pam_auth version bump

Resolves: rhbz#1950819
8.5p1 => 8.6p1

.gitignore

@@ -45,3 +45,8 @@ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2.tar.bz2
 /openssh-8.4p1.tar.gz
 /openssh-8.4p1.tar.gz.asc
 /pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4.tar.gz
+/openssh-8.5p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-8.5p1.tar.gz.asc
+/gpgkey-736060BA.gpg
+/openssh-8.6p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-8.6p1.tar.gz.asc

openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch

@@ -1,12 +1,11 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info	2016-12-23 13:31:22.645213115 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info	2021-04-19 13:57:11.720113536 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2016-12-23 13:31:40.997216691 +0100
++++ openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2021-04-19 13:59:29.842163204 +0200
-@@ -65,9 +65,12 @@ report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_wi
+@@ -70,8 +70,12 @@ report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_wi
+ 
  	err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
- 				     GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR,
+ 	    GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR, GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
- 				     GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
+-	    "Could not grab %s. A malicious client may be eavesdropping "
--				     "Could not grab %s. "
--				     "A malicious client may be eavesdropping "
 -	    "on your session.", what);
 +	    "SSH password dialog could not grab the %s input.\n"
 +	    "This might be caused by application such as screensaver, "

openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch

@@ -1,19 +1,19 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/log.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100
++++ openssh-8.6p1/log.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.544843434 +0200
-@@ -250,6 +250,11 @@ debug3(const char *fmt,...)
+@@ -194,6 +194,11 @@ void
- void
+ log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility,
- log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr)
+     int on_stderr)
  {
 +	log_init_handler(av0, level, facility, on_stderr, 1);
 +}
 +
 +void
-+log_init_handler(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr, int reset_handler) {
++log_init_handler(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr, int reset_handler) {
  #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
  	struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
  #endif
-@@ -273,8 +278,10 @@ log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, Sysl
+@@ -206,8 +211,10 @@ log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level
  		exit(1);
  	}
  
@@ -26,21 +26,21 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.c
  
  	log_on_stderr = on_stderr;
  	if (on_stderr)
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.h
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/log.h.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.544843434 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/log.h	2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100
++++ openssh-8.6p1/log.h	2021-04-19 14:56:46.931042176 +0200
-@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ typedef enum {
+@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ typedef enum {
- typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, const char *, void *);
+ typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, int, const char *, void *);
  
- void     log_init(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
+ void     log_init(const char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
-+void     log_init_handler(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int, int);
++void     log_init_handler(const char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int, int);
  LogLevel log_level_get(void);
  int      log_change_level(LogLevel);
  int      log_is_on_stderr(void);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.311168085 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.526843298 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c	2016-12-23 15:16:42.154193100 +0100
++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c	2021-04-19 14:55:25.286424043 +0200
-@@ -307,6 +307,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
+@@ -297,6 +297,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s
  		close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
  	pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
  
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
  	authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
  	memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
  	ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
-@@ -405,6 +407,8 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *p
+@@ -408,6 +410,8 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh,
  	close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
  	pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
  
@@ -58,16 +58,16 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
  	monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
  	ssh_signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
  	ssh_signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
-@@ -472,7 +476,7 @@ monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonito
+@@ -480,7 +484,7 @@ monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonito
+ 	/* Log it */
  	if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
- 		fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
+ 		fatal_f("invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)", level);
- 		    __func__, level);
+-	sshlogdirect(level, forced, "%s [preauth]", msg);
--	do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
++	sshlogdirect(level, forced, "%s [%s]", msg, pmonitor->m_state);
-+	do_log2(level, "%s [%s]", msg, pmonitor->m_state);
  
  	sshbuf_free(logmsg);
  	free(msg);
-@@ -1719,13 +1723,28 @@ monitor_init(void)
+@@ -1868,13 +1872,28 @@ monitor_init(void)
  	mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
  	monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
  
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
 +		xasprintf(&dev_log_path, "%s/dev/log", chroot_dir);
 +
 +		if (stat(dev_log_path, &dev_log_stat) != 0) {
-+			debug("%s: /dev/log doesn't exist in %s chroot - will try to log via monitor using [postauth] suffix", __func__, chroot_dir);
++			debug_f("/dev/log doesn't exist in %s chroot - will try to log via monitor using [postauth] suffix", chroot_dir);
 +			do_logfds = 1;
 +		}
 +		free(dev_log_path);
@@ -98,10 +98,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
  }
  
  #ifdef GSSAPI
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.527843305 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h	2016-12-23 15:16:28.372190424 +0100
++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
-@@ -83,10 +83,11 @@ struct monitor {
+@@ -80,10 +80,11 @@ struct monitor {
  	int			 m_log_sendfd;
  	struct kex		**m_pkex;
  	pid_t			 m_pid;
@@ -114,9 +114,9 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h
  
  struct Authctxt;
  void monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *, struct monitor *);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.319168086 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.534843358 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 15:18:18.742211853 +0100
++++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
 @@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ login_cap_t *lc;
  
  static int is_child = 0;
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  
  /* File containing userauth info, if ExposeAuthInfo set */
  static char *auth_info_file = NULL;
-@@ -619,6 +620,7 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+@@ -661,6 +662,7 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, con
  	int ret;
  	const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL;
  	char session_type[1024];
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  
  	if (options.adm_forced_command) {
  		original_command = command;
-@@ -676,6 +678,10 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+@@ -720,6 +722,10 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, con
  			tty += 5;
  	}
  
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  	verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
  	    session_type,
  	    tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
-@@ -1486,14 +1492,6 @@ child_close_fds(void)
+@@ -1524,14 +1530,6 @@ child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh)
  
  	/* Stop directing logs to a high-numbered fd before we close it */
  	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  }
  
  /*
-@@ -1629,8 +1627,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+@@ -1665,8 +1663,6 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
  			exit(1);
  	}
  
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  	do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell);
  
  	/* restore SIGPIPE for child */
-@@ -1653,9 +1649,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+@@ -1691,9 +1687,17 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
  		argv[i] = NULL;
  		optind = optreset = 1;
  		__progname = argv[0];
@@ -187,9 +187,9 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  	fflush(NULL);
  
  	/* Get the last component of the shell name. */
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h	2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
 @@ -97,5 +97,5 @@
  
  struct passwd;
@@ -197,10 +197,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h
 -int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *);
 +int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *, int);
  void	sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
-@@ -1497,7 +1497,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
+@@ -1644,7 +1644,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
  }
  
  int
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c
  {
  	fd_set *rset, *wset;
  	int i, r, in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
-@@ -1511,7 +1511,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+@@ -1657,7 +1657,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
  	extern char *__progname;
  
  	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c
  
  	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
  
-@@ -1582,7 +1582,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+@@ -1730,7 +1730,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
  		}
  	}
  
@@ -227,20 +227,20 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c
  
  	/*
  	 * On platforms where we can, avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps}
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
-@@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+@@ -50,5 +50,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
  		return 1;
  	}
  
 -	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
 +	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw, 0));
  }
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.328168088 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.543843426 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.332168088 +0100
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
-@@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
  	}
  
  	/* New socket pair */
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
  
  	pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
  	if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
-@@ -668,6 +668,11 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+@@ -578,6 +578,11 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
  
  	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
  	pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;

openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch

@@ -34,19 +34,19 @@ index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
 +
 +	contexts_path = selinux_openssh_contexts_path();
 +	if (contexts_path == NULL) {
-+		debug3("%s: Failed to get the path to SELinux context", __func__);
++		debug3_f("Failed to get the path to SELinux context");
 +		return;
 +	}
 +
 +	if ((contexts_file = fopen(contexts_path, "r")) == NULL) {
-+		debug("%s: Failed to open SELinux context file", __func__);
++		debug_f("Failed to open SELinux context file");
 +		return;
 +	}
 +
 +	if (fstat(fileno(contexts_file), &sb) != 0 ||
 +	    sb.st_uid != 0 || (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
-+		logit("%s: SELinux context file needs to be owned by root"
++		logit_f("SELinux context file needs to be owned by root"
-+		    " and not writable by anyone else", __func__);
++		    " and not writable by anyone else");
 +		fclose(contexts_file);
 +		return;
 +	}
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
 +		if (arg && strcmp(arg, "privsep_preauth") == 0) {
 +			arg = strdelim(&cp);
 +			if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
-+				debug("%s: privsep_preauth is empty", __func__);
++				debug_f("privsep_preauth is empty");
 +				fclose(contexts_file);
 +				return;
 +			}
@@ -80,8 +80,8 @@ index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
 +	fclose(contexts_file);
 +
 +	if (preauth_context == NULL) {
-+		debug("%s: Unable to find 'privsep_preauth' option in"
++		debug_f("Unable to find 'privsep_preauth' option in"
-+		    " SELinux context file", __func__);
++		    " SELinux context file");
 +		return;
 +	}
 +
@@ -101,10 +101,11 @@ index 22ea8ef..1fc963d 100644
  	if ((cx = index(cx + 1, ':')))
  		strlcat(newctx, cx, newlen);
 -	debug3("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
-+	debug("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
++	debug_f("setting context from '%s' to '%s'",
  	    oldctx, newctx);
  	if (setcon(newctx) < 0)
- 		switchlog("%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s", __func__,
+ 		do_log2(log_level, "%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s",
+		    __func__, newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno));
 diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
 index cb51f99..8b7cda2 100644
 --- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h

openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch

@@ -39,8 +39,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  		options->password_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
 @@ -418,7 +421,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes,
+ 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms,
- 	sHostKeyAlgorithms,
+ 	sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
  	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
 -	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
 +	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,

openssh-6.6p1-ctr-cavstest.patch

@@ -1,257 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in
---- openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs	2015-03-18 11:22:05.493289018 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in	2015-03-18 11:22:44.504196316 +0100
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
- SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
- SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
- SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
-+CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest
- SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
- SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
- PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
-@@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
- 
- .SUFFIXES: .lo
- 
--TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
- 
- XMSS_OBJS=\
- 	ssh-xmss.o \
-@@ -194,6 +195,9 @@ ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) l
- ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS)
- 
-+ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
-+
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
- 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
- 
-@@ -326,6 +330,7 @@ install-files:
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
-+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
-diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c
---- openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs	2015-03-18 11:22:05.521288952 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c	2015-03-18 11:22:05.521288952 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
-+/*
-+ *
-+ * invocation (all of the following are equal):
-+ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6
-+ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 --iv 00000000000000000000000000000000
-+ * echo -n a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 | ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <sys/param.h>
-+#include <stdarg.h>
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <ctype.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "ssherr.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+
-+/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
-+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-+
-+void usage(void) {
-+        fprintf(stderr, "Usage: ctr-cavstest --algo <ssh-crypto-algorithm>\n"
-+                        "                    --key <hexadecimal-key> --mode <encrypt|decrypt>\n"
-+                        "                    [--iv <hexadecimal-iv>] --data <hexadecimal-data>\n\n"
-+                        "Hexadecimal output is printed to stdout.\n"
-+                        "Hexadecimal input data can be alternatively read from stdin.\n");
-+        exit(1);
-+}
-+
-+void *fromhex(char *hex, size_t *len)
-+{
-+        unsigned char *bin;
-+        char *p;
-+        size_t n = 0;
-+        int shift = 4;
-+        unsigned char out = 0;
-+        unsigned char *optr;
-+
-+        bin = xmalloc(strlen(hex)/2);
-+        optr = bin;
-+
-+        for (p = hex; *p != '\0'; ++p) {
-+                unsigned char c;
-+
-+                c = *p;
-+                if (isspace(c))
-+                        continue;
-+
-+                if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
-+                        c = c - '0';
-+                } else if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') {
-+                        c = c - 'A' + 10;
-+                } else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') {
-+                        c = c - 'a' + 10;
-+                } else {
-+                        /* truncate on nonhex cipher */
-+                        break;
-+                }
-+
-+                out |= c << shift;
-+                shift = (shift + 4) % 8;
-+
-+                if (shift) {
-+                        *(optr++) = out;
-+                        out = 0;
-+                        ++n;
-+                }
-+        }
-+
-+        *len = n;
-+        return bin;
-+}
-+
-+#define READ_CHUNK 4096
-+#define MAX_READ_SIZE 1024*1024*100
-+char *read_stdin(void)
-+{
-+        char *buf;
-+        size_t n, total = 0;
-+
-+        buf = xmalloc(READ_CHUNK);
-+
-+        do {
-+                n = fread(buf + total, 1, READ_CHUNK, stdin);
-+                if (n < READ_CHUNK) /* terminate on short read */
-+                        break;
-+
-+                total += n;
-+                buf = xreallocarray(buf, total + READ_CHUNK, 1);
-+        } while(total < MAX_READ_SIZE);
-+        return buf;
-+}
-+
-+int main (int argc, char *argv[])
-+{
-+
-+        const struct sshcipher *c;
-+        struct sshcipher_ctx *cc;
-+        char *algo = "aes128-ctr";
-+        char *hexkey = NULL;
-+        char *hexiv = "00000000000000000000000000000000";
-+        char *hexdata = NULL;
-+        char *p;
-+        int i, r;
-+        int encrypt = 1;
-+        void *key;
-+        size_t keylen;
-+        void *iv;
-+        size_t ivlen;
-+        void *data;
-+        size_t datalen;
-+        void *outdata;
-+
-+        for (i = 1; i < argc; ++i) {
-+                if (strcmp(argv[i], "--algo") == 0) {
-+                        algo = argv[++i];
-+                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--key") == 0) {
-+                        hexkey = argv[++i];
-+                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--mode") == 0) {
-+                        ++i;
-+                        if (argv[i] == NULL) {
-+                                usage();
-+                        }
-+                        if (strncmp(argv[i], "enc", 3) == 0) {
-+                                encrypt = 1;
-+                        } else if (strncmp(argv[i], "dec", 3) == 0) {
-+                                encrypt = 0;
-+                        } else {
-+                                usage();
-+                        }
-+                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--iv") == 0) {
-+                        hexiv = argv[++i];
-+                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--data") == 0) {
-+                        hexdata = argv[++i];
-+                }
-+        }
-+
-+        if (hexkey == NULL || algo == NULL) {
-+                usage();
-+        }
-+
-+	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
-+
-+	c = cipher_by_name(algo);
-+	if (c == NULL) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unknown algorithm\n");
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+        if (hexdata == NULL) {
-+                hexdata = read_stdin();
-+        } else {
-+                hexdata = xstrdup(hexdata);
-+        }
-+
-+        key = fromhex(hexkey, &keylen);
-+
-+	if (keylen != 16 && keylen != 24 && keylen == 32) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported key length\n");
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+        iv = fromhex(hexiv, &ivlen);
-+
-+        if (ivlen != 16) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported iv length\n");
-+		return 2;
-+        }
-+
-+        data = fromhex(hexdata, &datalen);
-+
-+	if (data == NULL || datalen == 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: no data to encrypt/decrypt\n");
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((r = cipher_init(&cc, c, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, encrypt)) != 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: cipher_init failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+	free(key);
-+	free(iv);
-+
-+	outdata = malloc(datalen);
-+	if(outdata == NULL) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: memory allocation failure\n");
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((r = cipher_crypt(cc, 0, outdata, data, datalen, 0, 0)) != 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: cipher_crypt failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+	free(data);
-+
-+	cipher_free(cc);
-+
-+        for (p = outdata; datalen > 0; ++p, --datalen) {
-+		printf("%02X", (unsigned char)*p);
-+	}
-+
-+        free(outdata);
-+
-+        printf("\n");
-+        return 0;
-+}
-+

openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-diff -up openssh/auth.c.keycat openssh/misc.c
+diff -up openssh/misc.c.keycat openssh/misc.c
---- openssh/auth.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.158849606 +0200
+--- openssh/misc.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.158849606 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth.c	2015-06-24 11:04:23.989868638 +0200
++++ openssh/misc.c	2015-06-24 11:04:23.989868638 +0200
-@@ -966,6 +966,14 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
+@@ -966,6 +966,13 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
+ 			error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
  			_exit(1);
  		}
- 
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 +		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
 +			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
@@ -12,10 +12,9 @@ diff -up openssh/auth.c.keycat openssh/misc.c
 +			_exit(127);
 +		}
 +#endif
-+
+ 		if (env != NULL)
- 		execve(av[0], av, child_env);
+ 			execve(av[0], av, env);
- 		error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno));
+ 		else
- 		_exit(127);
 diff -up openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
 --- openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
 +++ openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200

openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch

@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  		options->password_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
 @@ -399,7 +402,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
+ 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
  	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
  	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
 -	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache,

openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-
 --- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
 @@ -419,6 +419,28 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
- 	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+ 	debug3_f("done");
  }
  
 +void
@@ -25,15 +25,15 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-
 +		return;
 +
 +	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
-+		logit("%s: getexeccon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++		logit_f("getexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
 +		return;
 +	}
 +	if (ctx != NULL) {
 +		/* unset exec context before we will lose this capabililty */
 +		if (setexeccon(NULL) != 0)
-+			fatal("%s: setexeccon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++			fatal_f("setexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
 +		if (setcon(ctx) != 0)
-+			fatal("%s: setcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++			fatal_f("setcon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
 +		freecon(ctx);
 +	}
 +}

openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch

@@ -1,3 +1,79 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/addr.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/addr.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/addr.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/addr.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100
+@@ -312,8 +312,10 @@ addr_pton(const char *p, struct xaddr *n
+ 	if (p == NULL || getaddrinfo(p, NULL, &hints, &ai) != 0)
+ 		return -1;
+ 
+-	if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL)
++	if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL) {
++		freeaddrinfo(ai);
+ 		return -1;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (n != NULL && addr_sa_to_xaddr(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
+ 	    n) == -1) {
+@@ -336,12 +338,16 @@ addr_sa_pton(const char *h, const char *
+ 	if (h == NULL || getaddrinfo(h, s, &hints, &ai) != 0)
+ 		return -1;
+ 
+-	if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL)
++	if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL) {
++		freeaddrinfo(ai);
+ 		return -1;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (sa != NULL) {
+-		if (slen < ai->ai_addrlen)
++		if (slen < ai->ai_addrlen) {
++			freeaddrinfo(ai);
+ 			return -1;
++		}
+ 		memcpy(sa, &ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
+ 	}
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.724967756 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100
+@@ -426,6 +426,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx,
+ 		umask(old_umask);
+ 		if (tmpfd == -1) {
+ 			logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
++			free(ccname);
+ 			return oerrno;
+ 		}
+ 
+@@ -433,6 +434,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx,
+ 			oerrno = errno;
+ 			logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+ 			close(tmpfd);
++			free(ccname);
+ 			return oerrno;
+ 		}
+ 		/* make sure the KRB5CCNAME is set for non-standard location */
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100
+@@ -409,8 +409,10 @@ sshauthopt_parse(const char *opts, const
+ 				errstr = "invalid environment string";
+ 				goto fail;
+ 			}
+-			if ((cp = strdup(opt)) == NULL)
++			if ((cp = strdup(opt)) == NULL) {
++				free(opt);
+ 				goto alloc_fail;
++			}
+ 			cp[tmp - opt] = '\0'; /* truncate at '=' */
+ 			if (!valid_env_name(cp)) {
+ 				free(cp);
+@@ -706,6 +708,7 @@ serialise_array(struct sshbuf *m, char *
+ 		return r;
+ 	}
+ 	/* success */
++	sshbuf_free(b);
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.881788686 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c	2016-12-23 16:42:36.244818763 +0100
@@ -16,6 +92,195 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
  			set_nonblock(efd);
  	}
  }
+@@ -1875,7 +1875,7 @@ channel_post_connecting(struct ssh *ssh,
+ 		debug("channel %d: connection failed: %s",
+ 		    c->self, strerror(err));
+ 		/* Try next address, if any */
+-		if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) > 0) {
++		if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) >= 0) {
+ 			close(c->sock);
+ 			c->sock = c->rfd = c->wfd = sock;
+ 			channel_find_maxfd(ssh->chanctxt);
+@@ -3804,7 +3804,7 @@ int
+ channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd)
+ {
+ 	int r, success = 0, idx = -1;
+-	char *host_to_connect, *listen_host, *listen_path;
++	char *host_to_connect = NULL, *listen_host = NULL, *listen_path = NULL;
+ 	int port_to_connect, listen_port;
+ 
+ 	/* Send the forward request to the remote side. */
+@@ -3832,7 +3832,6 @@ channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct
+ 	success = 1;
+ 	if (success) {
+ 		/* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */
+-		host_to_connect = listen_host = listen_path = NULL;
+ 		port_to_connect = listen_port = 0;
+ 		if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) {
+ 			host_to_connect = xstrdup(fwd->connect_path);
+@@ -3853,6 +3852,9 @@ channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct
+ 		    host_to_connect, port_to_connect,
+ 		    listen_host, listen_path, listen_port, NULL);
+ 	}
++	free(host_to_connect);
++	free(listen_host);
++	free(listen_path);
+ 	return idx;
+ }
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/compat.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/compat.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/compat.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.768968062 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/compat.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100
+@@ -191,10 +191,12 @@ compat_kex_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, cha
+ 		return p;
+ 	debug2_f("original KEX proposal: %s", p);
+ 	if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0)
++		/* coverity[overwrite_var : FALSE] */
+ 		if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p,
+ 		    "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org")) == NULL)
+ 			fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
+ 	if ((ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) != 0) {
++		/* coverity[overwrite_var : FALSE] */
+ 		if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p,
+ 		    "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,"
+ 		    "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1")) == NULL)
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/dns.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/dns.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/dns.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/dns.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100
+@@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname
+ 			    &hostkey_digest_len, hostkey)) {
+ 				error("Error calculating key fingerprint.");
+ 				freerrset(fingerprints);
++				free(dnskey_digest);
+ 				return -1;
+ 			}
+ 		}
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity	2021-03-26 11:52:46.613942552 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c	2021-03-26 11:54:37.881726318 +0100
+@@ -167,8 +167,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup
+ 			enclen = __b64_ntop(digest,
+ 			    ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5), encoded,
+ 			    ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5) * 2);
+-
++#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wstringop-overflow"
+ 			cp = strncpy(s, kex, strlen(kex));
++#pragma pop
+ 			for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
+ 				(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+ 				if (sshbuf_len(buf) != 0 &&
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/kexgssc.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/kexgssc.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/kexgssc.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.711967665 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/kexgssc.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100
+@@ -98,8 +98,10 @@ kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	default:
+ 		fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
+ 	}
+-	if (r != 0)
++	if (r != 0) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
+ 		return r;
++	}
+ 
+ 	token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/krl.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/krl.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/krl.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/krl.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100
+@@ -1209,6 +1209,7 @@ ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, st
+ 	sshkey_free(key);
+ 	sshbuf_free(copy);
+ 	sshbuf_free(sect);
++	/* coverity[leaked_storage : FALSE] */
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1261,6 +1262,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons
+ 		return r;
+ 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb);
+ 	free(rb.blob);
++	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
+ 	if (erb != NULL) {
+ 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA1"));
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+@@ -1271,6 +1273,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons
+ 		return r;
+ 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, &rb);
+ 	free(rb.blob);
++	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
+ 	if (erb != NULL) {
+ 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA256"));
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+@@ -1282,6 +1285,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons
+ 		return r;
+ 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb);
+ 	free(rb.blob);
++	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
+ 	if (erb != NULL) {
+ 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by explicit key"));
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c.coverity	2021-03-24 13:18:53.793225885 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c	2021-03-24 13:21:27.948404751 +0100
+@@ -690,9 +690,11 @@ construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li,
+ 	 */
+ 
+ 	/* Use strncpy because we don't necessarily want null termination */
++	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
+ 	strncpy(ut->ut_name, li->username,
+ 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_name, li->username));
+ # ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
++	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
+ 	strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname,
+ 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname));
+ # endif
+@@ -1690,6 +1692,7 @@ record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, con
+ 
+ 	memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(ut));
+ 	/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
++	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
+ 	strncpy(ut.ut_user, username, sizeof(ut.ut_user));
+ 	strlcpy(ut.ut_line, "ssh:notty", sizeof(ut.ut_line));
+ 
+@@ -1699,6 +1702,7 @@ record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, con
+ 	ut.ut_pid = getpid();
+ 
+ 	/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
++	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
+ 	strncpy(ut.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(ut.ut_host));
+ 
+ 	if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) &&
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/misc.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.745967902 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/misc.c	2021-03-24 13:31:47.037079617 +0100
+@@ -1425,6 +1425,8 @@ sanitise_stdfd(void)
+ 	}
+ 	if (nullfd > STDERR_FILENO)
+ 		close(nullfd);
++	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
++	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
+ }
+ 
+ char *
+@@ -2511,6 +2513,7 @@ stdfd_devnull(int do_stdin, int do_stdou
+ 	}
+ 	if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
+ 		close(devnull);
++	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.784968173 +0100
+@@ -476,6 +476,7 @@ write_checkpoint(char *cpfile, u_int32_t
+ 	else
+ 		logit("failed to write to checkpoint file '%s': %s", cpfile,
+ 		    strerror(errno));
++	/* coverity[leaked_storage : FALSE] */
+ }
+ 
+ static unsigned long
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.888788688 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
@@ -28,13 +293,22 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
  		;
  
  	if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
+@@ -1678,7 +1678,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock,
+ 	s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
+ 
+ 	debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ttyfd);
+-
++	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE] */
+ 	return (0);
+ 
+  error:
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.892788689 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
 @@ -525,10 +525,10 @@ mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd,
  	if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
  	    (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
- 		error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__);
+ 		error_f("cannot allocate fds for pty");
 -		if (tmp1 > 0)
 +		if (tmp1 >= 0)
  			close(tmp1);
@@ -57,6 +331,17 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/open
  	int i;
  
  	if (sa == NULL) {
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.778968131 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.785968180 +0100
+@@ -1847,6 +1847,7 @@ parse_pubkey_algos:
+ 			} else if (r != 0) {
+ 				error("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.",
+ 				    filename, linenum, arg2);
++				free(arg2);
+ 				return -1;
+ 			}
+ 			free(arg2);
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/scp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/scp.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/scp.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.856788681 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/scp.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
@@ -120,11 +405,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c
 -		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
 +	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
 +		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
- 			debug2("%s: reading", __func__);
+ 			debug2_f("reading");
  }
  
 @@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ server_request_tun(void)
- 		debug("%s: invalid tun", __func__);
+ 		debug_f("invalid tun");
  		goto done;
  	}
 -	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) {
@@ -132,6 +417,24 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c
  		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY &&
  		    auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun)
  			goto done;
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/session.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/session.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/session.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.777968124 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/session.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.786968187 +0100
+@@ -1223,12 +1223,14 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
+ 	/* Environment specified by admin */
+ 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) {
+ 		cp = xstrdup(options.setenv[i]);
++		/* coverity[overwrite_var : FALSE] */
+ 		if ((value = strchr(cp, '=')) == NULL) {
+ 			/* shouldn't happen; vars are checked in servconf.c */
+ 			fatal("Invalid config SetEnv: %s", options.setenv[i]);
+ 		}
+ 		*value++ = '\0';
+ 		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, cp, value);
++		free(cp);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
@@ -144,9 +447,45 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c
  	}
  
  	_exit(1);
+@@ -762,6 +762,8 @@ process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
+ 			    fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
+ 				err = -1;
+ 		}
++		free(abs_dst);
++		abs_dst = NULL;
+ 	}
+ 
+ out:
+@@ -985,6 +987,7 @@ do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, co
+ 		if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) {
+ 			if (g.gl_statv[i] == NULL) {
+ 				error("no stat information for %s", fname);
++				free(fname);
+ 				continue;
+ 			}
+ 			lname = ls_file(fname, g.gl_statv[i], 1,
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.786968187 +0100
+@@ -1256,6 +1256,7 @@ sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, s
+ 		freezero(rks[i], sizeof(*rks[i]));
+ 	}
+ 	free(rks);
++	free(device);
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
+@@ -869,6 +869,7 @@ sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *pro
+ 
+ 		if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider, uri) != 0) {
+ 			error("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI");
++			pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
+ 			return NULL;
+ 		}
+ 		/* validate also provider from URI */
 @@ -1220,8 +1220,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  	sanitise_stdfd();
  
@@ -158,6 +497,17 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
  
  	platform_disable_tracing(0);	/* strict=no */
  
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.779968138 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.786968187 +0100
+@@ -1746,6 +1746,7 @@ control_persist_detach(void)
+ 		close(muxserver_sock);
+ 		muxserver_sock = -1;
+ 		options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO;
++		/* coverity[leaked_handle: FALSE]*/
+ 		muxclient(options.control_path);
+ 		/* muxclient() doesn't return on success. */
+ 		fatal("Failed to connect to new control master");
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.897788690 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.904788692 +0100
@@ -183,3 +533,67 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
  }
  
  /*
+@@ -2474,7 +2479,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
+ 		ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit,
+ 		    options.rekey_interval);
+-
++	/* coverity[leaked_storage : FALSE]*/
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
+ 	    ssh, list_hostkey_types());
+ 
+@@ -2519,8 +2524,11 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 
+ 	if (newstr)
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
+-	else
++	else {
+ 		fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
++		free(gss);
++	     }
++	     /* coverity[leaked_storage: FALSE]*/
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.780968145 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.787968194 +0100
+@@ -2332,6 +2332,9 @@ update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw,
+ 			r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen);
+ 			if (r != 0)
+ 				fatal_fr(r, "revoke key failed");
++			freezero(blob, blen);
++			blob = NULL;
++			blen = 0;
+ 		} else {
+ 			if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) {
+ 				cp += 4;
+@@ -2879,6 +2882,7 @@ do_moduli_screen(const char *out_file, c
+ 		} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "start-line=", 11) == 0) {
+ 			start_lineno = strtoul(opts[i]+11, NULL, 10);
+ 		} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "checkpoint=", 11) == 0) {
++			free(checkpoint);
+ 			checkpoint = xstrdup(opts[i]+11);
+ 		} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "generator=", 10) == 0) {
+ 			generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum(
+@@ -2920,6 +2924,9 @@ do_moduli_screen(const char *out_file, c
+ #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ 	fatal("Moduli screening is not supported");
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
++	free(checkpoint);
++	if (in != stdin)
++		fclose(in);
+ }
+ 
+ static char *
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.787968194 +0100
+@@ -515,6 +515,7 @@ hash_file(int fd, const char *hashalg, s
+ 			oerrno = errno;
+ 			error_f("read: %s", strerror(errno));
+ 			ssh_digest_free(ctx);
++			ctx = NULL;
+ 			errno = oerrno;
+ 			r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ 			goto out;

openssh-6.7p1-kdf-cavs.patch

@@ -1,618 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in
---- openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.kdf-cavs	2015-03-18 11:23:46.346049359 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in	2015-03-18 11:24:20.395968445 +0100
-@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-h
- SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
- SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
- CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest
-+SSH_CAVS=$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs
- SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
- SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
- PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
-@@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
- 
- .SUFFIXES: .lo
- 
--TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT)
- 
- XMSS_OBJS=\
- 	ssh-xmss.o \
-@@ -198,6 +199,9 @@ ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHD
- ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
- 
-+ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-cavs.o $(SKOBJS)
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-cavs.o $(SKOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-+
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
- 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
- 
-@@ -331,6 +335,8 @@ install-files:
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
-+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT)
-+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-cavs_driver.pl $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs_driver.pl
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
-diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c
---- openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c.kdf-cavs	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
-+ *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
-+ *    products derived from this software without specific prior
-+ *    written permission.
-+ *
-+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
-+ * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2
-+ * are required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
-+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
-+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
-+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
-+ * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
-+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
-+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
-+ * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
-+ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
-+ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
-+ * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
-+ * DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <errno.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+#include "kex.h"
-+#include "packet.h"
-+#include "digest.h"
-+
-+static int bin_char(unsigned char hex)
-+{
-+	if (48 <= hex && 57 >= hex)
-+		return (hex - 48);
-+	if (65 <= hex && 70 >= hex)
-+		return (hex - 55);
-+	if (97 <= hex && 102 >= hex)
-+		return (hex - 87);
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Convert hex representation into binary string
-+ * @hex input buffer with hex representation
-+ * @hexlen length of hex
-+ * @bin output buffer with binary data
-+ * @binlen length of already allocated bin buffer (should be at least
-+ *	   half of hexlen -- if not, only a fraction of hexlen is converted)
-+ */
-+static void hex2bin(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
-+		    unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen)
-+{
-+	size_t i = 0;
-+	size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
-+
-+	for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
-+		bin[i] = bin_char(hex[(i*2)]) << 4;
-+		bin[i] |= bin_char(hex[((i*2)+1)]);
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Allocate sufficient space for binary representation of hex
-+ * and convert hex into bin
-+ *
-+ * Caller must free bin
-+ * @hex input buffer with hex representation
-+ * @hexlen length of hex
-+ * @bin return value holding the pointer to the newly allocated buffer
-+ * @binlen return value holding the allocated size of bin
-+ *
-+ * return: 0 on success, !0 otherwise
-+ */
-+static int hex2bin_alloc(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
-+			 unsigned char **bin, size_t *binlen)
-+{
-+	unsigned char *out = NULL;
-+	size_t outlen = 0;
-+
-+	if (!hexlen)
-+		return -EINVAL;
-+
-+	outlen = (hexlen + 1) / 2;
-+
-+	out = calloc(1, outlen);
-+	if (!out)
-+		return -errno;
-+
-+	hex2bin(hex, hexlen, out, outlen);
-+	*bin = out;
-+	*binlen = outlen;
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static char hex_char_map_l[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
-+				 '8', '9', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f' };
-+static char hex_char_map_u[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
-+				 '8', '9', 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F' };
-+static char hex_char(unsigned int bin, int u)
-+{
-+	if (bin < sizeof(hex_char_map_l))
-+		return (u) ? hex_char_map_u[bin] : hex_char_map_l[bin];
-+	return 'X';
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Convert binary string into hex representation
-+ * @bin input buffer with binary data
-+ * @binlen length of bin
-+ * @hex output buffer to store hex data
-+ * @hexlen length of already allocated hex buffer (should be at least
-+ *	   twice binlen -- if not, only a fraction of binlen is converted)
-+ * @u case of hex characters (0=>lower case, 1=>upper case)
-+ */
-+static void bin2hex(const unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen,
-+		    char *hex, size_t hexlen, int u)
-+{
-+	size_t i = 0;
-+	size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
-+
-+	for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
-+		hex[(i*2)] = hex_char((bin[i] >> 4), u);
-+		hex[((i*2)+1)] = hex_char((bin[i] & 0x0f), u);
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+struct kdf_cavs {
-+	unsigned char *K;
-+	size_t Klen;
-+	unsigned char *H;
-+	size_t Hlen;
-+	unsigned char *session_id;
-+	size_t session_id_len;
-+
-+	unsigned int iv_len;
-+	unsigned int ek_len;
-+	unsigned int ik_len;
-+};
-+
-+static int sshkdf_cavs(struct kdf_cavs *test)
-+{
-+	int ret = 0;
-+	struct kex kex;
-+	struct sshbuf *Kb = NULL;
-+	BIGNUM *Kbn = NULL;
-+	int mode = 0;
-+	struct newkeys *ctoskeys;
-+	struct newkeys *stockeys;
-+	struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
-+
-+#define HEXOUTLEN 500
-+	char hex[HEXOUTLEN];
-+
-+	memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(struct kex));
-+
-+	Kbn = BN_new();
-+	BN_bin2bn(test->K, test->Klen, Kbn);
-+	if (!Kbn) {
-+		printf("cannot convert K into bignum\n");
-+		ret = 1;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	Kb = sshbuf_new();
-+	if (!Kb) {
-+		printf("cannot convert K into sshbuf\n");
-+		ret = 1;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	sshbuf_put_bignum2(Kb, Kbn);
-+
-+	kex.session_id = test->session_id;
-+	kex.session_id_len = test->session_id_len;
-+
-+	/* setup kex */
-+
-+	/* select the right hash based on struct ssh_digest digests */
-+	switch (test->ik_len) {
-+		case 20:
-+			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
-+			break;
-+		case 32:
-+			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA256;
-+			break;
-+		case 48:
-+			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA384;
-+			break;
-+		case 64:
-+			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA512;
-+			break;
-+		default:
-+			printf("Wrong hash type %u\n", test->ik_len);
-+			ret = 1;
-+			goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* implement choose_enc */
-+	for (mode = 0; mode < 2; mode++) {
-+		kex.newkeys[mode] = calloc(1, sizeof(struct newkeys));
-+		if (!kex.newkeys[mode]) {
-+			printf("allocation of newkeys failed\n");
-+			ret = 1;
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.iv_len = test->iv_len;
-+		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.key_len = test->ek_len;
-+		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.block_size = (test->iv_len == 64) ? 8 : 16;
-+		kex.newkeys[mode]->mac.key_len = test->ik_len;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* implement kex_choose_conf */
-+	kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.key_len;
-+	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size)
-+		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size;
-+	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len)
-+		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len;
-+	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len)
-+		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len;
-+
-+	/* MODE_OUT (1) -> server to client
-+	 * MODE_IN (0) -> client to server */
-+	kex.server = 1;
-+
-+	/* do it */
-+	if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, -1, -1)) == NULL){
-+		printf("Allocation error\n");
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	ssh->kex = &kex;
-+	kex_derive_keys(ssh, test->H, test->Hlen, Kb);
-+
-+	ctoskeys = kex.newkeys[0];
-+	stockeys = kex.newkeys[1];
-+
-+	/* get data */
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(ctoskeys->enc.iv, (size_t)ctoskeys->enc.iv_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Initial IV (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(stockeys->enc.iv, (size_t)stockeys->enc.iv_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Initial IV (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
-+
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(ctoskeys->enc.key, (size_t)ctoskeys->enc.key_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Encryption key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(stockeys->enc.key, (size_t)stockeys->enc.key_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Encryption key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
-+
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(ctoskeys->mac.key, (size_t)ctoskeys->mac.key_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Integrity key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(stockeys->mac.key, (size_t)stockeys->mac.key_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Integrity key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
-+
-+out:
-+	if (Kbn)
-+		BN_free(Kbn);
-+	if (Kb)
-+		sshbuf_free(Kb);
-+	if (ssh)
-+		ssh_packet_close(ssh);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+static void usage(void)
-+{
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\nOpenSSH KDF CAVS Test\n\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "Usage:\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-K\tShared secret string\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-H\tHash string\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-s\tSession ID string\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-i\tIV length to be generated\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-e\tEncryption key length to be generated\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-m\tMAC key length to be generated\n");
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Test command example:
-+ * ./ssh-cavs -K 0055d50f2d163cc07cd8a93cc7c3430c30ce786b572c01ad29fec7597000cf8618d664e2ec3dcbc8bb7a1a7eb7ef67f61cdaf291625da879186ac0a5cb27af571b59612d6a6e0627344d846271959fda61c78354aa498773d59762f8ca2d0215ec590d8633de921f920d41e47b3de6ab9a3d0869e1c826d0e4adebf8e3fb646a15dea20a410b44e969f4b791ed6a67f13f1b74234004d5fa5e87eff7abc32d49bbdf44d7b0107e8f10609233b7e2b7eff74a4daf25641de7553975dac6ac1e5117df6f6dbaa1c263d23a6c3e5a3d7d49ae8a828c1e333ac3f85fbbf57b5c1a45be45e43a7be1a4707eac779b8285522d1f531fe23f890fd38a004339932b93eda4 -H d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -s d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -i 8 -e 24 -m 20
-+ *
-+ * Initial IV (client to server) = 4bb320d1679dfd3a
-+ * Initial IV (server to client) = 43dea6fdf263a308
-+ * Encryption key (client to server) = 13048cc600b9d3cf9095aa6cf8e2ff9cf1c54ca0520c89ed
-+ * Encryption key (server to client) = 1e483c5134e901aa11fc4e0a524e7ec7b75556148a222bb0
-+ * Integrity key (client to server) = ecef63a092b0dcc585bdc757e01b2740af57d640
-+ * Integrity key (server to client) = 7424b05f3c44a72b4ebd281fb71f9cbe7b64d479
-+ */
-+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
-+{
-+	struct kdf_cavs test;
-+	int ret = 1;
-+	int opt = 0;
-+
-+	memset(&test, 0, sizeof(struct kdf_cavs));
-+	while((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "K:H:s:i:e:m:")) != -1)
-+	{
-+		size_t len = 0;
-+		switch(opt)
-+		{
-+			/*
-+			 * CAVS K is MPINT
-+			 * we want a hex (i.e. the caller must ensure the
-+			 * following transformations already happened):
-+			 * 	1. cut off first four bytes
-+			 * 	2. if most significant bit of value is
-+			 *	   1, prepend 0 byte
-+			 */
-+			case 'K':
-+				len = strlen(optarg);
-+				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
-+						    &test.K, &test.Klen);
-+				if (ret)
-+					goto out;
-+				break;
-+			case 'H':
-+				len = strlen(optarg);
-+				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
-+						    &test.H, &test.Hlen);
-+				if (ret)
-+					goto out;
-+				break;
-+			case 's':
-+				len = strlen(optarg);
-+				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
-+						    &test.session_id,
-+						    &test.session_id_len);
-+				if (ret)
-+					goto out;
-+				break;
-+			case 'i':
-+				test.iv_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
-+				break;
-+			case 'e':
-+				test.ek_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
-+				break;
-+			case 'm':
-+				test.ik_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
-+				break;
-+			default:
-+				usage();
-+				goto out;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	ret = sshkdf_cavs(&test);
-+
-+out:
-+	if (test.session_id)
-+		free(test.session_id);
-+	if (test.K)
-+		free(test.K);
-+	if (test.H)
-+		free(test.H);
-+	return ret;
-+
-+}
-diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl
---- openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl.kdf-cavs	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
-+#!/usr/bin/env perl
-+#
-+# CAVS test driver for OpenSSH
-+#
-+# Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
-+#
-+# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
-+# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
-+# in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
-+# to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
-+# copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
-+# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
-+#
-+# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
-+# all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
-+#
-+#                            NO WARRANTY
-+#
-+#    BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO WARRANTY
-+#    FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW.  EXCEPT WHEN
-+#    OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES
-+#    PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED
-+#    OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
-+#    MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  THE ENTIRE RISK AS
-+#    TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU.  SHOULD THE
-+#    PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING,
-+#    REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
-+#
-+#    IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING
-+#    WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MAY MODIFY AND/OR
-+#    REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES,
-+#    INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING
-+#    OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED
-+#    TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY
-+#    YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER
-+#    PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE
-+#    POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
-+#
-+use strict;
-+use warnings;
-+use IPC::Open2;
-+
-+# Executing a program by feeding STDIN and retrieving
-+# STDOUT
-+# $1: data string to be piped to the app on STDIN
-+# rest: program and args
-+# returns: STDOUT of program as string
-+sub pipe_through_program($@) {
-+	my $in = shift;
-+	my @args = @_;
-+
-+	my ($CO, $CI);
-+	my $pid = open2($CO, $CI, @args);
-+
-+	my $out = "";
-+	my $len = length($in);
-+	my $first = 1;
-+	while (1) {
-+		my $rin = "";
-+		my $win = "";
-+		# Output of prog is FD that we read
-+		vec($rin,fileno($CO),1) = 1;
-+		# Input of prog is FD that we write
-+		# check for $first is needed because we can have NULL input
-+		# that is to be written to the app
-+		if ( $len > 0 || $first) {
-+			(vec($win,fileno($CI),1) = 1);
-+			$first=0;
-+		}
-+		# Let us wait for 100ms
-+		my $nfound = select(my $rout=$rin, my $wout=$win, undef, 0.1);
-+		if ( $wout ) {
-+			my $written = syswrite($CI, $in, $len);
-+			die "broken pipe" if !defined $written;
-+			$len -= $written;
-+			substr($in, 0, $written) = "";
-+			if ($len <= 0) {
-+				close $CI or die "broken pipe: $!";
-+			}
-+		}
-+		if ( $rout ) {
-+			my $tmp_out = "";
-+			my $bytes_read = sysread($CO, $tmp_out, 4096);
-+			$out .= $tmp_out;
-+			last if ($bytes_read == 0);
-+		}
-+	}
-+	close $CO or die "broken pipe: $!";
-+	waitpid $pid, 0;
-+
-+	return $out;
-+}
-+
-+# Parser of CAVS test vector file
-+# $1: Test vector file
-+# $2: Output file for test results
-+# return: nothing
-+sub parse($$) {
-+	my $infile = shift;
-+	my $outfile = shift;
-+
-+	my $out = "";
-+
-+	my $K = "";
-+	my $H = "";
-+	my $session_id = "";
-+	my $ivlen = 0;
-+	my $eklen = "";
-+	my $iklen = "";
-+
-+	open(IN, "<$infile");
-+	while(<IN>) {
-+
-+		my $line = $_;
-+		chomp($line);
-+		$line =~ s/\r//;
-+
-+		if ($line =~ /\[SHA-1\]/) {
-+			$iklen = 20;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-256\]/) {
-+			$iklen = 32;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-384\]/) {
-+			$iklen = 48;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-512\]/) {
-+			$iklen = 64;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /^\[IV length\s*=\s*(.*)\]/) {
-+			$ivlen = $1;
-+			$ivlen = $ivlen / 8;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /^\[encryption key length\s*=\s*(.*)\]/) {
-+			$eklen = $1;
-+			$eklen = $eklen / 8;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /^K\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
-+			$K = $1;
-+			$K = substr($K, 8);
-+			$K = "00" . $K;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /^H\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
-+			$H = $1;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /^session_id\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
-+			$session_id = $1;
-+		}
-+		$out .= $line . "\n";
-+
-+		if ($K ne "" && $H ne "" && $session_id ne "" &&
-+		    $ivlen ne "" && $eklen ne "" && $iklen > 0) {
-+			$out .= pipe_through_program("", "./ssh-cavs -H $H -K $K -s $session_id -i $ivlen -e $eklen -m $iklen");
-+
-+			$K = "";
-+			$H = "";
-+			$session_id = "";
-+		}
-+	}
-+	close IN;
-+	$out =~ s/\n/\r\n/g; # make it a dos file
-+	open(OUT, ">$outfile") or die "Cannot create output file $outfile: $?";
-+	print OUT $out;
-+	close OUT;
-+}
-+
-+############################################################
-+#
-+# let us pretend to be C :-)
-+sub main() {
-+
-+	my $infile=$ARGV[0];
-+	die "Error: Test vector file $infile not found" if (! -f $infile);
-+
-+	my $outfile = $infile;
-+	# let us add .rsp regardless whether we could strip .req
-+	$outfile =~ s/\.req$//;
-+	$outfile .= ".rsp";
-+	if (-f $outfile) {
-+		die "Output file $outfile could not be removed: $?"
-+			unless unlink($outfile);
-+	}
-+	print STDERR "Performing tests from source file $infile with results stored in destination file $outfile\n";
-+
-+	# Do the job
-+	parse($infile, $outfile);
-+}
-+
-+###########################################
-+# Call it
-+main();
-+1;

openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch

@@ -13,33 +13,33 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
 +	struct sshbuf *m;
 +	int r, ret = 0;
 +
-+	debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
++	debug3_f("entering");
 +	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+ 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
++ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +	do {
 +		blen = atomicio(read, fdin, buf, sizeof(buf));
 +		if (blen == 0) /* closed pipe */
 +			break;
 +		if (blen != sizeof(buf)) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to read the buffer from child", __func__);
++			error_f("Failed to read the buffer from child");
 +			ret = -1;
 +			break;
 +		}
 +
 +		msg_len = get_u32(buf);
 +		if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
-+			fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len);
++			fatal_f("read: bad msg_len %d", msg_len);
 +		sshbuf_reset(m);
 +		if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, NULL)) != 0)
-+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++			fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +		if (atomicio(read, fdin, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to read the the buffer content from the child", __func__);
++			error_f("Failed to read the the buffer content from the child");
 +			ret = -1;
 +			break;
 +		}
 +		if (atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, buf, blen) != blen || 
 +		    atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to write the message to the monitor", __func__);
++			error_f("Failed to write the message to the monitor");
 +			ret = -1;
 +			break;
 +		}

openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch

@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644
 +	int ret = 0;
 +
 +	ret = ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb_context, &k5login_directory);
-+	debug3("%s: k5login_directory = %s (rv=%d)", __func__, k5login_directory, ret);
++	debug3_f("k5login_directory = %s (rv=%d)", k5login_directory, ret);
 +	if (k5login_directory == NULL || ret != 0) {
 +		/* If not set, the library will look for  k5login
 +		 * files in the user's home directory, with the filename  .k5login.
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644
 +			k5login_directory[strlen(k5login_directory)-1] != '/' ? "/" : "",
 +			pw->pw_name);
 +	}
-+	debug("%s: Checking existence of file %s", __func__, file);
++	debug_f("Checking existence of file %s", file);
  
 -	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir);
  	return access(file, F_OK) == 0;

openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch

@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
 --- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.188821236 +0200
 +++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
 @@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
+ 
+ /* import */
  extern ServerOptions options;
- extern u_char *session_id2;
- extern u_int session_id2_len;
 +extern int inetd_flag;
 +extern int rexeced_flag;
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
@@ -12,59 +12,59 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
  static char *
  format_key(const struct sshkey *key)
 @@ -511,7 +514,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct ssh *ssh
- 
+ 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command,
- 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", runas_pw, command,
  	    ac, av, &f,
--	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
+ 	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
-+	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
+-	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
++	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
 +	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
  		goto out;
  
  	uid_swapped = 1;
 @@ -981,7 +985,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct ssh *ss
- 
+ 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", command,
- 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", runas_pw, command,
  	    ac, av, &f,
--	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
+	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
-+	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
+-	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
++	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
 +	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
  		goto out;
  
  	uid_swapped = 1;
-diff -up openssh/auth.c.refactor openssh/auth.c
+diff -up openssh/misc.c.refactor openssh/misc.c
---- openssh/auth.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.235821686 +0200
+--- openssh/misc.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.235821686 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
++++ openssh/misc.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
 @@ -756,7 +756,8 @@ auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *
-  */
  pid_t
- subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command,
+ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
--    int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags)
+     int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags,
-+    int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags, int inetd,
+-    struct passwd *pw, privdrop_fn *drop_privs, privrestore_fn *restore_privs)
-+    void *the_authctxt)
++    struct passwd *pw, privdrop_fn *drop_privs,
++    privrestore_fn *restore_privs, int inetd, void *the_authctxt)
  {
  	FILE *f = NULL;
  	struct stat st;
 @@ -872,7 +873,7 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
+ 			_exit(1);
  		}
- 
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 -		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
 +		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(inetd, the_authctxt) < 0) {
  			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
  			    strerror(errno));
  			_exit(127);
-diff -up openssh/auth.h.refactor openssh/auth.h
+diff -up openssh/misc.h.refactor openssh/misc.h
---- openssh/auth.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.251821839 +0200
+--- openssh/misc.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.251821839 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
++++ openssh/misc.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
 @@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ struct passwd *fakepw(void);
- #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE  (1<<1)  /* Redirect stdout */
+ #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH	(1<<3)	/* Don't check for safe cmd */
- #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD  (1<<2)  /* Discard stderr */
+ #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV	(1<<4)	/* Keep parent environment */
- pid_t	subprocess(const char *, struct passwd *,
+ pid_t subprocess(const char *, const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int,
--    const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int flags);
+-    struct passwd *, privdrop_fn *, privrestore_fn *);
-+    const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int flags, int, void *);
++    struct passwd *, privdrop_fn *, privrestore_fn *, int, void *);
- 
- int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
  
+ typedef struct arglist arglist;
+ struct arglist {
 diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
 --- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200
 +++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
  	char *role;
 @@ -342,11 +339,11 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it
  
- 	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+ 	debug3_f("setting execution context");
  
 -	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
 +	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl, the_authctxt);
@@ -203,10 +203,10 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
 +		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(inetd, pam_setenv, authctxt)) {
  			switch (security_getenforce()) {
  			case -1:
- 				fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+ 				fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed");
 @@ -410,7 +411,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
  
- 	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+ 	debug3_f("setting execution context");
  
 -	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
 +	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx, inetd, authctxt);
@@ -269,3 +269,15 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.refactor openssh/sshd.c
  #endif
  #ifdef USE_PAM
  	if (options.use_pam) {
+diff -up openssh/sshconnect.c.refactor openssh/sshconnect.c
+--- openssh/sshconnect.c.refactor	2021-02-24 00:12:03.065325046 +0100
++++ openssh/sshconnect.c	2021-02-24 00:12:12.126449544 +0100
+@@ -892,7 +892,7 @@ load_hostkeys_command(struct hostkeys *h
+ 
+ 	if ((pid = subprocess(tag, command, ac, av, &f,
+ 	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH|
+-	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == 0)
++	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL)) == 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+ 	load_hostkeys_file(hostkeys, hostfile_hostname, tag, f, 1);

openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/cipher-ctr.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/cipher-ctr.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.326525641 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:02.994577324 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/cipher-ctr.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.401526401 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/cipher-ctr.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.064577862 +0200
 @@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ evp_aes_128_ctr(void)
  	aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr;
  #ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/cipher-ctr.c
  #endif
  	return (&aes_ctr);
  }
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/dh.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/dh.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/dh.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/dh.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/dh.c.fips	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/dh.c.fips	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/dh.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.401526401 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/dh.c	2021-04-19 16:58:47.750263410 +0200
-@@ -152,6 +152,12 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max
+@@ -164,6 +164,12 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max
  	int best, bestcount, which, linenum;
  	struct dhgroup dhg;
  
@@ -24,10 +24,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/dh.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/dh.c
 +		return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
 +	}
 +
- 	if ((f = fopen(_PATH_DH_MODULI, "r")) == NULL) {
+ 	if ((f = fopen(get_moduli_filename(), "r")) == NULL) {
  		logit("WARNING: could not open %s (%s), using fixed modulus",
- 		    _PATH_DH_MODULI, strerror(errno));
+ 		    get_moduli_filename(), strerror(errno));
-@@ -489,4 +495,38 @@ dh_estimate(int bits)
+@@ -502,4 +508,38 @@ dh_estimate(int bits)
  	return 8192;
  }
  
@@ -66,21 +66,21 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/dh.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/dh.c
 +}
 +
  #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/dh.h.fips openssh-8.0p1/dh.h
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/dh.h.fips openssh-8.6p1/dh.h
---- openssh-8.0p1/dh.h.fips	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/dh.h.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.064577862 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/dh.h	2019-07-23 14:55:45.401526401 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/dh.h	2021-04-19 16:59:31.951616078 +0200
-@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ DH	*dh_new_group_fallback(int);
+@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ DH	*dh_new_group_fallback(int);
  
  int	 dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
  int	 dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *, const BIGNUM *);
 +int	 dh_is_known_group(const DH *);
  
  u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
- 
+ void	 dh_set_moduli_file(const char *);
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/kex.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/kex.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/kex.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.395526340 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.058577815 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/kex.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.402526411 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/kex.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.065577869 +0200
-@@ -199,7 +199,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+@@ -203,7 +203,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
  	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
  	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
  		if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
@@ -92,9 +92,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/kex.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/kex.c
  			free(s);
  			return 0;
  		}
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/kexgexc.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/kexgexc.c.fips	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c.fips	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/kexgexc.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.402526411 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.065577869 +0200
 @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
  
  #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/kexgexc.c
  #include <sys/types.h>
  
  #include <openssl/dh.h>
-@@ -113,6 +114,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32
+@@ -115,6 +116,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32
  		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
  		goto out;
  	}
@@ -114,10 +114,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/kexgexc.c
  	p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
  
  	/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h
---- openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h.fips	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h.fips	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h	2019-07-23 14:55:45.402526411 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h	2021-04-19 16:53:03.065577869 +0200
-@@ -111,6 +111,20 @@
+@@ -57,6 +57,20 @@
  	"rsa-sha2-256," \
  	"ssh-rsa"
  
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h
  #define	KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
  	"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
  	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
-@@ -134,6 +142,27 @@
+@@ -78,6 +92,27 @@
  
  #define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
  
@@ -165,11 +165,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h
 +
  /* Not a KEX value, but here so all the algorithm defaults are together */
  #define	SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS	\
- 	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
+ 	"ssh-ed25519," \
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.334525723 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:02.999577362 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.402526411 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.065577869 +0200
-@@ -2179,11 +2179,16 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+@@ -2538,11 +2538,16 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
  	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
  	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
  	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
@@ -191,10 +191,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c
  #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
  	do { \
  		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.373526117 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.034577631 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.402526411 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.065577869 +0200
-@@ -137,6 +137,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+@@ -160,6 +160,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
  #ifdef __NR_open
  	SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES),
  #endif
@@ -204,10 +204,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sandbox-secco
  #ifdef __NR_openat
  	SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES),
  #endif
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.361525996 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.027577577 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.403526421 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.066577877 +0200
-@@ -208,11 +208,16 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -226,11 +226,16 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
  	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
  	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
  	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
@@ -229,10 +229,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c
  #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
  	do { \
  		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.378526168 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.038577662 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.403526421 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.066577877 +0200
-@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
+@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@
  #include <openssl/evp.h>
  #include <openssl/err.h>
  #endif
@@ -240,21 +240,21 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c
  #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
  #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
  
-@@ -614,6 +626,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -1516,6 +1517,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		dump_client_config(&options, host);
  		exit(0);
  	}
-+
+ 
 +	if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
 +	}
- 
++
  	/* Expand SecurityKeyProvider if it refers to an environment variable */
  	if (options.sk_provider != NULL && *options.sk_provider == '$' &&
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c
+ 	    strlen(options.sk_provider) > 1) {
---- openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.336525743 +0200
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.403526421 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.055577792 +0200
-@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.066577877 +0200
+@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@
  #include <vis.h>
  #endif
  
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c
  #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
  
  #include "xmalloc.h"
-@@ -198,36 +203,41 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+@@ -269,36 +271,41 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
  
  #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
  	if (options.gss_keyex) {
@@ -279,24 +279,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c
 -			 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
 -			if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
 -				free(gss_host);
--				gss_host = xstrdup(host);
--			}
--		} else {
--			gss_host = xstrdup(host);
--		}
--
--		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
--		    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
--		if (gss) {
--			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
--			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
--			    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
--
--			/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
--			 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
--			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
--			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
--			    "%s,null", orig);
 +		if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
 +			options.gss_keyex = 0;
@@ -316,9 +298,24 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c
 +					gss_host = xstrdup(host);
 +				}
 +			} else {
-+				gss_host = xstrdup(host);
+ 				gss_host = xstrdup(host);
-+			}
+ 			}
-+
+-		} else {
+-			gss_host = xstrdup(host);
+-		}
+ 
+-		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
+-		    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
+-		if (gss) {
+-			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
+-			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+-			    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+-
+-			/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
+-			 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
+-			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
+-			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+-			    "%s,null", orig);
 +			gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
 +			    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
 +			if (gss) {
@@ -335,9 +332,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c
  		}
  	}
  #endif
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.398526371 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.060577831 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.403526421 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 16:57:45.827769340 +0200
 @@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
  #include <grp.h>
  #include <pwd.h>
@@ -354,7 +351,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c
  #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
  #endif
  
-@@ -1529,6 +1532,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -1619,6 +1621,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  #endif
  	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
  
@@ -362,7 +359,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c
  	/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
  	saved_argc = ac;
  	rexec_argc = ac;
-@@ -1992,6 +2007,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -2110,6 +2113,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  	/* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
  	log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
  
@@ -370,10 +367,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c
 +		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
 +	}
 +
- 	/* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
+ 	/*
- 	   unmounted if desired. */
+ 	 * Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
- 	if (chdir("/") == -1)
+ 	 * unmounted if desired.
-@@ -2382,10 +2401,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -2494,10 +2501,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
  	if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
  		orig = NULL;
  
@@ -392,9 +389,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c
  
  	if (gss && orig)
  		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshkey.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/sshkey.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.398526371 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.061577838 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshkey.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.404526431 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.067577885 +0200
 @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
  #include <openssl/evp.h>
  #include <openssl/err.h>
@@ -411,19 +408,19 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshkey.c
  #include "ssh-sk.h"
  
  #ifdef WITH_XMSS
-@@ -1591,6 +1593,8 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA
+@@ -1705,6 +1707,8 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA
  	}
  	if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) ||
  	    !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) {
 +			if (FIPS_mode())
-+				logit("%s: the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method", __func__);
++				logit_f("the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method");
  		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
  		goto out;
  	}
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.391526300 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.038577662 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c	2019-07-23 14:57:54.118830056 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.068577892 +0200
-@@ -199,6 +199,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *na
+@@ -205,6 +205,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *na
  #endif
  	}
  #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
@@ -436,7 +433,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c
  	switch (type) {
  	case KEY_DSA:
  		if (*bitsp != 1024)
-@@ -1029,9 +1035,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
+@@ -1098,9 +1104,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
  			first = 1;
  			printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
  		}

openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,26 @@
-diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth.h
-index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
+--- openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.820744325 +0200
---- a/auth-krb5.c
++++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.h	2021-04-19 14:05:10.853744569 +0200
-+++ b/auth-krb5.c
+@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
+ 	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
+ 	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
+ 	char		*krb5_ccname;
++	int		 krb5_set_env;
+ #endif
+ 	struct sshbuf	*loginmsg;
+ 
+@@ -231,7 +232,7 @@ struct passwd *fakepw(void);
+ int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
+ 
+ #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
+-krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
++krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #endif /* AUTH_H */
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c	2021-04-19 14:40:55.142832954 +0200
 @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
  #include <unistd.h>
  #include <string.h>
@@ -10,7 +29,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
  
  extern ServerOptions	 options;
  
-@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
  #endif
  	krb5_error_code problem;
  	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
@@ -19,24 +38,18 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
  	char *client, *platform_client;
  	const char *errmsg;
  
-@@ -163,7 +164,8 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+@@ -163,8 +164,8 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
  		goto out;
  	}
  
--	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+-	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+-	    &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
 +	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
 +	     &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, &authctxt->krb5_set_env);
  	if (problem)
  		goto out;
  
-@@ -172,21 +174,20 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+@@ -179,15 +180,14 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
- 	if (problem)
- 		goto out;
- 
--	problem= krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache,
-+	problem = krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache,
- 				 &creds);
- 	if (problem)
  		goto out;
  #endif
  
@@ -57,7 +70,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
  		do_pam_putenv("KRB5CCNAME", authctxt->krb5_ccname);
  #endif
  
-@@ -222,11 +223,54 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+@@ -223,11 +223,54 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
  void
  krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
  {
@@ -113,7 +126,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
  	if (authctxt->krb5_user) {
  		krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user);
  		authctxt->krb5_user = NULL;
-@@ -237,36 +281,188 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
+@@ -238,36 +281,188 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
  	}
  }
  
@@ -151,7 +164,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +ssh_krb5_expand_template(char **result, const char *template) {
 +	char *p_n, *p_o, *r, *tmp_template;
 +
-+	debug3("%s: called, template = %s", __func__, template);
++	debug3_f("called, template = %s", template);
 +	if (template == NULL)
 +		return -1;
 +
@@ -179,7 +192,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +		} else {
 +			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
 +			*p_o = '\0';
-+			debug("%s: unsupported token %s in %s", __func__, p_n, template);
++			debug_f("unsupported token %s in %s", p_n, template);
 +			/* unknown token, fallback to the default */
 +			goto cleanup;
 +		}
@@ -198,16 +211,13 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +	return -1;
 +}
 +
- krb5_error_code
++krb5_error_code
--ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
--	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
--	char ccname[40];
 +ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(krb5_context ctx, char **ccname) {
 +	profile_t p;
 +	int ret = 0;
 +	char *value = NULL;
 +
-+	debug3("%s: called", __func__);
++	debug3_f("called");
 +	ret = krb5_get_profile(ctx, &p);
 +	if (ret)
 +		return ret;
@@ -218,11 +228,14 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +
 +	ret = ssh_krb5_expand_template(ccname, value);
 +
-+	debug3("%s: returning with ccname = %s", __func__, *ccname);
++	debug3_f("returning with ccname = %s", *ccname);
 +	return ret;
 +}
 +
-+krb5_error_code
+ krb5_error_code
+-ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+-	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
+-	char ccname[40];
 +ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environment) {
 +	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno, type_len;
 +	char *ccname = NULL;
@@ -242,7 +255,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 -		logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
 -		return oerrno;
 -	}
-+	debug3("%s: called", __func__);
++	debug3_f("called");
 +	if (need_environment)
 +		*need_environment = 0;
 +	ret = ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(ctx, &ccname);
@@ -283,7 +296,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 -	close(tmpfd);
  
 -	return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
-+	debug3("%s: setting default ccname to %s", __func__, ccname);
++	debug3_f("setting default ccname to %s", ccname);
 +	/* set the default with already expanded user IDs */
 +	ret = krb5_cc_set_default_name(ctx, ccname);
 +	if (ret)
@@ -304,13 +317,13 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +	 * a primary cache for this collection, if it supports that (non-FILE)
 +	 */
 +	if (krb5_cc_support_switch(ctx, type)) {
-+		debug3("%s: calling cc_new_unique(%s)", __func__, ccname);
++		debug3_f("calling cc_new_unique(%s)", ccname);
 +		ret = krb5_cc_new_unique(ctx, type, NULL, ccache);
 +		free(type);
 +		if (ret)
 +			return ret;
 +
-+		debug3("%s: calling cc_switch()", __func__);
++		debug3_f("calling cc_switch()");
 +		return krb5_cc_switch(ctx, *ccache);
 +	} else {
 +		/* Otherwise, we can not create a unique ccname here (either
@@ -318,36 +331,47 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +		 * collections
 +		 */
 +		free(type);
-+		debug3("%s: calling cc_resolve(%s)", __func__, ccname);
++		debug3_f("calling cc_resolve(%s)", ccname);
 +		return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
 +	}
  }
  #endif /* !HEIMDAL */
  #endif /* KRB5 */
-diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c
-index 29491df9..fdab5040 100644
+--- openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.844744503 +0200
---- a/auth.h
++++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.854744577 +0200
-+++ b/auth.h
+@@ -413,13 +413,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
-@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
+ }
- 	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
- 	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
- 	char		*krb5_ccname;
-+	int		 krb5_set_env;
- #endif
- 	struct sshbuf	*loginmsg;
  
-@@ -238,7 +239,7 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
+ /* As user */
- int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
+-void
++int
+ ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
+ {
+ 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
+-		(*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
++		return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
+ 	} else
+ 		debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
++
++	return 0;
+ }
  
- #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
+ /* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the child's environment based
--krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
+@@ -499,9 +501,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) {
-+krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
+ 	char *envstr;
  #endif
  
- #endif /* AUTH_H */
+-	if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
+-	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
---- openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name	2019-03-01 15:17:42.708611802 +0100
+-	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2019-03-01 15:17:42.713611844 +0100
++	if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
+ 		return;
+ 
+ 	ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.852744562 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.854744577 +0200
 @@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
  /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
   * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
@@ -450,7 +474,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  		do_pam_putenv(client->store.envvar, client->store.envval);
  #endif
  
-@@ -361,7 +355,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+@@ -364,7 +354,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
  
  	client->store.data = krb_context;
  
@@ -459,43 +483,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  }
  
  int
-diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
-index 6cae720e..16e55cbc 100644
+--- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.848744532 +0200
---- a/gss-serv.c
++++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.854744577 +0200
-+++ b/gss-serv.c
+@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
-@@ -320,13 +320,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- }
- 
- /* As user */
--void
-+int
- ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
- {
- 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
--		(*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
-+		return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
- 	} else
- 		debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
-+
-+	return 0;
- }
- 
- /* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the child's environment based
-@@ -498,9 +500,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() {
- 	char *envstr;
- #endif
- 
--	if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
--	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
--	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
-+	if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
- 		return;
- 
- 	ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name	2019-03-01 15:17:42.704611768 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c	2019-03-01 15:17:42.713611844 +0100
-@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
  	options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1;
  	options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
  	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
@@ -503,7 +494,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
  	options->gss_authentication=-1;
  	options->gss_keyex = -1;
  	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
-@@ -315,6 +316,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+@@ -359,6 +360,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
  		options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1;
  	if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1)
  		options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
@@ -512,8 +503,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
  	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
  		options->gss_authentication = 0;
  	if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
-@@ -447,7 +450,8 @@ typedef enum {
+@@ -506,7 +509,8 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
+ 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
  	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
  	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
 -	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
@@ -522,7 +513,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
  	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
  	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
  	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
-@@ -526,11 +530,13 @@ static struct {
+@@ -593,11 +597,13 @@ static struct {
  #else
  	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  #endif
@@ -536,7 +527,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
  #endif
  	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1437,6 +1443,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+@@ -1573,6 +1579,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
  		intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token;
  		goto parse_flag;
  
@@ -547,7 +538,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
  	case sGssAuthentication:
  		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -2507,6 +2517,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -2891,6 +2901,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
  # ifdef USE_AFS
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
  # endif
@@ -555,11 +546,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
  #endif
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
-diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h
-index db8362c6..4fa42d64 100644
+--- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.848744532 +0200
---- a/servconf.h
++++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
-+++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ typedef struct {
-@@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ typedef struct {
  						 * file on logout. */
  	int     kerberos_get_afs_token;		/* If true, try to get AFS token if
  						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
@@ -568,11 +558,10 @@ index db8362c6..4fa42d64 100644
  	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
  	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
  	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/session.c
-index 85df6a27..480a5ead 100644
+--- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.852744562 +0200
---- a/session.c
++++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
-+++ b/session.c
+@@ -1038,7 +1038,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
-@@ -1033,7 +1033,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
  	/* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter
  	 * the child's environment as they see fit
  	 */
@@ -582,7 +571,7 @@ index 85df6a27..480a5ead 100644
  #endif
  
  	/* Set basic environment. */
-@@ -1105,7 +1106,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
+@@ -1114,7 +1115,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
  	}
  #endif
  #ifdef KRB5
@@ -591,33 +580,10 @@ index 85df6a27..480a5ead 100644
  		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
  		    s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
  #endif
-diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
-index 6593e422..245178af 100644
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.849744540 +0200
---- a/ssh-gss.h
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
-+++ b/ssh-gss.h
+@@ -2284,7 +2284,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
-@@ -83,7 +82,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
- 	int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
- 	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
- 	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
--	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
-+	int (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
- 	int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
- } ssh_gssapi_mech;
- 
-@@ -127,7 +126,7 @@ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
- void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
--void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
-+int ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
- const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
- 
- char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index edbe815c..89514e8a 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -2162,7 +2162,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	if (options.gss_authentication) {
  		temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
@@ -626,11 +592,10 @@ index edbe815c..89514e8a 100644
  		restore_uid();
  	}
  #endif
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5
-index c0683d4a..2349f477 100644
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.849744540 +0200
---- a/sshd_config.5
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5	2021-04-19 14:05:10.856744592 +0200
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -939,6 +939,14 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
-@@ -860,6 +860,14 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache
  file on logout.
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
@@ -645,3 +610,24 @@ index c0683d4a..2349f477 100644
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
  Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
  Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.852744562 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
+@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+ 	int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ 	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
+ 	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
+-	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
++	int (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ 	int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ } ssh_gssapi_mech;
+ 
+@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
+ void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
+-void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
++int ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
+ const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
+ 
+ char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);

openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
---- a/sshd.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no	2021-04-19 14:00:45.099735129 +0200
-+++ b/sshd.c
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 14:03:21.140920974 +0200
-@@ -1701,6 +1701,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -1749,6 +1749,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  	parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
  	    cfg, &includes, NULL);
  
@@ -9,13 +9,13 @@ diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
 +	if (! options.use_pam)
 +		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora and may cause several problems.");
 +
- 	/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- 	fill_default_server_options(&options);
+ 	if (options.moduli_file != NULL)
- 
+ 		dh_set_moduli_file(options.moduli_file);
-diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config
---- a/sshd_config
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no	2021-04-19 14:00:45.098735121 +0200
-+++ b/sshd_config
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config	2021-04-19 14:00:45.099735129 +0200
-@@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
+@@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
  # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
  # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
  # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.

openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
  	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
  	const char *displayname;
 @@ -298,7 +299,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
- 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
  	mic.value = p;
  	mic.length = len;
 -	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
 +#endif
 +		micuser = authctxt->user;
 +	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, micuser, authctxt->service,
- 	    "gssapi-with-mic");
+ 	    "gssapi-with-mic", ssh->kex->session_id);
  
  	if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
 @@ -311,6 +318,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
 +++ openssh/auth2-hostbased.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
 @@ -123,7 +123,16 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
  	/* reconstruct packet */
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 +	    (authctxt->role
@@ -224,8 +224,8 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
 +	monitor_permit_authentications(1);
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->role, NULL)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_f("buffer error: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+	debug3("%s: role=%s", __func__, authctxt->role);
++	debug3_f("role=%s", authctxt->role);
 +
 +	if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
 +		free(authctxt->role);
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
 @@ -1251,6 +1280,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i
  		fail++;
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
 +	if ((s = strchr(cp, '/')) != NULL)
 +		*s = '\0';
  	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
 @@ -1308,6 +1339,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
  		fail++;
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
 +	if ((s = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL)
 +		*s = '\0';
  	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
@@ -305,12 +305,12 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.c
 +	int r;
 +	struct sshbuf *m;
 +
-+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
++	debug3_f("entering");
 +
 +	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
++		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, role ? role : "")) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_f("buffer error: %s", ssh_err(r));
 +	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, m);
 +
 +	sshbuf_free(m);
@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/por
 -void
 -ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
 -{
--	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+-	char *user_ctx = NULL;
 -
 -	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
 -		return;
@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/por
  
 -	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
 +	if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) != 0) {
-+		error("%s: getexeccon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++		error_f("getexeccon: %s", strerror(errno));
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +
@@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/por
 diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
 --- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
 +++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,425 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,421 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
 + * Copyright (c) 2014 Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +	access_vector_t bit;
 +	security_class_t class;
 +
-+	debug("%s: src:%s dst:%s", __func__, src, dst);
++	debug_f("src:%s dst:%s", src, dst);
 +	class = string_to_security_class("context");
 +	if (!class) {
 +		error("string_to_security_class failed to translate security class context");
@@ -692,7 +692,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +			    /* we actually don't change level */
 +			    reqlvl = "";
 +
-+			debug("%s: current connection level '%s'", __func__, reqlvl);
++			debug_f("current connection level '%s'", reqlvl);
 +
 +		}
 +
@@ -720,8 +720,8 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +		}
 +	}
 +	if (r != 0) {
-+		error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
++		error_f("Failed to get default SELinux security "
-+		    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
++		    "context for %s", pwname);
 +	}
 +
 +#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
@@ -746,7 +746,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +	char *use_current;
 +	int rv;
 +
-+	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
++	debug3_f("setting execution context");
 +
 +	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
 +
@@ -783,32 +783,30 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) {
 +			switch (security_getenforce()) {
 +			case -1:
-+				fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
++				fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed");
 +			case 0:
-+				error("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
++				error_f("SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.");
-+				    __func__);
 +			break;
 +			default:
-+				fatal("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.",
++				fatal_f("SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.");
-+				    __func__);
 +			}
 +		}
 +		return;
 +	}
 +
-+	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
++	debug3_f("setting execution context");
 +
 +	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
 +	if (r >= 0) {
 +		r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
 +		if (r < 0) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s",
++			error_f("Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s",
-+			    __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
++			    user_ctx, pwname);
 +		}
 +#ifdef HAVE_SETKEYCREATECON
 +		else if (setkeycreatecon(user_ctx) < 0) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s",
++			error_f("Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s",
-+			    __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
++			    user_ctx, pwname);
 +		}
 +#endif
 +	}
@@ -823,14 +821,12 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +	if (r < 0) {
 +		switch (security_getenforce()) {
 +		case -1:
-+			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
++			fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed");
 +		case 0:
-+			error("%s: SELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
++			error_f("ELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.");
-+			    __func__);
 +			break;
 +		default:
-+			fatal("%s: SELinux failure. Aborting connection.",
++			fatal_f("SELinux failure. Aborting connection.");
-+			    __func__);
 +		}
 +	}
 +	if (user_ctx != NULL && user_ctx != default_ctx)
@@ -838,7 +834,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +	if (default_ctx != NULL)
 +		freecon(default_ctx);
 +
-+	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
++	debug3_f("done");
 +}
 +
 +#endif

openssh-7.9p1-ssh-copy-id.patch

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-From 22bfdcf060b632b5a6ff603f8f42ff166c211a66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2020 10:02:45 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Fail hard on the first failed attempt to write the
- authorized_keys_file
-
----
- ssh-copy-id | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-index 392f64f..e69a23f 100755
---- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-+++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ installkeys_sh() {
- 	cd;
- 	umask 077;
- 	mkdir -p $(dirname "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}") &&
--	  { [ -z \`tail -1c ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} 2>/dev/null\` ] || echo >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE}; } &&
-+	  { [ -z \`tail -1c ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} 2>/dev/null\` ] || echo >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} || exit 1; } &&
- 	  cat >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} ||
- 	  exit 1;
- 	if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1; then
--- 
-GitLab
-
-

openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5
---- openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies	2020-03-26 14:40:44.546775605 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies	2021-04-19 15:18:32.071920379 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5	2020-03-26 14:52:20.700649727 +0100
++++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5	2021-04-19 15:21:18.400179265 +0200
-@@ -359,17 +359,17 @@ or
+@@ -368,15 +368,13 @@ or
  .Qq *.c.example.com
  domains.
  .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
@@ -14,19 +14,16 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5
  by certificate authorities (CAs).
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
--ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
  .Xr ssh 1
  will not accept host certificates signed using algorithms other than those
  specified.
-+.Pp
+@@ -436,20 +434,25 @@ If the option is set to
- .It Cm CertificateFile
+ (the default),
- Specifies a file from which the user's certificate is read.
- A corresponding private key must be provided separately in order
-@@ -424,20 +424,25 @@ If the option is set to
- .Cm no ,
  the check will not be executed.
  .It Cm Ciphers
 +The default is handled system-wide by
@@ -55,7 +52,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5
  .Pp
  The supported ciphers are:
  .Bd -literal -offset indent
-@@ -453,13 +458,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+@@ -465,13 +468,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
  chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
  .Ed
  .Pp
@@ -69,7 +66,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5
  The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
  .It Cm ClearAllForwardings
-@@ -812,6 +810,11 @@ command line will be passed untouched to
+@@ -826,6 +822,11 @@ command line will be passed untouched to
  The default is
  .Dq no .
  .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
@@ -81,7 +78,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5
  The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI
  key exchange. Possible values are
  .Bd -literal -offset 3n
-@@ -824,10 +827,8 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-,
+@@ -838,10 +839,8 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-,
  gss-curve25519-sha256-
  .Ed
  .Pp
@@ -93,7 +90,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5
  .It Cm HashKnownHosts
  Indicates that
  .Xr ssh 1
-@@ -1149,29 +1150,25 @@ it may be zero or more of:
+@@ -1169,29 +1168,25 @@ it may be zero or more of:
  and
  .Cm pam .
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
@@ -132,9 +129,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5
  .Pp
  The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q kex .
-@@ -1231,37 +1228,33 @@ The default is INFO.
+@@ -1301,37 +1296,33 @@ function, and all code in the
- DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
+ file.
- DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output.
+ This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
  .It Cm MACs
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
@@ -179,56 +176,57 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5
  The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q mac .
  .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
-@@ -1394,36 +1387,25 @@ instead of continuing to execute and pas
+@@ -1503,37 +1494,25 @@ instead of continuing to execute and pas
  The default is
  .Cm no .
- .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
+ .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
- Specifies the key types that will be used for public key authentication
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be used for public key
- as a comma-separated list of patterns.
+ authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns.
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
--character, then the key types after it will be appended to the default
+-character, then the algorithms after it will be appended to the default
 -instead of replacing it.
-+character, then the key types after it will be appended to the built-in
++character, then the algorithms after it will be appended to the built-in
 +openssh default instead of replacing it.
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq -
- character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
 +from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq ^
- character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
 -default set.
 -The default for this option is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
--ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
 -.Ed
 +built-in openssh default set.
  .Pp
- The list of available key types may also be obtained using
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes .
+ .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
-diff -up openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies	2020-03-26 14:40:44.530775355 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies	2021-04-19 15:18:32.062920311 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5	2020-03-26 14:48:56.732468099 +0100
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5	2021-04-19 15:20:42.591908243 +0200
-@@ -375,16 +375,16 @@ If the argument is
+@@ -373,15 +373,13 @@ If the argument is
  then no banner is displayed.
  By default, no banner is displayed.
  .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
@@ -241,17 +239,15 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5
  by certificate authorities (CAs).
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
--ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
  Certificates signed using other algorithms will not be accepted for
  public key or host-based authentication.
-+.Pp
  .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
- Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
+@@ -445,20 +443,25 @@ The default is
- PAM or through authentication styles supported in
-@@ -446,20 +446,25 @@ The default is
  indicating not to
  .Xr chroot 2 .
  .It Cm Ciphers
@@ -281,7 +277,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5
  .Pp
  The supported ciphers are:
  .Pp
-@@ -486,13 +491,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+@@ -485,13 +488,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
  chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
  .El
  .Pp
@@ -295,7 +291,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5
  The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
  .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
-@@ -681,22 +679,24 @@ For this to work
+@@ -680,21 +676,22 @@ For this to work
  .Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
  needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client.
  .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
@@ -326,11 +322,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5
 -.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,
 -gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
  This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
-+.Pp
+ .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
- .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased
- Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication
+@@ -794,26 +791,13 @@ is specified, the location of the socket
- as a list of comma-separated patterns.
-@@ -793,25 +793,13 @@ is specified, the location of the socket
  .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
  environment variable.
  .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
@@ -339,29 +333,30 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5
 +To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
- Specifies the host key algorithms
+ Specifies the host key signature algorithms
  that the server offers.
 -The default for this option is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
--ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
- The list of available key types may also be obtained using
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
  .It Cm IgnoreRhosts
-@@ -943,20 +931,25 @@ Specifies whether to look at .k5login fi
+@@ -958,20 +942,25 @@ Specifies whether to look at .k5login fi
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
@@ -391,8 +386,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5
  The supported algorithms are:
  .Pp
  .Bl -item -compact -offset indent
-@@ -988,15 +981,6 @@ ecdh-sha2-nistp521
+@@ -1003,15 +992,6 @@ ecdh-sha2-nistp521
- sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org
+ sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com
  .El
  .Pp
 -The default is:
@@ -407,9 +402,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5
  The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q KexAlgorithms .
  .It Cm ListenAddress
-@@ -1065,21 +1049,26 @@ DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
+@@ -1097,21 +1077,26 @@ function, and all code in the
- DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output.
+ file.
- Logging with a DEBUG level violates the privacy of users and is not recommended.
+ This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
  .It Cm MACs
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
@@ -438,7 +433,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5
  .Pp
  The algorithms that contain
  .Qq -etm
-@@ -1122,15 +1111,6 @@ umac-64-etm@openssh.com
+@@ -1154,15 +1139,6 @@ umac-64-etm@openssh.com
  umac-128-etm@openssh.com
  .El
  .Pp
@@ -454,49 +449,50 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5
  The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q mac .
  .It Cm Match
-@@ -1480,36 +1460,25 @@ or equivalent.)
+@@ -1541,37 +1517,25 @@ or equivalent.)
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
- .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
+ .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
- Specifies the key types that will be accepted for public key authentication
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for public key
- as a list of comma-separated patterns.
+ authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
  Alternately if the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
--character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
+-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
 -instead of replacing them.
-+character, then the specified key types will be appended to the built-in
++character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in
 +openssh default set instead of replacing them.
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq -
- character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
 +from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq ^
- character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
 -default set.
 -The default for this option is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
--ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
 -.Ed
 +built-in openssh default set.
  .Pp
- The list of available key types may also be obtained using
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes .
+ .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .

openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ index e7549470..b68c1710 100644
 @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
  	kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
  	kexgexc.o kexgexs.o \
- 	sntrup4591761.o kexsntrup4591761x25519.o kexgen.o \
+ 	kexsntrup761x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \
 +	kexgssc.o \
  	sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \
  	sshbuf-io.o
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ index e7549470..b68c1710 100644
 -	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
 +	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
  	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
- 	sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+ 	srclimit.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
  	sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
 diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
 index 086b8ebb..687c57b4 100644
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644
 --- a/auth2-gss.c
 +++ b/auth2-gss.c
 @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.29 2018/07/31 03:10:27 djm Exp $ */
+ /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.32 2021/01/27 10:15:08 djm Exp $ */
  
  /*
 - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
@@ -165,19 +165,19 @@ index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644
 +
 +	if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "parsing");
 +
 +	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
++		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +
 +	mic.value = p;
 +	mic.length = len;
 +
 +	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
-+	    "gssapi-keyex");
++	    "gssapi-keyex", ssh->kex->session_id);
 +
 +	if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed", __func__);
++		fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed");
 +	gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
 +
 +	/* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644
   * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
 @@ -260,7 +302,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
  	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
  
 -	authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
 +	authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 --- a/gss-genr.c
 +++ b/gss-genr.c
 @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.26 2018/07/10 09:13:30 djm Exp $ */
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.28 2021/01/27 10:05:28 djm Exp $ */
  
  /*
 - * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
   *
   * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
   * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -41,12 +41,36 @@
+@@ -41,9 +41,33 @@
  #include "sshbuf.h"
  #include "log.h"
  #include "ssh2.h"
@@ -461,9 +461,6 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
  
  #include "ssh-gss.h"
  
- extern u_char *session_id2;
- extern u_int session_id2_len;
- 
 +typedef struct {
 +	char *encoded;
 +	gss_OID oid;
@@ -486,7 +483,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
  /* sshbuf_get for gss_buffer_desc */
  int
  ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g)
-@@ -62,6 +86,162 @@ ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g)
+@@ -62,6 +86,159 @@ ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g)
  	return 0;
  }
  
@@ -548,7 +545,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +	    (gss_supported->count + 1));
 +
 +	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
++		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +
 +	oidpos = 0;
 +	s = cp = xstrdup(kex);
@@ -565,8 +562,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +			        gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
 +			        gss_supported->elements[i].length)) != 0 ||
 +			    (r = ssh_digest_final(md, digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+				fatal("%s: digest failed: %s", __func__,
++				fatal_fr(r, "digest failed");
-+				    ssh_err(r));
 +			ssh_digest_free(md);
 +			md = NULL;
 +
@@ -581,12 +577,10 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +				(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
 +				if (sshbuf_len(buf) != 0 &&
 +				    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ',')) != 0)
-+					fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u8 error: %s",
++					fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8 error");
-+					    __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +				if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, p, strlen(p))) != 0 ||
 +				    (r = sshbuf_put(buf, encoded, enclen)) != 0)
-+					fatal("%s: sshbuf_put error: %s",
++					fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put error");
-+					    __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +			}
 +
 +			gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
@@ -599,7 +593,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +	gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
 +
 +	if ((mechs = sshbuf_dup_string(buf)) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
++		fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed");
 +
 +	sshbuf_free(buf);
 +
@@ -721,7 +715,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +
  void
  ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service,
-     const char *context)
+     const char *context, const struct sshbuf *session_id)
 @@ -273,11 +500,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service,
  }
  
@@ -1123,10 +1117,10 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
 +
 +	if (gssapi_client.store.data != NULL) {
 +		if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(gssapi_client.store.data, gssapi_client.store.envval, &ccache))) {
-+			debug("%s: krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", __func__,
++			debug_f("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
 +				krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem));
 +		} else if ((problem = krb5_cc_destroy(gssapi_client.store.data, ccache))) {
-+			debug("%s: krb5_cc_destroy(): %.100s", __func__,
++			debug_f("krb5_cc_destroy(): %.100s",
 +				krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem));
 +		} else {
 +			krb5_free_context(gssapi_client.store.data);
@@ -1375,7 +1369,7 @@ index ce85f043..574c7609 100644
 @@ -698,6 +755,9 @@ kex_free(struct kex *kex)
  	sshbuf_free(kex->server_version);
  	sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub);
- 	free(kex->session_id);
+ 	sshbuf_free(kex->session_id);
 +#ifdef GSSAPI
 +	free(kex->gss_host);
 +#endif /* GSSAPI */
@@ -1389,7 +1383,7 @@ index a5ae6ac0..fe714141 100644
 @@ -102,6 +102,15 @@ enum kex_exchange {
  	KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
  	KEX_C25519_SHA256,
- 	KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512,
+ 	KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512,
 +#ifdef GSSAPI
 +	KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
 +	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
@@ -1498,7 +1492,7 @@ new file mode 100644
 index 00000000..f6e1405e
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/kexgssc.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,606 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,599 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
 + *
@@ -1597,7 +1591,7 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e
 +		r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex);
 +		break;
 +	default:
-+		fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++		fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
 +	}
 +	if (r != 0)
 +		return r;
@@ -1785,7 +1779,7 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e
 +	    server_blob,
 +	    shared_secret,
 +	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++		fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
 +
 +	gssbuf.value = hash;
 +	gssbuf.length = hashlen;
@@ -2074,13 +2068,6 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e
 +
 +	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
 +
-+	/* save session id */
-+	if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
-+		kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
-+		kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
-+		memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
-+	}
-+
 +	if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
 +		ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
 +
@@ -2202,12 +2189,12 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +		free(mechs);
 +	}
 +
-+	debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name);
++	debug2_f("Identifying %s", kex->name);
 +	oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
 +	if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
 +	   fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
 +
-+	debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
++	debug2_f("Acquiring credentials");
 +
 +	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
 +		fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
@@ -2242,7 +2229,7 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +				    &shared_secret);
 +				break;
 +			default:
-+				fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++				fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
 +			}
 +			if (r != 0)
 +				goto out;
@@ -2398,12 +2385,12 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +		if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms()))
 +			free(mechs);
 +
-+	debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name);
++	debug2_f("Identifying %s", kex->name);
 +	oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
 +	if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
 +	   fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
 +
-+	debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
++	debug2_f("Acquiring credentials");
 +
 +	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
 +		fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
@@ -2656,29 +2643,29 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
 +# endif
  #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
  	kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
- 		kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
 @@ -1806,8 +1834,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  	u_char *p;
  	int r;
  
 -	if (!options.gss_authentication)
--		fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+-		fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
 +	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+		fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
++		fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled");
  
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
 @@ -1839,8 +1867,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  	OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
  	int r;
  
 -	if (!options.gss_authentication)
--		fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+-		fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
 +	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+		fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
++		fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled");
  
  	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &in)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc");
 @@ -1860,6 +1888,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
  		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
@@ -2692,9 +2679,9 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  	int r;
  
 -	if (!options.gss_authentication)
--		fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+-		fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
 +	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+		fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
++		fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled");
  
  	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &gssbuf)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &mic)) != 0)
@@ -2707,13 +2694,13 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  	const char *displayname;
  
 -	if (!options.gss_authentication)
--		fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+-		fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
 +	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+		fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
++		fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled");
  
 -	authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +
 +	authenticated = authctxt->valid &&
 +	    ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw, kex);
@@ -2721,7 +2708,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  	sshbuf_reset(m);
  	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
 @@ -1913,7 +1946,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
- 	debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
+ 	debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated);
  	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
  
 -	auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
@@ -2733,7 +2720,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  
  	if ((displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
  		auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname);
-@@ -1921,5 +1958,85 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+@@ -1921,5 +1958,84 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  	/* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
  	return (authenticated);
  }
@@ -2749,16 +2736,15 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
 +	int r;
 +
 +	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+		fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
++		fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled");
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +	data.value = p;
 +	data.length = len;
 +	/* Lengths of SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512 hashes that are used */
 +	if (data.length != 20 && data.length != 32 && data.length != 64)
-+		fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__,
++		fatal_f("data length incorrect: %d", (int) data.length);
-+		    (int) data.length);
 +
 +	/* Save the session ID on the first time around */
 +	if (session_id2_len == 0) {
@@ -2774,7 +2760,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +
 +	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
 +
@@ -2795,12 +2781,12 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
 +	int r, ok;
 +
 +	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+		fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
++		fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled");
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, (u_char **)&store.filename, NULL)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, (u_char **)&store.envvar, NULL)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, (u_char **)&store.envval, NULL)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +
 +	ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
 +
@@ -2810,7 +2796,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
 +
 +	sshbuf_reset(m);
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ok)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +
 +	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
 +
@@ -2847,14 +2833,14 @@ index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644
  	int r, authenticated = 0;
  
  	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
  
  	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, m);
  	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
 @@ -1012,4 +1014,57 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
- 	debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
+ 	debug3_f("user %sauthenticated", authenticated ? "" : "not ");
  	return (authenticated);
  }
 +
@@ -2866,16 +2852,16 @@ index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644
 +	int r;
 +
 +	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
++		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, data->value, data->length)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +
 +	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, m);
 +	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, hash)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +
 +	sshbuf_free(m);
 +
@@ -2889,7 +2875,7 @@ index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644
 +	int r, ok;
 +
 +	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
++		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m,
 +	    store->filename ? store->filename : "")) != 0 ||
@@ -2897,13 +2883,13 @@ index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644
 +	    store->envvar ? store->envvar : "")) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m,
 +	    store->envval ? store->envval : "")) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +
 +	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, m);
 +	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ok)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +
 +	sshbuf_free(m);
 +
@@ -3124,7 +3110,7 @@ index 70f5f73f..191575a1 100644
  		options->password_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
 @@ -531,6 +543,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sHostKeyAlgorithms,
+ 	sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
  	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
  	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
 +	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
@@ -3246,7 +3232,7 @@ index 36180d07..70dd3665 100644
 --- a/ssh-gss.h
 +++ b/ssh-gss.h
 @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.14 2018/07/10 09:13:30 djm Exp $ */
+ /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.15 2021/01/27 10:05:28 djm Exp $ */
  /*
 - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
 + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
@@ -3332,7 +3318,7 @@ index 36180d07..70dd3665 100644
 @@ -123,17 +149,33 @@ void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
  OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
  void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *, const char *,
-     const char *, const char *);
+     const char *, const char *, const struct sshbuf *);
 -int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
 +int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
 +OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
@@ -3382,7 +3368,7 @@ index 60de6087..db5c65bc 100644
 +.It GSSAPITrustDns
  .It HashKnownHosts
  .It Host
- .It HostbasedAuthentication
+ .It HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
 @@ -579,6 +585,8 @@ flag),
  (supported message integrity codes),
  .Ar kex
@@ -3526,9 +3512,9 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +
  	xxx_host = host;
  	xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
- 
+ 	xxx_conn_info = cinfo;
 @@ -206,6 +209,42 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
- 		    compat_pkalg_proposal(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
+ 		    compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, options.hostkeyalgorithms);
  	}
  
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
@@ -3588,7 +3574,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +# endif
 +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
  	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
- 	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
+	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
  	ssh->kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
  
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
@@ -3604,7 +3590,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
  
  	/* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */
  	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] =
- 	    compat_kex_proposal(options.kex_algorithms);
+ 	    compat_kex_proposal(ssh, options.kex_algorithms);
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
 +	/* repair myproposal after it was crumpled by the */
 +	/* ext-info removal above */
@@ -3616,7 +3602,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +	}
 +#endif
  	if ((r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, myproposal)) != 0)
- 		fatal("kex_prop2buf: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ 		fatal_r(r, "kex_prop2buf");
  
 @@ -330,6 +392,7 @@ static int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
  static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
@@ -3714,13 +3700,13 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +	}
 +
 +	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
++		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +
 +	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
-+	    "gssapi-keyex");
++	    "gssapi-keyex", ssh->kex->session_id);
 +
 +	if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed", __func__);
++		fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed");
 +	gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
 +
 +	if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
@@ -3734,7 +3720,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, mic.value, mic.length)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_fr(r, "parsing");
 +
 +	sshbuf_free(b);
 +	gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
@@ -3751,11 +3737,11 @@ index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
 +++ b/sshd.c
 @@ -817,8 +817,8 @@ notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
  	}
- 	debug3("%s: sent %u hostkeys", __func__, nkeys);
+ 	debug3_f("sent %u hostkeys", nkeys);
  	if (nkeys == 0)
--		fatal("%s: no hostkeys", __func__);
+-		fatal_f("no hostkeys");
 -	if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+		debug3("%s: no hostkeys", __func__);
++		debug3_f("no hostkeys");
 +	else if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
  		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send", __func__);
  	sshbuf_free(buf);
@@ -3772,7 +3758,7 @@ index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
  	}
 @@ -2347,6 +2348,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
  	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
- 	    list_hostkey_types());
+ 	    ssh, list_hostkey_types());
  
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
 +	{
@@ -3818,7 +3804,7 @@ index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
 +
  	/* start key exchange */
  	if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
- 		fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ 		fatal_r(r, "kex_setup");
 @@ -2362,7 +2405,18 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
  # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
  	kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
@@ -3837,7 +3823,7 @@ index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
 +# endif
 +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
  	kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
- 	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
  	kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
 diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
 index 19b7c91a..2c48105f 100644
@@ -3898,9 +3884,9 @@ index 70ccea44..f6b41a2f 100644
 +.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,
 +gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
 +This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
- .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
+ .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
- Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased
- as a list of comma-separated patterns.
+ authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
 diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
 index 57995ee6..fd5b7724 100644
 --- a/sshkey.c

openssh-8.0p1-keygen-strip-doseol.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.strip-doseol openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.strip-doseol	2021-03-18 17:41:34.472404994 +0100
++++ openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-03-18 17:41:55.255538761 +0100
+@@ -901,7 +901,7 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
+ 	while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
+ 		lnum++;
+ 		cp = line;
+-		cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0';
++		cp[strcspn(cp, "\r\n")] = '\0';
+ 		/* Trim leading space and comments */
+ 		cp = line + strspn(line, " \t");
+ 		if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0')

openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch

@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ index b6f041f4..1fbce2bb 100644
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID,
-+	    kex->session_id, kex->session_id_len);
++	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->session_id), sshbuf_len(kex->session_id));
 +	if (r != 1) {
 +		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 +		goto out;

openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c.preserve-pam-errors openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c.preserve-pam-errors	2021-03-31 17:03:15.618592347 +0200
++++ openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c	2021-03-31 17:06:58.115220014 +0200
+@@ -511,7 +511,11 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
+ 		goto auth_fail;
+ 
+ 	if (!do_pam_account()) {
+-		sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
++		/* Preserve PAM_PERM_DENIED and PAM_USER_UNKNOWN.
++		 * Backward compatibility for other errors. */
++		if (sshpam_err != PAM_PERM_DENIED
++			&& sshpam_err != PAM_USER_UNKNOWN)
++			sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
+ 		goto auth_fail;
+ 	}
+ 	if (sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange) {
+@@ -568,8 +572,10 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
+ 	    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err))) != 0)
+ 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 	/* XXX - can't do much about an error here */
+-	if (sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
+-		ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED, buffer);
++	if (sshpam_err == PAM_PERM_DENIED
++		|| sshpam_err == PAM_USER_UNKNOWN
++		|| sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
++		ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, sshpam_err, buffer);
+ 	else if (sshpam_maxtries_reached)
+ 		ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MAXTRIES, buffer);
+ 	else
+@@ -856,10 +862,12 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha
+ 			plen++;
+ 			free(msg);
+ 			break;
++		case PAM_USER_UNKNOWN:
++		case PAM_PERM_DENIED:
+ 		case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED:
++			sshpam_account_status = 0;
++			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+ 		case PAM_MAXTRIES:
+-			if (type == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
+-				sshpam_account_status = 0;
+ 			if (type == PAM_MAXTRIES)
+ 				sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1);
+ 			/* FALLTHROUGH */

openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch

@@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
  			if (x11_use_localhost)
  				set_reuseaddr(sock);
  			if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
- 				debug2("%s: bind port %d: %.100s", __func__,
+ 				debug2_f("bind port %d: %.100s", port,
- 				    port, strerror(errno));
+ 				    strerror(errno));
  				close(sock);
 +
 +				/* do not remove successfully opened

openssh-8.4p1-debian-compat.patch

@@ -37,8 +37,8 @@
 +	 * SHA2 signature types.
 +	 */
 +	if (alg == NULL &&
-+	    (key->type == KEY_RSA && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74))) {
++	    (key->type == KEY_RSA && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74))) {
-+		oallowed = allowed = xstrdup(options.pubkey_key_types);
++		oallowed = allowed = xstrdup(options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
 +		while ((cp = strsep(&allowed, ",")) != NULL) {
 +			if (sshkey_type_from_name(cp) != key->type)
 +				continue;

openssh-8.4p1-sandbox-seccomp.patch

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-index e0768c06..5065ae7e 100644
---- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -267,6 +267,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- #ifdef __NR_pselect6
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_pselect6_time64
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6_time64),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_read
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_read),
- #endif

openssh-8.4p1-ssh-copy-id.patch

@@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
-From 66f16e5425eb881570e82bfef7baeac2e7accc0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Oleg <Fallmay@users.noreply.github.com>
-Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2020 12:09:08 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix `EOF: command not found` error in ssh-copy-id
-
----
- contrib/ssh-copy-id | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-index 392f64f94..a76907717 100644
---- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-+++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ installkeys_sh() {
-   #    the -z `tail ...` checks for a trailing newline. The echo adds one if was missing
-   #    the cat adds the keys we're getting via STDIN
-   #    and if available restorecon is used to restore the SELinux context
--  INSTALLKEYS_SH=$(tr '\t\n' ' ' <<-EOF)
-+  INSTALLKEYS_SH=$(tr '\t\n' ' ' <<-EOF
- 	cd;
- 	umask 077;
- 	mkdir -p $(dirname "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}") &&
-@@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ installkeys_sh() {
- 	  restorecon -F .ssh ${AUTH_KEY_FILE};
- 	fi
- EOF
-+  )
- 
-   # to defend against quirky remote shells: use 'exec sh -c' to get POSIX;
-   printf "exec sh -c '%s'" "${INSTALLKEYS_SH}"
-
-From de59a431cdec833e3ec15691dd950402b4c052cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>
-Date: Sat, 3 Oct 2020 00:20:07 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] un-nest $() to make ksh cheerful
-
----
- ssh-copy-id | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-From 02ac2c3c3db5478a440dfb1b90d15f686f2cbfc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>
-Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2020 21:30:10 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] ksh doesn't grok 'local'
-
-and AFAICT it's not actually doing anything useful in the code, so let's
-see how things go without it.
----
- ssh-copy-id | 11 +++++------
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-index a769077..11c9463 100755
---- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-+++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ quote() {
- }
- 
- use_id_file() {
--  local L_ID_FILE="$1"
-+  L_ID_FILE="$1"
- 
-   if [ -z "$L_ID_FILE" ] ; then
-     printf '%s: ERROR: no ID file found\n' "$0"
-@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ use_id_file() {
-   # check that the files are readable
-   for f in "$PUB_ID_FILE" ${PRIV_ID_FILE:+"$PRIV_ID_FILE"} ; do
-     ErrMSG=$( { : < "$f" ; } 2>&1 ) || {
--      local L_PRIVMSG=""
-+      L_PRIVMSG=""
-       [ "$f" = "$PRIV_ID_FILE" ] && L_PRIVMSG="	(to install the contents of '$PUB_ID_FILE' anyway, look at the -f option)"
-       printf "\\n%s: ERROR: failed to open ID file '%s': %s\\n" "$0" "$f" "$(printf '%s\n%s\n' "$ErrMSG" "$L_PRIVMSG" | sed -e 's/.*: *//')"
-       exit 1
-@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ fi
- # populate_new_ids() uses several global variables ($USER_HOST, $SSH_OPTS ...)
- # and has the side effect of setting $NEW_IDS
- populate_new_ids() {
--  local L_SUCCESS="$1"
-+  L_SUCCESS="$1"
- 
-   # shellcheck disable=SC2086
-   if [ "$FORCED" ] ; then
-@@ -181,13 +181,12 @@ populate_new_ids() {
-   eval set -- "$SSH_OPTS"
- 
-   umask 0177
--  local L_TMP_ID_FILE
-   L_TMP_ID_FILE=$(mktemp ~/.ssh/ssh-copy-id_id.XXXXXXXXXX)
-   if test $? -ne 0 || test "x$L_TMP_ID_FILE" = "x" ; then
-     printf '%s: ERROR: mktemp failed\n' "$0" >&2
-     exit 1
-   fi
--  local L_CLEANUP="rm -f \"$L_TMP_ID_FILE\" \"${L_TMP_ID_FILE}.stderr\""
-+  L_CLEANUP="rm -f \"$L_TMP_ID_FILE\" \"${L_TMP_ID_FILE}.stderr\""
-   # shellcheck disable=SC2064
-   trap "$L_CLEANUP" EXIT TERM INT QUIT
-   printf '%s: INFO: attempting to log in with the new key(s), to filter out any that are already installed\n' "$0" >&2
-@@ -237,7 +236,7 @@ populate_new_ids() {
- #    produce a one-liner to add the keys to remote authorized_keys file
- #    optionally takes an alternative path for authorized_keys
- installkeys_sh() {
--  local AUTH_KEY_FILE=${1:-.ssh/authorized_keys}
-+  AUTH_KEY_FILE=${1:-.ssh/authorized_keys}
- 
-   # In setting INSTALLKEYS_SH:
-   #    the tr puts it all on one line (to placate tcsh)
--- 
-
-diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-index 11c9463..ee3f637 100755
---- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-+++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-@@ -237,6 +237,7 @@ populate_new_ids() {
- #    optionally takes an alternative path for authorized_keys
- installkeys_sh() {
-   AUTH_KEY_FILE=${1:-.ssh/authorized_keys}
-+  AUTH_KEY_DIR=$(dirname "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}")
- 
-   # In setting INSTALLKEYS_SH:
-   #    the tr puts it all on one line (to placate tcsh)
-@@ -249,7 +250,7 @@ installkeys_sh() {
-   INSTALLKEYS_SH=$(tr '\t\n' ' ' <<-EOF
- 	cd;
- 	umask 077;
--	mkdir -p $(dirname "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}") &&
-+	mkdir -p "${AUTH_KEY_DIR}" &&
- 	  { [ -z \`tail -1c ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} 2>/dev/null\` ] || echo >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} || exit 1; } &&
- 	  cat >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} ||
- 	  exit 1;
--- 

openssh.rpmlintrc

@@ -13,9 +13,8 @@ addFilter(r'openssh-(askpass|cavs).x86_64: W: no-documentation')
 # sshd config and sysconfig is not supposed to be world readable
 addFilter(r'non-readable /etc/(ssh/sshd_config|sysconfig/sshd)')
 
-# The /var/empty/sshd is supposed to have the given permissions
+# /usr/share/empty.sshd is required to have the given permissions
-addFilter(r'non-standard-dir-perm /var/empty/sshd 711')
+addFilter(r'non-standard-dir-perm /usr/share/empty.sshd 711')
-addFilter(r'non-standard-dir-in-var empty')
 
 # Spelling false-positives
 addFilter(r'spelling-error (Summary\(en_US\)|.* en_US) (mls|su|sudo|rlogin|rsh|untrusted) ')

openssh.spec

@@ -50,10 +50,10 @@
 %{?static_openssl:%global static_libcrypto 1}
 
 # Do not forget to bump pam_ssh_agent_auth release if you rewind the main package release to 1
-%global openssh_ver 8.4p1
+%global openssh_ver 8.6p1
-%global openssh_rel 4
+%global openssh_rel 1
 %global pam_ssh_agent_ver 0.10.4
-%global pam_ssh_agent_rel 1
+%global pam_ssh_agent_rel 3
 
 Summary: An open source implementation of SSH protocol version 2
 Name: openssh
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html
 Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
 Source1: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz.asc
 Source2: sshd.pam
-Source3: DJM-GPG-KEY.gpg
+Source3: gpgkey-736060BA.gpg
 Source4: https://github.com/jbeverly/pam_ssh_agent_auth/archive/pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}.tar.gz
 Source5: pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders
 Source6: ssh-keycat.pam
@@ -74,8 +74,8 @@ Source10: sshd.socket
 Source11: sshd.service
 Source12: sshd-keygen@.service
 Source13: sshd-keygen
-Source14: sshd.tmpfiles
 Source15: sshd-keygen.target
+Source16: ssh-agent.service
 
 #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2581
 Patch100: openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
@@ -133,10 +133,6 @@ Patch707: openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch
 Patch711: openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
 # make aes-ctr ciphers use EVP engines such as AES-NI from OpenSSL
 Patch712: openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch
-# add cavs test binary for the aes-ctr
-Patch713: openssh-6.6p1-ctr-cavstest.patch
-# add SSH KDF CAVS test driver
-Patch714: openssh-6.7p1-kdf-cavs.patch
 
 # GSSAPI Key Exchange (RFC 4462 + RFC 8732)
 # from https://github.com/openssh-gsskex/openssh-gsskex/tree/fedora/master
@@ -183,9 +179,6 @@ Patch950: openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
 Patch951: openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
 # Unbreak scp between two IPv6 hosts (#1620333)
 Patch953: openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
-# ssh-copy-id is unmaintained: Aggreagete patches
-# https://gitlab.com/phil_hands/ssh-copy-id/-/merge_requests/2
-Patch958: openssh-7.9p1-ssh-copy-id.patch
 # Mention crypto-policies in manual pages (#1668325)
 Patch962: openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
 # Use OpenSSL high-level API to produce and verify signatures (#1707485)
@@ -196,11 +189,12 @@ Patch964: openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
 Patch965: openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch
 # Do not break X11 without IPv6
 Patch966: openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
-Patch967: openssh-8.4p1-ssh-copy-id.patch
-# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3232
-Patch968: openssh-8.4p1-sandbox-seccomp.patch
 # https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3213
 Patch969: openssh-8.4p1-debian-compat.patch
+# ssh-keygen printing fingerprint issue with Windows keys (#1901518)
+Patch974: openssh-8.0p1-keygen-strip-doseol.patch
+# sshd provides PAM an incorrect error code (#1879503)
+Patch975: openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
 
 License: BSD
 Requires: /sbin/nologin
@@ -221,11 +215,13 @@ BuildRequires: pam-devel
 BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 0.9.8j
 BuildRequires: perl-podlators
 BuildRequires: systemd-devel
+BuildRequires: systemd-rpm-macros
 BuildRequires: gcc make
 BuildRequires: p11-kit-devel
 BuildRequires: libfido2-devel
 Recommends: p11-kit
 Obsoletes: openssh-ldap < 8.3p1-4
+Obsoletes: openssh-cavs < 8.4p1-5
 
 %if %{kerberos5}
 BuildRequires: krb5-devel
@@ -267,14 +263,10 @@ Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
 Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and X
 Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
 
-%package cavs
-Summary: CAVS tests for FIPS validation
-Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
-
 %package -n pam_ssh_agent_auth
 Summary: PAM module for authentication with ssh-agent
 Version: %{pam_ssh_agent_ver}
-Release: %{pam_ssh_agent_rel}.%{openssh_rel}%{?dist}.2
+Release: %{pam_ssh_agent_rel}.%{openssh_rel}%{?dist}
 License: BSD
 
 %description
@@ -311,10 +303,6 @@ OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
 into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains
 an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH.
 
-%description cavs
-This package contains test binaries and scripts to make FIPS validation
-easier. Now contains CTR and KDF CAVS test driver.
-
 %description -n pam_ssh_agent_auth
 This package contains a PAM module which can be used to authenticate
 users using ssh keys stored in a ssh-agent. Through the use of the
@@ -355,8 +343,6 @@ popd
 %patch707 -p1 -b .redhat
 %patch711 -p1 -b .log-usepam-no
 %patch712 -p1 -b .evp-ctr
-%patch713 -p1 -b .ctr-cavs
-%patch714 -p1 -b .kdf-cavs
 # 
 %patch800 -p1 -b .gsskex
 %patch801 -p1 -b .force_krb
@@ -378,15 +364,14 @@ popd
 %patch950 -p1 -b .sandbox
 %patch951 -p1 -b .pkcs11-uri
 %patch953 -p1 -b .scp-ipv6
-%patch958 -p1 -b .ssh-copy-id
 %patch962 -p1 -b .crypto-policies
 %patch963 -p1 -b .openssl-evp
 %patch964 -p1 -b .openssl-kdf
 %patch965 -p1 -b .visibility
 %patch966 -p1 -b .x11-ipv6
-%patch967 -p1 -b .ssh-copy-id
-%patch968 -p1 -b .seccomp
 %patch969 -p0 -b .debian
+%patch974 -p1 -b .keygen-strip-doseol
+%patch975 -p1 -b .preserve-pam-errors
 
 %patch200 -p1 -b .audit
 %patch201 -p1 -b .audit-race
@@ -438,7 +423,7 @@ fi
 	--datadir=%{_datadir}/openssh \
 	--with-default-path=/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/sbin \
 	--with-superuser-path=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin \
-	--with-privsep-path=%{_var}/empty/sshd \
+	--with-privsep-path=%{_datadir}/empty.sshd \
 	--disable-strip \
 	--without-zlib-version-check \
 	--with-ssl-engine \
@@ -515,7 +500,6 @@ mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/ssh
 mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config.d
 mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config.d
 mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh
-mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_var}/empty/sshd
 %make_install
 
 install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/
@@ -532,10 +516,12 @@ install -m644 %{SOURCE10} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/sshd.socket
 install -m644 %{SOURCE11} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/sshd.service
 install -m644 %{SOURCE12} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/sshd-keygen@.service
 install -m644 %{SOURCE15} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/sshd-keygen.target
+install -d -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_userunitdir}
+install -m644 %{SOURCE16} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_userunitdir}/ssh-agent.service
 install -m744 %{SOURCE13} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libexecdir}/openssh/sshd-keygen
 install -m755 contrib/ssh-copy-id $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/
 install contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/
-install -m644 -D %{SOURCE14} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_tmpfilesdir}/%{name}.conf
+install -d -m711 ${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}/%{_datadir}/empty.sshd
 
 %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
 install contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
@@ -566,7 +552,7 @@ getent group ssh_keys >/dev/null || groupadd -r ssh_keys || :
 getent group sshd >/dev/null || groupadd -g %{sshd_uid} -r sshd || :
 getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \
   useradd -c "Privilege-separated SSH" -u %{sshd_uid} -g sshd \
-  -s /sbin/nologin -r -d /var/empty/sshd sshd 2> /dev/null || :
+  -s /sbin/nologin -r -d /usr/share/empty.sshd sshd 2> /dev/null || :
 
 %post server
 %systemd_post sshd.service sshd.socket
@@ -588,6 +574,12 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
 %postun server
 %systemd_postun_with_restart sshd.service
 
+%post clients
+%systemd_user_post ssh-agent.service
+
+%preun clients
+%systemd_user_preun ssh-agent.service
+
 %files
 %license LICENCE
 %doc CREDITS ChangeLog OVERVIEW PROTOCOL* README README.platform README.privsep README.tun README.dns TODO
@@ -622,9 +614,10 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-copy-id.1*
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8*
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-sk-helper.8*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_userunitdir}/ssh-agent.service
 
 %files server
-%dir %attr(0711,root,root) %{_var}/empty/sshd
+%dir %attr(0711,root,root) %{_datadir}/empty.sshd
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sftp-server
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sshd-keygen
@@ -642,7 +635,6 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/sshd.socket
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/sshd-keygen@.service
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/sshd-keygen.target
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_tmpfilesdir}/openssh.conf
 
 %files keycat
 %doc HOWTO.ssh-keycat
@@ -656,11 +648,6 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass
 %endif
 
-%files cavs
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ctr-cavstest
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-cavs
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-cavs_driver.pl
-
 %if %{pam_ssh_agent}
 %files -n pam_ssh_agent_auth
 %license pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}/OPENSSH_LICENSE
@@ -669,6 +656,29 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
 %endif
 
 %changelog
+* Mon Apr 19 2021 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.6p1-1 + 0.10.4-3
+- New upstream release (#1950819)
+- ssh-keygen printing fingerprint issue with Windows keys (#1901518)
+- sshd provides PAM an incorrect error code (#1879503)
+
+* Tue Mar 09 2021 Rex Dieter <rdieter@fedoraproject.org> - 8.5p1-2
+- ssh-agent.serivce is user unit (#1761817#27)
+
+* Wed Mar 03 2021 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 8.5p1-1 + 0.10.4-2
+- New upstream release (#1934336)
+
+* Tue Mar 02 2021 Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek <zbyszek@in.waw.pl> - 8.4p1-5.2
+- Rebuilt for updated systemd-rpm-macros
+  See https://pagure.io/fesco/issue/2583.
+
+* Tue Jan 26 2021 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 8.4p1-5.1
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_34_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Fri Jan 22 2021 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 8.4p1-5 + 0.10.4-1
+- Use /usr/share/empty.sshd instead of /var/empty/sshd
+- Allow emptu labels in PKCS#11 tokens (#1919007)
+- Drop openssh-cavs subpackage
+
 * Tue Dec 01 2020 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 8.4p1-4 + 0.10.4-1
 - Remove "PasswordAuthentication yes" from vendor configuration as it is
   already default and it might be hard to override.

sources

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-SHA512 (openssh-8.4p1.tar.gz) = d65275b082c46c5efe7cf3264fa6794d6e99a36d4a54b50554fc56979d6c0837381587fd5399195e1db680d2a5ad1ef0b99a180eac2b4de5637906cb7a89e9ce
+SHA512 (openssh-8.6p1.tar.gz) = 9854eda0b773c64c9f1f74844ce466b2b42ee8845f58ad062b73141d617af944fa4ebafdf72069f400106d2c2bd0a69c92fe805ec1fc26d4f0faadf06c3fbbe6
-SHA512 (openssh-8.4p1.tar.gz.asc) = 3d9a026db27729a5a56785db3824230ccf2a3beca4bb48ef465e44d869b944dbc5d443152a1b1be21bc9c213c465d3d7ca1f876a387d0a6b9682a0cfec3e6e32
+SHA512 (openssh-8.6p1.tar.gz.asc) = ea75d7fe350fd1761ee5490b222249e9b8915b2a02a1d41979195f15d239def387e4c6467362ab9515d517087750fa66bc368f5baa15c325502f725172631967
 SHA512 (pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4.tar.gz) = caccf72174d15e43f4c86a459ac6448682e62116557cf1e1e828955f3d1731595b238df42adec57860e7f341e92daf5d8285020bcb5018f3b8a5145aa32ee1c2
-SHA512 (DJM-GPG-KEY.gpg) = db1191ed9b6495999e05eed2ef863fb5179bdb63e94850f192dad68eed8579836f88fbcfffd9f28524fe1457aff8cd248ee3e0afc112c8f609b99a34b80ecc0d
+SHA512 (gpgkey-736060BA.gpg) = df44f3fdbcd1d596705348c7f5aed3f738c5f626a55955e0642f7c6c082995cf36a1b1891bb41b8715cb2aff34fef1c877e0eff0d3507dd00a055ba695757a21

ssh-agent.service

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# Requires SSH_AUTH_SOCK="$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/ssh-agent.socket"
+# set in environment, handled for example in plasma via
+# /etc/xdg/plasma-workspace/env/ssh-agent.sh
+[Unit]
+ConditionEnvironment=!SSH_AGENT_PID
+Description=OpenSSH key agent
+Documentation=man:ssh-agent(1) man:ssh-add(1) man:ssh(1)
+
+[Service]
+Environment=SSH_AUTH_SOCK=%t/ssh-agent.socket
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/ssh-agent -a $SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+PassEnvironment=SSH_AGENT_PID
+SuccessExitStatus=2
+Type=forking

sshd.tmpfiles

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-d /var/empty/sshd 711 root root -