dist-git conversion

Fix typo that causes a failure to update the common directory. (releng
#2781)
2010-07-29 05:17:21 +00:00 · 2009-11-26 01:24:55 +00:00 · 2009-09-21 08:46:55 +00:00 · 2009-06-30 11:14:25 +00:00 · 2009-06-23 18:21:38 +00:00 · 2009-04-15 05:34:20 +00:00
101 changed files with 4449 additions and 21251 deletions
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@ -1,47 +1 @@
-openssh-5.5p1-noacss.tar.bz2
-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2.tar.bz2
-/openssh-5.6p1-noacss.tar.bz2
-/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2.tar.bz2
-/openssh-5.8p1-noacss.tar.bz2
-/openssh-5.8p2-noacss.tar.bz2
-/openssh-5.9p1-noacss.tar.bz2
-/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.tar.bz2
-/openssh-6.0p1-noacss.tar.bz2
-/openssh-6.1p1-noacss.tar.bz2
-/openssh-6.2p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-6.2p2.tar.gz
-/openssh-6.3p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-6.4p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-6.6p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-6.7p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-6.8p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-6.9p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-7.0p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-7.1p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-7.1p2.tar.gz
-/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2.tar.bz2
-/openssh-7.2p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-7.2p2.tar.gz
-/openssh-7.3p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-7.4p1.tar.gz
-/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3.tar.bz2
-/openssh-7.5p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-7.6p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-7.7p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-7.7p1.tar.gz.asc
-/DJM-GPG-KEY.gpg
-/openssh-7.8p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-7.8p1.tar.gz.asc
-/openssh-7.9p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-7.9p1.tar.gz.asc
-/openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz.asc
-/openssh-8.1p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-8.1p1.tar.gz.asc
-/openssh-8.2p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-8.2p1.tar.gz.asc
-/openssh-8.3p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-8.3p1.tar.gz.asc
-/openssh-8.4p1.tar.gz
-/openssh-8.4p1.tar.gz.asc
-/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4.tar.gz
+openssh-5.2p1-noacss.tar.bz2
--- a/openssh-3.8.1p1-krb5-config.patch
+++ b/openssh-3.8.1p1-krb5-config.patch
@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+Search the path for krb5-config if the prefix wasn't specified.
+--- openssh-3.8p1/configure.ac	2004-02-26 21:17:12.000000000 -0500
+++ openssh-3.8p1/configure.ac	2004-02-26 21:17:06.000000000 -0500
+@@ -2077,8 +2077,10 @@
+ 		KRB5_MSG="yes"
+ 
+ 		AC_MSG_CHECKING(for krb5-config)
+-		if test -x  $KRB5ROOT/bin/krb5-config ; then
+-			KRB5CONF=$KRB5ROOT/bin/krb5-config
+		AC_PATH_PROG([KRB5CONF],[krb5-config],
+			     [$KRB5ROOT/bin/krb5-config],
+			     [$KRB5ROOT/bin:$PATH])
+		if test -x $KRB5CONF ; then
+ 			AC_MSG_RESULT($KRB5CONF)
+ 
+ 			AC_MSG_CHECKING(for gssapi support)
--- a/openssh-3.9p1-askpass-keep-above.patch
+++ b/openssh-3.9p1-askpass-keep-above.patch
@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+--- openssh-3.9p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.keep-above	2003-11-21 13:48:56.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-3.9p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2005-02-08 08:44:02.099739294 +0100
+@@ -119,6 +119,8 @@
+ 	g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "activate",
+ 			 G_CALLBACK(ok_dialog), dialog);
+ 
+	gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
+
+ 	/* Grab focus */
+ 	gtk_widget_show_now(dialog);
+ 	if (grab_pointer) {
--- a/openssh-3.9p1.tar.gz.sig
+++ b/openssh-3.9p1.tar.gz.sig
@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+Version: GnuPG v1.2.2 (OpenBSD)
+
+iD8DBQBBIgAxzo7LA4b/nEgRArlqAJ0UhIfcfbz+oAxn8AsiOeHBVMwFXwCgkXcX
+hxmfq8nv/+hpiid1j9lAUx8=
+=P4zN
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
--- a/openssh-4.0p1-exit-deadlock.patch
+++ b/openssh-4.0p1-exit-deadlock.patch
@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+--- openssh-4.0p1/channels.c.exit-deadlock	2005-03-01 11:24:33.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-4.0p1/channels.c	2005-04-05 22:25:15.197226237 +0200
+@@ -1403,6 +1403,10 @@
+ 	u_int dlen;
+ 	int len;
+ 
+	if(c->wfd != -1 && buffer_len(&c->output) > 0 && c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
+		debug("channel %d: forcing write", c->self);
+		FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset);
+	}
+ 	/* Send buffered output data to the socket. */
+ 	if (c->wfd != -1 &&
+ 	    FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) &&
--- a/openssh-4.3p1-fromto-remote.patch
+++ b/openssh-4.3p1-fromto-remote.patch
@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+--- openssh-4.3p2/scp.c.fromto-remote	2006-01-31 12:11:38.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-4.3p2/scp.c	2006-04-14 10:09:56.000000000 +0200
+@@ -446,7 +446,11 @@
+ 				addargs(&alist, "-v");
+ 			addargs(&alist, "-x");
+ 			addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings yes");
+-			addargs(&alist, "-n");
+			if (isatty(fileno(stdin))) {
+				addargs(&alist, "-t");
+			} else {
+				addargs(&alist, "-n");
+			}
+ 
+ 			*src++ = 0;
+ 			if (*src == 0)
--- a/openssh-4.3p2-allow-ip-opts.patch
+++ b/openssh-4.3p2-allow-ip-opts.patch
@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+From: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
+Subject: OpenSSH: fix option handling on incoming connections
+
+OpenSSH rejects incoming connections if any IP options are present when the
+comments state that they are only concerned with source routing options.  This
+connection rejection causes problems with CIPSO which uses IP options to tag
+packets with security attributes.
+
+This patch modifies the check_ip_options() function to only fail if loose or
+strict source routing options are present, all other options are allowed.
+
+Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
+
+---
+ canohost.c |   23 +++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+Index: openssh-4.3p2/canohost.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-4.3p2.orig/canohost.c
+++ openssh-4.3p2/canohost.c
+@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ check_ip_options(int sock, char *ipaddr)
+ 	u_int i;
+ 	int ipproto;
+ 	struct protoent *ip;
+	u_int opt_iter;
+ 
+ 	if ((ip = getprotobyname("ip")) != NULL)
+ 		ipproto = ip->p_proto;
+@@ -154,13 +155,23 @@ check_ip_options(int sock, char *ipaddr)
+ 	option_size = sizeof(options);
+ 	if (getsockopt(sock, ipproto, IP_OPTIONS, options,
+ 	    &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
+-		text[0] = '\0';
+-		for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
+-			snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
+-			    " %2.2x", options[i]);
+-		fatal("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s",
+-		    ipaddr, text);
+		opt_iter = 0;
+		do {
+			/* Fail, fatally, if we detect either loose or strict
+			 * source routing options. */
+			if (options[opt_iter] == 131 ||
+			    options[opt_iter] == 137)
+				goto fail;
+			opt_iter += options[opt_iter + 1] + 2;
+		} while (opt_iter < option_size);
+ 	}
+	return;
+
+fail:
+	text[0] = '\0';
+	for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
+		snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3, " %2.2x", options[i]);
+	fatal("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s", ipaddr, text);
+ #endif /* IP_OPTIONS */
+ }
+ 
--- a/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
+++ b/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info	2016-12-23 13:31:22.645213115 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2016-12-23 13:31:40.997216691 +0100
-@@ -65,9 +65,12 @@ report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_wi
- 	err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
+--- openssh-4.3p2/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info	2006-07-17 15:10:11.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-4.3p2/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2006-07-17 15:25:04.000000000 +0200
+@@ -65,9 +65,12 @@
+ 	err = gtk_message_dialog_new(NULL, 0,
 				     GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR,
 				     GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
 -				     "Could not grab %s. "
@ -15,5 +14,5 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info openssh-7.4p1/cont
 +				     "Either close the application which grabs the %s or "
 +				     "log out and log in again to prevent this from happening.", what, what);
 	gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
- 
- 	gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(err));
+ 	gtk_label_set_line_wrap(GTK_LABEL((GTK_MESSAGE_DIALOG(err))->label),
+ 				TRUE);
--- a/openssh-4.3p2-cve-2007-3102.patch
+++ b/openssh-4.3p2-cve-2007-3102.patch
@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+--- openssh-4.3p2/loginrec.c.inject-fix	2007-06-20 21:18:00.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-4.3p2/loginrec.c	2007-07-13 15:25:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -1389,11 +1389,44 @@
+ #endif /* USE_WTMPX */
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
+static void
+_audit_hexscape(const char *what, char *where, unsigned int size)
+{
+	const char *ptr = what;
+	const char *hex = "0123456789ABCDEF";
+
+	while (*ptr) {
+		if (*ptr == '"' || *ptr < 0x21 || *ptr > 0x7E) {
+			unsigned int i;
+			ptr = what;
+			for (i = 0; *ptr && i+2 < size; i += 2) {
+				where[i] = hex[((unsigned)*ptr & 0xF0)>>4]; /* Upper nibble */
+				where[i+1] = hex[(unsigned)*ptr & 0x0F];   /* Lower nibble */
+				ptr++;
+			}
+			where[i] = '\0';
+			return;
+		}
+		ptr++;
+	}
+	where[0] = '"';
+	if ((unsigned)(ptr - what) < size - 3)
+	{
+		size = ptr - what + 3;
+	}
+	strncpy(where + 1, what, size - 3);
+	where[size-2] = '"';
+	where[size-1] = '\0';
+}
+
+#define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 128
+#define AUDIT_ACCT_SIZE (AUDIT_LOG_SIZE - 8)
+
+ int
+ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username,
+ 	const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success)
+ {
+-	char buf[64];
+	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ 	int audit_fd, rc;
+ 
+ 	audit_fd = audit_open();
+@@ -1406,8 +1439,11 @@
+ 	}
+ 	if (username == NULL)
+ 		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "uid=%d", uid);
+-	else
+-		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "acct=%s", username);
+	else {
+		char encoded[AUDIT_ACCT_SIZE];
+		_audit_hexscape(username, encoded, sizeof(encoded));
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "acct=%s", encoded);
+	}
+ 	rc = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN,
+ 		buf, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
+ 	close(audit_fd);
--- a/openssh-4.3p2-gssapi-canohost.patch
+++ b/openssh-4.3p2-gssapi-canohost.patch
@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+Symptom: intermittent errors on GSSAPI authentication vs 
+machines on DNS loadbalancer, stupid client message "Generic Error",
+server-side debug complains about unknown principal.
+
+Comes from the fact that we resolve the generic DNS name once for
+the connection, then again for getting the GSSAPI/Kerberos service
+ticket. So the service ticket may be for a different host, if
+the DNS alias switches in between the two resolves.
+--- openssh-4.3p2/sshconnect2.c.gss-canohost	2006-11-28 21:58:03.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-4.3p2/sshconnect2.c	2006-11-30 11:33:14.000000000 +0100
+@@ -485,6 +485,7 @@
+ 	static u_int mech = 0;
+ 	OM_uint32 min;
+ 	int ok = 0;
+	const char* remotehost = get_canonical_hostname(1);
+ 
+ 	/* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
+ 	 * once. */
+@@ -497,7 +498,7 @@
+ 		/* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
+ 		if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
+ 		    ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, 
+-		    &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
+		    &gss_supported->elements[mech], remotehost)) {
+ 			ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
+ 		} else {
+ 			mech++;
--- a/openssh-4.3p2-no-v6only.patch
+++ b/openssh-4.3p2-no-v6only.patch
@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+--- openssh-4.3p2/channels.c.no-v6only	2006-07-17 15:39:31.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-4.3p2/channels.c	2006-08-08 12:44:51.000000000 +0200
+@@ -2794,7 +2794,7 @@
+ 				}
+ 			}
+ #ifdef IPV6_V6ONLY
+-			if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) {
+			if (x11_use_localhost && ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) {
+ 				int on = 1;
+ 				if (setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
+ 					error("setsockopt IPV6_V6ONLY: %.100s", strerror(errno));
--- a/openssh-4.7p1-audit.patch
+++ b/openssh-4.7p1-audit.patch
@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/auth.c.audit openssh-4.7p1/auth.c
+--- openssh-4.7p1/auth.c.audit	2007-03-26 18:35:28.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-4.7p1/auth.c	2007-09-06 17:07:44.000000000 +0200
+@@ -286,6 +286,12 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authent
+ 		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh", &loginmsg);
+ # endif
+ #endif
+#if HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
+	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed) {
+		linux_audit_record_event(-1, authctxt->user, NULL,
+			get_remote_ipaddr(), "sshd", 0);
+	}
+#endif
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ 	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed)
+ 		audit_event(audit_classify_auth(method));
+@@ -492,6 +498,10 @@ getpwnamallow(const char *user)
+ 		record_failed_login(user,
+ 		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
+ #endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
+		linux_audit_record_event(-1, user, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(),
+			"sshd", 0);
+#endif
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ 		audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER);
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/loginrec.c.audit openssh-4.7p1/loginrec.c
+--- openssh-4.7p1/loginrec.c.audit	2007-04-29 04:10:58.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-4.7p1/loginrec.c	2007-09-06 17:07:44.000000000 +0200
+@@ -176,6 +176,10 @@
+ #include "auth.h"
+ #include "buffer.h"
+ 
+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
+# include <libaudit.h>
+#endif
+
+ #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+ # include <util.h>
+ #endif
+@@ -202,6 +206,9 @@ int utmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *l
+ int utmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+ int wtmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+ int wtmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
+int linux_audit_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+#endif
+ int lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+ int syslogin_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+ 
+@@ -440,6 +447,10 @@ login_write(struct logininfo *li)
+ 
+ 	/* set the timestamp */
+ 	login_set_current_time(li);
+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
+	if (linux_audit_write_entry(li) == 0)
+		fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+#endif
+ #ifdef USE_LOGIN
+ 	syslogin_write_entry(li);
+ #endif
+@@ -1394,6 +1405,51 @@ wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+ }
+ #endif /* USE_WTMPX */
+ 
+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
+int
+linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username,
+	const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success)
+{
+	char buf[64];
+	int audit_fd, rc;
+
+	audit_fd = audit_open();
+	if (audit_fd < 0) {
+	 	if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
+					errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
+			return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */
+		else
+			return 0; /* Must prevent login */
+	}
+	if (username == NULL)
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "uid=%d", uid);
+	else
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "acct=%s", username);
+	rc = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN,
+		buf, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
+	close(audit_fd);
+	if (rc >= 0)
+		return 1;
+	else
+		return 0;
+}
+
+int
+linux_audit_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	switch(li->type) {
+	case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+		return (linux_audit_record_event(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
+			NULL, li->line, 1));
+	case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+		return (1);	/* We only care about logins */
+	default:
+		logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT */
+
+ /**
+  ** Low-level libutil login() functions
+  **/
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/config.h.in.audit openssh-4.7p1/config.h.in
+--- openssh-4.7p1/config.h.in.audit	2007-09-04 08:50:04.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-4.7p1/config.h.in	2007-09-06 17:07:44.000000000 +0200
+@@ -1334,6 +1334,9 @@
+ /* Define if you want SELinux support. */
+ #undef WITH_SELINUX
+ 
+/* Define if you want Linux audit support. */
+#undef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
+
+ /* Define to 1 if your processor stores words with the most significant byte
+    first (like Motorola and SPARC, unlike Intel and VAX). */
+ #undef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/loginrec.h.audit openssh-4.7p1/loginrec.h
+--- openssh-4.7p1/loginrec.h.audit	2006-08-05 04:39:40.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-4.7p1/loginrec.h	2007-09-06 17:07:44.000000000 +0200
+@@ -127,5 +127,9 @@ char *line_stripname(char *dst, const ch
+ char *line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize);
+ 
+ void record_failed_login(const char *, const char *, const char *);
+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
+int linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username,
+	const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success);
+#endif /* HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT */
+ 
+ #endif /* _HAVE_LOGINREC_H_ */
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/configure.ac.audit openssh-4.7p1/configure.ac
+--- openssh-4.7p1/configure.ac.audit	2007-09-06 17:07:44.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-4.7p1/configure.ac	2007-09-06 17:15:23.000000000 +0200
+@@ -3216,6 +3216,18 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(selinux,
+ 	fi ]
+ )
+ 
+# Check whether user wants Linux audit support
+LINUX_AUDIT_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH(linux-audit,
+	[  --with-linux-audit   Enable Linux audit support],
+	[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT,1,[Define if you want Linux audit support.])
+		LINUX_AUDIT_MSG="yes"
+		AC_CHECK_HEADERS(libaudit.h)
+		SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -laudit"
+	fi ]
+)
+
+ # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
+ KRB5_MSG="no"
+ AC_ARG_WITH(kerberos5,
+@@ -4037,6 +4049,7 @@ echo "                       PAM support
+ echo "                   OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG"
+ echo "                 KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
+ echo "                   SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
+echo "               Linux audit support: $LINUX_AUDIT_MSG"
+ echo "                 Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"
+ echo "                     S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"
+ echo "              TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG"
--- a/openssh-5.0p1-pam_selinux.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.0p1-pam_selinux.patch
@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.0p1/auth-pam.h.pam_selinux openssh-5.0p1/auth-pam.h
+--- openssh-5.0p1/auth-pam.h.pam_selinux	2004-09-11 14:17:26.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.0p1/auth-pam.h	2008-04-30 14:25:28.000000000 +0200
+@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void do_pam_session(void);
+ void do_pam_set_tty(const char *);
+ void do_pam_setcred(int );
+ void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
+-int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
+int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *);
+ char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
+ char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
+ void free_pam_environment(char **);
+diff -up openssh-5.0p1/auth-pam.c.pam_selinux openssh-5.0p1/auth-pam.c
+--- openssh-5.0p1/auth-pam.c.pam_selinux	2008-03-11 12:58:25.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.0p1/auth-pam.c	2008-04-30 14:25:21.000000000 +0200
+@@ -1069,7 +1069,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void)
+  * during the ssh authentication process.
+  */
+ int
+-do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
+do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value)
+ {
+ 	int ret = 1;
+ #ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
+diff -up openssh-5.0p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.pam_selinux openssh-5.0p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+--- openssh-5.0p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.pam_selinux	2008-04-07 22:01:37.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.0p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2008-04-30 14:26:17.000000000 +0200
+@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
+ #include "hostfile.h"
+ #include "auth.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+ 
+ #include <selinux/selinux.h>
+ #include <selinux/flask.h>
+@@ -47,6 +48,7 @@
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+extern ServerOptions options;
+ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+ extern int inetd_flag;
+ extern int rexeced_flag;
+@@ -208,29 +210,38 @@ get_user_context(const char *sename, con
+         return -1;
+ }
+ 
+static void
+ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level)
+{
+	*role = NULL;
+	*level = NULL;
+	if (the_authctxt) {
+		if (the_authctxt->role != NULL) {
+			char *slash;
+			*role = xstrdup(the_authctxt->role);
+			if ((slash = strchr(*role, '/')) != NULL) {
+				*slash = '\0';
+				*level = slash + 1;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+ /* Return the default security context for the given username */
+ static int
+ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+ 	security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc)
+ {
+ 	char *sename, *lvl;
+-	const char *reqlvl = NULL;
+-	char *role = NULL;
+	const char *reqlvl;
+	char *role;
+ 	int r = -1;
+ 	context_t con = NULL;
+ 
+ 	*default_sc = NULL;
+ 	*user_sc = NULL;
+-	if (the_authctxt) {
+-		if (the_authctxt->role != NULL) {
+-			char *slash;
+-			role = xstrdup(the_authctxt->role);
+-			if ((slash = strchr(role, '/')) != NULL) {
+-				*slash = '\0';
+-				reqlvl = slash + 1;
+-			}
+-		}
+-	}
+
+	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+ 	if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) {
+@@ -311,6 +322,36 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+ 	return (r);
+ }
+ 
+/* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
+static int
+ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+{
+	const char *reqlvl;
+	char *role;
+	char *use_current;
+	int rv;
+
+	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+
+	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
+
+	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
+	
+	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+		use_current = "1";
+	} else {
+		use_current = "";
+		rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: "");
+	}
+
+	rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current);
+
+	if (role != NULL)
+		xfree(role);
+	
+	return rv;
+}
+
+ /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
+ void
+ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+@@ -322,6 +363,24 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwn
+ 	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+ 		return;
+ 
+	if (options.use_pam) {
+		/* do not compute context, just setup environment for pam_selinux */
+		if (ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) {
+			switch (security_getenforce()) {
+			case -1:
+				fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+			case 0:
+				error("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
+				    __func__);
+			break;
+			default:
+				fatal("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.",
+				    __func__);
+			}
+		}
+		return;
+	}
+
+ 	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+ 
+ 	r = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
--- a/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2016-12-23 13:31:16.545211926 +0100
+diff -up openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+--- openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress	2008-07-23 19:05:26.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2008-07-23 19:05:26.000000000 +0200
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
+ #include <string.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
- 
 #include <X11/Xlib.h>
 +#include <glib.h>
 #include <gtk/gtk.h>
 #include <gdk/gdkx.h>
- #include <gdk/gdkkeysyms.h>
-@@ -81,14 +82,25 @@ ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dia
- 	return 1;
+ 
+@@ -83,13 +84,24 @@ ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dia
+ 	gtk_dialog_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
 }
 
 +static void
@ -25,59 +25,55 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contr
 +}
 +
 static int
- passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
+ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
 {
 	const char *failed;
 	char *passphrase, *local;
 	int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer;
- 	int buttons, default_response;
-	GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry;
-+	GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry, *progress, *hbox;
+-	GtkWidget *dialog, *entry;
+	GtkWidget *dialog, *entry, *progress, *hbox;
 	GdkGrabStatus status;
- 	GdkColor fg, bg;
- 	int fg_set = 0, bg_set = 0;
-@@ -104,14 +116,19 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
- 		gtk_widget_modify_bg(dialog, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
 
- 	if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY || prompt_type == PROMPT_NONE) {
-+		hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
-+		gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE,
-+		    FALSE, 0);
-+		gtk_widget_show(hbox);
-+
-		entry = gtk_entry_new();
-		if (fg_set)
-			gtk_widget_modify_fg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &fg);
-		if (bg_set)
-			gtk_widget_modify_bg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
-		gtk_box_pack_start(
-		    GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))),
-		    entry, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
-+		    GTK_BOX(hbox), entry, TRUE, FALSE, 0);
-+		gtk_entry_set_width_chars(GTK_ENTRY(entry), 2);
- 		gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
- 		gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
- 		if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY) {
-@@ -130,6 +145,22 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
- 			g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "key_press_event",
- 			                 G_CALLBACK(check_none), dialog);
- 		}
-+
-+		hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
-+		gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox),
-+		    hbox, FALSE, FALSE, 8);
-+		gtk_widget_show(hbox);
-+
-+		progress = gtk_progress_bar_new();
-+
-+		gtk_progress_bar_set_text(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress),
-+		    "Passphrase length hidden intentionally");
-+		gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(hbox), progress, TRUE,
-+		    TRUE, 5);
-+		gtk_widget_show(progress);
-+		g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "changed",
-+				 G_CALLBACK(move_progress), progress);
-+
- 	}
+ 	grab_server = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER") != NULL);
+@@ -102,13 +114,31 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+ 					"%s",
+ 					message);
+ 
+	hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
+	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE,
+	    FALSE, 0);
+	gtk_widget_show(hbox);
+
+ 	entry = gtk_entry_new();
+-	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), entry, FALSE,
+	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(hbox), entry, TRUE,
+ 	    FALSE, 0);
+	gtk_entry_set_width_chars(GTK_ENTRY(entry), 2);
+ 	gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
+ 	gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
+ 	gtk_widget_show(entry);
+ 
+	hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
+	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE,
+	    FALSE, 8);
+	gtk_widget_show(hbox);
+
+	progress = gtk_progress_bar_new();
+	
+	gtk_progress_bar_set_text(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress), "Passphrase length hidden intentionally");
+	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(hbox), progress, TRUE,
+	    TRUE, 5);
+	gtk_widget_show(progress);
+
+ 	gtk_window_set_title(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), "OpenSSH");
+ 	gtk_window_set_position (GTK_WINDOW(dialog), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
+ 	gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
+@@ -119,6 +149,8 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+ 	gtk_dialog_set_default_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
+ 	g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "activate",
+ 			 G_CALLBACK(ok_dialog), dialog);
+	g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "changed",
+			 G_CALLBACK(move_progress), progress);
+ 
+ 	gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
 
- 	/* Grab focus */
--- a/openssh-5.1p1-cloexec.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.1p1-cloexec.patch
@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.1p1/channels.c.cloexec openssh-5.1p1/channels.c
+--- openssh-5.1p1/channels.c.cloexec	2008-12-11 22:24:49.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.1p1/channels.c	2008-12-11 22:29:52.000000000 +0100
+@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
+ #include <termios.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+ 
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+@@ -230,6 +231,18 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd
+ 
+ 	/* XXX set close-on-exec -markus */
+ 
+	if (rfd != -1) {
+		fcntl(rfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+	}
+
+	if (wfd != -1 && wfd != rfd) {
+		fcntl(wfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+	}
+
+	if (efd != -1 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd) {
+		fcntl(efd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+	}
+
+ 	c->rfd = rfd;
+ 	c->wfd = wfd;
+ 	c->sock = (rfd == wfd) ? rfd : -1;
+diff -up openssh-5.1p1/sshconnect2.c.cloexec openssh-5.1p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-5.1p1/sshconnect2.c.cloexec	2008-12-11 22:24:49.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.1p1/sshconnect2.c	2008-12-11 22:24:49.000000000 +0100
+@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+ #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H)
+ #include <vis.h>
+ #endif
+@@ -1267,6 +1268,7 @@ ssh_keysign(Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_i
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 	if (pid == 0) {
+		fcntl(packet_get_connection_in(), F_SETFD, 0); /* keep the socket on exec */
+ 		permanently_drop_suid(getuid());
+ 		close(from[0]);
+ 		if (dup2(from[1], STDOUT_FILENO) < 0)
+diff -up openssh-5.1p1/sshconnect.c.cloexec openssh-5.1p1/sshconnect.c
+--- openssh-5.1p1/sshconnect.c.cloexec	2008-07-02 14:34:30.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.1p1/sshconnect.c	2008-12-11 22:24:49.000000000 +0100
+@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+ 
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "key.h"
+@@ -194,8 +195,11 @@ ssh_create_socket(int privileged, struct
+ 		return sock;
+ 	}
+ 	sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
+-	if (sock < 0)
+	if (sock < 0) {
+ 		error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+ 
+ 	/* Bind the socket to an alternative local IP address */
+ 	if (options.bind_address == NULL)
--- a/openssh-5.1p1-gssapi-role.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.1p1-gssapi-role.patch
@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+Written-by: Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com>
+diff -up openssh-5.1p1/auth2-gss.c.gssapi-role openssh-5.1p1/auth2-gss.c
+--- openssh-5.1p1/auth2-gss.c.gssapi-role	2007-12-02 12:59:45.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.1p1/auth2-gss.c	2008-07-23 19:18:15.000000000 +0200
+@@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ 	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+ 	int authenticated = 0;
+	char *micuser;
+ 	Buffer b;
+ 	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
+ 	u_int len;
+@@ -270,7 +271,11 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ 	mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
+ 	mic.length = len;
+ 
+-	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
+	if (authctxt->role && (strlen(authctxt->role) > 0))
+		xasprintf(&micuser, "%s/%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->role);
+	else
+		micuser = authctxt->user;
+	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, micuser, authctxt->service,
+ 	    "gssapi-with-mic");
+ 
+ 	gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
+@@ -282,6 +287,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ 		logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
+ 
+ 	buffer_free(&b);
+	if (micuser != authctxt->user)
+		xfree(micuser);
+ 	xfree(mic.value);
+ 
+ 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
--- a/openssh-5.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.1p1/sshd.c.log-chroot openssh-5.1p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-5.1p1/sshd.c.log-chroot	2008-07-23 15:18:52.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.1p1/sshd.c	2008-07-23 15:18:52.000000000 +0200
+@@ -591,6 +591,10 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
+ 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
+ 	demote_sensitive_data();
+ 
+	/* Open the syslog permanently so the chrooted process still
+	   can write to syslog. */
+	open_log();
+	
+ 	/* Change our root directory */
+ 	if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
+ 		fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,
+diff -up openssh-5.1p1/log.c.log-chroot openssh-5.1p1/log.c
+--- openssh-5.1p1/log.c.log-chroot	2008-06-10 15:01:51.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.1p1/log.c	2008-07-23 15:18:52.000000000 +0200
+@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
+ #include <syslog.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+ #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H)
+ # include <vis.h>
+ #endif
+@@ -56,6 +57,7 @@
+ static int log_on_stderr = 1;
+ static int log_facility = LOG_AUTH;
+ static char *argv0;
+int log_fd_keep = 0;
+ 
+ extern char *__progname;
+ 
+@@ -310,6 +312,8 @@
+ 		exit(1);
+ 	}
+ 
+	if (log_fd_keep != 0)
+		return;
+ 	/*
+ 	 * If an external library (eg libwrap) attempts to use syslog
+ 	 * immediately after reexec, syslog may be pointing to the wrong
+@@ -392,10 +396,33 @@
+ 		syslog_r(pri, &sdata, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
+ 		closelog_r(&sdata);
+ #else
+	    if (!log_fd_keep) {
+ 		openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility);
+	    }
+ 		syslog(pri, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
+	    if (!log_fd_keep) {
+ 		closelog();
+	    }
+ #endif
+ 	}
+ 	errno = saved_errno;
+ }
+
+void
+open_log(void)
+{
+	int temp1, temp2;
+
+	temp1 = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY);
+	openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID|LOG_NDELAY, log_facility);
+	temp2 = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY);
+	if (temp1 + 2 ==  temp2)
+		log_fd_keep = temp1 + 1;
+	else 
+		log_fd_keep = -1;
+
+	if (temp1 != -1)
+		close(temp1);
+	if (temp2 != -1)
+		close(temp2);
+}
+diff -up openssh-5.1p1/log.h.log-chroot openssh-5.1p1/log.h
+--- openssh-5.1p1/log.h.log-chroot	2008-06-13 02:22:54.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.1p1/log.h	2008-07-23 15:20:11.000000000 +0200
+@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@
+ 	SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET = -1
+ }       LogLevel;
+ 
+
+extern int log_fd_keep;
+
+ void     log_init(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
+ 
+ SyslogFacility	log_facility_number(char *);
+@@ -66,4 +69,6 @@
+ 
+ void	 do_log(LogLevel, const char *, va_list);
+ void	 cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
+
+void     open_log(void);
+ #endif
+--- openssh-5.2p1/session.c.	2009-03-20 18:32:01.004151364 +0100
+++ openssh-5.2p1/session.c	2009-03-20 19:00:28.328742384 +0100
+@@ -1445,6 +1456,7 @@
+ 	if (chdir(path) == -1)
+ 		fatal("Unable to chdir to chroot path \"%s\": "
+ 		    "%s", path, strerror(errno));
+	open_log ();
+ 	if (chroot(path) == -1)
+ 		fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", path, strerror(errno));
+ 	if (chdir("/") == -1)
+@@ -1632,7 +1644,8 @@
+ 	 * descriptors open.
+ 	 */
+ 	for (i = 3; i < 64; i++)
+-		close(i);
+		if (i != log_fd_keep)
+			close(i);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
--- a/openssh-5.1p1-mls.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.1p1-mls.patch
@ -0,0 +1,445 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.1p1/misc.c.mls openssh-5.1p1/misc.c
+--- openssh-5.1p1/misc.c.mls	2008-06-13 06:48:59.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.1p1/misc.c	2008-07-23 18:53:37.000000000 +0200
+@@ -427,6 +427,7 @@ char *
+ colon(char *cp)
+ {
+ 	int flag = 0;
+	int start = 1;
+ 
+ 	if (*cp == ':')		/* Leading colon is part of file name. */
+ 		return (0);
+@@ -440,8 +441,13 @@ colon(char *cp)
+ 			return (cp+1);
+ 		if (*cp == ':' && !flag)
+ 			return (cp);
+-		if (*cp == '/')
+-			return (0);
+		if (start) {
+		/* Slash on beginning or after dots only denotes file name. */
+			if (*cp == '/')
+				return (0);
+			if (*cp != '.')
+				start = 0;
+		}
+ 	}
+ 	return (0);
+ }
+diff -up openssh-5.1p1/session.c.mls openssh-5.1p1/session.c
+--- openssh-5.1p1/session.c.mls	2008-06-16 15:29:18.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.1p1/session.c	2008-07-23 18:53:37.000000000 +0200
+@@ -1550,10 +1550,6 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+ #endif
+ 	if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid)
+ 		fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int) pw->pw_uid);
+-
+-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-	ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
+-#endif
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+diff -up openssh-5.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.mls openssh-5.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+--- openssh-5.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.mls	2008-07-23 18:53:37.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2008-07-23 18:53:37.000000000 +0200
+@@ -33,12 +33,23 @@
+ #include "key.h"
+ #include "hostfile.h"
+ #include "auth.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+ 
+ #include <selinux/selinux.h>
+ #include <selinux/flask.h>
+#include <selinux/context.h>
+ #include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
+#include <selinux/get_default_type.h>
+#include <selinux/av_permissions.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
+#include <libaudit.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+ 
+ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+extern int inetd_flag;
+extern int rexeced_flag;
+ 
+ /* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
+ int
+@@ -54,17 +65,173 @@ ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
+ 	return (enabled);
+ }
+ 
+/* Send audit message */
+static int
+send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context,
+		       security_context_t selected_context)
+{
+	int rc=0;
+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
+	char *msg = NULL;
+	int audit_fd = audit_open();
+	security_context_t default_raw=NULL;
+	security_context_t selected_raw=NULL;
+	rc = -1;
+	if (audit_fd < 0) {
+		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
+                                        errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
+                        return 0; /* No audit support in kernel */
+		error("Error connecting to audit system.");
+		return rc;
+	}
+	if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(default_context, &default_raw) < 0) {
+		error("Error translating default context.");
+		default_raw = NULL;
+	}
+	if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(selected_context, &selected_raw) < 0) {
+		error("Error translating selected context.");
+		selected_raw = NULL;
+	}
+	if (asprintf(&msg, "sshd: default-context=%s selected-context=%s",
+		     default_raw ? default_raw : (default_context ? default_context: "?"),
+		     selected_context ? selected_raw : (selected_context ? selected_context :"?")) < 0) {
+		error("Error allocating memory.");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_ROLE_CHANGE,
+				   msg, NULL, NULL, NULL, success) <= 0) {
+		error("Error sending audit message.");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+      out:
+	free(msg);
+	freecon(default_raw);
+	freecon(selected_raw);
+	close(audit_fd);
+#endif
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int
+mls_range_allowed(security_context_t src, security_context_t dst)
+{
+	struct av_decision avd;
+	int retval;
+	unsigned int bit = CONTEXT__CONTAINS;
+
+	debug("%s: src:%s dst:%s", __func__, src, dst);
+	retval = security_compute_av(src, dst, SECCLASS_CONTEXT, bit, &avd);
+	if (retval || ((bit & avd.allowed) != bit))
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+get_user_context(const char *sename, const char *role, const char *lvl,
+	security_context_t *sc) {
+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
+	if (lvl == NULL || lvl[0] == '\0' || get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, sc) != 0) {
+	        /* User may have requested a level completely outside of his 
+	           allowed range. We get a context just for auditing as the
+	           range check below will certainly fail for default context. */
+#endif
+		if (get_default_context(sename, NULL, sc) != 0) {
+			*sc = NULL;
+			return -1;
+		}
+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
+	}
+#endif
+	if (role != NULL && role[0]) {
+		context_t con;
+		char *type=NULL;
+		if (get_default_type(role, &type) != 0) {
+			error("get_default_type: failed to get default type for '%s'",
+				role);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		con = context_new(*sc);
+		if (!con) {
+			goto out;
+		}
+		context_role_set(con, role);
+		context_type_set(con, type);
+		freecon(*sc);
+		*sc = strdup(context_str(con));
+		context_free(con);
+		if (!*sc) 
+			return -1;
+	}
+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
+	if (lvl != NULL && lvl[0]) {
+		/* verify that the requested range is obtained */
+		context_t con;
+		security_context_t obtained_raw;
+		security_context_t requested_raw;
+		con = context_new(*sc);
+		if (!con) {
+			goto out;
+		}
+		context_range_set(con, lvl);
+		if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(*sc, &obtained_raw) < 0) {
+			context_free(con);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(context_str(con), &requested_raw) < 0) {
+			freecon(obtained_raw);
+			context_free(con);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		debug("get_user_context: obtained context '%s' requested context '%s'",
+			obtained_raw, requested_raw);
+		if (strcmp(obtained_raw, requested_raw)) {
+			/* set the context to the real requested one but fail */
+			freecon(requested_raw);
+			freecon(obtained_raw);
+			freecon(*sc);
+			*sc = strdup(context_str(con));
+			context_free(con);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		freecon(requested_raw);
+		freecon(obtained_raw);
+		context_free(con);
+	}
+#endif
+	return 0;
+      out:
+        freecon(*sc);
+        *sc = NULL;
+        return -1;
+}
+
+ /* Return the default security context for the given username */
+-static security_context_t
+-ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+static int
+ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+	security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc)
+ {
+-	security_context_t sc = NULL;
+ 	char *sename, *lvl;
+	const char *reqlvl = NULL;
+ 	char *role = NULL;
+-	int r = 0;
+	int r = -1;
+	context_t con = NULL;
+
+	*default_sc = NULL;
+	*user_sc = NULL;
+	if (the_authctxt) {
+		if (the_authctxt->role != NULL) {
+			char *slash;
+			role = xstrdup(the_authctxt->role);
+			if ((slash = strchr(role, '/')) != NULL) {
+				*slash = '\0';
+				reqlvl = slash + 1;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+ 
+-	if (the_authctxt) 
+-		role=the_authctxt->role;
+ #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+ 	if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) {
+ 		sename = NULL;
+@@ -72,38 +239,63 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+ 	}
+ #else
+ 	sename = pwname;
+-	lvl = NULL;
+	lvl = "";
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	if (r == 0) {
+ #ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
+-		if (role != NULL && role[0])
+-			r = get_default_context_with_rolelevel(sename, role, lvl, NULL, &sc);
+-		else
+-			r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
+		r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, default_sc);
+ #else
+-		if (role != NULL && role[0])
+-			r = get_default_context_with_role(sename, role, NULL, &sc);
+-		else
+-			r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
+		r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, default_sc);
+ #endif
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (r != 0) {
+-		switch (security_getenforce()) {
+-		case -1:
+-			fatal("%s: ssh_selinux_getctxbyname: "
+-			    "security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+-		case 0:
+-			error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
+-			    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+-			break;
+-		default:
+-			fatal("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
+-			    "context for %s (in enforcing mode)",
+-			    __func__, pwname);
+	if (r == 0) {
+		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
+		if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
+
+			if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
+				fatal("failed to allocate security context");
+
+			if ((con=context_new(sshdsc)) == NULL)
+				fatal("failed to allocate selinux context");
+			reqlvl = context_range_get(con);
+			freecon(sshdsc);
+			if (reqlvl !=NULL && lvl != NULL && strcmp(reqlvl, lvl) == 0)
+			    /* we actually don't change level */
+			    reqlvl = "";
+
+			debug("%s: current connection level '%s'", __func__, reqlvl);
+		}
+		
+		if ((reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) || (role != NULL && role[0])) {
+			r = get_user_context(sename, role, reqlvl, user_sc);
+		
+			if (r == 0 && reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) {
+				security_context_t default_level_sc = *default_sc;
+				if (role != NULL && role[0]) {
+					if (get_user_context(sename, role, lvl, &default_level_sc) < 0)
+						default_level_sc = *default_sc;
+				}
+				/* verify that the requested range is contained in the user range */
+				if (mls_range_allowed(default_level_sc, *user_sc)) {
+					logit("permit MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
+				} else {
+					r = -1;
+					error("deny MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
+				}
+				if (default_level_sc != *default_sc)
+					freecon(default_level_sc);
+			}
+		} else {
+			*user_sc = *default_sc;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+	if (r != 0) {
+		error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
+		    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+	}
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+ 	if (sename != NULL)
+@@ -111,14 +303,20 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+ 	if (lvl != NULL)
+ 		xfree(lvl);
+ #endif
+	if (role != NULL)
+		xfree(role);
+	if (con)
+		context_free(con);
+ 
+-	return (sc);
+	return (r);
+ }
+ 
+ /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
+ void
+ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+ {
+	int r = 0;
+	security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
+ 	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+@@ -126,22 +324,45 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwn
+ 
+ 	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+ 
+-	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+-	if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
+	r = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
+	if (r >= 0) {
+		r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s",
+			    __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
+		} 
+#ifdef HAVE_SETKEYCREATECON
+		else if (setkeycreatecon(user_ctx) < 0) {
+			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s",
+			    __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
+		}
+#endif
+	}
+	if (user_ctx == NULL) {
+		user_ctx = default_ctx;
+	}
+	if (r < 0 || user_ctx != default_ctx) {
+		/* audit just the case when user changed a role or there was
+		   a failure */
+		send_audit_message(r >= 0, default_ctx, user_ctx);
+	}
+	if (r < 0) {
+ 		switch (security_getenforce()) {
+ 		case -1:
+ 			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+ 		case 0:
+-			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
+-			    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+			error("%s: SELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
+			    __func__);
+ 			break;
+ 		default:
+-			fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
+-			    "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
+			fatal("%s: SELinux failure. Aborting connection.",
+			    __func__);
+ 		}
+ 	}
+-	if (user_ctx != NULL)
+	if (user_ctx != NULL && user_ctx != default_ctx)
+ 		freecon(user_ctx);
+	if (default_ctx != NULL)
+		freecon(default_ctx);
+ 
+ 	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+ }
+@@ -159,7 +380,10 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, cons
+ 
+ 	debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
+ 
+-	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+	if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) < 0) {
+		error("%s: getexeccon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+ 
+ 	/* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
+ 
+diff -up openssh-5.1p1/configure.ac.mls openssh-5.1p1/configure.ac
+--- openssh-5.1p1/configure.ac.mls	2008-07-23 18:53:37.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.1p1/configure.ac	2008-07-23 18:53:37.000000000 +0200
+@@ -3311,6 +3311,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(selinux,
+ 		SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
+ 		LIBS="$LIBS $LIBSELINUX"
+ 		AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level)
+		AC_CHECK_FUNCS(setkeycreatecon)
+ 		LIBS="$save_LIBS"
+ 	fi ]
+ )
+diff -up openssh-5.1p1/sshd.c.mls openssh-5.1p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-5.1p1/sshd.c.mls	2008-07-23 18:53:37.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.1p1/sshd.c	2008-07-23 18:53:37.000000000 +0200
+@@ -1896,6 +1896,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		restore_uid();
+ 	}
+ #endif
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+	ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
+#endif
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	if (options.use_pam) {
+ 		do_pam_setcred(1);
--- a/openssh-5.1p1-scp-manpage.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.1p1-scp-manpage.patch
@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.1p1/scp.1.manpage openssh-5.1p1/scp.1
+--- openssh-5.1p1/scp.1.manpage	2008-07-12 09:12:49.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.1p1/scp.1	2008-07-23 19:18:15.000000000 +0200
+@@ -66,6 +66,14 @@ treating file names containing
+ as host specifiers.
+ Copies between two remote hosts are also permitted.
+ .Pp
+When copying a source file to a target file which already exists,
+.Nm 
+will replace the contents of the target file (keeping the inode).
+.Pp
+If the target file does not yet exist, an empty file with the target
+file name is created, then filled with the source file contents.
+No attempt is made at "near-atomic" transfer using temporary files.
+.Pp
+ The options are as follows:
+ .Bl -tag -width Ds
+ .It Fl 1
--- a/openssh-5.1p1-skip-initial.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.1p1-skip-initial.patch
@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+Skip the initial empty-password check if permit_empty_passwd is disabled.  This
+doesn't change the timing profiles of the host because the additional condition
+check which can short-circuit the call to pam_authenticate() has no dependency
+on the identity of the user who is being authenticated.
+diff -up openssh-5.1p1/auth1.c.skip-initial openssh-5.1p1/auth1.c
+--- openssh-5.1p1/auth1.c.skip-initial	2008-07-09 12:54:05.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.1p1/auth1.c	2008-07-23 18:26:01.000000000 +0200
+@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", authctxt->user);
+ 
+ 	/* If the user has no password, accept authentication immediately. */
+-	if (options.password_authentication &&
+	if (options.permit_empty_passwd && options.password_authentication &&
+ #ifdef KRB5
+ 	    (!options.kerberos_authentication || options.kerberos_or_local_passwd) &&
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh-5.1p1/auth2-none.c.skip-initial openssh-5.1p1/auth2-none.c
+--- openssh-5.1p1/auth2-none.c.skip-initial	2008-07-02 14:56:09.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.1p1/auth2-none.c	2008-07-23 18:26:01.000000000 +0200
+@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ userauth_none(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	if (check_nt_auth(1, authctxt->pw) == 0)
+ 		return (0);
+ #endif
+-	if (options.password_authentication)
+	if (options.permit_empty_passwd && options.password_authentication)
+ 		return (PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, "")));
+ 	return (0);
+ }
--- a/openssh-5.2p1-fips.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.2p1-fips.patch
@ -0,0 +1,656 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/ssh-agent.c.fips openssh-5.2p1/ssh-agent.c
+--- openssh-5.2p1/ssh-agent.c.fips	2009-03-13 11:23:15.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.2p1/ssh-agent.c	2009-03-13 11:23:15.000000000 +0100
+@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@
+ 
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+#include <fipscheck.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ 
+ #include <errno.h>
+@@ -200,9 +202,9 @@ confirm_key(Identity *id)
+ 	char *p;
+ 	int ret = -1;
+ 
+-	p = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-	if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.",
+-	    id->comment, p))
+	p = key_fingerprint(id->key, FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+	if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey %sfingerprint %s.",
+	    id->comment, FIPS_mode() ? "SHA1 " : "", p))
+ 		ret = 0;
+ 	xfree(p);
+ 
+@@ -1196,6 +1198,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+        if (FIPS_mode() && !FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)) {
+                fprintf(stderr,
+                    "FIPS integrity verification test failed.\n");
+                exit(3);
+        }
+ 
+ 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
+ 	init_rng();
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/auth2-pubkey.c.fips openssh-5.2p1/auth2-pubkey.c
+--- openssh-5.2p1/auth2-pubkey.c.fips	2009-03-13 11:23:15.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.2p1/auth2-pubkey.c	2009-03-13 11:23:15.000000000 +0100
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "ssh.h"
+@@ -243,7 +244,7 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key
+ 			found_key = 1;
+ 			debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu",
+ 			    file, linenum);
+-			fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+			fp = key_fingerprint(found, FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 			verbose("Found matching %s key: %s",
+ 			    key_type(found), fp);
+ 			xfree(fp);
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-5.2p1/ssh.c
+--- openssh-5.2p1/ssh.c.fips	2009-03-13 11:23:15.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.2p1/ssh.c	2009-03-13 11:23:15.000000000 +0100
+@@ -71,6 +71,8 @@
+ 
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+#include <fipscheck.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ 
+@@ -220,6 +222,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	sanitise_stdfd();
+ 
+ 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
+        SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+        if (FIPS_mode() && !FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)) {
+                fatal("FIPS integrity verification test failed.");
+        }
+ 	init_rng();
+ 
+ 	/*
+@@ -550,7 +556,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	if (!host)
+ 		usage();
+ 
+-	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+ 	ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+ 
+ 	/* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-5.2p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-5.2p1/sshconnect2.c.fips	2009-03-13 11:23:15.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.2p1/sshconnect2.c	2009-03-13 11:23:15.000000000 +0100
+@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@
+ #include <vis.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ 
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+@@ -115,6 +117,10 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
+ 	if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers;
+	} else if (FIPS_mode()) {
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT;
+
+ 	}
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ 	    compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
+@@ -130,7 +136,11 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
+ 	if (options.macs != NULL) {
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
+	} else if (FIPS_mode()) {
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_MAC;
+ 	}
+
+ 	if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL)
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
+ 		    options.hostkeyalgorithms;
+@@ -507,8 +517,8 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t
+ 		    key->type, pktype);
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
+-	fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-	debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp);
+	fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_SHA1, SSH_FP_HEX);
+	debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: SHA1 fp %s", fp);
+ 	xfree(fp);
+ 
+ 	/*
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/Makefile.in.fips openssh-5.2p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-5.2p1/Makefile.in.fips	2009-03-13 11:23:15.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.2p1/Makefile.in	2009-03-13 11:23:15.000000000 +0100
+@@ -134,28 +134,28 @@ libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS)
+ 	$(RANLIB) $@
+ 
+ ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS)
+-	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+ 
+ sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a	$(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS)
+-	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS)
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+ 
+ scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+ 
+ ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-add.o
+-	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+ 
+ ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-agent.o
+-	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+ 
+ ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o
+-	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+ 
+ ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o
+-	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+ 
+ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
+-	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+ 
+ sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-5.2p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-5.2p1/sshd.c.fips	2009-03-13 11:23:15.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.2p1/sshd.c	2009-03-13 11:23:15.000000000 +0100
+@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/md5.h>
+ #include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+#include <fipscheck.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
+@@ -1260,6 +1262,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	(void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
+ #endif
+ 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
+
+        SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+        if (FIPS_mode() && !FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)) {
+                fatal("FIPS integrity verification test failed.");
+        }
+
+ 	init_rng();
+ 
+ 	/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
+@@ -1412,8 +1420,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	else
+ 		closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD);
+ 
+-	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+-
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host
+ 	 * key (unless started from inetd)
+@@ -2182,6 +2188,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
+ 	if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers;
+	} else if (FIPS_mode()) {
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT;
+ 	}
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ 	    compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
+@@ -2191,6 +2200,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
+ 	if (options.macs != NULL) {
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
+	} else if (FIPS_mode()) {
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_MAC;
+ 	}
+ 	if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) {
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/mac.c.fips openssh-5.2p1/mac.c
+--- openssh-5.2p1/mac.c.fips	2008-06-13 02:58:50.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.2p1/mac.c	2009-03-13 11:23:15.000000000 +0100
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ 
+ #include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+@@ -47,14 +48,14 @@
+ #define SSH_EVP		1	/* OpenSSL EVP-based MAC */
+ #define SSH_UMAC	2	/* UMAC (not integrated with OpenSSL) */
+ 
+-struct {
+struct Macs {
+ 	char		*name;
+ 	int		type;
+ 	const EVP_MD *	(*mdfunc)(void);
+ 	int		truncatebits;	/* truncate digest if != 0 */
+ 	int		key_len;	/* just for UMAC */
+ 	int		len;		/* just for UMAC */
+-} macs[] = {
+} all_macs[] = {
+ 	{ "hmac-sha1",			SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 0, -1, -1 },
+ 	{ "hmac-sha1-96",		SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 96, -1, -1 },
+ 	{ "hmac-md5",			SSH_EVP, EVP_md5, 0, -1, -1 },
+@@ -65,9 +66,15 @@ struct {
+ 	{ NULL,				0, NULL, 0, -1, -1 }
+ };
+ 
+struct Macs fips_macs[] = {
+	{ "hmac-sha1",			SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 0, -1, -1 },
+	{ NULL,				0, NULL, 0, -1, -1 }
+};
+
+ static void
+ mac_setup_by_id(Mac *mac, int which)
+ {
+	struct Macs *macs = FIPS_mode() ? fips_macs : all_macs;
+ 	int evp_len;
+ 	mac->type = macs[which].type;
+ 	if (mac->type == SSH_EVP) {
+@@ -88,6 +95,7 @@ int
+ mac_setup(Mac *mac, char *name)
+ {
+ 	int i;
+	struct Macs *macs = FIPS_mode() ? fips_macs : all_macs;
+ 
+ 	for (i = 0; macs[i].name; i++) {
+ 		if (strcmp(name, macs[i].name) == 0) {
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-5.2p1/ssh-keygen.c
+--- openssh-5.2p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips	2009-03-13 11:23:15.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.2p1/ssh-keygen.c	2009-03-13 11:23:15.000000000 +0100
+@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@
+ 
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+#include <fipscheck.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ 
+ #include <errno.h>
+@@ -537,7 +539,7 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
+ 	enum fp_type fptype;
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 
+-	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
+	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
+ 	rep =    print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
+ 
+ 	if (!have_identity)
+@@ -1125,6 +1127,12 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+ 
+ 	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+        if (FIPS_mode() && !FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)) {
+                fprintf(stderr,
+                    "FIPS integrity verification test failed.\n");
+                exit(3);
+        }
+
+ 	log_init(argv[0], SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+ 
+ 	init_rng();
+@@ -1506,14 +1514,15 @@ passphrase_again:
+ 	fclose(f);
+ 
+ 	if (!quiet) {
+-		char *fp = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-		char *ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5,
+		int fips_on = FIPS_mode();
+		char *fp = key_fingerprint(public, fips_on ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+		char *ra = key_fingerprint(public, fips_on ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5,
+ 		    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ 		printf("Your public key has been saved in %s.\n",
+ 		    identity_file);
+-		printf("The key fingerprint is:\n");
+		printf("The key %sfingerprint is:\n", fips_on ? "SHA1 " : "");
+ 		printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment);
+-		printf("The key's randomart image is:\n");
+		printf("The key's %srandomart image is:\n", fips_on ? "SHA1 " :"");
+ 		printf("%s\n", ra);
+ 		xfree(ra);
+ 		xfree(fp);
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/nsskeys.c.fips openssh-5.2p1/nsskeys.c
+--- openssh-5.2p1/nsskeys.c.fips	2009-03-13 11:23:15.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.2p1/nsskeys.c	2009-03-13 11:23:15.000000000 +0100
+@@ -183,8 +183,8 @@ nss_convert_pubkey(Key *k)
+ 			break;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	p = key_fingerprint(k, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-	debug("fingerprint %u %s", key_size(k), p);
+	p = key_fingerprint(k, SSH_FP_SHA1, SSH_FP_HEX);
+	debug("SHA1 fingerprint %u %s", key_size(k), p);
+ 	xfree(p);
+ 
+ 	return 0;
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/ssh-add.c.fips openssh-5.2p1/ssh-add.c
+--- openssh-5.2p1/ssh-add.c.fips	2009-03-13 11:23:15.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.2p1/ssh-add.c	2009-03-13 11:23:15.000000000 +0100
+@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@
+ #include <sys/param.h>
+ 
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+#include <fipscheck.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS
+@@ -254,7 +256,7 @@ list_identities(AuthenticationConnection
+ 		    key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, version)) {
+ 			had_identities = 1;
+ 			if (do_fp) {
+-				fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5,
+				fp = key_fingerprint(key, FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5,
+ 				    SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 				printf("%d %s %s (%s)\n",
+ 				    key_size(key), fp, comment, key_type(key));
+@@ -463,11 +465,16 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	sanitise_stdfd();
+ 
+ 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+	if (FIPS_mode() && !FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)) {
+		fprintf(stderr,
+		    "FIPS integrity verification test failed.\n");
+		exit(3);
+	}
+
+ 	init_rng();
+ 	seed_rng();
+ 
+-	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+-
+ 	/* At first, get a connection to the authentication agent. */
+ 	ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection();
+ 	if (ac == NULL) {
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c.fips openssh-5.2p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c
+--- openssh-5.2p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c.fips	2008-06-04 02:54:00.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.2p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c	2009-03-13 11:23:15.000000000 +0100
+@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
+ static int rc4_ready = 0;
+ static RC4_KEY rc4;
+ 
+#if 0
+ unsigned int
+ arc4random(void)
+ {
+@@ -82,6 +83,32 @@ arc4random_stir(void)
+ 
+ 	rc4_ready = REKEY_BYTES;
+ }
+#else
+unsigned int
+arc4random(void)
+{
+	unsigned int r = 0;
+	void *rp = &r;
+
+	if (!rc4_ready) {
+		arc4random_stir();
+	}
+	RAND_bytes(rp, sizeof(r));
+
+	return(r);
+}
+
+void
+arc4random_stir(void)
+{
+	unsigned char rand_buf[SEED_SIZE];
+
+	if (RAND_bytes(rand_buf, sizeof(rand_buf)) <= 0)
+		fatal("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error %ld)",
+		    ERR_get_error());
+	rc4_ready = 1;
+}
+#endif
+ #endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */
+ 
+ #ifndef ARC4RANDOM_BUF
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-5.2p1/myproposal.h
+--- openssh-5.2p1/myproposal.h.fips	2009-01-28 06:33:31.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.2p1/myproposal.h	2009-03-13 11:27:49.000000000 +0100
+@@ -53,7 +53,12 @@
+ 	"hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96"
+ #define	KEX_DEFAULT_COMP	"none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib"
+ #define	KEX_DEFAULT_LANG	""
+-
+#define	KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \
+	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
+	"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \
+	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se"
+#define	KEX_FIPS_MAC \
+	"hmac-sha1"
+ 
+ static char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {
+ 	KEX_DEFAULT_KEX,
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/ssh-keysign.c.fips openssh-5.2p1/ssh-keysign.c
+--- openssh-5.2p1/ssh-keysign.c.fips	2006-09-01 07:38:37.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.2p1/ssh-keysign.c	2009-03-13 11:23:15.000000000 +0100
+@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/rand.h>
+ #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+#include <fipscheck.h>
+ 
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+@@ -175,6 +177,11 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 
+ 	permanently_set_uid(pw);
+ 
+        SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+        if (FIPS_mode() && !FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)) {
+                fatal("FIPS integrity verification test failed");
+        }
+
+ 	init_rng();
+ 	seed_rng();
+ 	arc4random_stir();
+@@ -194,7 +201,6 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	if (key_fd[0] == -1 && key_fd[1] == -1)
+ 		fatal("could not open any host key");
+ 
+-	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+ 	for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
+ 		rnd[i] = arc4random();
+ 	RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/cipher.c.fips openssh-5.2p1/cipher.c
+--- openssh-5.2p1/cipher.c.fips	2009-03-06 18:23:21.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.2p1/cipher.c	2009-03-13 11:23:15.000000000 +0100
+@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ 
+ #include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+@@ -93,6 +94,22 @@ struct Cipher {
+ 	{ NULL,			SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
+ };
+ 
+struct Cipher fips_ciphers[] = {
+	{ "none",		SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null },
+	{ "3des",		SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_3des },
+
+	{ "3des-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, 1, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
+	{ "aes128-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 1, EVP_aes_128_cbc },
+	{ "aes192-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 1, EVP_aes_192_cbc },
+	{ "aes256-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
+	{ "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se",
+				SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
+	{ "aes128-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr },
+	{ "aes192-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr },
+	{ "aes256-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr },
+	{ NULL,			SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
+};
+
+ /*--*/
+ 
+ u_int
+@@ -135,7 +152,7 @@ Cipher *
+ cipher_by_name(const char *name)
+ {
+ 	Cipher *c;
+-	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
+	for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
+ 		if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0)
+ 			return c;
+ 	return NULL;
+@@ -145,7 +162,7 @@ Cipher *
+ cipher_by_number(int id)
+ {
+ 	Cipher *c;
+-	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
+	for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
+ 		if (c->number == id)
+ 			return c;
+ 	return NULL;
+@@ -189,7 +206,7 @@ cipher_number(const char *name)
+ 	Cipher *c;
+ 	if (name == NULL)
+ 		return -1;
+-	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
+	for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
+ 		if (strcasecmp(c->name, name) == 0)
+ 			return c->number;
+ 	return -1;
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/ssh-keyscan.c.fips openssh-5.2p1/ssh-keyscan.c
+--- openssh-5.2p1/ssh-keyscan.c.fips	2009-01-28 06:31:23.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.2p1/ssh-keyscan.c	2009-03-13 11:23:15.000000000 +0100
+@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
+ #include <arpa/inet.h>
+ 
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+#include <fipscheck.h>
+ 
+ #include <netdb.h>
+ #include <errno.h>
+@@ -731,6 +733,13 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	extern char *optarg;
+ 
+ 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+        SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+        if (FIPS_mode() && !FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)) {
+                fprintf(stderr,
+                    "FIPS integrity verification test failed.\n");
+                exit(3);
+        }
+
+ 	init_rng();
+ 	seed_rng();
+ 	TAILQ_INIT(&tq);
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/sshconnect.c.fips openssh-5.2p1/sshconnect.c
+--- openssh-5.2p1/sshconnect.c.fips	2009-03-13 11:23:15.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.2p1/sshconnect.c	2009-03-13 11:23:15.000000000 +0100
+@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #include <fcntl.h>
+ 
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "key.h"
+ #include "hostfile.h"
+@@ -761,6 +763,7 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
+ 			goto fail;
+ 		} else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) {
+ 			char msg1[1024], msg2[1024];
+			int fips_on = FIPS_mode();
+ 
+ 			if (show_other_keys(host, host_key))
+ 				snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1),
+@@ -769,8 +772,8 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
+ 			else
+ 				snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), ".");
+ 			/* The default */
+-			fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-			ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5,
+			fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, fips_on ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+			ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, fips_on ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5,
+ 			    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ 			msg2[0] = '\0';
+ 			if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
+@@ -786,10 +789,10 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
+ 			snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
+ 			    "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be "
+ 			    "established%s\n"
+-			    "%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s"
+			    "%s key %sfingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s"
+ 			    "Are you sure you want to continue connecting "
+ 			    "(yes/no)? ",
+-			    host, ip, msg1, type, fp,
+			    host, ip, msg1, type, fips_on ? "SHA1 " : "", fp,
+ 			    options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "",
+ 			    options.visual_host_key ? ra : "",
+ 			    msg2);
+@@ -1077,17 +1080,18 @@ show_key_from_file(const char *file, con
+ 	Key *found;
+ 	char *fp, *ra;
+ 	int line, ret;
+	int fips_on = FIPS_mode();
+ 
+ 	found = key_new(keytype);
+ 	if ((ret = lookup_key_in_hostfile_by_type(file, host,
+ 	    keytype, found, &line))) {
+-		fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-		ra = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+		fp = key_fingerprint(found, fips_on ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+		ra = key_fingerprint(found, fips_on ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ 		logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n"
+ 		    "in %s:%d\n"
+-		    "%s key fingerprint %s.\n%s\n",
+		    "%s key %sfingerprint %s.\n%s\n",
+ 		    key_type(found), host, file, line,
+-		    key_type(found), fp, ra);
+		    key_type(found), fips_on ? "SHA1 ":"", fp, ra);
+ 		xfree(ra);
+ 		xfree(fp);
+ 	}
+@@ -1133,8 +1137,9 @@ warn_changed_key(Key *host_key)
+ {
+ 	char *fp;
+ 	const char *type = key_type(host_key);
+	int fips_on = FIPS_mode();
+ 
+-	fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+	fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, fips_on ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ 
+ 	error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+ 	error("@    WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED!     @");
+@@ -1142,8 +1147,8 @@ warn_changed_key(Key *host_key)
+ 	error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!");
+ 	error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!");
+ 	error("It is also possible that the %s host key has just been changed.", type);
+-	error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.",
+-	    type, fp);
+	error("The %sfingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.",
+	    fips_on ? "SHA1 ":"", type, fp);
+ 	error("Please contact your system administrator.");
+ 
+ 	xfree(fp);
--- a/openssh-5.2p1-nss-keys.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.2p1-nss-keys.patch
--- a/openssh-5.2p1-redhat.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.2p1-redhat.patch
@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config.redhat openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config.redhat	2008-07-02 14:35:43.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config	2008-07-23 14:11:12.000000000 +0200
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ Protocol 2
+ # Logging
+ # obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging
+ #SyslogFacility AUTH
+SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
+ #LogLevel INFO
+ 
+ # Authentication:
+@@ -60,9 +61,11 @@ Protocol 2
+ # To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
+ #PasswordAuthentication yes
+ #PermitEmptyPasswords no
+PasswordAuthentication yes
+ 
+ # Change to no to disable s/key passwords
+ #ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes
+ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
+ 
+ # Kerberos options
+ #KerberosAuthentication no
+@@ -72,7 +75,9 @@ Protocol 2
+ 
+ # GSSAPI options
+ #GSSAPIAuthentication no
+GSSAPIAuthentication yes
+ #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
+GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
+ 
+ # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, 
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will 
+@@ -84,11 +89,18 @@ Protocol 2
+ # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
+ # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
+ #UsePAM no
+UsePAM yes
+
+# Accept locale-related environment variables
+AcceptEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
+AcceptEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
+AcceptEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
+ 
+ #AllowAgentForwarding yes
+ #AllowTcpForwarding yes
+ #GatewayPorts no
+ #X11Forwarding no
+X11Forwarding yes
+ #X11DisplayOffset 10
+ #X11UseLocalhost yes
+ #PrintMotd yes
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/ssh_config.redhat openssh-5.2p1/ssh_config
+--- openssh-5.2p1/ssh_config.redhat	2007-06-11 06:04:42.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.2p1/ssh_config	2008-07-23 14:07:29.000000000 +0200
+@@ -44,3 +44,13 @@
+ #   TunnelDevice any:any
+ #   PermitLocalCommand no
+ #   VisualHostKey no
+Host *
+	GSSAPIAuthentication yes
+# If this option is set to yes then remote X11 clients will have full access
+# to the original X11 display. As virtually no X11 client supports the untrusted
+# mode correctly we set this to yes.
+	ForwardX11Trusted yes
+# Send locale-related environment variables
+	SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES 
+	SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT 
+	SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config.0
+--- openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config.0.redhat	2008-07-21 10:30:51.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config.0	2008-07-23 14:07:29.000000000 +0200
+@@ -490,9 +490,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
+ 
+      SyslogFacility
+              Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+-             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0,
+-             LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.  The de-
+-             fault is AUTH.
+             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV,
+             LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
+             The default is AUTH.
+ 
+      TCPKeepAlive
+              Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config.5.redhat	2008-07-02 14:35:43.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config.5	2008-07-23 14:07:29.000000000 +0200
+@@ -846,7 +846,7 @@ Note that this option applies to protoco
+ .It Cm SyslogFacility
+ Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+ .Xr sshd 8 .
+-The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
+The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
+ LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
+ The default is AUTH.
+ .It Cm TCPKeepAlive
--- a/openssh-5.2p1-selabel.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.2p1-selabel.patch
@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.selabel openssh-5.2p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id
+--- openssh-5.2p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.selabel	2009-06-29 23:43:03.514390092 +0200
+++ openssh-5.2p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id	2009-06-29 23:44:11.188382120 +0200
+@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ if [ "$#" -lt 1 ] || [ "$1" = "-h" ] || 
+   exit 1
+ fi
+ 
+-{ eval "$GET_ID" ; } | ssh $1 "umask 077; test -d .ssh || mkdir .ssh ; cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys" || exit 1
+{ eval "$GET_ID" ; } | ssh $1 "umask 077; test -d .ssh || mkdir .ssh ; cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys; test -x /sbin/restorecon && /sbin/restorecon .ssh .ssh/authorized_keys" || exit 1
+ 
+ cat <<EOF
+ Now try logging into the machine, with "ssh '$1'", and check in:
--- a/openssh-5.2p1-selinux.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.2p1-selinux.patch
@ -0,0 +1,328 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/configure.ac.selinux openssh-5.2p1/configure.ac
+--- openssh-5.2p1/configure.ac.selinux	2008-07-23 16:32:13.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.2p1/configure.ac	2008-07-23 16:32:13.000000000 +0200
+@@ -3309,6 +3309,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(selinux,
+ 		AC_CHECK_LIB(selinux, setexeccon, [ LIBSELINUX="-lselinux" ],
+ 		    AC_MSG_ERROR(SELinux support requires libselinux library))
+ 		SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
+		LIBS="$LIBS $LIBSELINUX"
+ 		AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level)
+ 		LIBS="$save_LIBS"
+ 	fi ]
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/auth1.c.selinux openssh-5.2p1/auth1.c
+--- openssh-5.2p1/auth1.c.selinux	2008-07-23 16:32:13.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.2p1/auth1.c	2008-07-23 16:32:13.000000000 +0200
+@@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ void
+ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ {
+ 	u_int ulen;
+-	char *user, *style = NULL;
+	char *user, *style = NULL, *role=NULL;
+ 
+ 	/* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */
+ 	packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_USER);
+@@ -400,11 +400,19 @@ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	user = packet_get_string(&ulen);
+ 	packet_check_eom();
+ 
+	if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
+		*role++ = '\0';
+
+ 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
+ 		*style++ = '\0';
+	else
+		if (role && (style = strchr(role, ':')) != NULL)
+			*style++ = '\0';
+			
+ 
+ 	authctxt->user = user;
+ 	authctxt->style = style;
+	authctxt->role = role;
+ 
+ 	/* Verify that the user is a valid user. */
+ 	if ((authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user))) != NULL)
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/auth2-pubkey.c.selinux openssh-5.2p1/auth2-pubkey.c
+--- openssh-5.2p1/auth2-pubkey.c.selinux	2008-07-04 04:54:25.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.2p1/auth2-pubkey.c	2008-07-23 16:32:13.000000000 +0200
+@@ -117,7 +117,14 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 		}
+ 		/* reconstruct packet */
+ 		buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+-		buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
+		if (authctxt->role) {
+			buffer_put_int(&b, strlen(authctxt->user)+strlen(authctxt->role)+1);
+			buffer_append(&b, authctxt->user, strlen(authctxt->user));
+			buffer_put_char(&b, '/');
+			buffer_append(&b, authctxt->role, strlen(authctxt->role));
+		} else {
+			buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
+		}
+ 		buffer_put_cstring(&b,
+ 		    datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ?
+ 		    "ssh-userauth" :
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/monitor_wrap.h.selinux openssh-5.2p1/monitor_wrap.h
+--- openssh-5.2p1/monitor_wrap.h.selinux	2006-08-05 04:39:40.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.2p1/monitor_wrap.h	2008-07-23 16:32:13.000000000 +0200
+@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ int mm_is_monitor(void);
+ DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
+ int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int);
+ void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
+void mm_inform_authrole(char *);
+ struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
+ char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
+ int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *);
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/monitor.h.selinux openssh-5.2p1/monitor.h
+--- openssh-5.2p1/monitor.h.selinux	2006-03-26 05:30:02.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.2p1/monitor.h	2008-07-23 16:32:13.000000000 +0200
+@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
+ 
+ enum monitor_reqtype {
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI,
+-	MONITOR_REQ_FREE, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV,
+	MONITOR_REQ_FREE, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV,MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER,
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/auth2-hostbased.c.selinux openssh-5.2p1/auth2-hostbased.c
+--- openssh-5.2p1/auth2-hostbased.c.selinux	2008-07-17 10:57:19.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.2p1/auth2-hostbased.c	2008-07-23 16:32:13.000000000 +0200
+@@ -106,7 +106,14 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
+ 	/* reconstruct packet */
+ 	buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+-	buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
+	if (authctxt->role) {
+		buffer_put_int(&b, strlen(authctxt->user)+strlen(authctxt->role)+1);
+		buffer_append(&b, authctxt->user, strlen(authctxt->user));
+		buffer_put_char(&b, '/');
+		buffer_append(&b, authctxt->role, strlen(authctxt->role));
+	} else {
+		buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
+	}
+ 	buffer_put_cstring(&b, service);
+ 	buffer_put_cstring(&b, "hostbased");
+ 	buffer_put_string(&b, pkalg, alen);
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/monitor_wrap.c.selinux openssh-5.2p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh-5.2p1/monitor_wrap.c.selinux	2008-07-11 09:36:48.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.2p1/monitor_wrap.c	2008-07-23 16:32:13.000000000 +0200
+@@ -296,6 +296,23 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *
+ 	buffer_free(&m);
+ }
+ 
+/* Inform the privileged process about role */
+
+void
+mm_inform_authrole(char *role)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : "");
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, &m);
+
+	buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+ /* Do the password authentication */
+ int
+ mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password)
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.selinux openssh-5.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+--- openssh-5.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.selinux	2008-03-26 21:27:21.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2008-07-23 16:32:13.000000000 +0200
+@@ -30,11 +30,16 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "port-linux.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+ 
+ #include <selinux/selinux.h>
+ #include <selinux/flask.h>
+ #include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
+ 
+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+
+ /* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
+ int
+ ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
+@@ -53,23 +58,36 @@ ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
+ static security_context_t
+ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+ {
+-	security_context_t sc;
+-	char *sename = NULL, *lvl = NULL;
+-	int r;
+	security_context_t sc = NULL;
+	char *sename, *lvl;
+	char *role = NULL;
+	int r = 0;
+ 
+	if (the_authctxt) 
+		role=the_authctxt->role;
+ #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+-	if (getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl) != 0)
+-		return NULL;
+	if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) {
+		sename = NULL;
+		lvl = NULL;
+	}
+ #else
+ 	sename = pwname;
+ 	lvl = NULL;
+ #endif
+ 
+	if (r == 0) {
+ #ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
+-	r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
+		if (role != NULL && role[0])
+			r = get_default_context_with_rolelevel(sename, role, lvl, NULL, &sc);
+		else
+			r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
+ #else
+-	r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
+		if (role != NULL && role[0])
+			r = get_default_context_with_role(sename, role, NULL, &sc);
+		else
+			r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
+ #endif
+	}
+ 
+ 	if (r != 0) {
+ 		switch (security_getenforce()) {
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/auth.h.selinux openssh-5.2p1/auth.h
+--- openssh-5.2p1/auth.h.selinux	2008-07-02 14:37:30.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.2p1/auth.h	2008-07-23 16:32:13.000000000 +0200
+@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
+ 	char		*service;
+ 	struct passwd	*pw;		/* set if 'valid' */
+ 	char		*style;
+	char		*role;
+ 	void		*kbdintctxt;
+ 	void		*jpake_ctx;
+ #ifdef BSD_AUTH
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/auth2.c.selinux openssh-5.2p1/auth2.c
+--- openssh-5.2p1/auth2.c.selinux	2008-07-05 01:44:53.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.2p1/auth2.c	2008-07-23 16:32:13.000000000 +0200
+@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+ {
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ 	Authmethod *m = NULL;
+-	char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL;
+	char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL, *role = NULL;
+ 	int authenticated = 0;
+ 
+ 	if (authctxt == NULL)
+@@ -221,6 +221,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+ 	debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
+ 	debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
+ 
+	if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
+		*role++ = 0;
+
+ 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
+ 		*style++ = 0;
+ 
+@@ -246,8 +249,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+ 		    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
+ 		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
+ 		authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
+-		if (use_privsep)
+		authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
+		if (use_privsep) {
+ 			mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
+			mm_inform_authrole(role);
+		}
+ 		userauth_banner();
+ 	} else if (strcmp(user, authctxt->user) != 0 ||
+ 	    strcmp(service, authctxt->service) != 0) {
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/monitor.c.selinux openssh-5.2p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-5.2p1/monitor.c.selinux	2008-07-11 09:36:48.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.2p1/monitor.c	2008-07-23 16:36:10.000000000 +0200
+@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_authrole(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
+@@ -205,6 +206,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] 
+     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+@@ -658,6 +660,7 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m
+ 	else {
+ 		/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
+ 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1);
+ 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -703,6 +706,23 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ }
+ 
+ int
+mm_answer_authrole(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	monitor_permit_authentications(1);
+
+	authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+	debug3("%s: role=%s",
+	    __func__, authctxt->role);
+
+	if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
+		xfree(authctxt->role);
+		authctxt->role = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+ mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ {
+ 	static int call_count;
+@@ -1080,7 +1100,7 @@ static int
+ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+ {
+ 	Buffer b;
+-	char *p;
+	char *p, *r;
+ 	u_int len;
+ 	int fail = 0;
+ 
+@@ -1106,6 +1126,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i
+ 	if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
+ 		fail++;
+ 	p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+	if ((r = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL)
+		*r = '\0';
+ 	if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) {
+ 		logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
+ 		    authctxt->user, p);
+@@ -1137,7 +1159,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
+     char *chost)
+ {
+ 	Buffer b;
+-	char *p;
+	char *p, *r;
+ 	u_int len;
+ 	int fail = 0;
+ 
+@@ -1154,6 +1176,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
+ 	if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
+ 		fail++;
+ 	p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+	if ((r = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL)
+		*r = '\0';
+ 	if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) {
+ 		logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
+ 		    authctxt->user, p);
--- a/openssh-5.2p1-vendor.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.2p1-vendor.patch
@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/configure.ac.vendor openssh-5.2p1/configure.ac
+--- openssh-5.2p1/configure.ac.vendor	2008-07-23 14:13:22.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.2p1/configure.ac	2008-07-23 14:13:22.000000000 +0200
+@@ -3890,6 +3890,12 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(lastlog,
+ 		fi
+ 	]
+ )
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(vendor-patchlevel,
+  [  --enable-vendor-patchlevel=TAG  specify a vendor patch level],
+  [AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL,[SSH_RELEASE "-" "$enableval"],[Define to your vendor patch level, if it has been modified from the upstream source release.])
+   SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL="$enableval"],
+  [AC_DEFINE(SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL,SSH_RELEASE,[Define to your vendor patch level, if it has been modified from the upstream source release.])
+   SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL=none])
+ 
+ dnl lastlog, [uw]tmpx? detection
+ dnl  NOTE: set the paths in the platform section to avoid the
+@@ -4146,6 +4152,7 @@ echo "       IP address in \$DISPLAY hac
+ echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
+ echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
+ echo "              Random number source: $RAND_MSG"
+echo "                Vendor patch level: $SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL"
+ if test ! -z "$USE_RAND_HELPER" ; then
+ echo "     ssh-rand-helper collects from: $RAND_HELPER_MSG"
+ fi
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config.5.vendor openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config.5.vendor	2008-07-23 14:13:22.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config.5	2008-07-23 14:19:23.000000000 +0200
+@@ -812,6 +812,14 @@ This option applies to protocol version 
+ .It Cm ServerKeyBits
+ Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key.
+ The minimum value is 512, and the default is 1024.
+.It Cm ShowPatchLevel 
+Specifies whether 
+.Nm sshd 
+will display the patch level of the binary in the identification string. 
+The patch level is set at compile-time. 
+The default is 
+.Dq no . 
+This option applies to protocol version 1 only. 
+ .It Cm StrictModes
+ Specifies whether
+ .Xr sshd 8
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/servconf.h.vendor openssh-5.2p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-5.2p1/servconf.h.vendor	2008-06-10 15:01:51.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.2p1/servconf.h	2008-07-23 14:13:22.000000000 +0200
+@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	int	max_authtries;
+ 	int	max_sessions;
+ 	char   *banner;			/* SSH-2 banner message */
+	int	show_patchlevel;	/* Show vendor patch level to clients */
+ 	int	use_dns;
+ 	int	client_alive_interval;	/*
+ 					 * poke the client this often to
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/servconf.c.vendor openssh-5.2p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-5.2p1/servconf.c.vendor	2008-07-04 05:51:12.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.2p1/servconf.c	2008-07-23 14:32:27.000000000 +0200
+@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions 
+ 	options->max_authtries = -1;
+ 	options->max_sessions = -1;
+ 	options->banner = NULL;
+	options->show_patchlevel = -1;
+ 	options->use_dns = -1;
+ 	options->client_alive_interval = -1;
+ 	options->client_alive_count_max = -1;
+@@ -262,6 +263,9 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 	if (options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = 0;
+ 
+	if (options->show_patchlevel == -1)
+ 		options->show_patchlevel = 0;
+ 
+ 	/* Turn privilege separation on by default */
+ 	if (use_privsep == -1)
+ 		use_privsep = 1;
+@@ -299,7 +303,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sProtocol, sPidFile,
+ 	sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem,
+ 	sMaxStartups, sMaxAuthTries, sMaxSessions,
+-	sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
+	sBanner, sShowPatchLevel, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
+ 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
+ 	sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, sAuthorizedKeysFile2,
+ 	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+@@ -410,6 +414,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "maxauthtries", sMaxAuthTries, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "maxsessions", sMaxSessions, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "banner", sBanner, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "showpatchlevel", sShowPatchLevel, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "usedns", sUseDNS, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "verifyreversemapping", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1033,6 +1038,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 		intptr = &use_privsep;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
+	case sShowPatchLevel:
+		intptr = &options->show_patchlevel;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+ 	case sAllowUsers:
+ 		while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
+ 			if (options->num_allow_users >= MAX_ALLOW_USERS)
+@@ -1613,6 +1622,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseLogin, o->use_login);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sCompression, o->compression);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGatewayPorts, o->gateway_ports);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sShowPatchLevel, o->show_patchlevel);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep);
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config.0.vendor openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config.0
+--- openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config.0.vendor	2008-07-23 14:13:22.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config.0	2008-07-23 14:13:22.000000000 +0200
+@@ -466,6 +466,11 @@ DESCRIPTION
+              Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1
+              server key.  The minimum value is 512, and the default is 1024.
+ 
+     ShowPatchLevel
+	     Specifies whether sshd will display the specific patch level of
+	     the binary in the server identification string.  The patch level
+	     is set at compile-time.  The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+      StrictModes
+              Specifies whether sshd(8) should check file modes and ownership
+              of the user's files and home directory before accepting login.
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config.vendor openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config.vendor	2008-07-23 14:13:22.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config	2008-07-23 14:13:22.000000000 +0200
+@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ X11Forwarding yes
+ #Compression delayed
+ #ClientAliveInterval 0
+ #ClientAliveCountMax 3
+#ShowPatchLevel no
+ #UseDNS yes
+ #PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid
+ #MaxStartups 10
+diff -up openssh-5.2p1/sshd.c.vendor openssh-5.2p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-5.2p1/sshd.c.vendor	2008-07-11 09:36:49.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.2p1/sshd.c	2008-07-23 14:35:43.000000000 +0200
+@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in
+ 		minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1;
+ 	}
+ 	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s", major, minor,
+-	    SSH_VERSION, newline);
+	   (options.show_patchlevel == 1) ? SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL : SSH_VERSION, newline);
+ 	server_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
+ 
+ 	/* Send our protocol version identification. */
+@@ -1484,7 +1484,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		exit(1);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_RELEASE);
+	debug("sshd version %.100s",
+	      (options.show_patchlevel == 1) ? SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL : SSH_RELEASE);
+ 
+ 	/* Store privilege separation user for later use if required. */
+ 	if ((privsep_pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL) {
--- a/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c
--- openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe	2011-08-23 18:30:33.873025916 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c	2011-08-23 18:32:24.574025362 +0200
-@@ -715,6 +715,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 		fdlim_set(maxfd);
- 	fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con));
- 
-+	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
-+
- 	read_wait_nfdset = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS);
- 	read_wait = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
- 
--- a/openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch
@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1
--- openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man	2011-08-05 22:17:32.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1	2011-08-31 13:08:34.880024485 +0200
-@@ -1400,6 +1400,8 @@ manual page for more information.
- .Nm
- exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255
- if an error occurred.
-+.Sh IPV6
-+IPv6 address can be used everywhere where IPv4 address. In all entries must be the IPv6 address enclosed in square brackets. Note: The square brackets are metacharacters for the shell and must be escaped in shell.
- .Sh SEE ALSO
- .Xr scp 1 ,
- .Xr sftp 1 ,
-diff -up openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8
--- openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man	2011-08-05 22:17:32.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8	2011-08-31 13:10:34.129039094 +0200
-@@ -940,6 +940,8 @@ concurrently for different ports, this c
- started last).
- The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
- .El
-+.Sh IPV6
-+IPv6 address can be used everywhere where IPv4 address. In all entries must be the IPv6 address enclosed in square brackets. Note: The square brackets are metacharacters for the shell and must be escaped in shell.
- .Sh SEE ALSO
- .Xr scp 1 ,
- .Xr sftp 1 ,
--- a/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch
@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c
--- openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp	2012-01-11 09:24:06.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c	2012-01-11 15:54:04.675956600 +0100
-@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, in
- 
- struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx
- {
-	AES_KEY		aes_ctx;
-+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX	ecbctx;
- 	u_char		aes_counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
- };
- 
-@@ -63,21 +63,42 @@ ssh_aes_ctr(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char
- {
- 	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
- 	size_t n = 0;
-	u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
-+	u_char ctrbuf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE*256];
-+	u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE*256];
- 
- 	if (len == 0)
- 		return (1);
- 	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL)
- 		return (0);
- 
-	while ((len--) > 0) {
-+	for (; len > 0; len -= sizeof(u_int)) {
-+		u_int r,a,b;
-+
- 		if (n == 0) {
-			AES_encrypt(c->aes_counter, buf, &c->aes_ctx);
-			ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+			int outl, i, buflen;
-+
-+			buflen = MIN(len, sizeof(ctrbuf));
-+
-+			for(i = 0; i < buflen; i += AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
-+				memcpy(&ctrbuf[i], c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+				ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+			}
-+
-+			EVP_EncryptUpdate(&c->ecbctx, buf, &outl,
-+				ctrbuf, buflen);
- 		}
-		*(dest++) = *(src++) ^ buf[n];
-		n = (n + 1) % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-+
-+		memcpy(&a, src, sizeof(a));
-+		memcpy(&b, &buf[n], sizeof(b));
-+		r = a ^ b;
-+		memcpy(dest, &r, sizeof(r));
-+		src += sizeof(a);
-+		dest += sizeof(r);
-+
-+		n = (n + sizeof(b)) % sizeof(buf);
- 	}
-+	memset(ctrbuf, '\0', sizeof(ctrbuf));
-+	memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
- 	return (1);
- }
- 
-@@ -91,9 +112,28 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, co
- 		c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c));
- 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c);
- 	}
-	if (key != NULL)
-		AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
-		    &c->aes_ctx);
-+
-+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->ecbctx);
-+
-+	if (key != NULL) {
-+		const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
-+		switch(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx)*8) {
-+			case 128:
-+				cipher = EVP_aes_128_ecb();
-+				break;
-+			case 192:
-+				cipher = EVP_aes_192_ecb();
-+				break;
-+			case 256:
-+				cipher = EVP_aes_256_ecb();
-+				break;
-+			default:
-+				fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_init: wrong aes key length");
-+		}
-+		if(!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&c->ecbctx, cipher, NULL, key, NULL))
-+			fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_init: cannot initialize aes encryption");
-+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&c->ecbctx, 0);
-+	}
- 	if (iv != NULL)
- 		memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- 	return (1);
-@@ -105,6 +145,7 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
- 	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
- 
- 	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
-+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->ecbctx);
- 		memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
- 		free(c);
- 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
--- a/openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch
@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
-index d98fa67..25d347b 100644
--- a/scp.c
-+++ b/scp.c
-@@ -638,7 +638,10 @@ toremote(char *targ, int argc, char **argv)
- 			addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program);
- 			addargs(&alist, "-x");
- 			addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes");
-			addargs(&alist, "-n");
-+			if (isatty(fileno(stdin)))
-+				addargs(&alist, "-t");
-+			else
-+				addargs(&alist, "-n");
- 			for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) {
- 				addargs(&alist, "%s",
- 				    remote_remote_args.list[j]);
--- a/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
@ -1,263 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/log.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100
-@@ -250,6 +250,11 @@ debug3(const char *fmt,...)
- void
- log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr)
- {
-+	log_init_handler(av0, level, facility, on_stderr, 1);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+log_init_handler(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr, int reset_handler) {
- #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
- 	struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
- #endif
-@@ -273,8 +278,10 @@ log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, Sysl
- 		exit(1);
- 	}
- 
-	log_handler = NULL;
-	log_handler_ctx = NULL;
-+	if (reset_handler) {
-+		log_handler = NULL;
-+		log_handler_ctx = NULL;
-+	}
- 
- 	log_on_stderr = on_stderr;
- 	if (on_stderr)
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.h
--- openssh-7.4p1/log.h.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/log.h	2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100
-@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ typedef enum {
- typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, const char *, void *);
- 
- void     log_init(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
-+void     log_init_handler(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int, int);
- LogLevel log_level_get(void);
- int      log_change_level(LogLevel);
- int      log_is_on_stderr(void);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.311168085 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c	2016-12-23 15:16:42.154193100 +0100
-@@ -307,6 +307,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
- 		close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
- 	pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
- 
-+	pmonitor->m_state = "preauth";
-+
- 	authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
- 	memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
- 	ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
-@@ -405,6 +407,8 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *p
- 	close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
- 	pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
- 
-+	pmonitor->m_state = "postauth";
-+
- 	monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
- 	ssh_signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
- 	ssh_signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
-@@ -472,7 +476,7 @@ monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonito
- 	if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
- 		fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
- 		    __func__, level);
-	do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
-+	do_log2(level, "%s [%s]", msg, pmonitor->m_state);
- 
- 	sshbuf_free(logmsg);
- 	free(msg);
-@@ -1719,13 +1723,28 @@ monitor_init(void)
- 	mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
- 	monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
- 
-+	mon->m_state = "";
-+
- 	return mon;
- }
- 
- void
-monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
-+monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon, const char *chroot_dir)
- {
-	monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
-+	struct stat dev_log_stat;
-+	char *dev_log_path;
-+	int do_logfds = 0;
-+
-+	if (chroot_dir != NULL) {
-+		xasprintf(&dev_log_path, "%s/dev/log", chroot_dir);
-+
-+		if (stat(dev_log_path, &dev_log_stat) != 0) {
-+			debug("%s: /dev/log doesn't exist in %s chroot - will try to log via monitor using [postauth] suffix", __func__, chroot_dir);
-+			do_logfds = 1;
-+		}
-+		free(dev_log_path);
-+	}
-+	monitor_openfds(mon, do_logfds);
- }
- 
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h
--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h	2016-12-23 15:16:28.372190424 +0100
-@@ -83,10 +83,11 @@ struct monitor {
- 	int			 m_log_sendfd;
- 	struct kex		**m_pkex;
- 	pid_t			 m_pid;
-+	char		*m_state;
- };
- 
- struct monitor *monitor_init(void);
-void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *);
-+void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *, const char *);
- 
- struct Authctxt;
- void monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *, struct monitor *);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.319168086 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 15:18:18.742211853 +0100
-@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ login_cap_t *lc;
- 
- static int is_child = 0;
- static int in_chroot = 0;
-+static int have_dev_log = 1;
- 
- /* File containing userauth info, if ExposeAuthInfo set */
- static char *auth_info_file = NULL;
-@@ -619,6 +620,7 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
- 	int ret;
- 	const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL;
- 	char session_type[1024];
-+	struct stat dev_log_stat;
- 
- 	if (options.adm_forced_command) {
- 		original_command = command;
-@@ -676,6 +678,10 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
- 			tty += 5;
- 	}
- 
-+	if (lstat("/dev/log", &dev_log_stat) != 0) {
-+		have_dev_log = 0;
-+	}
-+
- 	verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
- 	    session_type,
- 	    tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
-@@ -1486,14 +1492,6 @@ child_close_fds(void)
- 
- 	/* Stop directing logs to a high-numbered fd before we close it */
- 	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
-
-	/*
-	 * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
-	 * hanging around in clients.  Note that we want to do this after
-	 * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
-	 * descriptors open.
-	 */
-	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
- }
- 
- /*
-@@ -1629,8 +1627,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
- 			exit(1);
- 	}
- 
-	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
-
- 	do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell);
- 
- 	/* restore SIGPIPE for child */
-@@ -1653,9 +1649,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
- 		argv[i] = NULL;
- 		optind = optreset = 1;
- 		__progname = argv[0];
-		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
-+		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw, have_dev_log));
- 	}
- 
-+	/*
-+	 * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
-+	 * hanging around in clients.  Note that we want to do this after
-+	 * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
-+	 * descriptors open.
-+	 */
-+	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
-+
- 	fflush(NULL);
- 
- 	/* Get the last component of the shell name. */
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h
--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h	2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100
-@@ -97,5 +97,5 @@
- 
- struct passwd;
- 
-int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *);
-+int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *, int);
- void	sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100
-@@ -1497,7 +1497,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
- }
- 
- int
-sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
-+sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handler)
- {
- 	fd_set *rset, *wset;
- 	int i, r, in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
-@@ -1511,7 +1511,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
- 	extern char *__progname;
- 
- 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
-	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
-+	log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler);
- 
- 	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
- 
-@@ -1582,7 +1582,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
- 		}
- 	}
- 
-	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
-+	log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler);
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * On platforms where we can, avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps}
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100
-@@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 		return 1;
- 	}
- 
-	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
-+	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw, 0));
- }
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.328168088 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.332168088 +0100
-@@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 	}
- 
- 	/* New socket pair */
-	monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
-+	monitor_reinit(pmonitor, options.chroot_directory);
- 
- 	pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
- 	if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
-@@ -668,6 +668,11 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 
- 	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
- 	pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
-+	close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
-+	pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
-+
-+	if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd != -1)
-+		set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
- 
- 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
- 	demote_sensitive_data();
--- a/openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch
@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
--- a/scp.c	
-+++ a/scp.c	
-@@ -1084,6 +1084,10 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
- 			free(vect[0]);
- 			continue;
- 		}
-+		if (buf[0] == 'C' && ! exists && np[strlen(np)-1] == '/') {
-+			errno = ENOTDIR;
-+			goto bad;
-+		}
- 		omode = mode;
- 		mode |= S_IWUSR;
- 		if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) == -1) {
-- 
--- a/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
@ -1,132 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
- #include "misc.h"      /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
- #include "servconf.h"
- #include "port-linux.h"
-+#include "misc.h"
- #include "sshkey.h"
- #include "hostfile.h"
- #include "auth.h"
-@@ -445,7 +446,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
- void
- sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
- {
-	security_context_t *ctx;
-+	char *ctx;
- 
- 	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
- 		return;
-@@ -461,6 +462,72 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
- 	}
- }
- 
-+void
-+sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void)
-+{
-+	int len;
-+	char line[1024], *preauth_context = NULL, *cp, *arg;
-+	const char *contexts_path;
-+	FILE *contexts_file;
-+	struct stat sb;
-+
-+	contexts_path = selinux_openssh_contexts_path();
-+	if (contexts_path == NULL) {
-+		debug3("%s: Failed to get the path to SELinux context", __func__);
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((contexts_file = fopen(contexts_path, "r")) == NULL) {
-+		debug("%s: Failed to open SELinux context file", __func__);
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (fstat(fileno(contexts_file), &sb) != 0 ||
-+	    sb.st_uid != 0 || (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
-+		logit("%s: SELinux context file needs to be owned by root"
-+		    " and not writable by anyone else", __func__);
-+		fclose(contexts_file);
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
-+	while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), contexts_file)) {
-+		/* Strip trailing whitespace */
-+		for (len = strlen(line) - 1; len > 0; len--) {
-+			if (strchr(" \t\r\n", line[len]) == NULL)
-+				break;
-+			line[len] = '\0';
-+		}
-+
-+		if (line[0] == '\0')
-+			continue;
-+
-+		cp = line;
-+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
-+		if (arg && *arg == '\0')
-+			arg = strdelim(&cp);
-+
-+		if (arg && strcmp(arg, "privsep_preauth") == 0) {
-+			arg = strdelim(&cp);
-+			if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
-+				debug("%s: privsep_preauth is empty", __func__);
-+				fclose(contexts_file);
-+				return;
-+			}
-+			preauth_context = xstrdup(arg);
-+		}
-+	}
-+	fclose(contexts_file);
-+
-+	if (preauth_context == NULL) {
-+		debug("%s: Unable to find 'privsep_preauth' option in"
-+		    " SELinux context file", __func__);
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
-+	ssh_selinux_change_context(preauth_context);
-+	free(preauth_context);
-+}
-+
- #endif
- #endif
- 
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
-index 22ea8ef..1fc963d 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
-@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname)
- 	strlcpy(newctx + len, newname, newlen - len);
- 	if ((cx = index(cx + 1, ':')))
- 		strlcat(newctx, cx, newlen);
-	debug3("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
-+	debug("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
- 	    oldctx, newctx);
- 	if (setcon(newctx) < 0)
- 		switchlog("%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s", __func__,
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-index cb51f99..8b7cda2 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
- void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
- void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
- int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
-+void sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void);
- #endif
- 
- #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index 2871fe9..39b9c08 100644
--- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
- 	demote_sensitive_data();
- 
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-	ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t");
-+	sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context();
- #endif
- 
- 	/* Demote the child */
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.615216100 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2016-12-23 15:18:40.628216102 +0100
-@@ -279,7 +279,6 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
- 	FILE *fp;
- 	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
- 	char *line = NULL;
-	char kuser[65]; /* match krb5_kuserok() */
- 	struct stat st;
- 	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
- 	int found_principal = 0;
-@@ -288,7 +287,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
- 
- 	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
- 	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
-	if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) {
-+	if ( !options.enable_k5users || (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1))) {
-                 return ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, principal, luser,
-                                         k5login_exists);
- 	}
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.615216100 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 15:35:36.354401156 +0100
-@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
- 	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
- 	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
- 	options->use_kuserok = -1;
-+	options->enable_k5users = -1;
- 	options->password_authentication = -1;
- 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
-@@ -345,6 +346,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
- #endif
- 	if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
- 		options->use_kuserok = 1;
-+	if (options->enable_k5users == -1)
-+		options->enable_k5users = 0;
- 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
- 		options->password_authentication = 1;
- 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -418,7 +421,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes,
- 	sHostKeyAlgorithms,
- 	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
-	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
-+	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
- 	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
- 	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
- 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
-@@ -497,14 +500,16 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL },
- #else
- 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "gssapienablek5users", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- #endif
- 	{ "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1653,6 +1658,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
- 		goto parse_flag;
- 
-+	case sGssEnablek5users:
-+		intptr = &options->enable_k5users;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
- 	case sPermitListen:
- 	case sPermitOpen:
- 		if (opcode == sPermitListen) {
-@@ -2026,6 +2035,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok);
-+	M_CP_INTOPT(enable_k5users);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
-@@ -2320,6 +2330,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- # endif
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
-+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssEnablek5users, o->enable_k5users);
- #endif
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.616216100 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2016-12-23 15:18:40.629216102 +0100
-@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ typedef struct {
-	int     kerberos_unique_ccache;		/* If true, the acquired ticket will
-						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
- 	int	use_kuserok;
-+	int		enable_k5users;
- 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
- 	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
- 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.630216103 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2016-12-23 15:36:21.607408435 +0100
-@@ -628,6 +628,12 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
- on logout.
- The default is
- .Cm yes .
-+.It Cm GSSAPIEnablek5users
-+Specifies whether to look at .k5users file for GSSAPI authentication
-+access control. Further details are described in
-+.Xr ksu 1 .
-+The default is
-+.Cm no .
- .It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
- Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
- doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.616216100 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config	2016-12-23 15:18:40.631216103 +0100
-@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ GSSAPIAuthentication yes
- #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
- #GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
- #GSSAPIKeyExchange no
-+#GSSAPIEnablek5users no
- 
- # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
- # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c
--- openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts	2016-07-25 13:58:48.998507834 +0200
-+++ openssh/sshd.c	2016-07-25 14:01:28.346469878 +0200
-@@ -1507,12 +1507,29 @@ check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
- 
- 	if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts,
- 	    &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
-		text[0] = '\0';
-		for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
-			snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
-			    " %2.2x", opts[i]);
-		fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP opts: %.800s",
-		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text);
-+		i = 0;
-+		do {
-+			switch (opts[i]) {
-+				case 0:
-+				case 1:
-+					++i;
-+					break;
-+				case 130:
-+				case 133:
-+				case 134:
-+					i += opts[i + 1];
-+					break;
-+				default:
-+				/* Fail, fatally, if we detect either loose or strict
-+			 	 * source routing options. */
-+					text[0] = '\0';
-+					for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
-+						snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
-+							" %2.2x", opts[i]);
-+					fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP options:%.800s",
-+						ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text);
-+			}
-+		} while (i < option_size);
- 	}
- 	return;
- #endif /* IP_OPTIONS */
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-ctr-cavstest.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-ctr-cavstest.patch
@ -1,257 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in
--- openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs	2015-03-18 11:22:05.493289018 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in	2015-03-18 11:22:44.504196316 +0100
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
- SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
- SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
- SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
-+CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest
- SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
- SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
- PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
-@@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
- 
- .SUFFIXES: .lo
- 
-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
- 
- XMSS_OBJS=\
- 	ssh-xmss.o \
-@@ -194,6 +195,9 @@ ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) l
- ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS)
- 
-+ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
-+
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
- 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
- 
-@@ -326,6 +330,7 @@ install-files:
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
-+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
-diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c
--- openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs	2015-03-18 11:22:05.521288952 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c	2015-03-18 11:22:05.521288952 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
-+/*
-+ *
-+ * invocation (all of the following are equal):
-+ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6
-+ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 --iv 00000000000000000000000000000000
-+ * echo -n a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 | ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <sys/param.h>
-+#include <stdarg.h>
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <ctype.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "ssherr.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+
-+/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
-+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-+
-+void usage(void) {
-+        fprintf(stderr, "Usage: ctr-cavstest --algo <ssh-crypto-algorithm>\n"
-+                        "                    --key <hexadecimal-key> --mode <encrypt|decrypt>\n"
-+                        "                    [--iv <hexadecimal-iv>] --data <hexadecimal-data>\n\n"
-+                        "Hexadecimal output is printed to stdout.\n"
-+                        "Hexadecimal input data can be alternatively read from stdin.\n");
-+        exit(1);
-+}
-+
-+void *fromhex(char *hex, size_t *len)
-+{
-+        unsigned char *bin;
-+        char *p;
-+        size_t n = 0;
-+        int shift = 4;
-+        unsigned char out = 0;
-+        unsigned char *optr;
-+
-+        bin = xmalloc(strlen(hex)/2);
-+        optr = bin;
-+
-+        for (p = hex; *p != '\0'; ++p) {
-+                unsigned char c;
-+
-+                c = *p;
-+                if (isspace(c))
-+                        continue;
-+
-+                if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
-+                        c = c - '0';
-+                } else if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') {
-+                        c = c - 'A' + 10;
-+                } else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') {
-+                        c = c - 'a' + 10;
-+                } else {
-+                        /* truncate on nonhex cipher */
-+                        break;
-+                }
-+
-+                out |= c << shift;
-+                shift = (shift + 4) % 8;
-+
-+                if (shift) {
-+                        *(optr++) = out;
-+                        out = 0;
-+                        ++n;
-+                }
-+        }
-+
-+        *len = n;
-+        return bin;
-+}
-+
-+#define READ_CHUNK 4096
-+#define MAX_READ_SIZE 1024*1024*100
-+char *read_stdin(void)
-+{
-+        char *buf;
-+        size_t n, total = 0;
-+
-+        buf = xmalloc(READ_CHUNK);
-+
-+        do {
-+                n = fread(buf + total, 1, READ_CHUNK, stdin);
-+                if (n < READ_CHUNK) /* terminate on short read */
-+                        break;
-+
-+                total += n;
-+                buf = xreallocarray(buf, total + READ_CHUNK, 1);
-+        } while(total < MAX_READ_SIZE);
-+        return buf;
-+}
-+
-+int main (int argc, char *argv[])
-+{
-+
-+        const struct sshcipher *c;
-+        struct sshcipher_ctx *cc;
-+        char *algo = "aes128-ctr";
-+        char *hexkey = NULL;
-+        char *hexiv = "00000000000000000000000000000000";
-+        char *hexdata = NULL;
-+        char *p;
-+        int i, r;
-+        int encrypt = 1;
-+        void *key;
-+        size_t keylen;
-+        void *iv;
-+        size_t ivlen;
-+        void *data;
-+        size_t datalen;
-+        void *outdata;
-+
-+        for (i = 1; i < argc; ++i) {
-+                if (strcmp(argv[i], "--algo") == 0) {
-+                        algo = argv[++i];
-+                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--key") == 0) {
-+                        hexkey = argv[++i];
-+                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--mode") == 0) {
-+                        ++i;
-+                        if (argv[i] == NULL) {
-+                                usage();
-+                        }
-+                        if (strncmp(argv[i], "enc", 3) == 0) {
-+                                encrypt = 1;
-+                        } else if (strncmp(argv[i], "dec", 3) == 0) {
-+                                encrypt = 0;
-+                        } else {
-+                                usage();
-+                        }
-+                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--iv") == 0) {
-+                        hexiv = argv[++i];
-+                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--data") == 0) {
-+                        hexdata = argv[++i];
-+                }
-+        }
-+
-+        if (hexkey == NULL || algo == NULL) {
-+                usage();
-+        }
-+
-+	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
-+
-+	c = cipher_by_name(algo);
-+	if (c == NULL) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unknown algorithm\n");
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+        if (hexdata == NULL) {
-+                hexdata = read_stdin();
-+        } else {
-+                hexdata = xstrdup(hexdata);
-+        }
-+
-+        key = fromhex(hexkey, &keylen);
-+
-+	if (keylen != 16 && keylen != 24 && keylen == 32) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported key length\n");
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+        iv = fromhex(hexiv, &ivlen);
-+
-+        if (ivlen != 16) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported iv length\n");
-+		return 2;
-+        }
-+
-+        data = fromhex(hexdata, &datalen);
-+
-+	if (data == NULL || datalen == 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: no data to encrypt/decrypt\n");
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((r = cipher_init(&cc, c, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, encrypt)) != 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: cipher_init failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+	free(key);
-+	free(iv);
-+
-+	outdata = malloc(datalen);
-+	if(outdata == NULL) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: memory allocation failure\n");
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((r = cipher_crypt(cc, 0, outdata, data, datalen, 0, 0)) != 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: cipher_crypt failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+	free(data);
-+
-+	cipher_free(cc);
-+
-+        for (p = outdata; datalen > 0; ++p, --datalen) {
-+		printf("%02X", (unsigned char)*p);
-+	}
-+
-+        free(outdata);
-+
-+        printf("\n");
-+        return 0;
-+}
-+
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
@ -1,280 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-index 413b845..54dd383 100644
--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
-+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-@@ -32,7 +32,9 @@
- #include <sys/types.h>
- 
- #include <stdarg.h>
-+#include <stdio.h>
- #include <string.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
- 
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "sshkey.h"
-@@ -45,6 +47,7 @@
- 
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
- 
-+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
- extern ServerOptions options;
- 
- #ifdef HEIMDAL
-@@ -56,6 +59,13 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
- # include <gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h>
- #endif
- 
-+/* all commands are allowed by default */
-+char **k5users_allowed_cmds = NULL;
-+
-+static int ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists();
-+static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal, const char *, const char *,
-+    int);
-+
- static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
- 
- /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
-@@ -88,6 +98,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
- 	krb5_principal princ;
- 	int retval;
- 	const char *errmsg;
-+	int k5login_exists;
- 
- 	if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0)
- 		return 0;
-@@ -99,10 +110,22 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
- 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
- 		return 0;
- 	}
-	if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name)) {
-+	/* krb5_kuserok() returns 1 if .k5login DNE and this is self-login.
-+	 * We have to make sure to check .k5users in that case. */
-+	k5login_exists = ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists();
-+	/* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user,
-+	 * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials
-+	 * to access these files aren't available yet. */
-+	if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) {
- 		retval = 1;
- 		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
- 		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
-+	} else if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(princ, client->exportedname.value,
-+		name, k5login_exists)) {
-+		retval = 1;
-+		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s "
-+		    "(ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok)",
-+		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
- 	} else
- 		retval = 0;
- 
-@@ -110,6 +133,137 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
- 	return retval;
- }
- 
-+/* Test for existence of .k5login.
-+ * We need this as part of our .k5users check, because krb5_kuserok()
-+ * returns success if .k5login DNE and user is logging in as himself.
-+ * With .k5login absent and .k5users present, we don't want absence
-+ * of .k5login to authorize self-login.  (absence of both is required)
-+ * Returns 1 if .k5login is available, 0 otherwise.
-+ */
-+static int
-+ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists()
-+{
-+	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
-+	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
-+
-+	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir);
-+	return access(file, F_OK) == 0;
-+}
-+
-+/* check .k5users for login or command authorization
-+ * Returns 1 if principal is authorized, 0 otherwise.
-+ * If principal is authorized, (global) k5users_allowed_cmds may be populated.
-+ */
-+static int
-+ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name,
-+    const char *luser, int k5login_exists)
-+{
-+	FILE *fp;
-+	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
-+	char *line = NULL;
-+	char kuser[65]; /* match krb5_kuserok() */
-+	struct stat st;
-+	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
-+	int found_principal = 0;
-+	int ncommands = 0, allcommands = 0;
-+	u_long linenum = 0;
-+	size_t linesize = 0;
-+
-+	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
-+	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
-+	if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) {
-+		return (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb_context, principal,
-+		    sizeof(kuser), kuser) == 0) &&
-+		    (strcmp(kuser, luser) == 0);
-+	}
-+	if ((fp = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL) {
-+		int saved_errno = errno;
-+		/* 2nd access check to ease debugging if file perms are wrong.
-+		 * But we don't want to report this if .k5users simply DNE. */
-+		if (access(file, F_OK) == 0) {
-+			logit("User %s fopen %s failed: %s",
-+			    pw->pw_name, file, strerror(saved_errno));
-+		}
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+	/* .k5users must be owned either by the user or by root */
-+	if (fstat(fileno(fp), &st) == -1) {
-+		/* can happen, but very wierd error so report it */
-+		logit("User %s fstat %s failed: %s",
-+		    pw->pw_name, file, strerror(errno));
-+		fclose(fp);
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+	if (!(st.st_uid == pw->pw_uid || st.st_uid == 0)) {
-+		logit("User %s %s is not owned by root or user",
-+		    pw->pw_name, file);
-+		fclose(fp);
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+	/* .k5users must be a regular file.  krb5_kuserok() doesn't do this
-+	  * check, but we don't want to be deficient if they add a check. */
-+	if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
-+		logit("User %s %s is not a regular file", pw->pw_name, file);
-+		fclose(fp);
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+	/* file exists; initialize k5users_allowed_cmds (to none!) */
-+	k5users_allowed_cmds = xcalloc(++ncommands,
-+	    sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds));
-+
-+	/* Check each line.  ksu allows unlimited length lines. */
-+	while (!allcommands && getline(&line, &linesize, fp) != -1) {
-+		linenum++;
-+		char *token;
-+
-+		/* we parse just like ksu, even though we could do better */
-+		if ((token = strtok(line, " \t\n")) == NULL)
-+			continue;
-+		if (strcmp(name, token) == 0) {
-+			/* we matched on client principal */
-+			found_principal = 1;
-+			if ((token = strtok(NULL, " \t\n")) == NULL) {
-+				/* only shell is allowed */
-+				k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] =
-+				    xstrdup(pw->pw_shell);
-+				k5users_allowed_cmds =
-+				    xreallocarray(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands,
-+					sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds));
-+				break;
-+			}
-+			/* process the allowed commands */
-+			while (token) {
-+				if (strcmp(token, "*") == 0) {
-+					allcommands = 1;
-+					break;
-+				}
-+				k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] =
-+				    xstrdup(token);
-+				k5users_allowed_cmds =
-+				    xreallocarray(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands,
-+					sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds));
-+				token = strtok(NULL, " \t\n");
-+			}
-+		}
-+       }
-+	free(line);
-+	if (k5users_allowed_cmds) {
-+		/* terminate vector */
-+		k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] = NULL;
-+		/* if all commands are allowed, free vector */
-+		if (allcommands) {
-+			int i;
-+			for (i = 0; i < ncommands; i++) {
-+				free(k5users_allowed_cmds[i]);
-+			}
-+			free(k5users_allowed_cmds);
-+			k5users_allowed_cmds = NULL;
-+		}
-+	}
-+	fclose(fp);
-+	return found_principal;
-+}
-+ 
- 
- /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
-  * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
-diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
-index 28659ec..9c94d8e 100644
--- a/session.c
-+++ b/session.c
-@@ -789,6 +789,29 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
- 		command = auth_opts->force_command;
- 		forced = "(key-option)";
- 	}
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+#ifdef KRB5 /* k5users_allowed_cmds only available w/ GSSAPI+KRB5 */
-+	else if (k5users_allowed_cmds) {
-+		const char *match = command;
-+		int allowed = 0, i = 0;
-+
-+		if (!match)
-+			match = s->pw->pw_shell;
-+		while (k5users_allowed_cmds[i]) {
-+			if (strcmp(match, k5users_allowed_cmds[i++]) == 0) {
-+				debug("Allowed command '%.900s'", match);
-+				allowed = 1;
-+				break;
-+			}
-+		}
-+		if (!allowed) {
-+			debug("command '%.900s' not allowed", match);
-+			return 1;
-+		}
-+	}
-+#endif
-+#endif
-+
- 	s->forced = 0;
- 	if (forced != NULL) {
- 		s->forced = 1;
-diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
-index 0374c88..509109a 100644
--- a/ssh-gss.h
-+++ b/ssh-gss.h
-@@ -49,6 +49,10 @@
- #  endif /* !HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_... */
- 
- # endif /* !HEIMDAL */
-+
-+/* .k5users support */
-+extern char **k5users_allowed_cmds;
-+
- #endif /* KRB5 */
- 
- /* draft-ietf-secsh-gsskeyex-06 */
-diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
-index adcaaf9..824163b 100644
--- a/sshd.8
-+++ b/sshd.8
-@@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.
- The client tries to authenticate itself using
- host-based authentication,
- public key authentication,
-+GSSAPI authentication,
- challenge-response authentication,
- or password authentication.
- .Pp
-@@ -800,6 +801,12 @@ This file is used in exactly the same way as
- but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
- rlogin/rsh.
- .Pp
-+.It Pa ~/.k5login
-+.It Pa ~/.k5users
-+These files enforce GSSAPI/Kerberos authentication access control.
-+Further details are described in
-+.Xr ksu 1 .
-+.Pp
- .It Pa ~/.ssh/
- This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
- and authentication information.
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
@ -1,485 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh/auth.c.keycat openssh/misc.c
--- openssh/auth.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.158849606 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth.c	2015-06-24 11:04:23.989868638 +0200
-@@ -966,6 +966,14 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
- 			_exit(1);
- 		}
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
-+			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
-+			    strerror(errno));
-+			_exit(127);
-+		}
-+#endif
-+
- 		execve(av[0], av, child_env);
- 		error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno));
- 		_exit(127);
-diff -up openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
--- openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
-+++ openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
-+The ssh-keycat retrieves the content of the ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
-+of an user in any environment. This includes environments with
-+polyinstantiation of home directories and SELinux MLS policy enabled.
-+
-+To use ssh-keycat, set these options in /etc/ssh/sshd_config file:
-+        AuthorizedKeysCommand /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keycat
-+        AuthorizedKeysCommandUser root
-+
-+Do not forget to enable public key authentication:
-+        PubkeyAuthentication yes
-+
-+
-diff -up openssh/Makefile.in.keycat openssh/Makefile.in
--- openssh/Makefile.in.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.152849621 +0200
-+++ openssh/Makefile.in	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
-@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
- ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
- SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
- SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
-+SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
- SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
- SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
- PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
-@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
- K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
- GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
- SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
-+KEYCATLIBS=@KEYCATLIBS@
- LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
- LIBFIDO2=@LIBFIDO2@
- AR=@AR@
-@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
- 
- .SUFFIXES: .lo
- 
-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT)
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
- 
- XMSS_OBJS=\
- 	ssh-xmss.o \
-@@ -190,6 +191,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT)
- ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SKHELPER_OBJS)
- 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2)
- 
-+ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS)
-+
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
- 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
- 
-@@ -321,6 +325,7 @@ install-files:
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
-+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.150849626 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2015-06-24 10:57:50.160849601 +0200
-@@ -25,8 +25,10 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const
- void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
- 
-+int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
- void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
- void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
-+int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
- #endif
- 
- #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.150849626 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2015-06-24 10:57:50.159849603 +0200
-@@ -54,6 +54,20 @@ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
- extern int inetd_flag;
- extern int rexeced_flag;
- 
-+/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
-+int
-+sshd_selinux_enabled(void)
-+{
-+	static int enabled = -1;
-+
-+	if (enabled == -1) {
-+		enabled = (is_selinux_enabled() == 1);
-+		debug("SELinux support %s", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled");
-+	}
-+
-+	return (enabled);
-+}
-+
- /* Send audit message */
- static int
- sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context,
-@@ -308,7 +322,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
- 
- /* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
- static int
-sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
-+sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *))
- {
- 	const char *reqlvl;
- 	char *role;
-@@ -319,16 +333,16 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
- 
- 	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
- 
-	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
-+	rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
- 
- 	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
- 		use_current = "1";
- 	} else {
- 		use_current = "";
-		rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: "");
-+		rv = rv || set_it("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: "");
- 	}
- 
-	rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current);
-+	rv = rv || set_it("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current);
- 
- 	if (role != NULL)
- 		free(role);
-@@ -336,6 +350,24 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
- 	return rv;
- }
- 
-+static int
-+sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
-+{
-+	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_pam_putenv);
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+do_setenv(char *name, const char *value)
-+{
-+	return setenv(name, value, 1);
-+}
-+
-+int
-+sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void)
-+{
-+	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv);
-+}
-+
- /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
- void
- sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
-@@ -344,7 +376,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
- 	int r = 0;
- 	security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
- 
-	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
-+	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
- 		return;
- 
- 	if (options.use_pam) {
-@@ -415,7 +447,7 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
- {
- 	security_context_t *ctx;
- 
-	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
-+	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
- 		return;
- 
- 	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
-diff -up openssh/platform.c.keycat openssh/platform.c
--- openssh/platform.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.147849633 +0200
-+++ openssh/platform.c	2015-06-24 10:57:50.160849601 +0200
-@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *p
- {
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- 	/* Cache selinux status for later use */
-	(void)ssh_selinux_enabled();
-+	(void)sshd_selinux_enabled();
- #endif
- 
- #ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS
-diff -up openssh/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh/ssh-keycat.c
--- openssh/ssh-keycat.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.161849599 +0200
-+++ openssh/ssh-keycat.c	2015-06-24 10:57:50.161849599 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
-+/*
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
-+ *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
-+ *    products derived from this software without specific prior
-+ *    written permission.
-+ *
-+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
-+ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
-+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
-+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
-+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
-+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
-+ * DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
-+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
-+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
-+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
-+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
-+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Red Hat, Inc.
-+ * Written by Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com>
-+*/
-+
-+#define _GNU_SOURCE
-+
-+#include "config.h"
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <sys/stat.h>
-+#include <pwd.h>
-+#include <fcntl.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
-+#include <stdint.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
-+
-+#include "uidswap.h"
-+#include "misc.h"
-+
-+#define ERR_USAGE 1
-+#define ERR_PAM_START 2
-+#define ERR_OPEN_SESSION 3
-+#define ERR_CLOSE_SESSION 4
-+#define ERR_PAM_END 5
-+#define ERR_GETPWNAM 6
-+#define ERR_MEMORY 7
-+#define ERR_OPEN 8
-+#define ERR_FILE_MODE 9
-+#define ERR_FDOPEN 10
-+#define ERR_STAT 11
-+#define ERR_WRITE 12
-+#define ERR_PAM_PUTENV 13
-+#define BUFLEN 4096
-+
-+/* Just ignore the messages in the conversation function */
-+static int
-+dummy_conv(int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msgm,
-+	   struct pam_response **response, void *appdata_ptr)
-+{
-+	struct pam_response *rsp;
-+
-+	(void)msgm;
-+	(void)appdata_ptr;
-+
-+	if (num_msg <= 0)
-+		return PAM_CONV_ERR;
-+
-+	/* Just allocate the array as empty responses */
-+	rsp = calloc (num_msg, sizeof (struct pam_response));
-+	if (rsp == NULL)
-+		return PAM_CONV_ERR;
-+
-+	*response = rsp;
-+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
-+}
-+
-+static struct pam_conv conv = {
-+	dummy_conv,
-+	NULL
-+};
-+
-+char *
-+make_auth_keys_name(const struct passwd *pwd)
-+{
-+	char *fname;
-+
-+	if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.ssh/authorized_keys", pwd->pw_dir) < 0)
-+		return NULL;
-+
-+	return fname;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+dump_keys(const char *user)
-+{
-+	struct passwd *pwd;
-+	int fd = -1;
-+	FILE *f = NULL;
-+	char *fname = NULL;
-+	int rv = 0;
-+	char buf[BUFLEN];
-+	size_t len;
-+	struct stat st;
-+
-+	if ((pwd = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) {
-+		return ERR_GETPWNAM;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((fname = make_auth_keys_name(pwd)) == NULL) {
-+		return ERR_MEMORY;
-+	}
-+
-+	temporarily_use_uid(pwd);
-+
-+	if ((fd = open(fname, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_NOFOLLOW, 0)) < 0) {
-+		rv = ERR_OPEN;
-+		goto fail;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
-+		rv = ERR_STAT;
-+		goto fail;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode) || 
-+		(st.st_uid != pwd->pw_uid && st.st_uid != 0)) {
-+		rv = ERR_FILE_MODE;
-+		goto fail;
-+	}
-+
-+	unset_nonblock(fd);
-+
-+	if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
-+		rv = ERR_FDOPEN;
-+		goto fail;
-+	}
-+
-+	fd = -1;
-+
-+	while ((len = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), f)) > 0) {
-+		rv = fwrite(buf, 1, len, stdout) != len ? ERR_WRITE : 0;
-+	}
-+
-+fail:
-+	if (fd != -1)
-+		close(fd);
-+	if (f != NULL)
-+		fclose(f);
-+	free(fname);
-+	restore_uid();
-+	return rv;
-+}
-+
-+static const char *env_names[] = { "SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED",
-+	"SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED",
-+	"SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE"
-+};
-+
-+extern char **environ;
-+
-+int
-+set_pam_environment(pam_handle_t *pamh)
-+{
-+	int i;
-+	size_t j;
-+
-+	for (j = 0; j < sizeof(env_names)/sizeof(env_names[0]); ++j) {
-+		int len = strlen(env_names[j]);
-+
-+		for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; ++i) {
-+			if (strncmp(env_names[j], environ[i], len) == 0 &&
-+			    environ[i][len] == '=') {
-+				if (pam_putenv(pamh, environ[i]) != PAM_SUCCESS)
-+					return ERR_PAM_PUTENV;
-+			}
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+main(int argc, char *argv[])
-+{
-+	pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
-+	int retval;
-+	int ev = 0;
-+
-+	if (argc != 2) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <user-name>\n", argv[0]);
-+		return ERR_USAGE;
-+	}
-+
-+	retval = pam_start("ssh-keycat", argv[1], &conv, &pamh);
-+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
-+		return ERR_PAM_START;
-+	}
-+
-+	ev = set_pam_environment(pamh);
-+	if (ev != 0)
-+		goto finish;
-+
-+	retval = pam_open_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
-+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
-+		ev = ERR_OPEN_SESSION;
-+		goto finish;
-+	}
-+
-+	ev = dump_keys(argv[1]);
-+
-+	retval = pam_close_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
-+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
-+		ev = ERR_CLOSE_SESSION;
-+	}
-+
-+finish:
-+	retval = pam_end (pamh,retval);
-+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
-+		ev = ERR_PAM_END;
-+	}
-+	return ev;
-+}
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index 3bbccfd..6481f1f 100644
--- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -2952,6 +2952,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
- 			PAM_MSG="yes"
- 
- 			SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam"
-+			KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -lpam"
- 			AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1],
- 				[Define if you want to enable PAM support])
- 
-@@ -3105,6 +3106,7 @@
- 					;;
- 				*)
- 					SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl"
-+					KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -ldl"
- 					;;
- 				esac
- 			fi
-@@ -4042,6 +4044,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
- 	fi ]
- )
- AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
-+AC_SUBST([KEYCATLIBS])
- 
- # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
- KRB5_MSG="no"
-@@ -5031,6 +5034,9 @@ fi
- if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then
- echo "         +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}"
- fi
-+if test ! -z "${KEYCATLIBS}"; then
-+echo "   +for ssh-keycat: ${KEYCATLIBS}"
-+fi
- 
- echo ""
- 
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch
@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c.keyperm openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c
--- openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c.keyperm	2020-02-14 01:40:54.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c	2020-02-17 11:55:12.841729758 +0100
-@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
- 
- #include <errno.h>
- #include <fcntl.h>
-+#include <grp.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
-@@ -101,7 +102,19 @@ sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filen
- #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
- 	if (check_ntsec(filename))
- #endif
-+
- 	if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
-+		if (st.st_mode & 040) {
-+			struct group *gr;
-+
-+			if ((gr = getgrnam("ssh_keys")) && (st.st_gid == gr->gr_gid)) {
-+				/* The only additional bit is read
-+				 * for ssh_keys group, which is fine */
-+				if ((st.st_mode & 077) == 040 ) {
-+					return 0;
-+				}
-+			}
-+		}
- 		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
- 		error("@         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @");
- 		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
@ -1,289 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.640465939 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c	2016-12-23 14:36:07.644465936 +0100
-@@ -56,6 +56,21 @@
- 
- extern ServerOptions	 options;
- 
-+int
-+ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context krb5_ctx, krb5_principal krb5_user, const char *client,
-+                 int k5login_exists)
-+{
-+	if (options.use_kuserok || !k5login_exists)
-+		return krb5_kuserok(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, client);
-+	else {
-+		char kuser[65];
-+
-+		if (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, sizeof(kuser), kuser))
-+			return 0;
-+		return strcmp(kuser, client) == 0;
-+	}
-+}
-+
- static int
- krb5_init(void *context)
- {
-@@ -160,8 +175,9 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
- 	if (problem)
- 		goto out;
- 
-	if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
-	    authctxt->pw->pw_name)) {
-+	/* Use !options.use_kuserok here to make ssh_krb5_kuserok() not
-+	 * depend on the existance of .k5login */
-+	if (!ssh_krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, authctxt->pw->pw_name, !options.use_kuserok)) {
- 		problem = -1;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.640465939 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2016-12-23 14:36:07.644465936 +0100
-@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_pr
-     int);
- 
- static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
-+extern int ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context, krb5_principal, const char *, int);
- 
- /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
- 
-@@ -92,6 +93,103 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
-  * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0
-  */
- 
-+/* The purpose of the function is to find out if a Kerberos principal is
-+ * allowed to log in as the given local user. This is a general problem with
-+ * Kerberized services because by design the Kerberos principals are
-+ * completely independent from the local user names. This is one of the
-+ * reasons why Kerberos is working well on different operating systems like
-+ * Windows and UNIX/Linux. Nevertheless a relationship between a Kerberos
-+ * principal and a local user name must be established because otherwise every
-+ * access would be granted for every principal with a valid ticket.
-+ *
-+ * Since it is a general issue libkrb5 provides some functions for
-+ * applications to find out about the relationship between the Kerberos
-+ * principal and a local user name. They are krb5_kuserok() and
-+ * krb5_aname_to_localname().
-+ *
-+ * krb5_kuserok() can be used to "Determine if a principal is authorized to
-+ * log in as a local user" (from the MIT Kerberos documentation of this
-+ * function). Which is exactly what we are looking for and should be the
-+ * preferred choice. It accepts the Kerberos principal and a local user name
-+ * and let libkrb5 or its plugins determine if they relate to each other or
-+ * not.
-+ *
-+ * krb5_aname_to_localname() can use used to "Convert a principal name to a
-+ * local name" (from the MIT Kerberos documentation of this function). It
-+ * accepts a Kerberos principle and returns a local name and it is up to the
-+ * application to do any additional checks. There are two issues using
-+ * krb5_aname_to_localname(). First, since POSIX user names are case
-+ * sensitive, the calling application in general has no other choice than
-+ * doing a case-sensitive string comparison between the name returned by
-+ * krb5_aname_to_localname() and the name used at the login prompt. When the
-+ * users are provided by a case in-sensitive server, e.g. Active Directory,
-+ * this might lead to login failures because the user typing the name at the
-+ * login prompt might not be aware of the right case. Another issue might be
-+ * caused if there are multiple alias names available for a single user. E.g.
-+ * the canonical name of a user is user@group.department.example.com but there
-+ * exists a shorter login name, e.g. user@example.com, to safe typing at the
-+ * login prompt. Here krb5_aname_to_localname() can only return the canonical
-+ * name, but if the short alias is used at the login prompt authentication
-+ * will fail as well. All this can be avoided by using krb5_kuserok() and
-+ * configuring krb5.conf or using a suitable plugin to meet the needs of the
-+ * given environment.
-+ *
-+ * The Fedora and RHEL version of openssh contain two patches which modify the
-+ * access control behavior:
-+ *  - openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
-+ *  - openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
-+ *
-+ * openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch adds a new option KerberosUseKuserok for
-+ * sshd_config which controls if krb5_kuserok() is used to check if the
-+ * principle is authorized or if krb5_aname_to_localname() should be used.
-+ * The reason to add this patch was that krb5_kuserok() by default checks if
-+ * a .k5login file exits in the users home-directory. With this the user can
-+ * give access to his account for any given principal which might be
-+ * in violation with company policies and it would be useful if this can be
-+ * rejected. Nevertheless the patch ignores the fact that krb5_kuserok() does
-+ * no only check .k5login but other sources as well and checking .k5login can
-+ * be disabled for all applications in krb5.conf as well. With this new
-+ * option KerberosUseKuserok set to 'no' (and this is the default for RHEL7
-+ * and Fedora 21) openssh can only use krb5_aname_to_localname() with the
-+ * restrictions mentioned above.
-+ *
-+ * openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch adds a ksu like behaviour to ssh, i.e. when
-+ * using GSSAPI authentication only commands configured in the .k5user can be
-+ * executed. Here the wrong assumption that krb5_kuserok() only checks
-+ * .k5login is made as well. In contrast ksu checks .k5login directly and
-+ * does not use krb5_kuserok() which might be more useful for the given
-+ * purpose. Additionally this patch is not synced with
-+ * openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch.
-+ *
-+ * The current patch tries to restore the usage of krb5_kuserok() so that e.g.
-+ * localauth plugins can be used. It does so by adding a forth parameter to
-+ * ssh_krb5_kuserok() which indicates whether .k5login exists or not. If it
-+ * does not exists krb5_kuserok() is called even if KerberosUseKuserok is set
-+ * to 'no' because the intent of the option is to not check .k5login and if it
-+ * does not exists krb5_kuserok() returns a result without checking .k5login.
-+ * If .k5login does exists and KerberosUseKuserok is 'no' we fall back to
-+ * krb5_aname_to_localname(). This is in my point of view an acceptable
-+ * limitation and does not break the current behaviour.
-+ *
-+ * Additionally with this patch ssh_krb5_kuserok() is called in
-+ * ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok() instead of only krb5_aname_to_localname() is
-+ * neither .k5login nor .k5users exists to allow plugin evaluation via
-+ * krb5_kuserok() as well.
-+ *
-+ * I tried to keep the patch as minimal as possible, nevertheless I see some
-+ * areas for improvement which, if they make sense, have to be evaluated
-+ * carefully because they might change existing behaviour and cause breaks
-+ * during upgrade:
-+ * - I wonder if disabling .k5login usage make sense in sshd or if it should
-+ *   be better disabled globally in krb5.conf
-+ * - if really needed openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch should be fixed to really
-+ *   only disable checking .k5login and maybe .k5users
-+ * - the ksu behaviour should be configurable and maybe check the .k5login and
-+ *   .k5users files directly like ksu itself does
-+ * - to make krb5_aname_to_localname() more useful an option for sshd to use
-+ *   the canonical name (the one returned by getpwnam()) instead of the name
-+ *   given at the login prompt might be useful */
-+
- static int
- ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
- {
-@@ -116,7 +214,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client
- 	/* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user,
- 	 * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials
- 	 * to access these files aren't available yet. */
-	if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) {
-+	if (ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)
-+			&& k5login_exists) {
- 		retval = 1;
- 		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
- 		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
-@@ -190,9 +289,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
- 	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
- 	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
- 	if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) {
-		return (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb_context, principal,
-		    sizeof(kuser), kuser) == 0) &&
-		    (strcmp(kuser, luser) == 0);
-+                return ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, principal, luser,
-+                                        k5login_exists);
- 	}
- 	if ((fp = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL) {
- 		int saved_errno = errno;
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.630465944 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 15:11:52.278133344 +0100
-@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
- 	options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
- 	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
- 	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
-+	options->use_kuserok = -1;
- 	options->password_authentication = -1;
- 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
-@@ -278,6 +279,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
- 	if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
- 		options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX);
- #endif
-+	if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
-+		options->use_kuserok = 1;
- 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
- 		options->password_authentication = 1;
- 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -399,7 +402,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
- 	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
- 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
-	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache,
-+	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok,
- 	sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
- 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
- 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
-@@ -478,12 +481,14 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #endif
- 	{ "kerberosuniqueccache", sKerberosUniqueCCache, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "kerberosusekuserok", sKerberosUseKuserok, SSHCFG_ALL },
- #else
- 	{ "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "kerberosuniqueccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "kerberosusekuserok", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- #endif
- 	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1644,6 +1649,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 		*inc_flags &= ~SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY;
- 		break;
- 
-+	case sKerberosUseKuserok:
-+		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
- 	case sPermitListen:
- 	case sPermitOpen:
- 		if (opcode == sPermitListen) {
-@@ -2016,6 +2025,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_interval);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
-+	M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
-@@ -2309,6 +2319,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
- # endif
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache);
-+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
- #endif
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.630465944 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2016-12-23 14:36:07.645465936 +0100
-@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ typedef struct {
- 						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
- 	int     kerberos_unique_ccache;		/* If true, the acquired ticket will
- 						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
-+	int	use_kuserok;
- 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
- 	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
- 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.637465940 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2016-12-23 15:14:03.117162222 +0100
-@@ -850,6 +850,10 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
- .Cm no
- can lead to overwriting previous tickets by subseqent connections to the same
- user account.
-+.It Cm KerberosUseKuserok
-+Specifies whether to look at .k5login file for user's aliases.
-+The default is
-+.Cm yes .
- .It Cm KexAlgorithms
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
-@@ -1078,6 +1082,7 @@ Available keywords are
- .Cm IPQoS ,
- .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication ,
- .Cm KerberosAuthentication ,
-+.Cm KerberosUseKuserok ,
- .Cm LogLevel ,
- .Cm MaxAuthTries ,
- .Cm MaxSessions ,
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.631465943 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config	2016-12-23 14:36:07.646465935 +0100
-@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
- #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
- #KerberosTicketCleanup yes
- #KerberosGetAFSToken no
-+#KerberosUseKuserok yes
- 
- # GSSAPI options
- #GSSAPIAuthentication no
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.972122201 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
-@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const
- void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
- 
-+void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
- void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
- #endif
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
-@@ -419,6 +419,28 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
- 	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
- }
- 
-+void
-+sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
-+{
-+	security_context_t *ctx;
-+
-+	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
-+		return;
-+
-+	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
-+		logit("%s: getexeccon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+		return;
-+	}
-+	if (ctx != NULL) {
-+		/* unset exec context before we will lose this capabililty */
-+		if (setexeccon(NULL) != 0)
-+			fatal("%s: setexeccon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+		if (setcon(ctx) != 0)
-+			fatal("%s: setcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+		freecon(ctx);
-+	}
-+}
-+
- #endif
- #endif
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/session.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
-@@ -1331,7 +1331,7 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
- 
- 	platform_setusercontext(pw);
- 
-	if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) {
-+	if (platform_privileged_uidswap() && (!is_child || !use_privsep)) {
- #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
- 		if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
- 		    (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) {
-@@ -1361,6 +1361,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
-			    (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
-			chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
-			    "u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+			sshd_selinux_copy_context();
-+#endif
- 			safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
- 			free(tmp);
- 			free(chroot_path);
-@@ -1396,6 +1399,11 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
- 		/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
- 		permanently_set_uid(pw);
- #endif
-+
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+		if (in_chroot == 0)
-+			sshd_selinux_copy_context();
-+#endif
- 	} else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
- 	    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
- 		fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory");
-@@ -1413,9 +1421,6 @@ do_pwchange(Session *s)
- 	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
- 		fprintf(stderr,
- 		    "You must change your password now and login again!\n");
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-		setexeccon(NULL);
-#endif
- #ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME
- 		execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name,
- 		    (char *)NULL);
-@@ -1625,9 +1630,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
- 		argv[i] = NULL;
- 		optind = optreset = 1;
- 		__progname = argv[0];
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-		ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
-#endif
- 		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
- 	}
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 18:59:13.808124269 +0100
-@@ -540,6 +540,10 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
- 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
- 	demote_sensitive_data();
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t");
-+#endif
-+
- 	/* Demote the child */
- 	if (privsep_chroot) {
- 		/* Change our root directory */
-@@ -633,6 +637,9 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- {
- #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
- 	if (1) {
-+#elif defined(WITH_SELINUX)
-+	if (0) {
-+		/* even root user can be confined by SELinux */
- #else
- 	if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) {
- #endif
--- a/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
@ -1,185 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.881788686 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c	2016-12-23 16:42:36.244818763 +0100
-@@ -288,11 +288,11 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd
- 
- 	/* enable nonblocking mode */
- 	if (nonblock) {
-		if (rfd != -1)
-+		if (rfd >= 0)
- 			set_nonblock(rfd);
-		if (wfd != -1)
-+		if (wfd >= 0)
- 			set_nonblock(wfd);
-		if (efd != -1)
-+		if (efd >= 0)
- 			set_nonblock(efd);
- 	}
- }
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.888788688 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
-@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
- 	mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
- 
- 	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
-	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
-+	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
- 		;
- 
- 	if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.892788689 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
-@@ -525,10 +525,10 @@ mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd,
- 	if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
- 	    (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
- 		error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__);
-		if (tmp1 > 0)
-+		if (tmp1 >= 0)
- 			close(tmp1);
-		if (tmp2 > 0)
-			close(tmp2);
-+		/*DEAD CODE if (tmp2 >= 0)
-+			close(tmp2);*/
- 		return 0;
- 	}
- 	close(tmp1);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
-@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr
- 	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
- 	u_int16_t *portp;
- 	u_int16_t port;
-	socklen_t salen;
-+	socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
- 	int i;
- 
- 	if (sa == NULL) {
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/scp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/scp.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/scp.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.856788681 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/scp.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
-@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
- {
- 	if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
- 		kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
-		waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
-+		(void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
- 	}
- 
- 	if (signo)
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.896788690 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
-@@ -1547,7 +1547,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.",
- 			    filename, linenum);
- 		if (!*activep) {
-			arg = strdelim(&cp);
-+			/*arg =*/ (void) strdelim(&cp);
- 			break;
- 		}
- 		for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++)
-@@ -1638,8 +1638,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
- 			*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
- 			/* increase optional counter */
-			if (intptr != NULL)
-				*intptr = *intptr + 1;
-+			/* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;)
-+  			 if (intptr != NULL)
-+				*intptr = *intptr + 1; */
- 		}
- 		break;
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.902788691 +0100
-@@ -125,13 +125,13 @@ notify_setup(void)
- static void
- notify_parent(void)
- {
-	if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
- 		(void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
- }
- static void
- notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
- {
-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
- 		FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
- }
- static void
-@@ -139,8 +139,8 @@ notify_done(fd_set *readset)
- {
- 	char c;
- 
-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
-		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
-+		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
- 			debug2("%s: reading", __func__);
- }
- 
-@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ server_request_tun(void)
- 		debug("%s: invalid tun", __func__);
- 		goto done;
- 	}
-	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) {
-+	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device >= 0) {
- 		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY &&
- 		    auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun)
- 			goto done;
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
-@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
- 	pid = sshpid;
- 	if (pid > 1) {
- 		kill(pid, SIGTERM);
-		waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
-+		(void) waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
- 	}
- 
- 	_exit(1);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
-@@ -1220,8 +1220,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	sanitise_stdfd();
- 
- 	/* drop */
-	setegid(getgid());
-	setgid(getgid());
-+	(void) setegid(getgid());
-+	(void) setgid(getgid());
- 
- 	platform_disable_tracing(0);	/* strict=no */
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.897788690 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.904788692 +0100
-@@ -691,8 +691,10 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 
- 		privsep_preauth_child(ssh);
- 		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
-		if (box != NULL)
-+		if (box != NULL) {
- 			ssh_sandbox_child(box);
-+			free(box);
-+		}
- 
- 		return 0;
- 	}
-@@ -1386,6 +1388,9 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
- 			explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
- 		}
- 	}
-+
-+	if (fdset != NULL)
-+		free(fdset);
- }
- 
- /*
--- a/openssh-6.7p1-kdf-cavs.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.7p1-kdf-cavs.patch
@ -1,618 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in
--- openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.kdf-cavs	2015-03-18 11:23:46.346049359 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in	2015-03-18 11:24:20.395968445 +0100
-@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-h
- SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
- SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
- CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest
-+SSH_CAVS=$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs
- SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
- SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
- PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
-@@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
- 
- .SUFFIXES: .lo
- 
-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT)
- 
- XMSS_OBJS=\
- 	ssh-xmss.o \
-@@ -198,6 +199,9 @@ ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHD
- ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
- 
-+ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-cavs.o $(SKOBJS)
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-cavs.o $(SKOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-+
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
- 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
- 
-@@ -331,6 +335,8 @@ install-files:
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
-+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT)
-+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-cavs_driver.pl $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs_driver.pl
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
-diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c
--- openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c.kdf-cavs	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
-+ *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
-+ *    products derived from this software without specific prior
-+ *    written permission.
-+ *
-+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
-+ * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2
-+ * are required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
-+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
-+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
-+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
-+ * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
-+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
-+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
-+ * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
-+ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
-+ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
-+ * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
-+ * DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <errno.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+#include "kex.h"
-+#include "packet.h"
-+#include "digest.h"
-+
-+static int bin_char(unsigned char hex)
-+{
-+	if (48 <= hex && 57 >= hex)
-+		return (hex - 48);
-+	if (65 <= hex && 70 >= hex)
-+		return (hex - 55);
-+	if (97 <= hex && 102 >= hex)
-+		return (hex - 87);
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Convert hex representation into binary string
-+ * @hex input buffer with hex representation
-+ * @hexlen length of hex
-+ * @bin output buffer with binary data
-+ * @binlen length of already allocated bin buffer (should be at least
-+ *	   half of hexlen -- if not, only a fraction of hexlen is converted)
-+ */
-+static void hex2bin(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
-+		    unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen)
-+{
-+	size_t i = 0;
-+	size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
-+
-+	for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
-+		bin[i] = bin_char(hex[(i*2)]) << 4;
-+		bin[i] |= bin_char(hex[((i*2)+1)]);
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Allocate sufficient space for binary representation of hex
-+ * and convert hex into bin
-+ *
-+ * Caller must free bin
-+ * @hex input buffer with hex representation
-+ * @hexlen length of hex
-+ * @bin return value holding the pointer to the newly allocated buffer
-+ * @binlen return value holding the allocated size of bin
-+ *
-+ * return: 0 on success, !0 otherwise
-+ */
-+static int hex2bin_alloc(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
-+			 unsigned char **bin, size_t *binlen)
-+{
-+	unsigned char *out = NULL;
-+	size_t outlen = 0;
-+
-+	if (!hexlen)
-+		return -EINVAL;
-+
-+	outlen = (hexlen + 1) / 2;
-+
-+	out = calloc(1, outlen);
-+	if (!out)
-+		return -errno;
-+
-+	hex2bin(hex, hexlen, out, outlen);
-+	*bin = out;
-+	*binlen = outlen;
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static char hex_char_map_l[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
-+				 '8', '9', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f' };
-+static char hex_char_map_u[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
-+				 '8', '9', 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F' };
-+static char hex_char(unsigned int bin, int u)
-+{
-+	if (bin < sizeof(hex_char_map_l))
-+		return (u) ? hex_char_map_u[bin] : hex_char_map_l[bin];
-+	return 'X';
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Convert binary string into hex representation
-+ * @bin input buffer with binary data
-+ * @binlen length of bin
-+ * @hex output buffer to store hex data
-+ * @hexlen length of already allocated hex buffer (should be at least
-+ *	   twice binlen -- if not, only a fraction of binlen is converted)
-+ * @u case of hex characters (0=>lower case, 1=>upper case)
-+ */
-+static void bin2hex(const unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen,
-+		    char *hex, size_t hexlen, int u)
-+{
-+	size_t i = 0;
-+	size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
-+
-+	for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
-+		hex[(i*2)] = hex_char((bin[i] >> 4), u);
-+		hex[((i*2)+1)] = hex_char((bin[i] & 0x0f), u);
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+struct kdf_cavs {
-+	unsigned char *K;
-+	size_t Klen;
-+	unsigned char *H;
-+	size_t Hlen;
-+	unsigned char *session_id;
-+	size_t session_id_len;
-+
-+	unsigned int iv_len;
-+	unsigned int ek_len;
-+	unsigned int ik_len;
-+};
-+
-+static int sshkdf_cavs(struct kdf_cavs *test)
-+{
-+	int ret = 0;
-+	struct kex kex;
-+	struct sshbuf *Kb = NULL;
-+	BIGNUM *Kbn = NULL;
-+	int mode = 0;
-+	struct newkeys *ctoskeys;
-+	struct newkeys *stockeys;
-+	struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
-+
-+#define HEXOUTLEN 500
-+	char hex[HEXOUTLEN];
-+
-+	memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(struct kex));
-+
-+	Kbn = BN_new();
-+	BN_bin2bn(test->K, test->Klen, Kbn);
-+	if (!Kbn) {
-+		printf("cannot convert K into bignum\n");
-+		ret = 1;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	Kb = sshbuf_new();
-+	if (!Kb) {
-+		printf("cannot convert K into sshbuf\n");
-+		ret = 1;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	sshbuf_put_bignum2(Kb, Kbn);
-+
-+	kex.session_id = test->session_id;
-+	kex.session_id_len = test->session_id_len;
-+
-+	/* setup kex */
-+
-+	/* select the right hash based on struct ssh_digest digests */
-+	switch (test->ik_len) {
-+		case 20:
-+			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
-+			break;
-+		case 32:
-+			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA256;
-+			break;
-+		case 48:
-+			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA384;
-+			break;
-+		case 64:
-+			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA512;
-+			break;
-+		default:
-+			printf("Wrong hash type %u\n", test->ik_len);
-+			ret = 1;
-+			goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* implement choose_enc */
-+	for (mode = 0; mode < 2; mode++) {
-+		kex.newkeys[mode] = calloc(1, sizeof(struct newkeys));
-+		if (!kex.newkeys[mode]) {
-+			printf("allocation of newkeys failed\n");
-+			ret = 1;
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.iv_len = test->iv_len;
-+		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.key_len = test->ek_len;
-+		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.block_size = (test->iv_len == 64) ? 8 : 16;
-+		kex.newkeys[mode]->mac.key_len = test->ik_len;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* implement kex_choose_conf */
-+	kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.key_len;
-+	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size)
-+		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size;
-+	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len)
-+		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len;
-+	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len)
-+		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len;
-+
-+	/* MODE_OUT (1) -> server to client
-+	 * MODE_IN (0) -> client to server */
-+	kex.server = 1;
-+
-+	/* do it */
-+	if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, -1, -1)) == NULL){
-+		printf("Allocation error\n");
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	ssh->kex = &kex;
-+	kex_derive_keys(ssh, test->H, test->Hlen, Kb);
-+
-+	ctoskeys = kex.newkeys[0];
-+	stockeys = kex.newkeys[1];
-+
-+	/* get data */
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(ctoskeys->enc.iv, (size_t)ctoskeys->enc.iv_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Initial IV (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(stockeys->enc.iv, (size_t)stockeys->enc.iv_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Initial IV (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
-+
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(ctoskeys->enc.key, (size_t)ctoskeys->enc.key_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Encryption key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(stockeys->enc.key, (size_t)stockeys->enc.key_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Encryption key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
-+
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(ctoskeys->mac.key, (size_t)ctoskeys->mac.key_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Integrity key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(stockeys->mac.key, (size_t)stockeys->mac.key_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Integrity key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
-+
-+out:
-+	if (Kbn)
-+		BN_free(Kbn);
-+	if (Kb)
-+		sshbuf_free(Kb);
-+	if (ssh)
-+		ssh_packet_close(ssh);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+static void usage(void)
-+{
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\nOpenSSH KDF CAVS Test\n\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "Usage:\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-K\tShared secret string\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-H\tHash string\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-s\tSession ID string\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-i\tIV length to be generated\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-e\tEncryption key length to be generated\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-m\tMAC key length to be generated\n");
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Test command example:
-+ * ./ssh-cavs -K 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 -H d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -s d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -i 8 -e 24 -m 20
-+ *
-+ * Initial IV (client to server) = 4bb320d1679dfd3a
-+ * Initial IV (server to client) = 43dea6fdf263a308
-+ * Encryption key (client to server) = 13048cc600b9d3cf9095aa6cf8e2ff9cf1c54ca0520c89ed
-+ * Encryption key (server to client) = 1e483c5134e901aa11fc4e0a524e7ec7b75556148a222bb0
-+ * Integrity key (client to server) = ecef63a092b0dcc585bdc757e01b2740af57d640
-+ * Integrity key (server to client) = 7424b05f3c44a72b4ebd281fb71f9cbe7b64d479
-+ */
-+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
-+{
-+	struct kdf_cavs test;
-+	int ret = 1;
-+	int opt = 0;
-+
-+	memset(&test, 0, sizeof(struct kdf_cavs));
-+	while((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "K:H:s:i:e:m:")) != -1)
-+	{
-+		size_t len = 0;
-+		switch(opt)
-+		{
-+			/*
-+			 * CAVS K is MPINT
-+			 * we want a hex (i.e. the caller must ensure the
-+			 * following transformations already happened):
-+			 * 	1. cut off first four bytes
-+			 * 	2. if most significant bit of value is
-+			 *	   1, prepend 0 byte
-+			 */
-+			case 'K':
-+				len = strlen(optarg);
-+				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
-+						    &test.K, &test.Klen);
-+				if (ret)
-+					goto out;
-+				break;
-+			case 'H':
-+				len = strlen(optarg);
-+				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
-+						    &test.H, &test.Hlen);
-+				if (ret)
-+					goto out;
-+				break;
-+			case 's':
-+				len = strlen(optarg);
-+				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
-+						    &test.session_id,
-+						    &test.session_id_len);
-+				if (ret)
-+					goto out;
-+				break;
-+			case 'i':
-+				test.iv_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
-+				break;
-+			case 'e':
-+				test.ek_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
-+				break;
-+			case 'm':
-+				test.ik_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
-+				break;
-+			default:
-+				usage();
-+				goto out;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	ret = sshkdf_cavs(&test);
-+
-+out:
-+	if (test.session_id)
-+		free(test.session_id);
-+	if (test.K)
-+		free(test.K);
-+	if (test.H)
-+		free(test.H);
-+	return ret;
-+
-+}
-diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl
--- openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl.kdf-cavs	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
-+#!/usr/bin/env perl
-+#
-+# CAVS test driver for OpenSSH
-+#
-+# Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
-+#
-+# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
-+# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
-+# in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
-+# to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
-+# copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
-+# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
-+#
-+# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
-+# all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
-+#
-+#                            NO WARRANTY
-+#
-+#    BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO WARRANTY
-+#    FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW.  EXCEPT WHEN
-+#    OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES
-+#    PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED
-+#    OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
-+#    MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  THE ENTIRE RISK AS
-+#    TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU.  SHOULD THE
-+#    PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING,
-+#    REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
-+#
-+#    IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING
-+#    WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MAY MODIFY AND/OR
-+#    REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES,
-+#    INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING
-+#    OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED
-+#    TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY
-+#    YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER
-+#    PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE
-+#    POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
-+#
-+use strict;
-+use warnings;
-+use IPC::Open2;
-+
-+# Executing a program by feeding STDIN and retrieving
-+# STDOUT
-+# $1: data string to be piped to the app on STDIN
-+# rest: program and args
-+# returns: STDOUT of program as string
-+sub pipe_through_program($@) {
-+	my $in = shift;
-+	my @args = @_;
-+
-+	my ($CO, $CI);
-+	my $pid = open2($CO, $CI, @args);
-+
-+	my $out = "";
-+	my $len = length($in);
-+	my $first = 1;
-+	while (1) {
-+		my $rin = "";
-+		my $win = "";
-+		# Output of prog is FD that we read
-+		vec($rin,fileno($CO),1) = 1;
-+		# Input of prog is FD that we write
-+		# check for $first is needed because we can have NULL input
-+		# that is to be written to the app
-+		if ( $len > 0 || $first) {
-+			(vec($win,fileno($CI),1) = 1);
-+			$first=0;
-+		}
-+		# Let us wait for 100ms
-+		my $nfound = select(my $rout=$rin, my $wout=$win, undef, 0.1);
-+		if ( $wout ) {
-+			my $written = syswrite($CI, $in, $len);
-+			die "broken pipe" if !defined $written;
-+			$len -= $written;
-+			substr($in, 0, $written) = "";
-+			if ($len <= 0) {
-+				close $CI or die "broken pipe: $!";
-+			}
-+		}
-+		if ( $rout ) {
-+			my $tmp_out = "";
-+			my $bytes_read = sysread($CO, $tmp_out, 4096);
-+			$out .= $tmp_out;
-+			last if ($bytes_read == 0);
-+		}
-+	}
-+	close $CO or die "broken pipe: $!";
-+	waitpid $pid, 0;
-+
-+	return $out;
-+}
-+
-+# Parser of CAVS test vector file
-+# $1: Test vector file
-+# $2: Output file for test results
-+# return: nothing
-+sub parse($$) {
-+	my $infile = shift;
-+	my $outfile = shift;
-+
-+	my $out = "";
-+
-+	my $K = "";
-+	my $H = "";
-+	my $session_id = "";
-+	my $ivlen = 0;
-+	my $eklen = "";
-+	my $iklen = "";
-+
-+	open(IN, "<$infile");
-+	while(<IN>) {
-+
-+		my $line = $_;
-+		chomp($line);
-+		$line =~ s/\r//;
-+
-+		if ($line =~ /\[SHA-1\]/) {
-+			$iklen = 20;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-256\]/) {
-+			$iklen = 32;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-384\]/) {
-+			$iklen = 48;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-512\]/) {
-+			$iklen = 64;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /^\[IV length\s*=\s*(.*)\]/) {
-+			$ivlen = $1;
-+			$ivlen = $ivlen / 8;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /^\[encryption key length\s*=\s*(.*)\]/) {
-+			$eklen = $1;
-+			$eklen = $eklen / 8;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /^K\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
-+			$K = $1;
-+			$K = substr($K, 8);
-+			$K = "00" . $K;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /^H\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
-+			$H = $1;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /^session_id\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
-+			$session_id = $1;
-+		}
-+		$out .= $line . "\n";
-+
-+		if ($K ne "" && $H ne "" && $session_id ne "" &&
-+		    $ivlen ne "" && $eklen ne "" && $iklen > 0) {
-+			$out .= pipe_through_program("", "./ssh-cavs -H $H -K $K -s $session_id -i $ivlen -e $eklen -m $iklen");
-+
-+			$K = "";
-+			$H = "";
-+			$session_id = "";
-+		}
-+	}
-+	close IN;
-+	$out =~ s/\n/\r\n/g; # make it a dos file
-+	open(OUT, ">$outfile") or die "Cannot create output file $outfile: $?";
-+	print OUT $out;
-+	close OUT;
-+}
-+
-+############################################################
-+#
-+# let us pretend to be C :-)
-+sub main() {
-+
-+	my $infile=$ARGV[0];
-+	die "Error: Test vector file $infile not found" if (! -f $infile);
-+
-+	my $outfile = $infile;
-+	# let us add .rsp regardless whether we could strip .req
-+	$outfile =~ s/\.req$//;
-+	$outfile .= ".rsp";
-+	if (-f $outfile) {
-+		die "Output file $outfile could not be removed: $?"
-+			unless unlink($outfile);
-+	}
-+	print STDERR "Performing tests from source file $infile with results stored in destination file $outfile\n";
-+
-+	# Do the job
-+	parse($infile, $outfile);
-+}
-+
-+###########################################
-+# Call it
-+main();
-+1;
--- a/openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8
--- openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode	2016-03-09 19:04:48.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8	2016-06-23 16:18:20.463854117 +0200
-@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
- .Op Fl P Ar denied_requests
- .Op Fl p Ar allowed_requests
- .Op Fl u Ar umask
-+.Op Fl m Ar force_file_perms
- .Ek
- .Nm
- .Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
-@@ -138,6 +139,12 @@ Sets an explicit
- .Xr umask 2
- to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the
- user's default mask.
-+.It Fl m Ar force_file_perms
-+Sets explicit file permissions to be applied to newly-created files instead
-+of the default or client requested mode.  Numeric values include:
-+777, 755, 750, 666, 644, 640, etc.  Using both -m and -u switches makes the
-+umask (-u) effective only for newly created directories and explicit mode (-m)
-+for newly created files.
- .El
- .Pp
- On some systems,
-diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
--- openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode	2016-06-23 16:18:20.446854128 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c	2016-06-23 16:20:37.950766082 +0200
-@@ -69,6 +69,10 @@ struct sshbuf *oqueue;
- /* Version of client */
- static u_int version;
- 
-+/* Force file permissions */
-+int permforce = 0;
-+long permforcemode;
-+
- /* SSH2_FXP_INIT received */
- static int init_done;
- 
-@@ -683,6 +687,7 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
- 	Attrib a;
- 	char *name;
- 	int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
-+	mode_t old_umask = 0;
- 
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */
-@@ -692,6 +697,10 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
- 	debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
- 	flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
- 	mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
-+	if (permforce == 1) {   /* Force perm if -m is set */
-+		mode = permforcemode;
-+		old_umask = umask(0); /* so umask does not interfere */
-+	}	
- 	logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
- 	    name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
- 	if (readonly &&
-@@ -713,6 +722,8 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
- 			}
- 		}
- 	}
-+	if (permforce == 1)
-+		(void) umask(old_umask); /* restore umask to something sane */
- 	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
- 		send_status(id, status);
- 	free(name);
-@@ -1494,7 +1505,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
- 	fprintf(stderr,
- 	    "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
- 	    "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P denied_requests] "
-	    "[-p allowed_requests] [-u umask]\n"
-+	    "[-p allowed_requests] [-u umask] [-m force_file_perms]\n"
- 	    "       %s -Q protocol_feature\n",
- 	    __progname, __progname);
- 	exit(1);
-@@ -1520,7 +1531,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
- 	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
- 
- 	while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
-	    "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:cehR")) != -1) {
-+	    "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:m:cehR")) != -1) {
- 		switch (ch) {
- 		case 'Q':
- 			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) {
-@@ -1580,6 +1591,15 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
- 				fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
- 			(void)umask((mode_t)mask);
- 			break;
-+		case 'm':
-+			/* Force permissions on file received via sftp */
-+			permforce = 1;
-+			permforcemode = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8);
-+			if (permforcemode < 0 || permforcemode > 0777 ||
-+			    *cp != '\0' || (permforcemode == 0 &&
-+			    errno != 0))
-+				fatal("Invalid file mode \"%s\"", optarg);
-+			break;
- 		case 'h':
- 		default:
- 			sftp_server_usage();
--- a/openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch
@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh/servconf.c.sshdt openssh/servconf.c
--- openssh/servconf.c.sshdt	2015-06-24 11:42:29.041078704 +0200
-+++ openssh/servconf.c	2015-06-24 11:44:39.734745802 +0200
-@@ -2317,7 +2317,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- 	dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs);
-	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner);
-+	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner != NULL ? o->banner : "none");
- 	dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys);
--- a/openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
@ -1,187 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race	2016-12-23 16:35:52.694685771 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c	2016-12-23 16:35:52.697685772 +0100
-@@ -1107,4 +1107,50 @@ mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const ch
- 	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m);
- 	sshbuf_free(m);
- }
-+
-+int mm_forward_audit_messages(int fdin)
-+{
-+	u_char buf[4];
-+	u_int blen, msg_len;
-+	struct sshbuf *m;
-+	int r, ret = 0;
-+
-+	debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
-+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+ 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
-+	do {
-+		blen = atomicio(read, fdin, buf, sizeof(buf));
-+		if (blen == 0) /* closed pipe */
-+			break;
-+		if (blen != sizeof(buf)) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to read the buffer from child", __func__);
-+			ret = -1;
-+			break;
-+		}
-+
-+		msg_len = get_u32(buf);
-+		if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
-+			fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len);
-+		sshbuf_reset(m);
-+		if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, NULL)) != 0)
-+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+		if (atomicio(read, fdin, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to read the the buffer content from the child", __func__);
-+			ret = -1;
-+			break;
-+		}
-+		if (atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, buf, blen) != blen || 
-+		    atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to write the message to the monitor", __func__);
-+			ret = -1;
-+			break;
-+		}
-+	} while (1);
-+	sshbuf_free(m);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+void mm_set_monitor_pipe(int fd)
-+{
-+	pmonitor->m_recvfd = fd;
-+}
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h
--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race	2016-12-23 16:35:52.694685771 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h	2016-12-23 16:35:52.698685772 +0100
-@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
- void mm_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
- void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int, pid_t, uid_t);
- void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
-+int mm_forward_audit_messages(int);
-+void mm_set_monitor_pipe(int);
- #endif
- 
- struct Session;
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race	2016-12-23 16:35:52.695685771 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 16:37:26.339730596 +0100
-@@ -162,6 +162,10 @@ static Session *sessions = NULL;
- login_cap_t *lc;
- #endif
- 
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+int paudit[2];
-+#endif
-+
- static int is_child = 0;
- static int in_chroot = 0;
- static int have_dev_log = 1;
-@@ -289,6 +293,8 @@ xauth_valid_string(const char *s)
- 	return 1;
- }
- 
-+void child_destory_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh);
-+
- #define USE_PIPES 1
- /*
-  * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty.  This
-@@ -424,6 +430,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *c
- 		close(err[0]);
- #endif
- 
-+		child_destory_sensitive_data(ssh);
-+
- 		/* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */
- 		do_child(ssh, s, command);
- 		/* NOTREACHED */
-@@ -547,6 +555,9 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm
- 		/* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */
- 		close(ttyfd);
- 
-+		/* Do this early, so we will not block large MOTDs */
-+		child_destory_sensitive_data(ssh);
-+
- 		/* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */
- #ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
- 		do_login(ssh, s, command);
-@@ -717,6 +728,8 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
- 	}
- 	if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1)
- 		s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(ssh, s->command));
-+	if (pipe(paudit) < 0)
-+		fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
- #endif
- 	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
- 		ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command);
-@@ -732,6 +745,20 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
- 	 */
- 	sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
- 
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	close(paudit[1]);
-+	if (use_privsep && ret == 0) {
-+		/*
-+		 * Read the audit messages from forked child and send them
-+		 * back to monitor. We don't want to communicate directly,
-+		 * because the messages might get mixed up.
-+		 * Continue after the pipe gets closed (all messages sent).
-+		 */
-+		ret = mm_forward_audit_messages(paudit[0]);
-+	}
-+	close(paudit[0]);
-+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-+
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
-@@ -1538,6 +1565,34 @@ child_close_fds(void)
- 	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
- }
- 
-+void
-+child_destory_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh)
-+{
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	int pparent = paudit[1];
-+	close(paudit[0]);
-+	/* Hack the monitor pipe to avoid race condition with parent */
-+	if (use_privsep)
-+		mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent);
-+#endif
-+
-+	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, use_privsep);
-+	/*
-+	 * We can audit this, because we hacked the pipe to direct the
-+	 * messages over postauth child. But this message requires answer
-+	 * which we can't do using one-way pipe.
-+	 */
-+	packet_destroy_all(ssh, 0, 1);
-+	/* XXX this will clean the rest but should not audit anymore */
-+	/* packet_clear_keys(ssh); */
-+
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	/* Notify parent that we are done */
-+	close(pparent);
-+#endif
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the
-  * environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group
-@@ -1554,13 +1608,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
- 
- 	sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
- 
-	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
-	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1);
-	ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
-	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
-	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
-	packet_destroy_all(ssh, 0, 1);
-
- 	/* Force a password change */
- 	if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
- 		do_setusercontext(pw);
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
-index 2b02a04..19b9364 100644
--- a/auth-krb5.c
-+++ b/auth-krb5.c
-@@ -375,5 +375,21 @@ cleanup:
- 		return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
- 	}
- }
-+
-+/*
-+ * Reads  k5login_directory  option from the  krb5.conf
-+ */
-+krb5_error_code
-+ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb5_context ctx, char **k5login_directory) {
-+	profile_t p;
-+	int ret = 0;
-+
-+	ret = krb5_get_profile(ctx, &p);
-+	if (ret)
-+		return ret;
-+
-+	return profile_get_string(p, "libdefaults", "k5login_directory", NULL, NULL,
-+		k5login_directory);
-+}
- #endif /* !HEIMDAL */
- #endif /* KRB5 */
-diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
-index f9d191c..c432d2f 100644
--- a/auth.h
-+++ b/auth.h
-@@ -222,6 +222,8 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
- 
- #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
- krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
-+krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb5_context ctx,
-+	char **k5login_directory);
- #endif
- 
- #endif /* AUTH_H */
-diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644
--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
-+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-@@ -244,8 +244,27 @@ ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists()
- {
- 	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
- 	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
-+	char *k5login_directory = NULL;
-+	int ret = 0;
-+
-+	ret = ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb_context, &k5login_directory);
-+	debug3("%s: k5login_directory = %s (rv=%d)", __func__, k5login_directory, ret);
-+	if (k5login_directory == NULL || ret != 0) {
-+		/* If not set, the library will look for  k5login
-+		 * files in the user's home directory, with the filename  .k5login.
-+		 */
-+		snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir);
-+	} else {
-+		/* If set, the library will look for a local user's k5login file
-+		 * within the named directory, with a filename corresponding to the
-+		 * local username.
-+		 */
-+		snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s%s%s", k5login_directory, 
-+			k5login_directory[strlen(k5login_directory)-1] != '/' ? "/" : "",
-+			pw->pw_name);
-+	}
-+	debug("%s: Checking existence of file %s", __func__, file);
- 
-	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir);
- 	return access(file, F_OK) == 0;
- }
- 
-diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
-index 5c4f15b..135e290 100644
--- a/sshd.8
-+++ b/sshd.8
-@@ -806,6 +806,10 @@ rlogin/rsh.
- These files enforce GSSAPI/Kerberos authentication access control.
- Further details are described in
- .Xr ksu 1 .
-+The location of the k5login file depends on the configuration option
-+.Cm k5login_directory
-+in the
-+.Xr krb5.conf 5 .
- .Pp
- .It Pa ~/.ssh/
- This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-Zseries only: Leave the hardware filedescriptors open.
-
-All filedescriptors above 2 are getting closed when a new
-sshd process to handle a new client connection is
-spawned. As the process also chroot into an empty filesystem
-without any device nodes, there is no chance to reopen the
-files. This patch filters out the reqired fds in the
-closefrom function so these are skipped in the close loop.
-
-Author: Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>
-
---
- openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c |   26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)
-
--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
-@@ -82,7 +82,33 @@ closefrom(int lowfd)
- 	    fd = strtol(dent->d_name, &endp, 10);
- 	    if (dent->d_name != endp && *endp == '\0' &&
- 		fd >= 0 && fd < INT_MAX && fd >= lowfd && fd != dirfd(dirp))
-+#ifdef __s390__
-+		{
-+		    /*
-+		     * the filedescriptors used to communicate with
-+		     * the device drivers to provide hardware support
-+		     * should survive. HF <freude@de.ibm.com>
-+		     */
-+		    char fpath[PATH_MAX], lpath[PATH_MAX];
-+		    len = snprintf(fpath, sizeof(fpath), "%s/%s",
-+				   fdpath, dent->d_name);
-+		    if (len > 0 && (size_t)len <= sizeof(fpath)) {
-+			len = readlink(fpath, lpath, sizeof(lpath));
-+			if (len > 0) {
-+			    lpath[len] = 0;
-+			    if (strstr(lpath, "dev/z90crypt")
-+				|| strstr(lpath, "dev/zcrypt")
-+				|| strstr(lpath, "dev/prandom")
-+				|| strstr(lpath, "dev/shm/icastats"))
-+				fd = -1;
-+			}
-+		    }
-+		    if (fd >= 0)
-+			(void) close((int) fd);
-+		}
-+#else
- 		(void) close((int) fd);
-+#endif
- 	}
- 	(void) closedir(dirp);
- 	return;
-
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
--- openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11	2016-03-09 19:04:48.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.2p2/channels.c	2016-06-03 10:42:04.775164520 +0200
-@@ -3990,21 +3990,24 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
- }
- 
- static int
-connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname)
-+connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname, int len)
- {
- 	int sock;
- 	struct sockaddr_un addr;
- 
-+	if (len <= 0)
-+		return -1;
- 	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
- 	if (sock == -1)
- 		error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- 	memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
- 	addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
-	strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path);
-	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0)
-+	if (len > sizeof addr.sun_path)
-+		len = sizeof addr.sun_path;
-+	memcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, len);
-+	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof addr - (sizeof addr.sun_path - len) ) == 0)
- 		return sock;
- 	close(sock);
-	error("connect %.100s: %.100s", addr.sun_path, strerror(errno));
- 	return -1;
- }
- 
-@@ -4012,8 +4015,18 @@ static int
- connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
- {
- 	char buf[1024];
-	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr);
-	return connect_local_xsocket_path(buf);
-+	int len, ret;
-+	len = snprintf(buf + 1, sizeof (buf) - 1, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr);
-+#ifdef linux
-+	/* try abstract socket first */
-+	buf[0] = '\0';
-+	if ((ret = connect_local_xsocket_path(buf, len + 1)) >= 0)
-+		return ret;
-+#endif
-+	if ((ret = connect_local_xsocket_path(buf + 1, len)) >= 0)
-+		return ret;
-+	error("connect %.100s: %.100s", buf + 1, strerror(errno));
-+	return -1;
- }
- 
- #ifdef __APPLE__
--- a/openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
@ -1,213 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.071506625 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c	2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100
-@@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ static int all_opens_permitted = 0;
- #define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST	"*"
- 
- /* -- X11 forwarding */
-/* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
-#define MAX_DISPLAYS  1000
-+/* Minimum port number for X11 forwarding */
-+#define X11_PORT_MIN 6000
- 
- /* Per-channel callback for pre/post select() actions */
- typedef void chan_fn(struct ssh *, Channel *c,
-@@ -4228,7 +4228,7 @@ channel_send_window_changes(void)
-  */
- int
- x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
-    int x11_use_localhost, int single_connection,
-+    int x11_use_localhost, int x11_max_displays, int single_connection,
-     u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids)
- {
- 	Channel *nc = NULL;
-@@ -4240,10 +4241,15 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
- 	if (chanids == NULL)
- 		return -1;
- 
-+	/* Try to bind ports starting at 6000+X11DisplayOffset */
-+	x11_max_displays = x11_max_displays + x11_display_offset;
-+
- 	for (display_number = x11_display_offset;
-	    display_number < MAX_DISPLAYS;
-+	    display_number < x11_max_displays;
- 	    display_number++) {
-		port = 6000 + display_number;
-+		port = X11_PORT_MIN + display_number;
-+		if (port < X11_PORT_MIN) /* overflow */
-+			break;
- 		memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- 		hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
- 		hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE;
-@@ -4295,7 +4301,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
- 		if (num_socks > 0)
- 			break;
- 	}
-	if (display_number >= MAX_DISPLAYS) {
-+	if (display_number >= x11_max_displays || port < X11_PORT_MIN ) {
- 		error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket.");
- 		return -1;
- 	}
-@@ -4441,7 +4447,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
- 	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- 	hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
- 	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
-	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number);
-+	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", X11_PORT_MIN + display_number);
- 	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
- 		error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf,
- 		ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
-@@ -4457,7 +4463,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
- 		/* Connect it to the display. */
- 		if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
- 			debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
-			    6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
-+			    X11_PORT_MIN + display_number, strerror(errno));
- 			close(sock);
- 			continue;
- 		}
-@@ -4466,8 +4472,8 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
- 	}
- 	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
- 	if (!ai) {
-		error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
-		    6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
-+		error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
-+		    X11_PORT_MIN + display_number, strerror(errno));
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- 	set_nodelay(sock);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.h
--- openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.h	2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100
-@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ int	 permitopen_port(const char *);
- 
- void	 channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, u_int);
- int	 x11_connect_display(struct ssh *);
-int	 x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
-+int	 x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
- void	 x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(struct ssh *, int,
- 	    const char *, const char *, const char *, int);
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.133506635 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 15:47:27.320519121 +0100
-@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
- 	options->print_lastlog = -1;
- 	options->x11_forwarding = -1;
- 	options->x11_display_offset = -1;
-+	options->x11_max_displays = -1;
- 	options->x11_use_localhost = -1;
- 	options->permit_tty = -1;
- 	options->permit_user_rc = -1;
-@@ -243,6 +244,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
- 		options->x11_forwarding = 0;
- 	if (options->x11_display_offset == -1)
- 		options->x11_display_offset = 10;
-+	if (options->x11_max_displays == -1)
-+		options->x11_max_displays = DEFAULT_MAX_DISPLAYS;
- 	if (options->x11_use_localhost == -1)
- 		options->x11_use_localhost = 1;
- 	if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
-@@ -419,7 +422,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
- 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
- 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
-	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
-+	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11MaxDisplays, sX11UseLocalhost,
- 	sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
- 	sPermitUserEnvironment, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
- 	sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups,
-@@ -540,6 +543,7 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+	{ "x11maxdisplays", sX11MaxDisplays, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1316,6 +1320,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 			*intptr = value;
- 		break;
- 
-+	case sX11MaxDisplays:
-+		intptr = &options->x11_max_displays;
-+		goto parse_int;
-+
- 	case sX11UseLocalhost:
- 		intptr = &options->x11_use_localhost;
- 		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -2063,6 +2071,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_display_offset);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_forwarding);
-+	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_max_displays);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_use_localhost);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tty);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_user_rc);
-@@ -2315,6 +2324,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- #endif
- 	dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time);
- 	dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset);
-+	dump_cfg_int(sX11MaxDisplays, o->x11_max_displays);
- 	dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries);
- 	dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
- 	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.133506635 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2016-12-23 15:46:32.140506636 +0100
-@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
- 
- #define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX	6	/* Default for MaxAuthTries */
- #define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX	10	/* Default for MaxSessions */
-+#define DEFAULT_MAX_DISPLAYS	1000 /* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
- 
- /* Magic name for internal sftp-server */
- #define INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME	"internal-sftp"
-@@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ typedef struct {
- 	int     x11_forwarding;	/* If true, permit inet (spoofing) X11 fwd. */
- 	int     x11_display_offset;	/* What DISPLAY number to start
- 					 * searching at */
-+	int 	x11_max_displays; /* Number of displays to search */
- 	int     x11_use_localhost;	/* If true, use localhost for fake X11 server. */
- 	char   *xauth_location;	/* Location of xauth program */
- 	int	permit_tty;	/* If false, deny pty allocation */
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/session.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.136506636 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 15:46:32.141506636 +0100
-@@ -2518,8 +2518,9 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s)
- 		return 0;
- 	}
-	if (x11_create_display_inet(ssh, options.x11_display_offset,
-	    options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection,
-	    &s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
-+	    options.x11_use_localhost, options.x11_max_displays,
-+	    s->single_connection, &s->display_number,
-+	    &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
- 		debug("x11_create_display_inet failed.");
- 		return 0;
- 	}
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.134506635 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2016-12-23 15:46:32.141506636 +0100
-@@ -1133,6 +1133,7 @@ Available keywords are
- .Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink ,
- .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys ,
- .Cm X11DisplayOffset ,
-+.Cm X11MaxDisplays ,
- .Cm X11Forwarding
- and
- .Cm X11UseLocalhost .
-@@ -1566,6 +1567,12 @@ Specifies the first display number avail
- X11 forwarding.
- This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers.
- The default is 10.
-+.It Cm X11MaxDisplays
-+Specifies the maximum number of displays available for
-+.Xr sshd 8 Ns 's
-+X11 forwarding.
-+This prevents sshd from exhausting local ports.
-+The default is 1000.
- .It Cm X11Forwarding
- Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted.
- The argument must be
--- a/openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch
@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
-commit 0e22b79bfde45a7cf7a2e51a68ec11c4285f3b31
-Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date:   Mon Nov 21 15:04:06 2016 +0100
-
-    systemd stuff
-
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index 2ffc369..162ce92 100644
--- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -4265,6 +4265,30 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
- AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
- AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
- 
-+# Check whether user wants systemd support
-+SYSTEMD_MSG="no"
-+AC_ARG_WITH(systemd,
-+	[  --with-systemd          Enable systemd support],
-+	[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
-+		AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
-+		if test "$PKGCONFIG" != "no"; then
-+			AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libsystemd])
-+			if $PKGCONFIG --exists libsystemd; then
-+				SYSTEMD_CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags libsystemd`
-+				SYSTEMD_LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libsystemd`
-+				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $SYSTEMD_CFLAGS"
-+				SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $SYSTEMD_LIBS"
-+				AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
-+				AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYSTEMD, 1, [Define if you want systemd support.])
-+				SYSTEMD_MSG="yes"
-+			else
-+				AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
-+			fi
-+		fi
-+	fi ]
-+)
-+
-+
- # Looking for programs, paths and files
- 
- PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
-@@ -5097,6 +5121,7 @@ echo "                   libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
- echo "  Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
- echo "           Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
- echo "         Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
-+echo "                   systemd support: $SYSTEMD_MSG"
- echo "       IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
- echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
- echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
-diff --git a/contrib/sshd.service b/contrib/sshd.service
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..e0d4923
--- /dev/null
-+++ b/contrib/sshd.service
-@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
-+[Unit]
-+Description=OpenSSH server daemon
-+Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
-+After=network.target
-+
-+[Service]
-+Type=notify
-+ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS
-+ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
-+KillMode=process
-+Restart=on-failure
-+RestartPreventExitStatus=255
-+
-+[Install]
-+WantedBy=multi-user.target
-+
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index 816611c..b8b9d13 100644
--- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@
- #include <prot.h>
- #endif
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
-+#include <systemd/sd-daemon.h>
-+#endif
-+
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "ssh.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
-@@ -1888,6 +1892,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 			}
- 		}
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
-+		/* Signal systemd that we are ready to accept connections */
-+		sd_notify(0, "READY=1");
-+#endif
-+
- 		/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
- 		server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
- 		    &newsock, config_s);
--- a/openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-In order to use the OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11 engine it is needed to allow flock
-and ipc calls, because this engine calls OpenCryptoki (a PKCS#11
-implementation) which calls the libraries that will communicate with the
-crypto cards. OpenCryptoki makes use of flock and ipc and, as of now,
-this is only need on s390 architecture.
-
-Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
- sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 6 ++++++
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-index ca75cc7..6e7de31 100644
--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -166,6 +166,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- #ifdef __NR_exit_group
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group),
- #endif
-+#if defined(__NR_flock) && defined(__s390__)
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_flock),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_futex
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_futex),
- #endif
-@@ -178,6 +181,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday),
- #endif
-+#if defined(__NR_ipc) && defined(__s390__)
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_ipc),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_getuid
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
- #endif
-- 
-1.9.1
-
-getuid and geteuid are needed when using an openssl engine that calls a
-crypto card, e.g. ICA (libica).
-Those syscalls are also needed by the distros for audit code.
-
-Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
- sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 12 ++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-index 6e7de31..e86aa2c 100644
--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -175,6 +175,18 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- #ifdef __NR_getpid
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_getuid
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
-+#endif
-+#ifdef __NR_getuid32
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32),
-+#endif
-+#ifdef __NR_geteuid
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid),
-+#endif
-+#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_getrandom
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
- #endif
-- 1.9.1
-1.9.1
-diff -up openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
--- openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox	2017-12-12 13:59:30.563874059 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2017-12-12 13:59:14.842784083 +0100
-@@ -190,6 +190,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
- #ifdef __NR_geteuid32
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_gettid
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettid),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_getrandom
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
- #endif
-
--- a/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
--- a/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
@ -1,271 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
--- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.188821236 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
- extern ServerOptions options;
- extern u_char *session_id2;
- extern u_int session_id2_len;
-+extern int inetd_flag;
-+extern int rexeced_flag;
-+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
- 
- static char *
- format_key(const struct sshkey *key)
-@@ -511,7 +514,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct ssh *ssh
- 
- 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", runas_pw, command,
- 	    ac, av, &f,
-	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
-+	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
- 		goto out;
- 
- 	uid_swapped = 1;
-@@ -981,7 +985,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct ssh *ss
- 
- 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", runas_pw, command,
- 	    ac, av, &f,
-	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
-+	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
- 		goto out;
- 
- 	uid_swapped = 1;
-diff -up openssh/auth.c.refactor openssh/auth.c
--- openssh/auth.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.235821686 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -756,7 +756,8 @@ auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *
-  */
- pid_t
- subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command,
-    int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags)
-+    int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags, int inetd,
-+    void *the_authctxt)
- {
- 	FILE *f = NULL;
- 	struct stat st;
-@@ -872,7 +873,7 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
- 		}
- 
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
-+		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(inetd, the_authctxt) < 0) {
- 			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
- 			    strerror(errno));
- 			_exit(127);
-diff -up openssh/auth.h.refactor openssh/auth.h
--- openssh/auth.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.251821839 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ struct passwd *fakepw(void);
- #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE  (1<<1)  /* Redirect stdout */
- #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD  (1<<2)  /* Discard stderr */
- pid_t	subprocess(const char *, struct passwd *,
-    const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int flags);
-+    const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int flags, int, void *);
- 
- int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
- 
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const ch
- 
- int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
- void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
-void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
-int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
-+void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *, int, int(char *, const char *), void *, int);
-+int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(int inetd, void *);
- void sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void);
- #endif
- 
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -49,11 +49,6 @@
- #include <unistd.h>
- #endif
- 
-extern ServerOptions options;
-extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
-extern int inetd_flag;
-extern int rexeced_flag;
-
- /* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
- int
- sshd_selinux_enabled(void)
-@@ -223,7 +218,8 @@ get_user_context(const char *sename, con
- }
- 
- static void
-ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level)
-+ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level,
-+    Authctxt *the_authctxt)
- {
- 	*role = NULL;
- 	*level = NULL;
-@@ -241,8 +237,8 @@ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role,
- 
- /* Return the default security context for the given username */
- static int
-sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
-	security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc)
-+sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, security_context_t *default_sc,
-+    security_context_t *user_sc, int inetd, Authctxt *the_authctxt)
- {
- 	char *sename, *lvl;
- 	char *role;
-@@ -250,7 +246,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
- 	int r = 0;
- 	context_t con = NULL;
- 
-	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
-+	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl, the_authctxt);
- 
- #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
- 	if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) {
-@@ -272,7 +268,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
- 
- 	if (r == 0) {
- 		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
-		if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
-+		if (inetd) {
- 			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
- 
- 			if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
-@@ -333,7 +329,8 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
- 
- /* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
- static int
-sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *))
-+sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *), int inetd,
-+    Authctxt *the_authctxt)
- {
- 	const char *reqlvl;
- 	char *role;
-@@ -342,11 +339,11 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it
- 
- 	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
- 
-	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
-+	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl, the_authctxt);
- 
- 	rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
- 
-	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
-+	if (inetd) {
- 		use_current = "1";
- 	} else {
- 		use_current = "";
-@@ -362,9 +359,10 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it
- }
- 
- static int
-sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
-+sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(int inetd,
-+    int(pam_setenv)(char *, const char *), Authctxt *the_authctxt)
- {
-	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_pam_putenv);
-+	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(pam_setenv, inetd, the_authctxt);
- }
- 
- static int
-@@ -374,25 +372,28 @@ do_setenv(char *name, const char *value)
- }
- 
- int
-sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void)
-+sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(int inetd, void *the_authctxt)
- {
-	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv);
-+	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *) the_authctxt;
-+	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv, inetd, authctxt);
- }
- 
- /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
- void
-sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
-+sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname, int inetd,
-+    int(pam_setenv)(char *, const char *), void *the_authctxt, int use_pam)
- {
- 	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
- 	int r = 0;
- 	security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
-+	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *) the_authctxt;
- 
- 	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
- 		return;
- 
-	if (options.use_pam) {
-+	if (use_pam) {
- 		/* do not compute context, just setup environment for pam_selinux */
-		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) {
-+		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(inetd, pam_setenv, authctxt)) {
- 			switch (security_getenforce()) {
- 			case -1:
- 				fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
-@@ -410,7 +411,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
- 
- 	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
- 
-	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
-+	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx, inetd, authctxt);
- 	if (r >= 0) {
- 		r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
- 		if (r < 0) {
-diff -up openssh/platform.c.refactor openssh/platform.c
--- openssh/platform.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.204821389 +0200
-+++ openssh/platform.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.277822088 +0200
-@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@
- 
- extern int use_privsep;
- extern ServerOptions options;
-+extern int inetd_flag;
-+extern int rexeced_flag;
-+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
- 
- void
- platform_pre_listen(void)
-@@ -183,7 +186,9 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru
- 	}
- #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
-+	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
-+	    options.use_pam);
- #endif
- }
- 
-diff -up openssh/sshd.c.refactor openssh/sshd.c
--- openssh/sshd.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.275822068 +0200
-+++ openssh/sshd.c	2019-04-04 13:19:51.270195262 +0200
-@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ int debug_flag = 0;
- static int test_flag = 0;
- 
- /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
-static int inetd_flag = 0;
-+int inetd_flag = 0;
- 
- /* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
- static int no_daemon_flag = 0;
-@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ static char **saved_argv;
- static int saved_argc;
- 
- /* re-exec */
-static int rexeced_flag = 0;
-+int rexeced_flag = 0;
- static int rexec_flag = 1;
- static int rexec_argc = 0;
- static char **rexec_argv;
-@@ -2192,7 +2192,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	}
- #endif
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
-+	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
-+	    options.use_pam);
- #endif
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- 	if (options.use_pam) {
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
@ -1,457 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/cipher-ctr.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.326525641 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/cipher-ctr.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.401526401 +0200
-@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ evp_aes_128_ctr(void)
- 	aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr;
- #ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
- 	aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH |
-	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV;
-+	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV |
-+	    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS;
- #endif
- 	return (&aes_ctr);
- }
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/dh.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/dh.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/dh.c.fips	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/dh.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.401526401 +0200
-@@ -152,6 +152,12 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max
- 	int best, bestcount, which, linenum;
- 	struct dhgroup dhg;
- 
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		logit("Using arbitrary primes is not allowed in FIPS mode."
-+		    " Falling back to known groups.");
-+		return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
-+	}
-+
- 	if ((f = fopen(_PATH_DH_MODULI, "r")) == NULL) {
- 		logit("WARNING: could not open %s (%s), using fixed modulus",
- 		    _PATH_DH_MODULI, strerror(errno));
-@@ -489,4 +495,38 @@ dh_estimate(int bits)
- 	return 8192;
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * Compares the received DH parameters with known-good groups,
-+ * which might be either from group14, group16 or group18.
-+ */
-+int
-+dh_is_known_group(const DH *dh)
-+{
-+	const BIGNUM *p, *g;
-+	const BIGNUM *known_p, *known_g;
-+	DH *known = NULL;
-+	int bits = 0, rv = 0;
-+
-+	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, &g);
-+	bits = BN_num_bits(p);
-+
-+	if (bits <= 3072) {
-+		known = dh_new_group14();
-+	} else if (bits <= 6144) {
-+		known = dh_new_group16();
-+	} else {
-+		known = dh_new_group18();
-+	}
-+
-+	DH_get0_pqg(known, &known_p, NULL, &known_g);
-+
-+	if (BN_cmp(g, known_g) == 0 &&
-+	    BN_cmp(p, known_p) == 0) {
-+		rv = 1;
-+	}
-+
-+	DH_free(known);
-+	return rv;
-+}
-+
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/dh.h.fips openssh-8.0p1/dh.h
--- openssh-8.0p1/dh.h.fips	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/dh.h	2019-07-23 14:55:45.401526401 +0200
-@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ DH	*dh_new_group_fallback(int);
- 
- int	 dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
- int	 dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *, const BIGNUM *);
-+int	 dh_is_known_group(const DH *);
- 
- u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/kex.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/kex.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/kex.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.395526340 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/kex.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.402526411 +0200
-@@ -199,7 +199,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
- 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
- 	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
- 		if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
-			error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
-+			if (FIPS_mode())
-+				error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p);
-+			else
-+				error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
- 			free(s);
- 			return 0;
- 		}
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/kexgexc.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/kexgexc.c.fips	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/kexgexc.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.402526411 +0200
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
- 
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- 
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #include <sys/types.h>
- 
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
-@@ -113,6 +114,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32
- 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+	if (FIPS_mode() && dh_is_known_group(kex->dh) == 0) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
- 	p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
- 
- 	/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h
--- openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h.fips	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h	2019-07-23 14:55:45.402526411 +0200
-@@ -111,6 +111,20 @@
- 	"rsa-sha2-256," \
- 	"ssh-rsa"
- 
-+#define	KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG	\
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521," \
-+	"rsa-sha2-512," \
-+	"rsa-sha2-256," \
-+	"ssh-rsa"
-+
- #define	KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
- 	"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
- 	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
-@@ -134,6 +142,27 @@
- 
- #define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
- 
-+#define	KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \
-+	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
-+	"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \
-+	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se," \
-+	"aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
-+#define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS		\
-+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
-+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \
-+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp521," \
-+	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," \
-+	"diffie-hellman-group16-sha512," \
-+	"diffie-hellman-group18-sha512," \
-+	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha256"
-+#define KEX_FIPS_MAC \
-+	"hmac-sha1," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-256," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-512," \
-+	"hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
-+
- /* Not a KEX value, but here so all the algorithm defaults are together */
- #define	SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS	\
- 	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.334525723 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.402526411 +0200
-@@ -2179,11 +2179,16 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
- 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
- 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
- 	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
-	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
-	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_MAC, all_mac);
-	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_KEX, all_kex);
-	def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
-	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
-+	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT), all_cipher);
-+	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_CLIENT_MAC), all_mac);
-+	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_CLIENT_KEX), all_kex);
-+	def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key);
-+	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig);
- #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
- 	do { \
- 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.373526117 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.402526411 +0200
-@@ -137,6 +137,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
- #ifdef __NR_open
- 	SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_socket
-+	SC_DENY(__NR_socket, EACCES),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_openat
- 	SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES),
- #endif
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.361525996 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.403526421 +0200
-@@ -208,11 +208,16 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
- 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
- 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
- 	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
-	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
-	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac);
-	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex);
-	def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
-	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
-+	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT), all_cipher);
-+	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_SERVER_MAC), all_mac);
-+	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_SERVER_KEX), all_kex);
-+	def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key);
-+	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig);
- #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
- 	do { \
- 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.378526168 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.403526421 +0200
-@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #endif
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- 
-@@ -614,6 +626,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		dump_client_config(&options, host);
- 		exit(0);
- 	}
-+
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
-+	}
- 
- 	/* Expand SecurityKeyProvider if it refers to an environment variable */
- 	if (options.sk_provider != NULL && *options.sk_provider == '$' &&
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.336525743 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.403526421 +0200
-@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@
- #include <vis.h>
- #endif
- 
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- 
- #include "xmalloc.h"
-@@ -198,36 +203,41 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
- 
- #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
- 	if (options.gss_keyex) {
-		/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
-		 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
-		orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
-
-		if (options.gss_server_identity) {
-			gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
-		} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
-			gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
-			/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
-			 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
-			if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
-				free(gss_host);
-				gss_host = xstrdup(host);
-			}
-		} else {
-			gss_host = xstrdup(host);
-		}
-
-		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
-		    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
-		if (gss) {
-			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
-			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
-			    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-
-			/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
-			 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
-			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
-			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
-			    "%s,null", orig);
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
-+			options.gss_keyex = 0;
-+		} else {
-+			/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
-+			 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
-+			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
-+
-+			if (options.gss_server_identity) {
-+				gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
-+			} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
-+				gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
-+				/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
-+				 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
-+				if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
-+					free(gss_host);
-+					gss_host = xstrdup(host);
-+				}
-+			} else {
-+				gss_host = xstrdup(host);
-+			}
-+
-+			gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
-+			    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
-+			if (gss) {
-+				debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
-+				xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
-+				    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-+
-+				/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
-+				 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
-+				orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
-+				xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
-+				    "%s,null", orig);
-+			}
- 		}
- 	}
- #endif
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.398526371 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.403526421 +0200
-@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
- #include <grp.h>
- #include <pwd.h>
- #include <signal.h>
-+#include <syslog.h>
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
-@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- #endif
- 
-@@ -1529,6 +1532,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- #endif
- 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
- 
-+	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
- 	/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
- 	saved_argc = ac;
- 	rexec_argc = ac;
-@@ -1992,6 +2007,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	/* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
- 	log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
- 
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
-+	}
-+
- 	/* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
- 	   unmounted if desired. */
- 	if (chdir("/") == -1)
-@@ -2382,10 +2401,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
- 		orig = NULL;
- 
-	if (options.gss_keyex)
-		gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
-	else
-		gss = NULL;
-+	if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
-+			options.gss_keyex = 0;
-+		} else {
-+			gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
-+		}
-+	}
- 
- 	if (gss && orig)
- 		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshkey.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/sshkey.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.398526371 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshkey.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.404526431 +0200
-@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #include <openssl/pem.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #endif
- 
- #include "crypto_api.h"
-@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@
- #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
- #include "sshkey.h"
- #include "match.h"
-+#include "log.h"
- #include "ssh-sk.h"
- 
- #ifdef WITH_XMSS
-@@ -1591,6 +1593,8 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA
- 	}
- 	if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) ||
- 	    !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) {
-+			if (FIPS_mode())
-+				logit("%s: the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method", __func__);
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.391526300 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c	2019-07-23 14:57:54.118830056 +0200
-@@ -199,6 +199,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *na
- #endif
- 	}
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		if (type == KEY_DSA)
-+			fatal("DSA keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		if (type == KEY_ED25519)
-+			fatal("ED25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+	}
- 	switch (type) {
- 	case KEY_DSA:
- 		if (*bitsp != 1024)
-@@ -1029,9 +1035,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
- 			first = 1;
- 			printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
- 		}
-+		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
-+
-+		/* Skip the keys that are not supported in FIPS mode */
-+		if (FIPS_mode() && (type == KEY_DSA || type == KEY_ED25519)) {
-+			logit("Skipping %s key in FIPS mode",
-+			    key_types[i].key_type_display);
-+			goto next;
-+		}
-+
- 		printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display);
- 		fflush(stdout);
-		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
- 		if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
- 			error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s",
-			    prv_tmp, strerror(errno));
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
@ -1,647 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
-index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
--- a/auth-krb5.c
-+++ b/auth-krb5.c
-@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
- #include <unistd.h>
- #include <string.h>
- #include <krb5.h>
-+#include <profile.h>
- 
- extern ServerOptions	 options;
- 
-@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
- #endif
- 	krb5_error_code problem;
- 	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
-	int len;
-+	char *ticket_name = NULL;
- 	char *client, *platform_client;
- 	const char *errmsg;
- 
-@@ -163,7 +164,8 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 
-	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
-+	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
-+	     &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, &authctxt->krb5_set_env);
- 	if (problem)
- 		goto out;
- 
-@@ -172,21 +174,20 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
- 	if (problem)
- 		goto out;
- 
-	problem= krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache,
-+	problem = krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache,
- 				 &creds);
- 	if (problem)
- 		goto out;
- #endif
- 
-	authctxt->krb5_ticket_file = (char *)krb5_cc_get_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
-+	problem = krb5_cc_get_full_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
-+	    authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, &ticket_name);
- 
-	len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
-	authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
-	snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
-	    authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
-+	authctxt->krb5_ccname = xstrdup(ticket_name);
-+	krb5_free_string(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ticket_name);
- 
- #ifdef USE_PAM
-	if (options.use_pam)
-+	if (options.use_pam && authctxt->krb5_set_env)
- 		do_pam_putenv("KRB5CCNAME", authctxt->krb5_ccname);
- #endif
- 
-@@ -222,11 +223,54 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
- void
- krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
- {
-+	struct stat krb5_ccname_stat;
-+	char krb5_ccname[128], *krb5_ccname_dir_start, *krb5_ccname_dir_end;
-+
- 	debug("krb5_cleanup_proc called");
- 	if (authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache) {
-		krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
-+		krb5_context ctx = authctxt->krb5_ctx;
-+		krb5_cccol_cursor cursor;
-+		krb5_ccache ccache;
-+		int ret;
-+
-+		krb5_cc_destroy(ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
- 		authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache = NULL;
-+
-+		ret = krb5_cccol_cursor_new(ctx, &cursor);
-+		if (ret)
-+			goto out;
-+
-+		ret = krb5_cccol_cursor_next(ctx, cursor, &ccache);
-+		if (ret == 0 && ccache != NULL) {
-+			/* There is at least one other ccache in collection
-+			 * we can switch to */
-+			krb5_cc_switch(ctx, ccache);
-+		} else if (authctxt->krb5_ccname != NULL) {
-+			/* Clean up the collection too */
-+			strncpy(krb5_ccname, authctxt->krb5_ccname, sizeof(krb5_ccname) - 10);
-+			krb5_ccname_dir_start = strchr(krb5_ccname, ':') + 1;
-+			*krb5_ccname_dir_start++ = '\0';
-+			if (strcmp(krb5_ccname, "DIR") == 0) {
-+
-+				strcat(krb5_ccname_dir_start, "/primary");
-+
-+				if (stat(krb5_ccname_dir_start, &krb5_ccname_stat) == 0) {
-+					if (unlink(krb5_ccname_dir_start) == 0) {
-+						krb5_ccname_dir_end = strrchr(krb5_ccname_dir_start, '/');
-+						*krb5_ccname_dir_end = '\0';
-+						if (rmdir(krb5_ccname_dir_start) == -1)
-+							debug("cache dir '%s' remove failed: %s",
-+							    krb5_ccname_dir_start, strerror(errno));
-+					}
-+					else
-+						debug("cache primary file '%s', remove failed: %s",
-+						    krb5_ccname_dir_start, strerror(errno));
-+				}
-+			}
-+		}
-+		krb5_cccol_cursor_free(ctx, &cursor);
- 	}
-+out:
- 	if (authctxt->krb5_user) {
- 		krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user);
- 		authctxt->krb5_user = NULL;
-@@ -237,36 +281,188 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 	}
- }
- 
-#ifndef HEIMDAL
-+
-+#if !defined(HEIMDAL)
-+int
-+ssh_asprintf_append(char **dsc, const char *fmt, ...) {
-+	char *src, *old;
-+	va_list ap;
-+	int i;
-+
-+	va_start(ap, fmt);
-+	i = vasprintf(&src, fmt, ap);
-+	va_end(ap);
-+
-+	if (i == -1 || src == NULL)
-+		return -1;
-+
-+	old = *dsc;
-+
-+	i = asprintf(dsc, "%s%s", *dsc, src);
-+	if (i == -1 || src == NULL) {
-+		free(src);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
-+	free(old);
-+	free(src);
-+
-+	return i;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+ssh_krb5_expand_template(char **result, const char *template) {
-+	char *p_n, *p_o, *r, *tmp_template;
-+
-+	debug3("%s: called, template = %s", __func__, template);
-+	if (template == NULL)
-+		return -1;
-+
-+	tmp_template = p_n = p_o = xstrdup(template);
-+	r = xstrdup("");
-+
-+	while ((p_n = strstr(p_o, "%{")) != NULL) {
-+
-+		*p_n++ = '\0';
-+		if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%s", p_o) == -1)
-+			goto cleanup;
-+
-+		if (strncmp(p_n, "{uid}", 5) == 0 || strncmp(p_n, "{euid}", 6) == 0 ||
-+			strncmp(p_n, "{USERID}", 8) == 0) {
-+			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
-+			if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%d", geteuid()) == -1)
-+				goto cleanup;
-+			continue;
-+		}
-+		else if (strncmp(p_n, "{TEMP}", 6) == 0) {
-+			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
-+			if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "/tmp") == -1)
-+				goto cleanup;
-+			continue;
-+		} else {
-+			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
-+			*p_o = '\0';
-+			debug("%s: unsupported token %s in %s", __func__, p_n, template);
-+			/* unknown token, fallback to the default */
-+			goto cleanup;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%s", p_o) == -1)
-+		goto cleanup;
-+
-+	*result = r;
-+	free(tmp_template);
-+	return 0;
-+
-+cleanup:
-+	free(r);
-+	free(tmp_template);
-+	return -1;
-+}
-+
- krb5_error_code
-ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
-	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
-	char ccname[40];
-+ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(krb5_context ctx, char **ccname) {
-+	profile_t p;
-+	int ret = 0;
-+	char *value = NULL;
-+
-+	debug3("%s: called", __func__);
-+	ret = krb5_get_profile(ctx, &p);
-+	if (ret)
-+		return ret;
-+
-+	ret = profile_get_string(p, "libdefaults", "default_ccache_name", NULL, NULL, &value);
-+	if (ret || !value)
-+		return ret;
-+
-+	ret = ssh_krb5_expand_template(ccname, value);
-+
-+	debug3("%s: returning with ccname = %s", __func__, *ccname);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+krb5_error_code
-+ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environment) {
-+	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno, type_len;
-+	char *ccname = NULL;
- 	mode_t old_umask;
-+	char *type = NULL, *colon = NULL;
- 
-	ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
-	    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
-	if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
-		return ENOMEM;
-
-	old_umask = umask(0177);
-	tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
-	oerrno = errno;
-	umask(old_umask);
-	if (tmpfd == -1) {
-		logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
-		return oerrno;
-	}
-+	debug3("%s: called", __func__);
-+	if (need_environment)
-+		*need_environment = 0;
-+	ret = ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(ctx, &ccname);
-+	if (ret || !ccname || options.kerberos_unique_ccache) {
-+		/* Otherwise, go with the old method */
-+		if (ccname)
-+			free(ccname);
-+		ccname = NULL;
-+
-+		ret = asprintf(&ccname,
-+		    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
-+		if (ret < 0)
-+			return ENOMEM;
- 
-	if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
-+		old_umask = umask(0177);
-+		tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
- 		oerrno = errno;
-		logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
-+		umask(old_umask);
-+		if (tmpfd == -1) {
-+			logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
-+			return oerrno;
-+		}
-+
-+		if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
-+			oerrno = errno;
-+			logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
-+			close(tmpfd);
-+			return oerrno;
-+		}
-+		/* make sure the KRB5CCNAME is set for non-standard location */
-+		if (need_environment)
-+			*need_environment = 1;
- 		close(tmpfd);
-		return oerrno;
- 	}
-	close(tmpfd);
- 
-	return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
-+	debug3("%s: setting default ccname to %s", __func__, ccname);
-+	/* set the default with already expanded user IDs */
-+	ret = krb5_cc_set_default_name(ctx, ccname);
-+	if (ret)
-+		return ret;
-+
-+	if ((colon = strstr(ccname, ":")) != NULL) {
-+		type_len = colon - ccname;
-+		type = malloc((type_len + 1) * sizeof(char));
-+		if (type == NULL)
-+			return ENOMEM;
-+		strncpy(type, ccname, type_len);
-+		type[type_len] = 0;
-+	} else {
-+		type = strdup(ccname);
-+	}
-+
-+	/* If we have a credential cache from krb5.conf, we need to switch
-+	 * a primary cache for this collection, if it supports that (non-FILE)
-+	 */
-+	if (krb5_cc_support_switch(ctx, type)) {
-+		debug3("%s: calling cc_new_unique(%s)", __func__, ccname);
-+		ret = krb5_cc_new_unique(ctx, type, NULL, ccache);
-+		free(type);
-+		if (ret)
-+			return ret;
-+
-+		debug3("%s: calling cc_switch()", __func__);
-+		return krb5_cc_switch(ctx, *ccache);
-+	} else {
-+		/* Otherwise, we can not create a unique ccname here (either
-+		 * it is already unique from above or the type does not support
-+		 * collections
-+		 */
-+		free(type);
-+		debug3("%s: calling cc_resolve(%s)", __func__, ccname);
-+		return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
-+	}
- }
- #endif /* !HEIMDAL */
- #endif /* KRB5 */
-diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
-index 29491df9..fdab5040 100644
--- a/auth.h
-+++ b/auth.h
-@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
- 	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
- 	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
- 	char		*krb5_ccname;
-+	int		 krb5_set_env;
- #endif
- 	struct sshbuf	*loginmsg;
- 
-@@ -238,7 +239,7 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
- int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
- 
- #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
-krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
-+krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
- #endif
- 
- #endif /* AUTH_H */
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
--- openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name	2019-03-01 15:17:42.708611802 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2019-03-01 15:17:42.713611844 +0100
-@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
- /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
-  * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
- 
-static void
-+static int
- ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- {
- 	krb5_ccache ccache;
-@@ -276,14 +276,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
- 	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
- 	const char *new_ccname, *new_cctype;
- 	const char *errmsg;
-+	int set_env = 0;
- 
- 	if (client->creds == NULL) {
- 		debug("No credentials stored");
-		return;
-+		return 0;
- 	}
- 
- 	if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0)
-		return;
-+		return 0;
- 
- #ifdef HEIMDAL
- # ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE
-@@ -297,14 +298,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
- 		krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
- # endif
- 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
-		return;
-+		return 0;
- 	}
- #else
-	if ((problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb_context, &ccache))) {
-+	if ((problem = ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb_context, &ccache, &set_env)) != 0) {
- 		errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem);
-		logit("ssh_krb5_cc_gen(): %.100s", errmsg);
-+		logit("ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(): %.100s", errmsg);
- 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
-		return;
-+		return 0;
- 	}
- #endif	/* #ifdef HEIMDAL */
- 
-@@ -313,7 +314,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
- 		errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem);
- 		logit("krb5_parse_name(): %.100s", errmsg);
- 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
-		return;
-+		return 0;
- 	}
- 
- 	if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, princ))) {
-@@ -322,7 +323,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
- 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
- 		krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
- 		krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
-		return;
-+		return 0;
- 	}
- 
- 	krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
-@@ -331,32 +332,21 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
- 	    client->creds, ccache))) {
- 		logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed");
- 		krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
-		return;
-+		return 0;
- 	}
- 
- 	new_cctype = krb5_cc_get_type(krb_context, ccache);
- 	new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
-
-	client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
-#ifdef USE_CCAPI
-	xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
-	client->store.filename = NULL;
-#else
-	if (new_ccname[0] == ':')
-		new_ccname++;
- 	xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "%s:%s", new_cctype, new_ccname);
-	if (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0) {
-		char *p;
-		p = strrchr(client->store.envval, '/');
-		if (p)
-			*p = '\0';
-+
-+	if (set_env) {
-+		client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
- 	}
- 	if ((strcmp(new_cctype, "FILE") == 0) || (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0))
- 		client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
-#endif
- 
- #ifdef USE_PAM
-	if (options.use_pam)
-+	if (options.use_pam && set_env)
- 		do_pam_putenv(client->store.envvar, client->store.envval);
- #endif
- 
-@@ -361,7 +355,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
- 
- 	client->store.data = krb_context;
- 
-	return;
-+	return set_env;
- }
- 
- int
-diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
-index 6cae720e..16e55cbc 100644
--- a/gss-serv.c
-+++ b/gss-serv.c
-@@ -320,13 +320,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- }
- 
- /* As user */
-void
-+int
- ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
- {
- 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
-		(*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
-+		return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
- 	} else
- 		debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
-+
-+	return 0;
- }
- 
- /* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the child's environment based
-@@ -498,9 +500,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() {
- 	char *envstr;
- #endif
- 
-	if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
-	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
-	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
-+	if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
- 		return;
- 
- 	ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
--- openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name	2019-03-01 15:17:42.704611768 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c	2019-03-01 15:17:42.713611844 +0100
-@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
- 	options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1;
- 	options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
- 	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
-+	options->kerberos_unique_ccache = -1;
- 	options->gss_authentication=-1;
- 	options->gss_keyex = -1;
- 	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
-@@ -315,6 +316,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
- 		options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1;
- 	if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1)
- 		options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
-+	if (options->kerberos_unique_ccache == -1)
-+		options->kerberos_unique_ccache = 0;
- 	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
- 		options->gss_authentication = 0;
- 	if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
-@@ -447,7 +450,8 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
- 	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
- 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
-	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
-+	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache,
-+	sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
- 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
- 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
- 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
-@@ -526,11 +530,13 @@ static struct {
- #else
- 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #endif
-+	{ "kerberosuniqueccache", sKerberosUniqueCCache, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #else
- 	{ "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "kerberosuniqueccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #endif
- 	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1437,6 +1443,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
- 		intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token;
- 		goto parse_flag;
- 
-+	case sKerberosUniqueCCache:
-+		intptr = &options->kerberos_unique_ccache;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
- 	case sGssAuthentication:
- 		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
- 		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -2507,6 +2517,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- # ifdef USE_AFS
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
- # endif
-+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache);
- #endif
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
-diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
-index db8362c6..4fa42d64 100644
--- a/servconf.h
-+++ b/servconf.h
-@@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ typedef struct {
- 						 * file on logout. */
- 	int     kerberos_get_afs_token;		/* If true, try to get AFS token if
- 						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
-+	int     kerberos_unique_ccache;		/* If true, the acquired ticket will
-+						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
- 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
- 	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
- 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
-index 85df6a27..480a5ead 100644
--- a/session.c
-+++ b/session.c
-@@ -1033,7 +1033,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
- 	/* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter
- 	 * the child's environment as they see fit
- 	 */
-	ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
-+	if (s->authctxt->krb5_set_env)
-+		ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
- #endif
- 
- 	/* Set basic environment. */
-@@ -1105,7 +1106,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
- 	}
- #endif
- #ifdef KRB5
-	if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname)
-+	if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname && s->authctxt->krb5_set_env)
- 		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
- 		    s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
- #endif
-diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
-index 6593e422..245178af 100644
--- a/ssh-gss.h
-+++ b/ssh-gss.h
-@@ -83,7 +82,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
- 	int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
- 	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
- 	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
-	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
-+	int (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
- 	int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
- } ssh_gssapi_mech;
- 
-@@ -127,7 +126,7 @@ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
- void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
-void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
-+int ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
- const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
- 
- char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index edbe815c..89514e8a 100644
--- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -2162,7 +2162,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- 	if (options.gss_authentication) {
- 		temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
-		ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
-+		authctxt->krb5_set_env = ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
- 		restore_uid();
- 	}
- #endif
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index c0683d4a..2349f477 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -860,6 +860,14 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache
- file on logout.
- The default is
- .Cm yes .
-+.It Cm KerberosUniqueCCache
-+Specifies whether to store the acquired tickets in the per-session credential
-+cache under /tmp/ or whether to use per-user credential cache as configured in
-+.Pa /etc/krb5.conf .
-+The default value
-+.Cm no
-+can lead to overwriting previous tickets by subseqent connections to the same
-+user account.
- .It Cm KexAlgorithms
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch
@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh/ssh_config.redhat openssh/ssh_config
--- openssh/ssh_config.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/ssh_config	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
-@@ -43,3 +43,10 @@
- #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
- #   RekeyLimit 1G 1h
- #   UserKnownHostsFile ~/.ssh/known_hosts.d/%k
-+#
-+# This system is following system-wide crypto policy.
-+# To modify the crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...), create a  *.conf
-+#  file under  /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/  which will be automatically
-+# included below. For more information, see manual page for
-+#  update-crypto-policies(8)  and  ssh_config(5).
-+Include /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/*.conf
-diff -up openssh/ssh_config_redhat.redhat openssh/ssh_config_redhat
--- openssh/ssh_config_redhat.redhat	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
-+++ openssh/ssh_config_redhat	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
-+# The options here are in the "Match final block" to be applied as the last
-+# options and could be potentially overwritten by the user configuration
-+Match final all
-+	# Follow system-wide Crypto Policy, if defined:
-+	Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config
-+
-+	GSSAPIAuthentication yes
-+
-+# If this option is set to yes then remote X11 clients will have full access
-+# to the original X11 display. As virtually no X11 client supports the untrusted
-+# mode correctly we set this to yes.
-+	ForwardX11Trusted yes
-+
-+# Send locale-related environment variables
-+	SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
-+	SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
-+	SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
-+	SendEnv XMODIFIERS
-+
-+# Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain
-+# Host *.local
-diff -up openssh/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh/sshd_config.0
--- openssh/sshd_config.0.redhat	2020-02-12 14:30:04.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/sshd_config.0	2020-02-13 18:13:39.181641855 +0100
-@@ -970,9 +970,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
- 
-      SyslogFacility
-              Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
-             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0,
-             LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.  The
-             default is AUTH.
-+             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV,
-+             LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
-+             The default is AUTH.
- 
-      TCPKeepAlive
-              Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
-diff -up openssh/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh/sshd_config.5
--- openssh/sshd_config.5.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/sshd_config.5	2020-02-13 18:13:39.181641855 +0100
-@@ -1614,7 +1614,7 @@ By default no subsystems are defined.
- .It Cm SyslogFacility
- Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
- .Xr sshd 8 .
-The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
-+The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
- LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
- The default is AUTH.
- .It Cm TCPKeepAlive
-diff -up openssh/sshd_config.redhat openssh/sshd_config
--- openssh/sshd_config.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/sshd_config	2020-02-13 18:20:16.349913681 +0100
-@@ -10,6 +10,14 @@
- # possible, but leave them commented.  Uncommented options override the
- # default value.
-
-+# To modify the system-wide sshd configuration, create a  *.conf  file under
-+#  /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/  which will be automatically included below
-+Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/*.conf
-+
-+# If you want to change the port on a SELinux system, you have to tell
-+# SELinux about this change.
-+# semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER
-+#
- #Port 22
- #AddressFamily any
- #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
-diff -up openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat openssh/sshd_config_redhat
--- openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat	2020-02-13 18:14:02.268006439 +0100
-+++ openssh/sshd_config_redhat	2020-02-13 18:19:20.765035947 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
-+# This system is following system-wide crypto policy. The changes to
-+# crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...) will not have any effect in
-+# this or following included files. To override some configuration option,
-+# write it before this block or include it before this file.
-+# Please, see manual pages for update-crypto-policies(8) and sshd_config(5).
-+Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config
-+
-+SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
-+
-+ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
-+
-+GSSAPIAuthentication yes
-+GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
-+
-+UsePAM yes
-+
-+X11Forwarding yes
-+
-+# It is recommended to use pam_motd in /etc/pam.d/sshd instead of PrintMotd,
-+# as it is more configurable and versatile than the built-in version.
-+PrintMotd no
-+
-+# Accept locale-related environment variables
-+AcceptEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
-+AcceptEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
-+AcceptEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
-+AcceptEnv XMODIFIERS
-+
--- a/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
--- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -1701,6 +1701,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
- 	    cfg, &includes, NULL);
- 
-+	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora */
-+	if (! options.use_pam)
-+		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora and may cause several problems.");
-+
- 	/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
- 	fill_default_server_options(&options);
- 
-diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
--- a/sshd_config
-+++ b/sshd_config
-@@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
- # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
- # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
- # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
-+# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora and may cause several
-+# problems.
- #UsePAM no
- 
- #AllowAgentForwarding yes
--- a/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
@ -1,871 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh/auth2.c.role-mls openssh/auth2.c
--- openssh/auth2.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth2.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.815430916 +0200
-@@ -256,6 +256,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
- 	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
- 	Authmethod *m = NULL;
- 	char *user = NULL, *service = NULL, *method = NULL, *style = NULL;
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	char *role = NULL;
-+#endif
- 	int r, authenticated = 0;
- 	double tstart = monotime_double();
- 
-@@ -268,6 +271,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
- 	debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
- 	debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
-+		*role++ = 0;
-+#endif
-+
- 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
- 		*style++ = 0;
- 
-@@ -296,8 +304,15 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
- 		    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
- 		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
- 		authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
-		if (use_privsep)
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+		authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
-+#endif
-+		if (use_privsep) {
- 			mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+			mm_inform_authrole(role);
-+#endif
-+		}
- 		userauth_banner(ssh);
- 		if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
- 			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
-diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
--- openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth2-gss.c	2018-08-22 11:15:42.459799171 +0200
-@@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
- 	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
- 	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
- 	int r, authenticated = 0;
-+	char *micuser;
- 	struct sshbuf *b;
- 	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
- 	const char *displayname;
-@@ -298,7 +299,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
- 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- 	mic.value = p;
- 	mic.length = len;
-	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	if (authctxt->role && authctxt->role[0] != 0)
-+		xasprintf(&micuser, "%s/%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->role);
-+	else
-+#endif
-+		micuser = authctxt->user;
-+	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, micuser, authctxt->service,
- 	    "gssapi-with-mic");
- 
- 	if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
-@@ -311,6 +318,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
- 		logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
- 
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
-+	if (micuser != authctxt->user)
-+		free(micuser);
- 	free(mic.value);
- 
- 	if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
-diff -up openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
--- openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth2-hostbased.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
-@@ -123,7 +123,16 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	/* reconstruct packet */
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	    (authctxt->role
-+	    ? ( (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, strlen(authctxt->user)+strlen(authctxt->role)+1)) != 0 ||
-+	        (r = sshbuf_put(b, authctxt->user, strlen(authctxt->user))) != 0 ||
-+	        (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, '/') != 0) ||
-+	        (r = sshbuf_put(b, authctxt->role, strlen(authctxt->role))) != 0)
-+	    : (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0) ||
-+#else
- 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0 ||
-+#endif
- 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "hostbased")) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkalg, alen)) != 0 ||
-diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
--- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c	2018-08-22 11:17:07.331483958 +0200
-@@ -169,9 +169,16 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
- 			goto done;
- 		}
- 		/* reconstruct packet */
-		xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
-+		xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
- 		    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
-		    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
-+		    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "",
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+		    authctxt->role ? "/" : "",
-+		    authctxt->role ? authctxt->role : ""
-+#else
-+		    "", ""
-+#endif
-+		    );
- 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
- 		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, userstyle)) != 0 ||
- 		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
-diff -up openssh/auth.h.role-mls openssh/auth.h
--- openssh/auth.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
-@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ struct Authctxt {
- 	char		*service;
- 	struct passwd	*pw;		/* set if 'valid' */
- 	char		*style;
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	char		*role;
-+#endif
- 
- 	/* Method lists for multiple authentication */
- 	char		**auth_methods;	/* modified from server config */
-diff -up openssh/auth-pam.c.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.c
--- openssh/auth-pam.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth-pam.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
-@@ -1172,7 +1172,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void)
-  * during the ssh authentication process.
-  */
- int
-do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
-+do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value)
- {
- 	int ret = 1;
- 	char *compound;
-diff -up openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.h
--- openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth-pam.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200
-@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ u_int do_pam_account(void);
- void do_pam_session(struct ssh *);
- void do_pam_setcred(int );
- void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
-int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
-+int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *);
- char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
- char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
- void free_pam_environment(char **);
-diff -up openssh/misc.c.role-mls openssh/misc.c
--- openssh/misc.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/misc.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200
-@@ -542,6 +542,7 @@ char *
- colon(char *cp)
- {
- 	int flag = 0;
-+	int start = 1;
- 
- 	if (*cp == ':')		/* Leading colon is part of file name. */
- 		return NULL;
-@@ -557,6 +558,13 @@ colon(char *cp)
- 			return (cp);
- 		if (*cp == '/')
- 			return NULL;
-+		if (start) {
-+		/* Slash on beginning or after dots only denotes file name. */
-+			if (*cp == '/')
-+				return (0);
-+			if (*cp != '.')
-+				start = 0;
-+		}
- 	}
- 	return NULL;
- }
-diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
--- openssh/monitor.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/monitor.c	2018-08-22 11:19:56.006844867 +0200
-@@ -115,6 +115,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, struct sshbuf *)
- int mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
- int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
- int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+int mm_answer_authrole(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
-+#endif
- int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
- int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
- int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
-@@ -189,6 +192,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
-     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole},
-+#endif
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
- #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -796,6 +802,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, struct ss
- 
- 	/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
- 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1);
-+#endif
- 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
- 
- #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -842,6 +851,26 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, struct sshb
- 	return found;
- }
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+int
-+mm_answer_authrole(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
-+{
-+	int r;
-+	monitor_permit_authentications(1);
-+
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->role, NULL)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+	debug3("%s: role=%s", __func__, authctxt->role);
-+
-+	if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
-+		free(authctxt->role);
-+		authctxt->role = NULL;
-+	}
-+
-+	return (0);
-+}
-+#endif
-+
- int
- mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
- {
-@@ -1218,7 +1247,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i
- {
- 	struct sshbuf *b;
- 	const u_char *p;
-	char *userstyle, *cp;
-+	char *userstyle, *s, *cp;
- 	size_t len;
- 	u_char type;
- 	int r, fail = 0;
-@@ -1251,6 +1280,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i
- 		fail++;
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+	if ((s = strchr(cp, '/')) != NULL)
-+		*s = '\0';
- 	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
- 	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
- 	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
-@@ -1286,7 +1317,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
- {
- 	struct sshbuf *b;
- 	const u_char *p;
-	char *cp, *userstyle;
-+	char *cp, *s, *userstyle;
- 	size_t len;
- 	int r, fail = 0;
- 	u_char type;
-@@ -1308,6 +1339,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
- 		fail++;
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+	if ((s = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL)
-+		*s = '\0';
- 	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
- 	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
- 	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
-diff -up openssh/monitor.h.role-mls openssh/monitor.h
--- openssh/monitor.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/monitor.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
-@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
- 	MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC = 48, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC = 49,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_TERM = 50,
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 80,
-+#endif
-+
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
-diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.c
--- openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
-+++ openssh/monitor_wrap.c	2018-08-22 11:21:47.938747968 +0200
-@@ -390,6 +390,27 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *
- 	sshbuf_free(m);
- }
- 
-+/* Inform the privileged process about role */
-+
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+void
-+mm_inform_authrole(char *role)
-+{
-+	int r;
-+	struct sshbuf *m;
-+
-+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-+
-+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, role ? role : "")) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, m);
-+
-+	sshbuf_free(m);
-+}
-+#endif
-+
- /* Do the password authentication */
- int
- mm_auth_password(struct ssh *ssh, char *password)
-diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.h
--- openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
-+++ openssh/monitor_wrap.h	2018-08-22 11:22:10.439929513 +0200
-@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
-     const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *,
-     const char *, u_int compat);
- void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+void mm_inform_authrole(char *);
-+#endif
- struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(struct ssh *, const char *);
- char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
- int mm_auth_password(struct ssh *, char *);
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
--- openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ PORTS=	port-aix.o \
- 	port-linux.o \
- 	port-solaris.o \
- 	port-net.o \
-	port-uw.o
-+	port-uw.o \
-+	port-linux-sshd.o
- 
- .c.o:
- 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS_NOPIE) $(PICFLAG) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -100,37 +100,6 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
- 	return sc;
- }
- 
-/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
-void
-ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
-{
-	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
-
-	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
-		return;
-
-	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
-
-	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
-	if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
-		switch (security_getenforce()) {
-		case -1:
-			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
-		case 0:
-			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
-			    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
-			break;
-		default:
-			fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
-			    "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
-		}
-	}
-	if (user_ctx != NULL)
-		freecon(user_ctx);
-
-	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
-}
-
- /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
- void
- ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
-@@ -145,7 +114,11 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, cons
- 
- 	debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
- 
-	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
-+	if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) != 0) {
-+		error("%s: getexeccon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
- 
- 	/* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
- 
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -20,9 +20,10 @@
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
- void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
-void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
- void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
-+
-+void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
- #endif
- 
- #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,425 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
-+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
-+ *
-+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
-+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
-+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
-+ *
-+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
-+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
-+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
-+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
-+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
-+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
-+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
-+ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * Linux-specific portability code - just SELinux support for sshd at present
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#if defined(WITH_SELINUX) || defined(LINUX_OOM_ADJUST)
-+#include <errno.h>
-+#include <stdarg.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "misc.h"      /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
-+#include "servconf.h"
-+#include "port-linux.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
-+#include "hostfile.h"
-+#include "auth.h"
-+
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
-+#include <selinux/context.h>
-+#include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
-+#include <selinux/get_default_type.h>
-+
-+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
-+#include <libaudit.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+extern ServerOptions options;
-+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
-+extern int inetd_flag;
-+extern int rexeced_flag;
-+
-+/* Send audit message */
-+static int
-+sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context,
-+		       security_context_t selected_context)
-+{
-+	int rc=0;
-+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
-+	char *msg = NULL;
-+	int audit_fd = audit_open();
-+	security_context_t default_raw=NULL;
-+	security_context_t selected_raw=NULL;
-+	rc = -1;
-+	if (audit_fd < 0) {
-+		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
-+					errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
-+				return 0; /* No audit support in kernel */
-+		error("Error connecting to audit system.");
-+		return rc;
-+	}
-+	if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(default_context, &default_raw) < 0) {
-+		error("Error translating default context.");
-+		default_raw = NULL;
-+	}
-+	if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(selected_context, &selected_raw) < 0) {
-+		error("Error translating selected context.");
-+		selected_raw = NULL;
-+	}
-+	if (asprintf(&msg, "sshd: default-context=%s selected-context=%s",
-+		     default_raw ? default_raw : (default_context ? default_context: "?"),
-+		     selected_context ? selected_raw : (selected_context ? selected_context :"?")) < 0) {
-+		error("Error allocating memory.");
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_ROLE_CHANGE,
-+				   msg, NULL, NULL, NULL, success) <= 0) {
-+		error("Error sending audit message.");
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	rc = 0;
-+      out:
-+	free(msg);
-+	freecon(default_raw);
-+	freecon(selected_raw);
-+	close(audit_fd);
-+#endif
-+	return rc;
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+mls_range_allowed(security_context_t src, security_context_t dst)
-+{
-+	struct av_decision avd;
-+	int retval;
-+	access_vector_t bit;
-+	security_class_t class;
-+
-+	debug("%s: src:%s dst:%s", __func__, src, dst);
-+	class = string_to_security_class("context");
-+	if (!class) {
-+		error("string_to_security_class failed to translate security class context");
-+		return 1;
-+	}
-+	bit = string_to_av_perm(class, "contains");
-+	if (!bit) {
-+		error("string_to_av_perm failed to translate av perm contains");
-+		return 1;
-+	}
-+	retval = security_compute_av(src, dst, class, bit, &avd);
-+	if (retval || ((bit & avd.allowed) != bit))
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+get_user_context(const char *sename, const char *role, const char *lvl,
-+	security_context_t *sc) {
-+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
-+	if (lvl == NULL || lvl[0] == '\0' || get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, sc) != 0) {
-+	        /* User may have requested a level completely outside of his 
-+	           allowed range. We get a context just for auditing as the
-+	           range check below will certainly fail for default context. */
-+#endif
-+		if (get_default_context(sename, NULL, sc) != 0) {
-+			*sc = NULL;
-+			return -1;
-+		}
-+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
-+	}
-+#endif
-+	if (role != NULL && role[0]) {
-+		context_t con;
-+		char *type=NULL;
-+		if (get_default_type(role, &type) != 0) {
-+			error("get_default_type: failed to get default type for '%s'",
-+				role);
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+		con = context_new(*sc);
-+		if (!con) {
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+		context_role_set(con, role);
-+		context_type_set(con, type);
-+		freecon(*sc);
-+		*sc = strdup(context_str(con));
-+		context_free(con);
-+		if (!*sc)
-+			return -1;
-+	}
-+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
-+	if (lvl != NULL && lvl[0]) {
-+		/* verify that the requested range is obtained */
-+		context_t con;
-+		security_context_t obtained_raw;
-+		security_context_t requested_raw;
-+		con = context_new(*sc);
-+		if (!con) {
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+		context_range_set(con, lvl);
-+		if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(*sc, &obtained_raw) < 0) {
-+			context_free(con);
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+		if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(context_str(con), &requested_raw) < 0) {
-+			freecon(obtained_raw);
-+			context_free(con);
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+
-+		debug("get_user_context: obtained context '%s' requested context '%s'",
-+			obtained_raw, requested_raw);
-+		if (strcmp(obtained_raw, requested_raw)) {
-+			/* set the context to the real requested one but fail */
-+			freecon(requested_raw);
-+			freecon(obtained_raw);
-+			freecon(*sc);
-+			*sc = strdup(context_str(con));
-+			context_free(con);
-+			return -1;
-+		}
-+		freecon(requested_raw);
-+		freecon(obtained_raw);
-+		context_free(con);
-+	}
-+#endif
-+	return 0;
-+      out:
-+	freecon(*sc);
-+	*sc = NULL;
-+	return -1;
-+}
-+
-+static void
-+ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level)
-+{
-+	*role = NULL;
-+	*level = NULL;
-+	if (the_authctxt) {
-+		if (the_authctxt->role != NULL) {
-+			char *slash;
-+			*role = xstrdup(the_authctxt->role);
-+			if ((slash = strchr(*role, '/')) != NULL) {
-+				*slash = '\0';
-+				*level = slash + 1;
-+			}
-+		}
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+/* Return the default security context for the given username */
-+static int
-+sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
-+	security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc)
-+{
-+	char *sename, *lvl;
-+	char *role;
-+	const char *reqlvl;
-+	int r = 0;
-+	context_t con = NULL;
-+
-+	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
-+
-+#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
-+	if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) {
-+		sename = NULL;
-+		lvl = NULL;
-+	}
-+#else
-+	sename = pwname;
-+	lvl = "";
-+#endif
-+
-+	if (r == 0) {
-+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
-+		r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, default_sc);
-+#else
-+		r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, default_sc);
-+#endif
-+	}
-+
-+	if (r == 0) {
-+		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
-+		if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
-+			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
-+
-+			if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
-+				fatal("failed to allocate security context");
-+
-+			if ((con=context_new(sshdsc)) == NULL)
-+				fatal("failed to allocate selinux context");
-+			reqlvl = context_range_get(con);
-+			freecon(sshdsc);
-+			if (reqlvl !=NULL && lvl != NULL && strcmp(reqlvl, lvl) == 0)
-+			    /* we actually don't change level */
-+			    reqlvl = "";
-+
-+			debug("%s: current connection level '%s'", __func__, reqlvl);
-+
-+		}
-+
-+		if ((reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) || (role != NULL && role[0])) {
-+			r = get_user_context(sename, role, reqlvl, user_sc);
-+
-+			if (r == 0 && reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) {
-+				security_context_t default_level_sc = *default_sc;
-+				if (role != NULL && role[0]) {
-+					if (get_user_context(sename, role, lvl, &default_level_sc) < 0)
-+						default_level_sc = *default_sc;
-+				}
-+				/* verify that the requested range is contained in the user range */
-+				if (mls_range_allowed(default_level_sc, *user_sc)) {
-+					logit("permit MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
-+				} else {
-+					r = -1;
-+					error("deny MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
-+				}
-+				if (default_level_sc != *default_sc)
-+					freecon(default_level_sc);
-+			}
-+		} else {
-+			*user_sc = *default_sc;
-+		}
-+	}
-+	if (r != 0) {
-+		error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
-+		    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
-+	}
-+
-+#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
-+	free(sename);
-+	free(lvl);
-+#endif
-+
-+	if (role != NULL)
-+		free(role);
-+	if (con)
-+		context_free(con);
-+
-+	return (r);
-+}
-+
-+/* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
-+static int
-+sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
-+{
-+	const char *reqlvl;
-+	char *role;
-+	char *use_current;
-+	int rv;
-+
-+	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
-+
-+	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
-+
-+	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
-+
-+	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
-+		use_current = "1";
-+	} else {
-+		use_current = "";
-+		rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: "");
-+	}
-+
-+	rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current);
-+
-+	if (role != NULL)
-+		free(role);
-+
-+	return rv;
-+}
-+
-+/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
-+void
-+sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
-+{
-+	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
-+	int r = 0;
-+	security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
-+
-+	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
-+		return;
-+
-+	if (options.use_pam) {
-+		/* do not compute context, just setup environment for pam_selinux */
-+		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) {
-+			switch (security_getenforce()) {
-+			case -1:
-+				fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
-+			case 0:
-+				error("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
-+				    __func__);
-+			break;
-+			default:
-+				fatal("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.",
-+				    __func__);
-+			}
-+		}
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
-+	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
-+
-+	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
-+	if (r >= 0) {
-+		r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
-+		if (r < 0) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s",
-+			    __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
-+		}
-+#ifdef HAVE_SETKEYCREATECON
-+		else if (setkeycreatecon(user_ctx) < 0) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s",
-+			    __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
-+		}
-+#endif
-+	}
-+	if (user_ctx == NULL) {
-+		user_ctx = default_ctx;
-+	}
-+	if (r < 0 || user_ctx != default_ctx) {
-+		/* audit just the case when user changed a role or there was
-+		   a failure */
-+		sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(r >= 0, default_ctx, user_ctx);
-+	}
-+	if (r < 0) {
-+		switch (security_getenforce()) {
-+		case -1:
-+			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
-+		case 0:
-+			error("%s: SELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
-+			    __func__);
-+			break;
-+		default:
-+			fatal("%s: SELinux failure. Aborting connection.",
-+			    __func__);
-+		}
-+	}
-+	if (user_ctx != NULL && user_ctx != default_ctx)
-+		freecon(user_ctx);
-+	if (default_ctx != NULL)
-+		freecon(default_ctx);
-+
-+	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
-+}
-+
-+#endif
-+#endif
-+
-diff -up openssh/platform.c.role-mls openssh/platform.c
--- openssh/platform.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/platform.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru
- 	}
- #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-	ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
-+	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
- #endif
- }
- 
-diff -up openssh/sshd.c.role-mls openssh/sshd.c
--- openssh/sshd.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/sshd.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.820430957 +0200
-@@ -2186,6 +2186,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		restore_uid();
- 	}
- #endif
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
-+#endif
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- 	if (options.use_pam) {
- 		do_pam_setcred(1);
--- a/openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
-index 60682c68..9344806e 100644
--- a/scp.c
-+++ b/scp.c
-@@ -714,7 +714,9 @@ toremote(int argc, char **argv)
- 			addargs(&alist, "%s", host);
- 			addargs(&alist, "%s", cmd);
- 			addargs(&alist, "%s", src);
-			addargs(&alist, "%s%s%s:%s",
-+			addargs(&alist,
-+			    /* IPv6 address needs to be enclosed with sqare brackets */
-+			    strchr(host, ':') != NULL ? "%s%s[%s]:%s" : "%s%s%s:%s",
- 			    tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "",
- 			    thost, targ);
- 			if (do_local_cmd(&alist) != 0)
-
--- a/openssh-7.9p1-ssh-copy-id.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.9p1-ssh-copy-id.patch
@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-From 22bfdcf060b632b5a6ff603f8f42ff166c211a66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2020 10:02:45 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Fail hard on the first failed attempt to write the
- authorized_keys_file
-
---
- ssh-copy-id | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-index 392f64f..e69a23f 100755
--- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-+++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ installkeys_sh() {
- 	cd;
- 	umask 077;
- 	mkdir -p $(dirname "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}") &&
-	  { [ -z \`tail -1c ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} 2>/dev/null\` ] || echo >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE}; } &&
-+	  { [ -z \`tail -1c ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} 2>/dev/null\` ] || echo >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} || exit 1; } &&
- 	  cat >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} ||
- 	  exit 1;
- 	if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-- 
-GitLab
-
-
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
@ -1,502 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5
--- openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies	2020-03-26 14:40:44.546775605 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5	2020-03-26 14:52:20.700649727 +0100
-@@ -359,17 +359,17 @@ or
- .Qq *.c.example.com
- domains.
- .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
- by certificate authorities (CAs).
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
-.Ed
-.Pp
- .Xr ssh 1
- will not accept host certificates signed using algorithms other than those
- specified.
-+.Pp
- .It Cm CertificateFile
- Specifies a file from which the user's certificate is read.
- A corresponding private key must be provided separately in order
-@@ -424,20 +424,25 @@ If the option is set to
- .Cm no ,
- the check will not be executed.
- .It Cm Ciphers
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference.
- Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq +
-character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
-instead of replacing them.
-+character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the built-in
-+openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
-from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq ^
- character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the
-default set.
-+built-in openssh default set.
- .Pp
- The supported ciphers are:
- .Bd -literal -offset indent
-@@ -453,13 +458,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
- chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
- .Ed
- .Pp
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
-aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
-aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
-.Ed
-.Pp
- The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
- .It Cm ClearAllForwardings
-@@ -812,6 +810,11 @@ command line will be passed untouched to
- The default is
- .Dq no .
- .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI
- key exchange. Possible values are
- .Bd -literal -offset 3n
-@@ -824,10 +827,8 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-,
- gss-curve25519-sha256-
- .Ed
- .Pp
-The default is
-.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,
-gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
- This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
-+.Pp
- .It Cm HashKnownHosts
- Indicates that
- .Xr ssh 1
-@@ -1149,29 +1150,25 @@ it may be zero or more of:
- and
- .Cm pam .
- .It Cm KexAlgorithms
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq +
-character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
-instead of replacing them.
-+character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in
-+openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
-from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq ^
- character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the
-default set.
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
-ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
-diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
-diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,
-diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
-diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
-.Ed
-+built-in openssh default set.
- .Pp
- The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q kex .
-@@ -1231,37 +1228,33 @@ The default is INFO.
- DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
- DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output.
- .It Cm MACs
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms
- in order of preference.
- The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq +
-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
-instead of replacing them.
-+character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in
-+openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
-from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq ^
- character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
-default set.
-+built-in openssh default set.
- .Pp
- The algorithms that contain
- .Qq -etm
- calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac).
- These are considered safer and their use recommended.
- .Pp
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
-hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
-hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
-umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
-hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
-.Ed
-.Pp
- The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q mac .
- .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
-@@ -1394,36 +1387,25 @@ instead of continuing to execute and pas
- The default is
- .Cm no .
- .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the key types that will be used for public key authentication
- as a comma-separated list of patterns.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq +
-character, then the key types after it will be appended to the default
-instead of replacing it.
-+character, then the key types after it will be appended to the built-in
-+openssh default instead of replacing it.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
-from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq ^
- character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the
-default set.
-The default for this option is:
-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
-ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
-.Ed
-+built-in openssh default set.
- .Pp
- The list of available key types may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes .
-diff -up openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5
--- openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies	2020-03-26 14:40:44.530775355 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5	2020-03-26 14:48:56.732468099 +0100
-@@ -375,16 +375,16 @@ If the argument is
- then no banner is displayed.
- By default, no banner is displayed.
- .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
- by certificate authorities (CAs).
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
-.Ed
-.Pp
- Certificates signed using other algorithms will not be accepted for
- public key or host-based authentication.
-+.Pp
- .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
- Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
- PAM or through authentication styles supported in
-@@ -446,20 +446,25 @@ The default is
- indicating not to
- .Xr chroot 2 .
- .It Cm Ciphers
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the ciphers allowed.
- Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq +
-character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
-instead of replacing them.
-+character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the built-in
-+openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
-from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq ^
- character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the
-default set.
-+built-in openssh default set.
- .Pp
- The supported ciphers are:
- .Pp
-@@ -486,13 +491,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
- chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
- .El
- .Pp
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
-aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
-aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
-.Ed
-.Pp
- The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
- .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
-@@ -681,22 +679,24 @@ For this to work
- .Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
- needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client.
- .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- The list of key exchange algorithms that are accepted by GSSAPI
- key exchange. Possible values are
- .Bd -literal -offset 3n
-gss-gex-sha1-,
-gss-group1-sha1-,
-gss-group14-sha1-,
-gss-group14-sha256-,
-gss-group16-sha512-,
-gss-nistp256-sha256-,
-+gss-gex-sha1-
-+gss-group1-sha1-
-+gss-group14-sha1-
-+gss-group14-sha256-
-+gss-group16-sha512-
-+gss-nistp256-sha256-
- gss-curve25519-sha256-
- .Ed
-.Pp
-The default is
-.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,
-gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
- This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
-+.Pp
- .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
- Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication
- as a list of comma-separated patterns.
-@@ -793,25 +793,13 @@ is specified, the location of the socket
- .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
- environment variable.
- .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the host key algorithms
- that the server offers.
-The default for this option is:
-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
-ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
-.Ed
-.Pp
- The list of available key types may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
- .It Cm IgnoreRhosts
-@@ -943,20 +931,25 @@ Specifies whether to look at .k5login fi
- The default is
- .Cm yes .
- .It Cm KexAlgorithms
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
- Alternately if the specified list begins with a
- .Sq +
-character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
-instead of replacing them.
-+character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in
-+openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
-from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq ^
- character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the
-default set.
-+built-in openssh default set.
- The supported algorithms are:
- .Pp
- .Bl -item -compact -offset indent
-@@ -988,15 +981,6 @@ ecdh-sha2-nistp521
- sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org
- .El
- .Pp
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
-ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
-diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
-diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
-diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
-.Ed
-.Pp
- The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q KexAlgorithms .
- .It Cm ListenAddress
-@@ -1065,21 +1049,26 @@ DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
- DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output.
- Logging with a DEBUG level violates the privacy of users and is not recommended.
- .It Cm MACs
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms.
- The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq +
-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
-instead of replacing them.
-+character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in
-+openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
-from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq ^
- character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
-default set.
-+built-in openssh default set.
- .Pp
- The algorithms that contain
- .Qq -etm
-@@ -1122,15 +1111,6 @@ umac-64-etm@openssh.com
- umac-128-etm@openssh.com
- .El
- .Pp
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
-hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
-hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
-umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
-hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
-.Ed
-.Pp
- The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q mac .
- .It Cm Match
-@@ -1480,36 +1460,25 @@ or equivalent.)
- The default is
- .Cm yes .
- .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the key types that will be accepted for public key authentication
- as a list of comma-separated patterns.
- Alternately if the specified list begins with a
- .Sq +
-character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
-instead of replacing them.
-+character, then the specified key types will be appended to the built-in
-+openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
-from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
- If the specified list begins with a
- .Sq ^
- character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the
-default set.
-The default for this option is:
-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
-ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
-.Ed
-+built-in openssh default set.
- .Pp
- The list of available key types may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes .
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-evp.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-evp.patch
@ -1,720 +0,0 @@
-From ed7ec0cdf577ffbb0b15145340cf51596ca3eb89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 10:45:45 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Use high-level OpenSSL API for signatures
-
---
- digest-openssl.c |  16 ++++
- digest.h         |   6 ++
- ssh-dss.c        |  65 ++++++++++------
- ssh-ecdsa.c      |  69 ++++++++++-------
- ssh-rsa.c        | 193 +++++++++--------------------------------------
- sshkey.c         |  77 +++++++++++++++++++
- sshkey.h         |   4 +
- 7 files changed, 221 insertions(+), 209 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/digest-openssl.c b/digest-openssl.c
-index da7ed72bc..6a21d8adb 100644
--- a/digest-openssl.c
-+++ b/digest-openssl.c
-@@ -63,6 +63,22 @@ const struct ssh_digest digests[] = {
- 	{ -1,			NULL,		0,	NULL },
- };
- 
-+const EVP_MD *
-+ssh_digest_to_md(int digest_type)
-+{
-+	switch (digest_type) {
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
-+		return EVP_sha1();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
-+		return EVP_sha256();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
-+		return EVP_sha384();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
-+		return EVP_sha512();
-+	}
-+	return NULL;
-+}
-+
- static const struct ssh_digest *
- ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg)
- {
-diff --git a/digest.h b/digest.h
-index 274574d0e..c7ceeb36f 100644
--- a/digest.h
-+++ b/digest.h
-@@ -32,6 +32,12 @@
- struct sshbuf;
- struct ssh_digest_ctx;
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-+/* Converts internal digest representation to the OpenSSL one */
-+const EVP_MD *ssh_digest_to_md(int digest_type);
-+#endif
-+
- /* Looks up a digest algorithm by name */
- int ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name);
- 
-diff --git a/ssh-dss.c b/ssh-dss.c
-index a23c383dc..ea45e7275 100644
--- a/ssh-dss.c
-+++ b/ssh-dss.c
-@@ -52,11 +52,15 @@ int
- ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
- {
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	DSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
- 	const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
-	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
-	size_t rlen, slen, len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
-+	u_char sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
-+	size_t rlen, slen;
-+	int len;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
-+	u_char *sigb = NULL;
-+	const u_char *psig = NULL;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 
- 	if (lenp != NULL)
-@@ -67,17 +71,24 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 	if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-	if (dlen == 0)
-		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
-	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
-	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1)
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &sigb, &len,
-+	    data, datalen);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	if (ret < 0) {
- 		goto out;
-+	}
- 
-	if ((sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa)) == NULL) {
-+	psig = sigb;
-+	if ((sig = d2i_DSA_SIG(NULL, &psig, len)) == NULL) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+	free(sigb);
-+	sigb = NULL;
- 
- 	DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s);
- 	rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig_r);
-@@ -110,7 +121,7 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 		*lenp = len;
- 	ret = 0;
-  out:
-	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-+	free(sigb);
- 	DSA_SIG_free(sig);
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	return ret;
-@@ -121,20 +132,20 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
-     const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
- {
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	DSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
- 	BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
-	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob = NULL;
-	size_t len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
-+	u_char *sigblob = NULL;
-+	size_t len, slen;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
- 	char *ktype = NULL;
-+	u_char *sigb = NULL, *psig = NULL;
- 
- 	if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA ||
- 	    signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-	if (dlen == 0)
-		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
- 	/* fetch signature */
- 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
-@@ -176,25 +187,31 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 	}
- 	sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
- 
-	/* sha1 the data */
-	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
-	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+	if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(sig, NULL)) == 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
-
-	switch (DSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->dsa)) {
-	case 1:
-		ret = 0;
-		break;
-	case 0:
-		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
-+	}
-+	if ((sigb = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
-	default:
-+	}
-+	psig = sigb;
-+	if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(sig, &psig)) == 0) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
-+	    sigb, slen);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+
-  out:
-	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-+	free(sigb);
- 	DSA_SIG_free(sig);
- 	BN_clear_free(sig_r);
- 	BN_clear_free(sig_s);
-diff --git a/ssh-ecdsa.c b/ssh-ecdsa.c
-index 599c7199d..b036796e8 100644
--- a/ssh-ecdsa.c
-+++ b/ssh-ecdsa.c
-@@ -50,11 +50,13 @@ int
- ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
- {
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
-+	unsigned char *sigb = NULL;
-+	const unsigned char *psig;
- 	const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
- 	int hash_alg;
-	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
-	size_t len, dlen;
-+	int len;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
-@@ -67,18 +69,24 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 
-	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
-	    (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
-+	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
-	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1)
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sigb, &len, data,
-+	    datalen);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	if (ret < 0) {
- 		goto out;
-+	}
- 
-	if ((sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->ecdsa)) == NULL) {
-+	psig = sigb;
-+	if ((sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &psig, len)) == NULL) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-
- 	if ((bb = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
-@@ -102,7 +110,7 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 		*lenp = len;
- 	ret = 0;
-  out:
-	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-+	free(sigb);
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	sshbuf_free(bb);
- 	ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
-@@ -115,22 +123,21 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
-     const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
- {
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
- 	BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
-	int hash_alg;
-	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
-	size_t dlen;
-+	int hash_alg, len;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL;
- 	char *ktype = NULL;
-+	unsigned char *sigb = NULL, *psig = NULL;
- 
- 	if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL ||
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA ||
- 	    signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 
-	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
-	    (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
-+	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
- 	/* fetch signature */
-@@ -166,28 +173,36 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 	}
- 	sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
- 
-	if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
-		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
-+	/* Figure out the length */
-+	if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, NULL)) == 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if ((sigb = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
-	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+	psig = sigb;
-+	if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, &psig)) == 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
-+	}
- 
-	switch (ECDSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->ecdsa)) {
-	case 1:
-		ret = 0;
-		break;
-	case 0:
-		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
-+	if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
- 		goto out;
-	default:
-		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1) {
-+		ret =  SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, datalen, sigb, len);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- 
-  out:
-	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-+	free(sigb);
- 	sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
-diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
-index 9b14f9a9a..8ef3a6aca 100644
--- a/ssh-rsa.c
-+++ b/ssh-rsa.c
-@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
- 
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- 
-static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, RSA *);
-+static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, const u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, EVP_PKEY *);
- 
- static const char *
- rsa_hash_alg_ident(int hash_alg)
-@@ -90,21 +90,6 @@ rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(const char *alg)
- 	return -1;
- }
- 
-static int
-rsa_hash_alg_nid(int type)
-{
-	switch (type) {
-	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
-		return NID_sha1;
-	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
-		return NID_sha256;
-	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
-		return NID_sha512;
-	default:
-		return -1;
-	}
-}
-
- int
- ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(struct sshkey *key, const BIGNUM *iqmp)
- {
-@@ -164,11 +149,10 @@ int
- ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg_ident)
- {
-	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
-	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sig = NULL;
-	size_t slen = 0;
-	u_int dlen, len;
-	int nid, hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+	u_char *sig = NULL;
-+	int len, slen = 0;
-+	int hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
- 
- 	if (lenp != NULL)
-@@ -180,33 +164,24 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 		hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
- 	else
- 		hash_alg = rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(alg_ident);
-+
- 	if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || hash_alg == -1 ||
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-	RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
-	if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
-		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
- 	slen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
-	if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
-		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-
-	/* hash the data */
-	nid = rsa_hash_alg_nid(hash_alg);
-	if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
-		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
-	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-		goto out;
-+	if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
-+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
- 
-	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
-		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1)
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sig, &len, data,
-+	    datalen);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	if (ret < 0) {
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 
-	if (RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa) != 1) {
-		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-		goto out;
-	}
- 	if (len < slen) {
- 		size_t diff = slen - len;
- 		memmove(sig + diff, sig, len);
-@@ -215,6 +190,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+
- 	/* encode signature */
- 	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-@@ -235,7 +211,6 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 		*lenp = len;
- 	ret = 0;
-  out:
-	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
- 	freezero(sig, slen);
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	return ret;
-@@ -246,10 +221,10 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
-     const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
-     const char *alg)
- {
-	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	char *sigtype = NULL;
- 	int hash_alg, want_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-	size_t len = 0, diff, modlen, dlen;
-+	size_t len = 0, diff, modlen;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
- 	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *osigblob, *sigblob = NULL;
- 
-@@ -257,8 +232,7 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA ||
- 	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-	RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
-	if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
-+	if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
- 
- 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
-@@ -310,16 +284,15 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 		explicit_bzero(sigblob, diff);
- 		len = modlen;
- 	}
-	if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) {
-		ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
-	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-		goto out;
-+	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, data, datalen, sigblob, len, pkey);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- 
-	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, digest, dlen, sigblob, len,
-	    key->rsa);
-  out:
- 	freezero(sigblob, len);
- 	free(sigtype);
-@@ -328,122 +301,26 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
-/*
- * See:
- * http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-1/
- * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1.asn
- */
-
-/*
- * id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
- *	oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 }
- */
-static const u_char id_sha1[] = {
-	0x30, 0x21, /* type Sequence, length 0x21 (33) */
-	0x30, 0x09, /* type Sequence, length 0x09 */
-	0x06, 0x05, /* type OID, length 0x05 */
-	0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, /* id-sha1 OID */
-	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
-	0x04, 0x14  /* Octet string, length 0x14 (20), followed by sha1 hash */
-};
-
-/*
- * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html
- * id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840)
- *      organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2)
- *      id-sha256(1) }
- */
-static const u_char id_sha256[] = {
-	0x30, 0x31, /* type Sequence, length 0x31 (49) */
-	0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */
-	0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */
-	0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, /* id-sha256 */
-	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
-	0x04, 0x20  /* Octet string, length 0x20 (32), followed by sha256 hash */
-};
-
-/*
- * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html
- * id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840)
- *      organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2)
- *      id-sha256(3) }
- */
-static const u_char id_sha512[] = {
-	0x30, 0x51, /* type Sequence, length 0x51 (81) */
-	0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */
-	0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */
-	0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, /* id-sha512 */
-	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
-	0x04, 0x40  /* Octet string, length 0x40 (64), followed by sha512 hash */
-};
-
- static int
-rsa_hash_alg_oid(int hash_alg, const u_char **oidp, size_t *oidlenp)
-+openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
-+    u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
- {
-	switch (hash_alg) {
-	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
-		*oidp = id_sha1;
-		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha1);
-		break;
-	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
-		*oidp = id_sha256;
-		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha256);
-		break;
-	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
-		*oidp = id_sha512;
-		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha512);
-		break;
-	default:
-		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-+	size_t rsasize = 0;
-+	const RSA *rsa;
-+	int ret;
- 
-static int
-openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, u_char *hash, size_t hashlen,
-    u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa)
-{
-	size_t rsasize = 0, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0;
-	int ret, len, oidmatch, hashmatch;
-	const u_char *oid = NULL;
-	u_char *decrypted = NULL;
-
-	if ((ret = rsa_hash_alg_oid(hash_alg, &oid, &oidlen)) != 0)
-		return ret;
-	ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-	hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
-	if (hashlen != hlen) {
-		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-		goto done;
-	}
-+	rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey);
- 	rsasize = RSA_size(rsa);
- 	if (rsasize <= 0 || rsasize > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM ||
- 	    siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 		goto done;
- 	}
-	if ((decrypted = malloc(rsasize)) == NULL) {
-		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-		goto done;
-	}
-	if ((len = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sigbuf, decrypted, rsa,
-	    RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) < 0) {
-		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-		goto done;
-	}
-	if (len < 0 || (size_t)len != hlen + oidlen) {
-		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
-		goto done;
-	}
-	oidmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) == 0;
-	hashmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) == 0;
-	if (!oidmatch || !hashmatch) {
-		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
-		goto done;
-	}
-	ret = 0;
-+
-+	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, datalen,
-+	    sigbuf, siglen);
-+
- done:
-	freezero(decrypted, rsasize);
- 	return ret;
- }
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
-index ad1957762..b95ed0b10 100644
--- a/sshkey.c
-+++ b/sshkey.c
-@@ -358,6 +358,83 @@ sshkey_type_plain(int type)
- }
- 
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+int
-+sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, u_char **sigp,
-+    int *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen)
-+{
-+	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	u_char *sig = NULL;
-+	int ret, slen, len;
-+
-+	if (sigp == NULL || lenp == NULL) {
-+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	}
-+
-+	slen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
-+	if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
-+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+
-+	len = slen;
-+	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto error;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_SignInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
-+	    EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0 ||
-+	    EVP_SignFinal(ctx, sig, &len, pkey) <= 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto error;
-+	}
-+
-+	*sigp = sig;
-+	*lenp = len;
-+	/* Now owned by the caller */
-+	sig = NULL;
-+	ret = 0;
-+
-+error:
-+	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	free(sig);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, const u_char *data,
-+    size_t datalen, u_char *sigbuf, int siglen)
-+{
-+	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	int ret;
-+
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
-+	    EVP_VerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto done;
-+	}
-+	ret = EVP_VerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen, pkey);
-+	switch (ret) {
-+	case 1:
-+		ret = 0;
-+		break;
-+	case 0:
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
-+		break;
-+	default:
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		break;
-+	}
-+
-+done:
-+	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
- /* XXX: these are really begging for a table-driven approach */
- int
- sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name)
-diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
-index a91e60436..270901a87 100644
--- a/sshkey.h
-+++ b/sshkey.h
-@@ -179,6 +179,10 @@ const char	*sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *);
- const char	*sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *);
- int		 sshkey_names_valid2(const char *, int);
- char		*sshkey_alg_list(int, int, int, char);
-+int		 sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY*, int, u_char **,
-+    int *, const u_char *, size_t);
-+int		 sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *, int, const u_char *,
-+    size_t, u_char *, int);
- 
- int	 sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **);
- int	 sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **);
-
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
@ -1,137 +0,0 @@
-commit 2c3ef499bfffce3cfd315edeebf202850ba4e00a
-Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date:   Tue Apr 16 15:35:18 2019 +0200
-
-    Use the new OpenSSL KDF
-
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index 2a455e4e..e01c3d43 100644
--- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -2712,6 +2712,7 @@ if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
- 		HMAC_CTX_init \
- 		RSA_generate_key_ex \
- 		RSA_get_default_method \
-+		EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id \
- 	])
- 
- 	# OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms may be a macro.
-diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
-index b6f041f4..1fbce2bb 100644
--- a/kex.c
-+++ b/kex.c
-@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- #include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
-+# ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID
-+# include <openssl/kdf.h>
-+# endif
- #endif
- 
- #include "ssh.h"
-@@ -942,6 +945,95 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	return r;
- }
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID
-+static const EVP_MD *
-+digest_to_md(int digest_type)
-+{
-+	switch (digest_type) {
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
-+		return EVP_sha1();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
-+		return EVP_sha256();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
-+		return EVP_sha384();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
-+		return EVP_sha512();
-+	}
-+	return NULL;
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
-+    const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
-+{
-+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
-+	EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	u_char *key = NULL;
-+	int r, key_len;
-+
-+	if ((key_len = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0)
-+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	key_len = ROUNDUP(need, key_len);
-+	if ((key = calloc(1, key_len)) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_SSHKDF);
-+	if (!ctx) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, digest_to_md(kex->hash_alg));
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY,
-+	    sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret));
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_XCGHASH, hash, hashlen);
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_TYPE, id);
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID,
-+	    kex->session_id, kex->session_id_len);
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_derive(ctx, key, key_len);
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
-+	fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", id);
-+	dump_digest("key", key, key_len);
-+#endif
-+	*keyp = key;
-+	key = NULL;
-+	r = 0;
-+
-+out:
-+	free (key);
-+	EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	if (r < 0) {
-+		return r;
-+	}
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+#else
- static int
- derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
-     const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
-@@ -1004,6 +1096,7 @@ derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
- 	ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
- 	return r;
- }
-+#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID */
- 
- #define NKEYS	6
- int
-
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
--- a/openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch
@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
-index dca158de..afdcb1d2 100644
--- a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
-+++ b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
-@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
- #endif
- }
- 
-uint32_t
-+uint32_t __attribute__((visibility("default")))
- sk_api_version(void)
- {
- 	return SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR;
-@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ check_options(struct sk_option **options)
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-int
-+int __attribute__((visibility("default")))
- sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
-     const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
-     struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response)
-@@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ sig_ed25519(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
-int
-+int __attribute__((visibility("default")))
- sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen,
-     const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
-     uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
-@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
-int
-+int __attribute__((visibility("default")))
- sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
-     struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks)
- {
--- a/openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
--- a/channels.c
-+++ b/channels.c
-@@ -3933,16 +3933,26 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
- 			if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
- 				sock_set_v6only(sock);
- 			if (x11_use_localhost)
- 				set_reuseaddr(sock);
- 			if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
- 				debug2("%s: bind port %d: %.100s", __func__,
- 				    port, strerror(errno));
- 				close(sock);
-+
-+				/* do not remove successfully opened
-+				 * sockets if the request failed because
-+				 * the protocol IPv4/6 is not available
-+				 * (e.g. IPv6 may be disabled while being
-+				 * supported)
-+				 */
-+				if (EADDRNOTAVAIL == errno)
-+    					continue;
-+
- 				for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++)
- 					close(socks[n]);
- 				num_socks = 0;
- 				break;
- 			}
- 			socks[num_socks++] = sock;
- 			if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS)
- 				break;
--- a/openssh-8.4p1-debian-compat.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.4p1-debian-compat.patch
@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
--- compat.h.orig	2020-10-05 10:09:02.953505129 -0700
-+++ compat.h	2020-10-05 10:10:17.587733113 -0700
-@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
- 
- #define SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE	0x00000001
- #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE		0x00000002
-/* #define unused		0x00000004 */
-+#define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74	0x00000004
- /* #define unused		0x00000008 */
- #define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID	0x00000010
- /* #define unused		0x00000020 */
--- compat.c.orig	2020-10-05 10:25:02.088720562 -0700
-+++ compat.c	2020-10-05 10:13:11.637282492 -0700
-@@ -65,11 +65,12 @@
- 		{ "OpenSSH_6.5*,"
- 		  "OpenSSH_6.6*",	SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|
- 					SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE},
-+		{ "OpenSSH_7.4*",	SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE|
-+		  			SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74},
- 		{ "OpenSSH_7.0*,"
- 		  "OpenSSH_7.1*,"
- 		  "OpenSSH_7.2*,"
- 		  "OpenSSH_7.3*,"
-		  "OpenSSH_7.4*,"
- 		  "OpenSSH_7.5*,"
- 		  "OpenSSH_7.6*,"
- 		  "OpenSSH_7.7*",	SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE},
--- sshconnect2.c.orig	2020-09-26 07:26:37.618010545 -0700
-+++ sshconnect2.c	2020-10-05 10:47:22.116315148 -0700
-@@ -1305,6 +1305,26 @@
- 			break;
- 	}
- 	free(oallowed);
-+	/*
-+	 * OpenSSH 7.4 supports SHA2 sig types, but fails to indicate its
-+	 * support.  For that release, check the local policy against the
-+	 * SHA2 signature types.
-+	 */
-+	if (alg == NULL &&
-+	    (key->type == KEY_RSA && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74))) {
-+		oallowed = allowed = xstrdup(options.pubkey_key_types);
-+		while ((cp = strsep(&allowed, ",")) != NULL) {
-+			if (sshkey_type_from_name(cp) != key->type)
-+				continue;
-+			tmp = match_list(sshkey_sigalg_by_name(cp), "rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-512", NULL);
-+			if (tmp != NULL)
-+				alg = xstrdup(cp);
-+			free(tmp);
-+			if (alg != NULL)
-+				break;
-+		}
-+		free(oallowed);
-+	}
- 	return alg;
- }
- 
-
--- a/openssh-8.4p1-sandbox-seccomp.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.4p1-sandbox-seccomp.patch
@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-index e0768c06..5065ae7e 100644
--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -267,6 +267,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- #ifdef __NR_pselect6
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_pselect6_time64
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6_time64),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_read
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_read),
- #endif
--- a/openssh-8.4p1-ssh-copy-id.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.4p1-ssh-copy-id.patch
@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
-From 66f16e5425eb881570e82bfef7baeac2e7accc0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Oleg <Fallmay@users.noreply.github.com>
-Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2020 12:09:08 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix `EOF: command not found` error in ssh-copy-id
-
---
- contrib/ssh-copy-id | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-index 392f64f94..a76907717 100644
--- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-+++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ installkeys_sh() {
-   #    the -z `tail ...` checks for a trailing newline. The echo adds one if was missing
-   #    the cat adds the keys we're getting via STDIN
-   #    and if available restorecon is used to restore the SELinux context
-  INSTALLKEYS_SH=$(tr '\t\n' ' ' <<-EOF)
-+  INSTALLKEYS_SH=$(tr '\t\n' ' ' <<-EOF
- 	cd;
- 	umask 077;
- 	mkdir -p $(dirname "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}") &&
-@@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ installkeys_sh() {
- 	  restorecon -F .ssh ${AUTH_KEY_FILE};
- 	fi
- EOF
-+  )
- 
-   # to defend against quirky remote shells: use 'exec sh -c' to get POSIX;
-   printf "exec sh -c '%s'" "${INSTALLKEYS_SH}"
-
-From de59a431cdec833e3ec15691dd950402b4c052cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>
-Date: Sat, 3 Oct 2020 00:20:07 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] un-nest $() to make ksh cheerful
-
---
- ssh-copy-id | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-From 02ac2c3c3db5478a440dfb1b90d15f686f2cbfc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>
-Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2020 21:30:10 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] ksh doesn't grok 'local'
-
-and AFAICT it's not actually doing anything useful in the code, so let's
-see how things go without it.
---
- ssh-copy-id | 11 +++++------
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-index a769077..11c9463 100755
--- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-+++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ quote() {
- }
- 
- use_id_file() {
-  local L_ID_FILE="$1"
-+  L_ID_FILE="$1"
- 
-   if [ -z "$L_ID_FILE" ] ; then
-     printf '%s: ERROR: no ID file found\n' "$0"
-@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ use_id_file() {
-   # check that the files are readable
-   for f in "$PUB_ID_FILE" ${PRIV_ID_FILE:+"$PRIV_ID_FILE"} ; do
-     ErrMSG=$( { : < "$f" ; } 2>&1 ) || {
-      local L_PRIVMSG=""
-+      L_PRIVMSG=""
-       [ "$f" = "$PRIV_ID_FILE" ] && L_PRIVMSG="	(to install the contents of '$PUB_ID_FILE' anyway, look at the -f option)"
-       printf "\\n%s: ERROR: failed to open ID file '%s': %s\\n" "$0" "$f" "$(printf '%s\n%s\n' "$ErrMSG" "$L_PRIVMSG" | sed -e 's/.*: *//')"
-       exit 1
-@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ fi
- # populate_new_ids() uses several global variables ($USER_HOST, $SSH_OPTS ...)
- # and has the side effect of setting $NEW_IDS
- populate_new_ids() {
-  local L_SUCCESS="$1"
-+  L_SUCCESS="$1"
- 
-   # shellcheck disable=SC2086
-   if [ "$FORCED" ] ; then
-@@ -181,13 +181,12 @@ populate_new_ids() {
-   eval set -- "$SSH_OPTS"
- 
-   umask 0177
-  local L_TMP_ID_FILE
-   L_TMP_ID_FILE=$(mktemp ~/.ssh/ssh-copy-id_id.XXXXXXXXXX)
-   if test $? -ne 0 || test "x$L_TMP_ID_FILE" = "x" ; then
-     printf '%s: ERROR: mktemp failed\n' "$0" >&2
-     exit 1
-   fi
-  local L_CLEANUP="rm -f \"$L_TMP_ID_FILE\" \"${L_TMP_ID_FILE}.stderr\""
-+  L_CLEANUP="rm -f \"$L_TMP_ID_FILE\" \"${L_TMP_ID_FILE}.stderr\""
-   # shellcheck disable=SC2064
-   trap "$L_CLEANUP" EXIT TERM INT QUIT
-   printf '%s: INFO: attempting to log in with the new key(s), to filter out any that are already installed\n' "$0" >&2
-@@ -237,7 +236,7 @@ populate_new_ids() {
- #    produce a one-liner to add the keys to remote authorized_keys file
- #    optionally takes an alternative path for authorized_keys
- installkeys_sh() {
-  local AUTH_KEY_FILE=${1:-.ssh/authorized_keys}
-+  AUTH_KEY_FILE=${1:-.ssh/authorized_keys}
- 
-   # In setting INSTALLKEYS_SH:
-   #    the tr puts it all on one line (to placate tcsh)
-- 
-
-diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-index 11c9463..ee3f637 100755
--- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-+++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-@@ -237,6 +237,7 @@ populate_new_ids() {
- #    optionally takes an alternative path for authorized_keys
- installkeys_sh() {
-   AUTH_KEY_FILE=${1:-.ssh/authorized_keys}
-+  AUTH_KEY_DIR=$(dirname "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}")
- 
-   # In setting INSTALLKEYS_SH:
-   #    the tr puts it all on one line (to placate tcsh)
-@@ -249,7 +250,7 @@ installkeys_sh() {
-   INSTALLKEYS_SH=$(tr '\t\n' ' ' <<-EOF
- 	cd;
- 	umask 077;
-	mkdir -p $(dirname "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}") &&
-+	mkdir -p "${AUTH_KEY_DIR}" &&
- 	  { [ -z \`tail -1c ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} 2>/dev/null\` ] || echo >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} || exit 1; } &&
- 	  cat >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} ||
- 	  exit 1;
-- 
--- a/openssh-nukeacss.sh
+++ b/openssh-nukeacss.sh
@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+#
+#  Remove the ACSS implementation from OpenSSH, and disable its use so that the
+#  rest of the package can still be built.
+#
+> acss.c
+patch -sp0 << EOF
+--- cipher.c.orig       2005-07-17 09:02:10.000000000 +0200
+++ cipher.c    2005-09-06 14:52:06.000000000 +0200
+@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@
+
+ /* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+#undef USE_CIPHER_ACSS
+#define EVP_acss NULL
+
+ extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_bf(void);
+ extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(void);
+EOF
--- a/openssh.rpmlintrc
+++ b/openssh.rpmlintrc
@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-# I do not know about any better place where to put profile files
-addFilter(r'openssh-askpass.x86_64: W: non-conffile-in-etc /etc/profile.d/gnome-ssh-askpass.c?sh')
-
-# The ssh-keysign is not supposed to have standard permissions
-addFilter(r'openssh.x86_64: E: non-standard-executable-perm /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign 2555')
-addFilter(r'openssh.x86_64: E: setgid-binary /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign ssh_keys 2555')
-addFilter(r'openssh.x86_64: W: non-standard-gid /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign ssh_keys')
-
-# The -cavs subpackage is internal without documentation
-# The -askpass is not intended to be used directly so it is missing documentation
-addFilter(r'openssh-(askpass|cavs).x86_64: W: no-documentation')
-
-# sshd config and sysconfig is not supposed to be world readable
-addFilter(r'non-readable /etc/(ssh/sshd_config|sysconfig/sshd)')
-
-# The /var/empty/sshd is supposed to have the given permissions
-addFilter(r'non-standard-dir-perm /var/empty/sshd 711')
-addFilter(r'non-standard-dir-in-var empty')
-
-# Spelling false-positives
-addFilter(r'spelling-error (Summary\(en_US\)|.* en_US) (mls|su|sudo|rlogin|rsh|untrusted) ')
--- a/openssh.spec
+++ b/openssh.spec
--- a/36
+++ b/36
@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-authfd.c
-authfd.h
-atomicio.c
-atomicio.h
-bufaux.c
-bufbn.c
-buffer.h
-buffer.c
-cleanup.c
-cipher.h
-compat.h
-entropy.c
-entropy.h
-fatal.c
-includes.h
-kex.h
-key.c
-key.h
-log.c
-log.h
-match.h
-misc.c
-misc.h
-pathnames.h
-platform.h
-rsa.h
-ssh-dss.c
-ssh-rsa.c
-ssh.h
-ssh2.h
-uidswap.c
-uidswap.h
-uuencode.c
-uuencode.h
-xmalloc.c
-xmalloc.h
--- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-compat.patch
+++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-compat.patch
@ -1,992 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c
--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
-  * or implied, of Jamie Beverly.
-  */
- 
-+#include <stdlib.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <errno.h>
- #include <string.h>
-@@ -66,8 +67,8 @@ proc_pid_cmdline(char *** inargv)
-                 case EOF:
-                 case '\0':
-                     if (len > 0) { 
-                        argv = pamsshagentauth_xrealloc(argv, count + 1, sizeof(*argv));
-                        argv[count] = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof(*argv[count]));
-+                        argv = xreallocarray(argv, count + 1, sizeof(*argv));
-+                        argv[count] = xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof(*argv[count]));
-                         strncpy(argv[count++], argbuf, len);
-                         memset(argbuf, '\0', MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG + 1);
-                         len = 0;
-@@ -106,9 +107,9 @@ pamsshagentauth_free_command_line(char *
- {
-     size_t i;
-     for (i = 0; i < n_args; i++)
-        pamsshagentauth_xfree(argv[i]);
-+        free(argv[i]);
- 
-    pamsshagentauth_xfree(argv);
-+    free(argv);
-     return;
- }
- 
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h
--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
- #include "authfd.h"
- #include <stdio.h>
- 
-@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ typedef struct idlist Idlist;
- struct identity {
-     TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
-     AuthenticationConnection *ac;   /* set if agent supports key */
-    Key *key;           /* public/private key */
-+    struct sshkey *key;           /* public/private key */
-     char    *filename;      /* comment for agent-only keys */
-     int tried;
-     int isprivate;      /* key points to the private key */
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat	2020-09-23 10:52:16.421001434 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
- #include "authfd.h"
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
-@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@
- #include "get_command_line.h"
- extern char **environ;
- 
-+#define PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1 101
-+
- /* 
-  * Added by Jamie Beverly, ensure socket fd points to a socket owned by the user 
-  * A cursory check is done, but to avoid race conditions, it is necessary 
-@@ -77,7 +79,7 @@ log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
-     if (count == 0)
-         return NULL;
-    
-    buf = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc((count * MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG) + (count * 3), sizeof(*buf));
-+    buf = xcalloc((count * MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG) + (count * 3), sizeof(*buf));
-     for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
-         strcat(buf, (i > 0) ? " '" : "'");
-         strncat(buf, action[i], MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG);
-@@ -87,21 +89,25 @@ log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
- }
- 
- void
-agent_action(Buffer *buf, char ** action, size_t count)
-+agent_action(struct sshbuf **buf, char ** action, size_t count)
- {
-     size_t i;
-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(buf);
-+    int r;
- 
-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(buf, count);
-+    if ((*buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+        fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
-+    if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(*buf, count)) != 0)
-+        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- 
-     for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(buf, action[i]);
-+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*buf, action[i])) != 0)
-+            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-     }
- }
- 
- 
-void
-pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * session_id2, const char * user,
-+static void
-+pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(struct sshbuf ** session_id2, const char * user,
-                                 const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
- {
-     u_char *cookie = NULL;
-@@ -114,22 +120,23 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
-     char ** reported_argv = NULL;
-     size_t count = 0;
-     char * action_logbuf = NULL;
-    Buffer action_agentbuf;
-+    struct sshbuf *action_agentbuf = NULL;
-     uint8_t free_logbuf = 0;
-     char * retc;
-     int32_t reti;
-+    int r;
- 
-    rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
-+    rnd = arc4random();
-     cookie_len = ((uint8_t) rnd);
-     while (cookie_len < 16) { 
-         cookie_len += 16;                                          /* Add 16 bytes to the size to ensure that while the length is random, the length is always reasonable; ticket #18 */
-     }
- 
-    cookie = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(1,cookie_len);
-+    cookie = xcalloc(1, cookie_len);
- 
-     for (i = 0; i < cookie_len; i++) {
-         if (i % 4 == 0) {
-            rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
-+            rnd = arc4random();
-         }
-         cookie[i] = (u_char) rnd;
-         rnd >>= 8;
-@@ -144,7 +151,8 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
-     }
-     else {
-         action_logbuf = "unknown on this platform";
-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&action_agentbuf); /* stays empty, means unavailable */
-+        if ((action_agentbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) /* stays empty, means unavailable */
-+            fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
-     }
-     
-     /*
-@@ -161,35 +169,39 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
-     retc = getcwd(pwd, sizeof(pwd) - 1);
-     time(&ts);
- 
-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(session_id2);
-+    if ((*session_id2 = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+        fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- 
-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(session_id2, PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1);
-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("cookie: %s", pamsshagentauth_tohex(cookie, cookie_len)); */
-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(session_id2, cookie, cookie_len);
-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("user: %s", user); */
-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, user);
-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("ruser: %s", ruser); */
-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, ruser);
-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("servicename: %s", servicename); */
-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, servicename);
-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("pwd: %s", pwd); */
-    if(retc)
-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, pwd);
-    else
-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");
-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("action: %s", action_logbuf); */
-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(session_id2, action_agentbuf.buf + action_agentbuf.offset, action_agentbuf.end - action_agentbuf.offset);
-+    if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(*session_id2, PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1)) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_string(*session_id2, cookie, cookie_len)) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, user)) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, ruser)) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, servicename)) != 0)
-+        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+    if (retc) {
-+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, pwd)) != 0)
-+            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+    } else {
-+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, "")) != 0)
-+            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+    }
-+    if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(*session_id2, action_agentbuf)) != 0)
-+        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-     if (free_logbuf) { 
-        pamsshagentauth_xfree(action_logbuf);
-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&action_agentbuf);
-+        free(action_logbuf);
-+        sshbuf_free(action_agentbuf);
-+    }
-+    /* debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */
-+    if (reti >= 0) {
-+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, hostname)) != 0)
-+            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+    } else {
-+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, "")) != 0)
-+            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-     }
-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */
-    if(reti >= 0)
-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, hostname);
-    else
-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");
-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */
-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int64(session_id2, (uint64_t) ts);
-+    /* debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */
-+    if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(*session_id2, (uint64_t) ts)) != 0)
-+        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- 
-     free(cookie);
-     return;
-@@ -278,7 +290,8 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_ui
- 
- 	auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth));
- 	auth->fd = sock;
-	buffer_init(&auth->identities);
-+	if ((auth->identities = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+           fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- 	auth->howmany = 0;
- 
- 	return auth;
-@@ -287,9 +300,9 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_ui
- int
- pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(const char * user, const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
- {
-    Buffer session_id2 = { 0 };
-+    struct sshbuf *session_id2 = NULL;
-     Identity *id;
-    Key *key;
-+    struct sshkey *key;
-     AuthenticationConnection *ac;
-     char *comment;
-     uint8_t retval = 0;
-@@ -299,31 +312,30 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
-     pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
- 
-     if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
-+        verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
-         for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) 
-         {
-             if(key != NULL) {
-                id = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
-+                id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
-                 id->key = key;
-                 id->filename = comment;
-                 id->ac = ac;
-                if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, &session_id2)) {
-+                if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, session_id2)) {
-                     retval = 1;
-                 }
-                pamsshagentauth_xfree(id->filename);
-                pamsshagentauth_key_free(id->key);
-                pamsshagentauth_xfree(id);
-+                free(id->filename);
-+                key_free(id->key);
-+                free(id);
-                 if(retval == 1)
-                     break;
-             }
-         }
-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&session_id2);
-+        sshbuf_free(session_id2);
-         ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
-     }
-     else {
-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
-+        verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
-     }
-    /* pamsshagentauth_xfree(session_id2); */
-     EVP_cleanup();
-     return retval;
- }
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat	2020-09-23 10:52:16.423001461 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c	2020-09-23 10:53:10.631727657 +0200
-@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
-  * a patch 8-)
-  */
- #if ! HAVE___PROGNAME || HAVE_BUNDLE
-    __progname = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup(servicename);
-+    __progname = xstrdup(servicename);
- #endif
- 
-     for(i = argc, argv_ptr = (char **) argv; i > 0; ++argv_ptr, i--) {
-@@ -132,11 +132,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
- #endif
-     }
- 
-    pamsshagentauth_log_init(__progname, log_lvl, facility, getenv("PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_DEBUG") ? 1 : 0);
-+    log_init(__progname, log_lvl, facility, getenv("PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_DEBUG") ? 1 : 0);
-     pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (void *) &user);
-     pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER, (void *) &ruser_ptr);
- 
-    pamsshagentauth_verbose("Beginning pam_ssh_agent_auth for user %s", user);
-+    verbose("Beginning pam_ssh_agent_auth for user %s", user);
- 
-     if(ruser_ptr) {
-         strncpy(ruser, ruser_ptr, sizeof(ruser) - 1);
-@@ -151,12 +151,12 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
- #ifdef ENABLE_SUDO_HACK
-         if( (strlen(sudo_service_name) > 0) && strncasecmp(servicename, sudo_service_name, sizeof(sudo_service_name) - 1) == 0 && getenv("SUDO_USER") ) {
-             strncpy(ruser, getenv("SUDO_USER"), sizeof(ruser) - 1 );
-            pamsshagentauth_verbose( "Using environment variable SUDO_USER (%s)", ruser );
-+            verbose( "Using environment variable SUDO_USER (%s)", ruser );
-         } else
- #endif
-         {
-             if( ! getpwuid(getuid()) ) {
-                pamsshagentauth_verbose("Unable to getpwuid(getuid())");
-+                verbose("Unable to getpwuid(getuid())");
-                 goto cleanexit;
-             }
-             strncpy(ruser, getpwuid(getuid())->pw_name, sizeof(ruser) - 1);
-@@ -165,11 +165,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
- 
-     /* Might as well explicitely confirm the user exists here */
-     if(! getpwnam(ruser) ) {
-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", ruser);
-+        verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", ruser);
-         goto cleanexit;
-     }
-     if( ! getpwnam(user) ) {
-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", user);
-+        verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", user);
-         goto cleanexit;
-     }
- 
-@@ -179,8 +179,8 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
-          */
-         parse_authorized_key_file(user, authorized_keys_file_input);
-     } else {
-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys");
-        authorized_keys_file = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys");
-+        verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys");
-+        authorized_keys_file = xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys");
-     }
- 
-     /*
-@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
-      */
- 
-     if(user && strlen(ruser) > 0) {
-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
-+        verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
- 
-         /*
-          * Attempt to read data from the sshd if we're being called as an auth agent.
-@@ -197,10 +197,10 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
-         const char* ssh_user_auth = pam_getenv(pamh, "SSH_AUTH_INFO_0");
-         int sshd_service = strncasecmp(servicename, sshd_service_name, sizeof(sshd_service_name) - 1);
-         if (sshd_service == 0 && ssh_user_auth != NULL) {
-            pamsshagentauth_verbose("Got SSH_AUTH_INFO_0: `%.20s...'", ssh_user_auth);
-+            verbose("Got SSH_AUTH_INFO_0: `%.20s...'", ssh_user_auth);
-             if (userauth_pubkey_from_pam(ruser, ssh_user_auth) > 0) {
-                 retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
-                pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated (sshd): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
-+                logit("Authenticated (sshd): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
-                 goto cleanexit;
-             }
-         }
-@@ -208,13 +208,13 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
-          * this pw_uid is used to validate the SSH_AUTH_SOCK, and so must be the uid of the ruser invoking the program, not the target-user
-          */
-         if(pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(user, ruser, servicename)) { /* getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid)) { */
-            pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated (agent): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
-+            logit("Authenticated (agent): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
-             retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
-         } else {
-            pamsshagentauth_logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
-+            logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
-         }
-     } else {
-        pamsshagentauth_logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" );
-+        logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" );
-     }
- 
- cleanexit:
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -66,8 +66,8 @@
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "match.h"
- #include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
- #include "misc.h"
- 
- #include "xmalloc.h"
-@@ -77,7 +77,6 @@
- #include "pathnames.h"
- #include "secure_filename.h"
- 
-#include "identity.h"
- #include "pam_user_key_allowed2.h"
- 
- extern char *authorized_keys_file;
-@@ -117,12 +116,12 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
-         } else {
-             slash_ptr = strchr(auth_keys_file_buf, '/');
-             if(!slash_ptr)
-                pamsshagentauth_fatal
-+                fatal
-                     ("cannot expand tilde in path without a `/'");
- 
-             owner_uname_len = slash_ptr - auth_keys_file_buf - 1;
-             if(owner_uname_len > (sizeof(owner_uname) - 1))
-                pamsshagentauth_fatal("Username too long");
-+                fatal("Username too long");
- 
-             strncat(owner_uname, auth_keys_file_buf + 1, owner_uname_len);
-             if(!authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid)
-@@ -130,11 +129,11 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
-                     getpwnam(owner_uname)->pw_uid;
-         }
-         authorized_keys_file =
-            pamsshagentauth_tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf,
-+            tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf,
-                                                   authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid);
-         strncpy(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file,
-                 sizeof(auth_keys_file_buf) - 1);
-        pamsshagentauth_xfree(authorized_keys_file)        /* when we
-+        free(authorized_keys_file)        /* when we
-                                                               percent_expand
-                                                               later, we'd step
-                                                               on this, so free
-@@ -150,13 +149,13 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
-     strncat(hostname, fqdn, strcspn(fqdn, "."));
- #endif
-     authorized_keys_file =
-        pamsshagentauth_percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h",
-+        percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h",
-                                        getpwnam(user)->pw_dir, "H", hostname,
-                                        "f", fqdn, "u", user, NULL);
- }
- 
- int
-pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, Key * key)
-+pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, struct sshkey * key)
- {
-     return
-         pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid),
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h
--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
- #define _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H
- 
- #include "identity.h"
-int pam_user_key_allowed(const char *, Key *);
-+int pam_user_key_allowed(const char *, struct sshkey *);
- void parse_authorized_key_file(const char *, const char *);
- 
- #endif
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c
--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -45,44 +45,46 @@
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "ssh.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
- #include "log.h"
- #include "compat.h"
-#include "key.h"
-+#include "digest.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
- #include "pathnames.h"
- #include "misc.h"
- #include "secure_filename.h"
- #include "uidswap.h"
-
-#include "identity.h"
-+#include <unistd.h>
- 
- /* return 1 if user allows given key */
- /* Modified slightly from original found in auth2-pubkey.c */
- static int
-pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE * f, char *file, Key * key)
-+pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE * f, char *file, struct sshkey * key)
- {
-    char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
-+    char *line = NULL;
-     int found_key = 0;
-     u_long linenum = 0;
-    Key *found;
-+    struct sshkey *found;
-     char *fp;
-+    size_t linesize = 0;
- 
-     found_key = 0;
-    found = pamsshagentauth_key_new(key->type);
-+    found = sshkey_new(key->type);
- 
-    while(read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
-+    while ((getline(&line, &linesize, f)) != -1) {
-         char *cp = NULL; /* *key_options = NULL; */
- 
-+        linenum++;
-         /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
-         for(cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++);
-         if(!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
-             continue;
- 
-        if(pamsshagentauth_key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
-+        if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
-             /* no key? check if there are options for this key */
-             int quoted = 0;
- 
-            pamsshagentauth_verbose("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
-+            verbose("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
-             /* key_options = cp; */
-             for(; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
-                 if(*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
-@@ -92,26 +94,27 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE
-             }
-             /* Skip remaining whitespace. */
-             for(; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++);
-            if(pamsshagentauth_key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
-                pamsshagentauth_verbose("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
-+            if(sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
-+                verbose("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
-                 /* still no key? advance to next line */
-                 continue;
-             }
-         }
-        if(pamsshagentauth_key_equal(found, key)) {
-+        if(sshkey_equal(found, key)) {
-             found_key = 1;
-            pamsshagentauth_logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file,
-+            logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file,
-                                   linenum);
-            fp = pamsshagentauth_key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-            pamsshagentauth_logit("Found matching %s key: %s",
-                                  pamsshagentauth_key_type(found), fp);
-            pamsshagentauth_xfree(fp);
-+            fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
-+            logit("Found matching %s key: %s",
-+                                  sshkey_type(found), fp);
-+            free(fp);
-             break;
-         }
-     }
-    pamsshagentauth_key_free(found);
-+    free(line);
-+    sshkey_free(found);
-     if(!found_key)
-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("key not found");
-+        verbose("key not found");
-     return found_key;
- }
- 
-@@ -120,19 +123,19 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE
-  * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
-  */
- int
-pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key * key, char *file)
-+pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey * key, char *file)
- {
-     FILE *f;
-     int found_key = 0;
-     struct stat st;
-    char buf[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
-+    char buf[256];
- 
-     /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
-    pamsshagentauth_verbose("trying public key file %s", file);
-+    verbose("trying public key file %s", file);
- 
-     /* Fail not so quietly if file does not exist */
-     if(stat(file, &st) < 0) {
-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("File not found: %s", file);
-+        verbose("File not found: %s", file);
-         return 0;
-     }
- 
-@@ -144,7 +147,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct
- 
-     if(pamsshagentauth_secure_filename(f, file, pw, buf, sizeof(buf)) != 0) {
-         fclose(f);
-        pamsshagentauth_logit("Authentication refused: %s", buf);
-+        logit("Authentication refused: %s", buf);
-         return 0;
-     }
- 
-@@ -160,7 +163,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct
- int
- pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *authorized_keys_command,
-                           char *authorized_keys_command_user,
-                          struct passwd *user_pw, Key * key)
-+                          struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey * key)
- {
-     FILE *f;
-     int ok, found_key = 0;
-@@ -187,44 +190,44 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
-     else {
-         pw = getpwnam(authorized_keys_command_user);
-         if(pw == NULL) {
-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("authorized_keys_command_user \"%s\" not found: %s",
-+            error("authorized_keys_command_user \"%s\" not found: %s",
-                  authorized_keys_command_user, strerror(errno));
-             return 0;
-         }
-     }
- 
-    pamsshagentauth_temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-+    temporarily_use_uid(pw);
- 
-     if(stat(authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) {
-        pamsshagentauth_logerror
-+        error
-             ("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s",
-              authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
-         goto out;
-     }
-     if(pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path
-        (authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
-+        error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
-         goto out;
-     }
- 
-     /* open the pipe and read the keys */
-     if(pipe(p) != 0) {
-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+        error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-         goto out;
-     }
- 
-    pamsshagentauth_debug("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\" with argument: \"%s\"",
-+    debug("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\" with argument: \"%s\"",
-                           authorized_keys_command, pw->pw_name, username);
- 
-     /* 
-      * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
-      * run cleanup_exit() code.
-      */
-    pamsshagentauth_restore_uid();
-+    restore_uid();
- 
-     switch ((pid = fork())) {
-     case -1:                                              /* error */
-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+        error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-         close(p[0]);
-         close(p[1]);
-         return 0;
-@@ -234,13 +237,13 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
- 
-         /* do this before the setresuid so thta they can be logged */
-         if((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
-+            error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
-                                      strerror(errno));
-             _exit(1);
-         }
-         if(dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1
-            || dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+            error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-             _exit(1);
-         }
- #if defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETRESGID)
-@@ -248,7 +251,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
- #else
-         if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) != 0 || setegid(pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
- #endif
-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid,
-+            error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid,
-                                      strerror(errno));
-             _exit(1);
-         }
-@@ -258,7 +261,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
- #else
-         if (setuid(pw->pw_uid) != 0 || seteuid(pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
- #endif
-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid,
-+            error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid,
-                                      strerror(errno));
-             _exit(1);
-         }
-@@ -270,18 +273,18 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
- 
-         /* pretty sure this will barf because we are now suid, but since we
-            should't reach this anyway, I'll leave it here */
-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
-+        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
-                                  authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
-         _exit(127);
-     default:                                              /* parent */
-         break;
-     }
- 
-    pamsshagentauth_temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-+    temporarily_use_uid(pw);
- 
-     close(p[1]);
-     if((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+        error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-         close(p[0]);
-         /* Don't leave zombie child */
-         while(waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR);
-@@ -292,22 +295,22 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
- 
-     while(waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
-         if(errno != EINTR) {
-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,
-+            error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,
-                                      strerror(errno));
-             goto out;
-         }
-     }
-     if(WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
-+        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
-                                  authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status));
-         goto out;
-     } else if(WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
-+        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
-                                  authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status));
-         goto out;
-     }
-     found_key = ok;
-   out:
-    pamsshagentauth_restore_uid();
-+    restore_uid();
-     return found_key;
- }
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h
--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
- #define _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H
- 
- #include "identity.h"
-int pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *, Key *, char *);
-int pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *, char *, struct passwd *, Key *);
-+int pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, char *);
-+int pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *, char *, struct passwd *, struct sshkey *);
- 
- #endif
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c
--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -53,8 +53,8 @@
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "match.h"
- #include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
- #include "misc.h"
- 
- 
-@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
- 	int comparehome = 0;
- 	struct stat st;
- 
-    pamsshagentauth_verbose("auth_secure_filename: checking for uid: %u", uid);
-+    verbose("auth_secure_filename: checking for uid: %u", uid);
- 
- 	if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
- 		snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
-@@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
- 			snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
- 			return -1;
- 		}
-		pamsshagentauth_strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
-+		strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
- 
-		pamsshagentauth_verbose("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
-+		verbose("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
- 		if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
- 		    (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
- 		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
-@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
- 
- 		/* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */
- 		if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) {
-			pamsshagentauth_verbose("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
-+			verbose("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
- 			    buf);
- 			break;
- 		}
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -37,10 +37,11 @@
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "ssh.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
- #include "log.h"
- #include "compat.h"
-#include "key.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
-+#include "ssherr.h"
- #include "pathnames.h"
- #include "misc.h"
- #include "secure_filename.h"
-@@ -48,54 +49,59 @@
- #include "identity.h"
- #include "pam_user_authorized_keys.h"
- 
-+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST          54
-+
- /* extern u_char  *session_id2;
- extern uint8_t  session_id_len;
-  */
- 
- int
-userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruser, Identity * id, Buffer * session_id2)
-+userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruser, Identity * id, struct sshbuf * session_id2)
- {
-    Buffer          b = { 0 };
-+    struct sshbuf  *b = NULL;
-     char           *pkalg = NULL;
-     u_char         *pkblob = NULL, *sig = NULL;
-    u_int           blen = 0, slen = 0;
-    int             authenticated = 0;
-+    size_t          blen = 0, slen = 0;
-+    int             r, authenticated = 0;
- 
-    pkalg = (char *) key_ssh_name(id->key);
-+    pkalg = (char *) sshkey_ssh_name(id->key);
- 
-     /* first test if this key is even allowed */
-     if(! pam_user_key_allowed(ruser, id->key))
-        goto user_auth_clean_exit;
-+        goto user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer;
- 
-    if(pamsshagentauth_key_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) == 0)
-        goto user_auth_clean_exit;
-+    if(sshkey_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) != 0)
-+        goto user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer;
- 
-     /* construct packet to sign and test */
-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&b);
-+    if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+        fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- 
-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2->buf + session_id2->offset, session_id2->end - session_id2->offset);
-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST); 
-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, ruser);
-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, "pam_ssh_agent_auth");
-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&b, 1);
-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
-+    if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, sshbuf_ptr(session_id2), sshbuf_len(session_id2))) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, ruser)) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "pam_ssh_agent_auth")) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "publickey")) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 1)) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, pkalg)) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
-+        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- 
-    if(ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, pamsshagentauth_buffer_ptr(&b), pamsshagentauth_buffer_len(&b)) != 0)
-+    if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)) != 0)
-         goto user_auth_clean_exit;
- 
-     /* test for correct signature */
-    if(pamsshagentauth_key_verify(id->key, sig, slen, pamsshagentauth_buffer_ptr(&b), pamsshagentauth_buffer_len(&b)) == 1)
-+    if (sshkey_verify(id->key, sig, slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0, NULL) == 0)
-         authenticated = 1;
- 
-   user_auth_clean_exit:
-     /* if(&b != NULL) */
-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&b);
-+    sshbuf_free(b);
-+  user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer:
-     if(sig != NULL)
-        pamsshagentauth_xfree(sig);
-+        free(sig);
-     if(pkblob != NULL)
-        pamsshagentauth_xfree(pkblob);
-+        free(pkblob);
-     CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
-     return authenticated;
- }
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h
--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
- #ifndef _USERAUTH_PUBKEY_FROM_ID_H
- #define _USERAUTH_PUBKEY_FROM_ID_H
- 
-#include <identity.h>
-int userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *, Identity *, Buffer *);
-+#include "identity.h"
-+int userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *, Identity *, struct sshbuf *);
- 
- #endif
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c
--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
-@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_uudecode(const char *src
- 	/* and remove trailing whitespace because __b64_pton needs this */
- 	*p = '\0';
- 	len = pamsshagentauth___b64_pton(encoded, target, targsize);
-	pamsshagentauth_xfree(encoded);
-+	xfree(encoded);
- 	return len;
- }
- 
-@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_dump_base64(FILE *fp, co
- 		fprintf(fp, "dump_base64: len > 65536\n");
- 		return;
- 	}
-	buf = pamsshagentauth_xmalloc(2*len);
-+	buf = malloc(2*len);
- 	n = pamsshagentauth_uuencode(data, len, buf, 2*len);
- 	for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
- 		fprintf(fp, "%c", buf[i]);
-@@ -79,5 +79,5 @@ pamsshagentauth_dump_base64(FILE *fp, co
- 	}
- 	if (i % 70 != 69)
- 		fprintf(fp, "\n");
-	pamsshagentauth_xfree(buf);
-+	free(buf);
- }
--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_pam.c.compat	2020-09-23 11:32:30.783695267 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_pam.c	2020-09-23 11:33:21.383389036 +0200
-@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@
- #include <string.h>
- 
- #include "defines.h"
-#include "key.h"
-+#include <includes.h>
-+#include "sshkey.h"
- #include "log.h"
- 
- #include "pam_user_authorized_keys.h"
-@@ -42,28 +42,28 @@
-     int authenticated = 0;
-     const char method[] = "publickey ";
- 
-    char* ai = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup(ssh_auth_info);
-+    char* ai = xstrdup(ssh_auth_info);
-     char* saveptr;
- 
-     char* auth_line = strtok_r(ai, "\n", &saveptr);
-     while (auth_line != NULL) {
-         if (strncmp(auth_line, method, sizeof(method) - 1) == 0) {
-             char* key_str = auth_line + sizeof(method) - 1;
-            Key* key = pamsshagentauth_key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
-+            struct sshkey* key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
-             if (key == NULL) {
-                 continue;
-             }
-            int r = pamsshagentauth_key_read(key, &key_str);
-+            int r = sshkey_read(key, &key_str);
-             if (r == 1) {
-                 if (pam_user_key_allowed(ruser, key)) {
-                     authenticated = 1;
-                    pamsshagentauth_key_free(key);
-+                    sshkey_free(key);
-                     break;
-                 }
-             } else {
-                pamsshagentauth_verbose("Failed to create key for %s: %d", auth_line, r);
-+                verbose("Failed to create key for %s: %d", auth_line, r);
-             }
-            pamsshagentauth_key_free(key);
-+            sshkey_free(key);
-         }
-         auth_line = strtok_r(NULL, "\n", &saveptr);
-     }
--- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-dereference.patch
+++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-dereference.patch
@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
--- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
-+++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
-@@ -158,11 +158,12 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *user,
- int
- pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, struct sshkey * key)
- {
-+    struct passwd *pw;
-     return
-        pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid),
-                                          key, authorized_keys_file)
-        || pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(0), key,
-                                             authorized_keys_file)
-+        ( (pw = getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid)) &&
-+            pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(pw, key, authorized_keys_file))
-+        || ((pw = getpwuid(0)) &&
-+            pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(pw, key, authorized_keys_file))
-         || pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(authorized_keys_command,
-                                                      authorized_keys_command_user,
-                                                      getpwnam(ruser), key);
--- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-seteuid.patch
+++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-seteuid.patch
@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-seteuid openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-seteuid	2017-02-07 15:41:53.172334151 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2017-02-07 15:41:53.174334149 +0100
-@@ -238,17 +238,26 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(ui
- 	}
- 
- 	errno = 0; 
-	seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
-	             above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
-	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
-+	/* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
-+	   above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
-+	if (seteuid(uid) == -1) {
- 		close(sock);
-        if(errno == EACCES)
-		fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
-+		error("seteuid(%lu) failed with error: %s",
-+		    (unsigned long) uid, strerror(errno));
- 		return -1;
- 	}
-+	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
-+		close(sock);
-+		sock = -1;
-+		if(errno == EACCES)
-+			fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
-+	}
- 
-	seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
-
-+	/* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
-+	if (0 != seteuid(0)) {
-+		fatal("setuid(0) failed with error: %s", strerror(errno));
-+		return -1;
-+	}
- 	return sock;
- }
- 
--- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch
+++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch
@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-visibility openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
--- openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-visibility	2014-03-31 19:35:17.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c	2016-01-22 15:22:40.984469774 +0100
-@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ char           *__progname;
- extern char    *__progname;
- #endif
- 
-PAM_EXTERN int
-+PAM_EXTERN int __attribute__ ((visibility ("default")))
- pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
- {
-     char          **argv_ptr;
-@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ cleanexit:
- }
- 
- 
-PAM_EXTERN int
-+PAM_EXTERN int __attribute__ ((visibility ("default")))
- pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
- {
-     UNUSED(pamh);
--- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-agent_structure.patch
+++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-agent_structure.patch
@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h
--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-agent	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h	2017-09-27 14:25:49.421739027 +0200
-@@ -38,6 +38,12 @@
- typedef struct identity Identity;
- typedef struct idlist Idlist;
- 
-+typedef struct {
-+       int     fd;
-+       struct sshbuf *identities;
-+       int     howmany;
-+}      AuthenticationConnection;
-+
- struct identity {
-     TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
-     AuthenticationConnection *ac;   /* set if agent supports key */
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-agent	2017-09-27 14:25:49.420739021 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2017-09-27 14:25:49.421739027 +0200
-@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
- #include "sshbuf.h"
- #include "sshkey.h"
- #include "authfd.h"
-+#include "ssherr.h"
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include "ssh2.h"
-@@ -291,36 +292,43 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
- {
-     struct sshbuf *session_id2 = NULL;
-     Identity *id;
-    struct sshkey *key;
-     AuthenticationConnection *ac;
-    char *comment;
-     uint8_t retval = 0;
-     uid_t uid = getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid;
-+    struct ssh_identitylist *idlist;
-+    int r;
-+    unsigned int i;
- 
-     OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
-     pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
- 
-     if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
-         verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
-        for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) 
-        {
-            if(key != NULL) {
-+        if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(ac->fd, &idlist)) != 0) {
-+            if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES)
-+               fprintf(stderr, "error fetching identities for "
-+                               "protocol %d: %s\n", 2, ssh_err(r));
-+        } else {
-+            for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++)
-+            {
-+              if (idlist->keys[i] != NULL) {
-                 id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
-                id->key = key;
-                id->filename = comment;
-+                id->key = idlist->keys[i];
-+                id->filename = idlist->comments[i];
-                 id->ac = ac;
-                 if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, session_id2)) {
-                     retval = 1;
-                 }
-                free(id->filename);
-                key_free(id->key);
-                 free(id);
-                 if(retval == 1)
-                     break;
-            }
-        }
-+              }
-+            }
-        sshbuf_free(session_id2);
-        ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
-+            sshbuf_free(session_id2);
-+            ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
-+        }
-+        ssh_close_authentication_socket(ac->fd);
-+        free(ac);
-     }
-     else {
-         verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-agent	2017-09-27 14:25:49.420739021 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c	2017-09-27 14:25:49.422739032 +0200
-@@ -84,7 +85,7 @@ userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruse
-         (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
-         fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- 
-    if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)) != 0)
-+    if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac->fd, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0) != 0)
-         goto user_auth_clean_exit;
- 
-     /* test for correct signature */
--- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch
+++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch
@ -1,198 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2017-02-07 14:29:41.626116675 +0100
-@@ -43,12 +43,31 @@
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include "ssh2.h"
- #include "misc.h"
-+#include "ssh.h"
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <sys/stat.h>
-+#include <sys/socket.h>
-+#include <sys/un.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <errno.h>
-+#include <fcntl.h>
- 
- #include "userauth_pubkey_from_id.h"
- #include "identity.h"
- #include "get_command_line.h"
- extern char **environ;
- 
-+/* 
-+ * Added by Jamie Beverly, ensure socket fd points to a socket owned by the user 
-+ * A cursory check is done, but to avoid race conditions, it is necessary 
-+ * to drop effective UID when connecting to the socket. 
-+ *
-+ * If the cause of error is EACCES, because we verified we would not have that 
-+ * problem initially, we can safely assume that somebody is attempting to find a 
-+ * race condition; so a more "direct" log message is generated.
-+ */
-+
- static char *
- log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
- {
-@@ -85,7 +104,7 @@ void
- pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * session_id2, const char * user,
-                                 const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
- {
-    char *cookie = NULL;
-+    u_char *cookie = NULL;
-     uint8_t i = 0;
-     uint32_t rnd = 0;
-     uint8_t cookie_len;
-@@ -112,7 +131,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
-         if (i % 4 == 0) {
-             rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
-         }
-        cookie[i] = (char) rnd;
-+        cookie[i] = (u_char) rnd;
-         rnd >>= 8;
-     }
- 
-@@ -177,6 +196,86 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
- }
- 
- int
-+ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	const char *authsocket;
-+	int sock;
-+	struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
-+	struct stat sock_st;
-+
-+	authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
-+	if (!authsocket)
-+		return -1;
-+
-+	/* Advisory only; seteuid ensures no race condition; but will only log if we see EACCES */
-+	if( stat(authsocket,&sock_st) == 0) {
-+		if(uid != 0 && sock_st.st_uid != uid) {
-+			fatal("uid %lu attempted to open an agent socket owned by uid %lu", (unsigned long) uid, (unsigned long) sock_st.st_uid);
-+			return -1;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	/* 
-+	 * Ensures that the EACCES tested for below can _only_ happen if somebody 
-+	 * is attempting to race the stat above to bypass authentication.
-+	 */
-+	if( (sock_st.st_mode & S_IWUSR) != S_IWUSR || (sock_st.st_mode & S_IRUSR) != S_IRUSR) {
-+		error("ssh-agent socket has incorrect permissions for owner");
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
-+	sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
-+	strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
-+
-+	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
-+	if (sock < 0)
-+		return -1;
-+
-+	/* close on exec */
-+	if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) {
-+		close(sock);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
-+	errno = 0; 
-+	seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
-+	             above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
-+	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
-+		close(sock);
-+        if(errno == EACCES)
-+		fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
-+	seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
-+
-+	return sock;
-+}
-+
-+AuthenticationConnection *
-+ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	AuthenticationConnection *auth;
-+	int sock;
-+
-+	sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(uid);
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Fail if we couldn't obtain a connection.  This happens if we
-+	 * exited due to a timeout.
-+	 */
-+	if (sock < 0)
-+		return NULL;
-+
-+	auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth));
-+	auth->fd = sock;
-+	buffer_init(&auth->identities);
-+	auth->howmany = 0;
-+
-+	return auth;
-+}
-+
-+int
- pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(const char * user, const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
- {
-     Buffer session_id2 = { 0 };
-@@ -190,7 +289,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
-     OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
-     pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
- 
-    if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection(uid))) {
-+    if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
-         pamsshagentauth_verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
-         for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) 
-         {
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in
--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in	2017-02-07 14:40:14.407566921 +0100
-@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ PATHS=
- CC=@CC@
- LD=@LD@
- CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
-CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
-+CPPFLAGS=-I.. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
- LIBS=@LIBS@
- AR=@AR@
- AWK=@AWK@
-@@ -61,8 +61,8 @@ INSTALL=@INSTALL@
- PERL=@PERL@
- SED=@SED@
- ENT=@ENT@
-LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
-LDFLAGS_SHARED = @LDFLAGS_SHARED@
-+LDFLAGS=-L.. -L../openbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
-+LDFLAGS_SHARED =-Wl,-z,defs @LDFLAGS_SHARED@
- EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
- 
- INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS=@INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS@
-@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ SSHOBJS=xmalloc.o atomicio.o authfd.o bu
- 
- ED25519OBJS=ed25519-donna/ed25519.o
- 
-PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o get_command_line.o userauth_pubkey_from_pam.o
-+PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o get_command_line.o userauth_pubkey_from_pam.o secure_filename.o
- 
- 
- MANPAGES_IN	= pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod
-@@ -94,13 +94,13 @@ $(PAM_MODULES): Makefile.in config.h
- .c.o:
- 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
- 
-LIBCOMPAT=openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
-+LIBCOMPAT=../openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
- $(LIBCOMPAT): always
- 	(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE))
- always:
- 
-pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHOBJS) $(ED25519OBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS)  pam_ssh_agent_auth.o
-	$(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(ED25519OBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lopenbsd-compat pam_ssh_agent_auth.o $(LIBS) -lpam
-+pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS)  pam_ssh_agent_auth.o ../uidswap.o ../ssh-sk-client.o
-+	$(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) ../ssh-sk-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat pam_ssh_agent_auth.o ../uidswap.o $(LIBS) -lpam
- 
- $(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
- 	pod2man --section=8 --release=v0.10.3 --name=pam_ssh_agent_auth --official --center "PAM" pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod > pam_ssh_agent_auth.8
--- a/5
+++ b/5
@ -1,4 +1 @@
-SHA512 (openssh-8.4p1.tar.gz) = d65275b082c46c5efe7cf3264fa6794d6e99a36d4a54b50554fc56979d6c0837381587fd5399195e1db680d2a5ad1ef0b99a180eac2b4de5637906cb7a89e9ce
-SHA512 (openssh-8.4p1.tar.gz.asc) = 3d9a026db27729a5a56785db3824230ccf2a3beca4bb48ef465e44d869b944dbc5d443152a1b1be21bc9c213c465d3d7ca1f876a387d0a6b9682a0cfec3e6e32
-SHA512 (pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4.tar.gz) = caccf72174d15e43f4c86a459ac6448682e62116557cf1e1e828955f3d1731595b238df42adec57860e7f341e92daf5d8285020bcb5018f3b8a5145aa32ee1c2
-SHA512 (DJM-GPG-KEY.gpg) = db1191ed9b6495999e05eed2ef863fb5179bdb63e94850f192dad68eed8579836f88fbcfffd9f28524fe1457aff8cd248ee3e0afc112c8f609b99a34b80ecc0d
+41c61b5e2c2cddfd53897582b114ffe1  openssh-5.2p1-noacss.tar.bz2
--- a/ssh-keycat.pam
+++ b/ssh-keycat.pam
@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-#%PAM-1.0
-# pam_selinux.so close should be the first session rule
-session    required     pam_selinux.so close
-session    required     pam_loginuid.so
-# pam_selinux.so open should only be followed by sessions to be executed in the user context
-session    required     pam_selinux.so open env_params
-session    required     pam_namespace.so
-
--- a/40
+++ b/40
@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-
-# Create the host keys for the OpenSSH server.
-KEYTYPE=$1
-case $KEYTYPE in
-	"dsa") ;& # disabled in FIPS
-	"ed25519")
-		FIPS=/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled
-		if [[ -r "$FIPS" && $(cat $FIPS) == "1" ]]; then
-			exit 0
-		fi ;;
-	"rsa") ;; # always ok
-	"ecdsa") ;;
-	*) # wrong argument
-		exit 12 ;;
-esac
-KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_${KEYTYPE}_key
-
-KEYGEN=/usr/bin/ssh-keygen
-if [[ ! -x $KEYGEN ]]; then
-	exit 13
-fi
-
-# remove old keys
-rm -f $KEY{,.pub}
-
-# create new keys
-if ! $KEYGEN -q -t $KEYTYPE -f $KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
-	exit 1
-fi
-
-# sanitize permissions
-/usr/bin/chgrp ssh_keys $KEY
-/usr/bin/chmod 640 $KEY
-/usr/bin/chmod 644 $KEY.pub
-if [[ -x /usr/sbin/restorecon ]]; then
-	/usr/sbin/restorecon $KEY{,.pub}
-fi
-
-exit 0
--- a/sshd-keygen.target
+++ b/sshd-keygen.target
@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Wants=sshd-keygen@rsa.service
-Wants=sshd-keygen@ecdsa.service
-Wants=sshd-keygen@ed25519.service
-PartOf=sshd.service
--- a/sshd-keygen@.service
+++ b/sshd-keygen@.service
@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=OpenSSH %i Server Key Generation
-ConditionFileNotEmpty=|!/etc/ssh/ssh_host_%i_key
-
-[Service]
-Type=oneshot
-EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd
-ExecStart=/usr/libexec/openssh/sshd-keygen %i
-
-[Install]
-WantedBy=sshd-keygen.target
--- a/sshd.init
+++ b/sshd.init
@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+#
+# sshd		Start up the OpenSSH server daemon
+#
+# chkconfig: 2345 55 25
+# description: SSH is a protocol for secure remote shell access. \
+#              This service starts up the OpenSSH server daemon.
+#
+# processname: sshd
+# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
+# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub
+# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_random_seed
+# config: /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+# pidfile: /var/run/sshd.pid
+
+### BEGIN INIT INFO
+# Provides: sshd
+# Required-Start: $local_fs $network $syslog
+# Required-Stop: $local_fs $syslog
+# Should-Start: $syslog
+# Should-Stop: $network $syslog
+# Default-Start: 2 3 4 5
+# Default-Stop: 0 1 6
+# Short-Description: Start up the OpenSSH server daemon
+# Description:       SSH is a protocol for secure remote shell access.
+#		     This service starts up the OpenSSH server daemon.
+### END INIT INFO
+
+# source function library
+. /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions
+
+# pull in sysconfig settings
+[ -f /etc/sysconfig/sshd ] && . /etc/sysconfig/sshd
+
+RETVAL=0
+prog="sshd"
+lockfile=/var/lock/subsys/$prog
+
+# Some functions to make the below more readable
+KEYGEN=/usr/bin/ssh-keygen
+SSHD=/usr/sbin/sshd
+RSA1_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
+RSA_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+DSA_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+PID_FILE=/var/run/sshd.pid
+
+runlevel=$(set -- $(runlevel); eval "echo \$$#" )
+
+do_rsa1_keygen() {
+	if [ ! -s $RSA1_KEY ]; then
+		echo -n $"Generating SSH1 RSA host key: "
+		if $KEYGEN -q -t rsa1 -f $RSA1_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
+			chmod 600 $RSA1_KEY
+			chmod 644 $RSA1_KEY.pub
+			if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then
+			    /sbin/restorecon $RSA1_KEY.pub
+			fi
+			success $"RSA1 key generation"
+			echo
+		else
+			failure $"RSA1 key generation"
+			echo
+			exit 1
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+
+do_rsa_keygen() {
+	if [ ! -s $RSA_KEY ]; then
+		echo -n $"Generating SSH2 RSA host key: "
+		if $KEYGEN -q -t rsa -f $RSA_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
+			chmod 600 $RSA_KEY
+			chmod 644 $RSA_KEY.pub
+			if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then
+			    /sbin/restorecon $RSA_KEY.pub
+			fi
+			success $"RSA key generation"
+			echo
+		else
+			failure $"RSA key generation"
+			echo
+			exit 1
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+
+do_dsa_keygen() {
+	if [ ! -s $DSA_KEY ]; then
+		echo -n $"Generating SSH2 DSA host key: "
+		if $KEYGEN -q -t dsa -f $DSA_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
+			chmod 600 $DSA_KEY
+			chmod 644 $DSA_KEY.pub
+			if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then
+			    /sbin/restorecon $DSA_KEY.pub
+			fi
+			success $"DSA key generation"
+			echo
+		else
+			failure $"DSA key generation"
+			echo
+			exit 1
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+
+do_restart_sanity_check()
+{
+	$SSHD -t
+	RETVAL=$?
+	if [ ! "$RETVAL" = 0 ]; then
+		failure $"Configuration file or keys are invalid"
+		echo
+	fi
+}
+
+start()
+{
+	[ -x $SSHD ] || exit 5
+	[ -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config ] || exit 6
+	# Create keys if necessary
+	if [ "x${AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS}" != xNO ]; then
+		do_rsa1_keygen
+		do_rsa_keygen
+		do_dsa_keygen
+	fi
+
+	echo -n $"Starting $prog: "
+	$SSHD $OPTIONS && success || failure
+	RETVAL=$?
+	[ "$RETVAL" = 0 ] && touch $lockfile
+	echo
+	return $RETVAL
+}
+
+stop()
+{
+	echo -n $"Stopping $prog: "
+	if [ -n "`pidfileofproc $SSHD`" ] ; then
+	    killproc $SSHD
+	else
+	    failure $"Stopping $prog"
+	fi
+	RETVAL=$?
+	# if we are in halt or reboot runlevel kill all running sessions
+	# so the TCP connections are closed cleanly
+	if [ "x$runlevel" = x0 -o "x$runlevel" = x6 ] ; then
+	    trap '' TERM
+	    killall $prog 2>/dev/null
+	    trap TERM
+	fi
+	[ "$RETVAL" = 0 ] && rm -f $lockfile
+	echo
+}
+
+reload()
+{
+	echo -n $"Reloading $prog: "
+	if [ -n "`pidfileofproc $SSHD`" ] ; then
+	    killproc $SSHD -HUP
+	else
+	    failure $"Reloading $prog"
+	fi
+	RETVAL=$?
+	echo
+}
+
+restart() {
+	stop
+	start
+}
+
+force_reload() {
+	restart
+}
+
+rh_status() {
+	status -p $PID_FILE openssh-daemon
+}
+
+rh_status_q() {
+	rh_status >/dev/null 2>&1
+}
+
+case "$1" in
+	start)
+		rh_status_q && exit 0
+		start
+		;;
+	stop)
+		rh_status_q || exit 0
+		stop
+		;;
+	restart)
+		restart
+		;;
+	reload)
+		rh_status_q || exit 7
+		reload
+		;;
+	force-reload)
+		force_reload
+		;;
+	condrestart|try-restart)
+		rh_status_q || exit 0
+		if [ -f $lockfile ] ; then
+			do_restart_sanity_check
+			if [ "$RETVAL" = 0 ] ; then
+				stop
+				# avoid race
+				sleep 3
+				start
+			else
+				RETVAL=6
+			fi
+		fi
+		;;
+	status)
+		rh_status
+		RETVAL=$?
+		;;
+	*)
+		echo $"Usage: $0 {start|stop|restart|reload|force-reload|condrestart|try-restart|status}"
+		RETVAL=2
+esac
+exit $RETVAL
--- a/sshd.pam
+++ b/sshd.pam
@ -1,17 +1,13 @@
 #%PAM-1.0
-auth       substack     password-auth
-auth       include      postlogin
-account    required     pam_sepermit.so
+auth	   required	pam_sepermit.so
+auth       include      system-auth
 account    required     pam_nologin.so
-account    include      password-auth
-password   include      password-auth
+account    include      system-auth
+password   include      system-auth
 # pam_selinux.so close should be the first session rule
 session    required     pam_selinux.so close
 session    required     pam_loginuid.so
 # pam_selinux.so open should only be followed by sessions to be executed in the user context
 session    required     pam_selinux.so open env_params
-session    required     pam_namespace.so
 session    optional     pam_keyinit.so force revoke
-session    optional     pam_motd.so
-session    include      password-auth
-session    include      postlogin
+session    include      system-auth
--- a/sshd.service
+++ b/sshd.service
@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=OpenSSH server daemon
-Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
-After=network.target sshd-keygen.target
-Wants=sshd-keygen.target
-
-[Service]
-Type=notify
-EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd
-ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS
-ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
-KillMode=process
-Restart=on-failure
-RestartSec=42s
-
-[Install]
-WantedBy=multi-user.target
--- a/sshd.socket
+++ b/sshd.socket
@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=OpenSSH Server Socket
-Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
-Conflicts=sshd.service
-
-[Socket]
-ListenStream=22
-Accept=yes
-
-[Install]
-WantedBy=sockets.target
--- a/sshd.sysconfig
+++ b/sshd.sysconfig
@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-# Configuration file for the sshd service.
-
-# The server keys are automatically generated if they are missing.
-# To change the automatic creation, adjust sshd.service options for
-# example using  systemctl enable sshd-keygen@dsa.service  to allow creation
-# of DSA key or  systemctl mask sshd-keygen@rsa.service  to disable RSA key
-# creation.
--- a/sshd.tmpfiles
+++ b/sshd.tmpfiles
@ -1 +0,0 @@
-d /var/empty/sshd 711 root root -
--- a/sshd@.service
+++ b/sshd@.service
@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=OpenSSH per-connection server daemon
-Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
-Wants=sshd-keygen.target
-After=sshd-keygen.target
-
-[Service]
-EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd
-ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/sshd -i $OPTIONS
-StandardInput=socket
--- a/tests/pam_ssh_agent_auth/Makefile
+++ b/tests/pam_ssh_agent_auth/Makefile
@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-# ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-#
-#   Makefile of /CoreOS/openssh/Sanity/pam_ssh_agent_auth
-#   Description: This is a basic sanity test for pam_ssh_agent_auth
-#   Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-#
-# ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-#
-#   Copyright (c) 2015 Red Hat, Inc.
-#
-#   This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or
-#   modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-#   published by the Free Software Foundation, either version 2 of
-#   the License, or (at your option) any later version.
-#
-#   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be
-#   useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied
-#   warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-#   PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License for more details.
-#
-#   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
-#   along with this program. If not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/.
-#
-# ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-export TEST=/CoreOS/openssh/Sanity/pam_ssh_agent_auth
-export TESTVERSION=1.0
-
-BUILT_FILES=
-
-FILES=$(METADATA) runtest.sh Makefile PURPOSE pam_save_ssh_var.c
-
-.PHONY: all install download clean
-
-run: $(FILES) build
-	./runtest.sh
-
-build: $(BUILT_FILES)
-	test -x runtest.sh || chmod a+x runtest.sh
-
-clean:
-	rm -f *~ $(BUILT_FILES)
-
-
-include /usr/share/rhts/lib/rhts-make.include
-
-$(METADATA): Makefile
-	@echo "Owner:           Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>" > $(METADATA)
-	@echo "Name:            $(TEST)" >> $(METADATA)
-	@echo "TestVersion:     $(TESTVERSION)" >> $(METADATA)
-	@echo "Path:            $(TEST_DIR)" >> $(METADATA)
-	@echo "Description:     This is basic sanity test for pam_ssh_agent_auth" >> $(METADATA)
-	@echo "Type:            Sanity" >> $(METADATA)
-	@echo "TestTime:        5m" >> $(METADATA)
-	@echo "RunFor:          openssh" >> $(METADATA)
-	@echo "Requires:        openssh pam_ssh_agent_auth pam-devel expect" >> $(METADATA)
-	@echo "RhtsRequires:    library(distribution/fips)" >> $(METADATA)
-	@echo "Priority:        Normal" >> $(METADATA)
-	@echo "License:         GPLv2+" >> $(METADATA)
-	@echo "Confidential:    no" >> $(METADATA)
-	@echo "Destructive:     no" >> $(METADATA)
-	@echo "Releases:        -RHEL4 -RHELClient5 -RHELServer5" >> $(METADATA)
-
-	rhts-lint $(METADATA)
--- a/tests/pam_ssh_agent_auth/PURPOSE
+++ b/tests/pam_ssh_agent_auth/PURPOSE
@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-PURPOSE of /CoreOS/openssh/Sanity/pam_ssh_agent_auth
-Description: This is basic sanity test for pam_ssh_agent_auth
-Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-
-Created as a response to rhbz#1251777 and previous one rhbz#1225106.
-The code of pam module is outdated and compiled with current openssh
-version which went through quite enough refactoring.
--- a/tests/pam_ssh_agent_auth/pam_save_ssh_var.c
+++ b/tests/pam_ssh_agent_auth/pam_save_ssh_var.c
@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-/*
-This simple pam module saves the content of SSH_USER_AUTH variable to /tmp/SSH_USER_AUTH
-file.
-
-Setup:
-  - gcc -fPIC -DPIC -shared -rdynamic -o pam_save_ssh_var.o pam_save_ssh_var.c
-  - copy pam_save_ssh_var.o to /lib/security resp. /lib64/security
-  - add to /etc/pam.d/sshd
-	auth	requisite	pam_save_ssh_var.o
-*/
-
-/* Define which PAM interfaces we provide */
-#define PAM_SM_ACCOUNT
-#define PAM_SM_AUTH
-#define PAM_SM_PASSWORD
-#define PAM_SM_SESSION
-
-/* Include PAM headers */
-#include <security/pam_appl.h>
-#include <security/pam_modules.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-
-int save_ssh_var(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *phase) {
-	FILE *fp;
-	const char *var;
-
-	fp = fopen("/tmp/SSH_USER_AUTH","a");
-	fprintf(fp, "BEGIN (%s)\n", phase);
-	var = pam_getenv(pamh, "SSH_USER_AUTH");
-	if (var != NULL) {
-		fprintf(fp, "SSH_USER_AUTH: '%s'\n", var);
-	}
-	fprintf(fp, "END (%s)\n", phase);
-	fclose(fp);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/* PAM entry point for session creation */
-int pam_sm_open_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv) {
-	return(PAM_IGNORE);
-}
-
-/* PAM entry point for session cleanup */
-int pam_sm_close_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv) {
-	return(PAM_IGNORE);
-}
-
-/* PAM entry point for accounting */
-int pam_sm_acct_mgmt(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv) {
-	return(PAM_IGNORE);
-}
-
-/* PAM entry point for authentication verification */
-int pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv) {
-	save_ssh_var(pamh, "auth");
-	return(PAM_IGNORE);
-}
-
-/*
-   PAM entry point for setting user credentials (that is, to actually
-   establish the authenticated user's credentials to the service provider)
- */
-int pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv) {
-	return(PAM_IGNORE);
-}
-
-/* PAM entry point for authentication token (password) changes */
-int pam_sm_chauthtok(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv) {
-	return(PAM_IGNORE);
-}
-
--- a/tests/pam_ssh_agent_auth/runtest.sh
+++ b/tests/pam_ssh_agent_auth/runtest.sh
@ -1,184 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-# vim: dict+=/usr/share/beakerlib/dictionary.vim cpt=.,w,b,u,t,i,k
-# ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-#
-#   runtest.sh of /CoreOS/openssh/Sanity/pam_ssh_agent_auth
-#   Description: This is a basic sanity test for pam_ssh_agent_auth
-#   Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-#
-# ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-#
-#   Copyright (c) 2015 Red Hat, Inc.
-#
-#   This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or
-#   modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-#   published by the Free Software Foundation, either version 2 of
-#   the License, or (at your option) any later version.
-#
-#   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be
-#   useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied
-#   warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-#   PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License for more details.
-#
-#   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
-#   along with this program. If not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/.
-#
-# ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-# Include Beaker environment
-. /usr/bin/rhts-environment.sh || exit 1
-. /usr/share/beakerlib/beakerlib.sh || exit 1
-
-PACKAGE="openssh"
-PAM_SUDO="/etc/pam.d/sudo"
-PAM_SSHD="/etc/pam.d/sshd"
-PAM_MODULE="pam_save_ssh_var"
-SUDOERS_CFG="/etc/sudoers.d/01_pam_ssh_auth"
-SSHD_CFG="/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
-USER="testuser$RANDOM"
-PASS="testpassxy4re.3298fhdsaf"
-AUTH_KEYS="/etc/security/authorized_keys"
-AK_COMMAND_BIN="/root/ak.sh"
-AK_COMMAND_KEYS="/root/akeys"
-declare -a KEYS=("rsa" "ecdsa")
-
-rlJournalStart
-    rlPhaseStartSetup
-        rlAssertRpm $PACKAGE
-        rlAssertRpm pam_ssh_agent_auth
-        rlImport distribution/fips
-        rlServiceStart sshd
-        rlRun "TmpDir=\$(mktemp -d)" 0 "Creating tmp directory"
-        rlRun "cp ${PAM_MODULE}.c $TmpDir/"
-        rlRun "pushd $TmpDir"
-        rlFileBackup --clean $PAM_SUDO /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/ /etc/security/ $AUTH_KEYS
-        rlRun "sed -i '1 a\
-auth       sufficient   pam_ssh_agent_auth.so file=$AUTH_KEYS' $PAM_SUDO"
-        rlRun "echo 'Defaults    env_keep += \"SSH_AUTH_SOCK\"' > $SUDOERS_CFG"
-        rlRun "echo 'Defaults    !requiretty' >> $SUDOERS_CFG"
-        grep '^%wheel' /etc/sudoers || \
-           rlRun "echo '%wheel        ALL=(ALL)       ALL' >> $SUDOERS_CFG"
-        rlRun "useradd $USER -G wheel"
-        rlRun "echo $PASS |passwd --stdin $USER"
-    rlPhaseEnd
-
-    if ! fipsIsEnabled; then
-        KEYS+=("dsa")
-    fi
-
-    for KEY in "${KEYS[@]}"; do
-        rlPhaseStartTest "Test with key type $KEY"
-            rlRun "su $USER -c 'ssh-keygen -t $KEY -f ~/.ssh/my_id_$KEY -N \"\"'" 0
-
-            # Without authorized_keys, the authentication should fail
-            rlRun -s "su $USER -c 'eval \`ssh-agent\`; sudo id; ssh-agent -k'" 0
-            rlAssertNotGrep "uid=0(root) gid=0(root)" $rlRun_LOG
-
-            # Append the keys only to make sure we can match also the non-first line
-            rlRun "cat ~$USER/.ssh/my_id_${KEY}.pub >> $AUTH_KEYS"
-            rlRun -s "su $USER -c 'eval \`ssh-agent\`; ssh-add ~/.ssh/my_id_$KEY; sudo id; ssh-agent -k'"
-            rlAssertGrep "uid=0(root) gid=0(root)" $rlRun_LOG
-        rlPhaseEnd
-    done
-
-    if rlIsRHEL '<6.8' || ( rlIsRHEL '<7.3' && rlIsRHEL 7 ) ; then
-        : # not available
-    else
-        rlPhaseStartSetup "Setup for authorized_keys_command"
-            rlFileBackup --namespace ak_command $PAM_SUDO
-            rlRun "rm -f $AUTH_KEYS"
-            cat >$AK_COMMAND_BIN <<_EOF
-#!/bin/bash
-cat $AK_COMMAND_KEYS
-_EOF
-            rlRun "chmod +x $AK_COMMAND_BIN"
-            rlRun "sed -i 's|.*pam_ssh_agent_auth.*|auth sufficient pam_ssh_agent_auth.so authorized_keys_command=$AK_COMMAND_BIN authorized_keys_command_user=root|' $PAM_SUDO"
-            rlRun "cat $PAM_SUDO"
-        rlPhaseEnd
-
-        for KEY in "${KEYS[@]}"; do
-            rlPhaseStartTest "Test authorized_keys_command with key type $KEY (bz1299555, bz1317858)"
-                rlRun "cat ~$USER/.ssh/my_id_${KEY}.pub >$AK_COMMAND_KEYS"
-                rlRun -s "su $USER -c 'eval \`ssh-agent\`; ssh-add ~/.ssh/my_id_$KEY; sudo id; ssh-agent -k'"
-                rlAssertGrep "uid=0(root) gid=0(root)" $rlRun_LOG
-            rlPhaseEnd
-        done
-
-        rlPhaseStartCleanup "Cleanup for authorized_keys_command"
-            rlFileRestore --namespace ak_command
-            rlRun "rm -f $AK_COMMAND_BIN $AK_COMMAND_KEYS"
-        rlPhaseEnd
-    fi
-
-    if rlIsRHEL '>=7.3'; then # not in Fedora anymore
-        rlPhaseStartTest "bz1312304 - Exposing information about succesful auth"
-            rlRun "rlFileBackup --namespace exposing $PAM_SSHD"
-            rlRun "rlFileBackup --namespace exposing $SSHD_CFG"
-            rlRun "rlFileBackup --namespace exposing /root/.ssh/"
-            rlRun "rm -f ~/.ssh/id_rsa*"
-            rlRun "ssh-keygen -f ~/.ssh/id_rsa -N \"\"" 0
-            rlRun "ssh-keyscan localhost >~/.ssh/known_hosts" 0
-            USER_AK_FILE=~$USER/.ssh/authorized_keys
-            rlRun "cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub >$USER_AK_FILE"
-            rlRun "chown $USER:$USER $USER_AK_FILE"
-            rlRun "chmod 0600 $USER_AK_FILE"
-            rlRun "gcc -fPIC -DPIC -shared -rdynamic -o $PAM_MODULE.o $PAM_MODULE.c"
-            rlRun "test -d /lib64/security && cp $PAM_MODULE.o /lib64/security/" 0,1
-            rlRun "test -d /lib/security && cp $PAM_MODULE.o /lib/security/" 0,1
-            rlRun "sed -i '1 i auth       optional         $PAM_MODULE.o' $PAM_SSHD"
-
-            # pam-and-env should expose information to both PAM and environmental variable;
-            # we will be testing only env variable here for the time being,
-            rlRun "echo 'ExposeAuthenticationMethods pam-and-env' >>$SSHD_CFG"
-            rlRun "sed -i '/^ChallengeResponseAuthentication/ d' $SSHD_CFG"
-            rlRun "service sshd restart"
-            rlWaitForSocket 22 -t 5
-            rlRun -s "ssh -i ~/.ssh/id_rsa $USER@localhost \"env|grep SSH_USER_AUTH\"" 0 \
-                "Environment variable SSH_USER_AUTH is set"
-            rlAssertGrep "^SSH_USER_AUTH=publickey:" $rlRun_LOG
-            rlRun "rm -f $rlRun_LOG"
-
-            # pam-only should expose information only to PAM and not to environment variable
-            rlRun "sed -i 's/pam-and-env/pam-only/' $SSHD_CFG"
-            rlRun "echo 'AuthenticationMethods publickey,keyboard-interactive:pam' >>$SSHD_CFG"
-            rlRun "service sshd restart"
-            rlWaitForSocket 22 -t 5
-ssh_with_pass() {
-    ssh_args=("-i /root/.ssh/id_rsa")
-    ssh_args+=("$USER@localhost")
-    cat >ssh.exp <<_EOF
-#!/usr/bin/expect -f
-
-set timeout 5
-spawn ssh ${ssh_args[*]} "echo CONNECTED; env|grep SSH_USER_AUTH"
-expect {
-    -re {.*[Pp]assword.*} { send -- "$PASS\r"; exp_continue }
-    timeout { exit 1 }
-    eof { exit 0 }
-}
-_EOF
-    rlRun -s "expect -f ssh.exp"
-}
-            #rlRun -s "ssh ${ssh_args[*]} \"echo CONNECTED; env|grep SSH_USER_AUTH\"" 1 \
-                #"Environment variable SSH_USER_AUTH is NOT set"
-            rlRun "ssh_with_pass"
-            rlRun "grep -q CONNECTED $rlRun_LOG" 0 "Connection was successful"
-            rlAssertGrep "^SSH_USER_AUTH: 'publickey:" /tmp/SSH_USER_AUTH
-            rlRun "cat /tmp/SSH_USER_AUTH"
-            rlRun "rm -f $rlRun_LOG /tmp/SSH_USER_AUTH"
-            for pm in /lib64/security/$PAM_MODULE.o /lib/security/$PAM_MODULE.o; do
-                rlRun "test -e $pm && rm -f $pm" 0,1
-            done
-            rlRun "rlFileRestore --namespace exposing"
-        rlPhaseEnd
-    fi
-
-    rlPhaseStartCleanup
-        rlRun "popd"
-        rlRun "rm -r $TmpDir" 0 "Removing tmp directory"
-        rlRun "userdel -fr $USER"
-        rlFileRestore
-        rlServiceRestore sshd
-    rlPhaseEnd
-rlJournalPrintText
-rlJournalEnd
--- a/tests/port-forwarding/Makefile
+++ b/tests/port-forwarding/Makefile
@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-# ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-#
-#   Makefile of /CoreOS/openssh/Sanity/port-forwarding
-#   Description: Testing port forwarding (ideally all possibilities: -L, -R, -D)
-#   Author: Stanislav Zidek <szidek@redhat.com>
-#
-# ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-#
-#   Copyright (c) 2015 Red Hat, Inc.
-#
-#   This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or
-#   modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-#   published by the Free Software Foundation, either version 2 of
-#   the License, or (at your option) any later version.
-#
-#   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be
-#   useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied
-#   warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-#   PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License for more details.
-#
-#   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
-#   along with this program. If not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/.
-#
-# ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-export TEST=/CoreOS/openssh/Sanity/port-forwarding
-export TESTVERSION=1.0
-
-BUILT_FILES=
-
-FILES=$(METADATA) runtest.sh Makefile PURPOSE
-
-.PHONY: all install download clean
-
-run: $(FILES) build
-	./runtest.sh
-
-build: $(BUILT_FILES)
-	test -x runtest.sh || chmod a+x runtest.sh
-
-clean:
-	rm -f *~ $(BUILT_FILES)
-
-
-include /usr/share/rhts/lib/rhts-make.include
-
-$(METADATA): Makefile
-	@echo "Owner:           Stanislav Zidek <szidek@redhat.com>" > $(METADATA)
-	@echo "Name:            $(TEST)" >> $(METADATA)
-	@echo "TestVersion:     $(TESTVERSION)" >> $(METADATA)
-	@echo "Path:            $(TEST_DIR)" >> $(METADATA)
-	@echo "Description:     Testing port forwarding (ideally all possibilities: -L, -R, -D)" >> $(METADATA)
-	@echo "Type:            Sanity" >> $(METADATA)
-	@echo "TestTime:        5m" >> $(METADATA)
-	@echo "RunFor:          openssh" >> $(METADATA)
-	@echo "Requires:        openssh net-tools nc" >> $(METADATA)
-	@echo "Priority:        Normal" >> $(METADATA)
-	@echo "License:         GPLv2+" >> $(METADATA)
-	@echo "Confidential:    yes" >> $(METADATA)
-	@echo "Destructive:     no" >> $(METADATA)
-	@echo "Releases:        -RHEL4 -RHELClient5 -RHELServer5" >> $(METADATA)
-
-	rhts-lint $(METADATA)
--- a/tests/port-forwarding/PURPOSE
+++ b/tests/port-forwarding/PURPOSE
@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-PURPOSE of /CoreOS/openssh/Sanity/port-forwarding
-Description: Testing port forwarding (ideally all possibilities: -L, -R, -D)
-Author: Stanislav Zidek <szidek@redhat.com>
--- a/tests/port-forwarding/runtest.sh
+++ b/tests/port-forwarding/runtest.sh
@ -1,152 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-# vim: dict+=/usr/share/beakerlib/dictionary.vim cpt=.,w,b,u,t,i,k
-# ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-#
-#   runtest.sh of /CoreOS/openssh/Sanity/port-forwarding
-#   Description: Testing port forwarding (ideally all possibilities: -L, -R, -D)
-#   Author: Stanislav Zidek <szidek@redhat.com>
-#
-# ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-#
-#   Copyright (c) 2015 Red Hat, Inc.
-#
-#   This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or
-#   modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-#   published by the Free Software Foundation, either version 2 of
-#   the License, or (at your option) any later version.
-#
-#   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be
-#   useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied
-#   warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-#   PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License for more details.
-#
-#   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
-#   along with this program. If not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/.
-#
-# ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-# Include Beaker environment
-. /usr/share/beakerlib/beakerlib.sh || exit 1
-
-PACKAGE="openssh"
-USER="user$RANDOM"
-FORWARDED=$((RANDOM % 100 + 6800))
-LISTEN=$((RANDOM % 100 + 6900))
-TIMEOUT=5
-MESSAGE="HUGE_SUCCESS"
-SSH_OPTIONS="-o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no"
-
-rlJournalStart
-    rlPhaseStartSetup
-        rlAssertRpm $PACKAGE
-        rlFileBackup /etc/ssh/sshd_config
-        rlRun "useradd -m $USER"
-        rlRun "su - $USER -c \"mkdir .ssh; chmod 700 .ssh; cd .ssh; ssh-keygen -N '' -f id_rsa; cat id_rsa.pub >authorized_keys; chmod 600 authorized_keys\""
-        rlRun "echo 'LogLevel DEBUG' >>/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
-        rlServiceStart sshd
-        rlRun "IP=\$( ip a |grep 'scope global' |grep -w inet |cut -d'/' -f1 |awk '{ print \$2 }' |tail -1 )"
-        rlRun "echo 'IP=$IP'"
-        rlRun "TmpDir=\$(mktemp -d)" 0 "Creating tmp directory"
-        rlRun "pushd $TmpDir"
-    rlPhaseEnd
-
-forwarding_test() {
-    EXP_RESULT=$1
-    FORWARDED=$2
-    HOST=$3
-    LISTEN=$4
-
-    rlRun "nc -l $LISTEN &>listen.log &"
-    LISTEN_PID=$!
-    rlWaitForSocket $LISTEN -t $TIMEOUT
-    rlRun "ps -fp $LISTEN_PID"
-    rlRun "su - $USER -c \"ssh $SSH_OPTIONS -N -L $FORWARDED:$HOST:$LISTEN $USER@localhost &\" &>tunnel.log"
-    rlRun "ps -fC ssh"
-    rlRun "SSH_PID=\$( pgrep -n -u $USER ssh )"
-    rlRun "echo SSH_PID is '$SSH_PID'"
-    rlWaitForSocket $FORWARDED -t $TIMEOUT
-    rlRun "[[ -n '$SSH_PID' ]] && ps -fp $SSH_PID"
-    rlRun "echo '$MESSAGE'|nc localhost $FORWARDED" 0,1
-
-    if [[ $EXP_RESULT == "success" ]]; then
-        rlAssertGrep "$MESSAGE" listen.log
-    else # failure expected
-        rlAssertGrep "open failed" tunnel.log -i
-        rlAssertGrep "administratively prohibited" tunnel.log -i
-        rlAssertNotGrep "$MESSAGE" listen.log
-    fi
-
-    rlRun "kill -9 $LISTEN_PID $SSH_PID" 0,1 "Killing cleanup"
-    rlWaitForSocket $LISTEN -t $TIMEOUT --close
-    rlWaitForSocket $FORWARDED -t $TIMEOUT --close
-    if ! rlGetPhaseState; then
-        rlRun "cat listen.log"
-        rlRun "cat tunnel.log"
-    fi
-    rlFileSubmit listen.log tunnel.log
-    rlRun "rm -f *.log;"
-}
-
-    rlPhaseStartTest "Local forwarding"
-        forwarding_test "success" $FORWARDED localhost $LISTEN
-        ((FORWARDED+=1))
-        ((LISTEN+=1))
-    rlPhaseEnd
-
-    rlPhaseStartTest "PermitOpen with 'any'"
-        rlFileBackup --namespace permitopen_any /etc/ssh/sshd_config /etc/hosts
-        rlRun "echo 'PermitOpen any' >>/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
-        rlRun "echo '$IP anyhost1 anyhost2' >>/etc/hosts"
-        rlRun "service sshd restart"
-        for i in `seq 3`; do
-            forwarding_test "success" $FORWARDED anyhost1 $LISTEN
-            forwarding_test "success" $FORWARDED anyhost2 $LISTEN
-            ((FORWARDED+=1))
-            ((LISTEN+=1))
-        done
-        rlFileRestore --namespace permitopen_any
-    rlPhaseEnd
-
-    if ! rlIsRHEL '<6.7'; then
-        # PermitOpen with wildcards is new feature in RHEL-6.7
-        rlPhaseStartTest "PermitOpen with port wildcard"
-            rlFileBackup --namespace port_wildcard /etc/ssh/sshd_config /etc/hosts
-            rlRun "echo 'PermitOpen wildportallow:*' >>/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
-            rlRun "echo '$IP wildportallow wildportdeny' >>/etc/hosts"
-            rlRun "service sshd restart"
-            forwarding_test "success" $FORWARDED wildportallow $LISTEN
-            ((FORWARDED+=1))
-            ((LISTEN+=1))
-            forwarding_test "failure" $FORWARDED wildportdeny $LISTEN
-            ((FORWARDED+=1))
-            ((LISTEN+=1))
-            rlFileRestore --namespace port_wildcard
-            rlRun "service sshd restart"
-        rlPhaseEnd
-    fi
-
-    if ! rlIsRHEL '<7.3'; then
-        rlPhaseStartTest "PermitOpen with host wildcard and specific port"
-            rlFileBackup --namespace host_wildcard /etc/ssh/sshd_config /etc/hosts
-            rlRun "echo 'PermitOpen *:$LISTEN' >>/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
-            rlRun "echo '$IP wildhost1 wildhost2' >>/etc/hosts"
-            rlRun "service sshd restart"
-            forwarding_test "success" $FORWARDED wildhost1 $LISTEN
-            ((FORWARDED+=1))
-            forwarding_test "success" $FORWARDED wildhost2 $LISTEN
-            ((FORWARDED+=1))
-            ((LISTEN+=1)) # different listen port, should fail
-            forwarding_test "failure" $FORWARDED wildhost2 $LISTEN
-            rlFileRestore --namespace host_wildcard
-        rlPhaseEnd
-    fi
-
-    rlPhaseStartCleanup
-        rlRun "userdel -rf $USER"
-        rlRun "popd"
-        rlFileRestore
-        rlServiceRestore sshd
-        rlRun "rm -r $TmpDir" 0 "Removing tmp directory"
-    rlPhaseEnd
-rlJournalPrintText
-rlJournalEnd
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Fedora Release Engineering	1d259445b1	dist-git conversion	2010-07-29 05:17:21 +00:00
Bill Nottingham	8d4e35d201	Fix typo that causes a failure to update the common directory. (releng #2781)	2009-11-26 01:24:55 +00:00
Jan F. Chadima	dfe8fee054	remove homechroot patch	2009-09-21 08:46:55 +00:00
Jan F. Chadima	a14d263c00	create '~/.ssh/known_hosts' within proper context	2009-06-30 11:14:25 +00:00
Jan F. Chadima	5503a047df	repair broken ls in chroot %%h	2009-06-23 18:21:38 +00:00
Jesse Keating	145212be4d	Initialize branch F-11 for openssh	2009-04-15 05:34:20 +00:00