 07:05:58.171521245 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.h	2011-09-14 07:05:59.624646515 +0200
+@@ -78,6 +78,8 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
+ void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
+ int mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
+ void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *);
++void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
++void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+ #endif
+ 
+ struct Session;
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c.audit3 openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c.audit3	2011-09-14 07:05:56.554583874 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c	2011-09-14 07:05:59.828466112 +0200
+@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@
+ #endif
+ #include "monitor_wrap.h"
+ #include "roaming.h"
++#include "audit.h"
+ #include "ssh-sandbox.h"
+ #include "version.h"
+ 
+@@ -2209,6 +2210,10 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
+ 		if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char())
+ 			packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match.");
+ 
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	audit_kex(2, cipher_name(cipher_type), "crc", "none");
++#endif
++
+ 	debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type));
+ 
+ 	/* Get the encrypted integer. */

openssh-5.9p1-copy-id-restorecon.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.restorecon openssh-5.9p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id
+--- openssh-5.9p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.restorecon	2011-08-17 04:05:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id	2011-11-21 08:40:56.000000000 +0100
+@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ fi
+ # strip any trailing colon
+ host=`echo $1 | sed 's/:$//'`
+ 
+-{ eval "$GET_ID" ; } | ssh $host "umask 077; test -d ~/.ssh || mkdir ~/.ssh ; cat >> ~/.ssh/authorized_keys" || exit 1
++{ eval "$GET_ID" ; } | ssh $host "umask 077; test -d ~/.ssh || mkdir ~/.ssh ; cat >> ~/.ssh/authorized_keys && (test -x /sbin/restorecon && /sbin/restorecon ~/.ssh ~/.ssh/authorized_keys >/dev/null 2>&1 || true)" || exit 1
+ 
+ cat <<EOF
+ Now try logging into the machine, with "ssh '$host'", and check in:

openssh-5.9p1-ctr-cavstest.patch

@@ -1,45 +1,7 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in
---- openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs	2015-03-18 11:22:05.493289018 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in	2015-03-18 11:22:44.504196316 +0100
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
- SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
- SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
- SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
-+CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest
- SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
- SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
- PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
-@@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
- 
- .SUFFIXES: .lo
- 
--TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
- 
- XMSS_OBJS=\
- 	ssh-xmss.o \
-@@ -194,6 +195,9 @@ ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) l
- ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS)
- 
-+ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
-+
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
- 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
- 
-@@ -326,6 +330,7 @@ install-files:
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
-+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
-diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c
---- openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs	2015-03-18 11:22:05.521288952 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c	2015-03-18 11:22:05.521288952 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-5.9p1/ctr-cavstest.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs	2012-01-13 15:59:06.584283289 +0100
++++ openssh-5.9p1/ctr-cavstest.c	2012-01-13 18:21:33.791941027 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
 +/*
 + *
 + * invocation (all of the following are equal):
@@ -60,7 +22,6 @@ diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c
 +
 +#include "xmalloc.h"
 +#include "log.h"
-+#include "ssherr.h"
 +#include "cipher.h"
 +
 +/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
@@ -134,7 +95,7 @@ diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c
 +                        break;
 +
 +                total += n;
-+                buf = xreallocarray(buf, total + READ_CHUNK, 1);
++                buf = xrealloc(buf, total + READ_CHUNK, 1);
 +        } while(total < MAX_READ_SIZE);
 +        return buf;
 +}
@@ -142,14 +103,14 @@ diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c
 +int main (int argc, char *argv[])
 +{
 +
-+        const struct sshcipher *c;
-+        struct sshcipher_ctx *cc;
++        Cipher *c;
++        CipherContext cc;
 +        char *algo = "aes128-ctr";
 +        char *hexkey = NULL;
 +        char *hexiv = "00000000000000000000000000000000";
 +        char *hexdata = NULL;
 +        char *p;
-+        int i, r;
++        int i;
 +        int encrypt = 1;
 +        void *key;
 +        size_t keylen;
@@ -187,7 +148,7 @@ diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c
 +                usage();
 +        }
 +
-+	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
++	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
 +
 +	c = cipher_by_name(algo);
 +	if (c == NULL) {
@@ -222,13 +183,10 @@ diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c
 +		return 2;
 +	}
 +
-+	if ((r = cipher_init(&cc, c, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, encrypt)) != 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: cipher_init failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
-+		return 2;
-+	}
++	cipher_init(&cc, c, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, encrypt);
 +
-+	free(key);
-+	free(iv);
++        xfree(key);
++        xfree(iv);
 +
 +	outdata = malloc(datalen);
 +	if(outdata == NULL) {
@@ -236,22 +194,57 @@ diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c
 +		return 2;
 +	}
 +
-+	if ((r = cipher_crypt(cc, 0, outdata, data, datalen, 0, 0)) != 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: cipher_crypt failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
-+		return 2;
-+	}
++	cipher_crypt(&cc, outdata, data, datalen);
 +
-+	free(data);
++        xfree(data);
 +
-+	cipher_free(cc);
++	cipher_cleanup(&cc);
 +
 +        for (p = outdata; datalen > 0; ++p, --datalen) {
 +		printf("%02X", (unsigned char)*p);
 +	}
 +
-+        free(outdata);
++        xfree(outdata);
 +
 +        printf("\n");
 +        return 0;
 +}
 +
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs	2012-01-13 15:59:06.539282357 +0100
++++ openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in	2012-01-13 15:59:06.588283373 +0100
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
+ SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper
+ SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper
+ SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
++CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest
+ SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
+@@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+ MANFMT=@MANFMT@
+ INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@
+ 
+-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
++TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
+ 
+ LIBSSH_OBJS=acss.o authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
+ 	canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-acss.o cipher-aes.o \
+@@ -171,6 +172,9 @@ ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) l
+ ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS)
+ 
++ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o
++	$(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
++
+ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+ 
+@@ -271,6 +275,7 @@ install-files:
+ 		$(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \
+ 	fi
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
++	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1

openssh-5.9p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch

@@ -97,5 +97,5 @@ diff -up openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c
  	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
 +		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->ecbctx);
  		memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
- 		free(c);
+ 		xfree(c);
  		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);

openssh-5.9p1-edns.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/dns.c.edns openssh-5.9p1/dns.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/dns.c.edns	2010-08-31 14:41:14.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/dns.c	2011-09-09 08:05:27.782440497 +0200
+@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname
+ {
+ 	u_int counter;
+ 	int result;
++	unsigned int rrset_flags = 0;
+ 	struct rrsetinfo *fingerprints = NULL;
+ 
+ 	u_int8_t hostkey_algorithm;
+@@ -200,8 +201,19 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
++	/*
++	 * Original getrrsetbyname function, found on OpenBSD for example,
++	 * doesn't accept any flag and prerequisite for obtaining AD bit in
++	 * DNS response is set by "options edns0" in resolv.conf.
++	 *
++	 * Our version is more clever and use RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 flag.
++	 */
++#ifndef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME
++	rrset_flags |= RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0;
++#endif
+ 	result = getrrsetbyname(hostname, DNS_RDATACLASS_IN,
+-	    DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, 0, &fingerprints);
++	    DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, rrset_flags, &fingerprints);
++
+ 	if (result) {
+ 		verbose("DNS lookup error: %s", dns_result_totext(result));
+ 		return -1;
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c.edns openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c.edns	2009-07-13 03:38:23.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c	2011-09-09 15:03:39.930500801 +0200
+@@ -209,8 +209,8 @@ getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, uns
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	/* don't allow flags yet, unimplemented */
+-	if (flags) {
++	/* Allow RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 flag only. */
++	if ((flags & ~RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0) != 0) {
+ 		result = ERRSET_INVAL;
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+@@ -226,9 +226,9 @@ getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, uns
+ #endif /* DEBUG */
+ 
+ #ifdef RES_USE_DNSSEC
+-	/* turn on DNSSEC if EDNS0 is configured */
+-	if (_resp->options & RES_USE_EDNS0)
+-		_resp->options |= RES_USE_DNSSEC;
++	/* turn on DNSSEC if required  */
++	if (flags & RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0)
++		_resp->options |= (RES_USE_EDNS0|RES_USE_DNSSEC);
+ #endif /* RES_USE_DNSEC */
+ 
+ 	/* make query */
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h.edns openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
+--- openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h.edns	2007-10-26 08:26:50.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h	2011-09-09 08:05:27.965438689 +0200
+@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
+ #ifndef RRSET_VALIDATED
+ # define RRSET_VALIDATED	1
+ #endif
++#ifndef RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0
++# define RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0	0x0001
++#endif
+ 
+ /*
+  * Return codes for getrrsetbyname()

openssh-5.9p1-fips.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,532 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/authfile.c.fips openssh-5.9p1/authfile.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/authfile.c.fips	2012-07-17 20:57:35.078155160 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/authfile.c	2012-07-17 20:57:35.086155338 +0200
+@@ -148,8 +148,14 @@ key_private_rsa1_to_blob(Key *key, Buffe
+ 	/* Allocate space for the private part of the key in the buffer. */
+ 	cp = buffer_append_space(&encrypted, buffer_len(&buffer));
+ 
+-	cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase,
+-	    CIPHER_ENCRYPT);
++	if (cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase,
++	    CIPHER_ENCRYPT) < 0) {
++	    error("cipher_set_key_string failed.");
++	    buffer_free(&encrypted);
++	    buffer_free(&buffer);
++	    return 0;
++	}
++
+ 	cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, cp,
+ 	    buffer_ptr(&buffer), buffer_len(&buffer));
+ 	cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext);
+@@ -472,8 +478,13 @@ key_parse_private_rsa1(Buffer *blob, con
+ 	cp = buffer_append_space(&decrypted, buffer_len(&copy));
+ 
+ 	/* Rest of the buffer is encrypted.  Decrypt it using the passphrase. */
+-	cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase,
+-	    CIPHER_DECRYPT);
++	if (cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase,
++	    CIPHER_DECRYPT) < 0) {
++	    error("cipher_set_key_string failed.");
++	    buffer_free(&decrypted);
++	    goto fail;
++	}
++
+ 	cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, cp,
+ 	    buffer_ptr(&copy), buffer_len(&copy));
+ 	cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext);
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/cipher.c.fips openssh-5.9p1/cipher.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/cipher.c.fips	2012-07-17 20:57:34.988153164 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/cipher.c	2012-07-17 20:57:35.086155338 +0200
+@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ 
+ #include <openssl/md5.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+@@ -86,6 +87,22 @@ struct Cipher ciphers[] = {
+ 	{ NULL,			SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
+ };
+ 
++struct Cipher fips_ciphers[] = {
++	{ "none",		SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null },
++	{ "3des",		SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_3des },
++
++	{ "3des-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, 1, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
++	{ "aes128-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 1, EVP_aes_128_cbc },
++	{ "aes192-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 1, EVP_aes_192_cbc },
++	{ "aes256-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
++	{ "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se",
++				SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
++	{ "aes128-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr },
++	{ "aes192-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr },
++	{ "aes256-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr },
++	{ NULL,			SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
++};
++
+ /*--*/
+ 
+ u_int
+@@ -128,7 +145,7 @@ Cipher *
+ cipher_by_name(const char *name)
+ {
+ 	Cipher *c;
+-	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
++	for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
+ 		if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0)
+ 			return c;
+ 	return NULL;
+@@ -138,7 +155,7 @@ Cipher *
+ cipher_by_number(int id)
+ {
+ 	Cipher *c;
+-	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
++	for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
+ 		if (c->number == id)
+ 			return c;
+ 	return NULL;
+@@ -182,7 +199,7 @@ cipher_number(const char *name)
+ 	Cipher *c;
+ 	if (name == NULL)
+ 		return -1;
+-	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
++	for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
+ 		if (strcasecmp(c->name, name) == 0)
+ 			return c->number;
+ 	return -1;
+@@ -289,14 +306,15 @@ cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *cc)
+  * passphrase and using the resulting 16 bytes as the key.
+  */
+ 
+-void
++int
+ cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *cc, Cipher *cipher,
+     const char *passphrase, int do_encrypt)
+ {
+ 	MD5_CTX md;
+ 	u_char digest[16];
+ 
+-	MD5_Init(&md);
++	if (MD5_Init(&md) <= 0)
++		return -1;
+ 	MD5_Update(&md, (const u_char *)passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+ 	MD5_Final(digest, &md);
+ 
+@@ -304,6 +322,7 @@ cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *cc,
+ 
+ 	memset(digest, 0, sizeof(digest));
+ 	memset(&md, 0, sizeof(md));
++	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips	2010-10-07 13:06:42.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c	2012-07-17 20:57:35.086155338 +0200
+@@ -140,7 +140,8 @@ evp_aes_128_ctr(void)
+ 	aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr;
+ #ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
+ 	aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH |
+-	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV;
++	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV |
++	    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS;
+ #endif
+ 	return (&aes_ctr);
+ }
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/cipher.h.fips openssh-5.9p1/cipher.h
+--- openssh-5.9p1/cipher.h.fips	2012-07-17 20:57:34.989153186 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/cipher.h	2012-07-17 20:57:35.087155360 +0200
+@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ void	 cipher_init(CipherContext *, Ciphe
+     const u_char *, u_int, int);
+ void	 cipher_crypt(CipherContext *, u_char *, const u_char *, u_int);
+ void	 cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *);
+-void	 cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *, Cipher *, const char *, int);
++int	 cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *, Cipher *, const char *, int);
+ u_int	 cipher_blocksize(const Cipher *);
+ u_int	 cipher_keylen(const Cipher *);
+ u_int	 cipher_is_cbc(const Cipher *);
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/key.c.fips openssh-5.9p1/key.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/key.c.fips	2012-07-17 20:57:35.007153585 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/key.c	2012-07-17 20:57:35.087155360 +0200
+@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ 
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include <openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h>
+ 
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+@@ -602,9 +603,13 @@ key_fingerprint_selection(void)
+ 	char *env;
+ 
+ 	if (!rv_defined) {
+-		env = getenv("SSH_FINGERPRINT_TYPE");
+-		rv = (env && !strcmp (env, "sha")) ?
+-			SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
++		if (FIPS_mode())
++			rv = SSH_FP_SHA1;
++		else {
++			env = getenv("SSH_FINGERPRINT_TYPE");
++			rv = (env && !strcmp (env, "sha")) ?
++				SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
++		}
+ 		rv_defined = 1;
+ 	}
+ 	return rv;
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/mac.c.fips openssh-5.9p1/mac.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/mac.c.fips	2012-07-17 20:57:34.996153341 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/mac.c	2012-07-17 20:58:35.584497499 +0200
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ 
+ #include <openssl/hmac.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+@@ -47,14 +48,14 @@
+ #define SSH_EVP		1	/* OpenSSL EVP-based MAC */
+ #define SSH_UMAC	2	/* UMAC (not integrated with OpenSSL) */
+ 
+-struct {
++struct Macs {
+ 	char		*name;
+ 	int		type;
+ 	const EVP_MD *	(*mdfunc)(void);
+ 	int		truncatebits;	/* truncate digest if != 0 */
+ 	int		key_len;	/* just for UMAC */
+ 	int		len;		/* just for UMAC */
+-} macs[] = {
++} all_macs[] = {
+ 	{ "hmac-sha1",			SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 0, -1, -1 },
+ 	{ "hmac-sha1-96",		SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 96, -1, -1 },
+ #ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
+@@ -71,9 +72,19 @@ struct {
+ 	{ NULL,				0, NULL, 0, -1, -1 }
+ };
+ 
++struct Macs fips_macs[] = {
++	{ "hmac-sha1",			SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 0, -1, -1 },
++#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
++	{ "hmac-sha2-256",		SSH_EVP, EVP_sha256, 0, -1, -1 },
++	{ "hmac-sha2-512",		SSH_EVP, EVP_sha512, 0, -1, -1 },
++#endif
++	{ NULL,				0, NULL, 0, -1, -1 }
++};
++
+ static void
+ mac_setup_by_id(Mac *mac, int which)
+ {
++	struct Macs *macs = FIPS_mode() ? fips_macs : all_macs;
+ 	int evp_len;
+ 	mac->type = macs[which].type;
+ 	if (mac->type == SSH_EVP) {
+@@ -94,6 +105,7 @@ int
+ mac_setup(Mac *mac, char *name)
+ {
+ 	int i;
++	struct Macs *macs = FIPS_mode() ? fips_macs : all_macs;
+ 
+ 	for (i = 0; macs[i].name; i++) {
+ 		if (strcmp(name, macs[i].name) == 0) {
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in.fips openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in.fips	2012-07-17 20:57:35.069154962 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in	2012-07-17 20:57:35.086155338 +0200
+@@ -142,25 +142,25 @@ libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS)
+ 	$(RANLIB) $@
+ 
+ ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS)
+-	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS)
++	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS)
+ 
+ sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a	$(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS)
+-	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS)
++	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS)
+ 
+ scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+ 
+ ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-add.o
+-	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
++	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+ 
+ ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o
+-	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
++	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+ 
+ ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o
+-	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
++	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+ 
+ ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o roaming_dummy.o readconf.o
+-	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
++	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+ 
+ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS)
+ 
+ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o
+-	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
++	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+ 
+ sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-5.9p1/myproposal.h
+--- openssh-5.9p1/myproposal.h.fips	2011-08-17 02:29:03.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/myproposal.h	2012-07-17 21:01:12.685982807 +0200
+@@ -97,6 +97,19 @@
+ #define	KEX_DEFAULT_COMP	"none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib"
+ #define	KEX_DEFAULT_LANG	""
+ 
++#define	KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \
++	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
++	"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \
++	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se"
++#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
++#define	KEX_FIPS_MAC \
++	"hmac-sha1," \
++	"hmac-sha2-256," \
++	"hmac-sha2-512"
++#else
++#define	KEX_FIPS_MAC \
++	"hmac-sha1"
++#endif
+ 
+ static char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {
+ 	KEX_DEFAULT_KEX,
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c.fips openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c.fips	2010-03-25 22:52:02.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c	2012-07-17 20:57:35.087155360 +0200
+@@ -37,25 +37,18 @@
+ #define REKEY_BYTES	(1 << 24)
+ 
+ static int rc4_ready = 0;
+-static RC4_KEY rc4;
+ 
+ unsigned int
+ arc4random(void)
+ {
+ 	unsigned int r = 0;
+-	static int first_time = 1;
++	void *rp = &r;
+ 
+-	if (rc4_ready <= 0) {
+-		if (first_time)
+-			seed_rng();
+-		first_time = 0;
++	if (!rc4_ready) {
+ 		arc4random_stir();
+ 	}
++	RAND_bytes(rp, sizeof(r));
+ 
+-	RC4(&rc4, sizeof(r), (unsigned char *)&r, (unsigned char *)&r);
+-
+-	rc4_ready -= sizeof(r);
+-	
+ 	return(r);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -63,24 +56,11 @@ void
+ arc4random_stir(void)
+ {
+ 	unsigned char rand_buf[SEED_SIZE];
+-	int i;
+ 
+-	memset(&rc4, 0, sizeof(rc4));
+ 	if (RAND_bytes(rand_buf, sizeof(rand_buf)) <= 0)
+ 		fatal("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error %ld)",
+ 		    ERR_get_error());
+-	RC4_set_key(&rc4, sizeof(rand_buf), rand_buf);
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * Discard early keystream, as per recommendations in:
+-	 * http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~itsik/RC4/Papers/Rc4_ksa.ps
+-	 */
+-	for(i = 0; i <= 256; i += sizeof(rand_buf))
+-		RC4(&rc4, sizeof(rand_buf), rand_buf, rand_buf);
+-
+-	memset(rand_buf, 0, sizeof(rand_buf));
+-
+-	rc4_ready = REKEY_BYTES;
++	rc4_ready = 1;
+ }
+ #endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */
+ 
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-5.9p1/ssh.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/ssh.c.fips	2011-08-05 22:18:16.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/ssh.c	2012-07-17 20:57:35.088155382 +0200
+@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@
+ 
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
++#include <fipscheck.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ 
+@@ -253,6 +255,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	sanitise_stdfd();
+ 
+ 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
++        SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
++        if (FIPS_mode() && !FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)) {
++                fatal("FIPS integrity verification test failed.");
++        }
+ 
+ #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
+ 	/* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
+@@ -329,6 +335,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	    "ACD:F:I:KL:MNO:PR:S:TVw:W:XYy")) != -1) {
+ 		switch (opt) {
+ 		case '1':
++			if (FIPS_mode()) {
++				fatal("Protocol 1 not allowed in the FIPS mode.");
++			}
+ 			options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_1;
+ 			break;
+ 		case '2':
+@@ -630,7 +639,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	if (!host)
+ 		usage();
+ 
+-	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+ 	ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+ 
+ 	/* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */
+@@ -721,6 +729,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 
+ 	seed_rng();
+ 
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		logit("FIPS mode initialized");
++	}
++
+ 	if (options.user == NULL)
+ 		options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+ 
+@@ -789,6 +801,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 
+ 	timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000;
+ 
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		options.protocol &= SSH_PROTO_2;
++		if (options.protocol == 0)
++			fatal("Protocol 2 disabled by configuration but required in the FIPS mode.");
++	}
++
+ 	/* Open a connection to the remote host. */
+ 	if (ssh_connect(host, &hostaddr, options.port,
+ 	    options.address_family, options.connection_attempts, &timeout_ms,
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-5.9p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/sshconnect2.c.fips	2012-07-17 20:57:34.955152432 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/sshconnect2.c	2012-07-17 20:57:35.088155382 +0200
+@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@
+ #include <vis.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
++
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ 
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+@@ -170,6 +172,10 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
+ 	if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers;
++	} else if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
++		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT;
++
+ 	}
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ 	    compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
+@@ -185,7 +191,11 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
+ 	if (options.macs != NULL) {
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
++	} else if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
++		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_MAC;
+ 	}
++
+ 	if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL)
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
+ 		    options.hostkeyalgorithms;
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c.fips	2012-07-17 20:57:35.049154517 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c	2012-07-17 20:57:35.089155405 +0200
+@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/md5.h>
+ #include <openssl/rand.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
++#include <fipscheck.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
+@@ -1395,6 +1397,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ #endif
+ 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
+ 
++        SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
++        if (FIPS_mode() && !FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)) {
++                fatal("FIPS integrity verification test failed.");
++        }
++
+ 	/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
+ 	saved_argc = ac;
+ 	rexec_argc = ac;
+@@ -1554,8 +1561,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	else
+ 		closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD);
+ 
+-	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+-
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host
+ 	 * key (unless started from inetd)
+@@ -1673,6 +1678,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		debug("private host key: #%d type %d %s", i, key->type,
+ 		    key_type(key));
+ 	}
++	if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && FIPS_mode()) {
++		logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Not allowed in the FIPS mode.");
++		options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
++	}
+ 	if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) {
+ 		logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
+ 		options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
+@@ -1837,6 +1846,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	/* Initialize the random number generator. */
+ 	arc4random_stir();
+ 
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		logit("FIPS mode initialized");
++	}
++
+ 	/* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
+ 	   unmounted if desired. */
+ 	(void) chdir("/");
+@@ -2379,6 +2392,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
+ 	if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers;
++	} else if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
++		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT;
+ 	}
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ 	    compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
+@@ -2388,6 +2404,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
+ 	if (options.macs != NULL) {
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
++	} else if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
++		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_MAC;
+ 	}
+ 	if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) {
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =

openssh-5.9p1-keycat.patch

@@ -1,24 +1,24 @@
-diff -up openssh/auth.c.keycat openssh/misc.c
---- openssh/auth.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.158849606 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth.c	2015-06-24 11:04:23.989868638 +0200
-@@ -966,6 +966,14 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c.keycat openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c.keycat	2013-02-14 17:39:21.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c	2013-02-14 17:40:42.600050510 +0100
+@@ -571,6 +571,14 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd
  			_exit(1);
  		}
  
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
++		if (ssh_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
 +			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
 +			    strerror(errno));
 +			_exit(127);
 +		}
 +#endif
 +
- 		execve(av[0], av, child_env);
- 		error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno));
- 		_exit(127);
-diff -up openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
---- openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
-+++ openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
+ 		execl(options.authorized_keys_command,
+ 		    options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, NULL);
+ 
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh-6.1p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
+--- openssh-6.1p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat	2013-02-14 17:39:21.148382013 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat	2013-02-14 17:39:21.148382013 +0100
 @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
 +The ssh-keycat retrieves the content of the ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
 +of an user in any environment. This includes environments with
@@ -32,106 +32,63 @@ diff -up openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
 +        PubkeyAuthentication yes
 +
 +
-diff -up openssh/Makefile.in.keycat openssh/Makefile.in
---- openssh/Makefile.in.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.152849621 +0200
-+++ openssh/Makefile.in	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/Makefile.in.keycat openssh-6.1p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-6.1p1/Makefile.in.keycat	2013-02-14 17:39:21.143382033 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/Makefile.in	2013-02-14 17:39:21.148382013 +0100
 @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
- ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
- SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
  SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
+ SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper
+ SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper
 +SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
  SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
- SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
  PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
-@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
- K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
- GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
- SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
-+KEYCATLIBS=@KEYCATLIBS@
- LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
- LIBFIDO2=@LIBFIDO2@
- AR=@AR@
-@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
+@@ -62,7 +63,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+ MANFMT=@MANFMT@
+ INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@
  
- .SUFFIXES: .lo
+-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT)
++TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
  
--TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT)
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
+ LIBSSH_OBJS=acss.o authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
+ 	canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-acss.o cipher-aes.o \
+@@ -168,6 +169,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT)
+ ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
  
- XMSS_OBJS=\
- 	ssh-xmss.o \
-@@ -190,6 +191,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT)
- ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SKHELPER_OBJS)
- 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2)
- 
-+ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS)
++ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o
++	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS)
 +
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
- 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
  
-@@ -321,6 +325,7 @@ install-files:
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
+@@ -267,6 +271,7 @@ install-files:
+ 		$(INSTALL) -m 0700 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-ldap-helper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_HELPER) ; \
+ 		$(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \
+ 	fi
 +	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
  	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
  	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
  	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.150849626 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2015-06-24 10:57:50.160849601 +0200
-@@ -25,8 +25,10 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const
- void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
- 
-+int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
- void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
- void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
-+int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
- #endif
- 
- #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.150849626 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2015-06-24 10:57:50.159849603 +0200
-@@ -54,6 +54,20 @@ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
- extern int inetd_flag;
- extern int rexeced_flag;
- 
-+/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
-+int
-+sshd_selinux_enabled(void)
-+{
-+	static int enabled = -1;
-+
-+	if (enabled == -1) {
-+		enabled = (is_selinux_enabled() == 1);
-+		debug("SELinux support %s", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled");
-+	}
-+
-+	return (enabled);
-+}
-+
- /* Send audit message */
- static int
- sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context,
-@@ -308,7 +322,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.keycat openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.keycat	2013-02-14 17:39:21.126382101 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2013-02-14 17:39:21.149382009 +0100
+@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
  
  /* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
  static int
--sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
-+sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *))
+-ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
++ssh_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(const char *, const char *))
  {
  	const char *reqlvl;
  	char *role;
-@@ -319,16 +333,16 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+@@ -326,16 +326,16 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
  
  	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
  
 -	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
 +	rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
- 
+ 	
  	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
  		use_current = "1";
  	} else {
@@ -144,66 +101,36 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/
 +	rv = rv || set_it("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current);
  
  	if (role != NULL)
- 		free(role);
-@@ -336,6 +350,24 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+ 		xfree(role);
+@@ -343,6 +343,24 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
  	return rv;
  }
  
 +static int
-+sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
++ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
 +{
-+	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_pam_putenv);
++	return ssh_selinux_setup_variables(do_pam_putenv);
 +}
 +
 +static int
-+do_setenv(char *name, const char *value)
++do_setenv(char *name, char *value)
 +{
 +	return setenv(name, value, 1);
 +}
 +
 +int
-+sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void)
++ssh_selinux_setup_env_variables(void)
 +{
-+	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv);
++	return ssh_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv);
 +}
 +
  /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
  void
- sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
-@@ -344,7 +376,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
- 	int r = 0;
- 	security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
- 
--	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
-+	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
- 		return;
- 
- 	if (options.use_pam) {
-@@ -415,7 +447,7 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
- {
- 	security_context_t *ctx;
- 
--	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
-+	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
- 		return;
- 
- 	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
-diff -up openssh/platform.c.keycat openssh/platform.c
---- openssh/platform.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.147849633 +0200
-+++ openssh/platform.c	2015-06-24 10:57:50.160849601 +0200
-@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *p
- {
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- 	/* Cache selinux status for later use */
--	(void)ssh_selinux_enabled();
-+	(void)sshd_selinux_enabled();
- #endif
- 
- #ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS
-diff -up openssh/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh/ssh-keycat.c
---- openssh/ssh-keycat.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.161849599 +0200
-+++ openssh/ssh-keycat.c	2015-06-24 10:57:50.161849599 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh-6.1p1/ssh-keycat.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/ssh-keycat.c.keycat	2013-02-14 17:39:21.149382009 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/ssh-keycat.c	2013-02-14 17:39:21.149382009 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
 +/*
 + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -253,9 +180,6 @@ diff -up openssh/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh/ssh-keycat.c
 +#include <pwd.h>
 +#include <fcntl.h>
 +#include <unistd.h>
-+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
-+#include <stdint.h>
-+#endif
 +
 +#include <security/pam_appl.h>
 +
@@ -445,41 +369,3 @@ diff -up openssh/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh/ssh-keycat.c
 +	}
 +	return ev;
 +}
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index 3bbccfd..6481f1f 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -2952,6 +2952,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
- 			PAM_MSG="yes"
- 
- 			SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam"
-+			KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -lpam"
- 			AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1],
- 				[Define if you want to enable PAM support])
- 
-@@ -3105,6 +3106,7 @@
- 					;;
- 				*)
- 					SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl"
-+					KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -ldl"
- 					;;
- 				esac
- 			fi
-@@ -4042,6 +4044,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
- 	fi ]
- )
- AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
-+AC_SUBST([KEYCATLIBS])
- 
- # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
- KRB5_MSG="no"
-@@ -5031,6 +5034,9 @@ fi
- if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then
- echo "         +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}"
- fi
-+if test ! -z "${KEYCATLIBS}"; then
-+echo "   +for ssh-keycat: ${KEYCATLIBS}"
-+fi
- 
- echo ""
- 

openssh-5.9p1-keygen.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.0.keygen openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.0
+--- openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.0.keygen	2011-08-29 16:30:02.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.0	2011-08-30 13:47:56.208087184 +0200
+@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ NAME
+      ssh-keygen - authentication key generation, management and conversion
+ 
+ SYNOPSIS
+-     ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] -t type [-N new_passphrase] [-C comment]
++     ssh-keygen [-q] [-o] [-b bits] -t type [-N new_passphrase] [-C comment]
+                 [-f output_keyfile]
+      ssh-keygen -p [-P old_passphrase] [-N new_passphrase] [-f keyfile]
+      ssh-keygen -i [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile]
+@@ -181,6 +181,8 @@ DESCRIPTION
+              principals may be specified, separated by commas.  Please see the
+              CERTIFICATES section for details.
+ 
++     -o      Overwrite the key without prompting user.
++
+      -O option
+              Specify a certificate option when signing a key.  This option may
+              be specified multiple times.  Please see the CERTIFICATES section
+diff -up openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.1.keygen openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.1
+--- openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.1.keygen	2011-08-30 13:32:30.787149917 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.1	2011-08-30 13:46:42.638087171 +0200
+@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
+ .Bk -words
+ .Nm ssh-keygen
+ .Op Fl q
++.Op Fl o
+ .Op Fl b Ar bits
+ .Fl t Ar type
+ .Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase
+@@ -339,6 +340,8 @@ Multiple principals may be specified, se
+ Please see the
+ .Sx CERTIFICATES
+ section for details.
++.It Fl o
++Overwrite the key without prompting user.
+ .It Fl O Ar option
+ Specify a certificate option when signing a key.
+ This option may be specified multiple times.
+diff -up openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.c.keygen openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.c
+--- openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.c.keygen	2011-08-30 13:32:20.268149992 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.c	2011-08-30 13:39:34.550214102 +0200
+@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ int change_passphrase = 0;
+ int change_comment = 0;
+ 
+ int quiet = 0;
++int overwrite = 0;
+ 
+ int log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+ 
+@@ -1959,7 +1960,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 		exit(1);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "AegiqpclBHLhvxXyF:b:f:t:D:I:P:m:N:n:"
++	while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "AegiqopclBHLhvxXyF:b:f:t:D:I:P:m:N:n:"
+ 	    "O:C:r:g:R:T:G:M:S:s:a:V:W:z:")) != -1) {
+ 		switch (opt) {
+ 		case 'A':
+@@ -2042,6 +2043,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 		case 'q':
+ 			quiet = 1;
+ 			break;
++		case 'o':
++			overwrite = 1;
++			break;
+ 		case 'e':
+ 		case 'x':
+ 			/* export key */
+@@ -2278,7 +2282,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	/* If the file already exists, ask the user to confirm. */
+-	if (stat(identity_file, &st) >= 0) {
++	if (!overwrite && stat(identity_file, &st) >= 0) {
+ 		char yesno[3];
+ 		printf("%s already exists.\n", identity_file);
+ 		printf("Overwrite (y/n)? ");

openssh-5.9p1-randclean.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.9p0/entropy.c.randclean openssh-5.9p0/entropy.c
+--- openssh-5.9p0/entropy.c.randclean	2011-08-30 13:52:45.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p0/entropy.c	2011-08-30 13:57:44.630111338 +0200
+@@ -217,6 +217,9 @@ seed_rng(void)
+ 		fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you "
+ 		    "have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay());
+ 
++	/* clean the PRNG status when exiting the program */
++	atexit(RAND_cleanup);
++
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+ 	if (RAND_status() == 1) {
+ 		debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding");

openssh-5.9p1-sesandbox.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,321 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in.sesandbox	2011-09-19 04:10:05.706521484 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in	2011-09-19 04:10:15.092646473 +0200
+@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passw
+ 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
+ 	sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+ 	roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o \
+-	sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o
++	sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o sandbox-selinux.o
+ 
+ MANPAGES	= moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out
+ MANPAGES_IN	= moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/configure.ac.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/configure.ac
+--- openssh-5.9p1/configure.ac.sesandbox	2011-08-18 06:48:24.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/configure.ac	2011-09-19 04:10:15.193521356 +0200
+@@ -2476,7 +2476,7 @@ AC_SUBST([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER])
+ # Decide which sandbox style to use
+ sandbox_arg=""
+ AC_ARG_WITH([sandbox],
+-	[  --with-sandbox=style    Specify privilege separation sandbox (no, darwin, rlimit, systrace)],
++	[  --with-sandbox=style    Specify privilege separation sandbox (no, darwin, rlimit, systrace, selinux)],
+ 	[
+ 		if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
+ 			sandbox_arg=""
+@@ -2499,6 +2499,10 @@ elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xdarwin" ||
+ 		AC_MSG_ERROR([Darwin seatbelt sandbox requires sandbox.h and sandbox_init function])
+ 	SANDBOX_STYLE="darwin"
+ 	AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_DARWIN], [1], [Sandbox using Darwin sandbox_init(3)])
++elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xselinux"  || \
++    test "x$WITH_SELINUX" = "x1"; then
++	SANDBOX_STYLE="selinux"
++	AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SELINUX], [1], [Sandbox using selinux(8)])
+ elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xrlimit" || \
+      ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" = "xyes" ) ; then
+ 	test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" != "xyes" && \
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.sesandbox	2011-09-19 04:10:14.731521450 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2011-09-19 04:10:15.292521265 +0200
+@@ -459,24 +459,24 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, cons
+ 	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+ }
+ 
+-void
++int
+ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname)
+ {
+-	int len, newlen;
++	int len, newlen, rv = -1;
+ 	char *oldctx, *newctx, *cx;
+ 	void (*switchlog) (const char *fmt,...) = logit;
+ 
+ 	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+-		return;
++		return -2;
+ 
+ 	if (getcon((security_context_t *)&oldctx) < 0) {
+ 		logit("%s: getcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+-		return;
++		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 	if ((cx = index(oldctx, ':')) == NULL || (cx = index(cx + 1, ':')) ==
+ 	    NULL) {
+ 		logit ("%s: unparseable context %s", __func__, oldctx);
+-		return;
++		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/*
+@@ -484,8 +484,10 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *n
+ 	 * security context.
+ 	 */
+ 	if (strncmp(cx, SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE,
+-	    sizeof(SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE) - 1) == 0)
++	    sizeof(SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE) - 1) == 0) {
+ 		switchlog = debug3;
++		rv = -2;
++	}
+ 
+ 	newlen = strlen(oldctx) + strlen(newname) + 1;
+ 	newctx = xmalloc(newlen);
+@@ -499,8 +501,11 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *n
+ 	if (setcon(newctx) < 0)
+ 		switchlog("%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s", __func__,
+ 		    newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno));
++	else
++		rv = 0;
+ 	xfree(oldctx);
+ 	xfree(newctx);
++	return rv;
+ }
+ 
+ void
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+--- openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.sesandbox	2011-09-19 04:10:14.817647868 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2011-09-19 04:10:15.401648009 +0200
+@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
+ int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+-void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
++int ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_chopy_context(void);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-darwin.c.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-darwin.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-darwin.c.sesandbox	2011-06-26 23:18:21.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-darwin.c	2011-09-19 04:10:15.490523231 +0200
+@@ -83,6 +83,12 @@ ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *bo
+ }
+ 
+ void
++ssh_sandbox_privileged_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
++{
++	/* empty */
++}
++
++void
+ ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+ {
+ 	free(box);
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-null.c.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-null.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-null.c.sesandbox	2011-06-23 11:45:51.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-null.c	2011-09-19 04:10:15.599458687 +0200
+@@ -58,6 +58,12 @@ ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *bo
+ }
+ 
+ void
++ssh_sandbox_privileged_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
++{
++	/* empty */
++}
++
++void
+ ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+ {
+ 	free(box);
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-rlimit.c.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-rlimit.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-rlimit.c.sesandbox	2011-06-23 11:45:51.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-rlimit.c	2011-09-19 04:10:16.077647289 +0200
+@@ -78,6 +78,12 @@ ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *bo
+ }
+ 
+ void
++ssh_sandbox_privileged_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
++{
++	/* empty */
++}
++
++void
+ ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+ {
+ 	free(box);
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-selinux.c.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-selinux.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-selinux.c.sesandbox	2011-09-19 04:10:16.179526059 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-selinux.c	2011-09-19 04:39:00.058646230 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
++/* $Id: sandbox-selinux.c,v 1.0 2011/01/17 10:15:30 jfch Exp $ */
++ 
++/*
++ * Copyright 2011 Red Hat, Inc.  All rights reserved.
++ * Use is subject to license terms.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ *
++ * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
++ */
++
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#ifdef SANDBOX_SELINUX
++
++#include <sys/types.h>
++
++#include <errno.h>
++#include <stdarg.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
++#include <sys/resource.h>
++
++#include "log.h"
++#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "openbsd-compat/port-linux.h"
++
++/* selinux based sandbox */
++
++struct ssh_sandbox {
++	pid_t child_pid;
++};
++
++struct ssh_sandbox *
++ssh_sandbox_init(void)
++{
++	struct ssh_sandbox *box;
++
++	/*
++	 * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need
++	 * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API.
++	 */
++	debug3("selinux sandbox init");
++	box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
++	box->child_pid = 0;
++	return box;
++}
++
++void
++ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
++{
++	struct rlimit rl_zero;
++
++	rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
++
++	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1)
++		fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
++			__func__, strerror(errno));
++	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero) == -1)
++		fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
++			__func__, strerror(errno));
++#ifdef HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC
++	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1)
++		fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s",
++			__func__, strerror(errno));
++#endif
++}
++
++void
++ssh_sandbox_privileged_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
++{
++	switch (ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_sandbox_t")) {
++	case 0:
++		debug3("selinux sandbox child sucessfully enabled");
++		break;
++	case -2:
++		logit("selinux sandbox not useful");
++		break;
++	case -1:
++		fatal("cannot set up selinux sandbox");
++	default:
++		fatal("inmternal error in selinux sandbox");
++	}
++}
++
++void
++ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
++{
++	free(box);
++	debug3("%s: finished", __func__);
++}
++
++void
++ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
++{
++	debug3("selinux sandbox parent sucessfully enabled");
++	box->child_pid = child_pid;
++}
++
++#endif /* SANDBOX_NULL */
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-systrace.c.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-systrace.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-systrace.c.sesandbox	2011-08-05 22:16:23.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-systrace.c	2011-09-19 04:10:16.268646532 +0200
+@@ -109,6 +109,12 @@ ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *bo
+ 	close(box->child_sock);
+ }
+ 
++void
++ssh_sandbox_privileged_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
++{
++	/* empty */
++}
++
+ static void
+ ssh_sandbox_parent(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid,
+     const struct sandbox_policy *allowed_syscalls)
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/ssh-sandbox.h.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/ssh-sandbox.h
+--- openssh-5.9p1/ssh-sandbox.h.sesandbox	2011-06-23 11:45:51.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/ssh-sandbox.h	2011-09-19 04:10:16.392523931 +0200
+@@ -19,5 +19,6 @@ struct ssh_sandbox;
+ 
+ struct ssh_sandbox *ssh_sandbox_init(void);
+ void ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *);
++void ssh_sandbox_privileged_child(struct ssh_sandbox *);
+ void ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *);
+ void ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *, pid_t);
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c.sesandbox	2011-09-19 04:10:14.564467584 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c	2011-09-19 04:36:43.324520132 +0200
+@@ -728,10 +730,12 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 		set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
+ 
+ 		/* Demote the child */
+-		if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
++		if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) {
++			ssh_sandbox_privileged_child(box);
+ 			privsep_preauth_child();
++		}
+ 		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
+ 		if (box != NULL) {
+ 			ssh_sandbox_child(box);
+ 			xfree(box);
+ 		}

openssh-5.9p1-sftp-chroot.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.9p0/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.sftp-chroot openssh-5.9p0/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+--- openssh-5.9p0/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.sftp-chroot	2011-09-01 04:12:22.743024608 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p0/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2011-09-01 04:12:23.069088065 +0200
+@@ -503,6 +503,23 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *n
+ 	xfree(newctx);
+ }
+ 
++void
++ssh_selinux_copy_context(void)
++{
++	char *ctx;
++
++	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
++		return;
++
++	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) < 0) {
++		logit("%s: getcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror (errno));
++		return;
++	}
++	if (setcon(ctx) < 0)
++		logit("%s: setcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror (errno));
++	xfree(ctx);
++}
++
+ #endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
+ 
+ #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+diff -up openssh-5.9p0/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.sftp-chroot openssh-5.9p0/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+--- openssh-5.9p0/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.sftp-chroot	2011-01-25 02:16:18.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.9p0/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2011-09-01 04:12:23.163088777 +0200
+@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
++void ssh_selinux_chopy_context(void);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -up openssh-5.9p0/session.c.sftp-chroot openssh-5.9p0/session.c
+--- openssh-5.9p0/session.c.sftp-chroot	2011-09-01 04:12:19.698049195 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p0/session.c	2011-09-01 04:40:03.598148719 +0200
+@@ -1519,6 +1519,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+ 			    pw->pw_uid);
+ 			chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
+ 			    "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++			ssh_selinux_change_context("chroot_user_t");
++#endif
+ 			safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
+ 			free(tmp);
+ 			free(chroot_path);
+@@ -1788,7 +1791,10 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+ 		optind = optreset = 1;
+ 		__progname = argv[0];
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-		ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
++		if (options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
++		    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) {
++			ssh_selinux_copy_context();
++		}
+ #endif
+ 		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
+ 	}

openssh-5.9p1-wIm.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in.wIm openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in.wIm	2011-08-05 22:15:18.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in	2011-09-12 16:24:18.643674014 +0200
+@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=acss.o authfd.o authfile.o b
+ 	cipher-bf1.o cipher-ctr.o cipher-3des1.o cleanup.o \
+ 	compat.o compress.o crc32.o deattack.o fatal.o hostfile.o \
+ 	log.o match.o md-sha256.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o \
+-	readpass.o rsa.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addrmatch.o \
++	readpass.o rsa.o ttymodes.o whereIam.o xmalloc.o addrmatch.o \
+ 	atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
+ 	monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
+ 	kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/log.h.wIm openssh-5.9p1/log.h
+--- openssh-5.9p1/log.h.wIm	2011-06-20 06:42:23.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/log.h	2011-09-12 16:34:52.984674326 +0200
+@@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ void     verbose(const char *, ...) __at
+ void     debug(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+ void     debug2(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+ void     debug3(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
++void	 _debug_wIm_body(const char *, int, const char *, const char *, int);
++#define	debug_wIm(a,b) _debug_wIm_body(a,b,__func__,__FILE__,__LINE__)
+ 
+ 
+ void	 set_log_handler(log_handler_fn *, void *);
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c.wIm openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c.wIm	2011-06-23 11:45:51.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c	2011-09-12 16:38:35.787816490 +0200
+@@ -140,6 +140,9 @@ int deny_severity;
+ 
+ extern char *__progname;
+ 
++/* trace of fork processes */
++extern int whereIam;
++
+ /* Server configuration options. */
+ ServerOptions options;
+ 
+@@ -666,6 +669,7 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 		return 1;
+ 	} else {
+ 		/* child */
++		whereIam = 1;
+ 		close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+ 		close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
+ 
+@@ -715,6 +719,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 
+ 	/* child */
+ 
++	whereIam = 2;
+ 	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+ 	pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
+ 
+@@ -1325,6 +1330,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	Key *key;
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt;
+ 
++	whereIam = 0;
++
+ #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
+ 	(void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh-5.9p1/whereIam.c.wIm openssh-5.9p1/whereIam.c
+--- openssh-5.9p1/whereIam.c.wIm	2011-09-12 16:24:18.722674167 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p1/whereIam.c	2011-09-12 16:24:18.724674418 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
++
++int whereIam = -1;
++
++void _debug_wIm_body(const char *txt, int val, const char *func, const char *file, int line)
++{
++	if (txt)
++		debug("%s=%d, %s(%s:%d) wIm = %d, uid=%d, euid=%d", txt, val, func, file, line, whereIam, getuid(), geteuid());
++	else
++		debug("%s(%s:%d) wIm = %d, uid=%d, euid=%d", func, file, line, whereIam, getuid(), geteuid());
++}
++
++

openssh-6.0p1-audit1.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,641 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.0p1/audit-bsm.c.audit1 openssh-6.0p1/audit-bsm.c
+--- openssh-6.0p1/audit-bsm.c.audit1	2012-02-24 00:40:43.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-6.0p1/audit-bsm.c	2012-08-06 20:33:24.416382804 +0200
+@@ -375,10 +375,23 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host,
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+-void
++int
+ audit_run_command(const char *command)
+ {
+ 	/* not implemented */
++	return 0;
++}
++
++void
++audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
++{
++	/* not implemented */
++}
++
++void
++audit_count_session_open(void)
++{
++	/* not necessary */
+ }
+ 
+ void
+diff -up openssh-6.0p1/audit.c.audit1 openssh-6.0p1/audit.c
+--- openssh-6.0p1/audit.c.audit1	2011-01-17 11:15:30.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-6.0p1/audit.c	2012-08-06 20:33:24.417382801 +0200
+@@ -140,6 +140,17 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ }
+ 
+ /*
++ * Called when a child process has called, or will soon call,
++ * audit_session_open.
++ */
++void
++audit_count_session_open(void)
++{
++	debug("audit count session open euid %d user %s", geteuid(),
++	      audit_username());
++}
++
++/*
+  * Called when a user session is started.  Argument is the tty allocated to
+  * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated.
+  *
+@@ -174,13 +185,29 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li
+ /*
+  * This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command.  Note that
+  * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
+- * multiple sessions within a single connection.
++ * multiple sessions within a single connection.  Returns a "handle" for
++ * audit_end_command.
+  */
+-void
++int
+ audit_run_command(const char *command)
+ {
+ 	debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
+ 	    audit_username(), command);
++	return 0;
++}
++
++/*
++ * This will be called when the non-interactive command finishes.  Note that
++ * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
++ * multiple sessions within a single connection.  "handle" should come from
++ * the corresponding audit_run_command.
++ */
++void
++audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
++{
++	debug("audit end nopty exec  euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
++	    audit_username(), command);
+ }
++
+ # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff -up openssh-6.0p1/audit.h.audit1 openssh-6.0p1/audit.h
+--- openssh-6.0p1/audit.h.audit1	2011-01-17 11:15:30.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-6.0p1/audit.h	2012-08-06 20:33:24.417382801 +0200
+@@ -49,9 +49,11 @@ typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_au
+ 
+ void	audit_connection_from(const char *, int);
+ void	audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
++void	audit_count_session_open(void);
+ void	audit_session_open(struct logininfo *);
+ void	audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
+-void	audit_run_command(const char *);
++int	audit_run_command(const char *);
++void 	audit_end_command(int, const char *);
+ ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
+ 
+ #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
+diff -up openssh-6.0p1/audit-linux.c.audit1 openssh-6.0p1/audit-linux.c
+--- openssh-6.0p1/audit-linux.c.audit1	2011-01-17 11:15:30.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-6.0p1/audit-linux.c	2012-08-06 20:33:24.416382804 +0200
+@@ -35,13 +35,20 @@
+ 
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "audit.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "hostfile.h"
++#include "auth.h"
++#include "servconf.h"
+ #include "canohost.h"
+ 
++extern ServerOptions options;
++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
++extern u_int utmp_len;
+ const char* audit_username(void);
+ 
+-int
+-linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username,
+-    const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success)
++static void
++linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username,
++    const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
+ {
+ 	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
+ 
+@@ -49,11 +56,11 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const
+ 	if (audit_fd < 0) {
+ 		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
+ 		    errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
+-			return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */
++			return; /* No audit support in kernel */
+ 		else
+-			return 0; /* Must prevent login */
++			goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
+ 	}
+-	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN,
++	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event,
+ 	    NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
+ 	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
+ 	saved_errno = errno;
+@@ -65,35 +72,119 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const
+ 	if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
+ 		rc = 0;
+ 	errno = saved_errno;
+-	return (rc >= 0);
++	if (rc < 0) {
++fatal_report:
++		fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
++	}
++}
++
++static void
++linux_audit_user_auth(int uid, const char *username,
++    const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
++{
++	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
++	static const char *event_name[] = {
++		"maxtries exceeded",
++		"root denied",
++		"success",
++		"none",
++		"password",
++		"challenge-response",
++		"pubkey",
++		"hostbased",
++		"gssapi",
++		"invalid user",
++		"nologin",
++		"connection closed",
++		"connection abandoned",
++		"unknown"
++	};
++
++	audit_fd = audit_open();
++	if (audit_fd < 0) {
++		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
++		    errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
++			return; /* No audit support in kernel */
++		else
++			goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
++	}
++	
++	if ((event < 0) || (event > SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN))
++		event = SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN;
++
++	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH,
++	    NULL, event_name[event], username ? username : "(unknown)",
++	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
++	saved_errno = errno;
++	close(audit_fd);
++	/*
++	 * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non
++	 * root user.
++	 */
++	if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
++		rc = 0;
++	errno = saved_errno;
++	if (rc < 0) {
++fatal_report:
++		fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
++	}
+ }
+ 
++static int user_login_count = 0;
++
+ /* Below is the sshd audit API code */
+ 
+ void
+ audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
+ {
+-}
+ 	/* not implemented */
++}
+ 
+-void
++int
+ audit_run_command(const char *command)
+ {
+-	/* not implemented */
++	if (!user_login_count++) 
++		linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
++		    NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
++	linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
++	    NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
++	return 0;
++}
++
++void
++audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
++{
++	linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
++	    NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
++	if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) 
++		linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
++		    NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
++}
++
++void
++audit_count_session_open(void)
++{
++	user_login_count++;
+ }
+ 
+ void
+ audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
+ {
+-	if (linux_audit_record_event(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
+-	    NULL, li->line, 1) == 0)
+-		fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
++	if (!user_login_count++) 
++		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
++		    NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
++	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
++	    NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
+ {
+-	/* not implemented */
++	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
++	    NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
++	if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) 
++		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
++		    NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+@@ -101,21 +192,43 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ {
+ 	switch(event) {
+ 	case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS:
+-	case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
++		linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
++			get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 1, event);
++		break;
++
+ 	case SSH_NOLOGIN:
+-	case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
+ 	case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
++		linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
++			get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, event);
++		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
++			get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
+ 		break;
+ 
++	case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
+ 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE:
+ 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
+ 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
+ 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
+ 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
+ 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
++		linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
++			get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, event);
++		break;
++
++	case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
++		if (user_login_count) {
++			while (user_login_count--)
++				linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
++				    NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
++			linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
++			    NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
++		}
++		break;
++
++	case SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON:
+ 	case SSH_INVALID_USER:
+-		linux_audit_record_event(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
+-			get_remote_ipaddr(), "sshd", 0);
++		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
++			get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
+ 		break;
+ 
+ 	default:
+diff -up openssh-6.0p1/monitor.c.audit1 openssh-6.0p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-6.0p1/monitor.c.audit1	2012-08-06 20:33:24.410382828 +0200
++++ openssh-6.0p1/monitor.c	2012-08-06 20:33:24.418382797 +0200
+@@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
++int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
+@@ -272,6 +273,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
+ #endif
+     {0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+@@ -314,6 +316,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
+ #endif
+     {0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+@@ -1427,6 +1430,12 @@ mm_session_close(Session *s)
+ 		debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
+ 		session_pty_cleanup2(s);
+ 	}
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	if (s->command != NULL) {
++		debug3("%s: command %d", __func__, s->command_handle);
++		session_end_command2(s);
++	}
++#endif
+ 	session_unused(s->self);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1751,11 +1760,44 @@ mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buff
+ {
+ 	u_int len;
+ 	char *cmd;
++	Session *s;
+ 
+ 	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+ 	cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
++
+ 	/* sanity check command, if so how? */
+-	audit_run_command(cmd);
++	s = session_new();
++	if (s == NULL)
++		fatal("%s: error allocating a session", __func__);
++	s->command = cmd;
++	s->command_handle = audit_run_command(cmd);
++
++	buffer_clear(m);
++	buffer_put_int(m, s->self);
++
++	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, m);
++
++	return (0);
++}
++
++int
++mm_answer_audit_end_command(int socket, Buffer *m)
++{
++	int handle;
++	u_int len;
++	char *cmd;
++	Session *s;
++
++	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
++	handle = buffer_get_int(m);
++	cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
++
++	s = session_by_id(handle);
++	if (s == NULL || s->ttyfd != -1 || s->command == NULL ||
++	    strcmp(s->command, cmd) != 0)
++		fatal("%s: invalid handle", __func__);
++	mm_session_close(s);
++
+ 	xfree(cmd);
+ 	return (0);
+ }
+diff -up openssh-6.0p1/monitor.h.audit1 openssh-6.0p1/monitor.h
+--- openssh-6.0p1/monitor.h.audit1	2011-06-20 06:42:23.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.0p1/monitor.h	2012-08-06 20:33:24.418382797 +0200
+@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND,
++	MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_TERM,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA,
+diff -up openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit1 openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit1	2012-08-06 20:33:24.384382930 +0200
++++ openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.c	2012-08-06 20:33:24.419382793 +0200
+@@ -1188,10 +1188,11 @@ mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ 	buffer_free(&m);
+ }
+ 
+-void
++int
+ mm_audit_run_command(const char *command)
+ {
+ 	Buffer m;
++	int handle;
+ 
+ 	debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
+ 
+@@ -1199,6 +1200,26 @@ mm_audit_run_command(const char *command
+ 	buffer_put_cstring(&m, command);
+ 
+ 	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
++	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
++
++	handle = buffer_get_int(&m);
++	buffer_free(&m);
++
++	return (handle);
++}
++
++void
++mm_audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
++{
++	Buffer m;
++
++	debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
++
++	buffer_init(&m);
++	buffer_put_int(&m, handle);
++	buffer_put_cstring(&m, command);
++
++	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, &m);
+ 	buffer_free(&m);
+ }
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff -up openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit1 openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.h
+--- openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit1	2011-06-20 06:42:23.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.h	2012-08-06 20:33:24.419382793 +0200
+@@ -74,7 +74,8 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ #include "audit.h"
+ void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
+-void mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
++int mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
++void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ struct Session;
+diff -up openssh-6.0p1/session.c.audit1 openssh-6.0p1/session.c
+--- openssh-6.0p1/session.c.audit1	2011-11-04 00:55:24.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-6.0p1/session.c	2012-08-06 20:33:24.420382789 +0200
+@@ -742,6 +742,14 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm
+ 	/* Parent.  Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */
+ 	close(ttyfd);
+ 
++#ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
++	/* do_login in the child did not affect state in this process,
++	   compensate.  From an architectural standpoint, this is extremely
++	   ugly. */
++	if (!(options.use_login && command == NULL))
++		audit_count_session_open();
++#endif
++
+ 	/* Enter interactive session. */
+ 	s->ptymaster = ptymaster;
+ 	packet_set_interactive(1, 
+@@ -813,15 +821,19 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 	}
+ 
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1)
++		fatal("do_exec: command already set");
+ 	if (command != NULL)
+-		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
++		s->command = xstrdup(command);
+ 	else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
+ 		char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell;
+ 
+ 		if (shell[0] == '\0')	/* empty shell means /bin/sh */
+ 			shell =_PATH_BSHELL;
+-		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell));
++		s->command = xstrdup(shell);
+ 	}
++	if (s->command != NULL)
++		s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(s->command));
+ #endif
+ 	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+ 		ret = do_exec_pty(s, command);
+@@ -1848,6 +1860,7 @@ session_unused(int id)
+ 	sessions[id].ttyfd = -1;
+ 	sessions[id].ptymaster = -1;
+ 	sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL;
++	sessions[id].command_handle = -1;
+ 	sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused;
+ 	sessions_first_unused = id;
+ }
+@@ -1930,6 +1943,19 @@ session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int cha
+ }
+ 
+ Session *
++session_by_id(int id)
++{
++	if (id >= 0 && id < sessions_nalloc) {
++		Session *s = &sessions[id];
++		if (s->used)
++			return s;
++	}
++	debug("session_by_id: unknown id %d", id);
++	session_dump();
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++Session *
+ session_by_tty(char *tty)
+ {
+ 	int i;
+@@ -2455,6 +2481,30 @@ session_exit_message(Session *s, int sta
+ 		chan_write_failed(c);
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++void
++session_end_command2(Session *s)
++{
++	if (s->command != NULL) {
++		audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command);
++		xfree(s->command);
++		s->command = NULL;
++		s->command_handle = -1;
++	}
++}
++
++static void
++session_end_command(Session *s)
++{
++	if (s->command != NULL) {
++		PRIVSEP(audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command));
++		xfree(s->command);
++		s->command = NULL;
++		s->command_handle = -1;
++	}
++}
++#endif
++
+ void
+ session_close(Session *s)
+ {
+@@ -2463,6 +2513,10 @@ session_close(Session *s)
+ 	debug("session_close: session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid);
+ 	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+ 		session_pty_cleanup(s);
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	if (s->command)
++		session_end_command(s);
++#endif
+ 	if (s->term)
+ 		xfree(s->term);
+ 	if (s->display)
+@@ -2682,6 +2736,15 @@ do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	server_loop2(authctxt);
+ }
+ 
++static void
++do_cleanup_one_session(Session *s)
++{
++	session_pty_cleanup2(s);
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	session_end_command2(s);
++#endif
++}
++
+ void
+ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ {
+@@ -2730,5 +2793,5 @@ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	 * or if running in monitor.
+ 	 */
+ 	if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
+-		session_destroy_all(session_pty_cleanup2);
++		session_destroy_all(do_cleanup_one_session);
+ }
+diff -up openssh-6.0p1/session.h.audit1 openssh-6.0p1/session.h
+--- openssh-6.0p1/session.h.audit1	2008-05-19 07:34:50.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.0p1/session.h	2012-08-06 20:33:24.420382789 +0200
+@@ -60,6 +60,12 @@ struct Session {
+ 		char	*name;
+ 		char	*val;
+ 	} *env;
++
++	/* exec */
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	int	command_handle;
++	char	*command;
++#endif
+ };
+ 
+ void	 do_authenticated(Authctxt *);
+@@ -72,8 +78,10 @@ void	 session_close_by_pid(pid_t, int);
+ void	 session_close_by_channel(int, void *);
+ void	 session_destroy_all(void (*)(Session *));
+ void	 session_pty_cleanup2(Session *);
++void	 session_end_command2(Session *);
+ 
+ Session	*session_new(void);
++Session *session_by_id(int);
+ Session	*session_by_tty(char *);
+ void	 session_close(Session *);
+ void	 do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
+diff -up openssh-6.0p1/sshd.c.audit1 openssh-6.0p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-6.0p1/sshd.c.audit1	2012-08-06 20:33:24.392382898 +0200
++++ openssh-6.0p1/sshd.c	2012-08-06 20:33:24.421382785 +0200
+@@ -2381,7 +2381,8 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
+ 	}
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ 	/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
+-	if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
++	if ((the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) &&
++	    (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
+ 		audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
+ #endif
+ 	_exit(i);

openssh-6.0p1-audit5.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,486 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.0p1/audit-bsm.c.audit5 openssh-6.0p1/audit-bsm.c
+--- openssh-6.0p1/audit-bsm.c.audit5	2012-08-06 20:37:50.036345216 +0200
++++ openssh-6.0p1/audit-bsm.c	2012-08-06 20:37:50.046345177 +0200
+@@ -491,4 +491,22 @@ audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pi
+ {
+ 	/* not implemented */
+ }
++
++void
++audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp)
++{
++	/* not implemented */
++}
++
++void
++audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++	/* not implemented */
++}
++
++void
++audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp)
++{
++	/* not implemented */
++}
+ #endif /* BSM */
+diff -up openssh-6.0p1/audit.c.audit5 openssh-6.0p1/audit.c
+--- openssh-6.0p1/audit.c.audit5	2012-08-06 20:37:50.036345216 +0200
++++ openssh-6.0p1/audit.c	2012-08-06 20:37:50.047345173 +0200
+@@ -290,5 +290,24 @@ audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pi
+ 	debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u",
+ 		(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
+ }
++
++/*
++ * This will be called on destroy private part of the server key
++ */
++void
++audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++	debug("audit destroy sensitive data euid %d fingerprint %s from pid %ld uid %u",
++		geteuid(), fp, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
++}
++
++/*
++ * This will be called on generation of the ephemeral server key
++ */
++void
++audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *)
++{
++	debug("audit create ephemeral server key euid %d fingerprint %s", geteuid(), fp);
++}
+ # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff -up openssh-6.0p1/audit.h.audit5 openssh-6.0p1/audit.h
+--- openssh-6.0p1/audit.h.audit5	2012-08-06 20:37:50.037345212 +0200
++++ openssh-6.0p1/audit.h	2012-08-06 20:37:50.047345173 +0200
+@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ enum ssh_audit_event_type {
+ };
+ typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t;
+ 
++int	listening_for_clients(void);
++
+ void	audit_connection_from(const char *, int);
+ void	audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
+ void	audit_count_session_open(void);
+@@ -64,5 +66,7 @@ void	audit_unsupported_body(int);
+ void	audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+ void	audit_session_key_free(int ctos);
+ void	audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
++void	audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
++void	audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *);
+ 
+ #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
+diff -up openssh-6.0p1/audit-linux.c.audit5 openssh-6.0p1/audit-linux.c
+--- openssh-6.0p1/audit-linux.c.audit5	2012-08-06 20:37:50.037345212 +0200
++++ openssh-6.0p1/audit-linux.c	2012-08-06 20:37:50.046345177 +0200
+@@ -356,4 +356,50 @@ audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pi
+ 		error("cannot write into audit");
+ }
+ 
++void
++audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
++	int audit_fd, audit_ok;
++
++	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=server fp=%s direction=? spid=%jd suid=%jd ",
++		fp, (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid);
++	audit_fd = audit_open();
++	if (audit_fd < 0) {
++		if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
++					 errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
++			error("cannot open audit");
++		return;
++	}
++	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
++			buf, NULL,
++			listening_for_clients() ? NULL : get_remote_ipaddr(),
++			NULL, 1);
++	audit_close(audit_fd);
++	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
++	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++		error("cannot write into audit");
++}
++
++void
++audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp)
++{
++	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
++	int audit_fd, audit_ok;
++
++	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=create kind=server fp=%s direction=? ", fp);
++	audit_fd = audit_open();
++	if (audit_fd < 0) {
++		if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
++					 errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
++			error("cannot open audit");
++		return;
++	}
++	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
++			buf, NULL, 0, NULL, 1);
++	audit_close(audit_fd);
++	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
++	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++		error("cannot write into audit");
++}
+ #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
+diff -up openssh-6.0p1/key.c.audit5 openssh-6.0p1/key.c
+--- openssh-6.0p1/key.c.audit5	2012-08-06 20:37:49.992345388 +0200
++++ openssh-6.0p1/key.c	2012-08-06 20:37:50.048345169 +0200
+@@ -1794,6 +1794,30 @@ key_demote(const Key *k)
+ }
+ 
+ int
++key_is_private(const Key *k)
++{
++	switch (k->type) {
++	case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
++	case KEY_RSA_CERT:
++	case KEY_RSA1:
++	case KEY_RSA:
++		return k->rsa->d != NULL;
++	case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
++	case KEY_DSA_CERT:
++	case KEY_DSA:
++		return k->dsa->priv_key != NULL;
++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
++	case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
++	case KEY_ECDSA:
++		return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa) != NULL;
++#endif
++	default:
++		fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type);
++		return 1;
++	}
++}
++
++int
+ key_is_cert(const Key *k)
+ {
+ 	if (k == NULL)
+diff -up openssh-6.0p1/key.h.audit5 openssh-6.0p1/key.h
+--- openssh-6.0p1/key.h.audit5	2012-08-06 20:37:49.993345384 +0200
++++ openssh-6.0p1/key.h	2012-08-06 20:37:50.049345165 +0200
+@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Key	*key_generate(int, u_int);
+ Key	*key_from_private(const Key *);
+ int	 key_type_from_name(char *);
+ int	 key_is_cert(const Key *);
++int	 key_is_private(const Key *k);
+ int	 key_type_plain(int);
+ int	 key_to_certified(Key *, int);
+ int	 key_drop_cert(Key *);
+diff -up openssh-6.0p1/monitor.c.audit5 openssh-6.0p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-6.0p1/monitor.c.audit5	2012-08-06 20:37:50.040345200 +0200
++++ openssh-6.0p1/monitor.c	2012-08-06 20:37:50.049345165 +0200
+@@ -114,6 +114,8 @@ extern Buffer auth_debug;
+ extern int auth_debug_init;
+ extern Buffer loginmsg;
+ 
++extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int);
++
+ /* State exported from the child */
+ 
+ struct {
+@@ -190,6 +192,7 @@ int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buf
+ int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int, Buffer *);
++int mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int, Buffer *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
+@@ -244,6 +247,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
+ #endif
+ #ifdef BSD_AUTH
+     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
+@@ -284,6 +288,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
+ #endif
+     {0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+@@ -318,6 +323,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[]
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
+ #endif
+     {0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+@@ -333,6 +339,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
+ #endif
+     {0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+@@ -1744,6 +1751,8 @@ mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
+ 		sshpam_cleanup();
+ #endif
+ 
++	destroy_sensitive_data(0);
++
+ 	while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
+ 		if (errno != EINTR)
+ 			exit(1);
+@@ -2485,4 +2494,25 @@ mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(in
+ 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m);
+ 	return 0;
+ }
++
++int
++mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int sock, Buffer *m)
++{
++	int len;
++	char *fp;
++	pid_t pid;
++	uid_t uid;
++
++	fp = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
++	pid = buffer_get_int64(m);
++	uid = buffer_get_int64(m);
++
++	audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid);
++
++	xfree(fp);
++	buffer_clear(m);
++
++	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m);
++	return 0;
++}
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff -up openssh-6.0p1/monitor.h.audit5 openssh-6.0p1/monitor.h
+--- openssh-6.0p1/monitor.h.audit5	2012-08-06 20:37:50.040345200 +0200
++++ openssh-6.0p1/monitor.h	2012-08-06 20:37:50.050345161 +0200
+@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE,
++	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_TERM,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA,
+diff -up openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit5 openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit5	2012-08-06 20:37:50.041345196 +0200
++++ openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.c	2012-08-06 20:37:50.050345161 +0200
+@@ -1539,4 +1539,20 @@ mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos,
+ 				  &m);
+ 	buffer_free(&m);
+ }
++
++void
++mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++	Buffer m;
++
++	buffer_init(&m);
++	buffer_put_cstring(&m, fp);
++	buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
++	buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
++
++	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, &m);
++	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE,
++				  &m);
++	buffer_free(&m);
++}
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff -up openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit5 openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.h
+--- openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit5	2012-08-06 20:37:50.041345196 +0200
++++ openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.h	2012-08-06 20:37:50.051345157 +0200
+@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ void mm_audit_end_command(int, const cha
+ void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
+ void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+ void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t);
++void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+ #endif
+ 
+ struct Session;
+diff -up openssh-6.0p1/session.c.audit5 openssh-6.0p1/session.c
+--- openssh-6.0p1/session.c.audit5	2012-08-06 20:37:50.043345189 +0200
++++ openssh-6.0p1/session.c	2012-08-06 20:37:50.052345153 +0200
+@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ extern int log_stderr;
+ extern int debug_flag;
+ extern u_int utmp_len;
+ extern int startup_pipe;
+-extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
++extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int);
+ extern Buffer loginmsg;
+ 
+ /* original command from peer. */
+@@ -1633,7 +1633,7 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+ 	int r = 0;
+ 
+ 	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
+-	destroy_sensitive_data();
++	destroy_sensitive_data(1);
+ 	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
+ 	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
+ 	packet_destroy_all(0, 1);
+diff -up openssh-6.0p1/sshd.c.audit5 openssh-6.0p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-6.0p1/sshd.c.audit5	2012-08-06 20:37:50.044345185 +0200
++++ openssh-6.0p1/sshd.c	2012-08-06 20:37:50.053345149 +0200
+@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ Buffer loginmsg;
+ struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
+ 
+ /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
+-void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
++void destroy_sensitive_data(int);
+ void demote_sensitive_data(void);
+ 
+ static void do_ssh1_kex(void);
+@@ -274,6 +274,15 @@ close_listen_socks(void)
+ 	num_listen_socks = -1;
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * Is this process listening for clients (i.e. not specific to any specific
++ * client connection?)
++ */
++int listening_for_clients(void)
++{
++	return num_listen_socks > 0;
++}
++
+ static void
+ close_startup_pipes(void)
+ {
+@@ -534,22 +543,47 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+-/* Destroy the host and server keys.  They will no longer be needed. */
++/*
++ * Destroy the host and server keys.  They will no longer be needed.  Careful,
++ * this can be called from cleanup_exit() - i.e. from just about anywhere.
++ */
+ void
+-destroy_sensitive_data(void)
++destroy_sensitive_data(int privsep)
+ {
+ 	int i;
++	pid_t pid;
++	uid_t uid;
+ 
+ 	if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
+ 		key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
+ 		sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
+ 	}
++	pid = getpid();
++	uid = getuid();
+ 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ 		if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
++			char *fp;
++
++			if (key_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]))
++				fp = key_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i],
++					FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5,
++					SSH_FP_HEX);
++			else
++				fp = NULL;
+ 			key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
+ 			sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
++			if (fp != NULL) {
++				if (privsep)
++					PRIVSEP(audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp,
++						pid, uid));
++				else
++					audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp,
++						pid, uid);
++				xfree(fp);
++			}
+ 		}
+-		if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) {
++		if (sensitive_data.host_certificates
++		    && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) {
+ 			key_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]);
+ 			sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
+ 		}
+@@ -563,6 +597,8 @@ void
+ demote_sensitive_data(void)
+ {
+ 	Key *tmp;
++	pid_t pid;
++	uid_t uid;
+ 	int i;
+ 
+ 	if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
+@@ -571,13 +607,27 @@ demote_sensitive_data(void)
+ 		sensitive_data.server_key = tmp;
+ 	}
+ 
++	pid = getpid();
++	uid = getuid();
+ 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ 		if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
++			char *fp;
++
++			if (key_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]))
++				fp = key_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i],
++					FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5,
++					SSH_FP_HEX);
++			else
++				fp = NULL;
+ 			tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
+ 			key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
+ 			sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
+ 			if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1)
+ 				sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp;
++			if (fp != NULL) {
++				audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid);
++				xfree(fp);
++			}
+ 		}
+ 		/* Certs do not need demotion */
+ 	}
+@@ -1149,6 +1199,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
+ 		if (received_sigterm) {
+ 			logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
+ 			    (int) received_sigterm);
++			destroy_sensitive_data(0);
+ 			close_listen_socks();
+ 			unlink(options.pid_file);
+ 			exit(received_sigterm == SIGTERM ? 0 : 255);
+@@ -2054,7 +2105,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		privsep_postauth(authctxt);
+ 		/* the monitor process [priv] will not return */
+ 		if (!compat20)
+-			destroy_sensitive_data();
++			destroy_sensitive_data(0);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval,
+@@ -2065,6 +2116,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 
+ 	/* The connection has been terminated. */
+ 	packet_destroy_all(1, 1);
++	destroy_sensitive_data(1);
+ 
+ 	packet_get_state(MODE_IN, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ibytes);
+ 	packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, NULL, NULL, NULL, &obytes);
+@@ -2293,7 +2345,7 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
+ 			session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16];
+ 	}
+ 	/* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */
+-	destroy_sensitive_data();
++	destroy_sensitive_data(0);
+ 
+ 	if (use_privsep)
+ 		mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id);
+@@ -2404,6 +2456,8 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	is_privsep_child = use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && !mm_is_monitor();
++	if (sensitive_data.host_keys != NULL)
++		destroy_sensitive_data(is_privsep_child);
+ 	packet_destroy_all(1, is_privsep_child);
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ 	/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */

openssh-6.0p1-entropy.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,272 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.0p1/entropy.c.entropy openssh-6.0p1/entropy.c
+--- openssh-6.0p1/entropy.c.entropy	2012-08-06 20:51:59.131033413 +0200
++++ openssh-6.0p1/entropy.c	2012-08-06 20:51:59.171033257 +0200
+@@ -237,6 +237,9 @@ seed_rng(void)
+ 	memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
+ 
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
++#ifdef __linux__
++	linux_seed();
++#endif /* __linux__ */
+ 	if (RAND_status() != 1)
+ 		fatal("PRNG is not seeded");
+ }
+diff -up openssh-6.0p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.entropy openssh-6.0p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-6.0p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.entropy	2012-08-06 20:51:59.100033534 +0200
++++ openssh-6.0p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in	2012-08-06 20:51:59.171033257 +0200
+@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bindresvport
+ 
+ COMPAT=bsd-arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o
+ 
+-PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux_part_2.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
++PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux_part_2.o port-linux-prng.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
+ 
+ .c.o:
+ 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
+diff -up openssh-6.0p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c.entropy openssh-6.0p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
+--- openssh-6.0p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c.entropy	2012-08-06 20:51:59.171033257 +0200
++++ openssh-6.0p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c	2012-08-06 20:51:59.171033257 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
++/* $Id: port-linux.c,v 1.11.4.2 2011/02/04 00:43:08 djm Exp $ */
++
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2011 Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
++ *
++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
++ *
++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
++ */
++
++/*
++ * Linux-specific portability code - prng support
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#include <errno.h>
++#include <stdarg.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <openssl/rand.h>
++
++#include "log.h"
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "servconf.h"
++#include "port-linux.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "hostfile.h"
++#include "auth.h"
++
++void
++linux_seed(void)
++{
++	int len;
++	char *env = getenv("SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG");
++	char *random = "/dev/random";
++	size_t ienv, randlen = 6;
++
++	if (!env || !strcmp(env, "0"))
++		random = "/dev/urandom";
++	else if ((ienv = atoi(env)) > 6)
++		randlen = ienv;
++
++	errno = 0;
++	if ((len = RAND_load_file(random, randlen)) != randlen) {
++		if (errno)
++			fatal ("cannot read from %s, %s", random, strerror(errno));
++		else
++			fatal ("EOF reading %s", random);
++	}
++}
+diff -up openssh-6.0p1/ssh.1.entropy openssh-6.0p1/ssh.1
+--- openssh-6.0p1/ssh.1.entropy	2012-08-06 20:51:59.139033382 +0200
++++ openssh-6.0p1/ssh.1	2012-08-06 20:51:59.174033245 +0200
+@@ -1269,6 +1269,23 @@ For more information, see the
+ .Cm PermitUserEnvironment
+ option in
+ .Xr sshd_config 5 .
++.Sh ENVIRONMENT
++.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
++.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
++.Cm /dev/urandom .
++If the 
++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++environment variable is set to value other than
++.Cm 0
++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
++.Cm /dev/random .
++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
++Minimum is 6 bytes.
++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
++be blocked until enough entropy is available.
++.El
+ .Sh FILES
+ .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+ .It Pa ~/.rhosts
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/ssh-add.0.entropy openssh-6.1p1/ssh-add.0
+--- openssh-6.1p1/ssh-add.0.entropy	2012-11-12 13:11:42.717393364 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/ssh-add.0	2012-11-12 13:12:46.288108790 +0100
+@@ -81,6 +81,16 @@ ENVIRONMENT
+              Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to communicate
+              with the agent.
+ 
++     SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++             The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done
++             from /dev/urandom.  If the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG environment vari-
++             able is set to value other than 0 the OpenSSL random generator is
++             reseeded from /dev/random.  The number of bytes read is defined
++             by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.  Minimum is 6 bytes.  This set-
++             ting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
++             random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connec-
++             tion to be blocked until enough entropy is available.
++
+ FILES
+      ~/.ssh/identity
+              Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/ssh-add.1.entropy openssh-6.1p1/ssh-add.1
+--- openssh-6.1p1/ssh-add.1.entropy	2011-10-18 07:06:33.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/ssh-add.1	2012-11-12 13:11:24.711476108 +0100
+@@ -160,6 +160,20 @@ to make this work.)
+ Identifies the path of a
+ .Ux Ns -domain
+ socket used to communicate with the agent.
++.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
++.Cm /dev/urandom .
++If the 
++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++environment variable is set to value other than
++.Cm 0
++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
++.Cm /dev/random .
++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
++Minimum is 6 bytes.
++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
++be blocked until enough entropy is available.
+ .El
+ .Sh FILES
+ .Bl -tag -width Ds
+ .It Pa ~/.ssh/identity
+diff -up openssh-6.0p1/ssh-agent.1.entropy openssh-6.0p1/ssh-agent.1
+--- openssh-6.0p1/ssh-agent.1.entropy	2010-12-01 01:50:35.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-6.0p1/ssh-agent.1	2012-08-06 20:51:59.172033253 +0200
+@@ -198,6 +198,24 @@ sockets used to contain the connection t
+ These sockets should only be readable by the owner.
+ The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits.
+ .El
++.Sh ENVIRONMENT
++.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
++.Pp
++.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
++.Cm /dev/urandom .
++If the 
++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++environment variable is set to value other than
++.Cm 0
++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
++.Cm /dev/random .
++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
++Minimum is 6 bytes.
++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
++be blocked until enough entropy is available.
++.El
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr ssh 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+diff -up openssh-6.0p1/sshd.8.entropy openssh-6.0p1/sshd.8
+--- openssh-6.0p1/sshd.8.entropy	2012-08-06 20:51:59.139033382 +0200
++++ openssh-6.0p1/sshd.8	2012-08-06 20:51:59.174033245 +0200
+@@ -943,6 +943,24 @@ concurrently for different ports, this c
+ started last).
+ The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
+ .El
++.Sh ENVIRONMENT
++.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
++.Pp
++.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
++.Cm /dev/urandom .
++If the 
++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++environment variable is set to value other than
++.Cm 0
++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
++.Cm /dev/random .
++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
++Minimum is 6 bytes.
++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
++be blocked until enough entropy is available.
++.El
+ .Sh IPV6
+ IPv6 address can be used everywhere where IPv4 address. In all entries must be the IPv6 address enclosed in square brackets. Note: The square brackets are metacharacters for the shell and must be escaped in shell.
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+diff -up openssh-6.0p1/ssh-keygen.1.entropy openssh-6.0p1/ssh-keygen.1
+--- openssh-6.0p1/ssh-keygen.1.entropy	2011-10-18 07:05:21.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.0p1/ssh-keygen.1	2012-08-06 20:51:59.173033249 +0200
+@@ -675,6 +675,24 @@ Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for
+ The file format is described in
+ .Xr moduli 5 .
+ .El
++.Sh ENVIRONMENT
++.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
++.Pp
++.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
++.Cm /dev/urandom .
++If the 
++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++environment variable is set to value other than
++.Cm 0
++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
++.Cm /dev/random .
++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
++Minimum is 6 bytes.
++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
++be blocked until enough entropy is available.
++.El
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr ssh 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+diff -up openssh-6.0p1/ssh-keysign.8.entropy openssh-6.0p1/ssh-keysign.8
+--- openssh-6.0p1/ssh-keysign.8.entropy	2010-08-31 14:41:14.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.0p1/ssh-keysign.8	2012-08-06 20:51:59.173033249 +0200
+@@ -78,6 +78,24 @@ must be set-uid root if host-based authe
+ If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate
+ information corresponding with the private keys above.
+ .El
++.Sh ENVIRONMENT
++.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
++.Pp
++.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
++.Cm /dev/urandom .
++If the 
++.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
++environment variable is set to value other than
++.Cm 0
++the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
++.Cm /dev/random .
++The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
++Minimum is 6 bytes.
++This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
++random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
++be blocked until enough entropy is available.
++.El
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr ssh 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,

openssh-6.1p1-akc.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,579 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c.akc openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c.akc	2013-02-14 17:46:45.259546968 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c	2013-02-14 17:48:19.072137541 +0100
+@@ -27,9 +27,13 @@
+ 
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <sys/stat.h>
++#include <sys/wait.h>
+ 
++#include <errno.h>
+ #include <fcntl.h>
++#include <paths.h>
+ #include <pwd.h>
++#include <signal.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+@@ -260,7 +264,7 @@ match_principals_file(char *file, struct
+ 			if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) == 0) {
+ 				debug3("matched principal \"%.100s\" "
+ 				    "from file \"%s\" on line %lu",
+-			    	    cert->principals[i], file, linenum);
++				    cert->principals[i], file, linenum);
+ 				if (auth_parse_options(pw, line_opts,
+ 				    file, linenum) != 1)
+ 					continue;
+@@ -273,31 +277,22 @@ match_principals_file(char *file, struct
+ 	fclose(f);
+ 	restore_uid();
+ 	return 0;
+-}	
++}
+ 
+-/* return 1 if user allows given key */
++/*
++ * Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file,
++ * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
++ */
+ static int
+-user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
++check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
+ {
+ 	char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
+ 	const char *reason;
+ 	int found_key = 0;
+-	FILE *f;
+ 	u_long linenum = 0;
+ 	Key *found;
+ 	char *fp;
+ 
+-	/* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
+-	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+-
+-	debug("trying public key file %s", file);
+-	f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes);
+-
+-	if (!f) {
+-		restore_uid();
+-		return 0;
+-	}
+-
+ 	found_key = 0;
+ 	found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type);
+ 
+@@ -390,8 +385,6 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+-	restore_uid();
+-	fclose(f);
+ 	key_free(found);
+ 	if (!found_key)
+ 		debug2("key not found");
+@@ -453,7 +446,180 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw,
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-/* check whether given key is in .ssh/authorized_keys* */
++/*
++ * Checks whether key is allowed in file.
++ * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
++ */
++static int
++user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
++{
++	FILE *f;
++	int found_key = 0;
++
++	/* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
++	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
++
++	debug("trying public key file %s", file);
++	if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) != NULL) {
++		found_key = check_authkeys_file(f, file, key, pw);
++		fclose(f);
++	}
++
++	restore_uid();
++	return found_key;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Checks whether key is allowed in output of command.
++ * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
++ */
++static int
++user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
++{
++	FILE *f;
++	int ok, found_key = 0;
++	struct passwd *pw;
++	struct stat st;
++	int status, devnull, p[2], i;
++	pid_t pid;
++	char *username, errmsg[512];
++
++	if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL ||
++	    options.authorized_keys_command[0] != '/')
++		return 0;
++
++	if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) {
++		pw = user_pw;
++	}
++	else {
++		username = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command_user,
++		    "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
++		pw = getpwnam(username);
++		if (pw == NULL) {
++			error("AuthorizedKeyCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
++			    username, strerror(errno));
++			free(username);
++			return 0;
++		}
++		free(username);
++	}
++
++	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
++
++	if (stat(options.authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) {
++		error("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s",
++		    options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (auth_secure_path(options.authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0,
++	    errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
++		error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if (pipe(p) != 0) {
++		error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	debug3("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s %s\" as \"%s\"",
++	    options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, pw->pw_name);
++
++	/*
++	 * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
++	 * run cleanup_exit() code.
++	 */
++	restore_uid();
++
++	switch ((pid = fork())) {
++	case -1: /* error */
++		error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++		close(p[0]);
++		close(p[1]);
++		return 0;
++	case 0: /* child */
++		for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
++			signal(i, SIG_DFL);
++
++		if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
++			error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
++			    strerror(errno));
++			_exit(1);
++		}
++		/* Keep stderr around a while longer to catch errors */
++		if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
++		    dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
++			error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++			_exit(1);
++		}
++		closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
++
++		/* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
++		if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
++			error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
++			    strerror(errno));
++			_exit(1);
++		}
++		if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
++			error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
++			    strerror(errno));
++			_exit(1);
++		}
++		/* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */
++		if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
++			error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++			_exit(1);
++		}
++
++		execl(options.authorized_keys_command,
++		    options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, NULL);
++
++		error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
++		    options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
++		_exit(127);
++	default: /* parent */
++		break;
++	}
++
++	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
++
++	close(p[1]);
++	if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
++		error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++		close(p[0]);
++		/* Don't leave zombie child */
++		kill(pid, SIGTERM);
++		while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
++			;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	ok = check_authkeys_file(f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw);
++	fclose(f);
++
++	while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
++		if (errno != EINTR) {
++			error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++			goto out;
++		}
++	}
++	if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
++		error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
++		    options.authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status));
++		goto out;
++	} else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
++		error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
++		    options.authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status));
++		goto out;
++	}
++	found_key = ok;
++ out:
++	restore_uid();
++	return found_key;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user.
++ */
+ int
+ user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
+ {
+@@ -469,9 +635,17 @@ user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key
+ 	if (success)
+ 		return success;
+ 
++	success = user_key_command_allowed2(pw, key);
++	if (success > 0)
++		return success;
++
+ 	for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) {
++
++		if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0)
++			continue;
+ 		file = expand_authorized_keys(
+ 		    options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw);
++
+ 		success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file);
+ 		xfree(file);
+ 	}
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth.c.akc openssh-6.1p1/auth.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/auth.c.akc	2013-02-14 17:46:45.189547274 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/auth.c	2013-02-14 17:46:45.273546907 +0100
+@@ -415,39 +415,41 @@ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw
+ 
+ 
+ /*
+- * Check a given file for security. This is defined as all components
++ * Check a given path for security. This is defined as all components
+  * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of
+  * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
+  *
+  * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
+  *
+- * Takes an open file descriptor, the file name, a uid and and
++ * Takes an the file name, its stat information (preferably from fstat() to
++ * avoid races), the uid of the expected owner, their home directory and an
+  * error buffer plus max size as arguments.
+  *
+  * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
+  */
+-static int
+-secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
+-    char *err, size_t errlen)
++int
++auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
++    uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen)
+ {
+-	uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid;
+ 	char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN];
+ 	char *cp;
+ 	int comparehome = 0;
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 
+-	if (realpath(file, buf) == NULL) {
+-		snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", file,
++	if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
++		snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
+ 		    strerror(errno));
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+-	if (realpath(pw->pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
++	if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
+ 		comparehome = 1;
+ 
+-	/* check the open file to avoid races */
+-	if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0 ||
+-	    (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
+-	    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
++	if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) {
++		snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
++		return -1;
++	}
++	if ((stp->st_uid != 0 && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
++	    (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) {
+ 		snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
+ 		    buf);
+ 		return -1;
+@@ -483,6 +485,31 @@ secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *fil
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * Version of secure_path() that accepts an open file descriptor to
++ * avoid races.
++ *
++ * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
++ */
++static int
++secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
++    char *err, size_t errlen)
++{
++	uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid;
++	char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN];
++	char *cp;
++	int comparehome = 0;
++	struct stat st;
++
++	/* check the open file to avoid races */
++	if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0) {
++		snprintf(err, errlen, "cannot stat file %s: %s",
++		    buf, strerror(errno));
++		return -1;
++	}
++	return auth_secure_path(file, &st, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, err, errlen);
++}
++
+ static FILE *
+ auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes,
+     int log_missing, char *file_type)
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth.h.akc openssh-6.1p1/auth.h
+--- openssh-6.1p1/auth.h.akc	2013-02-14 17:46:45.259546968 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/auth.h	2013-02-14 17:46:45.274546903 +0100
+@@ -125,6 +125,10 @@ int	 auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct
+ int	 hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *, Key *);
+ int	 user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);
+ 
++struct stat;
++int	 auth_secure_path(const char *, struct stat *, const char *, uid_t,
++    char *, size_t);
++
+ #ifdef KRB5
+ int	auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client, krb5_data *);
+ int	auth_krb5_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *tgt);
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c.akc openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c.akc	2013-02-14 17:46:45.193547257 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c	2013-02-14 17:46:45.274546903 +0100
+@@ -137,6 +137,8 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ 	options->num_permitted_opens = -1;
+ 	options->adm_forced_command = NULL;
+ 	options->chroot_directory = NULL;
++	options->authorized_keys_command = NULL;
++	options->authorized_keys_command_user = NULL;
+ 	options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->revoked_keys_file = NULL;
+ 	options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL;
+@@ -331,6 +333,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate,
+ 	sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
+ 	sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
++	sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser,
+ 	sAuthenticationMethods,
+ 	sDeprecated, sUnsupported
+ } ServerOpCodes;
+@@ -457,6 +460,9 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "authorizedkeyscommandrunas", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
+ };
+@@ -1520,6 +1526,26 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 		}
+ 		return 0;
+ 
++	case sAuthorizedKeysCommand:
++		len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
++		if (*activep && options->authorized_keys_command == NULL) {
++			options->authorized_keys_command = xstrdup(cp + len);
++			if (*options->authorized_keys_command != '/') {
++				fatal("%.200s line %d: AuthorizedKeysCommand "
++				    "must be an absolute path",
++				    filename, linenum);
++			}
++		}
++		return 0;
++
++	case sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser:
++		charptr = &options->authorized_keys_command_user;
++
++		arg = strdelim(&cp);
++		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
++			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
++		break;
++
+ 	case sDeprecated:
+ 		logit("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s",
+ 		    filename, linenum, arg);
+@@ -1670,6 +1696,8 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(kbd_interactive_authentication);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(zero_knowledge_password_authentication);
++	M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command);
++	M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command_user);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_root_login);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_empty_passwd);
+ 
+@@ -1930,6 +1958,8 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
+ 	    o->authorized_principals_file);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sVersionAddendum, o->version_addendum);
++	dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommand, o->authorized_keys_command);
++	dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, o->authorized_keys_command_user);
+ 
+ 	/* string arguments requiring a lookup */
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level));
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h.akc openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h.akc	2013-02-14 17:46:45.194547252 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h	2013-02-14 17:46:45.275546898 +0100
+@@ -167,6 +167,8 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	char   *revoked_keys_file;
+ 	char   *trusted_user_ca_keys;
+ 	char   *authorized_principals_file;
++	char   *authorized_keys_command;
++	char   *authorized_keys_command_user;
+ 
+ 	char   *version_addendum;	/* Appended to SSH banner */
+ 
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.akc openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.akc	2013-02-14 17:46:45.270546920 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c	2013-02-14 17:46:45.276546894 +0100
+@@ -366,9 +366,20 @@ main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
+ static void
+ grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
+ {
++	pid_t pgid;
++
+ 	if (use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 0)
+ 		kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGALRM);
+ 
++	/*
++	 * Try to kill any processes that we have spawned, E.g. authorized
++	 * keys command helpers.
++	 */
++	if ((pgid = getpgid(0)) == getpid()) {
++		signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN);
++		killpg(pgid, SIGTERM);
++	}
++
+ 	/* Log error and exit. */
+ 	sigdie("Timeout before authentication for %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
+ }
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0.akc openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0
+--- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0.akc	2012-08-29 02:53:04.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0	2013-02-14 17:46:45.276546894 +0100
+@@ -71,6 +71,23 @@ DESCRIPTION
+ 
+              See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.
+ 
++     AuthorizedKeysCommand
++
++             Specifies a program to be used for lookup of the user's
++	     public keys.  The program will be invoked with its first
++	     argument the name of the user being authorized, and should produce
++	     on standard output AuthorizedKeys lines (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS
++	     in sshd(8)).  By default (or when set to the empty string) there is no
++	     AuthorizedKeysCommand run.  If the AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully
++	     authorize the user, authorization falls through to the
++	     AuthorizedKeysFile.  Note that this option has an effect
++	     only with PubkeyAuthentication turned on.
++
++     AuthorizedKeysCommandRunAs
++             Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedKeysCommand is run.
++             Empty string (the default value) means the user being authorized
++             is used.
++
+      AuthorizedKeysFile
+              Specifies the file that contains the public keys that can be used
+              for user authentication.  The format is described in the
+@@ -402,7 +419,8 @@ DESCRIPTION
+              Only a subset of keywords may be used on the lines following a
+              Match keyword.  Available keywords are AcceptEnv,
+              AllowAgentForwarding, AllowGroups, AllowTcpForwarding,
+-             AllowUsers, AuthorizedKeysFile, AuthorizedPrincipalsFile, Banner,
++             AllowUsers, AuthorizedKeysFile, AuthorizedKeysCommand,
++             AuthorizedKeysCommandRunAs, AuthorizedPrincipalsFile, Banner,
+              ChrootDirectory, DenyGroups, DenyUsers, ForceCommand,
+              GatewayPorts, GSSAPIAuthentication, HostbasedAuthentication,
+              HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, KbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5.akc openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5.akc	2013-02-14 17:46:45.195547248 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5	2013-02-14 17:46:45.277546890 +0100
+@@ -173,6 +173,20 @@ Note that each authentication method lis
+ in the configuration.
+ The default is not to require multiple authentication; successful completion
+ of a single authentication method is sufficient.
++.It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
++Specifies a program to be used for lookup of the user's public keys.
++The program will be invoked with a single argument of the username
++being authenticated, and should produce on standard output zero or
++more lines of authorized_keys output (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS in
++.Xr sshd 8 )
++If a key supplied by AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully authenticate
++and authorize the user then public key authentication continues using the usual
++.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
++files.
++By default, no AuthorizedKeysCommand is run.
++.It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser
++Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedKeysCommand is run.
++The default is the user being authenticated.
+ .It Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
+ Specifies the file that contains the public keys that can be used
+ for user authentication.
+@@ -734,6 +748,8 @@ Available keywords are
+ .Cm AllowTcpForwarding ,
+ .Cm AllowUsers ,
+ .Cm AuthenticationMethods ,
++.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand ,
++.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ,
+ .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile ,
+ .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile ,
+ .Cm Banner ,
+@@ -749,6 +765,7 @@ Available keywords are
+ .Cm KerberosAuthentication ,
+ .Cm MaxAuthTries ,
+ .Cm MaxSessions ,
++.Cm PubkeyAuthentication ,
+ .Cm PasswordAuthentication ,
+ .Cm PermitEmptyPasswords ,
+ .Cm PermitOpen ,
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.akc openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.akc	2012-07-31 04:21:34.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config	2013-02-14 17:46:45.277546890 +0100
+@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@
+ # but this is overridden so installations will only check .ssh/authorized_keys
+ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ 
++#AuthorizedKeysCommand none
++#AuthorizedKeysCommandUser nobody
++
+ #AuthorizedPrincipalsFile none
+ 
+ # For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts

openssh-6.1p1-askpass-ld.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/contrib/Makefile.askpass-ld openssh-6.1p1/contrib/Makefile
+--- openssh-6.1p1/contrib/Makefile.askpass-ld	2012-05-19 07:24:37.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/contrib/Makefile	2012-09-14 20:35:47.565704718 +0200
+@@ -4,12 +4,12 @@ all:
+ 	@echo "Valid targets: gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass2"
+ 
+ gnome-ssh-askpass1: gnome-ssh-askpass1.c
+-	$(CC) `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \
++	$(CC) ${CFLAGS} `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \
+ 		gnome-ssh-askpass1.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass1 \
+ 		`gnome-config --libs gnome gnomeui`
+ 
+ gnome-ssh-askpass2: gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+-	$(CC) `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags gtk+-2.0` \
++	$(CC) ${CFLAGS} `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags gtk+-2.0` \
+ 		gnome-ssh-askpass2.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass2 \
+ 		`$(PKG_CONFIG) --libs gtk+-2.0 x11`
+ 

openssh-6.1p1-audit4.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,672 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/audit-bsm.c.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/audit-bsm.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/audit-bsm.c.audit4	2012-11-28 14:20:38.990185823 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/audit-bsm.c	2012-11-28 14:20:38.995185800 +0100
+@@ -485,4 +485,10 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char
+ {
+ 	/* not implemented */
+ }
++
++void
++audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++	/* not implemented */
++}
+ #endif /* BSM */
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/audit.c.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/audit.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/audit.c.audit4	2012-11-28 14:20:38.990185823 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/audit.c	2012-11-28 14:20:38.995185800 +0100
+@@ -143,6 +143,12 @@ audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac
+ 	PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, getpid(), getuid()));
+ }
+ 
++void
++audit_session_key_free(int ctos)
++{
++	PRIVSEP(audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, getpid(), getuid()));
++}
++
+ # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ /*
+  * Null implementations of audit functions.
+@@ -274,5 +280,15 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char
+ 		(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, (long)pid,
+ 	        (unsigned)uid);
+ }
++
++/*
++ * This will be called on succesfull session key discard
++ */
++void
++audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++	debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u",
++		(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
++}
+ # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/audit.h.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/audit.h
+--- openssh-6.1p1/audit.h.audit4	2012-11-28 14:20:38.990185823 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/audit.h	2012-11-28 14:20:38.995185800 +0100
+@@ -62,5 +62,7 @@ void	audit_unsupported(int);
+ void	audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *);
+ void	audit_unsupported_body(int);
+ void	audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
++void	audit_session_key_free(int ctos);
++void	audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
+ 
+ #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/audit-linux.c.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/audit-linux.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/audit-linux.c.audit4	2012-11-28 14:20:38.990185823 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/audit-linux.c	2012-11-28 14:20:38.995185800 +0100
+@@ -294,6 +294,8 @@ audit_unsupported_body(int what)
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
++const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
++
+ void
+ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
+ 	       uid_t uid)
+@@ -301,7 +303,6 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char
+ #ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
+ 	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ 	int audit_fd, audit_ok;
+-	const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
+ 	Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc);
+ 	char *s;
+ 
+@@ -327,4 +328,32 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
++void
++audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
++	int audit_fd, audit_ok;
++	char *s;
++
++	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=session fp=? direction=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
++		 direction[ctos], (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid,
++		 get_remote_port(),
++		 (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())),
++		 get_local_port());
++	xfree(s);
++	audit_fd = audit_open();
++	if (audit_fd < 0) {
++		if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
++					 errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
++			error("cannot open audit");
++		return;
++	}
++	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
++			buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1);
++	audit_close(audit_fd);
++	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
++	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++		error("cannot write into audit");
++}
++
+ #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auditstub.c.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/auditstub.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/auditstub.c.audit4	2012-11-28 14:20:38.990185823 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/auditstub.c	2012-11-28 14:20:38.995185800 +0100
+@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
+  * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
+  */
+ 
++#include <sys/types.h>
++
+ void
+ audit_unsupported(int n)
+ {
+@@ -37,3 +39,12 @@ audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac
+ {
+ }
+ 
++void
++audit_session_key_free(int ctos)
++{
++}
++
++void
++audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++}
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/kex.c.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/kex.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/kex.c.audit4	2012-11-28 14:20:38.991185818 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/kex.c	2012-11-28 14:20:38.995185800 +0100
+@@ -624,3 +624,34 @@ dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, i
+ 	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ }
+ #endif
++
++static void
++enc_destroy(Enc *enc)
++{
++	if (enc == NULL)
++		return;
++
++	if (enc->key) {
++		memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len);
++		xfree(enc->key);
++	}
++
++	if (enc->iv) {
++		memset(enc->iv,  0, enc->block_size);
++		xfree(enc->iv);
++	}
++
++	memset(enc, 0, sizeof(*enc));
++}
++
++void
++newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys)
++{
++	if (newkeys == NULL)
++		return;
++
++	enc_destroy(&newkeys->enc);
++	mac_destroy(&newkeys->mac);
++	memset(&newkeys->comp, 0, sizeof(newkeys->comp));
++}
++
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/kex.h.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/kex.h
+--- openssh-6.1p1/kex.h.audit4	2010-09-24 14:11:14.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/kex.h	2012-11-28 14:20:38.996185795 +0100
+@@ -156,6 +156,8 @@ void	 kexgex_server(Kex *);
+ void	 kexecdh_client(Kex *);
+ void	 kexecdh_server(Kex *);
+ 
++void	newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys);
++
+ void
+ kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,
+     BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/mac.c.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/mac.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/mac.c.audit4	2012-06-30 00:34:59.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/mac.c	2012-11-28 14:20:38.996185795 +0100
+@@ -169,6 +169,20 @@ mac_clear(Mac *mac)
+ 	mac->umac_ctx = NULL;
+ }
+ 
++void
++mac_destroy(Mac *mac)
++{
++	if (mac == NULL)
++		return;
++
++	if (mac->key) {
++		memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len);
++		xfree(mac->key);
++	}
++
++	memset(mac, 0, sizeof(*mac));
++}
++
+ /* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */
+ #define	MAC_SEP	","
+ int
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/mac.h.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/mac.h
+--- openssh-6.1p1/mac.h.audit4	2007-06-11 06:01:42.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/mac.h	2012-11-28 14:20:38.996185795 +0100
+@@ -28,3 +28,4 @@ int	 mac_setup(Mac *, char *);
+ int	 mac_init(Mac *);
+ u_char	*mac_compute(Mac *, u_int32_t, u_char *, int);
+ void	 mac_clear(Mac *);
++void	 mac_destroy(Mac *);
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/monitor.c.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/monitor.c.audit4	2012-11-28 14:20:38.992185813 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/monitor.c	2012-11-28 17:02:17.677045093 +0100
+@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer
+ int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *);
++int mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int, Buffer *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
+@@ -241,6 +242,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
+ #endif
+ #ifdef BSD_AUTH
+     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
+@@ -280,6 +282,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
+ #endif
+     {0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+@@ -313,6 +316,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[]
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
+ #endif
+     {0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+@@ -327,6 +331,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
+ #endif
+     {0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+@@ -448,10 +453,6 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
+ #endif
+ 	}
+ 
+-	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
+-	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
+-		;
+-
+ 	if (!authctxt->valid)
+ 		fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
+ 	if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
+@@ -1950,11 +1951,13 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor
+ 
+ 	blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
+ 	current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
++	memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
+ 	xfree(blob);
+ 
+ 	debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __func__);
+ 	blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
+ 	current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
++	memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
+ 	xfree(blob);
+ 
+ 	/* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */
+@@ -2000,6 +2003,21 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	buffer_free(&m);
++
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	if (compat20) {
++		buffer_init(&m);
++		mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd,
++					  MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m);
++		mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
++		buffer_free(&m);
++	}
++#endif
++
++	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
++	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
++		;
++
+ }
+ 
+ 
+@@ -2444,4 +2462,22 @@ mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, Buffe
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
++int
++mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
++{
++	int ctos;
++	pid_t pid;
++	uid_t uid;
++
++	ctos = buffer_get_int(m);
++	pid = buffer_get_int64(m);
++	uid = buffer_get_int64(m);
++
++	audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, pid, uid);
++
++	buffer_clear(m);
++
++	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m);
++	return 0;
++}
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/monitor.h.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/monitor.h
+--- openssh-6.1p1/monitor.h.audit4	2012-11-28 14:20:38.992185813 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/monitor.h	2012-11-28 14:20:38.997185790 +0100
+@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
+ 	MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX,
++	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_TERM,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA,
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit4	2012-11-28 14:20:38.992185813 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.c	2012-11-28 14:20:38.997185790 +0100
+@@ -653,12 +653,14 @@ mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor
+ 		fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__);
+ 
+ 	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);
++	memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
+ 	xfree(blob);
+ 
+ 	if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_IN, &blob, &bloblen))
+ 		fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__);
+ 
+ 	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);
++	memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
+ 	xfree(blob);
+ 
+ 	packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, &seqnr, &blocks, &packets, &bytes);
+@@ -1522,4 +1524,19 @@ mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher
+ 
+ 	buffer_free(&m);
+ }
++
++void
++mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++	Buffer m;
++
++	buffer_init(&m);
++	buffer_put_int(&m, ctos);
++	buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
++	buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
++	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m);
++	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE,
++				  &m);
++	buffer_free(&m);
++}
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.h
+--- openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit4	2012-11-28 14:20:38.992185813 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.h	2012-11-28 14:20:38.997185790 +0100
+@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ int mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
+ void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *);
+ void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
+ void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
++void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t);
+ #endif
+ 
+ struct Session;
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/packet.c.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/packet.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/packet.c.audit4	2012-11-28 14:20:38.973185902 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/packet.c	2012-11-28 14:20:38.998185785 +0100
+@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
+ #include <signal.h>
+ 
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "audit.h"
+ #include "buffer.h"
+ #include "packet.h"
+ #include "crc32.h"
+@@ -470,6 +471,13 @@ packet_get_connection_out(void)
+ 	return active_state->connection_out;
+ }
+ 
++static int
++packet_state_has_keys (const struct session_state *state)
++{
++	return state != NULL &&
++		(state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL || state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL);
++}
++
+ /* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */
+ 
+ void
+@@ -478,13 +486,6 @@ packet_close(void)
+ 	if (!active_state->initialized)
+ 		return;
+ 	active_state->initialized = 0;
+-	if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) {
+-		shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
+-		close(active_state->connection_out);
+-	} else {
+-		close(active_state->connection_in);
+-		close(active_state->connection_out);
+-	}
+ 	buffer_free(&active_state->input);
+ 	buffer_free(&active_state->output);
+ 	buffer_free(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+@@ -493,8 +494,18 @@ packet_close(void)
+ 		buffer_free(&active_state->compression_buffer);
+ 		buffer_compress_uninit();
+ 	}
+-	cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context);
+-	cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context);
++	if (packet_state_has_keys(active_state)) {
++		cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context);
++		cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context);
++		audit_session_key_free(2);
++	}
++	if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) {
++		shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
++		close(active_state->connection_out);
++	} else {
++		close(active_state->connection_in);
++		close(active_state->connection_out);
++	}
+ }
+ 
+ /* Sets remote side protocol flags. */
+@@ -729,6 +740,23 @@ packet_send1(void)
+ 	 */
+ }
+ 
++static void
++newkeys_destroy_and_free(Newkeys *newkeys)
++{
++	if (newkeys == NULL)
++		return;
++
++	xfree(newkeys->enc.name);
++
++	mac_clear(&newkeys->mac);
++	xfree(newkeys->mac.name);
++
++	xfree(newkeys->comp.name);
++
++	newkeys_destroy(newkeys);
++	xfree(newkeys);
++}
++
+ void
+ set_newkeys(int mode)
+ {
+@@ -754,18 +782,9 @@ set_newkeys(int mode)
+ 	}
+ 	if (active_state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) {
+ 		debug("set_newkeys: rekeying");
++		audit_session_key_free(mode);
+ 		cipher_cleanup(cc);
+-		enc  = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
+-		mac  = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
+-		comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
+-		mac_clear(mac);
+-		xfree(enc->name);
+-		xfree(enc->iv);
+-		xfree(enc->key);
+-		xfree(mac->name);
+-		xfree(mac->key);
+-		xfree(comp->name);
+-		xfree(active_state->newkeys[mode]);
++		newkeys_destroy_and_free(active_state->newkeys[mode]);
+ 	}
+ 	active_state->newkeys[mode] = kex_get_newkeys(mode);
+ 	if (active_state->newkeys[mode] == NULL)
+@@ -1921,6 +1940,47 @@ packet_get_newkeys(int mode)
+ 	return (void *)active_state->newkeys[mode];
+ }
+ 
++static void
++packet_destroy_state(struct session_state *state)
++{
++	if (state == NULL)
++		return;
++
++	cipher_cleanup(&state->receive_context);
++	cipher_cleanup(&state->send_context);
++
++	buffer_free(&state->input);
++	buffer_free(&state->output);
++	buffer_free(&state->outgoing_packet);
++	buffer_free(&state->incoming_packet);
++	buffer_free(&state->compression_buffer);
++	newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_IN]);
++	state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = NULL;
++	newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]);
++	state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
++	mac_destroy(state->packet_discard_mac);
++//	TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing;
++//	memset(state, 0, sizeof(state));
++}
++
++void
++packet_destroy_all(int audit_it, int privsep)
++{
++	if (audit_it)
++		audit_it = packet_state_has_keys (active_state) ||
++			packet_state_has_keys (backup_state);
++	packet_destroy_state(active_state);
++	packet_destroy_state(backup_state);
++	if (audit_it) {
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++		if (privsep)
++			audit_session_key_free(2);
++		else
++			audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid());
++#endif
++	}
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Save the state for the real connection, and use a separate state when
+  * resuming a suspended connection.
+@@ -1928,18 +1988,12 @@ packet_get_newkeys(int mode)
+ void
+ packet_backup_state(void)
+ {
+-	struct session_state *tmp;
+-
+ 	close(active_state->connection_in);
+ 	active_state->connection_in = -1;
+ 	close(active_state->connection_out);
+ 	active_state->connection_out = -1;
+-	if (backup_state)
+-		tmp = backup_state;
+-	else
+-		tmp = alloc_session_state();
+ 	backup_state = active_state;
+-	active_state = tmp;
++	active_state = alloc_session_state();
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -1956,9 +2010,7 @@ packet_restore_state(void)
+ 	backup_state = active_state;
+ 	active_state = tmp;
+ 	active_state->connection_in = backup_state->connection_in;
+-	backup_state->connection_in = -1;
+ 	active_state->connection_out = backup_state->connection_out;
+-	backup_state->connection_out = -1;
+ 	len = buffer_len(&backup_state->input);
+ 	if (len > 0) {
+ 		buf = buffer_ptr(&backup_state->input);
+@@ -1966,4 +2018,10 @@ packet_restore_state(void)
+ 		buffer_clear(&backup_state->input);
+ 		add_recv_bytes(len);
+ 	}
++	backup_state->connection_in = -1;
++	backup_state->connection_out = -1;
++	packet_destroy_state(backup_state);
++	xfree(backup_state);
++	backup_state = NULL;
+ }
++
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/packet.h.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/packet.h
+--- openssh-6.1p1/packet.h.audit4	2012-02-10 22:19:21.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/packet.h	2012-11-28 14:20:38.998185785 +0100
+@@ -123,4 +123,5 @@ void	 packet_restore_state(void);
+ void	*packet_get_input(void);
+ void	*packet_get_output(void);
+ 
++void	 packet_destroy_all(int, int);
+ #endif				/* PACKET_H */
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/session.c.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/session.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/session.c.audit4	2012-11-28 14:20:38.983185855 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/session.c	2012-11-28 14:20:38.998185785 +0100
+@@ -1634,6 +1634,9 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+ 
+ 	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
+ 	destroy_sensitive_data();
++	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
++	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
++	packet_destroy_all(0, 1);
+ 
+ 	/* Force a password change */
+ 	if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.audit4	2012-11-28 14:20:38.993185808 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c	2012-11-28 14:20:38.999185780 +0100
+@@ -692,6 +692,8 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
++extern Newkeys *current_keys[];
++
+ static void
+ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ {
+@@ -716,6 +718,10 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
+ 		verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
+ 		buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
++ 		newkeys_destroy(current_keys[MODE_OUT]);
++		newkeys_destroy(current_keys[MODE_IN]);
++		audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid());
++		packet_destroy_all(0, 0);
+ 		monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor);
+ 
+ 		/* NEVERREACHED */
+@@ -2016,6 +2022,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	 */
+ 	if (use_privsep) {
+ 		mm_send_keystate(pmonitor);
++		packet_destroy_all(1, 1);
+ 		exit(0);
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -2068,6 +2075,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	do_authenticated(authctxt);
+ 
+ 	/* The connection has been terminated. */
++	packet_destroy_all(1, 1);
++
+ 	packet_get_state(MODE_IN, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ibytes);
+ 	packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, NULL, NULL, NULL, &obytes);
+ 	verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes",
+@@ -2385,6 +2394,16 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
+ void
+ cleanup_exit(int i)
+ {
++	static int in_cleanup = 0;
++	int is_privsep_child;
++
++	/* cleanup_exit can be called at the very least from the privsep
++	   wrappers used for auditing.  Make sure we don't recurse
++	   indefinitely. */
++	if (in_cleanup)
++		_exit(i);
++	in_cleanup = 1;
++
+ 	if (the_authctxt) {
+ 		do_cleanup(the_authctxt);
+ 		if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) {
+@@ -2395,6 +2414,8 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
+ 				    pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno));
+ 		}
+ 	}
++	is_privsep_child = use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && !mm_is_monitor();
++	packet_destroy_all(1, is_privsep_child);
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ 	/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
+ 	if ((the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) &&

openssh-6.1p1-authenticationmethods.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,841 @@
+diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
+index ee0cb05..1b2fc2b 100644
+--- a/auth.c
++++ b/auth.c
+@@ -251,7 +251,8 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
+ }
+ 
+ void
+-auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
++auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial,
++    const char *method, const char *submethod, const char *info)
+ {
+ 	void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
+ 	char *authmsg;
+@@ -268,12 +269,15 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
+ 
+ 	if (authctxt->postponed)
+ 		authmsg = "Postponed";
++	else if (partial)
++		authmsg = "Partial";
+ 	else
+ 		authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
+ 
+-	authlog("%s %s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s",
++	authlog("%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s",
+ 	    authmsg,
+ 	    method,
++	    submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod,
+ 	    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
+ 	    authctxt->user,
+ 	    get_remote_ipaddr(),
+@@ -303,7 +307,7 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
+  * Check whether root logins are disallowed.
+  */
+ int
+-auth_root_allowed(char *method)
++auth_root_allowed(const char *method)
+ {
+ 	switch (options.permit_root_login) {
+ 	case PERMIT_YES:
+diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
+index 0d786c4..29823bb 100644
+--- a/auth.h
++++ b/auth.h
+@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ struct Authctxt {
+ #ifdef BSD_AUTH
+ 	auth_session_t	*as;
+ #endif
++	char		**auth_methods;	/* modified from server config */
++	u_int		 num_auth_methods;
+ #ifdef KRB5
+ 	krb5_context	 krb5_ctx;
+ 	krb5_ccache	 krb5_fwd_ccache;
+@@ -142,12 +144,17 @@ void disable_forwarding(void);
+ void	do_authentication(Authctxt *);
+ void	do_authentication2(Authctxt *);
+ 
+-void	auth_log(Authctxt *, int, char *, char *);
+-void	userauth_finish(Authctxt *, int, char *);
++void	auth_log(Authctxt *, int, int, const char *, const char *,
++    const char *);
++void	userauth_finish(Authctxt *, int, const char *, const char *);
++int	auth_root_allowed(const char *);
++
+ void	userauth_send_banner(const char *);
+-int	auth_root_allowed(char *);
+ 
+ char	*auth2_read_banner(void);
++int	 auth2_methods_valid(const char *, int);
++int	 auth2_update_methods_lists(Authctxt *, const char *);
++int	 auth2_setup_methods_lists(Authctxt *);
+ 
+ void	privsep_challenge_enable(void);
+ 
+diff --git a/auth1.c b/auth1.c
+index cc85aec..458a110 100644
+--- a/auth1.c
++++ b/auth1.c
+@@ -253,7 +253,8 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 		if (options.use_pam && (PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())))
+ #endif
+ 		{
+-			auth_log(authctxt, 1, "without authentication", "");
++			auth_log(authctxt, 1, 0, "without authentication",
++			    NULL, "");
+ 			return;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+@@ -352,7 +353,8 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 
+  skip:
+ 		/* Log before sending the reply */
+-		auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, get_authname(type), info);
++		auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, 0, get_authname(type),
++		    NULL, info);
+ 
+ 		if (client_user != NULL) {
+ 			xfree(client_user);
+@@ -406,6 +408,11 @@ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 		authctxt->pw = fakepw();
+ 	}
+ 
++	/* Configuration may have changed as a result of Match */
++	if (options.num_auth_methods != 0)
++		fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported with SSH "
++		    "protocol 1");
++
+ 	setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
+ 	    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
+ 
+diff --git a/auth2-chall.c b/auth2-chall.c
+index e6dbffe..5f7ec6d 100644
+--- a/auth2-chall.c
++++ b/auth2-chall.c
+@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+ 	KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
+ 	int authenticated = 0, res;
+ 	u_int i, nresp;
+-	char **response = NULL, *method;
++	char *devicename = NULL, **response = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (authctxt == NULL)
+ 		fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no authctxt");
+@@ -329,9 +329,7 @@ input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+ 		/* Failure! */
+ 		break;
+ 	}
+-
+-	xasprintf(&method, "keyboard-interactive/%s", kbdintctxt->device->name);
+-
++	devicename = kbdintctxt->device->name;
+ 	if (!authctxt->postponed) {
+ 		if (authenticated) {
+ 			auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt);
+@@ -341,8 +339,8 @@ input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+ 			auth2_challenge_start(authctxt);
+ 		}
+ 	}
+-	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method);
+-	xfree(method);
++	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "keyboard-interactive",
++	    devicename);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
+index 0d59b21..338c748 100644
+--- a/auth2-gss.c
++++ b/auth2-gss.c
+@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+ 		}
+ 		authctxt->postponed = 0;
+ 		dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+-		userauth_finish(authctxt, 0, "gssapi-with-mic");
++		userauth_finish(authctxt, 0, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
+ 	} else {
+ 		if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+ 			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN);
+@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+ 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
+ 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL);
+ 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
+-	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic");
++	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
+ 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
+ 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL);
+ 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
+-	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic");
++	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
+ }
+ 
+ Authmethod method_gssapi = {
+diff --git a/auth2-jpake.c b/auth2-jpake.c
+index a460e82..e4ba9aa 100644
+--- a/auth2-jpake.c
++++ b/auth2-jpake.c
+@@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ input_userauth_jpake_client_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+ 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
+ 	jpake_free(authctxt->jpake_ctx);
+ 	authctxt->jpake_ctx = NULL;
+-	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method_jpake.name);
++	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method_jpake.name, NULL);
+ }
+ 
+ #endif /* JPAKE */
+diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
+index b66bef6..ea0fd92 100644
+--- a/auth2.c
++++ b/auth2.c
+@@ -96,8 +96,10 @@ static void input_service_request(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+ static void input_userauth_request(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+ 
+ /* helper */
+-static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(const char *);
+-static char *authmethods_get(void);
++static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(Authctxt *, const char *);
++static char *authmethods_get(Authctxt *authctxt);
++static int method_allowed(Authctxt *, const char *);
++static int list_starts_with(const char *, const char *);
+ 
+ char *
+ auth2_read_banner(void)
+@@ -255,6 +257,8 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+ 		if (use_privsep)
+ 			mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
+ 		userauth_banner();
++		if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
++			packet_disconnect("no authentication methods enabled");
+ 	} else if (strcmp(user, authctxt->user) != 0 ||
+ 	    strcmp(service, authctxt->service) != 0) {
+ 		packet_disconnect("Change of username or service not allowed: "
+@@ -277,12 +281,12 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+ 	authctxt->server_caused_failure = 0;
+ 
+ 	/* try to authenticate user */
+-	m = authmethod_lookup(method);
++	m = authmethod_lookup(authctxt, method);
+ 	if (m != NULL && authctxt->failures < options.max_authtries) {
+ 		debug2("input_userauth_request: try method %s", method);
+ 		authenticated =	m->userauth(authctxt);
+ 	}
+-	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method);
++	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method, NULL);
+ 
+ 	xfree(service);
+ 	xfree(user);
+@@ -290,13 +294,17 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+ }
+ 
+ void
+-userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
++userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, const char *method,
++    const char *submethod)
+ {
+ 	char *methods;
++	int partial = 0;
+ 
+ 	if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated)
+ 		fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s",
+ 		    authctxt->user);
++	if (authenticated && authctxt->postponed)
++		fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated and postponed");
+ 
+ 	/* Special handling for root */
+ 	if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
+@@ -307,6 +315,19 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
+ #endif
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (authenticated && options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
++		if (!auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt, method)) {
++			authenticated = 0;
++			partial = 1;
++		}
++	}
++
++	/* Log before sending the reply */
++	auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial, method, submethod, " ssh2");
++
++	if (authctxt->postponed)
++		return;
++
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	if (options.use_pam && authenticated) {
+ 		if (!PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())) {
+@@ -325,17 +346,10 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
+ #ifdef _UNICOS
+ 	if (authenticated && cray_access_denied(authctxt->user)) {
+ 		authenticated = 0;
+-		fatal("Access denied for user %s.",authctxt->user);
++		fatal("Access denied for user %s.", authctxt->user);
+ 	}
+ #endif /* _UNICOS */
+ 
+-	/* Log before sending the reply */
+-	auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, method, " ssh2");
+-
+-	if (authctxt->postponed)
+-		return;
+-
+-	/* XXX todo: check if multiple auth methods are needed */
+ 	if (authenticated == 1) {
+ 		/* turn off userauth */
+ 		dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, &dispatch_protocol_ignore);
+@@ -348,7 +362,8 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
+ 
+ 		/* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */
+ 		if (!authctxt->server_caused_failure &&
+-		    (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0))
++		    (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0) &&
++		    partial == 0)
+ 			authctxt->failures++;
+ 		if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) {
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+@@ -356,34 +371,61 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
+ #endif
+ 			packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user);
+ 		}
+-		methods = authmethods_get();
++		methods = authmethods_get(authctxt);
++		debug3("%s: failure partial=%d next methods=\"%s\"", __func__,
++		    partial, methods);
+ 		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE);
+ 		packet_put_cstring(methods);
+-		packet_put_char(0);	/* XXX partial success, unused */
++		packet_put_char(partial);
+ 		packet_send();
+ 		packet_write_wait();
+ 		xfree(methods);
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * Checks whether method is allowed by at least one AuthenticationMethods
++ * methods list. Returns 1 if allowed, or no methods lists configured.
++ * 0 otherwise.
++ */
++static int
++method_allowed(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method)
++{
++	u_int i;
++
++	/*
++	 * NB. authctxt->num_auth_methods might be zero as a result of
++	 * auth2_setup_methods_lists(), so check the configuration.
++	 */
++	if (options.num_auth_methods == 0)
++		return 1;
++	for (i = 0; i < authctxt->num_auth_methods; i++) {
++		if (list_starts_with(authctxt->auth_methods[i], method))
++			return 1;
++	}
++	return 0;
++}
++
+ static char *
+-authmethods_get(void)
++authmethods_get(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ {
+ 	Buffer b;
+ 	char *list;
+-	int i;
++	u_int i;
+ 
+ 	buffer_init(&b);
+ 	for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ 		if (strcmp(authmethods[i]->name, "none") == 0)
+ 			continue;
+-		if (authmethods[i]->enabled != NULL &&
+-		    *(authmethods[i]->enabled) != 0) {
+-			if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
+-				buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
+-			buffer_append(&b, authmethods[i]->name,
+-			    strlen(authmethods[i]->name));
+-		}
++		if (authmethods[i]->enabled == NULL ||
++		    *(authmethods[i]->enabled) == 0)
++			continue;
++		if (!method_allowed(authctxt, authmethods[i]->name))
++			continue;
++		if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
++			buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
++		buffer_append(&b, authmethods[i]->name,
++		    strlen(authmethods[i]->name));
+ 	}
+ 	buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1);
+ 	list = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b));
+@@ -392,7 +434,7 @@ authmethods_get(void)
+ }
+ 
+ static Authmethod *
+-authmethod_lookup(const char *name)
++authmethod_lookup(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *name)
+ {
+ 	int i;
+ 
+@@ -400,10 +442,152 @@ authmethod_lookup(const char *name)
+ 		for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++)
+ 			if (authmethods[i]->enabled != NULL &&
+ 			    *(authmethods[i]->enabled) != 0 &&
+-			    strcmp(name, authmethods[i]->name) == 0)
++			    strcmp(name, authmethods[i]->name) == 0 &&
++			    method_allowed(authctxt, authmethods[i]->name))
+ 				return authmethods[i];
+ 	debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s",
+ 	    name ? name : "NULL");
+ 	return NULL;
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * Check a comma-separated list of methods for validity. Is need_enable is
++ * non-zero, then also require that the methods are enabled.
++ * Returns 0 on success or -1 if the methods list is invalid.
++ */
++int
++auth2_methods_valid(const char *_methods, int need_enable)
++{
++	char *methods, *omethods, *method;
++	u_int i, found;
++	int ret = -1;
++
++	if (*_methods == '\0') {
++		error("empty authentication method list");
++		return -1;
++	}
++	omethods = methods = xstrdup(_methods);
++	while ((method = strsep(&methods, ",")) != NULL) {
++		for (found = i = 0; !found && authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) {
++			if (strcmp(method, authmethods[i]->name) != 0)
++				continue;
++			if (need_enable) {
++				if (authmethods[i]->enabled == NULL ||
++				    *(authmethods[i]->enabled) == 0) {
++					error("Disabled method \"%s\" in "
++					    "AuthenticationMethods list \"%s\"",
++					    method, _methods);
++					goto out;
++				}
++			}
++			found = 1;
++			break;
++		}
++		if (!found) {
++			error("Unknown authentication method \"%s\" in list",
++			    method);
++			goto out;
++		}
++	}
++	ret = 0;
++ out:
++	free(omethods);
++	return ret;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Prune the AuthenticationMethods supplied in the configuration, removing
++ * any methods lists that include disabled methods. Note that this might
++ * leave authctxt->num_auth_methods == 0, even when multiple required auth
++ * has been requested. For this reason, all tests for whether multiple is
++ * enabled should consult options.num_auth_methods directly.
++ */
++int
++auth2_setup_methods_lists(Authctxt *authctxt)
++{
++	u_int i;
++
++	if (options.num_auth_methods == 0)
++		return 0;
++	debug3("%s: checking methods", __func__);
++	authctxt->auth_methods = xcalloc(options.num_auth_methods,
++	    sizeof(*authctxt->auth_methods));
++	authctxt->num_auth_methods = 0;
++	for (i = 0; i < options.num_auth_methods; i++) {
++		if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[i], 1) != 0) {
++			logit("Authentication methods list \"%s\" contains "
++			    "disabled method, skipping",
++			    options.auth_methods[i]);
++			continue;
++		}
++		debug("authentication methods list %d: %s",
++		    authctxt->num_auth_methods, options.auth_methods[i]);
++		authctxt->auth_methods[authctxt->num_auth_methods++] =
++		    xstrdup(options.auth_methods[i]);
++	}
++	if (authctxt->num_auth_methods == 0) {
++		error("No AuthenticationMethods left after eliminating "
++		    "disabled methods");
++		return -1;
++	}
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static int
++list_starts_with(const char *methods, const char *method)
++{
++	size_t l = strlen(method);
++
++	if (strncmp(methods, method, l) != 0)
++		return 0;
++	if (methods[l] != ',' && methods[l] != '\0')
++		return 0;
++	return 1;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Remove method from the start of a comma-separated list of methods.
++ * Returns 0 if the list of methods did not start with that method or 1
++ * if it did.
++ */
++static int
++remove_method(char **methods, const char *method)
++{
++	char *omethods = *methods;
++	size_t l = strlen(method);
++
++	if (!list_starts_with(omethods, method))
++		return 0;
++	*methods = xstrdup(omethods + l + (omethods[l] == ',' ? 1 : 0));
++	free(omethods);
++	return 1;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Called after successful authentication. Will remove the successful method
++ * from the start of each list in which it occurs. If it was the last method
++ * in any list, then authentication is deemed successful.
++ * Returns 1 if the method completed any authentication list or 0 otherwise.
++ */
++int
++auth2_update_methods_lists(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method)
++{
++	u_int i, found = 0;
++
++	debug3("%s: updating methods list after \"%s\"", __func__, method);
++	for (i = 0; i < authctxt->num_auth_methods; i++) {
++		if (!remove_method(&(authctxt->auth_methods[i]), method))
++			continue;
++		found = 1;
++		if (*authctxt->auth_methods[i] == '\0') {
++			debug2("authentication methods list %d complete", i);
++			return 1;
++		}
++		debug3("authentication methods list %d remaining: \"%s\"",
++		    i, authctxt->auth_methods[i]);
++	}
++	/* This should not happen, but would be bad if it did */
++	if (!found)
++		fatal("%s: method not in AuthenticationMethods", __func__);
++	return 0;
++}
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index 1dc42f5..66f3eea 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
++++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
+ static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
+ static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
+ static char *auth_method = "unknown";
++static char *auth_submethod = NULL;
+ static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
+ static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
+ static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
+@@ -352,7 +353,7 @@ void
+ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+ {
+ 	struct mon_table *ent;
+-	int authenticated = 0;
++	int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
+ 
+ 	debug3("preauth child monitor started");
+ 
+@@ -379,8 +380,26 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+ 
+ 	/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
+ 	while (!authenticated) {
++		partial = 0;
+ 		auth_method = "unknown";
++		auth_submethod = NULL;
+ 		authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
++
++		/* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
++		if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
++			if (!compat20)
++				fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported"
++				    "with SSH protocol 1");
++			if (authenticated &&
++			    !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
++			    auth_method)) {
++				debug3("%s: method %s: partial", __func__,
++				    auth_method);
++				authenticated = 0;
++				partial = 1;
++			}
++		}
++
+ 		if (authenticated) {
+ 			if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
+ 				fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
+@@ -403,9 +422,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
+-			auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, auth_method,
++			auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial,
++			    auth_method, auth_submethod,
+ 			    compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
+-			if (!authenticated)
++			if (!authenticated && !partial)
+ 				authctxt->failures++;
+ 		}
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+@@ -781,7 +801,17 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ 	COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
+ #undef M_CP_STROPT
+ #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
+-	
++
++	/* Create valid auth method lists */
++	if (compat20 && auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
++		/*
++		 * The monitor will continue long enough to let the child
++		 * run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
++		 * authentication to succeed.
++		 */
++		debug("%s: no valid authentication method lists", __func__);
++	}
++
+ 	debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
+ 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
+ 
+@@ -918,7 +948,11 @@ mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ 	debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
+ 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
+ 
+-	auth_method = "bsdauth";
++	if (compat20)
++		auth_method = "keyboard-interactive"; /* XXX auth_submethod */
++	else
++		auth_method = "bsdauth";
++
+ 
+ 	return (authok != 0);
+ }
+@@ -1057,7 +1091,9 @@ mm_answer_pam_query(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ 		xfree(prompts);
+ 	if (echo_on != NULL)
+ 		xfree(echo_on);
+-	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive/pam";
++	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
++	auth_submethod = "pam";
++
+ 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m);
+ 	return (0);
+ }
+@@ -1086,7 +1122,8 @@ mm_answer_pam_respond(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ 	buffer_clear(m);
+ 	buffer_put_int(m, ret);
+ 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m);
+-	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive/pam";
++	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
++	auth_submethod= "pam";
+ 	if (ret == 0)
+ 		sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
+ 	return (0);
+@@ -1100,7 +1137,8 @@ mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ 	(sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt);
+ 	buffer_clear(m);
+ 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
+-	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive/pam";
++	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
++	auth_submethod = "pam";
+ 	return (sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt);
+ }
+ #endif
+@@ -1178,7 +1216,8 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ 		hostbased_chost = chost;
+ 	} else {
+ 		/* Log failed attempt */
+-		auth_log(authctxt, 0, auth_method, compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
++		auth_log(authctxt, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL,
++		    compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
+ 		xfree(blob);
+ 		xfree(cuser);
+ 		xfree(chost);
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 906778f..2c84993 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@
+ #include "groupaccess.h"
+ #include "canohost.h"
+ #include "packet.h"
++#include "hostfile.h"
++#include "auth.h"
+ 
+ static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int);
+ static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int);
+@@ -329,6 +331,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate,
+ 	sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
+ 	sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
++	sAuthenticationMethods,
+ 	sDeprecated, sUnsupported
+ } ServerOpCodes;
+ 
+@@ -454,6 +457,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+@@ -1498,6 +1502,24 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 		}
+ 		return 0;
+ 
++	case sAuthenticationMethods:
++		if (*activep && options->num_auth_methods == 0) {
++			while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
++				if (options->num_auth_methods >=
++				    MAX_AUTH_METHODS)
++					fatal("%s line %d: "
++					    "too many authentication methods.",
++					    filename, linenum);
++				if (auth2_methods_valid(arg, 0) != 0)
++					fatal("%s line %d: invalid "
++					    "authentication method list.",
++					    filename, linenum);
++				options->auth_methods[
++				    options->num_auth_methods++] = xstrdup(arg);
++			}
++		}
++		return 0;
++
+ 	case sDeprecated:
+ 		logit("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s",
+ 		    filename, linenum, arg);
+@@ -1925,6 +1947,8 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowGroups, o->num_allow_groups, o->allow_groups);
+ 	dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyGroups, o->num_deny_groups, o->deny_groups);
+ 	dump_cfg_strarray(sAcceptEnv, o->num_accept_env, o->accept_env);
++	dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sAuthenticationMethods,
++		o->num_auth_methods, o->auth_methods);
+ 
+ 	/* other arguments */
+ 	for (i = 0; i < o->num_subsystems; i++)
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index 096d596..ef80eef 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
++++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
+ #define MAX_ACCEPT_ENV		256	/* Max # of env vars. */
+ #define MAX_MATCH_GROUPS	256	/* Max # of groups for Match. */
+ #define MAX_AUTHKEYS_FILES	256	/* Max # of authorized_keys files. */
++#define MAX_AUTH_METHODS	256	/* Max # of AuthenticationMethods. */
+ 
+ /* permit_root_login */
+ #define	PERMIT_NOT_SET		-1
+@@ -168,6 +169,9 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	char   *authorized_principals_file;
+ 
+ 	char   *version_addendum;	/* Appended to SSH banner */
++
++	u_int	num_auth_methods;
++	char   *auth_methods[MAX_AUTH_METHODS];
+ }       ServerOptions;
+ 
+ /* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
+@@ -197,6 +201,7 @@ struct connection_info {
+ 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_groups, num_allow_groups); \
+ 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_groups, num_deny_groups); \
+ 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(accept_env, num_accept_env); \
++		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(auth_methods, num_auth_methods); \
+ 	} while (0)
+ 
+ struct connection_info *get_connection_info(int, int);
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index d5ec4e6..cb4bdd3 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -1333,6 +1333,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	int remote_port;
+ 	char *line;
+ 	int config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 };
++	u_int n;
+ 	u_int64_t ibytes, obytes;
+ 	mode_t new_umask;
+ 	Key *key;
+@@ -1555,6 +1556,26 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
+ 		options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
+ 
++	/*
++	 * Check whether there is any path through configured auth methods.
++	 * Unfortunately it is not possible to verify this generally before
++	 * daemonisation in the presence of Match block, but this catches
++	 * and warns for trivial misconfigurations that could break login.
++	 */
++	if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
++		if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1))
++			fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported with "
++			    "SSH protocol 1");
++		for (n = 0; n < options.num_auth_methods; n++) {
++			if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[n],
++			    1) == 0)
++				break;
++		}
++		if (n >= options.num_auth_methods)
++			fatal("AuthenticationMethods cannot be satisfied by "
++			    "enabled authentication methods");
++	}
++
+ 	/* set default channel AF */
+ 	channel_set_af(options.address_family);
+ 
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 314ecfb..ed81ac8 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -151,6 +151,28 @@ See
+ in
+ .Xr ssh_config 5
+ for more information on patterns.
++.It Cm AuthenticationMethods
++Specifies the authentication methods that must be successfully completed
++for a user to be granted access.
++This option must be followed by one or more comma-separated lists of
++authentication method names.
++Successful authentication requires completion of every method in at least
++one of these lists.
++.Pp
++For example, an argument of
++.Dq publickey,password publickey,keyboard-interactive
++would require the user to complete public key authentication, followed by
++either password or keyboard interactive authentication.
++Only methods that are next in one or more lists are offered at each stage,
++so for this example, it would not be possible to attempt password or
++keyboard-interactive authentication before public key.
++.Pp
++This option is only available for SSH protocol 2 and will yield a fatal
++error if enabled if protocol 1 is also enabled.
++Note that each authentication method listed should also be explicitly enabled
++in the configuration.
++The default is not to require multiple authentication; successful completion
++of a single authentication method is sufficient.
+ .It Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
+ Specifies the file that contains the public keys that can be used
+ for user authentication.
+@@ -711,6 +733,7 @@ Available keywords are
+ .Cm AllowGroups ,
+ .Cm AllowTcpForwarding ,
+ .Cm AllowUsers ,
++.Cm AuthenticationMethods ,
+ .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile ,
+ .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile ,
+ .Cm Banner ,

openssh-6.1p1-change-max-startups.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 684fbb4..a230c7b 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -267,11 +267,11 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 	if (options->gateway_ports == -1)
+ 		options->gateway_ports = 0;
+ 	if (options->max_startups == -1)
+-		options->max_startups = 10;
++		options->max_startups = 100;
+ 	if (options->max_startups_rate == -1)
+-		options->max_startups_rate = 100;		/* 100% */
++		options->max_startups_rate = 30;		/* 30% */
+ 	if (options->max_startups_begin == -1)
+-		options->max_startups_begin = options->max_startups;
++		options->max_startups_begin = 10;
+ 	if (options->max_authtries == -1)
+ 		options->max_authtries = DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX;
+ 	if (options->max_sessions == -1)
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+index d1b85d0..5c03fd9 100644
+--- a/sshd_config
++++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox		# Default for new installations.
+ #ShowPatchLevel no
+ #UseDNS yes
+ #PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid
+-#MaxStartups 10
++#MaxStartups 10:30:100
+ #PermitTunnel no
+ #ChrootDirectory none
+ #VersionAddendum none
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index fd0d35a..f02f6cc 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -826,7 +826,7 @@ SSH daemon.
+ Additional connections will be dropped until authentication succeeds or the
+ .Cm LoginGraceTime
+ expires for a connection.
+-The default is 10.
++The default is 10:30:100.
+ .Pp
+ Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by specifying
+ the three colon separated values

openssh-6.1p1-coverity.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,806 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth-pam.c.coverity openssh-6.1p1/auth-pam.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/auth-pam.c.coverity	2009-07-12 14:07:21.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/auth-pam.c	2012-09-14 21:16:41.264906486 +0200
+@@ -216,7 +216,12 @@ pthread_join(sp_pthread_t thread, void *
+ 	if (sshpam_thread_status != -1)
+ 		return (sshpam_thread_status);
+ 	signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig);
+-	waitpid(thread, &status, 0);
++	while (waitpid(thread, &status, 0) < 0) {                     
++		if (errno == EINTR)                                
++			continue;
++		fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,         
++				strerror(errno));                      
++	}
+ 	return (status);
+ }
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/clientloop.c.coverity openssh-6.1p1/clientloop.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/clientloop.c.coverity	2012-06-20 14:31:27.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/clientloop.c	2012-09-14 21:16:41.267906501 +0200
+@@ -2006,14 +2006,15 @@ client_input_global_request(int type, u_
+ 	char *rtype;
+ 	int want_reply;
+ 	int success = 0;
++/* success is still 0 the packet is allways SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, isn't it? */
+ 
+ 	rtype = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ 	want_reply = packet_get_char();
+ 	debug("client_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d",
+ 	    rtype, want_reply);
+ 	if (want_reply) {
+-		packet_start(success ?
+-		    SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
++		packet_start(/*success ?
++		    SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS :*/ SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
+ 		packet_send();
+ 		packet_write_wait();
+ 	}
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/channels.c.coverity openssh-6.1p1/channels.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/channels.c.coverity	2012-04-23 10:21:05.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/channels.c	2012-09-14 21:16:41.272906528 +0200
+@@ -232,11 +232,11 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd
+ 	channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, wfd);
+ 	channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, efd);
+ 
+-	if (rfd != -1)
++	if (rfd >= 0)
+ 		fcntl(rfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+-	if (wfd != -1 && wfd != rfd)
++	if (wfd >= 0 && wfd != rfd)
+ 		fcntl(wfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+-	if (efd != -1 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
++	if (efd >= 0 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
+ 		fcntl(efd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+ 
+ 	c->rfd = rfd;
+@@ -251,11 +251,11 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd
+ 
+ 	/* enable nonblocking mode */
+ 	if (nonblock) {
+-		if (rfd != -1)
++		if (rfd >= 0)
+ 			set_nonblock(rfd);
+-		if (wfd != -1)
++		if (wfd >= 0)
+ 			set_nonblock(wfd);
+-		if (efd != -1)
++		if (efd >= 0)
+ 			set_nonblock(efd);
+ 	}
+ }
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/key.c.coverity openssh-6.1p1/key.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/key.c.coverity	2012-06-30 12:05:02.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/key.c	2012-09-14 21:16:41.274906537 +0200
+@@ -808,8 +808,10 @@ key_read(Key *ret, char **cpp)
+ 		success = 1;
+ /*XXXX*/
+ 		key_free(k);
++/*XXXX
+ 		if (success != 1)
+ 			break;
++XXXX*/
+ 		/* advance cp: skip whitespace and data */
+ 		while (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t')
+ 			cp++;
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-6.1p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/monitor.c.coverity	2012-06-30 00:33:17.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/monitor.c	2012-09-14 21:16:41.277906552 +0200
+@@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
+-	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
++	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
+ 		;
+ 
+ 	if (!authctxt->valid)
+@@ -1159,6 +1159,10 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+ 	}
++
++	debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
++	    __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
++
+ 	if (key != NULL)
+ 		key_free(key);
+ 
+@@ -1180,9 +1184,6 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m
+ 		xfree(chost);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
+-	    __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
+-
+ 	buffer_clear(m);
+ 	buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
+ 	buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity	2011-06-20 06:42:23.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.c	2012-09-14 21:16:41.280906568 +0200
+@@ -707,10 +707,10 @@ mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd,
+ 	if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
+ 	    (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
+ 		error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__);
+-		if (tmp1 > 0)
++		if (tmp1 >= 0)
+ 			close(tmp1);
+-		if (tmp2 > 0)
+-			close(tmp2);
++		/*DEAD CODE if (tmp2 >= 0)
++			close(tmp2);*/
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 	close(tmp1);
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity	2010-12-03 00:50:26.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c	2012-09-14 21:16:41.281906573 +0200
+@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr
+ 	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
+ 	u_int16_t *portp;
+ 	u_int16_t port;
+-	socklen_t salen;
++	socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
+ 	int i;
+ 
+ 	if (sa == NULL) {
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/packet.c.coverity openssh-6.1p1/packet.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/packet.c.coverity	2012-03-09 00:28:07.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/packet.c	2012-09-14 21:16:41.284906588 +0200
+@@ -1177,6 +1177,7 @@ packet_read_poll1(void)
+ 		case DEATTACK_DETECTED:
+ 			packet_disconnect("crc32 compensation attack: "
+ 			    "network attack detected");
++			break;
+ 		case DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED:
+ 			packet_disconnect("deattack denial of "
+ 			    "service detected");
+@@ -1678,7 +1679,7 @@ void
+ packet_write_wait(void)
+ {
+ 	fd_set *setp;
+-	int ret, ms_remain;
++	int ret, ms_remain = 0;
+ 	struct timeval start, timeout, *timeoutp = NULL;
+ 
+ 	setp = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(active_state->connection_out + 1,
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/progressmeter.c.coverity openssh-6.1p1/progressmeter.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/progressmeter.c.coverity	2006-08-05 04:39:40.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/progressmeter.c	2012-09-14 21:16:41.285906593 +0200
+@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static void update_progress_meter(int);
+ 
+ static time_t start;		/* start progress */
+ static time_t last_update;	/* last progress update */
+-static char *file;		/* name of the file being transferred */
++static const char *file;	/* name of the file being transferred */
+ static off_t end_pos;		/* ending position of transfer */
+ static off_t cur_pos;		/* transfer position as of last refresh */
+ static volatile off_t *counter;	/* progress counter */
+@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ update_progress_meter(int ignore)
+ }
+ 
+ void
+-start_progress_meter(char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr)
++start_progress_meter(const char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr)
+ {
+ 	start = last_update = time(NULL);
+ 	file = f;
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/progressmeter.h.coverity openssh-6.1p1/progressmeter.h
+--- openssh-6.1p1/progressmeter.h.coverity	2006-03-26 05:30:02.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/progressmeter.h	2012-09-14 21:16:41.286906598 +0200
+@@ -23,5 +23,5 @@
+  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+  */
+ 
+-void	start_progress_meter(char *, off_t, off_t *);
++void	start_progress_meter(const char *, off_t, off_t *);
+ void	stop_progress_meter(void);
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/scp.c.coverity openssh-6.1p1/scp.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/scp.c.coverity	2011-09-22 13:38:01.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/scp.c	2012-09-14 21:16:41.288906608 +0200
+@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
+ {
+ 	if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
+ 		kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
+-		waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
++		(void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (signo)
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c.coverity openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c.coverity	2012-07-31 04:22:38.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c	2012-09-14 21:16:41.291906623 +0200
+@@ -1249,7 +1249,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.",
+ 			    filename, linenum);
+ 		if (!*activep) {
+-			arg = strdelim(&cp);
++			/*arg =*/ (void) strdelim(&cp);
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+ 		for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++)
+@@ -1340,8 +1340,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
+ 			*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
+ 			/* increase optional counter */
+-			if (intptr != NULL)
+-				*intptr = *intptr + 1;
++			/* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;)
++  			 if (intptr != NULL)
++				*intptr = *intptr + 1; */
+ 		}
+ 		break;
+ 
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-6.1p1/serverloop.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/serverloop.c.coverity	2012-06-20 14:31:27.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/serverloop.c	2012-09-14 21:16:41.294906638 +0200
+@@ -147,13 +147,13 @@ notify_setup(void)
+ static void
+ notify_parent(void)
+ {
+-	if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
+ 		write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
+ }
+ static void
+ notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
+ {
+-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
+ 		FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
+ }
+ static void
+@@ -161,8 +161,8 @@ notify_done(fd_set *readset)
+ {
+ 	char c;
+ 
+-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
+-		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
++		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
+ 			debug2("notify_done: reading");
+ }
+ 
+@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **rea
+ 		 * If we have buffered data, try to write some of that data
+ 		 * to the program.
+ 		 */
+-		if (fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0)
++		if (fdin >= 0 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0)
+ 			FD_SET(fdin, *writesetp);
+ 	}
+ 	notify_prepare(*readsetp);
+@@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ process_output(fd_set *writeset)
+ 	int len;
+ 
+ 	/* Write buffered data to program stdin. */
+-	if (!compat20 && fdin != -1 && FD_ISSET(fdin, writeset)) {
++	if (!compat20 && fdin >= 0 && FD_ISSET(fdin, writeset)) {
+ 		data = buffer_ptr(&stdin_buffer);
+ 		dlen = buffer_len(&stdin_buffer);
+ 		len = write(fdin, data, dlen);
+@@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int
+ 	set_nonblock(fdin);
+ 	set_nonblock(fdout);
+ 	/* we don't have stderr for interactive terminal sessions, see below */
+-	if (fderr != -1)
++	if (fderr >= 0)
+ 		set_nonblock(fderr);
+ 
+ 	if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG) && isatty(fdin))
+@@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int
+ 	max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out);
+ 	max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdin);
+ 	max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdout);
+-	if (fderr != -1)
++	if (fderr >= 0)
+ 		max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fderr);
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int
+ 		 * If we have received eof, and there is no more pending
+ 		 * input data, cause a real eof by closing fdin.
+ 		 */
+-		if (stdin_eof && fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) {
++		if (stdin_eof && fdin >= 0 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) {
+ 			if (fdin != fdout)
+ 				close(fdin);
+ 			else
+@@ -741,15 +741,15 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int
+ 	buffer_free(&stderr_buffer);
+ 
+ 	/* Close the file descriptors. */
+-	if (fdout != -1)
++	if (fdout >= 0)
+ 		close(fdout);
+ 	fdout = -1;
+ 	fdout_eof = 1;
+-	if (fderr != -1)
++	if (fderr >= 0)
+ 		close(fderr);
+ 	fderr = -1;
+ 	fderr_eof = 1;
+-	if (fdin != -1)
++	if (fdin >= 0)
+ 		close(fdin);
+ 	fdin = -1;
+ 
+@@ -943,7 +943,7 @@ server_input_window_size(int type, u_int
+ 
+ 	debug("Window change received.");
+ 	packet_check_eom();
+-	if (fdin != -1)
++	if (fdin >= 0)
+ 		pty_change_window_size(fdin, row, col, xpixel, ypixel);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -996,7 +996,7 @@ server_request_tun(void)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	tun = packet_get_int();
+-	if (forced_tun_device != -1) {
++	if (forced_tun_device >= 0) {
+ 		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY && forced_tun_device != tun)
+ 			goto done;
+ 		tun = forced_tun_device;
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sftp.c.coverity openssh-6.1p1/sftp.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/sftp.c.coverity	2012-06-30 00:33:32.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/sftp.c	2012-09-14 21:16:41.297906653 +0200
+@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
+ {
+ 	if (sshpid > 1) {
+ 		kill(sshpid, SIGTERM);
+-		waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
++		(void) waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	_exit(1);
+@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ local_do_ls(const char *args)
+ 
+ /* Strip one path (usually the pwd) from the start of another */
+ static char *
+-path_strip(char *path, char *strip)
++path_strip(const char *path, const char *strip)
+ {
+ 	size_t len;
+ 
+@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ path_strip(char *path, char *strip)
+ }
+ 
+ static char *
+-make_absolute(char *p, char *pwd)
++make_absolute(char *p, const char *pwd)
+ {
+ 	char *abs_str;
+ 
+@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ parse_df_flags(const char *cmd, char **a
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-is_dir(char *path)
++is_dir(const char *path)
+ {
+ 	struct stat sb;
+ 
+@@ -494,7 +494,7 @@ is_dir(char *path)
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
++remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+ {
+ 	Attrib *a;
+ 
+@@ -508,7 +508,7 @@ remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, ch
+ 
+ /* Check whether path returned from glob(..., GLOB_MARK, ...) is a directory */
+ static int
+-pathname_is_dir(char *pathname)
++pathname_is_dir(const char *pathname)
+ {
+ 	size_t l = strlen(pathname);
+ 
+@@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ pathname_is_dir(char *pathname)
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, char *pwd,
++process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, const char *pwd,
+     int pflag, int rflag)
+ {
+ 	char *abs_src = NULL;
+@@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ out:
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, char *pwd,
++process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, const char *pwd,
+     int pflag, int rflag)
+ {
+ 	char *tmp_dst = NULL;
+@@ -695,7 +695,7 @@ sdirent_comp(const void *aa, const void
+ 
+ /* sftp ls.1 replacement for directories */
+ static int
+-do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path, int lflag)
++do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, const char *strip_path, int lflag)
+ {
+ 	int n;
+ 	u_int c = 1, colspace = 0, columns = 1;
+@@ -780,7 +780,7 @@ do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *
+ 
+ /* sftp ls.1 replacement which handles path globs */
+ static int
+-do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path,
++do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, const char *strip_path,
+     int lflag)
+ {
+ 	char *fname, *lname;
+@@ -861,7 +861,7 @@ do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, ch
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int hflag, int iflag)
++do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int hflag, int iflag)
+ {
+ 	struct sftp_statvfs st;
+ 	char s_used[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sftp-client.c.coverity openssh-6.1p1/sftp-client.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/sftp-client.c.coverity	2012-07-02 14:15:39.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/sftp-client.c	2012-09-14 21:18:16.891332281 +0200
+@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ get_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, Buffer *
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+-send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, char *s,
++send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, const char *s,
+     u_int len)
+ {
+ 	Buffer msg;
+@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *co
+ 
+ static void
+ send_string_attrs_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code,
+-    char *s, u_int len, Attrib *a)
++    const char *s, u_int len, Attrib *a)
+ {
+ 	Buffer msg;
+ 
+@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *con
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len)
++do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *handle, u_int handle_len)
+ {
+ 	u_int id, status;
+ 	Buffer msg;
+@@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *h
+ 
+ 
+ static int
+-do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int printflag,
++do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int printflag,
+     SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
+ {
+ 	Buffer msg;
+@@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, cha
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
++do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
+ {
+ 	return(do_lsreaddir(conn, path, 0, dir));
+ }
+@@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **s)
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
++do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+ {
+ 	u_int status, id;
+ 
+@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, Attrib *a, int printflag)
++do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a, int printflag)
+ {
+ 	u_int status, id;
+ 
+@@ -621,7 +621,7 @@ do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *p
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
++do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+ {
+ 	u_int status, id;
+ 
+@@ -637,7 +637,7 @@ do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *p
+ }
+ 
+ Attrib *
+-do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int quiet)
++do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet)
+ {
+ 	u_int id;
+ 
+@@ -651,7 +651,7 @@ do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *pa
+ }
+ 
+ Attrib *
+-do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int quiet)
++do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet)
+ {
+ 	u_int id;
+ 
+@@ -685,7 +685,7 @@ do_fstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *h
+ #endif
+ 
+ int
+-do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, Attrib *a)
++do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a)
+ {
+ 	u_int status, id;
+ 
+@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len,
++do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *handle, u_int handle_len,
+     Attrib *a)
+ {
+ 	u_int status, id;
+@@ -719,7 +719,7 @@ do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char
+ }
+ 
+ char *
+-do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
++do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+ {
+ 	Buffer msg;
+ 	u_int type, expected_id, count, id;
+@@ -768,7 +768,7 @@ do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, char
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath)
++do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath)
+ {
+ 	Buffer msg;
+ 	u_int status, id;
+@@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath)
++do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath)
+ {
+ 	Buffer msg;
+ 	u_int status, id;
+@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath)
++do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath)
+ {
+ 	Buffer msg;
+ 	u_int status, id;
+@@ -987,7 +987,7 @@ send_read_request(struct sftp_conn *conn
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path, char *local_path,
++do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *remote_path, const char *local_path,
+     Attrib *a, int pflag)
+ {
+ 	Attrib junk;
+@@ -1226,7 +1226,7 @@ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, char
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst,
++download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+     Attrib *dirattrib, int pflag, int printflag, int depth)
+ {
+ 	int i, ret = 0;
+@@ -1316,7 +1316,7 @@ download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst,
++download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+     Attrib *dirattrib, int pflag, int printflag)
+ {
+ 	char *src_canon;
+@@ -1334,7 +1334,7 @@ download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, cha
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *local_path, char *remote_path,
++do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *local_path, const char *remote_path,
+     int pflag)
+ {
+ 	int local_fd;
+@@ -1517,7 +1517,7 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst,
++upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+     int pflag, int printflag, int depth)
+ {
+ 	int ret = 0, status;
+@@ -1608,7 +1608,7 @@ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *co
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, int printflag,
++upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, int printflag,
+     int pflag)
+ {
+ 	char *dst_canon;
+@@ -1625,7 +1625,7 @@ upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char
+ }
+ 
+ char *
+-path_append(char *p1, char *p2)
++path_append(const char *p1, const char *p2)
+ {
+ 	char *ret;
+ 	size_t len = strlen(p1) + strlen(p2) + 2;
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sftp-client.h.coverity openssh-6.1p1/sftp-client.h
+--- openssh-6.1p1/sftp-client.h.coverity	2010-12-04 23:02:48.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/sftp-client.h	2012-09-14 21:16:41.301906674 +0200
+@@ -56,49 +56,49 @@ struct sftp_conn *do_init(int, int, u_in
+ u_int sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *);
+ 
+ /* Close file referred to by 'handle' */
+-int do_close(struct sftp_conn *, char *, u_int);
++int do_close(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, u_int);
+ 
+ /* Read contents of 'path' to NULL-terminated array 'dir' */
+-int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, SFTP_DIRENT ***);
++int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, SFTP_DIRENT ***);
+ 
+ /* Frees a NULL-terminated array of SFTP_DIRENTs (eg. from do_readdir) */
+ void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **);
+ 
+ /* Delete file 'path' */
+-int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *, char *);
++int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
+ 
+ /* Create directory 'path' */
+-int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, Attrib *, int);
++int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, Attrib *, int);
+ 
+ /* Remove directory 'path' */
+-int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *);
++int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
+ 
+ /* Get file attributes of 'path' (follows symlinks) */
+-Attrib *do_stat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, int);
++Attrib *do_stat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int);
+ 
+ /* Get file attributes of 'path' (does not follow symlinks) */
+-Attrib *do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, int);
++Attrib *do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int);
+ 
+ /* Set file attributes of 'path' */
+-int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, Attrib *);
++int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, Attrib *);
+ 
+ /* Set file attributes of open file 'handle' */
+-int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, u_int, Attrib *);
++int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, u_int, Attrib *);
+ 
+ /* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */
+-char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, char *);
++char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
+ 
+ /* Get statistics for filesystem hosting file at "path" */
+ int do_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, struct sftp_statvfs *, int);
+ 
+ /* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
+-int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *);
++int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *);
+ 
+ /* Link 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
+-int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *);
++int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *);
+ 
+-/* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
+-int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *);
++/* Symlink 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
++int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *);
+ 
+ /* XXX: add callbacks to do_download/do_upload so we can do progress meter */
+ 
+@@ -106,27 +106,27 @@ int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, char
+  * Download 'remote_path' to 'local_path'. Preserve permissions and times
+  * if 'pflag' is set
+  */
+-int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, Attrib *, int);
++int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *, int);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Recursively download 'remote_directory' to 'local_directory'. Preserve 
+  * times if 'pflag' is set
+  */
+-int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, Attrib *, int, int);
++int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *, int, int);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Upload 'local_path' to 'remote_path'. Preserve permissions and times
+  * if 'pflag' is set
+  */
+-int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, int);
++int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Recursively upload 'local_directory' to 'remote_directory'. Preserve 
+  * times if 'pflag' is set
+  */
+-int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, int, int);
++int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int);
+ 
+ /* Concatenate paths, taking care of slashes. Caller must free result. */
+-char *path_append(char *, char *);
++char *path_append(const char *, const char *);
+ 
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-6.1p1/ssh-agent.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity	2011-06-03 06:14:16.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/ssh-agent.c	2012-09-14 21:16:41.303906683 +0200
+@@ -1147,8 +1147,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	sanitise_stdfd();
+ 
+ 	/* drop */
+-	setegid(getgid());
+-	setgid(getgid());
++	(void) setegid(getgid());
++	(void) setgid(getgid());
+ 
+ #if defined(HAVE_PRCTL) && defined(PR_SET_DUMPABLE)
+ 	/* Disable ptrace on Linux without sgid bit */
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.coverity	2012-07-31 04:21:34.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c	2012-09-14 21:16:41.307906705 +0200
+@@ -682,8 +682,10 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 		if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
+ 			privsep_preauth_child();
+ 		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
+-		if (box != NULL)
++		if (box != NULL) {
+ 			ssh_sandbox_child(box);
++			xfree(box);
++		}
+ 
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+@@ -1311,6 +1313,9 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
+ 		if (num_listen_socks < 0)
+ 			break;
+ 	}
++
++	if (fdset != NULL)
++		xfree(fdset);
+ }
+ 
+ 
+@@ -1768,7 +1773,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 
+ 	/* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
+ 	   unmounted if desired. */
+-	chdir("/");
++	(void) chdir("/");
+ 
+ 	/* ignore SIGPIPE */
+ 	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);

openssh-6.1p1-gssapi-canohost.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c.canohost openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c.canohost	2012-10-30 10:52:59.593301692 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c	2012-10-30 11:01:12.870301632 +0100
+@@ -699,12 +699,15 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	static u_int mech = 0;
+ 	OM_uint32 min;
+ 	int ok = 0;
+-	const char *gss_host;
++	const char *gss_host = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (options.gss_server_identity)
+ 		gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
+-	else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
++	else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
+ 		gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1);
++		if ( strcmp( gss_host, "UNKNOWN" )  == 0 )
++			gss_host = authctxt->host;
++	}
+ 	else
+ 		gss_host = authctxt->host;
+ 

openssh-6.1p1-increase-size-of-DF-groups.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+diff -U0 openssh-6.2p2/ChangeLog.dh openssh-6.2p2/ChangeLog
+--- openssh-6.2p2/ChangeLog.dh	2013-11-18 12:14:09.662240103 +0100
++++ openssh-6.2p2/ChangeLog	2013-11-18 12:14:09.665240089 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
++20131010
++ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/08 11:42:13
++   [dh.c dh.h]
++   Increase the size of the Diffie-Hellman groups requested for a each
++   symmetric key size.  New values from NIST Special Publication 800-57 with
++   the upper limit specified by RFC4419.  Pointed out by Peter Backes, ok
++   djm@.
++
+diff -up openssh-6.2p2/dh.c.dh openssh-6.2p2/dh.c
+--- openssh-6.2p2/dh.c.dh	2011-12-19 00:52:52.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-6.2p2/dh.c	2013-11-18 12:14:09.665240089 +0100
+@@ -332,17 +332,20 @@ dh_new_group14(void)
+ 
+ /*
+  * Estimates the group order for a Diffie-Hellman group that has an
+- * attack complexity approximately the same as O(2**bits).  Estimate
+- * with:  O(exp(1.9223 * (ln q)^(1/3) (ln ln q)^(2/3)))
++ * attack complexity approximately the same as O(2**bits).
++ * Values from NIST Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation for Key
++ * Management Part 1 (rev 3) limited by the recommended maximum value
++ * from RFC4419 section 3.
+  */
+ 
+ int
+ dh_estimate(int bits)
+ {
+-
++	if (bits <= 112)
++		return 2048;
+ 	if (bits <= 128)
+-		return (1024);	/* O(2**86) */
++		return 3072;
+ 	if (bits <= 192)
+-		return (2048);	/* O(2**116) */
+-	return (4096);		/* O(2**156) */
++		return 7680;
++	return 8192;
+ }
+diff -up openssh-6.2p2/dh.h.dh openssh-6.2p2/dh.h
+--- openssh-6.2p2/dh.h.dh	2008-06-29 14:47:04.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.2p2/dh.h	2013-11-18 12:14:09.665240089 +0100
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: dh.h,v 1.10 2008/06/26 09:19:40 djm Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: dh.h,v 1.11 2013/10/08 11:42:13 dtucker Exp $ */
+ 
+ /*
+  * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
+@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ int	 dh_pub_is_valid(DH *, BIGNUM *);
+ 
+ int	 dh_estimate(int);
+ 
++/* Min and max values from RFC4419. */
+ #define DH_GRP_MIN	1024
+ #define DH_GRP_MAX	8192
+ 

openssh-6.1p1-kuserok.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-6.1p1/auth-krb5.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok	2012-09-14 21:08:16.941496194 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/auth-krb5.c	2012-09-14 21:08:17.063496896 +0200
+@@ -55,6 +55,20 @@
+ 
+ extern ServerOptions	 options;
+ 
++int
++ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context krb5_ctx, krb5_principal krb5_user, const char *client)
++{
++	if (options.use_kuserok)
++		return krb5_kuserok(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, client);
++	else {
++		char kuser[65];
++
++		if (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, sizeof(kuser), kuser))
++			return 0;
++		return strcmp(kuser, client) == 0;
++	}
++}
++
+ static int
+ krb5_init(void *context)
+ {
+@@ -147,7 +161,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+ 	if (problem)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+-	if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, client)) {
++	if (!ssh_krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, client)) {
+ 		problem = -1;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-6.1p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok	2012-09-14 21:08:17.019496642 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2012-09-14 21:08:17.065496906 +0200
+@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_pr
+     int);
+ 
+ static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
++extern int ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context, krb5_principal, const char *);
+ 
+ /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
+ 
+@@ -115,7 +116,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client
+ 	/* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user,
+ 	 * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials
+ 	 * to access these files aren't available yet. */
+-	if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, luser) && k5login_exists) {
++	if (ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, luser) && k5login_exists) {
+ 		retval = 1;
+ 		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
+ 		    luser, (char *)client->displayname.value);
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c.kuserok	2012-09-14 21:08:16.989496471 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c	2012-09-14 21:09:30.864868698 +0200
+@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ 	options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
+ 	options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
+ 	options->version_addendum = NULL;
++	options->use_kuserok = -1;
+ }
+ 
+ void
+@@ -301,6 +302,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 		options->version_addendum = xstrdup("");
+ 	if (options->show_patchlevel == -1)
+ 		options->show_patchlevel = 0;
++	if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
++		options->use_kuserok = 1;
+ 
+ 	/* Turn privilege separation on by default */
+ 	if (use_privsep == -1)
+@@ -327,7 +330,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
+ 	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
+ 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
+-	sKerberosGetAFSToken,
++	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUseKuserok,
+ 	sKerberosTgtPassing, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
+ 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+ 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+@@ -399,11 +402,13 @@ static struct {
+ #else
+ 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
++	{ "kerberosusekuserok", sKerberosUseKuserok, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #else
+ 	{ "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "kerberosusekuserok", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1486,6 +1491,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 		*activep = value;
+ 		break;
+ 
++	case sKerberosUseKuserok:
++		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case sPermitOpen:
+ 		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+@@ -1769,6 +1778,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(max_authtries);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
++	M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok);
+ 
+ 	/* See comment in servconf.h */
+ 	COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
+@@ -2005,6 +2015,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
+ 
+ 	/* string arguments */
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file);
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h.kuserok openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h.kuserok	2012-09-14 21:08:16.990496476 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h	2012-09-14 21:08:17.071496942 +0200
+@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 
+ 	int	num_permitted_opens;
+ 
++	int	use_kuserok;
+ 	char   *chroot_directory;
+ 	char   *revoked_keys_file;
+ 	char   *trusted_user_ca_keys;
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.kuserok openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.kuserok	2012-09-14 21:08:17.002496545 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config	2012-09-14 21:08:17.074496957 +0200
+@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
+ #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
+ #KerberosTicketCleanup yes
+ #KerberosGetAFSToken no
++#KerberosUseKuserok yes
+ 
+ # GSSAPI options
+ #GSSAPIAuthentication no
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok	2012-09-14 21:08:17.004496556 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5	2012-09-14 21:08:17.073496952 +0200
+@@ -618,6 +618,10 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
+ file on logout.
+ The default is
+ .Dq yes .
++.It Cm KerberosUseKuserok
++Specifies whether to look at .k5login file for user's aliases.
++The default is
++.Dq yes .
+ .It Cm KexAlgorithms
+ Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
+ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+@@ -767,6 +771,7 @@ Available keywords are
+ .Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly ,
+ .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication ,
+ .Cm KerberosAuthentication ,
++.Cm KerberosUseKuserok ,
+ .Cm MaxAuthTries ,
+ .Cm MaxSessions ,
+ .Cm PubkeyAuthentication ,

openssh-6.1p1-log-usepam-no.patch

@@ -1,26 +1,26 @@
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -1701,6 +1701,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no	2012-09-14 20:54:58.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c	2012-09-14 20:55:42.289477749 +0200
+@@ -1617,6 +1617,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  	parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
- 	    cfg, &includes, NULL);
+ 	    &cfg, NULL);
  
 +	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora */
 +	if (! options.use_pam)
 +		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora and may cause several problems.");
 +
- 	/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
- 	fill_default_server_options(&options);
+ 	seed_rng();
  
-diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
---- a/sshd_config
-+++ b/sshd_config
-@@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
+ 	/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no	2012-09-14 20:54:58.514255748 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config	2012-09-14 20:54:58.551255954 +0200
+@@ -95,6 +95,8 @@ GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
  # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
  # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
  # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
 +# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora and may cause several
 +# problems.
  #UsePAM no
+ UsePAM yes
  
- #AllowAgentForwarding yes

openssh-6.1p1-man-moduli.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/moduli.0.man-moduli openssh-6.1p1/moduli.0
+--- openssh-6.1p1/moduli.0.man-moduli	2012-11-06 09:42:13.677062887 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/moduli.0	2012-11-06 09:42:58.693543381 +0100
+@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ DESCRIPTION
+ 
+                         0     Unknown, not tested.
+                         2     "Safe" prime; (p-1)/2 is also prime.
+-                        4     Sophie Germain; (p+1)*2 is also prime.
++                        4     Sophie Germain; (p*2)+1 is also prime.
+ 
+                         Moduli candidates initially produced by ssh-keygen(1)
+                         are Sophie Germain primes (type 4).  Further primality
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/moduli.5.man-moduli openssh-6.1p1/moduli.5
+--- openssh-6.1p1/moduli.5.man-moduli	2012-11-06 09:42:17.730035388 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/moduli.5	2012-11-06 09:43:31.403180375 +0100
+@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ Unknown, not tested.
+ .It 2
+ "Safe" prime; (p-1)/2 is also prime.
+ .It 4
+-Sophie Germain; (p+1)*2 is also prime.
++Sophie Germain; (p*2)+1 is also prime.
+ .El
+ .Pp
+ Moduli candidates initially produced by

openssh-6.1p1-privsep-selinux.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.privsep-selinux openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.privsep-selinux	2012-11-05 14:46:39.334809203 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2012-11-05 14:54:32.614504884 +0100
+@@ -505,6 +505,25 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *n
+ 	xfree(newctx);
+ }
+ 
++void
++ssh_selinux_copy_context(void)
++{
++	security_context_t *ctx;
++
++	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
++		return;
++
++	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
++		logit("%s: getcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror (errno));
++		return;
++	}
++	if (ctx != NULL) {
++		if (setcon(ctx) != 0)
++			logit("%s: setcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror (errno));
++		freecon(ctx);
++	}
++}
++
+ #endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
+ 
+ #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+--- openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux	2011-01-25 02:16:18.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2012-11-05 14:46:39.339809234 +0100
+@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
++void ssh_selinux_copy_context(void);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/session.c.privsep-selinux openssh-6.1p1/session.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/session.c.privsep-selinux	2012-12-03 09:43:11.727505761 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/session.c	2012-12-03 09:54:50.455688902 +0100
+@@ -1519,6 +1519,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+ 			    pw->pw_uid);
+ 			chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
+ 			    "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++			ssh_selinux_copy_context();
++#endif
+ 			safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
+ 			free(tmp);
+ 			free(chroot_path);
+@@ -1533,6 +1536,12 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+ 		/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
+ 		permanently_set_uid(pw);
+ #endif
++
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++		if (options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
++		    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0)
++			ssh_selinux_copy_context();
++#endif
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid)
+@@ -1787,9 +1796,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+ 		argv[i] = NULL;
+ 		optind = optreset = 1;
+ 		__progname = argv[0];
+-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-		ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
+-#endif
+ 		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
+ 	}
+ 
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux	2012-11-05 14:46:39.335809209 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c	2012-11-05 14:46:39.341809247 +0100
+@@ -794,6 +794,13 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
+ 
+  skip:
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	/* switch SELinux content for root too */
++	if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) {
++		ssh_selinux_copy_context();
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	/* It is safe now to apply the key state */
+ 	monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
+ 

openssh-6.1p1-redhat.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/ssh_config.redhat openssh-6.1p1/ssh_config
+--- openssh-6.1p1/ssh_config.redhat	2010-01-12 09:40:27.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/ssh_config	2012-10-26 16:28:51.820340584 +0200
+@@ -45,3 +45,14 @@
+ #   PermitLocalCommand no
+ #   VisualHostKey no
+ #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
++Host *
++	GSSAPIAuthentication yes
++# If this option is set to yes then remote X11 clients will have full access
++# to the original X11 display. As virtually no X11 client supports the untrusted
++# mode correctly we set this to yes.
++	ForwardX11Trusted yes
++# Send locale-related environment variables
++	SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES 
++	SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT 
++	SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
++	SendEnv XMODIFIERS
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0
+--- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0.redhat	2012-10-26 16:28:51.762340584 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0	2012-10-26 16:28:51.821340584 +0200
+@@ -583,9 +583,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
+ 
+      SyslogFacility
+              Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+-             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0,
+-             LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.  The
+-             default is AUTH.
++             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV,
++             LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
++             The default is AUTH.
+ 
+      TCPKeepAlive
+              Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5.redhat	2012-10-26 16:28:51.763340584 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5	2012-10-26 16:28:51.822340584 +0200
+@@ -1015,7 +1015,7 @@ Note that this option applies to protoco
+ .It Cm SyslogFacility
+ Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+ .Xr sshd 8 .
+-The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
++The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
+ LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
+ The default is AUTH.
+ .It Cm TCPKeepAlive
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.redhat openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.redhat	2012-10-26 16:28:51.819340584 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config	2012-10-26 16:31:44.773340564 +0200
+@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@
+ # possible, but leave them commented.  Uncommented options override the
+ # default value.
+ 
++# If you want to change the port on a SELinux system, you have to tell
++# SELinux about this change.
++# semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER
++#
+ #Port 22
+ #AddressFamily any
+ #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
+@@ -32,6 +36,7 @@
+ # Logging
+ # obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging
+ #SyslogFacility AUTH
++SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
+ #LogLevel INFO
+ 
+ # Authentication:
+@@ -67,9 +72,11 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ # To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
+ #PasswordAuthentication yes
+ #PermitEmptyPasswords no
++PasswordAuthentication yes
+ 
+ # Change to no to disable s/key passwords
+ #ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes
++ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
+ 
+ # Kerberos options
+ #KerberosAuthentication no
+@@ -79,7 +86,9 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ 
+ # GSSAPI options
+ #GSSAPIAuthentication no
++GSSAPIAuthentication yes
+ #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
++GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
+ 
+ # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, 
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will 
+@@ -91,11 +100,13 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
+ # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
+ #UsePAM no
++UsePAM yes
+ 
+ #AllowAgentForwarding yes
+ #AllowTcpForwarding yes
+ #GatewayPorts no
+ #X11Forwarding no
++X11Forwarding yes
+ #X11DisplayOffset 10
+ #X11UseLocalhost yes
+ #PrintMotd yes
+@@ -117,6 +128,12 @@ UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox		# Defaul
+ # no default banner path
+ #Banner none
+ 
++# Accept locale-related environment variables
++AcceptEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
++AcceptEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
++AcceptEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
++AcceptEnv XMODIFIERS
++
+ # override default of no subsystems
+ Subsystem	sftp	/usr/libexec/sftp-server
+ 

openssh-6.1p1-required-authentications.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c.required-authentication openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c.required-authentication	2012-11-30 21:13:14.375382453 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c	2012-11-30 21:33:56.972017545 +0100
+@@ -495,6 +495,8 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "authorizedkeyscommandrunas", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "requiredauthentications1", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "requiredauthentications2", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+@@ -1560,6 +1562,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+ 	case sAuthenticationMethods:
++		if (strncasecmp(arg, "requiredauthentications", 23) == 0)
++			logit("%s line %d: Option %s is obsolete. Please use AuthenticationMethods",
++			    filename, linenum, arg);
+ 		if (*activep && options->num_auth_methods == 0) {
+ 			while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
+ 				if (options->num_auth_methods >=

openssh-6.1p1-role-mls.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,934 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth1.c.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/auth1.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/auth1.c.role-mls	2012-11-28 17:06:43.657990103 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/auth1.c	2012-11-28 17:06:43.699989959 +0100
+@@ -384,6 +384,9 @@ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ {
+ 	u_int ulen;
+ 	char *user, *style = NULL;
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	char *role=NULL;
++#endif
+ 
+ 	/* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */
+ 	packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_USER);
+@@ -392,11 +395,24 @@ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	user = packet_get_cstring(&ulen);
+ 	packet_check_eom();
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
++		*role++ = '\0';
++#endif
++
+ 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
+ 		*style++ = '\0';
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	else
++		if (role && (style = strchr(role, ':')) != NULL)
++			*style++ = '\0';
++#endif
+ 
+ 	authctxt->user = user;
+ 	authctxt->style = style;
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	authctxt->role = role;
++#endif
+ 
+ 	/* Verify that the user is a valid user. */
+ 	if ((authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user))) != NULL)
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth2.c.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/auth2.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/auth2.c.role-mls	2012-11-28 17:06:43.661990089 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/auth2.c	2012-11-28 17:11:09.058916613 +0100
+@@ -218,6 +218,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ 	Authmethod *m = NULL;
+ 	char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL;
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	char *role = NULL;
++#endif
+ 	int authenticated = 0;
+ 
+ 	if (authctxt == NULL)
+@@ -229,6 +232,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+ 	debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
+ 	debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
++		*role++ = 0;
++#endif
++
+ 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
+ 		*style++ = 0;
+ 
+@@ -251,8 +259,15 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+ 		    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
+ 		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
+ 		authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
+-		if (use_privsep)
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++		authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
++#endif
++		if (use_privsep) {
+ 			mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++			mm_inform_authrole(role);
++#endif
++		}
+ 		userauth_banner();
+ 		if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
+ 			packet_disconnect("no authentication methods enabled");
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/auth2-gss.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/auth2-gss.c.role-mls	2011-05-05 06:04:11.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/auth2-gss.c	2012-11-28 17:06:43.700989956 +0100
+@@ -260,6 +260,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ 	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+ 	int authenticated = 0;
++	char *micuser;
+ 	Buffer b;
+ 	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
+ 	u_int len;
+@@ -272,7 +273,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ 	mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
+ 	mic.length = len;
+ 
+-	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	if (authctxt->role && (strlen(authctxt->role) > 0))
++		xasprintf(&micuser, "%s/%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->role);
++	else
++#endif
++		micuser = authctxt->user;
++	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, micuser, authctxt->service,
+ 	    "gssapi-with-mic");
+ 
+ 	gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
+@@ -284,6 +291,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ 		logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
+ 
+ 	buffer_free(&b);
++	if (micuser != authctxt->user)
++		xfree(micuser);
+ 	xfree(mic.value);
+ 
+ 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/auth2-hostbased.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls	2012-11-28 17:06:43.669990062 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/auth2-hostbased.c	2012-11-28 17:06:43.700989956 +0100
+@@ -106,7 +106,15 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
+ 	/* reconstruct packet */
+ 	buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+-	buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	if (authctxt->role) {
++		buffer_put_int(&b, strlen(authctxt->user)+strlen(authctxt->role)+1);
++		buffer_append(&b, authctxt->user, strlen(authctxt->user));
++		buffer_put_char(&b, '/');
++		buffer_append(&b, authctxt->role, strlen(authctxt->role));
++	} else 
++#endif
++		buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
+ 	buffer_put_cstring(&b, service);
+ 	buffer_put_cstring(&b, "hostbased");
+ 	buffer_put_string(&b, pkalg, alen);
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls	2012-11-28 17:06:43.669990062 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c	2012-11-28 17:06:43.700989956 +0100
+@@ -121,7 +121,15 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 		}
+ 		/* reconstruct packet */
+ 		buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+-		buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++		if (authctxt->role) {
++			buffer_put_int(&b, strlen(authctxt->user)+strlen(authctxt->role)+1);
++			buffer_append(&b, authctxt->user, strlen(authctxt->user));
++			buffer_put_char(&b, '/');
++			buffer_append(&b, authctxt->role, strlen(authctxt->role));
++		} else 
++#endif
++			buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
+ 		buffer_put_cstring(&b,
+ 		    datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ?
+ 		    "ssh-userauth" :
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth.h.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/auth.h
+--- openssh-6.1p1/auth.h.role-mls	2012-11-28 17:06:43.669990062 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/auth.h	2012-11-28 17:06:43.699989959 +0100
+@@ -59,6 +59,9 @@ struct Authctxt {
+ 	char		*service;
+ 	struct passwd	*pw;		/* set if 'valid' */
+ 	char		*style;
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	char		*role;
++#endif
+ 	void		*kbdintctxt;
+ 	void		*jpake_ctx;
+ #ifdef BSD_AUTH
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth-pam.c.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/auth-pam.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/auth-pam.c.role-mls	2012-11-28 17:06:43.638990168 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/auth-pam.c	2012-11-28 17:06:43.699989959 +0100
+@@ -1074,7 +1074,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void)
+  * during the ssh authentication process.
+  */
+ int
+-do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
++do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value)
+ {
+ 	int ret = 1;
+ #ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth-pam.h.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/auth-pam.h
+--- openssh-6.1p1/auth-pam.h.role-mls	2004-09-11 14:17:26.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/auth-pam.h	2012-11-28 17:06:43.699989959 +0100
+@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void do_pam_session(void);
+ void do_pam_set_tty(const char *);
+ void do_pam_setcred(int );
+ void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
+-int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
++int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *);
+ char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
+ char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
+ void free_pam_environment(char **);
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/misc.c.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/misc.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/misc.c.role-mls	2011-09-22 13:34:36.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/misc.c	2012-11-28 17:06:43.701989952 +0100
+@@ -427,6 +427,7 @@ char *
+ colon(char *cp)
+ {
+ 	int flag = 0;
++	int start = 1;
+ 
+ 	if (*cp == ':')		/* Leading colon is part of file name. */
+ 		return NULL;
+@@ -442,6 +443,13 @@ colon(char *cp)
+ 			return (cp);
+ 		if (*cp == '/')
+ 			return NULL;
++		if (start) {
++		/* Slash on beginning or after dots only denotes file name. */
++			if (*cp == '/')
++				return (0);
++			if (*cp != '.')
++				start = 0;
++		}
+ 	}
+ 	return NULL;
+ }
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/monitor.c.role-mls	2012-11-28 17:06:43.686990004 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/monitor.c	2012-11-28 17:06:43.701989952 +0100
+@@ -148,6 +148,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++int mm_answer_authrole(int, Buffer *);
++#endif
+ int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
+@@ -231,6 +234,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
+     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole},
++#endif
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+@@ -838,6 +844,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m
+ 	else {
+ 		/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
+ 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1);
++#endif
+ 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
+ 	}
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+@@ -881,6 +890,25 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ 	return (0);
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++int
++mm_answer_authrole(int sock, Buffer *m)
++{
++	monitor_permit_authentications(1);
++
++	authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
++	debug3("%s: role=%s",
++	    __func__, authctxt->role);
++
++	if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
++		xfree(authctxt->role);
++		authctxt->role = NULL;
++	}
++
++	return (0);
++}
++#endif
++
+ int
+ mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ {
+@@ -1251,7 +1279,7 @@ static int
+ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+ {
+ 	Buffer b;
+-	char *p;
++	char *p, *r;
+ 	u_int len;
+ 	int fail = 0;
+ 
+@@ -1277,6 +1305,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i
+ 	if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
+ 		fail++;
+ 	p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
++	if ((r = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL)
++		*r = '\0';
+ 	if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) {
+ 		logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
+ 		    authctxt->user, p);
+@@ -1308,7 +1338,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
+     char *chost)
+ {
+ 	Buffer b;
+-	char *p;
++	char *p, *r;
+ 	u_int len;
+ 	int fail = 0;
+ 
+@@ -1325,6 +1355,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
+ 	if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
+ 		fail++;
+ 	p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
++	if ((r = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL)
++		*r = '\0';
+ 	if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) {
+ 		logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
+ 		    authctxt->user, p);
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/monitor.h.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/monitor.h
+--- openssh-6.1p1/monitor.h.role-mls	2012-11-28 17:06:43.686990004 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/monitor.h	2012-11-28 17:06:43.701989952 +0100
+@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@
+ enum monitor_reqtype {
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_FREE, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV,
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE,
++#endif
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER,
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls	2012-11-28 17:06:43.686990004 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.c	2012-11-28 17:06:43.702989948 +0100
+@@ -336,6 +336,25 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *
+ 	buffer_free(&m);
+ }
+ 
++/* Inform the privileged process about role */
++
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++void
++mm_inform_authrole(char *role)
++{
++	Buffer m;
++
++	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
++
++	buffer_init(&m);
++	buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : "");
++
++	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, &m);
++
++	buffer_free(&m);
++}
++#endif
++
+ /* Do the password authentication */
+ int
+ mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password)
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.h
+--- openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls	2012-11-28 17:06:43.686990004 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.h	2012-11-28 17:06:43.702989948 +0100
+@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ int mm_is_monitor(void);
+ DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
+ int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int);
+ void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++void mm_inform_authrole(char *);
++#endif
+ struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
+ char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
+ int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *);
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls	2011-11-04 01:25:25.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in	2012-11-28 17:06:43.702989948 +0100
+@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bindresvport
+ 
+ COMPAT=bsd-arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o
+ 
+-PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
++PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux_part_2.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
+ 
+ .c.o:
+ 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls	2012-03-09 00:25:18.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2012-11-28 17:06:43.702989948 +0100
+@@ -31,68 +31,271 @@
+ 
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "servconf.h"
+ #include "port-linux.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "hostfile.h"
++#include "auth.h"
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ #include <selinux/selinux.h>
+ #include <selinux/flask.h>
++#include <selinux/context.h>
+ #include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
++#include <selinux/get_default_type.h>
++#include <selinux/av_permissions.h>
++
++#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
++#include <libaudit.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
++#endif
+ 
+ #ifndef SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE
+ # define SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE ":unconfined_t:"
+ #endif
+ 
+-/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
+-int
+-ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
++extern ServerOptions options;
++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
++extern int inetd_flag;
++extern int rexeced_flag;
++
++/* Send audit message */
++static int
++send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context,
++		       security_context_t selected_context)
++{
++	int rc=0;
++#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
++	char *msg = NULL;
++	int audit_fd = audit_open();
++	security_context_t default_raw=NULL;
++	security_context_t selected_raw=NULL;
++	rc = -1;
++	if (audit_fd < 0) {
++		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
++					errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
++				return 0; /* No audit support in kernel */
++		error("Error connecting to audit system.");
++		return rc;
++	}
++	if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(default_context, &default_raw) < 0) {
++		error("Error translating default context.");
++		default_raw = NULL;
++	}
++	if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(selected_context, &selected_raw) < 0) {
++		error("Error translating selected context.");
++		selected_raw = NULL;
++	}
++	if (asprintf(&msg, "sshd: default-context=%s selected-context=%s",
++		     default_raw ? default_raw : (default_context ? default_context: "?"),
++		     selected_context ? selected_raw : (selected_context ? selected_context :"?")) < 0) {
++		error("Error allocating memory.");
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_ROLE_CHANGE,
++				   msg, NULL, NULL, NULL, success) <= 0) {
++		error("Error sending audit message.");
++		goto out;
++	}
++	rc = 0;
++      out:
++	free(msg);
++	freecon(default_raw);
++	freecon(selected_raw);
++	close(audit_fd);
++#endif
++	return rc;
++}
++
++static int
++mls_range_allowed(security_context_t src, security_context_t dst)
+ {
+-	static int enabled = -1;
++	struct av_decision avd;
++	int retval;
++	unsigned int bit = CONTEXT__CONTAINS;
++
++	debug("%s: src:%s dst:%s", __func__, src, dst);
++	retval = security_compute_av(src, dst, SECCLASS_CONTEXT, bit, &avd);
++	if (retval || ((bit & avd.allowed) != bit))
++		return 0;
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++static int
++get_user_context(const char *sename, const char *role, const char *lvl,
++	security_context_t *sc) {
++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
++	if (lvl == NULL || lvl[0] == '\0' || get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, sc) != 0) {
++	        /* User may have requested a level completely outside of his 
++	           allowed range. We get a context just for auditing as the
++	           range check below will certainly fail for default context. */
++#endif
++		if (get_default_context(sename, NULL, sc) != 0) {
++			*sc = NULL;
++			return -1;
++		}
++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
++	}
++#endif
++	if (role != NULL && role[0]) {
++		context_t con;
++		char *type=NULL;
++		if (get_default_type(role, &type) != 0) {
++			error("get_default_type: failed to get default type for '%s'",
++				role);
++			goto out;
++		}
++		con = context_new(*sc);
++		if (!con) {
++			goto out;
++		}
++		context_role_set(con, role);
++		context_type_set(con, type);
++		freecon(*sc);
++		*sc = strdup(context_str(con));
++		context_free(con);
++		if (!*sc) 
++			return -1;
++	}
++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
++	if (lvl != NULL && lvl[0]) {
++		/* verify that the requested range is obtained */
++		context_t con;
++		security_context_t obtained_raw;
++		security_context_t requested_raw;
++		con = context_new(*sc);
++		if (!con) {
++			goto out;
++		}
++		context_range_set(con, lvl);
++		if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(*sc, &obtained_raw) < 0) {
++			context_free(con);
++			goto out;
++		}
++		if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(context_str(con), &requested_raw) < 0) {
++			freecon(obtained_raw);
++			context_free(con);
++			goto out;
++		}
+ 
+-	if (enabled == -1) {
+-		enabled = (is_selinux_enabled() == 1);
+-		debug("SELinux support %s", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled");
++		debug("get_user_context: obtained context '%s' requested context '%s'",
++			obtained_raw, requested_raw);
++		if (strcmp(obtained_raw, requested_raw)) {
++			/* set the context to the real requested one but fail */
++			freecon(requested_raw);
++			freecon(obtained_raw);
++			freecon(*sc);
++			*sc = strdup(context_str(con));
++			context_free(con);
++			return -1;
++		}
++		freecon(requested_raw);
++		freecon(obtained_raw);
++		context_free(con);
+ 	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++      out:
++	freecon(*sc);
++	*sc = NULL;
++	return -1;
++}
+ 
+-	return (enabled);
++static void
++ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level)
++{
++	*role = NULL;
++	*level = NULL;
++	if (the_authctxt) {
++		if (the_authctxt->role != NULL) {
++			char *slash;
++			*role = xstrdup(the_authctxt->role);
++			if ((slash = strchr(*role, '/')) != NULL) {
++				*slash = '\0';
++				*level = slash + 1;
++			}
++		}
++	}
+ }
+ 
+ /* Return the default security context for the given username */
+ static security_context_t
+-ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
++ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
++	security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc)
+ {
+-	security_context_t sc = NULL;
+-	char *sename = NULL, *lvl = NULL;
+-	int r;
++	char *sename, *lvl;
++	char *role;
++	const char *reqlvl;
++	int r = 0;
++	context_t con = NULL;
++ 
++	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+-	if (getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl) != 0)
+-		return NULL;
++	if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) {
++		sename = NULL;
++		lvl = NULL;
++	}
+ #else
+ 	sename = pwname;
+-	lvl = NULL;
++	lvl = "";
+ #endif
+ 
++	if (r == 0) {
+ #ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
+-	r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
++		r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, default_sc);
+ #else
+-	r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
++		r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, default_sc);
+ #endif
++	}
++
++	if (r == 0) {
++		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
++		if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
++			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
++
++			if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
++				fatal("failed to allocate security context");
++
++			if ((con=context_new(sshdsc)) == NULL)
++				fatal("failed to allocate selinux context");
++			reqlvl = context_range_get(con);
++			freecon(sshdsc);
++			if (reqlvl !=NULL && lvl != NULL && strcmp(reqlvl, lvl) == 0)
++			    /* we actually don't change level */
++			    reqlvl = "";
++
++			debug("%s: current connection level '%s'", __func__, reqlvl);
+ 
+-	if (r != 0) {
+-		switch (security_getenforce()) {
+-		case -1:
+-			fatal("%s: ssh_selinux_getctxbyname: "
+-			    "security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+-		case 0:
+-			error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
+-			    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+-			sc = NULL;
+-			break;
+-		default:
+-			fatal("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
+-			    "context for %s (in enforcing mode)",
+-			    __func__, pwname);
+ 		}
++		
++		if ((reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) || (role != NULL && role[0])) {
++			r = get_user_context(sename, role, reqlvl, user_sc);
++		
++			if (r == 0 && reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) {
++				security_context_t default_level_sc = *default_sc;
++				if (role != NULL && role[0]) {
++					if (get_user_context(sename, role, lvl, &default_level_sc) < 0)
++						default_level_sc = *default_sc;
++				}
++				/* verify that the requested range is contained in the user range */
++				if (mls_range_allowed(default_level_sc, *user_sc)) {
++					logit("permit MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
++				} else {
++					r = -1;
++					error("deny MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
++				}
++				if (default_level_sc != *default_sc)
++					freecon(default_level_sc);
++			}
++		} else {
++			*user_sc = *default_sc;
++		}
++	}
++	if (r != 0) {
++		error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
++		    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+ 	}
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+@@ -102,7 +305,42 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+ 		xfree(lvl);
+ #endif
+ 
+-	return sc;
++	if (role != NULL)
++		xfree(role);
++	if (con)
++		context_free(con);
++ 
++	return (r);
++}
++
++/* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
++static int
++ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
++{
++	const char *reqlvl;
++	char *role;
++	char *use_current;
++	int rv;
++
++	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
++
++	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
++
++	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
++	
++	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
++		use_current = "1";
++	} else {
++		use_current = "";
++		rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: "");
++	}
++
++	rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current);
++
++	if (role != NULL)
++		xfree(role);
++	
++	return rv;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
+@@ -110,28 +348,71 @@ void
+ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+ {
+ 	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
++	int r = 0;
++	security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+ 		return;
+ 
++	if (options.use_pam) {
++		/* do not compute context, just setup environment for pam_selinux */
++		if (ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) {
++			switch (security_getenforce()) {
++			case -1:
++				fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
++			case 0:
++				error("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
++				    __func__);
++			break;
++			default:
++				fatal("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.",
++				    __func__);
++			}
++		}
++		return;
++	}
++
+ 	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+ 
+-	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+-	if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
++	r = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
++	if (r >= 0) {
++		r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
++		if (r < 0) {
++			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s",
++			    __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
++		} 
++#ifdef HAVE_SETKEYCREATECON
++		else if (setkeycreatecon(user_ctx) < 0) {
++			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s",
++			    __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
++		}
++#endif
++	}
++	if (user_ctx == NULL) {
++		user_ctx = default_ctx;
++	}
++	if (r < 0 || user_ctx != default_ctx) {
++		/* audit just the case when user changed a role or there was
++		   a failure */
++		send_audit_message(r >= 0, default_ctx, user_ctx);
++	}
++	if (r < 0) {
+ 		switch (security_getenforce()) {
+ 		case -1:
+ 			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+ 		case 0:
+-			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
+-			    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
++			error("%s: SELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
++			    __func__);
+ 			break;
+ 		default:
+-			fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
+-			    "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
++			fatal("%s: SELinux failure. Aborting connection.",
++			    __func__);
+ 		}
+ 	}
+-	if (user_ctx != NULL)
++	if (user_ctx != NULL && user_ctx != default_ctx)
+ 		freecon(user_ctx);
++	if (default_ctx != NULL)
++		freecon(default_ctx);
+ 
+ 	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+ }
+@@ -149,7 +430,10 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, cons
+ 
+ 	debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
+ 
+-	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
++	if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) < 0) {
++		error("%s: getexeccon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++		goto out;
++	}
+ 
+ 	/* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
+ 
+@@ -221,21 +505,6 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *n
+ 	xfree(newctx);
+ }
+ 
+-void
+-ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *path)
+-{
+-	security_context_t context;
+-
+-	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+-		return;
+-	if (path == NULL) {
+-		setfscreatecon(NULL);
+-		return;
+-	}
+-	if (matchpathcon(path, 0700, &context) == 0)
+-		setfscreatecon(context);
+-}
+-
+ #endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
+ 
+ #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux_part_2.c.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux_part_2.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux_part_2.c.role-mls	2012-11-28 17:06:43.703989944 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux_part_2.c	2012-11-28 17:06:43.703989944 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
++/* $Id: port-linux.c,v 1.11.4.2 2011/02/04 00:43:08 djm Exp $ */
++
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
++ * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
++ *
++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
++ *
++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
++ */
++
++/*
++ * Linux-specific portability code - just SELinux support at present
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#if defined(WITH_SELINUX) || defined(LINUX_OOM_ADJUST)
++#include <errno.h>
++#include <stdarg.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++
++#include "log.h"
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "port-linux.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "hostfile.h"
++#include "auth.h"
++
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++#include <selinux/selinux.h>
++#include <selinux/flask.h>
++#include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
++
++/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
++int
++ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
++{
++	static int enabled = -1;
++
++	if (enabled == -1) {
++		enabled = (is_selinux_enabled() == 1);
++		debug("SELinux support %s", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled");
++	}
++
++	return (enabled);
++}
++
++void
++ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *path)
++{
++	security_context_t context;
++
++	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
++		return;
++	if (path == NULL) {
++		setfscreatecon(NULL);
++		return;
++	}
++	if (matchpathcon(path, 0700, &context) == 0)
++		setfscreatecon(context);
++}
++
++#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
++
++#endif /* WITH_SELINUX || LINUX_OOM_ADJUST */
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.role-mls	2012-11-28 17:06:43.688989996 +0100
++++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c	2012-11-28 17:06:43.703989944 +0100
+@@ -2101,6 +2101,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		restore_uid();
+ 	}
+ #endif
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
++#endif
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	if (options.use_pam) {
+ 		do_pam_setcred(1);

openssh-6.1p1-sftp-multibyte.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+diff -U0 openssh-6.1p1/ChangeLog.sftp-multibyte openssh-6.1p1/ChangeLog
+--- openssh-6.1p1/ChangeLog.sftp-multibyte	2013-06-19 17:32:22.527999462 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/ChangeLog	2013-06-19 17:34:12.236533762 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
++20130605
++   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/04 20:42:36
++     [sftp.c]
++     Make sftp's libedit interface marginally multibyte aware by building up
++     the quoted string by character instead of by byte.  Prevents failures
++     when linked against a libedit built with wide character support (bz#1990).
++     "looks ok" djm
++
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sftp.c.sftp-multibyte openssh-6.1p1/sftp.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/sftp.c.sftp-multibyte	2013-06-19 17:32:22.353000206 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/sftp.c	2013-06-19 17:36:46.947876920 +0200
+@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
+ #ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
+ #include <libgen.h>
+ #endif
++#include <locale.h>
+ #ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
+ #include <histedit.h>
+ #else
+@@ -1694,8 +1695,9 @@ complete_match(EditLine *el, struct sftp
+     char *file, int remote, int lastarg, char quote, int terminated)
+ {
+ 	glob_t g;
+-	char *tmp, *tmp2, ins[3];
++	char *tmp, *tmp2, ins[8];
+ 	u_int i, hadglob, pwdlen, len, tmplen, filelen;
++	int clen;
+ 	const LineInfo *lf;
+ 	
+ 	/* Glob from "file" location */
+@@ -1751,10 +1753,13 @@ complete_match(EditLine *el, struct sftp
+ 		tmp2 = tmp + filelen;
+ 		len = strlen(tmp2); 
+ 		/* quote argument on way out */
+-		for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
++		for (i = 0; i < len; i += clen) {
++			if ((clen = mblen(tmp2 + i, len - i)) < 0 ||
++			    (size_t)clen > sizeof(ins) - 2)
++				fatal("invalid multibyte character");
+ 			ins[0] = '\\';
+-			ins[1] = tmp2[i];
+-			ins[2] = '\0';
++			memcpy(ins + 1, tmp2 + i, clen);
++			ins[clen + 1] = '\0';
+ 			switch (tmp2[i]) {
+ 			case '\'':
+ 			case '"':
+@@ -2096,6 +2101,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 
+ 	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+ 	sanitise_stdfd();
++	setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "");
+ 
+ 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+ 	memset(&args, '\0', sizeof(args));

openssh-6.1p1-ssh_gai_strerror.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+diff -U0 openssh-6.2p2/ChangeLog.ssh_gai_strerror openssh-6.2p2/ChangeLog
+--- openssh-6.2p2/ChangeLog.ssh_gai_strerror	2013-07-23 12:03:41.467902339 +0200
++++ openssh-6.2p2/ChangeLog	2013-07-23 12:06:03.414281151 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
++20130718
++   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/12 00:43:50
++     [misc.c]
++     in ssh_gai_strerror() don't fallback to strerror for EAI_SYSTEM when
++     errno == 0. Avoids confusing error message in some broken resolver
++     cases. bz#2122 patch from plautrba AT redhat.com; ok dtucker
++
+diff -up openssh-6.2p2/misc.c.ssh_gai_strerror openssh-6.2p2/misc.c
+--- openssh-6.2p2/misc.c.ssh_gai_strerror	2013-07-23 12:03:41.321902978 +0200
++++ openssh-6.2p2/misc.c	2013-07-23 12:03:41.467902339 +0200
+@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ unset_nonblock(int fd)
+ const char *
+ ssh_gai_strerror(int gaierr)
+ {
+-	if (gaierr == EAI_SYSTEM)
++	if (gaierr == EAI_SYSTEM && errno != 0)
+ 		return strerror(errno);
+ 	return gai_strerror(gaierr);
+ }

openssh-6.1p1-vendor.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/configure.ac.vendor openssh-6.1p1/configure.ac
+--- openssh-6.1p1/configure.ac.vendor	2012-09-14 20:36:49.153085211 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/configure.ac	2012-09-14 20:36:49.559088133 +0200
+@@ -4303,6 +4303,12 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([lastlog],
+ 		fi
+ 	]
+ )
++AC_ARG_ENABLE(vendor-patchlevel,
++  [  --enable-vendor-patchlevel=TAG  specify a vendor patch level],
++  [AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL,[SSH_RELEASE "-" "$enableval"],[Define to your vendor patch level, if it has been modified from the upstream source release.])
++   SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL="$enableval"],
++  [AC_DEFINE(SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL,SSH_RELEASE,[Define to your vendor patch level, if it has been modified from the upstream source release.])
++   SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL=none])
+ 
+ dnl lastlog, [uw]tmpx? detection
+ dnl  NOTE: set the paths in the platform section to avoid the
+@@ -4529,6 +4535,7 @@ echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack
+ echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
+ echo "              Random number source: $RAND_MSG"
+ echo "             Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE"
++echo "                Vendor patch level: $SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL"
+ 
+ echo ""
+ 
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c.vendor openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c.vendor	2012-09-14 20:36:49.124085002 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c	2012-09-14 20:50:34.995972516 +0200
+@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ 	options->max_authtries = -1;
+ 	options->max_sessions = -1;
+ 	options->banner = NULL;
++	options->show_patchlevel = -1;
+ 	options->use_dns = -1;
+ 	options->client_alive_interval = -1;
+ 	options->client_alive_count_max = -1;
+@@ -289,6 +290,9 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 		options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_THROUGHPUT;
+ 	if (options->version_addendum == NULL)
+ 		options->version_addendum = xstrdup("");
++	if (options->show_patchlevel == -1)
++		options->show_patchlevel = 0;
++
+ 	/* Turn privilege separation on by default */
+ 	if (use_privsep == -1)
+ 		use_privsep = PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX;
+@@ -326,7 +330,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sProtocol, sPidFile,
+ 	sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem,
+ 	sMaxStartups, sMaxAuthTries, sMaxSessions,
+-	sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
++	sBanner, sShowPatchLevel, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
+ 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
+ 	sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
+ 	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+@@ -441,6 +445,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "maxauthtries", sMaxAuthTries, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "maxsessions", sMaxSessions, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "banner", sBanner, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "showpatchlevel", sShowPatchLevel, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "usedns", sUseDNS, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "verifyreversemapping", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1162,6 +1167,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 		multistate_ptr = multistate_privsep;
+ 		goto parse_multistate;
+ 
++	case sShowPatchLevel:
++		intptr = &options->show_patchlevel;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case sAllowUsers:
+ 		while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
+ 			if (options->num_allow_users >= MAX_ALLOW_USERS)
+@@ -1956,6 +1965,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseLogin, o->use_login);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sCompression, o->compression);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGatewayPorts, o->gateway_ports);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(sShowPatchLevel, o->show_patchlevel);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep);
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h.vendor openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h.vendor	2012-09-14 20:36:49.125085009 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h	2012-09-14 20:36:49.564088168 +0200
+@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	int	max_authtries;
+ 	int	max_sessions;
+ 	char   *banner;			/* SSH-2 banner message */
++	int	show_patchlevel;	/* Show vendor patch level to clients */
+ 	int	use_dns;
+ 	int	client_alive_interval;	/*
+ 					 * poke the client this often to
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.vendor openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.vendor	2012-09-14 20:36:49.507087759 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config	2012-09-14 20:36:49.565088175 +0200
+@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox		# Defaul
+ #Compression delayed
+ #ClientAliveInterval 0
+ #ClientAliveCountMax 3
++#ShowPatchLevel no
+ #UseDNS yes
+ #PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid
+ #MaxStartups 10
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0.vendor openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0
+--- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0.vendor	2012-09-14 20:36:49.510087780 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0	2012-09-14 20:36:49.567088190 +0200
+@@ -558,6 +558,11 @@ DESCRIPTION
+              Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1
+              server key.  The minimum value is 512, and the default is 1024.
+ 
++     ShowPatchLevel
++	     Specifies whether sshd will display the specific patch level of
++	     the binary in the server identification string.  The patch level
++	     is set at compile-time.  The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
++
+      StrictModes
+              Specifies whether sshd(8) should check file modes and ownership
+              of the user's files and home directory before accepting login.
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5.vendor openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5.vendor	2012-09-14 20:36:49.512087794 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5	2012-09-14 20:36:49.568088198 +0200
+@@ -978,6 +978,14 @@ This option applies to protocol version
+ .It Cm ServerKeyBits
+ Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key.
+ The minimum value is 512, and the default is 1024.
++.It Cm ShowPatchLevel 
++Specifies whether 
++.Nm sshd 
++will display the patch level of the binary in the identification string. 
++The patch level is set at compile-time. 
++The default is 
++.Dq no . 
++This option applies to protocol version 1 only. 
+ .It Cm StrictModes
+ Specifies whether
+ .Xr sshd 8
+diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.vendor openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.vendor	2012-09-14 20:36:49.399086981 +0200
++++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c	2012-09-14 20:47:30.696088744 +0200
+@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s",
+-	    major, minor, SSH_VERSION,
++	    major, minor, (options.show_patchlevel == 1) ? SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL : SSH_VERSION,
+ 	    *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
+ 	    options.version_addendum, newline);
+ 
+@@ -1635,7 +1635,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		exit(1);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_RELEASE);
++	debug("sshd version %.100s",
++	      (options.show_patchlevel == 1) ? SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL : SSH_RELEASE);
+ 
+ 	/* Store privilege separation user for later use if required. */
+ 	if ((privsep_pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL) {

openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
-index d98fa67..25d347b 100644
---- a/scp.c
-+++ b/scp.c
-@@ -638,7 +638,10 @@ toremote(char *targ, int argc, char **argv)
- 			addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program);
- 			addargs(&alist, "-x");
- 			addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes");
--			addargs(&alist, "-n");
-+			if (isatty(fileno(stdin)))
-+				addargs(&alist, "-t");
-+			else
-+				addargs(&alist, "-n");
- 			for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) {
- 				addargs(&alist, "%s",
- 				    remote_remote_args.list[j]);

openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch

@@ -1,263 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/log.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100
-@@ -250,6 +250,11 @@ debug3(const char *fmt,...)
- void
- log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr)
- {
-+	log_init_handler(av0, level, facility, on_stderr, 1);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+log_init_handler(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr, int reset_handler) {
- #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
- 	struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
- #endif
-@@ -273,8 +278,10 @@ log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, Sysl
- 		exit(1);
- 	}
- 
--	log_handler = NULL;
--	log_handler_ctx = NULL;
-+	if (reset_handler) {
-+		log_handler = NULL;
-+		log_handler_ctx = NULL;
-+	}
- 
- 	log_on_stderr = on_stderr;
- 	if (on_stderr)
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/log.h.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/log.h	2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100
-@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ typedef enum {
- typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, const char *, void *);
- 
- void     log_init(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
-+void     log_init_handler(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int, int);
- LogLevel log_level_get(void);
- int      log_change_level(LogLevel);
- int      log_is_on_stderr(void);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.311168085 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c	2016-12-23 15:16:42.154193100 +0100
-@@ -307,6 +307,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
- 		close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
- 	pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
- 
-+	pmonitor->m_state = "preauth";
-+
- 	authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
- 	memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
- 	ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
-@@ -405,6 +407,8 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *p
- 	close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
- 	pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
- 
-+	pmonitor->m_state = "postauth";
-+
- 	monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
- 	ssh_signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
- 	ssh_signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
-@@ -472,7 +476,7 @@ monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonito
- 	if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
- 		fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
- 		    __func__, level);
--	do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
-+	do_log2(level, "%s [%s]", msg, pmonitor->m_state);
- 
- 	sshbuf_free(logmsg);
- 	free(msg);
-@@ -1719,13 +1723,28 @@ monitor_init(void)
- 	mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
- 	monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
- 
-+	mon->m_state = "";
-+
- 	return mon;
- }
- 
- void
--monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
-+monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon, const char *chroot_dir)
- {
--	monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
-+	struct stat dev_log_stat;
-+	char *dev_log_path;
-+	int do_logfds = 0;
-+
-+	if (chroot_dir != NULL) {
-+		xasprintf(&dev_log_path, "%s/dev/log", chroot_dir);
-+
-+		if (stat(dev_log_path, &dev_log_stat) != 0) {
-+			debug("%s: /dev/log doesn't exist in %s chroot - will try to log via monitor using [postauth] suffix", __func__, chroot_dir);
-+			do_logfds = 1;
-+		}
-+		free(dev_log_path);
-+	}
-+	monitor_openfds(mon, do_logfds);
- }
- 
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h	2016-12-23 15:16:28.372190424 +0100
-@@ -83,10 +83,11 @@ struct monitor {
- 	int			 m_log_sendfd;
- 	struct kex		**m_pkex;
- 	pid_t			 m_pid;
-+	char		*m_state;
- };
- 
- struct monitor *monitor_init(void);
--void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *);
-+void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *, const char *);
- 
- struct Authctxt;
- void monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *, struct monitor *);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.319168086 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 15:18:18.742211853 +0100
-@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ login_cap_t *lc;
- 
- static int is_child = 0;
- static int in_chroot = 0;
-+static int have_dev_log = 1;
- 
- /* File containing userauth info, if ExposeAuthInfo set */
- static char *auth_info_file = NULL;
-@@ -619,6 +620,7 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
- 	int ret;
- 	const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL;
- 	char session_type[1024];
-+	struct stat dev_log_stat;
- 
- 	if (options.adm_forced_command) {
- 		original_command = command;
-@@ -676,6 +678,10 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
- 			tty += 5;
- 	}
- 
-+	if (lstat("/dev/log", &dev_log_stat) != 0) {
-+		have_dev_log = 0;
-+	}
-+
- 	verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
- 	    session_type,
- 	    tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
-@@ -1486,14 +1492,6 @@ child_close_fds(void)
- 
- 	/* Stop directing logs to a high-numbered fd before we close it */
- 	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
--
--	/*
--	 * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
--	 * hanging around in clients.  Note that we want to do this after
--	 * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
--	 * descriptors open.
--	 */
--	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
- }
- 
- /*
-@@ -1629,8 +1627,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
- 			exit(1);
- 	}
- 
--	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
--
- 	do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell);
- 
- 	/* restore SIGPIPE for child */
-@@ -1653,9 +1649,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
- 		argv[i] = NULL;
- 		optind = optreset = 1;
- 		__progname = argv[0];
--		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
-+		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw, have_dev_log));
- 	}
- 
-+	/*
-+	 * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
-+	 * hanging around in clients.  Note that we want to do this after
-+	 * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
-+	 * descriptors open.
-+	 */
-+	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
-+
- 	fflush(NULL);
- 
- 	/* Get the last component of the shell name. */
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h	2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100
-@@ -97,5 +97,5 @@
- 
- struct passwd;
- 
--int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *);
-+int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *, int);
- void	sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100
-@@ -1497,7 +1497,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
- }
- 
- int
--sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
-+sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handler)
- {
- 	fd_set *rset, *wset;
- 	int i, r, in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
-@@ -1511,7 +1511,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
- 	extern char *__progname;
- 
- 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
--	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
-+	log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler);
- 
- 	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
- 
-@@ -1582,7 +1582,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
- 		}
- 	}
- 
--	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
-+	log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler);
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * On platforms where we can, avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps}
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100
-@@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 		return 1;
- 	}
- 
--	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
-+	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw, 0));
- }
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.328168088 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.332168088 +0100
-@@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 	}
- 
- 	/* New socket pair */
--	monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
-+	monitor_reinit(pmonitor, options.chroot_directory);
- 
- 	pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
- 	if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
-@@ -668,6 +668,11 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 
- 	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
- 	pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
-+	close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
-+	pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
-+
-+	if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd != -1)
-+		set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
- 
- 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
- 	demote_sensitive_data();

openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
---- a/scp.c	
-+++ a/scp.c	
-@@ -1084,6 +1084,10 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
- 			free(vect[0]);
- 			continue;
- 		}
-+		if (buf[0] == 'C' && ! exists && np[strlen(np)-1] == '/') {
-+			errno = ENOTDIR;
-+			goto bad;
-+		}
- 		omode = mode;
- 		mode |= S_IWUSR;
- 		if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) == -1) {
--- 

openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch

@@ -1,132 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
---- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
- #include "misc.h"      /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
- #include "servconf.h"
- #include "port-linux.h"
-+#include "misc.h"
- #include "sshkey.h"
- #include "hostfile.h"
- #include "auth.h"
-@@ -445,7 +446,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
- void
- sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
- {
--	security_context_t *ctx;
-+	char *ctx;
- 
- 	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
- 		return;
-@@ -461,6 +462,72 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
- 	}
- }
- 
-+void
-+sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void)
-+{
-+	int len;
-+	char line[1024], *preauth_context = NULL, *cp, *arg;
-+	const char *contexts_path;
-+	FILE *contexts_file;
-+	struct stat sb;
-+
-+	contexts_path = selinux_openssh_contexts_path();
-+	if (contexts_path == NULL) {
-+		debug3("%s: Failed to get the path to SELinux context", __func__);
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((contexts_file = fopen(contexts_path, "r")) == NULL) {
-+		debug("%s: Failed to open SELinux context file", __func__);
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (fstat(fileno(contexts_file), &sb) != 0 ||
-+	    sb.st_uid != 0 || (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
-+		logit("%s: SELinux context file needs to be owned by root"
-+		    " and not writable by anyone else", __func__);
-+		fclose(contexts_file);
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
-+	while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), contexts_file)) {
-+		/* Strip trailing whitespace */
-+		for (len = strlen(line) - 1; len > 0; len--) {
-+			if (strchr(" \t\r\n", line[len]) == NULL)
-+				break;
-+			line[len] = '\0';
-+		}
-+
-+		if (line[0] == '\0')
-+			continue;
-+
-+		cp = line;
-+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
-+		if (arg && *arg == '\0')
-+			arg = strdelim(&cp);
-+
-+		if (arg && strcmp(arg, "privsep_preauth") == 0) {
-+			arg = strdelim(&cp);
-+			if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
-+				debug("%s: privsep_preauth is empty", __func__);
-+				fclose(contexts_file);
-+				return;
-+			}
-+			preauth_context = xstrdup(arg);
-+		}
-+	}
-+	fclose(contexts_file);
-+
-+	if (preauth_context == NULL) {
-+		debug("%s: Unable to find 'privsep_preauth' option in"
-+		    " SELinux context file", __func__);
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
-+	ssh_selinux_change_context(preauth_context);
-+	free(preauth_context);
-+}
-+
- #endif
- #endif
- 
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
-index 22ea8ef..1fc963d 100644
---- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
-@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname)
- 	strlcpy(newctx + len, newname, newlen - len);
- 	if ((cx = index(cx + 1, ':')))
- 		strlcat(newctx, cx, newlen);
--	debug3("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
-+	debug("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
- 	    oldctx, newctx);
- 	if (setcon(newctx) < 0)
- 		switchlog("%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s", __func__,
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-index cb51f99..8b7cda2 100644
---- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
- void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
- void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
- int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
-+void sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void);
- #endif
- 
- #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index 2871fe9..39b9c08 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
- 	demote_sensitive_data();
- 
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--	ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t");
-+	sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context();
- #endif
- 
- 	/* Demote the child */

openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch

@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.615216100 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2016-12-23 15:18:40.628216102 +0100
-@@ -279,7 +279,6 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
- 	FILE *fp;
- 	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
- 	char *line = NULL;
--	char kuser[65]; /* match krb5_kuserok() */
- 	struct stat st;
- 	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
- 	int found_principal = 0;
-@@ -288,7 +287,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
- 
- 	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
- 	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
--	if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) {
-+	if ( !options.enable_k5users || (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1))) {
-                 return ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, principal, luser,
-                                         k5login_exists);
- 	}
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.615216100 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 15:35:36.354401156 +0100
-@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
- 	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
- 	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
- 	options->use_kuserok = -1;
-+	options->enable_k5users = -1;
- 	options->password_authentication = -1;
- 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
-@@ -345,6 +346,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
- #endif
- 	if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
- 		options->use_kuserok = 1;
-+	if (options->enable_k5users == -1)
-+		options->enable_k5users = 0;
- 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
- 		options->password_authentication = 1;
- 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -418,7 +421,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes,
- 	sHostKeyAlgorithms,
- 	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
--	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
-+	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
- 	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
- 	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
- 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
-@@ -497,14 +500,16 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL },
- #else
- 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "gssapienablek5users", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- #endif
- 	{ "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1653,6 +1658,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
- 		goto parse_flag;
- 
-+	case sGssEnablek5users:
-+		intptr = &options->enable_k5users;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
- 	case sPermitListen:
- 	case sPermitOpen:
- 		if (opcode == sPermitListen) {
-@@ -2026,6 +2035,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok);
-+	M_CP_INTOPT(enable_k5users);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
-@@ -2320,6 +2330,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- # endif
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
-+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssEnablek5users, o->enable_k5users);
- #endif
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.616216100 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2016-12-23 15:18:40.629216102 +0100
-@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ typedef struct {
-	int     kerberos_unique_ccache;		/* If true, the acquired ticket will
-						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
- 	int	use_kuserok;
-+	int		enable_k5users;
- 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
- 	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
- 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.630216103 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2016-12-23 15:36:21.607408435 +0100
-@@ -628,6 +628,12 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
- on logout.
- The default is
- .Cm yes .
-+.It Cm GSSAPIEnablek5users
-+Specifies whether to look at .k5users file for GSSAPI authentication
-+access control. Further details are described in
-+.Xr ksu 1 .
-+The default is
-+.Cm no .
- .It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
- Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
- doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.616216100 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config	2016-12-23 15:18:40.631216103 +0100
-@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ GSSAPIAuthentication yes
- #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
- #GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
- #GSSAPIKeyExchange no
-+#GSSAPIEnablek5users no
- 
- # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
- # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will

openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch

@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c
---- openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts	2016-07-25 13:58:48.998507834 +0200
-+++ openssh/sshd.c	2016-07-25 14:01:28.346469878 +0200
-@@ -1507,12 +1507,29 @@ check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
- 
- 	if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts,
- 	    &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
--		text[0] = '\0';
--		for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
--			snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
--			    " %2.2x", opts[i]);
--		fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP opts: %.800s",
--		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text);
-+		i = 0;
-+		do {
-+			switch (opts[i]) {
-+				case 0:
-+				case 1:
-+					++i;
-+					break;
-+				case 130:
-+				case 133:
-+				case 134:
-+					i += opts[i + 1];
-+					break;
-+				default:
-+				/* Fail, fatally, if we detect either loose or strict
-+			 	 * source routing options. */
-+					text[0] = '\0';
-+					for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
-+						snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
-+							" %2.2x", opts[i]);
-+					fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP options:%.800s",
-+						ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text);
-+			}
-+		} while (i < option_size);
- 	}
- 	return;
- #endif /* IP_OPTIONS */

openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c.keyperm openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c
---- openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c.keyperm	2020-02-14 01:40:54.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c	2020-02-17 11:55:12.841729758 +0100
-@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
- 
- #include <errno.h>
- #include <fcntl.h>
-+#include <grp.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
-@@ -101,7 +102,19 @@ sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filen
- #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
- 	if (check_ntsec(filename))
- #endif
-+
- 	if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
-+		if (st.st_mode & 040) {
-+			struct group *gr;
-+
-+			if ((gr = getgrnam("ssh_keys")) && (st.st_gid == gr->gr_gid)) {
-+				/* The only additional bit is read
-+				 * for ssh_keys group, which is fine */
-+				if ((st.st_mode & 077) == 040 ) {
-+					return 0;
-+				}
-+			}
-+		}
- 		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
- 		error("@         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @");
- 		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");

openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch

@@ -1,289 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.640465939 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c	2016-12-23 14:36:07.644465936 +0100
-@@ -56,6 +56,21 @@
- 
- extern ServerOptions	 options;
- 
-+int
-+ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context krb5_ctx, krb5_principal krb5_user, const char *client,
-+                 int k5login_exists)
-+{
-+	if (options.use_kuserok || !k5login_exists)
-+		return krb5_kuserok(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, client);
-+	else {
-+		char kuser[65];
-+
-+		if (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, sizeof(kuser), kuser))
-+			return 0;
-+		return strcmp(kuser, client) == 0;
-+	}
-+}
-+
- static int
- krb5_init(void *context)
- {
-@@ -160,8 +175,9 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
- 	if (problem)
- 		goto out;
- 
--	if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
--	    authctxt->pw->pw_name)) {
-+	/* Use !options.use_kuserok here to make ssh_krb5_kuserok() not
-+	 * depend on the existance of .k5login */
-+	if (!ssh_krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, authctxt->pw->pw_name, !options.use_kuserok)) {
- 		problem = -1;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.640465939 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2016-12-23 14:36:07.644465936 +0100
-@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_pr
-     int);
- 
- static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
-+extern int ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context, krb5_principal, const char *, int);
- 
- /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
- 
-@@ -92,6 +93,103 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
-  * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0
-  */
- 
-+/* The purpose of the function is to find out if a Kerberos principal is
-+ * allowed to log in as the given local user. This is a general problem with
-+ * Kerberized services because by design the Kerberos principals are
-+ * completely independent from the local user names. This is one of the
-+ * reasons why Kerberos is working well on different operating systems like
-+ * Windows and UNIX/Linux. Nevertheless a relationship between a Kerberos
-+ * principal and a local user name must be established because otherwise every
-+ * access would be granted for every principal with a valid ticket.
-+ *
-+ * Since it is a general issue libkrb5 provides some functions for
-+ * applications to find out about the relationship between the Kerberos
-+ * principal and a local user name. They are krb5_kuserok() and
-+ * krb5_aname_to_localname().
-+ *
-+ * krb5_kuserok() can be used to "Determine if a principal is authorized to
-+ * log in as a local user" (from the MIT Kerberos documentation of this
-+ * function). Which is exactly what we are looking for and should be the
-+ * preferred choice. It accepts the Kerberos principal and a local user name
-+ * and let libkrb5 or its plugins determine if they relate to each other or
-+ * not.
-+ *
-+ * krb5_aname_to_localname() can use used to "Convert a principal name to a
-+ * local name" (from the MIT Kerberos documentation of this function). It
-+ * accepts a Kerberos principle and returns a local name and it is up to the
-+ * application to do any additional checks. There are two issues using
-+ * krb5_aname_to_localname(). First, since POSIX user names are case
-+ * sensitive, the calling application in general has no other choice than
-+ * doing a case-sensitive string comparison between the name returned by
-+ * krb5_aname_to_localname() and the name used at the login prompt. When the
-+ * users are provided by a case in-sensitive server, e.g. Active Directory,
-+ * this might lead to login failures because the user typing the name at the
-+ * login prompt might not be aware of the right case. Another issue might be
-+ * caused if there are multiple alias names available for a single user. E.g.
-+ * the canonical name of a user is user@group.department.example.com but there
-+ * exists a shorter login name, e.g. user@example.com, to safe typing at the
-+ * login prompt. Here krb5_aname_to_localname() can only return the canonical
-+ * name, but if the short alias is used at the login prompt authentication
-+ * will fail as well. All this can be avoided by using krb5_kuserok() and
-+ * configuring krb5.conf or using a suitable plugin to meet the needs of the
-+ * given environment.
-+ *
-+ * The Fedora and RHEL version of openssh contain two patches which modify the
-+ * access control behavior:
-+ *  - openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
-+ *  - openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
-+ *
-+ * openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch adds a new option KerberosUseKuserok for
-+ * sshd_config which controls if krb5_kuserok() is used to check if the
-+ * principle is authorized or if krb5_aname_to_localname() should be used.
-+ * The reason to add this patch was that krb5_kuserok() by default checks if
-+ * a .k5login file exits in the users home-directory. With this the user can
-+ * give access to his account for any given principal which might be
-+ * in violation with company policies and it would be useful if this can be
-+ * rejected. Nevertheless the patch ignores the fact that krb5_kuserok() does
-+ * no only check .k5login but other sources as well and checking .k5login can
-+ * be disabled for all applications in krb5.conf as well. With this new
-+ * option KerberosUseKuserok set to 'no' (and this is the default for RHEL7
-+ * and Fedora 21) openssh can only use krb5_aname_to_localname() with the
-+ * restrictions mentioned above.
-+ *
-+ * openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch adds a ksu like behaviour to ssh, i.e. when
-+ * using GSSAPI authentication only commands configured in the .k5user can be
-+ * executed. Here the wrong assumption that krb5_kuserok() only checks
-+ * .k5login is made as well. In contrast ksu checks .k5login directly and
-+ * does not use krb5_kuserok() which might be more useful for the given
-+ * purpose. Additionally this patch is not synced with
-+ * openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch.
-+ *
-+ * The current patch tries to restore the usage of krb5_kuserok() so that e.g.
-+ * localauth plugins can be used. It does so by adding a forth parameter to
-+ * ssh_krb5_kuserok() which indicates whether .k5login exists or not. If it
-+ * does not exists krb5_kuserok() is called even if KerberosUseKuserok is set
-+ * to 'no' because the intent of the option is to not check .k5login and if it
-+ * does not exists krb5_kuserok() returns a result without checking .k5login.
-+ * If .k5login does exists and KerberosUseKuserok is 'no' we fall back to
-+ * krb5_aname_to_localname(). This is in my point of view an acceptable
-+ * limitation and does not break the current behaviour.
-+ *
-+ * Additionally with this patch ssh_krb5_kuserok() is called in
-+ * ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok() instead of only krb5_aname_to_localname() is
-+ * neither .k5login nor .k5users exists to allow plugin evaluation via
-+ * krb5_kuserok() as well.
-+ *
-+ * I tried to keep the patch as minimal as possible, nevertheless I see some
-+ * areas for improvement which, if they make sense, have to be evaluated
-+ * carefully because they might change existing behaviour and cause breaks
-+ * during upgrade:
-+ * - I wonder if disabling .k5login usage make sense in sshd or if it should
-+ *   be better disabled globally in krb5.conf
-+ * - if really needed openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch should be fixed to really
-+ *   only disable checking .k5login and maybe .k5users
-+ * - the ksu behaviour should be configurable and maybe check the .k5login and
-+ *   .k5users files directly like ksu itself does
-+ * - to make krb5_aname_to_localname() more useful an option for sshd to use
-+ *   the canonical name (the one returned by getpwnam()) instead of the name
-+ *   given at the login prompt might be useful */
-+
- static int
- ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
- {
-@@ -116,7 +214,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client
- 	/* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user,
- 	 * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials
- 	 * to access these files aren't available yet. */
--	if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) {
-+	if (ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)
-+			&& k5login_exists) {
- 		retval = 1;
- 		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
- 		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
-@@ -190,9 +289,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
- 	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
- 	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
- 	if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) {
--		return (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb_context, principal,
--		    sizeof(kuser), kuser) == 0) &&
--		    (strcmp(kuser, luser) == 0);
-+                return ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, principal, luser,
-+                                        k5login_exists);
- 	}
- 	if ((fp = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL) {
- 		int saved_errno = errno;
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.630465944 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 15:11:52.278133344 +0100
-@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
- 	options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
- 	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
- 	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
-+	options->use_kuserok = -1;
- 	options->password_authentication = -1;
- 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
-@@ -278,6 +279,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
- 	if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
- 		options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX);
- #endif
-+	if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
-+		options->use_kuserok = 1;
- 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
- 		options->password_authentication = 1;
- 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -399,7 +402,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
- 	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
- 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
--	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache,
-+	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok,
- 	sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
- 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
- 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
-@@ -478,12 +481,14 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #endif
- 	{ "kerberosuniqueccache", sKerberosUniqueCCache, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "kerberosusekuserok", sKerberosUseKuserok, SSHCFG_ALL },
- #else
- 	{ "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "kerberosuniqueccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "kerberosusekuserok", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- #endif
- 	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1644,6 +1649,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 		*inc_flags &= ~SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY;
- 		break;
- 
-+	case sKerberosUseKuserok:
-+		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
- 	case sPermitListen:
- 	case sPermitOpen:
- 		if (opcode == sPermitListen) {
-@@ -2016,6 +2025,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_interval);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
-+	M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
-@@ -2309,6 +2319,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
- # endif
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache);
-+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
- #endif
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.630465944 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2016-12-23 14:36:07.645465936 +0100
-@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ typedef struct {
- 						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
- 	int     kerberos_unique_ccache;		/* If true, the acquired ticket will
- 						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
-+	int	use_kuserok;
- 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
- 	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
- 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.637465940 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2016-12-23 15:14:03.117162222 +0100
-@@ -850,6 +850,10 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
- .Cm no
- can lead to overwriting previous tickets by subseqent connections to the same
- user account.
-+.It Cm KerberosUseKuserok
-+Specifies whether to look at .k5login file for user's aliases.
-+The default is
-+.Cm yes .
- .It Cm KexAlgorithms
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
-@@ -1078,6 +1082,7 @@ Available keywords are
- .Cm IPQoS ,
- .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication ,
- .Cm KerberosAuthentication ,
-+.Cm KerberosUseKuserok ,
- .Cm LogLevel ,
- .Cm MaxAuthTries ,
- .Cm MaxSessions ,
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.631465943 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config	2016-12-23 14:36:07.646465935 +0100
-@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
- #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
- #KerberosTicketCleanup yes
- #KerberosGetAFSToken no
-+#KerberosUseKuserok yes
- 
- # GSSAPI options
- #GSSAPIAuthentication no

openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch

@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.972122201 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
-@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const
- void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
- 
-+void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
- void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
- #endif
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
-@@ -419,6 +419,28 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
- 	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
- }
- 
-+void
-+sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
-+{
-+	security_context_t *ctx;
-+
-+	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
-+		return;
-+
-+	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
-+		logit("%s: getexeccon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+		return;
-+	}
-+	if (ctx != NULL) {
-+		/* unset exec context before we will lose this capabililty */
-+		if (setexeccon(NULL) != 0)
-+			fatal("%s: setexeccon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+		if (setcon(ctx) != 0)
-+			fatal("%s: setcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+		freecon(ctx);
-+	}
-+}
-+
- #endif
- #endif
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/session.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
-@@ -1331,7 +1331,7 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
- 
- 	platform_setusercontext(pw);
- 
--	if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) {
-+	if (platform_privileged_uidswap() && (!is_child || !use_privsep)) {
- #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
- 		if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
- 		    (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) {
-@@ -1361,6 +1361,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
-			    (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
-			chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
-			    "u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+			sshd_selinux_copy_context();
-+#endif
- 			safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
- 			free(tmp);
- 			free(chroot_path);
-@@ -1396,6 +1399,11 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
- 		/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
- 		permanently_set_uid(pw);
- #endif
-+
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+		if (in_chroot == 0)
-+			sshd_selinux_copy_context();
-+#endif
- 	} else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
- 	    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
- 		fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory");
-@@ -1413,9 +1421,6 @@ do_pwchange(Session *s)
- 	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
- 		fprintf(stderr,
- 		    "You must change your password now and login again!\n");
--#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--		setexeccon(NULL);
--#endif
- #ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME
- 		execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name,
- 		    (char *)NULL);
-@@ -1625,9 +1630,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
- 		argv[i] = NULL;
- 		optind = optreset = 1;
- 		__progname = argv[0];
--#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--		ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
--#endif
- 		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
- 	}
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 18:59:13.808124269 +0100
-@@ -540,6 +540,10 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
- 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
- 	demote_sensitive_data();
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t");
-+#endif
-+
- 	/* Demote the child */
- 	if (privsep_chroot) {
- 		/* Change our root directory */
-@@ -633,6 +637,9 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- {
- #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
- 	if (1) {
-+#elif defined(WITH_SELINUX)
-+	if (0) {
-+		/* even root user can be confined by SELinux */
- #else
- 	if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) {
- #endif

openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch

@@ -1,185 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.881788686 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c	2016-12-23 16:42:36.244818763 +0100
-@@ -288,11 +288,11 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd
- 
- 	/* enable nonblocking mode */
- 	if (nonblock) {
--		if (rfd != -1)
-+		if (rfd >= 0)
- 			set_nonblock(rfd);
--		if (wfd != -1)
-+		if (wfd >= 0)
- 			set_nonblock(wfd);
--		if (efd != -1)
-+		if (efd >= 0)
- 			set_nonblock(efd);
- 	}
- }
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.888788688 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
-@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
- 	mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
- 
- 	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
--	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
-+	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
- 		;
- 
- 	if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.892788689 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
-@@ -525,10 +525,10 @@ mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd,
- 	if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
- 	    (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
- 		error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__);
--		if (tmp1 > 0)
-+		if (tmp1 >= 0)
- 			close(tmp1);
--		if (tmp2 > 0)
--			close(tmp2);
-+		/*DEAD CODE if (tmp2 >= 0)
-+			close(tmp2);*/
- 		return 0;
- 	}
- 	close(tmp1);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
-@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr
- 	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
- 	u_int16_t *portp;
- 	u_int16_t port;
--	socklen_t salen;
-+	socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
- 	int i;
- 
- 	if (sa == NULL) {
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/scp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/scp.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/scp.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.856788681 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/scp.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
-@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
- {
- 	if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
- 		kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
--		waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
-+		(void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
- 	}
- 
- 	if (signo)
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.896788690 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
-@@ -1547,7 +1547,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.",
- 			    filename, linenum);
- 		if (!*activep) {
--			arg = strdelim(&cp);
-+			/*arg =*/ (void) strdelim(&cp);
- 			break;
- 		}
- 		for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++)
-@@ -1638,8 +1638,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
- 			*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
- 			/* increase optional counter */
--			if (intptr != NULL)
--				*intptr = *intptr + 1;
-+			/* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;)
-+  			 if (intptr != NULL)
-+				*intptr = *intptr + 1; */
- 		}
- 		break;
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.902788691 +0100
-@@ -125,13 +125,13 @@ notify_setup(void)
- static void
- notify_parent(void)
- {
--	if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
- 		(void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
- }
- static void
- notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
- {
--	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
- 		FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
- }
- static void
-@@ -139,8 +139,8 @@ notify_done(fd_set *readset)
- {
- 	char c;
- 
--	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
--		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
-+		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
- 			debug2("%s: reading", __func__);
- }
- 
-@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ server_request_tun(void)
- 		debug("%s: invalid tun", __func__);
- 		goto done;
- 	}
--	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) {
-+	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device >= 0) {
- 		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY &&
- 		    auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun)
- 			goto done;
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
-@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
- 	pid = sshpid;
- 	if (pid > 1) {
- 		kill(pid, SIGTERM);
--		waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
-+		(void) waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
- 	}
- 
- 	_exit(1);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
-@@ -1220,8 +1220,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	sanitise_stdfd();
- 
- 	/* drop */
--	setegid(getgid());
--	setgid(getgid());
-+	(void) setegid(getgid());
-+	(void) setgid(getgid());
- 
- 	platform_disable_tracing(0);	/* strict=no */
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.897788690 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.904788692 +0100
-@@ -691,8 +691,10 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 
- 		privsep_preauth_child(ssh);
- 		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
--		if (box != NULL)
-+		if (box != NULL) {
- 			ssh_sandbox_child(box);
-+			free(box);
-+		}
- 
- 		return 0;
- 	}
-@@ -1386,6 +1388,9 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
- 			explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
- 		}
- 	}
-+
-+	if (fdset != NULL)
-+		free(fdset);
- }
- 
- /*

openssh-6.7p1-kdf-cavs.patch

@@ -1,618 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in
---- openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.kdf-cavs	2015-03-18 11:23:46.346049359 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in	2015-03-18 11:24:20.395968445 +0100
-@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-h
- SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
- SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
- CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest
-+SSH_CAVS=$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs
- SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
- SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
- PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
-@@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
- 
- .SUFFIXES: .lo
- 
--TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT)
- 
- XMSS_OBJS=\
- 	ssh-xmss.o \
-@@ -198,6 +199,9 @@ ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHD
- ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
- 
-+ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-cavs.o $(SKOBJS)
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-cavs.o $(SKOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-+
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
- 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
- 
-@@ -331,6 +335,8 @@ install-files:
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
-+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT)
-+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-cavs_driver.pl $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs_driver.pl
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
-diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c
---- openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c.kdf-cavs	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
-+ *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
-+ *    products derived from this software without specific prior
-+ *    written permission.
-+ *
-+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
-+ * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2
-+ * are required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
-+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
-+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
-+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
-+ * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
-+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
-+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
-+ * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
-+ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
-+ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
-+ * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
-+ * DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <errno.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+#include "kex.h"
-+#include "packet.h"
-+#include "digest.h"
-+
-+static int bin_char(unsigned char hex)
-+{
-+	if (48 <= hex && 57 >= hex)
-+		return (hex - 48);
-+	if (65 <= hex && 70 >= hex)
-+		return (hex - 55);
-+	if (97 <= hex && 102 >= hex)
-+		return (hex - 87);
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Convert hex representation into binary string
-+ * @hex input buffer with hex representation
-+ * @hexlen length of hex
-+ * @bin output buffer with binary data
-+ * @binlen length of already allocated bin buffer (should be at least
-+ *	   half of hexlen -- if not, only a fraction of hexlen is converted)
-+ */
-+static void hex2bin(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
-+		    unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen)
-+{
-+	size_t i = 0;
-+	size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
-+
-+	for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
-+		bin[i] = bin_char(hex[(i*2)]) << 4;
-+		bin[i] |= bin_char(hex[((i*2)+1)]);
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Allocate sufficient space for binary representation of hex
-+ * and convert hex into bin
-+ *
-+ * Caller must free bin
-+ * @hex input buffer with hex representation
-+ * @hexlen length of hex
-+ * @bin return value holding the pointer to the newly allocated buffer
-+ * @binlen return value holding the allocated size of bin
-+ *
-+ * return: 0 on success, !0 otherwise
-+ */
-+static int hex2bin_alloc(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
-+			 unsigned char **bin, size_t *binlen)
-+{
-+	unsigned char *out = NULL;
-+	size_t outlen = 0;
-+
-+	if (!hexlen)
-+		return -EINVAL;
-+
-+	outlen = (hexlen + 1) / 2;
-+
-+	out = calloc(1, outlen);
-+	if (!out)
-+		return -errno;
-+
-+	hex2bin(hex, hexlen, out, outlen);
-+	*bin = out;
-+	*binlen = outlen;
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static char hex_char_map_l[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
-+				 '8', '9', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f' };
-+static char hex_char_map_u[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
-+				 '8', '9', 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F' };
-+static char hex_char(unsigned int bin, int u)
-+{
-+	if (bin < sizeof(hex_char_map_l))
-+		return (u) ? hex_char_map_u[bin] : hex_char_map_l[bin];
-+	return 'X';
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Convert binary string into hex representation
-+ * @bin input buffer with binary data
-+ * @binlen length of bin
-+ * @hex output buffer to store hex data
-+ * @hexlen length of already allocated hex buffer (should be at least
-+ *	   twice binlen -- if not, only a fraction of binlen is converted)
-+ * @u case of hex characters (0=>lower case, 1=>upper case)
-+ */
-+static void bin2hex(const unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen,
-+		    char *hex, size_t hexlen, int u)
-+{
-+	size_t i = 0;
-+	size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
-+
-+	for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
-+		hex[(i*2)] = hex_char((bin[i] >> 4), u);
-+		hex[((i*2)+1)] = hex_char((bin[i] & 0x0f), u);
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+struct kdf_cavs {
-+	unsigned char *K;
-+	size_t Klen;
-+	unsigned char *H;
-+	size_t Hlen;
-+	unsigned char *session_id;
-+	size_t session_id_len;
-+
-+	unsigned int iv_len;
-+	unsigned int ek_len;
-+	unsigned int ik_len;
-+};
-+
-+static int sshkdf_cavs(struct kdf_cavs *test)
-+{
-+	int ret = 0;
-+	struct kex kex;
-+	struct sshbuf *Kb = NULL;
-+	BIGNUM *Kbn = NULL;
-+	int mode = 0;
-+	struct newkeys *ctoskeys;
-+	struct newkeys *stockeys;
-+	struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
-+
-+#define HEXOUTLEN 500
-+	char hex[HEXOUTLEN];
-+
-+	memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(struct kex));
-+
-+	Kbn = BN_new();
-+	BN_bin2bn(test->K, test->Klen, Kbn);
-+	if (!Kbn) {
-+		printf("cannot convert K into bignum\n");
-+		ret = 1;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	Kb = sshbuf_new();
-+	if (!Kb) {
-+		printf("cannot convert K into sshbuf\n");
-+		ret = 1;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	sshbuf_put_bignum2(Kb, Kbn);
-+
-+	kex.session_id = test->session_id;
-+	kex.session_id_len = test->session_id_len;
-+
-+	/* setup kex */
-+
-+	/* select the right hash based on struct ssh_digest digests */
-+	switch (test->ik_len) {
-+		case 20:
-+			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
-+			break;
-+		case 32:
-+			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA256;
-+			break;
-+		case 48:
-+			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA384;
-+			break;
-+		case 64:
-+			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA512;
-+			break;
-+		default:
-+			printf("Wrong hash type %u\n", test->ik_len);
-+			ret = 1;
-+			goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* implement choose_enc */
-+	for (mode = 0; mode < 2; mode++) {
-+		kex.newkeys[mode] = calloc(1, sizeof(struct newkeys));
-+		if (!kex.newkeys[mode]) {
-+			printf("allocation of newkeys failed\n");
-+			ret = 1;
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.iv_len = test->iv_len;
-+		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.key_len = test->ek_len;
-+		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.block_size = (test->iv_len == 64) ? 8 : 16;
-+		kex.newkeys[mode]->mac.key_len = test->ik_len;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* implement kex_choose_conf */
-+	kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.key_len;
-+	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size)
-+		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size;
-+	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len)
-+		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len;
-+	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len)
-+		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len;
-+
-+	/* MODE_OUT (1) -> server to client
-+	 * MODE_IN (0) -> client to server */
-+	kex.server = 1;
-+
-+	/* do it */
-+	if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, -1, -1)) == NULL){
-+		printf("Allocation error\n");
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	ssh->kex = &kex;
-+	kex_derive_keys(ssh, test->H, test->Hlen, Kb);
-+
-+	ctoskeys = kex.newkeys[0];
-+	stockeys = kex.newkeys[1];
-+
-+	/* get data */
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(ctoskeys->enc.iv, (size_t)ctoskeys->enc.iv_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Initial IV (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(stockeys->enc.iv, (size_t)stockeys->enc.iv_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Initial IV (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
-+
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(ctoskeys->enc.key, (size_t)ctoskeys->enc.key_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Encryption key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(stockeys->enc.key, (size_t)stockeys->enc.key_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Encryption key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
-+
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(ctoskeys->mac.key, (size_t)ctoskeys->mac.key_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Integrity key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(stockeys->mac.key, (size_t)stockeys->mac.key_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Integrity key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
-+
-+out:
-+	if (Kbn)
-+		BN_free(Kbn);
-+	if (Kb)
-+		sshbuf_free(Kb);
-+	if (ssh)
-+		ssh_packet_close(ssh);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+static void usage(void)
-+{
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\nOpenSSH KDF CAVS Test\n\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "Usage:\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-K\tShared secret string\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-H\tHash string\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-s\tSession ID string\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-i\tIV length to be generated\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-e\tEncryption key length to be generated\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-m\tMAC key length to be generated\n");
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Test command example:
-+ * ./ssh-cavs -K 0055d50f2d163cc07cd8a93cc7c3430c30ce786b572c01ad29fec7597000cf8618d664e2ec3dcbc8bb7a1a7eb7ef67f61cdaf291625da879186ac0a5cb27af571b59612d6a6e0627344d846271959fda61c78354aa498773d59762f8ca2d0215ec590d8633de921f920d41e47b3de6ab9a3d0869e1c826d0e4adebf8e3fb646a15dea20a410b44e969f4b791ed6a67f13f1b74234004d5fa5e87eff7abc32d49bbdf44d7b0107e8f10609233b7e2b7eff74a4daf25641de7553975dac6ac1e5117df6f6dbaa1c263d23a6c3e5a3d7d49ae8a828c1e333ac3f85fbbf57b5c1a45be45e43a7be1a4707eac779b8285522d1f531fe23f890fd38a004339932b93eda4 -H d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -s d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -i 8 -e 24 -m 20
-+ *
-+ * Initial IV (client to server) = 4bb320d1679dfd3a
-+ * Initial IV (server to client) = 43dea6fdf263a308
-+ * Encryption key (client to server) = 13048cc600b9d3cf9095aa6cf8e2ff9cf1c54ca0520c89ed
-+ * Encryption key (server to client) = 1e483c5134e901aa11fc4e0a524e7ec7b75556148a222bb0
-+ * Integrity key (client to server) = ecef63a092b0dcc585bdc757e01b2740af57d640
-+ * Integrity key (server to client) = 7424b05f3c44a72b4ebd281fb71f9cbe7b64d479
-+ */
-+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
-+{
-+	struct kdf_cavs test;
-+	int ret = 1;
-+	int opt = 0;
-+
-+	memset(&test, 0, sizeof(struct kdf_cavs));
-+	while((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "K:H:s:i:e:m:")) != -1)
-+	{
-+		size_t len = 0;
-+		switch(opt)
-+		{
-+			/*
-+			 * CAVS K is MPINT
-+			 * we want a hex (i.e. the caller must ensure the
-+			 * following transformations already happened):
-+			 * 	1. cut off first four bytes
-+			 * 	2. if most significant bit of value is
-+			 *	   1, prepend 0 byte
-+			 */
-+			case 'K':
-+				len = strlen(optarg);
-+				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
-+						    &test.K, &test.Klen);
-+				if (ret)
-+					goto out;
-+				break;
-+			case 'H':
-+				len = strlen(optarg);
-+				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
-+						    &test.H, &test.Hlen);
-+				if (ret)
-+					goto out;
-+				break;
-+			case 's':
-+				len = strlen(optarg);
-+				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
-+						    &test.session_id,
-+						    &test.session_id_len);
-+				if (ret)
-+					goto out;
-+				break;
-+			case 'i':
-+				test.iv_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
-+				break;
-+			case 'e':
-+				test.ek_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
-+				break;
-+			case 'm':
-+				test.ik_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
-+				break;
-+			default:
-+				usage();
-+				goto out;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	ret = sshkdf_cavs(&test);
-+
-+out:
-+	if (test.session_id)
-+		free(test.session_id);
-+	if (test.K)
-+		free(test.K);
-+	if (test.H)
-+		free(test.H);
-+	return ret;
-+
-+}
-diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl
---- openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl.kdf-cavs	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
-+#!/usr/bin/env perl
-+#
-+# CAVS test driver for OpenSSH
-+#
-+# Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
-+#
-+# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
-+# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
-+# in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
-+# to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
-+# copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
-+# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
-+#
-+# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
-+# all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
-+#
-+#                            NO WARRANTY
-+#
-+#    BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO WARRANTY
-+#    FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW.  EXCEPT WHEN
-+#    OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES
-+#    PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED
-+#    OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
-+#    MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  THE ENTIRE RISK AS
-+#    TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU.  SHOULD THE
-+#    PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING,
-+#    REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
-+#
-+#    IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING
-+#    WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MAY MODIFY AND/OR
-+#    REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES,
-+#    INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING
-+#    OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED
-+#    TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY
-+#    YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER
-+#    PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE
-+#    POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
-+#
-+use strict;
-+use warnings;
-+use IPC::Open2;
-+
-+# Executing a program by feeding STDIN and retrieving
-+# STDOUT
-+# $1: data string to be piped to the app on STDIN
-+# rest: program and args
-+# returns: STDOUT of program as string
-+sub pipe_through_program($@) {
-+	my $in = shift;
-+	my @args = @_;
-+
-+	my ($CO, $CI);
-+	my $pid = open2($CO, $CI, @args);
-+
-+	my $out = "";
-+	my $len = length($in);
-+	my $first = 1;
-+	while (1) {
-+		my $rin = "";
-+		my $win = "";
-+		# Output of prog is FD that we read
-+		vec($rin,fileno($CO),1) = 1;
-+		# Input of prog is FD that we write
-+		# check for $first is needed because we can have NULL input
-+		# that is to be written to the app
-+		if ( $len > 0 || $first) {
-+			(vec($win,fileno($CI),1) = 1);
-+			$first=0;
-+		}
-+		# Let us wait for 100ms
-+		my $nfound = select(my $rout=$rin, my $wout=$win, undef, 0.1);
-+		if ( $wout ) {
-+			my $written = syswrite($CI, $in, $len);
-+			die "broken pipe" if !defined $written;
-+			$len -= $written;
-+			substr($in, 0, $written) = "";
-+			if ($len <= 0) {
-+				close $CI or die "broken pipe: $!";
-+			}
-+		}
-+		if ( $rout ) {
-+			my $tmp_out = "";
-+			my $bytes_read = sysread($CO, $tmp_out, 4096);
-+			$out .= $tmp_out;
-+			last if ($bytes_read == 0);
-+		}
-+	}
-+	close $CO or die "broken pipe: $!";
-+	waitpid $pid, 0;
-+
-+	return $out;
-+}
-+
-+# Parser of CAVS test vector file
-+# $1: Test vector file
-+# $2: Output file for test results
-+# return: nothing
-+sub parse($$) {
-+	my $infile = shift;
-+	my $outfile = shift;
-+
-+	my $out = "";
-+
-+	my $K = "";
-+	my $H = "";
-+	my $session_id = "";
-+	my $ivlen = 0;
-+	my $eklen = "";
-+	my $iklen = "";
-+
-+	open(IN, "<$infile");
-+	while(<IN>) {
-+
-+		my $line = $_;
-+		chomp($line);
-+		$line =~ s/\r//;
-+
-+		if ($line =~ /\[SHA-1\]/) {
-+			$iklen = 20;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-256\]/) {
-+			$iklen = 32;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-384\]/) {
-+			$iklen = 48;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-512\]/) {
-+			$iklen = 64;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /^\[IV length\s*=\s*(.*)\]/) {
-+			$ivlen = $1;
-+			$ivlen = $ivlen / 8;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /^\[encryption key length\s*=\s*(.*)\]/) {
-+			$eklen = $1;
-+			$eklen = $eklen / 8;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /^K\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
-+			$K = $1;
-+			$K = substr($K, 8);
-+			$K = "00" . $K;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /^H\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
-+			$H = $1;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /^session_id\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
-+			$session_id = $1;
-+		}
-+		$out .= $line . "\n";
-+
-+		if ($K ne "" && $H ne "" && $session_id ne "" &&
-+		    $ivlen ne "" && $eklen ne "" && $iklen > 0) {
-+			$out .= pipe_through_program("", "./ssh-cavs -H $H -K $K -s $session_id -i $ivlen -e $eklen -m $iklen");
-+
-+			$K = "";
-+			$H = "";
-+			$session_id = "";
-+		}
-+	}
-+	close IN;
-+	$out =~ s/\n/\r\n/g; # make it a dos file
-+	open(OUT, ">$outfile") or die "Cannot create output file $outfile: $?";
-+	print OUT $out;
-+	close OUT;
-+}
-+
-+############################################################
-+#
-+# let us pretend to be C :-)
-+sub main() {
-+
-+	my $infile=$ARGV[0];
-+	die "Error: Test vector file $infile not found" if (! -f $infile);
-+
-+	my $outfile = $infile;
-+	# let us add .rsp regardless whether we could strip .req
-+	$outfile =~ s/\.req$//;
-+	$outfile .= ".rsp";
-+	if (-f $outfile) {
-+		die "Output file $outfile could not be removed: $?"
-+			unless unlink($outfile);
-+	}
-+	print STDERR "Performing tests from source file $infile with results stored in destination file $outfile\n";
-+
-+	# Do the job
-+	parse($infile, $outfile);
-+}
-+
-+###########################################
-+# Call it
-+main();
-+1;

openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch

@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8
---- openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode	2016-03-09 19:04:48.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8	2016-06-23 16:18:20.463854117 +0200
-@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
- .Op Fl P Ar denied_requests
- .Op Fl p Ar allowed_requests
- .Op Fl u Ar umask
-+.Op Fl m Ar force_file_perms
- .Ek
- .Nm
- .Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
-@@ -138,6 +139,12 @@ Sets an explicit
- .Xr umask 2
- to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the
- user's default mask.
-+.It Fl m Ar force_file_perms
-+Sets explicit file permissions to be applied to newly-created files instead
-+of the default or client requested mode.  Numeric values include:
-+777, 755, 750, 666, 644, 640, etc.  Using both -m and -u switches makes the
-+umask (-u) effective only for newly created directories and explicit mode (-m)
-+for newly created files.
- .El
- .Pp
- On some systems,
-diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
---- openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode	2016-06-23 16:18:20.446854128 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c	2016-06-23 16:20:37.950766082 +0200
-@@ -69,6 +69,10 @@ struct sshbuf *oqueue;
- /* Version of client */
- static u_int version;
- 
-+/* Force file permissions */
-+int permforce = 0;
-+long permforcemode;
-+
- /* SSH2_FXP_INIT received */
- static int init_done;
- 
-@@ -683,6 +687,7 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
- 	Attrib a;
- 	char *name;
- 	int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
-+	mode_t old_umask = 0;
- 
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */
-@@ -692,6 +697,10 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
- 	debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
- 	flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
- 	mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
-+	if (permforce == 1) {   /* Force perm if -m is set */
-+		mode = permforcemode;
-+		old_umask = umask(0); /* so umask does not interfere */
-+	}	
- 	logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
- 	    name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
- 	if (readonly &&
-@@ -713,6 +722,8 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
- 			}
- 		}
- 	}
-+	if (permforce == 1)
-+		(void) umask(old_umask); /* restore umask to something sane */
- 	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
- 		send_status(id, status);
- 	free(name);
-@@ -1494,7 +1505,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
- 	fprintf(stderr,
- 	    "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
- 	    "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P denied_requests] "
--	    "[-p allowed_requests] [-u umask]\n"
-+	    "[-p allowed_requests] [-u umask] [-m force_file_perms]\n"
- 	    "       %s -Q protocol_feature\n",
- 	    __progname, __progname);
- 	exit(1);
-@@ -1520,7 +1531,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
- 	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
- 
- 	while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
--	    "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:cehR")) != -1) {
-+	    "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:m:cehR")) != -1) {
- 		switch (ch) {
- 		case 'Q':
- 			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) {
-@@ -1580,6 +1591,15 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
- 				fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
- 			(void)umask((mode_t)mask);
- 			break;
-+		case 'm':
-+			/* Force permissions on file received via sftp */
-+			permforce = 1;
-+			permforcemode = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8);
-+			if (permforcemode < 0 || permforcemode > 0777 ||
-+			    *cp != '\0' || (permforcemode == 0 &&
-+			    errno != 0))
-+				fatal("Invalid file mode \"%s\"", optarg);
-+			break;
- 		case 'h':
- 		default:
- 			sftp_server_usage();

openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh/servconf.c.sshdt openssh/servconf.c
---- openssh/servconf.c.sshdt	2015-06-24 11:42:29.041078704 +0200
-+++ openssh/servconf.c	2015-06-24 11:44:39.734745802 +0200
-@@ -2317,7 +2317,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- 	dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs);
--	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner);
-+	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner != NULL ? o->banner : "none");
- 	dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys);

openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch

@@ -1,187 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race	2016-12-23 16:35:52.694685771 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c	2016-12-23 16:35:52.697685772 +0100
-@@ -1107,4 +1107,50 @@ mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const ch
- 	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m);
- 	sshbuf_free(m);
- }
-+
-+int mm_forward_audit_messages(int fdin)
-+{
-+	u_char buf[4];
-+	u_int blen, msg_len;
-+	struct sshbuf *m;
-+	int r, ret = 0;
-+
-+	debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
-+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+ 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
-+	do {
-+		blen = atomicio(read, fdin, buf, sizeof(buf));
-+		if (blen == 0) /* closed pipe */
-+			break;
-+		if (blen != sizeof(buf)) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to read the buffer from child", __func__);
-+			ret = -1;
-+			break;
-+		}
-+
-+		msg_len = get_u32(buf);
-+		if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
-+			fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len);
-+		sshbuf_reset(m);
-+		if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, NULL)) != 0)
-+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+		if (atomicio(read, fdin, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to read the the buffer content from the child", __func__);
-+			ret = -1;
-+			break;
-+		}
-+		if (atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, buf, blen) != blen || 
-+		    atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to write the message to the monitor", __func__);
-+			ret = -1;
-+			break;
-+		}
-+	} while (1);
-+	sshbuf_free(m);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+void mm_set_monitor_pipe(int fd)
-+{
-+	pmonitor->m_recvfd = fd;
-+}
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race	2016-12-23 16:35:52.694685771 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h	2016-12-23 16:35:52.698685772 +0100
-@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
- void mm_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
- void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int, pid_t, uid_t);
- void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
-+int mm_forward_audit_messages(int);
-+void mm_set_monitor_pipe(int);
- #endif
- 
- struct Session;
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race	2016-12-23 16:35:52.695685771 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 16:37:26.339730596 +0100
-@@ -162,6 +162,10 @@ static Session *sessions = NULL;
- login_cap_t *lc;
- #endif
- 
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+int paudit[2];
-+#endif
-+
- static int is_child = 0;
- static int in_chroot = 0;
- static int have_dev_log = 1;
-@@ -289,6 +293,8 @@ xauth_valid_string(const char *s)
- 	return 1;
- }
- 
-+void child_destory_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh);
-+
- #define USE_PIPES 1
- /*
-  * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty.  This
-@@ -424,6 +430,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *c
- 		close(err[0]);
- #endif
- 
-+		child_destory_sensitive_data(ssh);
-+
- 		/* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */
- 		do_child(ssh, s, command);
- 		/* NOTREACHED */
-@@ -547,6 +555,9 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm
- 		/* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */
- 		close(ttyfd);
- 
-+		/* Do this early, so we will not block large MOTDs */
-+		child_destory_sensitive_data(ssh);
-+
- 		/* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */
- #ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
- 		do_login(ssh, s, command);
-@@ -717,6 +728,8 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
- 	}
- 	if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1)
- 		s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(ssh, s->command));
-+	if (pipe(paudit) < 0)
-+		fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
- #endif
- 	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
- 		ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command);
-@@ -732,6 +745,20 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
- 	 */
- 	sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
- 
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	close(paudit[1]);
-+	if (use_privsep && ret == 0) {
-+		/*
-+		 * Read the audit messages from forked child and send them
-+		 * back to monitor. We don't want to communicate directly,
-+		 * because the messages might get mixed up.
-+		 * Continue after the pipe gets closed (all messages sent).
-+		 */
-+		ret = mm_forward_audit_messages(paudit[0]);
-+	}
-+	close(paudit[0]);
-+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-+
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
-@@ -1538,6 +1565,34 @@ child_close_fds(void)
- 	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
- }
- 
-+void
-+child_destory_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh)
-+{
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	int pparent = paudit[1];
-+	close(paudit[0]);
-+	/* Hack the monitor pipe to avoid race condition with parent */
-+	if (use_privsep)
-+		mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent);
-+#endif
-+
-+	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, use_privsep);
-+	/*
-+	 * We can audit this, because we hacked the pipe to direct the
-+	 * messages over postauth child. But this message requires answer
-+	 * which we can't do using one-way pipe.
-+	 */
-+	packet_destroy_all(ssh, 0, 1);
-+	/* XXX this will clean the rest but should not audit anymore */
-+	/* packet_clear_keys(ssh); */
-+
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	/* Notify parent that we are done */
-+	close(pparent);
-+#endif
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the
-  * environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group
-@@ -1554,13 +1608,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
- 
- 	sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
- 
--	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
--	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1);
--	ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
--	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
--	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
--	packet_destroy_all(ssh, 0, 1);
--
- 	/* Force a password change */
- 	if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
- 		do_setusercontext(pw);

openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch

@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
-index 2b02a04..19b9364 100644
---- a/auth-krb5.c
-+++ b/auth-krb5.c
-@@ -375,5 +375,21 @@ cleanup:
- 		return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
- 	}
- }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Reads  k5login_directory  option from the  krb5.conf
-+ */
-+krb5_error_code
-+ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb5_context ctx, char **k5login_directory) {
-+	profile_t p;
-+	int ret = 0;
-+
-+	ret = krb5_get_profile(ctx, &p);
-+	if (ret)
-+		return ret;
-+
-+	return profile_get_string(p, "libdefaults", "k5login_directory", NULL, NULL,
-+		k5login_directory);
-+}
- #endif /* !HEIMDAL */
- #endif /* KRB5 */
-diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
-index f9d191c..c432d2f 100644
---- a/auth.h
-+++ b/auth.h
-@@ -222,6 +222,8 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
- 
- #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
- krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
-+krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb5_context ctx,
-+	char **k5login_directory);
- #endif
- 
- #endif /* AUTH_H */
-diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644
---- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
-+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-@@ -244,8 +244,27 @@ ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists()
- {
- 	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
- 	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
-+	char *k5login_directory = NULL;
-+	int ret = 0;
-+
-+	ret = ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb_context, &k5login_directory);
-+	debug3("%s: k5login_directory = %s (rv=%d)", __func__, k5login_directory, ret);
-+	if (k5login_directory == NULL || ret != 0) {
-+		/* If not set, the library will look for  k5login
-+		 * files in the user's home directory, with the filename  .k5login.
-+		 */
-+		snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir);
-+	} else {
-+		/* If set, the library will look for a local user's k5login file
-+		 * within the named directory, with a filename corresponding to the
-+		 * local username.
-+		 */
-+		snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s%s%s", k5login_directory, 
-+			k5login_directory[strlen(k5login_directory)-1] != '/' ? "/" : "",
-+			pw->pw_name);
-+	}
-+	debug("%s: Checking existence of file %s", __func__, file);
- 
--	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir);
- 	return access(file, F_OK) == 0;
- }
- 
-diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
-index 5c4f15b..135e290 100644
---- a/sshd.8
-+++ b/sshd.8
-@@ -806,6 +806,10 @@ rlogin/rsh.
- These files enforce GSSAPI/Kerberos authentication access control.
- Further details are described in
- .Xr ksu 1 .
-+The location of the k5login file depends on the configuration option
-+.Cm k5login_directory
-+in the
-+.Xr krb5.conf 5 .
- .Pp
- .It Pa ~/.ssh/
- This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration

openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch

@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-Zseries only: Leave the hardware filedescriptors open.
-
-All filedescriptors above 2 are getting closed when a new
-sshd process to handle a new client connection is
-spawned. As the process also chroot into an empty filesystem
-without any device nodes, there is no chance to reopen the
-files. This patch filters out the reqired fds in the
-closefrom function so these are skipped in the close loop.
-
-Author: Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>
-
----
- openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c |   26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)
-
---- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
-@@ -82,7 +82,33 @@ closefrom(int lowfd)
- 	    fd = strtol(dent->d_name, &endp, 10);
- 	    if (dent->d_name != endp && *endp == '\0' &&
- 		fd >= 0 && fd < INT_MAX && fd >= lowfd && fd != dirfd(dirp))
-+#ifdef __s390__
-+		{
-+		    /*
-+		     * the filedescriptors used to communicate with
-+		     * the device drivers to provide hardware support
-+		     * should survive. HF <freude@de.ibm.com>
-+		     */
-+		    char fpath[PATH_MAX], lpath[PATH_MAX];
-+		    len = snprintf(fpath, sizeof(fpath), "%s/%s",
-+				   fdpath, dent->d_name);
-+		    if (len > 0 && (size_t)len <= sizeof(fpath)) {
-+			len = readlink(fpath, lpath, sizeof(lpath));
-+			if (len > 0) {
-+			    lpath[len] = 0;
-+			    if (strstr(lpath, "dev/z90crypt")
-+				|| strstr(lpath, "dev/zcrypt")
-+				|| strstr(lpath, "dev/prandom")
-+				|| strstr(lpath, "dev/shm/icastats"))
-+				fd = -1;
-+			}
-+		    }
-+		    if (fd >= 0)
-+			(void) close((int) fd);
-+		}
-+#else
- 		(void) close((int) fd);
-+#endif
- 	}
- 	(void) closedir(dirp);
- 	return;
-

openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch

@@ -1,213 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.071506625 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c	2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100
-@@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ static int all_opens_permitted = 0;
- #define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST	"*"
- 
- /* -- X11 forwarding */
--/* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
--#define MAX_DISPLAYS  1000
-+/* Minimum port number for X11 forwarding */
-+#define X11_PORT_MIN 6000
- 
- /* Per-channel callback for pre/post select() actions */
- typedef void chan_fn(struct ssh *, Channel *c,
-@@ -4228,7 +4228,7 @@ channel_send_window_changes(void)
-  */
- int
- x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
--    int x11_use_localhost, int single_connection,
-+    int x11_use_localhost, int x11_max_displays, int single_connection,
-     u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids)
- {
- 	Channel *nc = NULL;
-@@ -4240,10 +4241,15 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
- 	if (chanids == NULL)
- 		return -1;
- 
-+	/* Try to bind ports starting at 6000+X11DisplayOffset */
-+	x11_max_displays = x11_max_displays + x11_display_offset;
-+
- 	for (display_number = x11_display_offset;
--	    display_number < MAX_DISPLAYS;
-+	    display_number < x11_max_displays;
- 	    display_number++) {
--		port = 6000 + display_number;
-+		port = X11_PORT_MIN + display_number;
-+		if (port < X11_PORT_MIN) /* overflow */
-+			break;
- 		memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- 		hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
- 		hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE;
-@@ -4295,7 +4301,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
- 		if (num_socks > 0)
- 			break;
- 	}
--	if (display_number >= MAX_DISPLAYS) {
-+	if (display_number >= x11_max_displays || port < X11_PORT_MIN ) {
- 		error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket.");
- 		return -1;
- 	}
-@@ -4441,7 +4447,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
- 	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- 	hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
- 	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
--	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number);
-+	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", X11_PORT_MIN + display_number);
- 	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
- 		error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf,
- 		ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
-@@ -4457,7 +4463,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
- 		/* Connect it to the display. */
- 		if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
- 			debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
--			    6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
-+			    X11_PORT_MIN + display_number, strerror(errno));
- 			close(sock);
- 			continue;
- 		}
-@@ -4466,8 +4472,8 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
- 	}
- 	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
- 	if (!ai) {
--		error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
--		    6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
-+		error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
-+		    X11_PORT_MIN + display_number, strerror(errno));
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- 	set_nodelay(sock);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.h	2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100
-@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ int	 permitopen_port(const char *);
- 
- void	 channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, u_int);
- int	 x11_connect_display(struct ssh *);
--int	 x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
-+int	 x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
- void	 x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(struct ssh *, int,
- 	    const char *, const char *, const char *, int);
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.133506635 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 15:47:27.320519121 +0100
-@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
- 	options->print_lastlog = -1;
- 	options->x11_forwarding = -1;
- 	options->x11_display_offset = -1;
-+	options->x11_max_displays = -1;
- 	options->x11_use_localhost = -1;
- 	options->permit_tty = -1;
- 	options->permit_user_rc = -1;
-@@ -243,6 +244,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
- 		options->x11_forwarding = 0;
- 	if (options->x11_display_offset == -1)
- 		options->x11_display_offset = 10;
-+	if (options->x11_max_displays == -1)
-+		options->x11_max_displays = DEFAULT_MAX_DISPLAYS;
- 	if (options->x11_use_localhost == -1)
- 		options->x11_use_localhost = 1;
- 	if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
-@@ -419,7 +422,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
- 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
- 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
--	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
-+	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11MaxDisplays, sX11UseLocalhost,
- 	sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
- 	sPermitUserEnvironment, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
- 	sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups,
-@@ -540,6 +543,7 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+	{ "x11maxdisplays", sX11MaxDisplays, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1316,6 +1320,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 			*intptr = value;
- 		break;
- 
-+	case sX11MaxDisplays:
-+		intptr = &options->x11_max_displays;
-+		goto parse_int;
-+
- 	case sX11UseLocalhost:
- 		intptr = &options->x11_use_localhost;
- 		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -2063,6 +2071,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_display_offset);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_forwarding);
-+	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_max_displays);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_use_localhost);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tty);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_user_rc);
-@@ -2315,6 +2324,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- #endif
- 	dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time);
- 	dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset);
-+	dump_cfg_int(sX11MaxDisplays, o->x11_max_displays);
- 	dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries);
- 	dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
- 	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.133506635 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2016-12-23 15:46:32.140506636 +0100
-@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
- 
- #define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX	6	/* Default for MaxAuthTries */
- #define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX	10	/* Default for MaxSessions */
-+#define DEFAULT_MAX_DISPLAYS	1000 /* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
- 
- /* Magic name for internal sftp-server */
- #define INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME	"internal-sftp"
-@@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ typedef struct {
- 	int     x11_forwarding;	/* If true, permit inet (spoofing) X11 fwd. */
- 	int     x11_display_offset;	/* What DISPLAY number to start
- 					 * searching at */
-+	int 	x11_max_displays; /* Number of displays to search */
- 	int     x11_use_localhost;	/* If true, use localhost for fake X11 server. */
- 	char   *xauth_location;	/* Location of xauth program */
- 	int	permit_tty;	/* If false, deny pty allocation */
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/session.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.136506636 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 15:46:32.141506636 +0100
-@@ -2518,8 +2518,9 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s)
- 		return 0;
- 	}
-	if (x11_create_display_inet(ssh, options.x11_display_offset,
--	    options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection,
--	    &s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
-+	    options.x11_use_localhost, options.x11_max_displays,
-+	    s->single_connection, &s->display_number,
-+	    &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
- 		debug("x11_create_display_inet failed.");
- 		return 0;
- 	}
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.134506635 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2016-12-23 15:46:32.141506636 +0100
-@@ -1133,6 +1133,7 @@ Available keywords are
- .Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink ,
- .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys ,
- .Cm X11DisplayOffset ,
-+.Cm X11MaxDisplays ,
- .Cm X11Forwarding
- and
- .Cm X11UseLocalhost .
-@@ -1566,6 +1567,12 @@ Specifies the first display number avail
- X11 forwarding.
- This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers.
- The default is 10.
-+.It Cm X11MaxDisplays
-+Specifies the maximum number of displays available for
-+.Xr sshd 8 Ns 's
-+X11 forwarding.
-+This prevents sshd from exhausting local ports.
-+The default is 1000.
- .It Cm X11Forwarding
- Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted.
- The argument must be

openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch

@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
-commit 0e22b79bfde45a7cf7a2e51a68ec11c4285f3b31
-Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date:   Mon Nov 21 15:04:06 2016 +0100
-
-    systemd stuff
-
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index 2ffc369..162ce92 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -4265,6 +4265,30 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
- AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
- AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
- 
-+# Check whether user wants systemd support
-+SYSTEMD_MSG="no"
-+AC_ARG_WITH(systemd,
-+	[  --with-systemd          Enable systemd support],
-+	[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
-+		AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
-+		if test "$PKGCONFIG" != "no"; then
-+			AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libsystemd])
-+			if $PKGCONFIG --exists libsystemd; then
-+				SYSTEMD_CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags libsystemd`
-+				SYSTEMD_LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libsystemd`
-+				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $SYSTEMD_CFLAGS"
-+				SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $SYSTEMD_LIBS"
-+				AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
-+				AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYSTEMD, 1, [Define if you want systemd support.])
-+				SYSTEMD_MSG="yes"
-+			else
-+				AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
-+			fi
-+		fi
-+	fi ]
-+)
-+
-+
- # Looking for programs, paths and files
- 
- PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
-@@ -5097,6 +5121,7 @@ echo "                   libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
- echo "  Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
- echo "           Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
- echo "         Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
-+echo "                   systemd support: $SYSTEMD_MSG"
- echo "       IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
- echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
- echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
-diff --git a/contrib/sshd.service b/contrib/sshd.service
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..e0d4923
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/contrib/sshd.service
-@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
-+[Unit]
-+Description=OpenSSH server daemon
-+Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
-+After=network.target
-+
-+[Service]
-+Type=notify
-+ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS
-+ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
-+KillMode=process
-+Restart=on-failure
-+RestartPreventExitStatus=255
-+
-+[Install]
-+WantedBy=multi-user.target
-+
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index 816611c..b8b9d13 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@
- #include <prot.h>
- #endif
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
-+#include <systemd/sd-daemon.h>
-+#endif
-+
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "ssh.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
-@@ -1888,6 +1892,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 			}
- 		}
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
-+		/* Signal systemd that we are ready to accept connections */
-+		sd_notify(0, "READY=1");
-+#endif
-+
- 		/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
- 		server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
- 		    &newsock, config_s);

openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch

@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-In order to use the OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11 engine it is needed to allow flock
-and ipc calls, because this engine calls OpenCryptoki (a PKCS#11
-implementation) which calls the libraries that will communicate with the
-crypto cards. OpenCryptoki makes use of flock and ipc and, as of now,
-this is only need on s390 architecture.
-
-Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
----
- sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 6 ++++++
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-index ca75cc7..6e7de31 100644
---- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -166,6 +166,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- #ifdef __NR_exit_group
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group),
- #endif
-+#if defined(__NR_flock) && defined(__s390__)
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_flock),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_futex
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_futex),
- #endif
-@@ -178,6 +181,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday),
- #endif
-+#if defined(__NR_ipc) && defined(__s390__)
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_ipc),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_getuid
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
- #endif
--- 
-1.9.1
-
-getuid and geteuid are needed when using an openssl engine that calls a
-crypto card, e.g. ICA (libica).
-Those syscalls are also needed by the distros for audit code.
-
-Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
----
- sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 12 ++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-index 6e7de31..e86aa2c 100644
---- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -175,6 +175,18 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- #ifdef __NR_getpid
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_getuid
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
-+#endif
-+#ifdef __NR_getuid32
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32),
-+#endif
-+#ifdef __NR_geteuid
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid),
-+#endif
-+#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_getrandom
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
- #endif
--- 1.9.1
-1.9.1
-diff -up openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
---- openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox	2017-12-12 13:59:30.563874059 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2017-12-12 13:59:14.842784083 +0100
-@@ -190,6 +190,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
- #ifdef __NR_geteuid32
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_gettid
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettid),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_getrandom
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
- #endif
-

openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch

@@ -1,271 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
---- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.188821236 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
- extern ServerOptions options;
- extern u_char *session_id2;
- extern u_int session_id2_len;
-+extern int inetd_flag;
-+extern int rexeced_flag;
-+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
- 
- static char *
- format_key(const struct sshkey *key)
-@@ -511,7 +514,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct ssh *ssh
- 
- 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", runas_pw, command,
- 	    ac, av, &f,
--	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
-+	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
- 		goto out;
- 
- 	uid_swapped = 1;
-@@ -981,7 +985,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct ssh *ss
- 
- 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", runas_pw, command,
- 	    ac, av, &f,
--	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
-+	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
- 		goto out;
- 
- 	uid_swapped = 1;
-diff -up openssh/auth.c.refactor openssh/auth.c
---- openssh/auth.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.235821686 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -756,7 +756,8 @@ auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *
-  */
- pid_t
- subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command,
--    int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags)
-+    int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags, int inetd,
-+    void *the_authctxt)
- {
- 	FILE *f = NULL;
- 	struct stat st;
-@@ -872,7 +873,7 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
- 		}
- 
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
-+		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(inetd, the_authctxt) < 0) {
- 			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
- 			    strerror(errno));
- 			_exit(127);
-diff -up openssh/auth.h.refactor openssh/auth.h
---- openssh/auth.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.251821839 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ struct passwd *fakepw(void);
- #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE  (1<<1)  /* Redirect stdout */
- #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD  (1<<2)  /* Discard stderr */
- pid_t	subprocess(const char *, struct passwd *,
--    const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int flags);
-+    const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int flags, int, void *);
- 
- int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
- 
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const ch
- 
- int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
- void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
--void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
--int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
-+void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *, int, int(char *, const char *), void *, int);
-+int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(int inetd, void *);
- void sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void);
- #endif
- 
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -49,11 +49,6 @@
- #include <unistd.h>
- #endif
- 
--extern ServerOptions options;
--extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
--extern int inetd_flag;
--extern int rexeced_flag;
--
- /* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
- int
- sshd_selinux_enabled(void)
-@@ -223,7 +218,8 @@ get_user_context(const char *sename, con
- }
- 
- static void
--ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level)
-+ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level,
-+    Authctxt *the_authctxt)
- {
- 	*role = NULL;
- 	*level = NULL;
-@@ -241,8 +237,8 @@ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role,
- 
- /* Return the default security context for the given username */
- static int
--sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
--	security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc)
-+sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, security_context_t *default_sc,
-+    security_context_t *user_sc, int inetd, Authctxt *the_authctxt)
- {
- 	char *sename, *lvl;
- 	char *role;
-@@ -250,7 +246,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
- 	int r = 0;
- 	context_t con = NULL;
- 
--	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
-+	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl, the_authctxt);
- 
- #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
- 	if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) {
-@@ -272,7 +268,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
- 
- 	if (r == 0) {
- 		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
--		if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
-+		if (inetd) {
- 			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
- 
- 			if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
-@@ -333,7 +329,8 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
- 
- /* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
- static int
--sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *))
-+sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *), int inetd,
-+    Authctxt *the_authctxt)
- {
- 	const char *reqlvl;
- 	char *role;
-@@ -342,11 +339,11 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it
- 
- 	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
- 
--	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
-+	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl, the_authctxt);
- 
- 	rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
- 
--	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
-+	if (inetd) {
- 		use_current = "1";
- 	} else {
- 		use_current = "";
-@@ -362,9 +359,10 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it
- }
- 
- static int
--sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
-+sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(int inetd,
-+    int(pam_setenv)(char *, const char *), Authctxt *the_authctxt)
- {
--	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_pam_putenv);
-+	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(pam_setenv, inetd, the_authctxt);
- }
- 
- static int
-@@ -374,25 +372,28 @@ do_setenv(char *name, const char *value)
- }
- 
- int
--sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void)
-+sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(int inetd, void *the_authctxt)
- {
--	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv);
-+	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *) the_authctxt;
-+	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv, inetd, authctxt);
- }
- 
- /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
- void
--sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
-+sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname, int inetd,
-+    int(pam_setenv)(char *, const char *), void *the_authctxt, int use_pam)
- {
- 	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
- 	int r = 0;
- 	security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
-+	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *) the_authctxt;
- 
- 	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
- 		return;
- 
--	if (options.use_pam) {
-+	if (use_pam) {
- 		/* do not compute context, just setup environment for pam_selinux */
--		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) {
-+		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(inetd, pam_setenv, authctxt)) {
- 			switch (security_getenforce()) {
- 			case -1:
- 				fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
-@@ -410,7 +411,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
- 
- 	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
- 
--	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
-+	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx, inetd, authctxt);
- 	if (r >= 0) {
- 		r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
- 		if (r < 0) {
-diff -up openssh/platform.c.refactor openssh/platform.c
---- openssh/platform.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.204821389 +0200
-+++ openssh/platform.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.277822088 +0200
-@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@
- 
- extern int use_privsep;
- extern ServerOptions options;
-+extern int inetd_flag;
-+extern int rexeced_flag;
-+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
- 
- void
- platform_pre_listen(void)
-@@ -183,7 +186,9 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru
- 	}
- #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
-+	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
-+	    options.use_pam);
- #endif
- }
- 
-diff -up openssh/sshd.c.refactor openssh/sshd.c
---- openssh/sshd.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.275822068 +0200
-+++ openssh/sshd.c	2019-04-04 13:19:51.270195262 +0200
-@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ int debug_flag = 0;
- static int test_flag = 0;
- 
- /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
--static int inetd_flag = 0;
-+int inetd_flag = 0;
- 
- /* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
- static int no_daemon_flag = 0;
-@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ static char **saved_argv;
- static int saved_argc;
- 
- /* re-exec */
--static int rexeced_flag = 0;
-+int rexeced_flag = 0;
- static int rexec_flag = 1;
- static int rexec_argc = 0;
- static char **rexec_argv;
-@@ -2192,7 +2192,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	}
- #endif
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
-+	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
-+	    options.use_pam);
- #endif
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- 	if (options.use_pam) {

openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch

@@ -1,457 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/cipher-ctr.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.326525641 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/cipher-ctr.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.401526401 +0200
-@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ evp_aes_128_ctr(void)
- 	aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr;
- #ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
- 	aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH |
--	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV;
-+	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV |
-+	    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS;
- #endif
- 	return (&aes_ctr);
- }
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/dh.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/dh.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/dh.c.fips	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/dh.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.401526401 +0200
-@@ -152,6 +152,12 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max
- 	int best, bestcount, which, linenum;
- 	struct dhgroup dhg;
- 
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		logit("Using arbitrary primes is not allowed in FIPS mode."
-+		    " Falling back to known groups.");
-+		return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
-+	}
-+
- 	if ((f = fopen(_PATH_DH_MODULI, "r")) == NULL) {
- 		logit("WARNING: could not open %s (%s), using fixed modulus",
- 		    _PATH_DH_MODULI, strerror(errno));
-@@ -489,4 +495,38 @@ dh_estimate(int bits)
- 	return 8192;
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * Compares the received DH parameters with known-good groups,
-+ * which might be either from group14, group16 or group18.
-+ */
-+int
-+dh_is_known_group(const DH *dh)
-+{
-+	const BIGNUM *p, *g;
-+	const BIGNUM *known_p, *known_g;
-+	DH *known = NULL;
-+	int bits = 0, rv = 0;
-+
-+	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, &g);
-+	bits = BN_num_bits(p);
-+
-+	if (bits <= 3072) {
-+		known = dh_new_group14();
-+	} else if (bits <= 6144) {
-+		known = dh_new_group16();
-+	} else {
-+		known = dh_new_group18();
-+	}
-+
-+	DH_get0_pqg(known, &known_p, NULL, &known_g);
-+
-+	if (BN_cmp(g, known_g) == 0 &&
-+	    BN_cmp(p, known_p) == 0) {
-+		rv = 1;
-+	}
-+
-+	DH_free(known);
-+	return rv;
-+}
-+
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/dh.h.fips openssh-8.0p1/dh.h
---- openssh-8.0p1/dh.h.fips	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/dh.h	2019-07-23 14:55:45.401526401 +0200
-@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ DH	*dh_new_group_fallback(int);
- 
- int	 dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
- int	 dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *, const BIGNUM *);
-+int	 dh_is_known_group(const DH *);
- 
- u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/kex.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/kex.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/kex.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.395526340 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/kex.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.402526411 +0200
-@@ -199,7 +199,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
- 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
- 	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
- 		if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
--			error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
-+			if (FIPS_mode())
-+				error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p);
-+			else
-+				error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
- 			free(s);
- 			return 0;
- 		}
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/kexgexc.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/kexgexc.c.fips	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/kexgexc.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.402526411 +0200
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
- 
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- 
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #include <sys/types.h>
- 
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
-@@ -113,6 +114,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32
- 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+	if (FIPS_mode() && dh_is_known_group(kex->dh) == 0) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
- 	p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
- 
- 	/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h
---- openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h.fips	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h	2019-07-23 14:55:45.402526411 +0200
-@@ -111,6 +111,20 @@
- 	"rsa-sha2-256," \
- 	"ssh-rsa"
- 
-+#define	KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG	\
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521," \
-+	"rsa-sha2-512," \
-+	"rsa-sha2-256," \
-+	"ssh-rsa"
-+
- #define	KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
- 	"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
- 	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
-@@ -134,6 +142,27 @@
- 
- #define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
- 
-+#define	KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \
-+	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
-+	"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \
-+	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se," \
-+	"aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
-+#define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS		\
-+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
-+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \
-+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp521," \
-+	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," \
-+	"diffie-hellman-group16-sha512," \
-+	"diffie-hellman-group18-sha512," \
-+	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha256"
-+#define KEX_FIPS_MAC \
-+	"hmac-sha1," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-256," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-512," \
-+	"hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
-+
- /* Not a KEX value, but here so all the algorithm defaults are together */
- #define	SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS	\
- 	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.334525723 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.402526411 +0200
-@@ -2179,11 +2179,16 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
- 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
- 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
- 	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
--	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
--	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_MAC, all_mac);
--	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_KEX, all_kex);
--	def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
--	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
-+	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT), all_cipher);
-+	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_CLIENT_MAC), all_mac);
-+	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_CLIENT_KEX), all_kex);
-+	def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key);
-+	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig);
- #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
- 	do { \
- 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.373526117 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.402526411 +0200
-@@ -137,6 +137,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
- #ifdef __NR_open
- 	SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_socket
-+	SC_DENY(__NR_socket, EACCES),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_openat
- 	SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES),
- #endif
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.361525996 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.403526421 +0200
-@@ -208,11 +208,16 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
- 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
- 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
- 	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
--	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
--	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac);
--	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex);
--	def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
--	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
-+	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT), all_cipher);
-+	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_SERVER_MAC), all_mac);
-+	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_SERVER_KEX), all_kex);
-+	def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key);
-+	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig);
- #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
- 	do { \
- 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.378526168 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.403526421 +0200
-@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #endif
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- 
-@@ -614,6 +626,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		dump_client_config(&options, host);
- 		exit(0);
- 	}
-+
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
-+	}
- 
- 	/* Expand SecurityKeyProvider if it refers to an environment variable */
- 	if (options.sk_provider != NULL && *options.sk_provider == '$' &&
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.336525743 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.403526421 +0200
-@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@
- #include <vis.h>
- #endif
- 
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- 
- #include "xmalloc.h"
-@@ -198,36 +203,41 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
- 
- #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
- 	if (options.gss_keyex) {
--		/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
--		 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
--		orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
--
--		if (options.gss_server_identity) {
--			gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
--		} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
--			gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
--			/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
--			 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
--			if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
--				free(gss_host);
--				gss_host = xstrdup(host);
--			}
--		} else {
--			gss_host = xstrdup(host);
--		}
--
--		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
--		    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
--		if (gss) {
--			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
--			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
--			    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
--
--			/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
--			 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
--			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
--			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
--			    "%s,null", orig);
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
-+			options.gss_keyex = 0;
-+		} else {
-+			/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
-+			 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
-+			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
-+
-+			if (options.gss_server_identity) {
-+				gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
-+			} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
-+				gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
-+				/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
-+				 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
-+				if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
-+					free(gss_host);
-+					gss_host = xstrdup(host);
-+				}
-+			} else {
-+				gss_host = xstrdup(host);
-+			}
-+
-+			gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
-+			    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
-+			if (gss) {
-+				debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
-+				xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
-+				    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-+
-+				/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
-+				 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
-+				orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
-+				xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
-+				    "%s,null", orig);
-+			}
- 		}
- 	}
- #endif
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.398526371 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.403526421 +0200
-@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
- #include <grp.h>
- #include <pwd.h>
- #include <signal.h>
-+#include <syslog.h>
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
-@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- #endif
- 
-@@ -1529,6 +1532,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- #endif
- 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
- 
-+	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
- 	/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
- 	saved_argc = ac;
- 	rexec_argc = ac;
-@@ -1992,6 +2007,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	/* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
- 	log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
- 
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
-+	}
-+
- 	/* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
- 	   unmounted if desired. */
- 	if (chdir("/") == -1)
-@@ -2382,10 +2401,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
- 		orig = NULL;
- 
--	if (options.gss_keyex)
--		gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
--	else
--		gss = NULL;
-+	if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
-+			options.gss_keyex = 0;
-+		} else {
-+			gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
-+		}
-+	}
- 
- 	if (gss && orig)
- 		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshkey.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/sshkey.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.398526371 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshkey.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.404526431 +0200
-@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #include <openssl/pem.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #endif
- 
- #include "crypto_api.h"
-@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@
- #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
- #include "sshkey.h"
- #include "match.h"
-+#include "log.h"
- #include "ssh-sk.h"
- 
- #ifdef WITH_XMSS
-@@ -1591,6 +1593,8 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA
- 	}
- 	if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) ||
- 	    !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) {
-+			if (FIPS_mode())
-+				logit("%s: the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method", __func__);
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.391526300 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c	2019-07-23 14:57:54.118830056 +0200
-@@ -199,6 +199,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *na
- #endif
- 	}
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		if (type == KEY_DSA)
-+			fatal("DSA keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		if (type == KEY_ED25519)
-+			fatal("ED25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+	}
- 	switch (type) {
- 	case KEY_DSA:
- 		if (*bitsp != 1024)
-@@ -1029,9 +1035,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
- 			first = 1;
- 			printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
- 		}
-+		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
-+
-+		/* Skip the keys that are not supported in FIPS mode */
-+		if (FIPS_mode() && (type == KEY_DSA || type == KEY_ED25519)) {
-+			logit("Skipping %s key in FIPS mode",
-+			    key_types[i].key_type_display);
-+			goto next;
-+		}
-+
- 		printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display);
- 		fflush(stdout);
--		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
- 		if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
- 			error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s",
-			    prv_tmp, strerror(errno));

openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch

@@ -1,647 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
-index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
---- a/auth-krb5.c
-+++ b/auth-krb5.c
-@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
- #include <unistd.h>
- #include <string.h>
- #include <krb5.h>
-+#include <profile.h>
- 
- extern ServerOptions	 options;
- 
-@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
- #endif
- 	krb5_error_code problem;
- 	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
--	int len;
-+	char *ticket_name = NULL;
- 	char *client, *platform_client;
- 	const char *errmsg;
- 
-@@ -163,7 +164,8 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 
--	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
-+	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
-+	     &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, &authctxt->krb5_set_env);
- 	if (problem)
- 		goto out;
- 
-@@ -172,21 +174,20 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
- 	if (problem)
- 		goto out;
- 
--	problem= krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache,
-+	problem = krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache,
- 				 &creds);
- 	if (problem)
- 		goto out;
- #endif
- 
--	authctxt->krb5_ticket_file = (char *)krb5_cc_get_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
-+	problem = krb5_cc_get_full_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
-+	    authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, &ticket_name);
- 
--	len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
--	authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
--	snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
--	    authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
-+	authctxt->krb5_ccname = xstrdup(ticket_name);
-+	krb5_free_string(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ticket_name);
- 
- #ifdef USE_PAM
--	if (options.use_pam)
-+	if (options.use_pam && authctxt->krb5_set_env)
- 		do_pam_putenv("KRB5CCNAME", authctxt->krb5_ccname);
- #endif
- 
-@@ -222,11 +223,54 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
- void
- krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
- {
-+	struct stat krb5_ccname_stat;
-+	char krb5_ccname[128], *krb5_ccname_dir_start, *krb5_ccname_dir_end;
-+
- 	debug("krb5_cleanup_proc called");
- 	if (authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache) {
--		krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
-+		krb5_context ctx = authctxt->krb5_ctx;
-+		krb5_cccol_cursor cursor;
-+		krb5_ccache ccache;
-+		int ret;
-+
-+		krb5_cc_destroy(ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
- 		authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache = NULL;
-+
-+		ret = krb5_cccol_cursor_new(ctx, &cursor);
-+		if (ret)
-+			goto out;
-+
-+		ret = krb5_cccol_cursor_next(ctx, cursor, &ccache);
-+		if (ret == 0 && ccache != NULL) {
-+			/* There is at least one other ccache in collection
-+			 * we can switch to */
-+			krb5_cc_switch(ctx, ccache);
-+		} else if (authctxt->krb5_ccname != NULL) {
-+			/* Clean up the collection too */
-+			strncpy(krb5_ccname, authctxt->krb5_ccname, sizeof(krb5_ccname) - 10);
-+			krb5_ccname_dir_start = strchr(krb5_ccname, ':') + 1;
-+			*krb5_ccname_dir_start++ = '\0';
-+			if (strcmp(krb5_ccname, "DIR") == 0) {
-+
-+				strcat(krb5_ccname_dir_start, "/primary");
-+
-+				if (stat(krb5_ccname_dir_start, &krb5_ccname_stat) == 0) {
-+					if (unlink(krb5_ccname_dir_start) == 0) {
-+						krb5_ccname_dir_end = strrchr(krb5_ccname_dir_start, '/');
-+						*krb5_ccname_dir_end = '\0';
-+						if (rmdir(krb5_ccname_dir_start) == -1)
-+							debug("cache dir '%s' remove failed: %s",
-+							    krb5_ccname_dir_start, strerror(errno));
-+					}
-+					else
-+						debug("cache primary file '%s', remove failed: %s",
-+						    krb5_ccname_dir_start, strerror(errno));
-+				}
-+			}
-+		}
-+		krb5_cccol_cursor_free(ctx, &cursor);
- 	}
-+out:
- 	if (authctxt->krb5_user) {
- 		krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user);
- 		authctxt->krb5_user = NULL;
-@@ -237,36 +281,188 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 	}
- }
- 
--#ifndef HEIMDAL
-+
-+#if !defined(HEIMDAL)
-+int
-+ssh_asprintf_append(char **dsc, const char *fmt, ...) {
-+	char *src, *old;
-+	va_list ap;
-+	int i;
-+
-+	va_start(ap, fmt);
-+	i = vasprintf(&src, fmt, ap);
-+	va_end(ap);
-+
-+	if (i == -1 || src == NULL)
-+		return -1;
-+
-+	old = *dsc;
-+
-+	i = asprintf(dsc, "%s%s", *dsc, src);
-+	if (i == -1 || src == NULL) {
-+		free(src);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
-+	free(old);
-+	free(src);
-+
-+	return i;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+ssh_krb5_expand_template(char **result, const char *template) {
-+	char *p_n, *p_o, *r, *tmp_template;
-+
-+	debug3("%s: called, template = %s", __func__, template);
-+	if (template == NULL)
-+		return -1;
-+
-+	tmp_template = p_n = p_o = xstrdup(template);
-+	r = xstrdup("");
-+
-+	while ((p_n = strstr(p_o, "%{")) != NULL) {
-+
-+		*p_n++ = '\0';
-+		if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%s", p_o) == -1)
-+			goto cleanup;
-+
-+		if (strncmp(p_n, "{uid}", 5) == 0 || strncmp(p_n, "{euid}", 6) == 0 ||
-+			strncmp(p_n, "{USERID}", 8) == 0) {
-+			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
-+			if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%d", geteuid()) == -1)
-+				goto cleanup;
-+			continue;
-+		}
-+		else if (strncmp(p_n, "{TEMP}", 6) == 0) {
-+			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
-+			if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "/tmp") == -1)
-+				goto cleanup;
-+			continue;
-+		} else {
-+			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
-+			*p_o = '\0';
-+			debug("%s: unsupported token %s in %s", __func__, p_n, template);
-+			/* unknown token, fallback to the default */
-+			goto cleanup;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%s", p_o) == -1)
-+		goto cleanup;
-+
-+	*result = r;
-+	free(tmp_template);
-+	return 0;
-+
-+cleanup:
-+	free(r);
-+	free(tmp_template);
-+	return -1;
-+}
-+
- krb5_error_code
--ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
--	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
--	char ccname[40];
-+ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(krb5_context ctx, char **ccname) {
-+	profile_t p;
-+	int ret = 0;
-+	char *value = NULL;
-+
-+	debug3("%s: called", __func__);
-+	ret = krb5_get_profile(ctx, &p);
-+	if (ret)
-+		return ret;
-+
-+	ret = profile_get_string(p, "libdefaults", "default_ccache_name", NULL, NULL, &value);
-+	if (ret || !value)
-+		return ret;
-+
-+	ret = ssh_krb5_expand_template(ccname, value);
-+
-+	debug3("%s: returning with ccname = %s", __func__, *ccname);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+krb5_error_code
-+ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environment) {
-+	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno, type_len;
-+	char *ccname = NULL;
- 	mode_t old_umask;
-+	char *type = NULL, *colon = NULL;
- 
--	ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
--	    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
--	if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
--		return ENOMEM;
--
--	old_umask = umask(0177);
--	tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
--	oerrno = errno;
--	umask(old_umask);
--	if (tmpfd == -1) {
--		logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
--		return oerrno;
--	}
-+	debug3("%s: called", __func__);
-+	if (need_environment)
-+		*need_environment = 0;
-+	ret = ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(ctx, &ccname);
-+	if (ret || !ccname || options.kerberos_unique_ccache) {
-+		/* Otherwise, go with the old method */
-+		if (ccname)
-+			free(ccname);
-+		ccname = NULL;
-+
-+		ret = asprintf(&ccname,
-+		    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
-+		if (ret < 0)
-+			return ENOMEM;
- 
--	if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
-+		old_umask = umask(0177);
-+		tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
- 		oerrno = errno;
--		logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
-+		umask(old_umask);
-+		if (tmpfd == -1) {
-+			logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
-+			return oerrno;
-+		}
-+
-+		if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
-+			oerrno = errno;
-+			logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
-+			close(tmpfd);
-+			return oerrno;
-+		}
-+		/* make sure the KRB5CCNAME is set for non-standard location */
-+		if (need_environment)
-+			*need_environment = 1;
- 		close(tmpfd);
--		return oerrno;
- 	}
--	close(tmpfd);
- 
--	return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
-+	debug3("%s: setting default ccname to %s", __func__, ccname);
-+	/* set the default with already expanded user IDs */
-+	ret = krb5_cc_set_default_name(ctx, ccname);
-+	if (ret)
-+		return ret;
-+
-+	if ((colon = strstr(ccname, ":")) != NULL) {
-+		type_len = colon - ccname;
-+		type = malloc((type_len + 1) * sizeof(char));
-+		if (type == NULL)
-+			return ENOMEM;
-+		strncpy(type, ccname, type_len);
-+		type[type_len] = 0;
-+	} else {
-+		type = strdup(ccname);
-+	}
-+
-+	/* If we have a credential cache from krb5.conf, we need to switch
-+	 * a primary cache for this collection, if it supports that (non-FILE)
-+	 */
-+	if (krb5_cc_support_switch(ctx, type)) {
-+		debug3("%s: calling cc_new_unique(%s)", __func__, ccname);
-+		ret = krb5_cc_new_unique(ctx, type, NULL, ccache);
-+		free(type);
-+		if (ret)
-+			return ret;
-+
-+		debug3("%s: calling cc_switch()", __func__);
-+		return krb5_cc_switch(ctx, *ccache);
-+	} else {
-+		/* Otherwise, we can not create a unique ccname here (either
-+		 * it is already unique from above or the type does not support
-+		 * collections
-+		 */
-+		free(type);
-+		debug3("%s: calling cc_resolve(%s)", __func__, ccname);
-+		return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
-+	}
- }
- #endif /* !HEIMDAL */
- #endif /* KRB5 */
-diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
-index 29491df9..fdab5040 100644
---- a/auth.h
-+++ b/auth.h
-@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
- 	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
- 	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
- 	char		*krb5_ccname;
-+	int		 krb5_set_env;
- #endif
- 	struct sshbuf	*loginmsg;
- 
-@@ -238,7 +239,7 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
- int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
- 
- #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
--krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
-+krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
- #endif
- 
- #endif /* AUTH_H */
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
---- openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name	2019-03-01 15:17:42.708611802 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2019-03-01 15:17:42.713611844 +0100
-@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
- /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
-  * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
- 
--static void
-+static int
- ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- {
- 	krb5_ccache ccache;
-@@ -276,14 +276,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
- 	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
- 	const char *new_ccname, *new_cctype;
- 	const char *errmsg;
-+	int set_env = 0;
- 
- 	if (client->creds == NULL) {
- 		debug("No credentials stored");
--		return;
-+		return 0;
- 	}
- 
- 	if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0)
--		return;
-+		return 0;
- 
- #ifdef HEIMDAL
- # ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE
-@@ -297,14 +298,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
- 		krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
- # endif
- 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
--		return;
-+		return 0;
- 	}
- #else
--	if ((problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb_context, &ccache))) {
-+	if ((problem = ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb_context, &ccache, &set_env)) != 0) {
- 		errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem);
--		logit("ssh_krb5_cc_gen(): %.100s", errmsg);
-+		logit("ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(): %.100s", errmsg);
- 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
--		return;
-+		return 0;
- 	}
- #endif	/* #ifdef HEIMDAL */
- 
-@@ -313,7 +314,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
- 		errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem);
- 		logit("krb5_parse_name(): %.100s", errmsg);
- 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
--		return;
-+		return 0;
- 	}
- 
- 	if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, princ))) {
-@@ -322,7 +323,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
- 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
- 		krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
- 		krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
--		return;
-+		return 0;
- 	}
- 
- 	krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
-@@ -331,32 +332,21 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
- 	    client->creds, ccache))) {
- 		logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed");
- 		krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
--		return;
-+		return 0;
- 	}
- 
- 	new_cctype = krb5_cc_get_type(krb_context, ccache);
- 	new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
--
--	client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
--#ifdef USE_CCAPI
--	xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
--	client->store.filename = NULL;
--#else
--	if (new_ccname[0] == ':')
--		new_ccname++;
- 	xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "%s:%s", new_cctype, new_ccname);
--	if (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0) {
--		char *p;
--		p = strrchr(client->store.envval, '/');
--		if (p)
--			*p = '\0';
-+
-+	if (set_env) {
-+		client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
- 	}
- 	if ((strcmp(new_cctype, "FILE") == 0) || (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0))
- 		client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
--#endif
- 
- #ifdef USE_PAM
--	if (options.use_pam)
-+	if (options.use_pam && set_env)
- 		do_pam_putenv(client->store.envvar, client->store.envval);
- #endif
- 
-@@ -361,7 +355,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
- 
- 	client->store.data = krb_context;
- 
--	return;
-+	return set_env;
- }
- 
- int
-diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
-index 6cae720e..16e55cbc 100644
---- a/gss-serv.c
-+++ b/gss-serv.c
-@@ -320,13 +320,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- }
- 
- /* As user */
--void
-+int
- ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
- {
- 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
--		(*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
-+		return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
- 	} else
- 		debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
-+
-+	return 0;
- }
- 
- /* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the child's environment based
-@@ -498,9 +500,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() {
- 	char *envstr;
- #endif
- 
--	if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
--	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
--	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
-+	if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
- 		return;
- 
- 	ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name	2019-03-01 15:17:42.704611768 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c	2019-03-01 15:17:42.713611844 +0100
-@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
- 	options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1;
- 	options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
- 	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
-+	options->kerberos_unique_ccache = -1;
- 	options->gss_authentication=-1;
- 	options->gss_keyex = -1;
- 	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
-@@ -315,6 +316,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
- 		options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1;
- 	if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1)
- 		options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
-+	if (options->kerberos_unique_ccache == -1)
-+		options->kerberos_unique_ccache = 0;
- 	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
- 		options->gss_authentication = 0;
- 	if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
-@@ -447,7 +450,8 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
- 	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
- 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
--	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
-+	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache,
-+	sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
- 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
- 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
- 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
-@@ -526,11 +530,13 @@ static struct {
- #else
- 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #endif
-+	{ "kerberosuniqueccache", sKerberosUniqueCCache, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #else
- 	{ "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "kerberosuniqueccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #endif
- 	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1437,6 +1443,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
- 		intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token;
- 		goto parse_flag;
- 
-+	case sKerberosUniqueCCache:
-+		intptr = &options->kerberos_unique_ccache;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
- 	case sGssAuthentication:
- 		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
- 		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -2507,6 +2517,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- # ifdef USE_AFS
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
- # endif
-+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache);
- #endif
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
-diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
-index db8362c6..4fa42d64 100644
---- a/servconf.h
-+++ b/servconf.h
-@@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ typedef struct {
- 						 * file on logout. */
- 	int     kerberos_get_afs_token;		/* If true, try to get AFS token if
- 						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
-+	int     kerberos_unique_ccache;		/* If true, the acquired ticket will
-+						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
- 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
- 	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
- 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
-index 85df6a27..480a5ead 100644
---- a/session.c
-+++ b/session.c
-@@ -1033,7 +1033,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
- 	/* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter
- 	 * the child's environment as they see fit
- 	 */
--	ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
-+	if (s->authctxt->krb5_set_env)
-+		ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
- #endif
- 
- 	/* Set basic environment. */
-@@ -1105,7 +1106,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
- 	}
- #endif
- #ifdef KRB5
--	if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname)
-+	if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname && s->authctxt->krb5_set_env)
- 		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
- 		    s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
- #endif
-diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
-index 6593e422..245178af 100644
---- a/ssh-gss.h
-+++ b/ssh-gss.h
-@@ -83,7 +82,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
- 	int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
- 	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
- 	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
--	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
-+	int (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
- 	int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
- } ssh_gssapi_mech;
- 
-@@ -127,7 +126,7 @@ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
- void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
--void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
-+int ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
- const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
- 
- char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index edbe815c..89514e8a 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -2162,7 +2162,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- 	if (options.gss_authentication) {
- 		temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
--		ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
-+		authctxt->krb5_set_env = ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
- 		restore_uid();
- 	}
- #endif
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index c0683d4a..2349f477 100644
---- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -860,6 +860,14 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache
- file on logout.
- The default is
- .Cm yes .
-+.It Cm KerberosUniqueCCache
-+Specifies whether to store the acquired tickets in the per-session credential
-+cache under /tmp/ or whether to use per-user credential cache as configured in
-+.Pa /etc/krb5.conf .
-+The default value
-+.Cm no
-+can lead to overwriting previous tickets by subseqent connections to the same
-+user account.
- .It Cm KexAlgorithms
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.

openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch

@@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh/ssh_config.redhat openssh/ssh_config
---- openssh/ssh_config.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/ssh_config	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
-@@ -43,3 +43,10 @@
- #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
- #   RekeyLimit 1G 1h
- #   UserKnownHostsFile ~/.ssh/known_hosts.d/%k
-+#
-+# This system is following system-wide crypto policy.
-+# To modify the crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...), create a  *.conf
-+#  file under  /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/  which will be automatically
-+# included below. For more information, see manual page for
-+#  update-crypto-policies(8)  and  ssh_config(5).
-+Include /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/*.conf
-diff -up openssh/ssh_config_redhat.redhat openssh/ssh_config_redhat
---- openssh/ssh_config_redhat.redhat	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
-+++ openssh/ssh_config_redhat	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
-+# The options here are in the "Match final block" to be applied as the last
-+# options and could be potentially overwritten by the user configuration
-+Match final all
-+	# Follow system-wide Crypto Policy, if defined:
-+	Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config
-+
-+	GSSAPIAuthentication yes
-+
-+# If this option is set to yes then remote X11 clients will have full access
-+# to the original X11 display. As virtually no X11 client supports the untrusted
-+# mode correctly we set this to yes.
-+	ForwardX11Trusted yes
-+
-+# Send locale-related environment variables
-+	SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
-+	SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
-+	SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
-+	SendEnv XMODIFIERS
-+
-+# Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain
-+# Host *.local
-diff -up openssh/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh/sshd_config.0
---- openssh/sshd_config.0.redhat	2020-02-12 14:30:04.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/sshd_config.0	2020-02-13 18:13:39.181641855 +0100
-@@ -970,9 +970,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
- 
-      SyslogFacility
-              Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
--             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0,
--             LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.  The
--             default is AUTH.
-+             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV,
-+             LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
-+             The default is AUTH.
- 
-      TCPKeepAlive
-              Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
-diff -up openssh/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh/sshd_config.5
---- openssh/sshd_config.5.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/sshd_config.5	2020-02-13 18:13:39.181641855 +0100
-@@ -1614,7 +1614,7 @@ By default no subsystems are defined.
- .It Cm SyslogFacility
- Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
- .Xr sshd 8 .
--The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
-+The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
- LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
- The default is AUTH.
- .It Cm TCPKeepAlive
-diff -up openssh/sshd_config.redhat openssh/sshd_config
---- openssh/sshd_config.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/sshd_config	2020-02-13 18:20:16.349913681 +0100
-@@ -10,6 +10,14 @@
- # possible, but leave them commented.  Uncommented options override the
- # default value.
-
-+# To modify the system-wide sshd configuration, create a  *.conf  file under
-+#  /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/  which will be automatically included below
-+Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/*.conf
-+
-+# If you want to change the port on a SELinux system, you have to tell
-+# SELinux about this change.
-+# semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER
-+#
- #Port 22
- #AddressFamily any
- #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
-diff -up openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat openssh/sshd_config_redhat
---- openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat	2020-02-13 18:14:02.268006439 +0100
-+++ openssh/sshd_config_redhat	2020-02-13 18:19:20.765035947 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
-+# This system is following system-wide crypto policy. The changes to
-+# crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...) will not have any effect in
-+# this or following included files. To override some configuration option,
-+# write it before this block or include it before this file.
-+# Please, see manual pages for update-crypto-policies(8) and sshd_config(5).
-+Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config
-+
-+SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
-+
-+ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
-+
-+GSSAPIAuthentication yes
-+GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
-+
-+UsePAM yes
-+
-+X11Forwarding yes
-+
-+# It is recommended to use pam_motd in /etc/pam.d/sshd instead of PrintMotd,
-+# as it is more configurable and versatile than the built-in version.
-+PrintMotd no
-+
-+# Accept locale-related environment variables
-+AcceptEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
-+AcceptEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
-+AcceptEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
-+AcceptEnv XMODIFIERS
-+

openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch

@@ -1,871 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh/auth2.c.role-mls openssh/auth2.c
---- openssh/auth2.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth2.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.815430916 +0200
-@@ -256,6 +256,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
- 	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
- 	Authmethod *m = NULL;
- 	char *user = NULL, *service = NULL, *method = NULL, *style = NULL;
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	char *role = NULL;
-+#endif
- 	int r, authenticated = 0;
- 	double tstart = monotime_double();
- 
-@@ -268,6 +271,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
- 	debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
- 	debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
-+		*role++ = 0;
-+#endif
-+
- 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
- 		*style++ = 0;
- 
-@@ -296,8 +304,15 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
- 		    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
- 		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
- 		authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
--		if (use_privsep)
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+		authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
-+#endif
-+		if (use_privsep) {
- 			mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+			mm_inform_authrole(role);
-+#endif
-+		}
- 		userauth_banner(ssh);
- 		if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
- 			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
-diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
---- openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth2-gss.c	2018-08-22 11:15:42.459799171 +0200
-@@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
- 	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
- 	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
- 	int r, authenticated = 0;
-+	char *micuser;
- 	struct sshbuf *b;
- 	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
- 	const char *displayname;
-@@ -298,7 +299,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
- 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- 	mic.value = p;
- 	mic.length = len;
--	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	if (authctxt->role && authctxt->role[0] != 0)
-+		xasprintf(&micuser, "%s/%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->role);
-+	else
-+#endif
-+		micuser = authctxt->user;
-+	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, micuser, authctxt->service,
- 	    "gssapi-with-mic");
- 
- 	if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
-@@ -311,6 +318,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
- 		logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
- 
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
-+	if (micuser != authctxt->user)
-+		free(micuser);
- 	free(mic.value);
- 
- 	if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
-diff -up openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
---- openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth2-hostbased.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
-@@ -123,7 +123,16 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	/* reconstruct packet */
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	    (authctxt->role
-+	    ? ( (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, strlen(authctxt->user)+strlen(authctxt->role)+1)) != 0 ||
-+	        (r = sshbuf_put(b, authctxt->user, strlen(authctxt->user))) != 0 ||
-+	        (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, '/') != 0) ||
-+	        (r = sshbuf_put(b, authctxt->role, strlen(authctxt->role))) != 0)
-+	    : (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0) ||
-+#else
- 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0 ||
-+#endif
- 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "hostbased")) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkalg, alen)) != 0 ||
-diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
---- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c	2018-08-22 11:17:07.331483958 +0200
-@@ -169,9 +169,16 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
- 			goto done;
- 		}
- 		/* reconstruct packet */
--		xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
-+		xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
- 		    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
--		    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
-+		    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "",
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+		    authctxt->role ? "/" : "",
-+		    authctxt->role ? authctxt->role : ""
-+#else
-+		    "", ""
-+#endif
-+		    );
- 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
- 		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, userstyle)) != 0 ||
- 		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
-diff -up openssh/auth.h.role-mls openssh/auth.h
---- openssh/auth.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
-@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ struct Authctxt {
- 	char		*service;
- 	struct passwd	*pw;		/* set if 'valid' */
- 	char		*style;
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	char		*role;
-+#endif
- 
- 	/* Method lists for multiple authentication */
- 	char		**auth_methods;	/* modified from server config */
-diff -up openssh/auth-pam.c.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.c
---- openssh/auth-pam.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth-pam.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
-@@ -1172,7 +1172,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void)
-  * during the ssh authentication process.
-  */
- int
--do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
-+do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value)
- {
- 	int ret = 1;
- 	char *compound;
-diff -up openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.h
---- openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth-pam.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200
-@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ u_int do_pam_account(void);
- void do_pam_session(struct ssh *);
- void do_pam_setcred(int );
- void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
--int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
-+int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *);
- char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
- char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
- void free_pam_environment(char **);
-diff -up openssh/misc.c.role-mls openssh/misc.c
---- openssh/misc.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/misc.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200
-@@ -542,6 +542,7 @@ char *
- colon(char *cp)
- {
- 	int flag = 0;
-+	int start = 1;
- 
- 	if (*cp == ':')		/* Leading colon is part of file name. */
- 		return NULL;
-@@ -557,6 +558,13 @@ colon(char *cp)
- 			return (cp);
- 		if (*cp == '/')
- 			return NULL;
-+		if (start) {
-+		/* Slash on beginning or after dots only denotes file name. */
-+			if (*cp == '/')
-+				return (0);
-+			if (*cp != '.')
-+				start = 0;
-+		}
- 	}
- 	return NULL;
- }
-diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
---- openssh/monitor.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/monitor.c	2018-08-22 11:19:56.006844867 +0200
-@@ -115,6 +115,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, struct sshbuf *)
- int mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
- int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
- int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+int mm_answer_authrole(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
-+#endif
- int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
- int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
- int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
-@@ -189,6 +192,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
-     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole},
-+#endif
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
- #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -796,6 +802,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, struct ss
- 
- 	/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
- 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1);
-+#endif
- 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
- 
- #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -842,6 +851,26 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, struct sshb
- 	return found;
- }
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+int
-+mm_answer_authrole(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
-+{
-+	int r;
-+	monitor_permit_authentications(1);
-+
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->role, NULL)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+	debug3("%s: role=%s", __func__, authctxt->role);
-+
-+	if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
-+		free(authctxt->role);
-+		authctxt->role = NULL;
-+	}
-+
-+	return (0);
-+}
-+#endif
-+
- int
- mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
- {
-@@ -1218,7 +1247,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i
- {
- 	struct sshbuf *b;
- 	const u_char *p;
--	char *userstyle, *cp;
-+	char *userstyle, *s, *cp;
- 	size_t len;
- 	u_char type;
- 	int r, fail = 0;
-@@ -1251,6 +1280,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i
- 		fail++;
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+	if ((s = strchr(cp, '/')) != NULL)
-+		*s = '\0';
- 	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
- 	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
- 	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
-@@ -1286,7 +1317,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
- {
- 	struct sshbuf *b;
- 	const u_char *p;
--	char *cp, *userstyle;
-+	char *cp, *s, *userstyle;
- 	size_t len;
- 	int r, fail = 0;
- 	u_char type;
-@@ -1308,6 +1339,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
- 		fail++;
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+	if ((s = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL)
-+		*s = '\0';
- 	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
- 	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
- 	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
-diff -up openssh/monitor.h.role-mls openssh/monitor.h
---- openssh/monitor.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/monitor.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
-@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
- 	MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC = 48, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC = 49,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_TERM = 50,
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 80,
-+#endif
-+
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
-diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.c
---- openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
-+++ openssh/monitor_wrap.c	2018-08-22 11:21:47.938747968 +0200
-@@ -390,6 +390,27 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *
- 	sshbuf_free(m);
- }
- 
-+/* Inform the privileged process about role */
-+
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+void
-+mm_inform_authrole(char *role)
-+{
-+	int r;
-+	struct sshbuf *m;
-+
-+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-+
-+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, role ? role : "")) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, m);
-+
-+	sshbuf_free(m);
-+}
-+#endif
-+
- /* Do the password authentication */
- int
- mm_auth_password(struct ssh *ssh, char *password)
-diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.h
---- openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
-+++ openssh/monitor_wrap.h	2018-08-22 11:22:10.439929513 +0200
-@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
-     const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *,
-     const char *, u_int compat);
- void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+void mm_inform_authrole(char *);
-+#endif
- struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(struct ssh *, const char *);
- char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
- int mm_auth_password(struct ssh *, char *);
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ PORTS=	port-aix.o \
- 	port-linux.o \
- 	port-solaris.o \
- 	port-net.o \
--	port-uw.o
-+	port-uw.o \
-+	port-linux-sshd.o
- 
- .c.o:
- 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS_NOPIE) $(PICFLAG) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -100,37 +100,6 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
- 	return sc;
- }
- 
--/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
--void
--ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
--{
--	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
--
--	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
--		return;
--
--	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
--
--	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
--	if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
--		switch (security_getenforce()) {
--		case -1:
--			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
--		case 0:
--			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
--			    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
--			break;
--		default:
--			fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
--			    "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
--		}
--	}
--	if (user_ctx != NULL)
--		freecon(user_ctx);
--
--	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
--}
--
- /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
- void
- ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
-@@ -145,7 +114,11 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, cons
- 
- 	debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
- 
--	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
-+	if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) != 0) {
-+		error("%s: getexeccon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
- 
- 	/* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
- 
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -20,9 +20,10 @@
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
- void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
--void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
- void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
-+
-+void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
- #endif
- 
- #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
---- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,425 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
-+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
-+ *
-+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
-+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
-+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
-+ *
-+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
-+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
-+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
-+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
-+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
-+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
-+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
-+ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * Linux-specific portability code - just SELinux support for sshd at present
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#if defined(WITH_SELINUX) || defined(LINUX_OOM_ADJUST)
-+#include <errno.h>
-+#include <stdarg.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "misc.h"      /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
-+#include "servconf.h"
-+#include "port-linux.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
-+#include "hostfile.h"
-+#include "auth.h"
-+
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
-+#include <selinux/context.h>
-+#include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
-+#include <selinux/get_default_type.h>
-+
-+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
-+#include <libaudit.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+extern ServerOptions options;
-+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
-+extern int inetd_flag;
-+extern int rexeced_flag;
-+
-+/* Send audit message */
-+static int
-+sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context,
-+		       security_context_t selected_context)
-+{
-+	int rc=0;
-+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
-+	char *msg = NULL;
-+	int audit_fd = audit_open();
-+	security_context_t default_raw=NULL;
-+	security_context_t selected_raw=NULL;
-+	rc = -1;
-+	if (audit_fd < 0) {
-+		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
-+					errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
-+				return 0; /* No audit support in kernel */
-+		error("Error connecting to audit system.");
-+		return rc;
-+	}
-+	if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(default_context, &default_raw) < 0) {
-+		error("Error translating default context.");
-+		default_raw = NULL;
-+	}
-+	if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(selected_context, &selected_raw) < 0) {
-+		error("Error translating selected context.");
-+		selected_raw = NULL;
-+	}
-+	if (asprintf(&msg, "sshd: default-context=%s selected-context=%s",
-+		     default_raw ? default_raw : (default_context ? default_context: "?"),
-+		     selected_context ? selected_raw : (selected_context ? selected_context :"?")) < 0) {
-+		error("Error allocating memory.");
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_ROLE_CHANGE,
-+				   msg, NULL, NULL, NULL, success) <= 0) {
-+		error("Error sending audit message.");
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	rc = 0;
-+      out:
-+	free(msg);
-+	freecon(default_raw);
-+	freecon(selected_raw);
-+	close(audit_fd);
-+#endif
-+	return rc;
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+mls_range_allowed(security_context_t src, security_context_t dst)
-+{
-+	struct av_decision avd;
-+	int retval;
-+	access_vector_t bit;
-+	security_class_t class;
-+
-+	debug("%s: src:%s dst:%s", __func__, src, dst);
-+	class = string_to_security_class("context");
-+	if (!class) {
-+		error("string_to_security_class failed to translate security class context");
-+		return 1;
-+	}
-+	bit = string_to_av_perm(class, "contains");
-+	if (!bit) {
-+		error("string_to_av_perm failed to translate av perm contains");
-+		return 1;
-+	}
-+	retval = security_compute_av(src, dst, class, bit, &avd);
-+	if (retval || ((bit & avd.allowed) != bit))
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+get_user_context(const char *sename, const char *role, const char *lvl,
-+	security_context_t *sc) {
-+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
-+	if (lvl == NULL || lvl[0] == '\0' || get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, sc) != 0) {
-+	        /* User may have requested a level completely outside of his 
-+	           allowed range. We get a context just for auditing as the
-+	           range check below will certainly fail for default context. */
-+#endif
-+		if (get_default_context(sename, NULL, sc) != 0) {
-+			*sc = NULL;
-+			return -1;
-+		}
-+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
-+	}
-+#endif
-+	if (role != NULL && role[0]) {
-+		context_t con;
-+		char *type=NULL;
-+		if (get_default_type(role, &type) != 0) {
-+			error("get_default_type: failed to get default type for '%s'",
-+				role);
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+		con = context_new(*sc);
-+		if (!con) {
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+		context_role_set(con, role);
-+		context_type_set(con, type);
-+		freecon(*sc);
-+		*sc = strdup(context_str(con));
-+		context_free(con);
-+		if (!*sc)
-+			return -1;
-+	}
-+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
-+	if (lvl != NULL && lvl[0]) {
-+		/* verify that the requested range is obtained */
-+		context_t con;
-+		security_context_t obtained_raw;
-+		security_context_t requested_raw;
-+		con = context_new(*sc);
-+		if (!con) {
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+		context_range_set(con, lvl);
-+		if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(*sc, &obtained_raw) < 0) {
-+			context_free(con);
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+		if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(context_str(con), &requested_raw) < 0) {
-+			freecon(obtained_raw);
-+			context_free(con);
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+
-+		debug("get_user_context: obtained context '%s' requested context '%s'",
-+			obtained_raw, requested_raw);
-+		if (strcmp(obtained_raw, requested_raw)) {
-+			/* set the context to the real requested one but fail */
-+			freecon(requested_raw);
-+			freecon(obtained_raw);
-+			freecon(*sc);
-+			*sc = strdup(context_str(con));
-+			context_free(con);
-+			return -1;
-+		}
-+		freecon(requested_raw);
-+		freecon(obtained_raw);
-+		context_free(con);
-+	}
-+#endif
-+	return 0;
-+      out:
-+	freecon(*sc);
-+	*sc = NULL;
-+	return -1;
-+}
-+
-+static void
-+ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level)
-+{
-+	*role = NULL;
-+	*level = NULL;
-+	if (the_authctxt) {
-+		if (the_authctxt->role != NULL) {
-+			char *slash;
-+			*role = xstrdup(the_authctxt->role);
-+			if ((slash = strchr(*role, '/')) != NULL) {
-+				*slash = '\0';
-+				*level = slash + 1;
-+			}
-+		}
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+/* Return the default security context for the given username */
-+static int
-+sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
-+	security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc)
-+{
-+	char *sename, *lvl;
-+	char *role;
-+	const char *reqlvl;
-+	int r = 0;
-+	context_t con = NULL;
-+
-+	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
-+
-+#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
-+	if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) {
-+		sename = NULL;
-+		lvl = NULL;
-+	}
-+#else
-+	sename = pwname;
-+	lvl = "";
-+#endif
-+
-+	if (r == 0) {
-+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
-+		r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, default_sc);
-+#else
-+		r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, default_sc);
-+#endif
-+	}
-+
-+	if (r == 0) {
-+		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
-+		if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
-+			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
-+
-+			if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
-+				fatal("failed to allocate security context");
-+
-+			if ((con=context_new(sshdsc)) == NULL)
-+				fatal("failed to allocate selinux context");
-+			reqlvl = context_range_get(con);
-+			freecon(sshdsc);
-+			if (reqlvl !=NULL && lvl != NULL && strcmp(reqlvl, lvl) == 0)
-+			    /* we actually don't change level */
-+			    reqlvl = "";
-+
-+			debug("%s: current connection level '%s'", __func__, reqlvl);
-+
-+		}
-+
-+		if ((reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) || (role != NULL && role[0])) {
-+			r = get_user_context(sename, role, reqlvl, user_sc);
-+
-+			if (r == 0 && reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) {
-+				security_context_t default_level_sc = *default_sc;
-+				if (role != NULL && role[0]) {
-+					if (get_user_context(sename, role, lvl, &default_level_sc) < 0)
-+						default_level_sc = *default_sc;
-+				}
-+				/* verify that the requested range is contained in the user range */
-+				if (mls_range_allowed(default_level_sc, *user_sc)) {
-+					logit("permit MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
-+				} else {
-+					r = -1;
-+					error("deny MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
-+				}
-+				if (default_level_sc != *default_sc)
-+					freecon(default_level_sc);
-+			}
-+		} else {
-+			*user_sc = *default_sc;
-+		}
-+	}
-+	if (r != 0) {
-+		error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
-+		    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
-+	}
-+
-+#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
-+	free(sename);
-+	free(lvl);
-+#endif
-+
-+	if (role != NULL)
-+		free(role);
-+	if (con)
-+		context_free(con);
-+
-+	return (r);
-+}
-+
-+/* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
-+static int
-+sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
-+{
-+	const char *reqlvl;
-+	char *role;
-+	char *use_current;
-+	int rv;
-+
-+	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
-+
-+	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
-+
-+	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
-+
-+	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
-+		use_current = "1";
-+	} else {
-+		use_current = "";
-+		rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: "");
-+	}
-+
-+	rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current);
-+
-+	if (role != NULL)
-+		free(role);
-+
-+	return rv;
-+}
-+
-+/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
-+void
-+sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
-+{
-+	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
-+	int r = 0;
-+	security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
-+
-+	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
-+		return;
-+
-+	if (options.use_pam) {
-+		/* do not compute context, just setup environment for pam_selinux */
-+		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) {
-+			switch (security_getenforce()) {
-+			case -1:
-+				fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
-+			case 0:
-+				error("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
-+				    __func__);
-+			break;
-+			default:
-+				fatal("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.",
-+				    __func__);
-+			}
-+		}
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
-+	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
-+
-+	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
-+	if (r >= 0) {
-+		r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
-+		if (r < 0) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s",
-+			    __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
-+		}
-+#ifdef HAVE_SETKEYCREATECON
-+		else if (setkeycreatecon(user_ctx) < 0) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s",
-+			    __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
-+		}
-+#endif
-+	}
-+	if (user_ctx == NULL) {
-+		user_ctx = default_ctx;
-+	}
-+	if (r < 0 || user_ctx != default_ctx) {
-+		/* audit just the case when user changed a role or there was
-+		   a failure */
-+		sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(r >= 0, default_ctx, user_ctx);
-+	}
-+	if (r < 0) {
-+		switch (security_getenforce()) {
-+		case -1:
-+			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
-+		case 0:
-+			error("%s: SELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
-+			    __func__);
-+			break;
-+		default:
-+			fatal("%s: SELinux failure. Aborting connection.",
-+			    __func__);
-+		}
-+	}
-+	if (user_ctx != NULL && user_ctx != default_ctx)
-+		freecon(user_ctx);
-+	if (default_ctx != NULL)
-+		freecon(default_ctx);
-+
-+	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
-+}
-+
-+#endif
-+#endif
-+
-diff -up openssh/platform.c.role-mls openssh/platform.c
---- openssh/platform.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/platform.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru
- 	}
- #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--	ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
-+	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
- #endif
- }
- 
-diff -up openssh/sshd.c.role-mls openssh/sshd.c
---- openssh/sshd.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/sshd.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.820430957 +0200
-@@ -2186,6 +2186,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		restore_uid();
- 	}
- #endif
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
-+#endif
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- 	if (options.use_pam) {
- 		do_pam_setcred(1);

openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
-index 60682c68..9344806e 100644
---- a/scp.c
-+++ b/scp.c
-@@ -714,7 +714,9 @@ toremote(int argc, char **argv)
- 			addargs(&alist, "%s", host);
- 			addargs(&alist, "%s", cmd);
- 			addargs(&alist, "%s", src);
--			addargs(&alist, "%s%s%s:%s",
-+			addargs(&alist,
-+			    /* IPv6 address needs to be enclosed with sqare brackets */
-+			    strchr(host, ':') != NULL ? "%s%s[%s]:%s" : "%s%s%s:%s",
- 			    tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "",
- 			    thost, targ);
- 			if (do_local_cmd(&alist) != 0)
-

openssh-7.9p1-ssh-copy-id.patch

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-From 22bfdcf060b632b5a6ff603f8f42ff166c211a66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2020 10:02:45 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Fail hard on the first failed attempt to write the
- authorized_keys_file
-
----
- ssh-copy-id | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-index 392f64f..e69a23f 100755
---- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-+++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ installkeys_sh() {
- 	cd;
- 	umask 077;
- 	mkdir -p $(dirname "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}") &&
--	  { [ -z \`tail -1c ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} 2>/dev/null\` ] || echo >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE}; } &&
-+	  { [ -z \`tail -1c ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} 2>/dev/null\` ] || echo >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} || exit 1; } &&
- 	  cat >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} ||
- 	  exit 1;
- 	if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1; then
--- 
-GitLab
-
-

openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch

@@ -1,502 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5
---- openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies	2020-03-26 14:40:44.546775605 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5	2020-03-26 14:52:20.700649727 +0100
-@@ -359,17 +359,17 @@ or
- .Qq *.c.example.com
- domains.
- .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
- by certificate authorities (CAs).
--The default is:
--.Bd -literal -offset indent
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
--ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
--.Ed
--.Pp
- .Xr ssh 1
- will not accept host certificates signed using algorithms other than those
- specified.
-+.Pp
- .It Cm CertificateFile
- Specifies a file from which the user's certificate is read.
- A corresponding private key must be provided separately in order
-@@ -424,20 +424,25 @@ If the option is set to
- .Cm no ,
- the check will not be executed.
- .It Cm Ciphers
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference.
- Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq +
--character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
--instead of replacing them.
-+character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the built-in
-+openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
--from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq ^
- character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the
--default set.
-+built-in openssh default set.
- .Pp
- The supported ciphers are:
- .Bd -literal -offset indent
-@@ -453,13 +458,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
- chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
- .Ed
- .Pp
--The default is:
--.Bd -literal -offset indent
--chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
--aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
--aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
--.Ed
--.Pp
- The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
- .It Cm ClearAllForwardings
-@@ -812,6 +810,11 @@ command line will be passed untouched to
- The default is
- .Dq no .
- .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI
- key exchange. Possible values are
- .Bd -literal -offset 3n
-@@ -824,10 +827,8 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-,
- gss-curve25519-sha256-
- .Ed
- .Pp
--The default is
--.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,
--gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
- This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
-+.Pp
- .It Cm HashKnownHosts
- Indicates that
- .Xr ssh 1
-@@ -1149,29 +1150,25 @@ it may be zero or more of:
- and
- .Cm pam .
- .It Cm KexAlgorithms
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq +
--character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
--instead of replacing them.
-+character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in
-+openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
--from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq ^
- character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the
--default set.
--The default is:
--.Bd -literal -offset indent
--curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
--ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
--diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
--diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,
--diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
--diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
--.Ed
-+built-in openssh default set.
- .Pp
- The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q kex .
-@@ -1231,37 +1228,33 @@ The default is INFO.
- DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
- DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output.
- .It Cm MACs
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms
- in order of preference.
- The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq +
--character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
--instead of replacing them.
-+character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in
-+openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
--from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq ^
- character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
--default set.
-+built-in openssh default set.
- .Pp
- The algorithms that contain
- .Qq -etm
- calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac).
- These are considered safer and their use recommended.
- .Pp
--The default is:
--.Bd -literal -offset indent
--umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
--hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
--hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
--umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
--hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
--.Ed
--.Pp
- The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q mac .
- .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
-@@ -1394,36 +1387,25 @@ instead of continuing to execute and pas
- The default is
- .Cm no .
- .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the key types that will be used for public key authentication
- as a comma-separated list of patterns.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq +
--character, then the key types after it will be appended to the default
--instead of replacing it.
-+character, then the key types after it will be appended to the built-in
-+openssh default instead of replacing it.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
--from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq ^
- character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the
--default set.
--The default for this option is:
--.Bd -literal -offset 3n
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
--sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
--ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
--rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
--.Ed
-+built-in openssh default set.
- .Pp
- The list of available key types may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes .
-diff -up openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies	2020-03-26 14:40:44.530775355 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5	2020-03-26 14:48:56.732468099 +0100
-@@ -375,16 +375,16 @@ If the argument is
- then no banner is displayed.
- By default, no banner is displayed.
- .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
- by certificate authorities (CAs).
--The default is:
--.Bd -literal -offset indent
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
--ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
--.Ed
--.Pp
- Certificates signed using other algorithms will not be accepted for
- public key or host-based authentication.
-+.Pp
- .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
- Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
- PAM or through authentication styles supported in
-@@ -446,20 +446,25 @@ The default is
- indicating not to
- .Xr chroot 2 .
- .It Cm Ciphers
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the ciphers allowed.
- Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq +
--character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
--instead of replacing them.
-+character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the built-in
-+openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
--from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq ^
- character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the
--default set.
-+built-in openssh default set.
- .Pp
- The supported ciphers are:
- .Pp
-@@ -486,13 +491,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
- chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
- .El
- .Pp
--The default is:
--.Bd -literal -offset indent
--chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
--aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
--aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
--.Ed
--.Pp
- The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
- .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
-@@ -681,22 +679,24 @@ For this to work
- .Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
- needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client.
- .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- The list of key exchange algorithms that are accepted by GSSAPI
- key exchange. Possible values are
- .Bd -literal -offset 3n
--gss-gex-sha1-,
--gss-group1-sha1-,
--gss-group14-sha1-,
--gss-group14-sha256-,
--gss-group16-sha512-,
--gss-nistp256-sha256-,
-+gss-gex-sha1-
-+gss-group1-sha1-
-+gss-group14-sha1-
-+gss-group14-sha256-
-+gss-group16-sha512-
-+gss-nistp256-sha256-
- gss-curve25519-sha256-
- .Ed
--.Pp
--The default is
--.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,
--gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
- This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
-+.Pp
- .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
- Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication
- as a list of comma-separated patterns.
-@@ -793,25 +793,13 @@ is specified, the location of the socket
- .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
- environment variable.
- .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the host key algorithms
- that the server offers.
--The default for this option is:
--.Bd -literal -offset 3n
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
--sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
--ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
--rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
--.Ed
--.Pp
- The list of available key types may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
- .It Cm IgnoreRhosts
-@@ -943,20 +931,25 @@ Specifies whether to look at .k5login fi
- The default is
- .Cm yes .
- .It Cm KexAlgorithms
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
- Alternately if the specified list begins with a
- .Sq +
--character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
--instead of replacing them.
-+character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in
-+openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
--from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq ^
- character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the
--default set.
-+built-in openssh default set.
- The supported algorithms are:
- .Pp
- .Bl -item -compact -offset indent
-@@ -988,15 +981,6 @@ ecdh-sha2-nistp521
- sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org
- .El
- .Pp
--The default is:
--.Bd -literal -offset indent
--curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
--ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
--diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
--diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
--diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
--.Ed
--.Pp
- The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q KexAlgorithms .
- .It Cm ListenAddress
-@@ -1065,21 +1049,26 @@ DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
- DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output.
- Logging with a DEBUG level violates the privacy of users and is not recommended.
- .It Cm MACs
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms.
- The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq +
--character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
--instead of replacing them.
-+character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in
-+openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
--from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq ^
- character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
--default set.
-+built-in openssh default set.
- .Pp
- The algorithms that contain
- .Qq -etm
-@@ -1122,15 +1111,6 @@ umac-64-etm@openssh.com
- umac-128-etm@openssh.com
- .El
- .Pp
--The default is:
--.Bd -literal -offset indent
--umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
--hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
--hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
--umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
--hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
--.Ed
--.Pp
- The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q mac .
- .It Cm Match
-@@ -1480,36 +1460,25 @@ or equivalent.)
- The default is
- .Cm yes .
- .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the key types that will be accepted for public key authentication
- as a list of comma-separated patterns.
- Alternately if the specified list begins with a
- .Sq +
--character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
--instead of replacing them.
-+character, then the specified key types will be appended to the built-in
-+openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
--from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq ^
- character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the
--default set.
--The default for this option is:
--.Bd -literal -offset 3n
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
--sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
--ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
--rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
--.Ed
-+built-in openssh default set.
- .Pp
- The list of available key types may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes .

openssh-8.0p1-openssl-evp.patch

@@ -1,720 +0,0 @@
-From ed7ec0cdf577ffbb0b15145340cf51596ca3eb89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 10:45:45 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Use high-level OpenSSL API for signatures
-
----
- digest-openssl.c |  16 ++++
- digest.h         |   6 ++
- ssh-dss.c        |  65 ++++++++++------
- ssh-ecdsa.c      |  69 ++++++++++-------
- ssh-rsa.c        | 193 +++++++++--------------------------------------
- sshkey.c         |  77 +++++++++++++++++++
- sshkey.h         |   4 +
- 7 files changed, 221 insertions(+), 209 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/digest-openssl.c b/digest-openssl.c
-index da7ed72bc..6a21d8adb 100644
---- a/digest-openssl.c
-+++ b/digest-openssl.c
-@@ -63,6 +63,22 @@ const struct ssh_digest digests[] = {
- 	{ -1,			NULL,		0,	NULL },
- };
- 
-+const EVP_MD *
-+ssh_digest_to_md(int digest_type)
-+{
-+	switch (digest_type) {
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
-+		return EVP_sha1();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
-+		return EVP_sha256();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
-+		return EVP_sha384();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
-+		return EVP_sha512();
-+	}
-+	return NULL;
-+}
-+
- static const struct ssh_digest *
- ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg)
- {
-diff --git a/digest.h b/digest.h
-index 274574d0e..c7ceeb36f 100644
---- a/digest.h
-+++ b/digest.h
-@@ -32,6 +32,12 @@
- struct sshbuf;
- struct ssh_digest_ctx;
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-+/* Converts internal digest representation to the OpenSSL one */
-+const EVP_MD *ssh_digest_to_md(int digest_type);
-+#endif
-+
- /* Looks up a digest algorithm by name */
- int ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name);
- 
-diff --git a/ssh-dss.c b/ssh-dss.c
-index a23c383dc..ea45e7275 100644
---- a/ssh-dss.c
-+++ b/ssh-dss.c
-@@ -52,11 +52,15 @@ int
- ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
- {
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	DSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
- 	const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
--	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
--	size_t rlen, slen, len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
-+	u_char sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
-+	size_t rlen, slen;
-+	int len;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
-+	u_char *sigb = NULL;
-+	const u_char *psig = NULL;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 
- 	if (lenp != NULL)
-@@ -67,17 +71,24 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 	if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	if (dlen == 0)
--		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1)
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &sigb, &len,
-+	    data, datalen);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	if (ret < 0) {
- 		goto out;
-+	}
- 
--	if ((sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa)) == NULL) {
-+	psig = sigb;
-+	if ((sig = d2i_DSA_SIG(NULL, &psig, len)) == NULL) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+	free(sigb);
-+	sigb = NULL;
- 
- 	DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s);
- 	rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig_r);
-@@ -110,7 +121,7 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 		*lenp = len;
- 	ret = 0;
-  out:
--	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-+	free(sigb);
- 	DSA_SIG_free(sig);
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	return ret;
-@@ -121,20 +132,20 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
-     const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
- {
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	DSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
- 	BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
--	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob = NULL;
--	size_t len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
-+	u_char *sigblob = NULL;
-+	size_t len, slen;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
- 	char *ktype = NULL;
-+	u_char *sigb = NULL, *psig = NULL;
- 
- 	if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA ||
- 	    signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	if (dlen == 0)
--		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
- 	/* fetch signature */
- 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
-@@ -176,25 +187,31 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 	}
- 	sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
- 
--	/* sha1 the data */
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+	if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(sig, NULL)) == 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
--
--	switch (DSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->dsa)) {
--	case 1:
--		ret = 0;
--		break;
--	case 0:
--		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
-+	}
-+	if ((sigb = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
--	default:
-+	}
-+	psig = sigb;
-+	if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(sig, &psig)) == 0) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
-+	    sigb, slen);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+
-  out:
--	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-+	free(sigb);
- 	DSA_SIG_free(sig);
- 	BN_clear_free(sig_r);
- 	BN_clear_free(sig_s);
-diff --git a/ssh-ecdsa.c b/ssh-ecdsa.c
-index 599c7199d..b036796e8 100644
---- a/ssh-ecdsa.c
-+++ b/ssh-ecdsa.c
-@@ -50,11 +50,13 @@ int
- ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
- {
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
-+	unsigned char *sigb = NULL;
-+	const unsigned char *psig;
- 	const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
- 	int hash_alg;
--	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
--	size_t len, dlen;
-+	int len;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
-@@ -67,18 +69,24 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 
--	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
--	    (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
-+	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1)
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sigb, &len, data,
-+	    datalen);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	if (ret < 0) {
- 		goto out;
-+	}
- 
--	if ((sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->ecdsa)) == NULL) {
-+	psig = sigb;
-+	if ((sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &psig, len)) == NULL) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--
- 	if ((bb = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
-@@ -102,7 +110,7 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 		*lenp = len;
- 	ret = 0;
-  out:
--	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-+	free(sigb);
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	sshbuf_free(bb);
- 	ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
-@@ -115,22 +123,21 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
-     const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
- {
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
- 	BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
--	int hash_alg;
--	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
--	size_t dlen;
-+	int hash_alg, len;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL;
- 	char *ktype = NULL;
-+	unsigned char *sigb = NULL, *psig = NULL;
- 
- 	if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL ||
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA ||
- 	    signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 
--	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
--	    (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
-+	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
- 	/* fetch signature */
-@@ -166,28 +173,36 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 	}
- 	sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
- 
--	if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
-+	/* Figure out the length */
-+	if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, NULL)) == 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if ((sigb = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+	psig = sigb;
-+	if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, &psig)) == 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
-+	}
- 
--	switch (ECDSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->ecdsa)) {
--	case 1:
--		ret = 0;
--		break;
--	case 0:
--		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
-+	if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
- 		goto out;
--	default:
--		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1) {
-+		ret =  SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, datalen, sigb, len);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- 
-  out:
--	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-+	free(sigb);
- 	sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
-diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
-index 9b14f9a9a..8ef3a6aca 100644
---- a/ssh-rsa.c
-+++ b/ssh-rsa.c
-@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
- 
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- 
--static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, RSA *);
-+static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, const u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, EVP_PKEY *);
- 
- static const char *
- rsa_hash_alg_ident(int hash_alg)
-@@ -90,21 +90,6 @@ rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(const char *alg)
- 	return -1;
- }
- 
--static int
--rsa_hash_alg_nid(int type)
--{
--	switch (type) {
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
--		return NID_sha1;
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
--		return NID_sha256;
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
--		return NID_sha512;
--	default:
--		return -1;
--	}
--}
--
- int
- ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(struct sshkey *key, const BIGNUM *iqmp)
- {
-@@ -164,11 +149,10 @@ int
- ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg_ident)
- {
--	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
--	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sig = NULL;
--	size_t slen = 0;
--	u_int dlen, len;
--	int nid, hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+	u_char *sig = NULL;
-+	int len, slen = 0;
-+	int hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
- 
- 	if (lenp != NULL)
-@@ -180,33 +164,24 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 		hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
- 	else
- 		hash_alg = rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(alg_ident);
-+
- 	if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || hash_alg == -1 ||
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
--	if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
--		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
- 	slen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
--	if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
--		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--
--	/* hash the data */
--	nid = rsa_hash_alg_nid(hash_alg);
--	if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
--		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
--		goto out;
-+	if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
-+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
- 
--	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1)
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sig, &len, data,
-+	    datalen);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	if (ret < 0) {
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 
--	if (RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa) != 1) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
--		goto out;
--	}
- 	if (len < slen) {
- 		size_t diff = slen - len;
- 		memmove(sig + diff, sig, len);
-@@ -215,6 +190,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+
- 	/* encode signature */
- 	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-@@ -235,7 +211,6 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 		*lenp = len;
- 	ret = 0;
-  out:
--	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
- 	freezero(sig, slen);
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	return ret;
-@@ -246,10 +221,10 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
-     const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
-     const char *alg)
- {
--	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	char *sigtype = NULL;
- 	int hash_alg, want_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
--	size_t len = 0, diff, modlen, dlen;
-+	size_t len = 0, diff, modlen;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
- 	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *osigblob, *sigblob = NULL;
- 
-@@ -257,8 +232,7 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA ||
- 	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
--	if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
-+	if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
- 
- 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
-@@ -310,16 +284,15 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 		explicit_bzero(sigblob, diff);
- 		len = modlen;
- 	}
--	if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
--		goto out;
-+	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, data, datalen, sigblob, len, pkey);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- 
--	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, digest, dlen, sigblob, len,
--	    key->rsa);
-  out:
- 	freezero(sigblob, len);
- 	free(sigtype);
-@@ -328,122 +301,26 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
--/*
-- * See:
-- * http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-1/
-- * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1.asn
-- */
--
--/*
-- * id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
-- *	oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 }
-- */
--static const u_char id_sha1[] = {
--	0x30, 0x21, /* type Sequence, length 0x21 (33) */
--	0x30, 0x09, /* type Sequence, length 0x09 */
--	0x06, 0x05, /* type OID, length 0x05 */
--	0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, /* id-sha1 OID */
--	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
--	0x04, 0x14  /* Octet string, length 0x14 (20), followed by sha1 hash */
--};
--
--/*
-- * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html
-- * id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840)
-- *      organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2)
-- *      id-sha256(1) }
-- */
--static const u_char id_sha256[] = {
--	0x30, 0x31, /* type Sequence, length 0x31 (49) */
--	0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */
--	0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */
--	0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, /* id-sha256 */
--	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
--	0x04, 0x20  /* Octet string, length 0x20 (32), followed by sha256 hash */
--};
--
--/*
-- * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html
-- * id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840)
-- *      organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2)
-- *      id-sha256(3) }
-- */
--static const u_char id_sha512[] = {
--	0x30, 0x51, /* type Sequence, length 0x51 (81) */
--	0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */
--	0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */
--	0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, /* id-sha512 */
--	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
--	0x04, 0x40  /* Octet string, length 0x40 (64), followed by sha512 hash */
--};
--
- static int
--rsa_hash_alg_oid(int hash_alg, const u_char **oidp, size_t *oidlenp)
-+openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
-+    u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
- {
--	switch (hash_alg) {
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
--		*oidp = id_sha1;
--		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha1);
--		break;
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
--		*oidp = id_sha256;
--		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha256);
--		break;
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
--		*oidp = id_sha512;
--		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha512);
--		break;
--	default:
--		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	}
--	return 0;
--}
-+	size_t rsasize = 0;
-+	const RSA *rsa;
-+	int ret;
- 
--static int
--openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, u_char *hash, size_t hashlen,
--    u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa)
--{
--	size_t rsasize = 0, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0;
--	int ret, len, oidmatch, hashmatch;
--	const u_char *oid = NULL;
--	u_char *decrypted = NULL;
--
--	if ((ret = rsa_hash_alg_oid(hash_alg, &oid, &oidlen)) != 0)
--		return ret;
--	ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
--	hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
--	if (hashlen != hlen) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--		goto done;
--	}
-+	rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey);
- 	rsasize = RSA_size(rsa);
- 	if (rsasize <= 0 || rsasize > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM ||
- 	    siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 		goto done;
- 	}
--	if ((decrypted = malloc(rsasize)) == NULL) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
--		goto done;
--	}
--	if ((len = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sigbuf, decrypted, rsa,
--	    RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) < 0) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
--		goto done;
--	}
--	if (len < 0 || (size_t)len != hlen + oidlen) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
--		goto done;
--	}
--	oidmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) == 0;
--	hashmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) == 0;
--	if (!oidmatch || !hashmatch) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
--		goto done;
--	}
--	ret = 0;
-+
-+	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, datalen,
-+	    sigbuf, siglen);
-+
- done:
--	freezero(decrypted, rsasize);
- 	return ret;
- }
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
-index ad1957762..b95ed0b10 100644
---- a/sshkey.c
-+++ b/sshkey.c
-@@ -358,6 +358,83 @@ sshkey_type_plain(int type)
- }
- 
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+int
-+sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, u_char **sigp,
-+    int *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen)
-+{
-+	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	u_char *sig = NULL;
-+	int ret, slen, len;
-+
-+	if (sigp == NULL || lenp == NULL) {
-+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	}
-+
-+	slen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
-+	if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
-+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+
-+	len = slen;
-+	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto error;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_SignInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
-+	    EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0 ||
-+	    EVP_SignFinal(ctx, sig, &len, pkey) <= 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto error;
-+	}
-+
-+	*sigp = sig;
-+	*lenp = len;
-+	/* Now owned by the caller */
-+	sig = NULL;
-+	ret = 0;
-+
-+error:
-+	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	free(sig);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, const u_char *data,
-+    size_t datalen, u_char *sigbuf, int siglen)
-+{
-+	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	int ret;
-+
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
-+	    EVP_VerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto done;
-+	}
-+	ret = EVP_VerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen, pkey);
-+	switch (ret) {
-+	case 1:
-+		ret = 0;
-+		break;
-+	case 0:
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
-+		break;
-+	default:
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		break;
-+	}
-+
-+done:
-+	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
- /* XXX: these are really begging for a table-driven approach */
- int
- sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name)
-diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
-index a91e60436..270901a87 100644
---- a/sshkey.h
-+++ b/sshkey.h
-@@ -179,6 +179,10 @@ const char	*sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *);
- const char	*sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *);
- int		 sshkey_names_valid2(const char *, int);
- char		*sshkey_alg_list(int, int, int, char);
-+int		 sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY*, int, u_char **,
-+    int *, const u_char *, size_t);
-+int		 sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *, int, const u_char *,
-+    size_t, u_char *, int);
- 
- int	 sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **);
- int	 sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **);
-

openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch

@@ -1,137 +0,0 @@
-commit 2c3ef499bfffce3cfd315edeebf202850ba4e00a
-Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date:   Tue Apr 16 15:35:18 2019 +0200
-
-    Use the new OpenSSL KDF
-
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index 2a455e4e..e01c3d43 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -2712,6 +2712,7 @@ if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
- 		HMAC_CTX_init \
- 		RSA_generate_key_ex \
- 		RSA_get_default_method \
-+		EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id \
- 	])
- 
- 	# OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms may be a macro.
-diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
-index b6f041f4..1fbce2bb 100644
---- a/kex.c
-+++ b/kex.c
-@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- #include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
-+# ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID
-+# include <openssl/kdf.h>
-+# endif
- #endif
- 
- #include "ssh.h"
-@@ -942,6 +945,95 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	return r;
- }
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID
-+static const EVP_MD *
-+digest_to_md(int digest_type)
-+{
-+	switch (digest_type) {
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
-+		return EVP_sha1();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
-+		return EVP_sha256();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
-+		return EVP_sha384();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
-+		return EVP_sha512();
-+	}
-+	return NULL;
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
-+    const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
-+{
-+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
-+	EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	u_char *key = NULL;
-+	int r, key_len;
-+
-+	if ((key_len = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0)
-+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	key_len = ROUNDUP(need, key_len);
-+	if ((key = calloc(1, key_len)) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_SSHKDF);
-+	if (!ctx) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, digest_to_md(kex->hash_alg));
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY,
-+	    sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret));
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_XCGHASH, hash, hashlen);
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_TYPE, id);
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID,
-+	    kex->session_id, kex->session_id_len);
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_derive(ctx, key, key_len);
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
-+	fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", id);
-+	dump_digest("key", key, key_len);
-+#endif
-+	*keyp = key;
-+	key = NULL;
-+	r = 0;
-+
-+out:
-+	free (key);
-+	EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	if (r < 0) {
-+		return r;
-+	}
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+#else
- static int
- derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
-     const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
-@@ -1004,6 +1096,7 @@ derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
- 	ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
- 	return r;
- }
-+#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID */
- 
- #define NKEYS	6
- int
-

openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
-index dca158de..afdcb1d2 100644
---- a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
-+++ b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
-@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
- #endif
- }
- 
--uint32_t
-+uint32_t __attribute__((visibility("default")))
- sk_api_version(void)
- {
- 	return SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR;
-@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ check_options(struct sk_option **options)
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--int
-+int __attribute__((visibility("default")))
- sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
-     const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
-     struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response)
-@@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ sig_ed25519(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
--int
-+int __attribute__((visibility("default")))
- sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen,
-     const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
-     uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
-@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
--int
-+int __attribute__((visibility("default")))
- sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
-     struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks)
- {

openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
---- a/channels.c
-+++ b/channels.c
-@@ -3933,16 +3933,26 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
- 			if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
- 				sock_set_v6only(sock);
- 			if (x11_use_localhost)
- 				set_reuseaddr(sock);
- 			if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
- 				debug2("%s: bind port %d: %.100s", __func__,
- 				    port, strerror(errno));
- 				close(sock);
-+
-+				/* do not remove successfully opened
-+				 * sockets if the request failed because
-+				 * the protocol IPv4/6 is not available
-+				 * (e.g. IPv6 may be disabled while being
-+				 * supported)
-+				 */
-+				if (EADDRNOTAVAIL == errno)
-+    					continue;
-+
- 				for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++)
- 					close(socks[n]);
- 				num_socks = 0;
- 				break;
- 			}
- 			socks[num_socks++] = sock;
- 			if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS)
- 				break;

openssh-8.4p1-debian-compat.patch

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
---- compat.h.orig	2020-10-05 10:09:02.953505129 -0700
-+++ compat.h	2020-10-05 10:10:17.587733113 -0700
-@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
- 
- #define SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE	0x00000001
- #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE		0x00000002
--/* #define unused		0x00000004 */
-+#define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74	0x00000004
- /* #define unused		0x00000008 */
- #define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID	0x00000010
- /* #define unused		0x00000020 */
---- compat.c.orig	2020-10-05 10:25:02.088720562 -0700
-+++ compat.c	2020-10-05 10:13:11.637282492 -0700
-@@ -65,11 +65,12 @@
- 		{ "OpenSSH_6.5*,"
- 		  "OpenSSH_6.6*",	SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|
- 					SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE},
-+		{ "OpenSSH_7.4*",	SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE|
-+		  			SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74},
- 		{ "OpenSSH_7.0*,"
- 		  "OpenSSH_7.1*,"
- 		  "OpenSSH_7.2*,"
- 		  "OpenSSH_7.3*,"
--		  "OpenSSH_7.4*,"
- 		  "OpenSSH_7.5*,"
- 		  "OpenSSH_7.6*,"
- 		  "OpenSSH_7.7*",	SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE},
---- sshconnect2.c.orig	2020-09-26 07:26:37.618010545 -0700
-+++ sshconnect2.c	2020-10-05 10:47:22.116315148 -0700
-@@ -1305,6 +1305,26 @@
- 			break;
- 	}
- 	free(oallowed);
-+	/*
-+	 * OpenSSH 7.4 supports SHA2 sig types, but fails to indicate its
-+	 * support.  For that release, check the local policy against the
-+	 * SHA2 signature types.
-+	 */
-+	if (alg == NULL &&
-+	    (key->type == KEY_RSA && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74))) {
-+		oallowed = allowed = xstrdup(options.pubkey_key_types);
-+		while ((cp = strsep(&allowed, ",")) != NULL) {
-+			if (sshkey_type_from_name(cp) != key->type)
-+				continue;
-+			tmp = match_list(sshkey_sigalg_by_name(cp), "rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-512", NULL);
-+			if (tmp != NULL)
-+				alg = xstrdup(cp);
-+			free(tmp);
-+			if (alg != NULL)
-+				break;
-+		}
-+		free(oallowed);
-+	}
- 	return alg;
- }
- 
-

openssh-8.4p1-sandbox-seccomp.patch

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-index e0768c06..5065ae7e 100644
---- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -267,6 +267,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- #ifdef __NR_pselect6
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_pselect6_time64
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6_time64),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_read
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_read),
- #endif

openssh-8.4p1-ssh-copy-id.patch

@@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
-From 66f16e5425eb881570e82bfef7baeac2e7accc0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Oleg <Fallmay@users.noreply.github.com>
-Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2020 12:09:08 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix `EOF: command not found` error in ssh-copy-id
-
----
- contrib/ssh-copy-id | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-index 392f64f94..a76907717 100644
---- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-+++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ installkeys_sh() {
-   #    the -z `tail ...` checks for a trailing newline. The echo adds one if was missing
-   #    the cat adds the keys we're getting via STDIN
-   #    and if available restorecon is used to restore the SELinux context
--  INSTALLKEYS_SH=$(tr '\t\n' ' ' <<-EOF)
-+  INSTALLKEYS_SH=$(tr '\t\n' ' ' <<-EOF
- 	cd;
- 	umask 077;
- 	mkdir -p $(dirname "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}") &&
-@@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ installkeys_sh() {
- 	  restorecon -F .ssh ${AUTH_KEY_FILE};
- 	fi
- EOF
-+  )
- 
-   # to defend against quirky remote shells: use 'exec sh -c' to get POSIX;
-   printf "exec sh -c '%s'" "${INSTALLKEYS_SH}"
-
-From de59a431cdec833e3ec15691dd950402b4c052cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>
-Date: Sat, 3 Oct 2020 00:20:07 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] un-nest $() to make ksh cheerful
-
----
- ssh-copy-id | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-From 02ac2c3c3db5478a440dfb1b90d15f686f2cbfc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>
-Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2020 21:30:10 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] ksh doesn't grok 'local'
-
-and AFAICT it's not actually doing anything useful in the code, so let's
-see how things go without it.
----
- ssh-copy-id | 11 +++++------
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-index a769077..11c9463 100755
---- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-+++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ quote() {
- }
- 
- use_id_file() {
--  local L_ID_FILE="$1"
-+  L_ID_FILE="$1"
- 
-   if [ -z "$L_ID_FILE" ] ; then
-     printf '%s: ERROR: no ID file found\n' "$0"
-@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ use_id_file() {
-   # check that the files are readable
-   for f in "$PUB_ID_FILE" ${PRIV_ID_FILE:+"$PRIV_ID_FILE"} ; do
-     ErrMSG=$( { : < "$f" ; } 2>&1 ) || {
--      local L_PRIVMSG=""
-+      L_PRIVMSG=""
-       [ "$f" = "$PRIV_ID_FILE" ] && L_PRIVMSG="	(to install the contents of '$PUB_ID_FILE' anyway, look at the -f option)"
-       printf "\\n%s: ERROR: failed to open ID file '%s': %s\\n" "$0" "$f" "$(printf '%s\n%s\n' "$ErrMSG" "$L_PRIVMSG" | sed -e 's/.*: *//')"
-       exit 1
-@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ fi
- # populate_new_ids() uses several global variables ($USER_HOST, $SSH_OPTS ...)
- # and has the side effect of setting $NEW_IDS
- populate_new_ids() {
--  local L_SUCCESS="$1"
-+  L_SUCCESS="$1"
- 
-   # shellcheck disable=SC2086
-   if [ "$FORCED" ] ; then
-@@ -181,13 +181,12 @@ populate_new_ids() {
-   eval set -- "$SSH_OPTS"
- 
-   umask 0177
--  local L_TMP_ID_FILE
-   L_TMP_ID_FILE=$(mktemp ~/.ssh/ssh-copy-id_id.XXXXXXXXXX)
-   if test $? -ne 0 || test "x$L_TMP_ID_FILE" = "x" ; then
-     printf '%s: ERROR: mktemp failed\n' "$0" >&2
-     exit 1
-   fi
--  local L_CLEANUP="rm -f \"$L_TMP_ID_FILE\" \"${L_TMP_ID_FILE}.stderr\""
-+  L_CLEANUP="rm -f \"$L_TMP_ID_FILE\" \"${L_TMP_ID_FILE}.stderr\""
-   # shellcheck disable=SC2064
-   trap "$L_CLEANUP" EXIT TERM INT QUIT
-   printf '%s: INFO: attempting to log in with the new key(s), to filter out any that are already installed\n' "$0" >&2
-@@ -237,7 +236,7 @@ populate_new_ids() {
- #    produce a one-liner to add the keys to remote authorized_keys file
- #    optionally takes an alternative path for authorized_keys
- installkeys_sh() {
--  local AUTH_KEY_FILE=${1:-.ssh/authorized_keys}
-+  AUTH_KEY_FILE=${1:-.ssh/authorized_keys}
- 
-   # In setting INSTALLKEYS_SH:
-   #    the tr puts it all on one line (to placate tcsh)
--- 
-
-diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-index 11c9463..ee3f637 100755
---- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-+++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-@@ -237,6 +237,7 @@ populate_new_ids() {
- #    optionally takes an alternative path for authorized_keys
- installkeys_sh() {
-   AUTH_KEY_FILE=${1:-.ssh/authorized_keys}
-+  AUTH_KEY_DIR=$(dirname "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}")
- 
-   # In setting INSTALLKEYS_SH:
-   #    the tr puts it all on one line (to placate tcsh)
-@@ -249,7 +250,7 @@ installkeys_sh() {
-   INSTALLKEYS_SH=$(tr '\t\n' ' ' <<-EOF
- 	cd;
- 	umask 077;
--	mkdir -p $(dirname "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}") &&
-+	mkdir -p "${AUTH_KEY_DIR}" &&
- 	  { [ -z \`tail -1c ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} 2>/dev/null\` ] || echo >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} || exit 1; } &&
- 	  cat >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} ||
- 	  exit 1;
--- 

openssh-nukeacss.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+#
+#  Remove the ACSS implementation from OpenSSH, and disable its use so that the
+#  rest of the package can still be built.
+#
+> acss.c
+patch -sp0 << EOF
+--- cipher.c.orig       2005-07-17 09:02:10.000000000 +0200
++++ cipher.c    2005-09-06 14:52:06.000000000 +0200
+@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@
+
+ /* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
++#undef USE_CIPHER_ACSS
++#undef EVP_acss
++#define EVP_acss NULL
+
+ extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_bf(void);
+ extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(void);
+EOF
+echo "Well done."

openssh.rpmlintrc

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-# I do not know about any better place where to put profile files
-addFilter(r'openssh-askpass.x86_64: W: non-conffile-in-etc /etc/profile.d/gnome-ssh-askpass.c?sh')
-
-# The ssh-keysign is not supposed to have standard permissions
-addFilter(r'openssh.x86_64: E: non-standard-executable-perm /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign 2555')
-addFilter(r'openssh.x86_64: E: setgid-binary /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign ssh_keys 2555')
-addFilter(r'openssh.x86_64: W: non-standard-gid /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign ssh_keys')
-
-# The -cavs subpackage is internal without documentation
-# The -askpass is not intended to be used directly so it is missing documentation
-addFilter(r'openssh-(askpass|cavs).x86_64: W: no-documentation')
-
-# sshd config and sysconfig is not supposed to be world readable
-addFilter(r'non-readable /etc/(ssh/sshd_config|sysconfig/sshd)')
-
-# The /var/empty/sshd is supposed to have the given permissions
-addFilter(r'non-standard-dir-perm /var/empty/sshd 711')
-addFilter(r'non-standard-dir-in-var empty')
-
-# Spelling false-positives
-addFilter(r'spelling-error (Summary\(en_US\)|.* en_US) (mls|su|sudo|rlogin|rsh|untrusted) ')

pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders

@@ -1,36 +1,20 @@
-authfd.c
-authfd.h
-atomicio.c
 atomicio.h
-bufaux.c
-bufbn.c
+authfd.h
 buffer.h
-buffer.c
-cleanup.c
 cipher.h
 compat.h
-entropy.c
+defines.h
 entropy.h
-fatal.c
 includes.h
 kex.h
-key.c
 key.h
-log.c
 log.h
 match.h
-misc.c
 misc.h
 pathnames.h
 platform.h
 rsa.h
-ssh-dss.c
-ssh-rsa.c
 ssh.h
 ssh2.h
-uidswap.c
-uidswap.h
-uuencode.c
 uuencode.h
-xmalloc.c
 xmalloc.h

pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-compat.patch

@@ -1,992 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
-  * or implied, of Jamie Beverly.
-  */
- 
-+#include <stdlib.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <errno.h>
- #include <string.h>
-@@ -66,8 +67,8 @@ proc_pid_cmdline(char *** inargv)
-                 case EOF:
-                 case '\0':
-                     if (len > 0) { 
--                        argv = pamsshagentauth_xrealloc(argv, count + 1, sizeof(*argv));
--                        argv[count] = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof(*argv[count]));
-+                        argv = xreallocarray(argv, count + 1, sizeof(*argv));
-+                        argv[count] = xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof(*argv[count]));
-                         strncpy(argv[count++], argbuf, len);
-                         memset(argbuf, '\0', MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG + 1);
-                         len = 0;
-@@ -106,9 +107,9 @@ pamsshagentauth_free_command_line(char *
- {
-     size_t i;
-     for (i = 0; i < n_args; i++)
--        pamsshagentauth_xfree(argv[i]);
-+        free(argv[i]);
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_xfree(argv);
-+    free(argv);
-     return;
- }
- 
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "log.h"
--#include "buffer.h"
--#include "key.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
- #include "authfd.h"
- #include <stdio.h>
- 
-@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ typedef struct idlist Idlist;
- struct identity {
-     TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
-     AuthenticationConnection *ac;   /* set if agent supports key */
--    Key *key;           /* public/private key */
-+    struct sshkey *key;           /* public/private key */
-     char    *filename;      /* comment for agent-only keys */
-     int tried;
-     int isprivate;      /* key points to the private key */
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat	2020-09-23 10:52:16.421001434 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "log.h"
--#include "buffer.h"
--#include "key.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
- #include "authfd.h"
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
-@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@
- #include "get_command_line.h"
- extern char **environ;
- 
-+#define PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1 101
-+
- /* 
-  * Added by Jamie Beverly, ensure socket fd points to a socket owned by the user 
-  * A cursory check is done, but to avoid race conditions, it is necessary 
-@@ -77,7 +79,7 @@ log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
-     if (count == 0)
-         return NULL;
-    
--    buf = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc((count * MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG) + (count * 3), sizeof(*buf));
-+    buf = xcalloc((count * MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG) + (count * 3), sizeof(*buf));
-     for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
-         strcat(buf, (i > 0) ? " '" : "'");
-         strncat(buf, action[i], MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG);
-@@ -87,21 +89,25 @@ log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
- }
- 
- void
--agent_action(Buffer *buf, char ** action, size_t count)
-+agent_action(struct sshbuf **buf, char ** action, size_t count)
- {
-     size_t i;
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(buf);
-+    int r;
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(buf, count);
-+    if ((*buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+        fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
-+    if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(*buf, count)) != 0)
-+        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- 
-     for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
--        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(buf, action[i]);
-+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*buf, action[i])) != 0)
-+            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-     }
- }
- 
- 
--void
--pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * session_id2, const char * user,
-+static void
-+pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(struct sshbuf ** session_id2, const char * user,
-                                 const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
- {
-     u_char *cookie = NULL;
-@@ -114,22 +120,23 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
-     char ** reported_argv = NULL;
-     size_t count = 0;
-     char * action_logbuf = NULL;
--    Buffer action_agentbuf;
-+    struct sshbuf *action_agentbuf = NULL;
-     uint8_t free_logbuf = 0;
-     char * retc;
-     int32_t reti;
-+    int r;
- 
--    rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
-+    rnd = arc4random();
-     cookie_len = ((uint8_t) rnd);
-     while (cookie_len < 16) { 
-         cookie_len += 16;                                          /* Add 16 bytes to the size to ensure that while the length is random, the length is always reasonable; ticket #18 */
-     }
- 
--    cookie = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(1,cookie_len);
-+    cookie = xcalloc(1, cookie_len);
- 
-     for (i = 0; i < cookie_len; i++) {
-         if (i % 4 == 0) {
--            rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
-+            rnd = arc4random();
-         }
-         cookie[i] = (u_char) rnd;
-         rnd >>= 8;
-@@ -144,7 +151,8 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
-     }
-     else {
-         action_logbuf = "unknown on this platform";
--        pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&action_agentbuf); /* stays empty, means unavailable */
-+        if ((action_agentbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) /* stays empty, means unavailable */
-+            fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
-     }
-     
-     /*
-@@ -161,35 +169,39 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
-     retc = getcwd(pwd, sizeof(pwd) - 1);
-     time(&ts);
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(session_id2);
-+    if ((*session_id2 = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+        fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(session_id2, PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1);
--    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("cookie: %s", pamsshagentauth_tohex(cookie, cookie_len)); */
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(session_id2, cookie, cookie_len);
--    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("user: %s", user); */
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, user);
--    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("ruser: %s", ruser); */
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, ruser);
--    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("servicename: %s", servicename); */
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, servicename);
--    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("pwd: %s", pwd); */
--    if(retc)
--        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, pwd);
--    else
--        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");
--    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("action: %s", action_logbuf); */
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(session_id2, action_agentbuf.buf + action_agentbuf.offset, action_agentbuf.end - action_agentbuf.offset);
-+    if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(*session_id2, PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1)) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_string(*session_id2, cookie, cookie_len)) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, user)) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, ruser)) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, servicename)) != 0)
-+        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+    if (retc) {
-+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, pwd)) != 0)
-+            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+    } else {
-+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, "")) != 0)
-+            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+    }
-+    if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(*session_id2, action_agentbuf)) != 0)
-+        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-     if (free_logbuf) { 
--        pamsshagentauth_xfree(action_logbuf);
--        pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&action_agentbuf);
-+        free(action_logbuf);
-+        sshbuf_free(action_agentbuf);
-+    }
-+    /* debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */
-+    if (reti >= 0) {
-+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, hostname)) != 0)
-+            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+    } else {
-+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, "")) != 0)
-+            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-     }
--    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */
--    if(reti >= 0)
--        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, hostname);
--    else
--        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");
--    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int64(session_id2, (uint64_t) ts);
-+    /* debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */
-+    if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(*session_id2, (uint64_t) ts)) != 0)
-+        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- 
-     free(cookie);
-     return;
-@@ -278,7 +290,8 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_ui
- 
- 	auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth));
- 	auth->fd = sock;
--	buffer_init(&auth->identities);
-+	if ((auth->identities = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+           fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- 	auth->howmany = 0;
- 
- 	return auth;
-@@ -287,9 +300,9 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_ui
- int
- pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(const char * user, const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
- {
--    Buffer session_id2 = { 0 };
-+    struct sshbuf *session_id2 = NULL;
-     Identity *id;
--    Key *key;
-+    struct sshkey *key;
-     AuthenticationConnection *ac;
-     char *comment;
-     uint8_t retval = 0;
-@@ -299,31 +312,30 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
-     pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
- 
-     if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
--        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
-+        verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
-         for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) 
-         {
-             if(key != NULL) {
--                id = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
-+                id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
-                 id->key = key;
-                 id->filename = comment;
-                 id->ac = ac;
--                if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, &session_id2)) {
-+                if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, session_id2)) {
-                     retval = 1;
-                 }
--                pamsshagentauth_xfree(id->filename);
--                pamsshagentauth_key_free(id->key);
--                pamsshagentauth_xfree(id);
-+                free(id->filename);
-+                key_free(id->key);
-+                free(id);
-                 if(retval == 1)
-                     break;
-             }
-         }
--        pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&session_id2);
-+        sshbuf_free(session_id2);
-         ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
-     }
-     else {
--        pamsshagentauth_verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
-+        verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
-     }
--    /* pamsshagentauth_xfree(session_id2); */
-     EVP_cleanup();
-     return retval;
- }
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat	2020-09-23 10:52:16.423001461 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c	2020-09-23 10:53:10.631727657 +0200
-@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
-  * a patch 8-)
-  */
- #if ! HAVE___PROGNAME || HAVE_BUNDLE
--    __progname = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup(servicename);
-+    __progname = xstrdup(servicename);
- #endif
- 
-     for(i = argc, argv_ptr = (char **) argv; i > 0; ++argv_ptr, i--) {
-@@ -132,11 +132,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
- #endif
-     }
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_log_init(__progname, log_lvl, facility, getenv("PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_DEBUG") ? 1 : 0);
-+    log_init(__progname, log_lvl, facility, getenv("PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_DEBUG") ? 1 : 0);
-     pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (void *) &user);
-     pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER, (void *) &ruser_ptr);
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_verbose("Beginning pam_ssh_agent_auth for user %s", user);
-+    verbose("Beginning pam_ssh_agent_auth for user %s", user);
- 
-     if(ruser_ptr) {
-         strncpy(ruser, ruser_ptr, sizeof(ruser) - 1);
-@@ -151,12 +151,12 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
- #ifdef ENABLE_SUDO_HACK
-         if( (strlen(sudo_service_name) > 0) && strncasecmp(servicename, sudo_service_name, sizeof(sudo_service_name) - 1) == 0 && getenv("SUDO_USER") ) {
-             strncpy(ruser, getenv("SUDO_USER"), sizeof(ruser) - 1 );
--            pamsshagentauth_verbose( "Using environment variable SUDO_USER (%s)", ruser );
-+            verbose( "Using environment variable SUDO_USER (%s)", ruser );
-         } else
- #endif
-         {
-             if( ! getpwuid(getuid()) ) {
--                pamsshagentauth_verbose("Unable to getpwuid(getuid())");
-+                verbose("Unable to getpwuid(getuid())");
-                 goto cleanexit;
-             }
-             strncpy(ruser, getpwuid(getuid())->pw_name, sizeof(ruser) - 1);
-@@ -165,11 +165,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
- 
-     /* Might as well explicitely confirm the user exists here */
-     if(! getpwnam(ruser) ) {
--        pamsshagentauth_verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", ruser);
-+        verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", ruser);
-         goto cleanexit;
-     }
-     if( ! getpwnam(user) ) {
--        pamsshagentauth_verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", user);
-+        verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", user);
-         goto cleanexit;
-     }
- 
-@@ -179,8 +179,8 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
-          */
-         parse_authorized_key_file(user, authorized_keys_file_input);
-     } else {
--        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys");
--        authorized_keys_file = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys");
-+        verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys");
-+        authorized_keys_file = xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys");
-     }
- 
-     /*
-@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
-      */
- 
-     if(user && strlen(ruser) > 0) {
--        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
-+        verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
- 
-         /*
-          * Attempt to read data from the sshd if we're being called as an auth agent.
-@@ -197,10 +197,10 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
-         const char* ssh_user_auth = pam_getenv(pamh, "SSH_AUTH_INFO_0");
-         int sshd_service = strncasecmp(servicename, sshd_service_name, sizeof(sshd_service_name) - 1);
-         if (sshd_service == 0 && ssh_user_auth != NULL) {
--            pamsshagentauth_verbose("Got SSH_AUTH_INFO_0: `%.20s...'", ssh_user_auth);
-+            verbose("Got SSH_AUTH_INFO_0: `%.20s...'", ssh_user_auth);
-             if (userauth_pubkey_from_pam(ruser, ssh_user_auth) > 0) {
-                 retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
--                pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated (sshd): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
-+                logit("Authenticated (sshd): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
-                 goto cleanexit;
-             }
-         }
-@@ -208,13 +208,13 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
-          * this pw_uid is used to validate the SSH_AUTH_SOCK, and so must be the uid of the ruser invoking the program, not the target-user
-          */
-         if(pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(user, ruser, servicename)) { /* getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid)) { */
--            pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated (agent): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
-+            logit("Authenticated (agent): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
-             retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
-         } else {
--            pamsshagentauth_logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
-+            logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
-         }
-     } else {
--        pamsshagentauth_logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" );
-+        logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" );
-     }
- 
- cleanexit:
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -66,8 +66,8 @@
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "match.h"
- #include "log.h"
--#include "buffer.h"
--#include "key.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
- #include "misc.h"
- 
- #include "xmalloc.h"
-@@ -77,7 +77,6 @@
- #include "pathnames.h"
- #include "secure_filename.h"
- 
--#include "identity.h"
- #include "pam_user_key_allowed2.h"
- 
- extern char *authorized_keys_file;
-@@ -117,12 +116,12 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
-         } else {
-             slash_ptr = strchr(auth_keys_file_buf, '/');
-             if(!slash_ptr)
--                pamsshagentauth_fatal
-+                fatal
-                     ("cannot expand tilde in path without a `/'");
- 
-             owner_uname_len = slash_ptr - auth_keys_file_buf - 1;
-             if(owner_uname_len > (sizeof(owner_uname) - 1))
--                pamsshagentauth_fatal("Username too long");
-+                fatal("Username too long");
- 
-             strncat(owner_uname, auth_keys_file_buf + 1, owner_uname_len);
-             if(!authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid)
-@@ -130,11 +129,11 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
-                     getpwnam(owner_uname)->pw_uid;
-         }
-         authorized_keys_file =
--            pamsshagentauth_tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf,
-+            tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf,
-                                                   authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid);
-         strncpy(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file,
-                 sizeof(auth_keys_file_buf) - 1);
--        pamsshagentauth_xfree(authorized_keys_file)        /* when we
-+        free(authorized_keys_file)        /* when we
-                                                               percent_expand
-                                                               later, we'd step
-                                                               on this, so free
-@@ -150,13 +149,13 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
-     strncat(hostname, fqdn, strcspn(fqdn, "."));
- #endif
-     authorized_keys_file =
--        pamsshagentauth_percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h",
-+        percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h",
-                                        getpwnam(user)->pw_dir, "H", hostname,
-                                        "f", fqdn, "u", user, NULL);
- }
- 
- int
--pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, Key * key)
-+pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, struct sshkey * key)
- {
-     return
-         pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid),
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
- #define _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H
- 
- #include "identity.h"
--int pam_user_key_allowed(const char *, Key *);
-+int pam_user_key_allowed(const char *, struct sshkey *);
- void parse_authorized_key_file(const char *, const char *);
- 
- #endif
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -45,44 +45,46 @@
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "ssh.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
--#include "buffer.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
- #include "log.h"
- #include "compat.h"
--#include "key.h"
-+#include "digest.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
- #include "pathnames.h"
- #include "misc.h"
- #include "secure_filename.h"
- #include "uidswap.h"
--
--#include "identity.h"
-+#include <unistd.h>
- 
- /* return 1 if user allows given key */
- /* Modified slightly from original found in auth2-pubkey.c */
- static int
--pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE * f, char *file, Key * key)
-+pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE * f, char *file, struct sshkey * key)
- {
--    char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
-+    char *line = NULL;
-     int found_key = 0;
-     u_long linenum = 0;
--    Key *found;
-+    struct sshkey *found;
-     char *fp;
-+    size_t linesize = 0;
- 
-     found_key = 0;
--    found = pamsshagentauth_key_new(key->type);
-+    found = sshkey_new(key->type);
- 
--    while(read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
-+    while ((getline(&line, &linesize, f)) != -1) {
-         char *cp = NULL; /* *key_options = NULL; */
- 
-+        linenum++;
-         /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
-         for(cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++);
-         if(!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
-             continue;
- 
--        if(pamsshagentauth_key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
-+        if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
-             /* no key? check if there are options for this key */
-             int quoted = 0;
- 
--            pamsshagentauth_verbose("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
-+            verbose("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
-             /* key_options = cp; */
-             for(; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
-                 if(*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
-@@ -92,26 +94,27 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE
-             }
-             /* Skip remaining whitespace. */
-             for(; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++);
--            if(pamsshagentauth_key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
--                pamsshagentauth_verbose("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
-+            if(sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
-+                verbose("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
-                 /* still no key? advance to next line */
-                 continue;
-             }
-         }
--        if(pamsshagentauth_key_equal(found, key)) {
-+        if(sshkey_equal(found, key)) {
-             found_key = 1;
--            pamsshagentauth_logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file,
-+            logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file,
-                                   linenum);
--            fp = pamsshagentauth_key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
--            pamsshagentauth_logit("Found matching %s key: %s",
--                                  pamsshagentauth_key_type(found), fp);
--            pamsshagentauth_xfree(fp);
-+            fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
-+            logit("Found matching %s key: %s",
-+                                  sshkey_type(found), fp);
-+            free(fp);
-             break;
-         }
-     }
--    pamsshagentauth_key_free(found);
-+    free(line);
-+    sshkey_free(found);
-     if(!found_key)
--        pamsshagentauth_verbose("key not found");
-+        verbose("key not found");
-     return found_key;
- }
- 
-@@ -120,19 +123,19 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE
-  * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
-  */
- int
--pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key * key, char *file)
-+pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey * key, char *file)
- {
-     FILE *f;
-     int found_key = 0;
-     struct stat st;
--    char buf[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
-+    char buf[256];
- 
-     /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
--    pamsshagentauth_verbose("trying public key file %s", file);
-+    verbose("trying public key file %s", file);
- 
-     /* Fail not so quietly if file does not exist */
-     if(stat(file, &st) < 0) {
--        pamsshagentauth_verbose("File not found: %s", file);
-+        verbose("File not found: %s", file);
-         return 0;
-     }
- 
-@@ -144,7 +147,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct
- 
-     if(pamsshagentauth_secure_filename(f, file, pw, buf, sizeof(buf)) != 0) {
-         fclose(f);
--        pamsshagentauth_logit("Authentication refused: %s", buf);
-+        logit("Authentication refused: %s", buf);
-         return 0;
-     }
- 
-@@ -160,7 +163,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct
- int
- pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *authorized_keys_command,
-                           char *authorized_keys_command_user,
--                          struct passwd *user_pw, Key * key)
-+                          struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey * key)
- {
-     FILE *f;
-     int ok, found_key = 0;
-@@ -187,44 +190,44 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
-     else {
-         pw = getpwnam(authorized_keys_command_user);
-         if(pw == NULL) {
--            pamsshagentauth_logerror("authorized_keys_command_user \"%s\" not found: %s",
-+            error("authorized_keys_command_user \"%s\" not found: %s",
-                  authorized_keys_command_user, strerror(errno));
-             return 0;
-         }
-     }
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-+    temporarily_use_uid(pw);
- 
-     if(stat(authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) {
--        pamsshagentauth_logerror
-+        error
-             ("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s",
-              authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
-         goto out;
-     }
-     if(pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path
-        (authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
--        pamsshagentauth_logerror("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
-+        error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
-         goto out;
-     }
- 
-     /* open the pipe and read the keys */
-     if(pipe(p) != 0) {
--        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+        error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-         goto out;
-     }
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_debug("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\" with argument: \"%s\"",
-+    debug("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\" with argument: \"%s\"",
-                           authorized_keys_command, pw->pw_name, username);
- 
-     /* 
-      * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
-      * run cleanup_exit() code.
-      */
--    pamsshagentauth_restore_uid();
-+    restore_uid();
- 
-     switch ((pid = fork())) {
-     case -1:                                              /* error */
--        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+        error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-         close(p[0]);
-         close(p[1]);
-         return 0;
-@@ -234,13 +237,13 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
- 
-         /* do this before the setresuid so thta they can be logged */
-         if((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
--            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
-+            error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
-                                      strerror(errno));
-             _exit(1);
-         }
-         if(dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1
-            || dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
--            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+            error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-             _exit(1);
-         }
- #if defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETRESGID)
-@@ -248,7 +251,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
- #else
-         if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) != 0 || setegid(pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
- #endif
--            pamsshagentauth_logerror("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid,
-+            error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid,
-                                      strerror(errno));
-             _exit(1);
-         }
-@@ -258,7 +261,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
- #else
-         if (setuid(pw->pw_uid) != 0 || seteuid(pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
- #endif
--            pamsshagentauth_logerror("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid,
-+            error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid,
-                                      strerror(errno));
-             _exit(1);
-         }
-@@ -270,18 +273,18 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
- 
-         /* pretty sure this will barf because we are now suid, but since we
-            should't reach this anyway, I'll leave it here */
--        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
-+        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
-                                  authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
-         _exit(127);
-     default:                                              /* parent */
-         break;
-     }
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-+    temporarily_use_uid(pw);
- 
-     close(p[1]);
-     if((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
--        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+        error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-         close(p[0]);
-         /* Don't leave zombie child */
-         while(waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR);
-@@ -292,22 +295,22 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
- 
-     while(waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
-         if(errno != EINTR) {
--            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,
-+            error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,
-                                      strerror(errno));
-             goto out;
-         }
-     }
-     if(WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
--        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
-+        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
-                                  authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status));
-         goto out;
-     } else if(WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
--        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
-+        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
-                                  authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status));
-         goto out;
-     }
-     found_key = ok;
-   out:
--    pamsshagentauth_restore_uid();
-+    restore_uid();
-     return found_key;
- }
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
- #define _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H
- 
- #include "identity.h"
--int pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *, Key *, char *);
--int pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *, char *, struct passwd *, Key *);
-+int pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, char *);
-+int pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *, char *, struct passwd *, struct sshkey *);
- 
- #endif
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -53,8 +53,8 @@
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "match.h"
- #include "log.h"
--#include "buffer.h"
--#include "key.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
- #include "misc.h"
- 
- 
-@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
- 	int comparehome = 0;
- 	struct stat st;
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_verbose("auth_secure_filename: checking for uid: %u", uid);
-+    verbose("auth_secure_filename: checking for uid: %u", uid);
- 
- 	if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
- 		snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
-@@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
- 			snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
- 			return -1;
- 		}
--		pamsshagentauth_strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
-+		strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
- 
--		pamsshagentauth_verbose("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
-+		verbose("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
- 		if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
- 		    (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
- 		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
-@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
- 
- 		/* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */
- 		if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) {
--			pamsshagentauth_verbose("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
-+			verbose("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
- 			    buf);
- 			break;
- 		}
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -37,10 +37,11 @@
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "ssh.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
--#include "buffer.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
- #include "log.h"
- #include "compat.h"
--#include "key.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
-+#include "ssherr.h"
- #include "pathnames.h"
- #include "misc.h"
- #include "secure_filename.h"
-@@ -48,54 +49,59 @@
- #include "identity.h"
- #include "pam_user_authorized_keys.h"
- 
-+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST          54
-+
- /* extern u_char  *session_id2;
- extern uint8_t  session_id_len;
-  */
- 
- int
--userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruser, Identity * id, Buffer * session_id2)
-+userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruser, Identity * id, struct sshbuf * session_id2)
- {
--    Buffer          b = { 0 };
-+    struct sshbuf  *b = NULL;
-     char           *pkalg = NULL;
-     u_char         *pkblob = NULL, *sig = NULL;
--    u_int           blen = 0, slen = 0;
--    int             authenticated = 0;
-+    size_t          blen = 0, slen = 0;
-+    int             r, authenticated = 0;
- 
--    pkalg = (char *) key_ssh_name(id->key);
-+    pkalg = (char *) sshkey_ssh_name(id->key);
- 
-     /* first test if this key is even allowed */
-     if(! pam_user_key_allowed(ruser, id->key))
--        goto user_auth_clean_exit;
-+        goto user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer;
- 
--    if(pamsshagentauth_key_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) == 0)
--        goto user_auth_clean_exit;
-+    if(sshkey_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) != 0)
-+        goto user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer;
- 
-     /* construct packet to sign and test */
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&b);
-+    if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+        fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2->buf + session_id2->offset, session_id2->end - session_id2->offset);
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST); 
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, ruser);
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, "pam_ssh_agent_auth");
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&b, 1);
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
-+    if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, sshbuf_ptr(session_id2), sshbuf_len(session_id2))) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, ruser)) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "pam_ssh_agent_auth")) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "publickey")) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 1)) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, pkalg)) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
-+        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- 
--    if(ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, pamsshagentauth_buffer_ptr(&b), pamsshagentauth_buffer_len(&b)) != 0)
-+    if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)) != 0)
-         goto user_auth_clean_exit;
- 
-     /* test for correct signature */
--    if(pamsshagentauth_key_verify(id->key, sig, slen, pamsshagentauth_buffer_ptr(&b), pamsshagentauth_buffer_len(&b)) == 1)
-+    if (sshkey_verify(id->key, sig, slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0, NULL) == 0)
-         authenticated = 1;
- 
-   user_auth_clean_exit:
-     /* if(&b != NULL) */
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&b);
-+    sshbuf_free(b);
-+  user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer:
-     if(sig != NULL)
--        pamsshagentauth_xfree(sig);
-+        free(sig);
-     if(pkblob != NULL)
--        pamsshagentauth_xfree(pkblob);
-+        free(pkblob);
-     CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
-     return authenticated;
- }
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
- #ifndef _USERAUTH_PUBKEY_FROM_ID_H
- #define _USERAUTH_PUBKEY_FROM_ID_H
- 
--#include <identity.h>
--int userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *, Identity *, Buffer *);
-+#include "identity.h"
-+int userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *, Identity *, struct sshbuf *);
- 
- #endif
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_uudecode(const char *src
- 	/* and remove trailing whitespace because __b64_pton needs this */
- 	*p = '\0';
- 	len = pamsshagentauth___b64_pton(encoded, target, targsize);
--	pamsshagentauth_xfree(encoded);
-+	xfree(encoded);
- 	return len;
- }
- 
-@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_dump_base64(FILE *fp, co
- 		fprintf(fp, "dump_base64: len > 65536\n");
- 		return;
- 	}
--	buf = pamsshagentauth_xmalloc(2*len);
-+	buf = malloc(2*len);
- 	n = pamsshagentauth_uuencode(data, len, buf, 2*len);
- 	for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
- 		fprintf(fp, "%c", buf[i]);
-@@ -79,5 +79,5 @@ pamsshagentauth_dump_base64(FILE *fp, co
- 	}
- 	if (i % 70 != 69)
- 		fprintf(fp, "\n");
--	pamsshagentauth_xfree(buf);
-+	free(buf);
- }
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_pam.c.compat	2020-09-23 11:32:30.783695267 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_pam.c	2020-09-23 11:33:21.383389036 +0200
-@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@
- #include <string.h>
- 
- #include "defines.h"
--#include "key.h"
-+#include <includes.h>
-+#include "sshkey.h"
- #include "log.h"
- 
- #include "pam_user_authorized_keys.h"
-@@ -42,28 +42,28 @@
-     int authenticated = 0;
-     const char method[] = "publickey ";
- 
--    char* ai = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup(ssh_auth_info);
-+    char* ai = xstrdup(ssh_auth_info);
-     char* saveptr;
- 
-     char* auth_line = strtok_r(ai, "\n", &saveptr);
-     while (auth_line != NULL) {
-         if (strncmp(auth_line, method, sizeof(method) - 1) == 0) {
-             char* key_str = auth_line + sizeof(method) - 1;
--            Key* key = pamsshagentauth_key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
-+            struct sshkey* key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
-             if (key == NULL) {
-                 continue;
-             }
--            int r = pamsshagentauth_key_read(key, &key_str);
-+            int r = sshkey_read(key, &key_str);
-             if (r == 1) {
-                 if (pam_user_key_allowed(ruser, key)) {
-                     authenticated = 1;
--                    pamsshagentauth_key_free(key);
-+                    sshkey_free(key);
-                     break;
-                 }
-             } else {
--                pamsshagentauth_verbose("Failed to create key for %s: %d", auth_line, r);
-+                verbose("Failed to create key for %s: %d", auth_line, r);
-             }
--            pamsshagentauth_key_free(key);
-+            sshkey_free(key);
-         }
-         auth_line = strtok_r(NULL, "\n", &saveptr);
-     }

pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-dereference.patch

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
---- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
-+++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
-@@ -158,11 +158,12 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *user,
- int
- pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, struct sshkey * key)
- {
-+    struct passwd *pw;
-     return
--        pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid),
--                                          key, authorized_keys_file)
--        || pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(0), key,
--                                             authorized_keys_file)
-+        ( (pw = getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid)) &&
-+            pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(pw, key, authorized_keys_file))
-+        || ((pw = getpwuid(0)) &&
-+            pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(pw, key, authorized_keys_file))
-         || pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(authorized_keys_command,
-                                                      authorized_keys_command_user,
-                                                      getpwnam(ruser), key);

pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-seteuid.patch

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-seteuid openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-seteuid	2017-02-07 15:41:53.172334151 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2017-02-07 15:41:53.174334149 +0100
-@@ -238,17 +238,26 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(ui
- 	}
- 
- 	errno = 0; 
--	seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
--	             above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
--	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
-+	/* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
-+	   above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
-+	if (seteuid(uid) == -1) {
- 		close(sock);
--        if(errno == EACCES)
--		fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
-+		error("seteuid(%lu) failed with error: %s",
-+		    (unsigned long) uid, strerror(errno));
- 		return -1;
- 	}
-+	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
-+		close(sock);
-+		sock = -1;
-+		if(errno == EACCES)
-+			fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
-+	}
- 
--	seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
--
-+	/* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
-+	if (0 != seteuid(0)) {
-+		fatal("setuid(0) failed with error: %s", strerror(errno));
-+		return -1;
-+	}
- 	return sock;
- }
- 

pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-seteuid.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.seteuid pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
+--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.seteuid	2010-09-08 08:54:29.000000000 +0200
++++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2010-11-22 08:38:05.000000000 +0100
+@@ -131,13 +131,18 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(ui
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	errno = 0; 
+-	seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
+-	             above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
++	/* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
++	   above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
++	if (seteuid(uid) == -1) {
++		close(sock);
++		error("seteuid(%lu) failed", (unsigned long) uid);
++		return -1;
++	}
+ 	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
+ 		close(sock);
+-        if(errno == EACCES)
+-		fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
+-		return -1;
++		sock = -1;
++		if(errno == EACCES)
++			fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */

pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-visibility openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
---- openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-visibility	2014-03-31 19:35:17.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c	2016-01-22 15:22:40.984469774 +0100
-@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ char           *__progname;
+diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.visibility pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
+--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.visibility	2009-12-21 20:57:34.000000000 +0100
++++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c	2012-06-21 20:01:31.356259429 +0200
+@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ char           *__progname;
  extern char    *__progname;
  #endif
  
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-visib
  pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
  {
      char          **argv_ptr;
-@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ cleanexit:
+@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
  }
  
  
@@ -18,4 +18,4 @@ diff -up openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-visib
 +PAM_EXTERN int __attribute__ ((visibility ("default")))
  pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
  {
-     UNUSED(pamh);
+     return PAM_SUCCESS;

pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-agent_structure.patch

@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-agent	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h	2017-09-27 14:25:49.421739027 +0200
-@@ -38,6 +38,12 @@
- typedef struct identity Identity;
- typedef struct idlist Idlist;
- 
-+typedef struct {
-+       int     fd;
-+       struct sshbuf *identities;
-+       int     howmany;
-+}      AuthenticationConnection;
-+
- struct identity {
-     TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
-     AuthenticationConnection *ac;   /* set if agent supports key */
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-agent	2017-09-27 14:25:49.420739021 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2017-09-27 14:25:49.421739027 +0200
-@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
- #include "sshbuf.h"
- #include "sshkey.h"
- #include "authfd.h"
-+#include "ssherr.h"
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include "ssh2.h"
-@@ -291,36 +292,43 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
- {
-     struct sshbuf *session_id2 = NULL;
-     Identity *id;
--    struct sshkey *key;
-     AuthenticationConnection *ac;
--    char *comment;
-     uint8_t retval = 0;
-     uid_t uid = getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid;
-+    struct ssh_identitylist *idlist;
-+    int r;
-+    unsigned int i;
- 
-     OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
-     pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
- 
-     if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
-         verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
--        for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) 
--        {
--            if(key != NULL) {
-+        if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(ac->fd, &idlist)) != 0) {
-+            if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES)
-+               fprintf(stderr, "error fetching identities for "
-+                               "protocol %d: %s\n", 2, ssh_err(r));
-+        } else {
-+            for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++)
-+            {
-+              if (idlist->keys[i] != NULL) {
-                 id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
--                id->key = key;
--                id->filename = comment;
-+                id->key = idlist->keys[i];
-+                id->filename = idlist->comments[i];
-                 id->ac = ac;
-                 if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, session_id2)) {
-                     retval = 1;
-                 }
--                free(id->filename);
--                key_free(id->key);
-                 free(id);
-                 if(retval == 1)
-                     break;
--            }
--        }
-+              }
-+            }
--        sshbuf_free(session_id2);
--        ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
-+            sshbuf_free(session_id2);
-+            ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
-+        }
-+        ssh_close_authentication_socket(ac->fd);
-+        free(ac);
-     }
-     else {
-         verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-agent	2017-09-27 14:25:49.420739021 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c	2017-09-27 14:25:49.422739032 +0200
-@@ -84,7 +85,7 @@ userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruse
-         (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
-         fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- 
--    if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)) != 0)
-+    if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac->fd, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0) != 0)
-         goto user_auth_clean_exit;
- 
-     /* test for correct signature */

pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch

@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2017-02-07 14:29:41.626116675 +0100
-@@ -43,12 +43,31 @@
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include "ssh2.h"
- #include "misc.h"
+diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
+--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build	2010-01-13 03:17:01.000000000 +0100
++++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2012-06-21 20:14:56.432527764 +0200
+@@ -37,7 +37,16 @@
+ #include "buffer.h"
+ #include "key.h"
+ #include "authfd.h"
 +#include "ssh.h"
+ #include <stdio.h>
 +#include <sys/types.h>
 +#include <sys/stat.h>
 +#include <sys/socket.h>
@@ -14,11 +15,12 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-b
 +#include <stdlib.h>
 +#include <errno.h>
 +#include <fcntl.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
  
  #include "userauth_pubkey_from_id.h"
- #include "identity.h"
- #include "get_command_line.h"
- extern char **environ;
+@@ -69,6 +78,96 @@ session_id2_gen()
+     return cookie;
+ }
  
 +/* 
 + * Added by Jamie Beverly, ensure socket fd points to a socket owned by the user 
@@ -30,31 +32,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-b
 + * race condition; so a more "direct" log message is generated.
 + */
 +
- static char *
- log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
- {
-@@ -85,7 +104,7 @@ void
- pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * session_id2, const char * user,
-                                 const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
- {
--    char *cookie = NULL;
-+    u_char *cookie = NULL;
-     uint8_t i = 0;
-     uint32_t rnd = 0;
-     uint8_t cookie_len;
-@@ -112,7 +131,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
-         if (i % 4 == 0) {
-             rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
-         }
--        cookie[i] = (char) rnd;
-+        cookie[i] = (u_char) rnd;
-         rnd >>= 8;
-     }
- 
-@@ -177,6 +196,86 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
- }
- 
- int
++int
 +ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(uid_t uid)
 +{
 +	const char *authsocket;
@@ -134,54 +112,56 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-b
 +	return auth;
 +}
 +
-+int
- pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(const char * user, const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
+ int
+ find_authorized_keys(uid_t uid)
  {
-     Buffer session_id2 = { 0 };
-@@ -190,7 +289,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
+@@ -81,7 +180,7 @@ find_authorized_keys(uid_t uid)
      OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
-     pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
+     session_id2 = session_id2_gen();
  
 -    if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection(uid))) {
 +    if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
-         pamsshagentauth_verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
+         verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", getpwuid(uid)->pw_name, uid);
          for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) 
          {
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in
---- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in	2017-02-07 14:40:14.407566921 +0100
-@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ PATHS=
+@@ -109,3 +208,4 @@ find_authorized_keys(uid_t uid)
+     EVP_cleanup();
+     return retval;
+ }
++
+diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/Makefile.in
+--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build	2009-10-27 21:19:41.000000000 +0100
++++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/Makefile.in	2012-06-21 20:14:56.432527764 +0200
+@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ PATHS=
  CC=@CC@
  LD=@LD@
  CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
 -CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
-+CPPFLAGS=-I.. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
++CPPFLAGS=-I.. -I$(srcdir) -I/usr/include/nss3 -I/usr/include/nspr4 @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
  LIBS=@LIBS@
  AR=@AR@
  AWK=@AWK@
-@@ -61,8 +61,8 @@ INSTALL=@INSTALL@
+@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ INSTALL=@INSTALL@
  PERL=@PERL@
  SED=@SED@
  ENT=@ENT@
 -LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
--LDFLAGS_SHARED = @LDFLAGS_SHARED@
 +LDFLAGS=-L.. -L../openbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
-+LDFLAGS_SHARED =-Wl,-z,defs @LDFLAGS_SHARED@
+ LDFLAGS_SHARED = @LDFLAGS_SHARED@
  EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
  
- INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS=@INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS@
-@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ SSHOBJS=xmalloc.o atomicio.o authfd.o bu
+@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ PAM_MODULES=pam_ssh_agent_auth.so
  
- ED25519OBJS=ed25519-donna/ed25519.o
+ SSHOBJS=xmalloc.o atomicio.o authfd.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o cleanup.o entropy.o fatal.o key.o log.o misc.o secure_filename.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o uuencode.o compat.o
  
--PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o get_command_line.o userauth_pubkey_from_pam.o
-+PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o get_command_line.o userauth_pubkey_from_pam.o secure_filename.o
+-PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o
++PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o secure_filename.o
  
  
  MANPAGES_IN	= pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod
-@@ -94,13 +94,13 @@ $(PAM_MODULES): Makefile.in config.h
+@@ -67,13 +67,13 @@ $(PAM_MODULES): Makefile.in config.h
  .c.o:
- 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
+ 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
  
 -LIBCOMPAT=openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
 +LIBCOMPAT=../openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
@@ -189,10 +169,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build openssh-
  	(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE))
  always:
  
--pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHOBJS) $(ED25519OBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS)  pam_ssh_agent_auth.o
--	$(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(ED25519OBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lopenbsd-compat pam_ssh_agent_auth.o $(LIBS) -lpam
-+pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS)  pam_ssh_agent_auth.o ../uidswap.o ../ssh-sk-client.o
-+	$(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) ../ssh-sk-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat pam_ssh_agent_auth.o ../uidswap.o $(LIBS) -lpam
+-pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHOBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS)  pam_ssh_agent_auth.o
+-	$(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -lpam pam_ssh_agent_auth.o
++pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS)  pam_ssh_agent_auth.o
++	$(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -lpam -lnss3 pam_ssh_agent_auth.o
  
  $(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
- 	pod2man --section=8 --release=v0.10.3 --name=pam_ssh_agent_auth --official --center "PAM" pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod > pam_ssh_agent_auth.8
+ 	pod2man --section=8 --release=v0.8 --name=pam_ssh_agent_auth --official --center "PAM" pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod > pam_ssh_agent_auth.8
+diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-build pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c