pam_auth version bump

Fixes from RHEL 8.5.0
2021-04-30 17:06:28 +02:00 · 2021-04-30 16:57:20 +02:00 · 2021-04-29 16:37:35 +02:00 · 2021-04-29 16:37:35 +02:00 · 2021-03-26 12:55:57 +01:00 · 2021-03-25 10:53:25 +01:00
36 changed files with 2920 additions and 3589 deletions
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@ -45,3 +45,8 @@ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2.tar.bz2
 /openssh-8.4p1.tar.gz
 /openssh-8.4p1.tar.gz.asc
 /pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4.tar.gz
+/openssh-8.5p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-8.5p1.tar.gz.asc
+/gpgkey-736060BA.gpg
+/openssh-8.6p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-8.6p1.tar.gz.asc
--- a/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
+++ b/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
@ -1,19 +1,18 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info	2016-12-23 13:31:22.645213115 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2016-12-23 13:31:40.997216691 +0100
-@@ -65,9 +65,12 @@ report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_wi
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info	2021-04-19 13:57:11.720113536 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2021-04-19 13:59:29.842163204 +0200
+@@ -70,8 +70,12 @@ report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_wi
+ 
 	err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
- 				     GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR,
- 				     GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
-				     "Could not grab %s. "
-				     "A malicious client may be eavesdropping "
-				     "on your session.", what);
-+				     "SSH password dialog could not grab the %s input.\n"
-+				     "This might be caused by application such as screensaver, "
-+				     "however it could also mean that someone may be eavesdropping "
-+				     "on your session.\n"
-+				     "Either close the application which grabs the %s or "
-+				     "log out and log in again to prevent this from happening.", what, what);
+ 	    GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR, GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
+-	    "Could not grab %s. A malicious client may be eavesdropping "
+-	    "on your session.", what);
+	    "SSH password dialog could not grab the %s input.\n"
+	    "This might be caused by application such as screensaver, "
+	    "however it could also mean that someone may be eavesdropping "
+	    "on your session.\n"
+	    "Either close the application which grabs the %s or "
+	    "log out and log in again to prevent this from happening.", what, what);
 	gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
 
 	gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(err));
--- a/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contr
 		if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY) {
@@ -130,6 +145,22 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
 			g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "key_press_event",
- 			                 G_CALLBACK(check_none), dialog);
+ 			    G_CALLBACK(check_none), dialog);
 		}
 +
 +		hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
--- a/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
@ -1,19 +1,19 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/log.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100
-@@ -250,6 +250,11 @@ debug3(const char *fmt,...)
- void
- log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr)
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/log.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.544843434 +0200
+@@ -194,6 +194,11 @@ void
+ log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility,
+     int on_stderr)
 {
 +	log_init_handler(av0, level, facility, on_stderr, 1);
 +}
 +
 +void
-+log_init_handler(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr, int reset_handler) {
+log_init_handler(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr, int reset_handler) {
 #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
 	struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
 #endif
-@@ -273,8 +278,10 @@ log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, Sysl
+@@ -206,8 +211,10 @@ log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level
 		exit(1);
 	}
 
@ -26,21 +26,21 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.c
 
 	log_on_stderr = on_stderr;
 	if (on_stderr)
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.h
--- openssh-7.4p1/log.h.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/log.h	2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100
-@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ typedef enum {
- typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, const char *, void *);
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.544843434 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/log.h	2021-04-19 14:56:46.931042176 +0200
+@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, int, const char *, void *);
 
- void     log_init(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
-+void     log_init_handler(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int, int);
+ void     log_init(const char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
+void     log_init_handler(const char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int, int);
 LogLevel log_level_get(void);
 int      log_change_level(LogLevel);
 int      log_is_on_stderr(void);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.311168085 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c	2016-12-23 15:16:42.154193100 +0100
-@@ -307,6 +307,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.526843298 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c	2021-04-19 14:55:25.286424043 +0200
+@@ -297,6 +297,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s
 		close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
 	pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
 
@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
 	authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
 	memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
 	ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
-@@ -405,6 +407,8 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *p
+@@ -408,6 +410,8 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh,
 	close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
 	pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
 
@ -58,16 +58,16 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
 	monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
 	ssh_signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
 	ssh_signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
-@@ -472,7 +476,7 @@ monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonito
+@@ -480,7 +484,7 @@ monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonito
+ 	/* Log it */
 	if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
- 		fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
- 		    __func__, level);
-	do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
-+	do_log2(level, "%s [%s]", msg, pmonitor->m_state);
+ 		fatal_f("invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)", level);
+-	sshlogdirect(level, forced, "%s [preauth]", msg);
+	sshlogdirect(level, forced, "%s [%s]", msg, pmonitor->m_state);
 
 	sshbuf_free(logmsg);
 	free(msg);
-@@ -1719,13 +1723,28 @@ monitor_init(void)
+@@ -1868,13 +1872,28 @@ monitor_init(void)
 	mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
 	monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
 
@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
 +		xasprintf(&dev_log_path, "%s/dev/log", chroot_dir);
 +
 +		if (stat(dev_log_path, &dev_log_stat) != 0) {
-+			debug("%s: /dev/log doesn't exist in %s chroot - will try to log via monitor using [postauth] suffix", __func__, chroot_dir);
+			debug_f("/dev/log doesn't exist in %s chroot - will try to log via monitor using [postauth] suffix", chroot_dir);
 +			do_logfds = 1;
 +		}
 +		free(dev_log_path);
@ -98,10 +98,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
 }
 
 #ifdef GSSAPI
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h
--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h	2016-12-23 15:16:28.372190424 +0100
-@@ -83,10 +83,11 @@ struct monitor {
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.527843305 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
+@@ -80,10 +80,11 @@ struct monitor {
 	int			 m_log_sendfd;
 	struct kex		**m_pkex;
 	pid_t			 m_pid;
@ -114,9 +114,9 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h
 
 struct Authctxt;
 void monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *, struct monitor *);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.319168086 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 15:18:18.742211853 +0100
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.534843358 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ login_cap_t *lc;
 
 static int is_child = 0;
@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
 
 /* File containing userauth info, if ExposeAuthInfo set */
 static char *auth_info_file = NULL;
-@@ -619,6 +620,7 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+@@ -661,6 +662,7 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, con
 	int ret;
 	const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL;
 	char session_type[1024];
@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
 
 	if (options.adm_forced_command) {
 		original_command = command;
-@@ -676,6 +678,10 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+@@ -720,6 +722,10 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, con
 			tty += 5;
 	}
 
@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
 	verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
 	    session_type,
 	    tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
-@@ -1486,14 +1492,6 @@ child_close_fds(void)
+@@ -1524,14 +1530,6 @@ child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh)
 
 	/* Stop directing logs to a high-numbered fd before we close it */
 	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
 }
 
 /*
-@@ -1629,8 +1627,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+@@ -1665,8 +1663,6 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
 			exit(1);
 	}
 
@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
 	do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell);
 
 	/* restore SIGPIPE for child */
-@@ -1653,9 +1649,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+@@ -1691,9 +1687,17 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
 		argv[i] = NULL;
 		optind = optreset = 1;
 		__progname = argv[0];
@ -187,9 +187,9 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
 	fflush(NULL);
 
 	/* Get the last component of the shell name. */
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h
--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h	2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
@@ -97,5 +97,5 @@
 
 struct passwd;
@ -197,10 +197,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h
 -int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *);
 +int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *, int);
 void	sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100
-@@ -1497,7 +1497,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
+@@ -1644,7 +1644,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
 }
 
 int
@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c
 {
 	fd_set *rset, *wset;
 	int i, r, in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
-@@ -1511,7 +1511,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+@@ -1657,7 +1657,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
 	extern char *__progname;
 
 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c
 
 	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
 
-@@ -1582,7 +1582,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+@@ -1730,7 +1730,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
 		}
 	}
 
@ -227,20 +227,20 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c
 
 	/*
 	 * On platforms where we can, avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps}
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100
-@@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
+@@ -50,5 +50,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 		return 1;
 	}
 
 -	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
 +	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw, 0));
 }
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.328168088 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.332168088 +0100
-@@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.543843426 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
+@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
 	}
 
 	/* New socket pair */
@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
 
 	pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
 	if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
-@@ -668,6 +668,11 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+@@ -578,6 +578,11 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
 
 	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
 	pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
--- a/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
@ -34,19 +34,19 @@ index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
 +
 +	contexts_path = selinux_openssh_contexts_path();
 +	if (contexts_path == NULL) {
-+		debug3("%s: Failed to get the path to SELinux context", __func__);
+		debug3_f("Failed to get the path to SELinux context");
 +		return;
 +	}
 +
 +	if ((contexts_file = fopen(contexts_path, "r")) == NULL) {
-+		debug("%s: Failed to open SELinux context file", __func__);
+		debug_f("Failed to open SELinux context file");
 +		return;
 +	}
 +
 +	if (fstat(fileno(contexts_file), &sb) != 0 ||
 +	    sb.st_uid != 0 || (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
-+		logit("%s: SELinux context file needs to be owned by root"
-+		    " and not writable by anyone else", __func__);
+		logit_f("SELinux context file needs to be owned by root"
+		    " and not writable by anyone else");
 +		fclose(contexts_file);
 +		return;
 +	}
@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
 +		if (arg && strcmp(arg, "privsep_preauth") == 0) {
 +			arg = strdelim(&cp);
 +			if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
-+				debug("%s: privsep_preauth is empty", __func__);
+				debug_f("privsep_preauth is empty");
 +				fclose(contexts_file);
 +				return;
 +			}
@ -80,8 +80,8 @@ index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
 +	fclose(contexts_file);
 +
 +	if (preauth_context == NULL) {
-+		debug("%s: Unable to find 'privsep_preauth' option in"
-+		    " SELinux context file", __func__);
+		debug_f("Unable to find 'privsep_preauth' option in"
+		    " SELinux context file");
 +		return;
 +	}
 +
@ -101,10 +101,11 @@ index 22ea8ef..1fc963d 100644
 	if ((cx = index(cx + 1, ':')))
 		strlcat(newctx, cx, newlen);
 -	debug3("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
-+	debug("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
+	debug_f("setting context from '%s' to '%s'",
 	    oldctx, newctx);
 	if (setcon(newctx) < 0)
- 		switchlog("%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s", __func__,
+ 		do_log2(log_level, "%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s",
+		    __func__, newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno));
 diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
 index cb51f99..8b7cda2 100644
 --- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
@ -39,8 +39,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
 		options->password_authentication = 1;
 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
@@ -418,7 +421,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes,
- 	sHostKeyAlgorithms,
+ 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms,
+ 	sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
 	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
 -	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
 +	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-ctr-cavstest.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-ctr-cavstest.patch
@ -1,257 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in
--- openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs	2015-03-18 11:22:05.493289018 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in	2015-03-18 11:22:44.504196316 +0100
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
- SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
- SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
- SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
-+CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest
- SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
- SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
- PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
-@@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
- 
- .SUFFIXES: .lo
- 
-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
- 
- XMSS_OBJS=\
- 	ssh-xmss.o \
-@@ -194,6 +195,9 @@ ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) l
- ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS)
- 
-+ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
-+
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
- 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
- 
-@@ -326,6 +330,7 @@ install-files:
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
-+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
-diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c
--- openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs	2015-03-18 11:22:05.521288952 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c	2015-03-18 11:22:05.521288952 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
-+/*
-+ *
-+ * invocation (all of the following are equal):
-+ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6
-+ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 --iv 00000000000000000000000000000000
-+ * echo -n a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 | ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <sys/param.h>
-+#include <stdarg.h>
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <ctype.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "ssherr.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+
-+/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
-+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-+
-+void usage(void) {
-+        fprintf(stderr, "Usage: ctr-cavstest --algo <ssh-crypto-algorithm>\n"
-+                        "                    --key <hexadecimal-key> --mode <encrypt|decrypt>\n"
-+                        "                    [--iv <hexadecimal-iv>] --data <hexadecimal-data>\n\n"
-+                        "Hexadecimal output is printed to stdout.\n"
-+                        "Hexadecimal input data can be alternatively read from stdin.\n");
-+        exit(1);
-+}
-+
-+void *fromhex(char *hex, size_t *len)
-+{
-+        unsigned char *bin;
-+        char *p;
-+        size_t n = 0;
-+        int shift = 4;
-+        unsigned char out = 0;
-+        unsigned char *optr;
-+
-+        bin = xmalloc(strlen(hex)/2);
-+        optr = bin;
-+
-+        for (p = hex; *p != '\0'; ++p) {
-+                unsigned char c;
-+
-+                c = *p;
-+                if (isspace(c))
-+                        continue;
-+
-+                if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
-+                        c = c - '0';
-+                } else if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') {
-+                        c = c - 'A' + 10;
-+                } else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') {
-+                        c = c - 'a' + 10;
-+                } else {
-+                        /* truncate on nonhex cipher */
-+                        break;
-+                }
-+
-+                out |= c << shift;
-+                shift = (shift + 4) % 8;
-+
-+                if (shift) {
-+                        *(optr++) = out;
-+                        out = 0;
-+                        ++n;
-+                }
-+        }
-+
-+        *len = n;
-+        return bin;
-+}
-+
-+#define READ_CHUNK 4096
-+#define MAX_READ_SIZE 1024*1024*100
-+char *read_stdin(void)
-+{
-+        char *buf;
-+        size_t n, total = 0;
-+
-+        buf = xmalloc(READ_CHUNK);
-+
-+        do {
-+                n = fread(buf + total, 1, READ_CHUNK, stdin);
-+                if (n < READ_CHUNK) /* terminate on short read */
-+                        break;
-+
-+                total += n;
-+                buf = xreallocarray(buf, total + READ_CHUNK, 1);
-+        } while(total < MAX_READ_SIZE);
-+        return buf;
-+}
-+
-+int main (int argc, char *argv[])
-+{
-+
-+        const struct sshcipher *c;
-+        struct sshcipher_ctx *cc;
-+        char *algo = "aes128-ctr";
-+        char *hexkey = NULL;
-+        char *hexiv = "00000000000000000000000000000000";
-+        char *hexdata = NULL;
-+        char *p;
-+        int i, r;
-+        int encrypt = 1;
-+        void *key;
-+        size_t keylen;
-+        void *iv;
-+        size_t ivlen;
-+        void *data;
-+        size_t datalen;
-+        void *outdata;
-+
-+        for (i = 1; i < argc; ++i) {
-+                if (strcmp(argv[i], "--algo") == 0) {
-+                        algo = argv[++i];
-+                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--key") == 0) {
-+                        hexkey = argv[++i];
-+                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--mode") == 0) {
-+                        ++i;
-+                        if (argv[i] == NULL) {
-+                                usage();
-+                        }
-+                        if (strncmp(argv[i], "enc", 3) == 0) {
-+                                encrypt = 1;
-+                        } else if (strncmp(argv[i], "dec", 3) == 0) {
-+                                encrypt = 0;
-+                        } else {
-+                                usage();
-+                        }
-+                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--iv") == 0) {
-+                        hexiv = argv[++i];
-+                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--data") == 0) {
-+                        hexdata = argv[++i];
-+                }
-+        }
-+
-+        if (hexkey == NULL || algo == NULL) {
-+                usage();
-+        }
-+
-+	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
-+
-+	c = cipher_by_name(algo);
-+	if (c == NULL) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unknown algorithm\n");
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+        if (hexdata == NULL) {
-+                hexdata = read_stdin();
-+        } else {
-+                hexdata = xstrdup(hexdata);
-+        }
-+
-+        key = fromhex(hexkey, &keylen);
-+
-+	if (keylen != 16 && keylen != 24 && keylen == 32) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported key length\n");
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+        iv = fromhex(hexiv, &ivlen);
-+
-+        if (ivlen != 16) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported iv length\n");
-+		return 2;
-+        }
-+
-+        data = fromhex(hexdata, &datalen);
-+
-+	if (data == NULL || datalen == 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: no data to encrypt/decrypt\n");
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((r = cipher_init(&cc, c, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, encrypt)) != 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: cipher_init failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+	free(key);
-+	free(iv);
-+
-+	outdata = malloc(datalen);
-+	if(outdata == NULL) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: memory allocation failure\n");
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((r = cipher_crypt(cc, 0, outdata, data, datalen, 0, 0)) != 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: cipher_crypt failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+	free(data);
-+
-+	cipher_free(cc);
-+
-+        for (p = outdata; datalen > 0; ++p, --datalen) {
-+		printf("%02X", (unsigned char)*p);
-+	}
-+
-+        free(outdata);
-+
-+        printf("\n");
-+        return 0;
-+}
-+
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-diff -up openssh/auth.c.keycat openssh/misc.c
--- openssh/auth.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.158849606 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth.c	2015-06-24 11:04:23.989868638 +0200
-@@ -966,6 +966,14 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
+diff -up openssh/misc.c.keycat openssh/misc.c
+--- openssh/misc.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.158849606 +0200
+++ openssh/misc.c	2015-06-24 11:04:23.989868638 +0200
+@@ -966,6 +966,13 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
+ 			error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
 			_exit(1);
 		}
- 
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 +		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
 +			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
@ -12,10 +12,9 @@ diff -up openssh/auth.c.keycat openssh/misc.c
 +			_exit(127);
 +		}
 +#endif
-+
- 		execve(av[0], av, child_env);
- 		error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno));
- 		_exit(127);
+ 		if (env != NULL)
+ 			execve(av[0], av, env);
+ 		else
 diff -up openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
 --- openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
 +++ openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
 		options->password_authentication = 1;
 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
@@ -399,7 +402,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
+ 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
 	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
 -	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache,
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-
 --- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
@@ -419,6 +419,28 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
- 	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+ 	debug3_f("done");
 }
 
 +void
@ -25,15 +25,15 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-
 +		return;
 +
 +	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
-+		logit("%s: getexeccon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		logit_f("getexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
 +		return;
 +	}
 +	if (ctx != NULL) {
 +		/* unset exec context before we will lose this capabililty */
 +		if (setexeccon(NULL) != 0)
-+			fatal("%s: setexeccon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+			fatal_f("setexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
 +		if (setcon(ctx) != 0)
-+			fatal("%s: setcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+			fatal_f("setcon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
 +		freecon(ctx);
 +	}
 +}
--- a/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
@ -1,3 +1,79 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/addr.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/addr.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/addr.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-8.5p1/addr.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100
+@@ -312,8 +312,10 @@ addr_pton(const char *p, struct xaddr *n
+ 	if (p == NULL || getaddrinfo(p, NULL, &hints, &ai) != 0)
+ 		return -1;
+ 
+-	if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL)
+	if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL) {
+		freeaddrinfo(ai);
+ 		return -1;
+	}
+ 
+ 	if (n != NULL && addr_sa_to_xaddr(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
+ 	    n) == -1) {
+@@ -336,12 +338,16 @@ addr_sa_pton(const char *h, const char *
+ 	if (h == NULL || getaddrinfo(h, s, &hints, &ai) != 0)
+ 		return -1;
+ 
+-	if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL)
+	if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL) {
+		freeaddrinfo(ai);
+ 		return -1;
+	}
+ 
+ 	if (sa != NULL) {
+-		if (slen < ai->ai_addrlen)
+		if (slen < ai->ai_addrlen) {
+			freeaddrinfo(ai);
+ 			return -1;
+		}
+ 		memcpy(sa, &ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
+ 	}
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.724967756 +0100
+++ openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100
+@@ -426,6 +426,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx,
+ 		umask(old_umask);
+ 		if (tmpfd == -1) {
+ 			logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+			free(ccname);
+ 			return oerrno;
+ 		}
+ 
+@@ -433,6 +434,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx,
+ 			oerrno = errno;
+ 			logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+ 			close(tmpfd);
+			free(ccname);
+ 			return oerrno;
+ 		}
+ 		/* make sure the KRB5CCNAME is set for non-standard location */
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100
+@@ -409,8 +409,10 @@ sshauthopt_parse(const char *opts, const
+ 				errstr = "invalid environment string";
+ 				goto fail;
+ 			}
+-			if ((cp = strdup(opt)) == NULL)
+			if ((cp = strdup(opt)) == NULL) {
+				free(opt);
+ 				goto alloc_fail;
+			}
+ 			cp[tmp - opt] = '\0'; /* truncate at '=' */
+ 			if (!valid_env_name(cp)) {
+ 				free(cp);
+@@ -706,6 +708,7 @@ serialise_array(struct sshbuf *m, char *
+ 		return r;
+ 	}
+ 	/* success */
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.881788686 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c	2016-12-23 16:42:36.244818763 +0100
@ -16,6 +92,195 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
 			set_nonblock(efd);
 	}
 }
+@@ -1875,7 +1875,7 @@ channel_post_connecting(struct ssh *ssh,
+ 		debug("channel %d: connection failed: %s",
+ 		    c->self, strerror(err));
+ 		/* Try next address, if any */
+-		if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) > 0) {
+		if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) >= 0) {
+ 			close(c->sock);
+ 			c->sock = c->rfd = c->wfd = sock;
+ 			channel_find_maxfd(ssh->chanctxt);
+@@ -3804,7 +3804,7 @@ int
+ channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd)
+ {
+ 	int r, success = 0, idx = -1;
+-	char *host_to_connect, *listen_host, *listen_path;
+	char *host_to_connect = NULL, *listen_host = NULL, *listen_path = NULL;
+ 	int port_to_connect, listen_port;
+ 
+ 	/* Send the forward request to the remote side. */
+@@ -3832,7 +3832,6 @@ channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct
+ 	success = 1;
+ 	if (success) {
+ 		/* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */
+-		host_to_connect = listen_host = listen_path = NULL;
+ 		port_to_connect = listen_port = 0;
+ 		if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) {
+ 			host_to_connect = xstrdup(fwd->connect_path);
+@@ -3853,6 +3852,9 @@ channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct
+ 		    host_to_connect, port_to_connect,
+ 		    listen_host, listen_path, listen_port, NULL);
+ 	}
+	free(host_to_connect);
+	free(listen_host);
+	free(listen_path);
+ 	return idx;
+ }
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/compat.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/compat.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/compat.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.768968062 +0100
+++ openssh-8.5p1/compat.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100
+@@ -191,10 +191,12 @@ compat_kex_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, cha
+ 		return p;
+ 	debug2_f("original KEX proposal: %s", p);
+ 	if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0)
+		/* coverity[overwrite_var : FALSE] */
+ 		if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p,
+ 		    "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org")) == NULL)
+ 			fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
+ 	if ((ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) != 0) {
+		/* coverity[overwrite_var : FALSE] */
+ 		if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p,
+ 		    "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,"
+ 		    "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1")) == NULL)
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/dns.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/dns.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/dns.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-8.5p1/dns.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100
+@@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname
+ 			    &hostkey_digest_len, hostkey)) {
+ 				error("Error calculating key fingerprint.");
+ 				freerrset(fingerprints);
+				free(dnskey_digest);
+ 				return -1;
+ 			}
+ 		}
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity	2021-03-26 11:52:46.613942552 +0100
+++ openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c	2021-03-26 11:54:37.881726318 +0100
+@@ -167,8 +167,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup
+ 			enclen = __b64_ntop(digest,
+ 			    ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5), encoded,
+ 			    ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5) * 2);
+-
+#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wstringop-overflow"
+ 			cp = strncpy(s, kex, strlen(kex));
+#pragma pop
+ 			for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
+ 				(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+ 				if (sshbuf_len(buf) != 0 &&
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/kexgssc.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/kexgssc.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/kexgssc.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.711967665 +0100
+++ openssh-8.5p1/kexgssc.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100
+@@ -98,8 +98,10 @@ kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	default:
+ 		fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
+ 	}
+-	if (r != 0)
+	if (r != 0) {
+		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
+ 		return r;
+	}
+ 
+ 	token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/krl.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/krl.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/krl.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-8.5p1/krl.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100
+@@ -1209,6 +1209,7 @@ ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, st
+ 	sshkey_free(key);
+ 	sshbuf_free(copy);
+ 	sshbuf_free(sect);
+	/* coverity[leaked_storage : FALSE] */
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1261,6 +1262,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons
+ 		return r;
+ 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb);
+ 	free(rb.blob);
+	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
+ 	if (erb != NULL) {
+ 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA1"));
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+@@ -1271,6 +1273,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons
+ 		return r;
+ 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, &rb);
+ 	free(rb.blob);
+	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
+ 	if (erb != NULL) {
+ 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA256"));
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+@@ -1282,6 +1285,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons
+ 		return r;
+ 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb);
+ 	free(rb.blob);
+	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
+ 	if (erb != NULL) {
+ 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by explicit key"));
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c.coverity	2021-03-24 13:18:53.793225885 +0100
+++ openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c	2021-03-24 13:21:27.948404751 +0100
+@@ -690,9 +690,11 @@ construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li,
+ 	 */
+ 
+ 	/* Use strncpy because we don't necessarily want null termination */
+	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
+ 	strncpy(ut->ut_name, li->username,
+ 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_name, li->username));
+ # ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
+	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
+ 	strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname,
+ 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname));
+ # endif
+@@ -1690,6 +1692,7 @@ record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, con
+ 
+ 	memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(ut));
+ 	/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
+	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
+ 	strncpy(ut.ut_user, username, sizeof(ut.ut_user));
+ 	strlcpy(ut.ut_line, "ssh:notty", sizeof(ut.ut_line));
+ 
+@@ -1699,6 +1702,7 @@ record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, con
+ 	ut.ut_pid = getpid();
+ 
+ 	/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
+	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
+ 	strncpy(ut.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(ut.ut_host));
+ 
+ 	if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) &&
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/misc.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.745967902 +0100
+++ openssh-8.5p1/misc.c	2021-03-24 13:31:47.037079617 +0100
+@@ -1425,6 +1425,8 @@ sanitise_stdfd(void)
+ 	}
+ 	if (nullfd > STDERR_FILENO)
+ 		close(nullfd);
+	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
+	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
+ }
+ 
+ char *
+@@ -2511,6 +2513,7 @@ stdfd_devnull(int do_stdin, int do_stdou
+ 	}
+ 	if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
+ 		close(devnull);
+	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.784968173 +0100
+@@ -476,6 +476,7 @@ write_checkpoint(char *cpfile, u_int32_t
+ 	else
+ 		logit("failed to write to checkpoint file '%s': %s", cpfile,
+ 		    strerror(errno));
+	/* coverity[leaked_storage : FALSE] */
+ }
+ 
+ static unsigned long
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.888788688 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
@ -28,13 +293,22 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
 		;
 
 	if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
+@@ -1678,7 +1678,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock,
+ 	s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
+ 
+ 	debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ttyfd);
+-
+	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE] */
+ 	return (0);
+ 
+  error:
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.892788689 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
@@ -525,10 +525,10 @@ mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd,
 	if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
 	    (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
- 		error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__);
+ 		error_f("cannot allocate fds for pty");
 -		if (tmp1 > 0)
 +		if (tmp1 >= 0)
 			close(tmp1);
@ -57,6 +331,17 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/open
 	int i;
 
 	if (sa == NULL) {
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.778968131 +0100
+++ openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.785968180 +0100
+@@ -1847,6 +1847,7 @@ parse_pubkey_algos:
+ 			} else if (r != 0) {
+ 				error("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.",
+ 				    filename, linenum, arg2);
+				free(arg2);
+ 				return -1;
+ 			}
+ 			free(arg2);
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/scp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/scp.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/scp.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.856788681 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/scp.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
@ -120,11 +405,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c
 -		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
 +	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
 +		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
- 			debug2("%s: reading", __func__);
+ 			debug2_f("reading");
 }
 
@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ server_request_tun(void)
- 		debug("%s: invalid tun", __func__);
+ 		debug_f("invalid tun");
 		goto done;
 	}
 -	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) {
@ -132,6 +417,24 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c
 		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY &&
 		    auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun)
 			goto done;
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/session.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/session.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/session.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.777968124 +0100
+++ openssh-8.5p1/session.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.786968187 +0100
+@@ -1223,12 +1223,14 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
+ 	/* Environment specified by admin */
+ 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) {
+ 		cp = xstrdup(options.setenv[i]);
+		/* coverity[overwrite_var : FALSE] */
+ 		if ((value = strchr(cp, '=')) == NULL) {
+ 			/* shouldn't happen; vars are checked in servconf.c */
+ 			fatal("Invalid config SetEnv: %s", options.setenv[i]);
+ 		}
+ 		*value++ = '\0';
+ 		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, cp, value);
+		free(cp);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
@ -144,9 +447,45 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c
 	}
 
 	_exit(1);
+@@ -762,6 +762,8 @@ process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
+ 			    fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
+ 				err = -1;
+ 		}
+		free(abs_dst);
+		abs_dst = NULL;
+ 	}
+ 
+ out:
+@@ -985,6 +987,7 @@ do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, co
+ 		if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) {
+ 			if (g.gl_statv[i] == NULL) {
+ 				error("no stat information for %s", fname);
+				free(fname);
+ 				continue;
+ 			}
+ 			lname = ls_file(fname, g.gl_statv[i], 1,
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.786968187 +0100
+@@ -1256,6 +1256,7 @@ sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, s
+ 		freezero(rks[i], sizeof(*rks[i]));
+ 	}
+ 	free(rks);
+	free(device);
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
+@@ -869,6 +869,7 @@ sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *pro
+ 
+ 		if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider, uri) != 0) {
+ 			error("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI");
+			pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
+ 			return NULL;
+ 		}
+ 		/* validate also provider from URI */
@@ -1220,8 +1220,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	sanitise_stdfd();
 
@ -158,6 +497,17 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
 
 	platform_disable_tracing(0);	/* strict=no */
 
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.779968138 +0100
+++ openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.786968187 +0100
+@@ -1746,6 +1746,7 @@ control_persist_detach(void)
+ 		close(muxserver_sock);
+ 		muxserver_sock = -1;
+ 		options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO;
+		/* coverity[leaked_handle: FALSE]*/
+ 		muxclient(options.control_path);
+ 		/* muxclient() doesn't return on success. */
+ 		fatal("Failed to connect to new control master");
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.897788690 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.904788692 +0100
@ -183,3 +533,67 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
 }
 
 /*
+@@ -2474,7 +2479,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
+ 		ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit,
+ 		    options.rekey_interval);
+-
+	/* coverity[leaked_storage : FALSE]*/
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
+ 	    ssh, list_hostkey_types());
+ 
+@@ -2519,8 +2524,11 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 
+ 	if (newstr)
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
+-	else
+	else {
+ 		fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
+		free(gss);
+	     }
+	     /* coverity[leaked_storage: FALSE]*/
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.780968145 +0100
+++ openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.787968194 +0100
+@@ -2332,6 +2332,9 @@ update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw,
+ 			r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen);
+ 			if (r != 0)
+ 				fatal_fr(r, "revoke key failed");
+			freezero(blob, blen);
+			blob = NULL;
+			blen = 0;
+ 		} else {
+ 			if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) {
+ 				cp += 4;
+@@ -2879,6 +2882,7 @@ do_moduli_screen(const char *out_file, c
+ 		} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "start-line=", 11) == 0) {
+ 			start_lineno = strtoul(opts[i]+11, NULL, 10);
+ 		} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "checkpoint=", 11) == 0) {
+			free(checkpoint);
+ 			checkpoint = xstrdup(opts[i]+11);
+ 		} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "generator=", 10) == 0) {
+ 			generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum(
+@@ -2920,6 +2924,9 @@ do_moduli_screen(const char *out_file, c
+ #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ 	fatal("Moduli screening is not supported");
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+	free(checkpoint);
+	if (in != stdin)
+		fclose(in);
+ }
+ 
+ static char *
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.787968194 +0100
+@@ -515,6 +515,7 @@ hash_file(int fd, const char *hashalg, s
+ 			oerrno = errno;
+ 			error_f("read: %s", strerror(errno));
+ 			ssh_digest_free(ctx);
+			ctx = NULL;
+ 			errno = oerrno;
+ 			r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ 			goto out;
--- a/openssh-6.7p1-kdf-cavs.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.7p1-kdf-cavs.patch
@ -1,618 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in
--- openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.kdf-cavs	2015-03-18 11:23:46.346049359 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in	2015-03-18 11:24:20.395968445 +0100
-@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-h
- SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
- SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
- CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest
-+SSH_CAVS=$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs
- SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
- SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
- PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
-@@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
- 
- .SUFFIXES: .lo
- 
-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT)
- 
- XMSS_OBJS=\
- 	ssh-xmss.o \
-@@ -198,6 +199,9 @@ ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHD
- ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
- 
-+ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-cavs.o $(SKOBJS)
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-cavs.o $(SKOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-+
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
- 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
- 
-@@ -331,6 +335,8 @@ install-files:
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
-+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT)
-+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-cavs_driver.pl $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs_driver.pl
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
-diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c
--- openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c.kdf-cavs	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
-+ *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
-+ *    products derived from this software without specific prior
-+ *    written permission.
-+ *
-+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
-+ * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2
-+ * are required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
-+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
-+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
-+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
-+ * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
-+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
-+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
-+ * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
-+ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
-+ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
-+ * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
-+ * DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <errno.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+#include "kex.h"
-+#include "packet.h"
-+#include "digest.h"
-+
-+static int bin_char(unsigned char hex)
-+{
-+	if (48 <= hex && 57 >= hex)
-+		return (hex - 48);
-+	if (65 <= hex && 70 >= hex)
-+		return (hex - 55);
-+	if (97 <= hex && 102 >= hex)
-+		return (hex - 87);
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Convert hex representation into binary string
-+ * @hex input buffer with hex representation
-+ * @hexlen length of hex
-+ * @bin output buffer with binary data
-+ * @binlen length of already allocated bin buffer (should be at least
-+ *	   half of hexlen -- if not, only a fraction of hexlen is converted)
-+ */
-+static void hex2bin(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
-+		    unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen)
-+{
-+	size_t i = 0;
-+	size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
-+
-+	for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
-+		bin[i] = bin_char(hex[(i*2)]) << 4;
-+		bin[i] |= bin_char(hex[((i*2)+1)]);
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Allocate sufficient space for binary representation of hex
-+ * and convert hex into bin
-+ *
-+ * Caller must free bin
-+ * @hex input buffer with hex representation
-+ * @hexlen length of hex
-+ * @bin return value holding the pointer to the newly allocated buffer
-+ * @binlen return value holding the allocated size of bin
-+ *
-+ * return: 0 on success, !0 otherwise
-+ */
-+static int hex2bin_alloc(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
-+			 unsigned char **bin, size_t *binlen)
-+{
-+	unsigned char *out = NULL;
-+	size_t outlen = 0;
-+
-+	if (!hexlen)
-+		return -EINVAL;
-+
-+	outlen = (hexlen + 1) / 2;
-+
-+	out = calloc(1, outlen);
-+	if (!out)
-+		return -errno;
-+
-+	hex2bin(hex, hexlen, out, outlen);
-+	*bin = out;
-+	*binlen = outlen;
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static char hex_char_map_l[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
-+				 '8', '9', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f' };
-+static char hex_char_map_u[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
-+				 '8', '9', 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F' };
-+static char hex_char(unsigned int bin, int u)
-+{
-+	if (bin < sizeof(hex_char_map_l))
-+		return (u) ? hex_char_map_u[bin] : hex_char_map_l[bin];
-+	return 'X';
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Convert binary string into hex representation
-+ * @bin input buffer with binary data
-+ * @binlen length of bin
-+ * @hex output buffer to store hex data
-+ * @hexlen length of already allocated hex buffer (should be at least
-+ *	   twice binlen -- if not, only a fraction of binlen is converted)
-+ * @u case of hex characters (0=>lower case, 1=>upper case)
-+ */
-+static void bin2hex(const unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen,
-+		    char *hex, size_t hexlen, int u)
-+{
-+	size_t i = 0;
-+	size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
-+
-+	for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
-+		hex[(i*2)] = hex_char((bin[i] >> 4), u);
-+		hex[((i*2)+1)] = hex_char((bin[i] & 0x0f), u);
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+struct kdf_cavs {
-+	unsigned char *K;
-+	size_t Klen;
-+	unsigned char *H;
-+	size_t Hlen;
-+	unsigned char *session_id;
-+	size_t session_id_len;
-+
-+	unsigned int iv_len;
-+	unsigned int ek_len;
-+	unsigned int ik_len;
-+};
-+
-+static int sshkdf_cavs(struct kdf_cavs *test)
-+{
-+	int ret = 0;
-+	struct kex kex;
-+	struct sshbuf *Kb = NULL;
-+	BIGNUM *Kbn = NULL;
-+	int mode = 0;
-+	struct newkeys *ctoskeys;
-+	struct newkeys *stockeys;
-+	struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
-+
-+#define HEXOUTLEN 500
-+	char hex[HEXOUTLEN];
-+
-+	memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(struct kex));
-+
-+	Kbn = BN_new();
-+	BN_bin2bn(test->K, test->Klen, Kbn);
-+	if (!Kbn) {
-+		printf("cannot convert K into bignum\n");
-+		ret = 1;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	Kb = sshbuf_new();
-+	if (!Kb) {
-+		printf("cannot convert K into sshbuf\n");
-+		ret = 1;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	sshbuf_put_bignum2(Kb, Kbn);
-+
-+	kex.session_id = test->session_id;
-+	kex.session_id_len = test->session_id_len;
-+
-+	/* setup kex */
-+
-+	/* select the right hash based on struct ssh_digest digests */
-+	switch (test->ik_len) {
-+		case 20:
-+			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
-+			break;
-+		case 32:
-+			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA256;
-+			break;
-+		case 48:
-+			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA384;
-+			break;
-+		case 64:
-+			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA512;
-+			break;
-+		default:
-+			printf("Wrong hash type %u\n", test->ik_len);
-+			ret = 1;
-+			goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* implement choose_enc */
-+	for (mode = 0; mode < 2; mode++) {
-+		kex.newkeys[mode] = calloc(1, sizeof(struct newkeys));
-+		if (!kex.newkeys[mode]) {
-+			printf("allocation of newkeys failed\n");
-+			ret = 1;
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.iv_len = test->iv_len;
-+		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.key_len = test->ek_len;
-+		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.block_size = (test->iv_len == 64) ? 8 : 16;
-+		kex.newkeys[mode]->mac.key_len = test->ik_len;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* implement kex_choose_conf */
-+	kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.key_len;
-+	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size)
-+		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size;
-+	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len)
-+		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len;
-+	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len)
-+		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len;
-+
-+	/* MODE_OUT (1) -> server to client
-+	 * MODE_IN (0) -> client to server */
-+	kex.server = 1;
-+
-+	/* do it */
-+	if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, -1, -1)) == NULL){
-+		printf("Allocation error\n");
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	ssh->kex = &kex;
-+	kex_derive_keys(ssh, test->H, test->Hlen, Kb);
-+
-+	ctoskeys = kex.newkeys[0];
-+	stockeys = kex.newkeys[1];
-+
-+	/* get data */
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(ctoskeys->enc.iv, (size_t)ctoskeys->enc.iv_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Initial IV (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(stockeys->enc.iv, (size_t)stockeys->enc.iv_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Initial IV (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
-+
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(ctoskeys->enc.key, (size_t)ctoskeys->enc.key_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Encryption key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(stockeys->enc.key, (size_t)stockeys->enc.key_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Encryption key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
-+
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(ctoskeys->mac.key, (size_t)ctoskeys->mac.key_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Integrity key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(stockeys->mac.key, (size_t)stockeys->mac.key_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Integrity key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
-+
-+out:
-+	if (Kbn)
-+		BN_free(Kbn);
-+	if (Kb)
-+		sshbuf_free(Kb);
-+	if (ssh)
-+		ssh_packet_close(ssh);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+static void usage(void)
-+{
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\nOpenSSH KDF CAVS Test\n\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "Usage:\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-K\tShared secret string\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-H\tHash string\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-s\tSession ID string\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-i\tIV length to be generated\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-e\tEncryption key length to be generated\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-m\tMAC key length to be generated\n");
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Test command example:
-+ * ./ssh-cavs -K 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 -H d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -s d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -i 8 -e 24 -m 20
-+ *
-+ * Initial IV (client to server) = 4bb320d1679dfd3a
-+ * Initial IV (server to client) = 43dea6fdf263a308
-+ * Encryption key (client to server) = 13048cc600b9d3cf9095aa6cf8e2ff9cf1c54ca0520c89ed
-+ * Encryption key (server to client) = 1e483c5134e901aa11fc4e0a524e7ec7b75556148a222bb0
-+ * Integrity key (client to server) = ecef63a092b0dcc585bdc757e01b2740af57d640
-+ * Integrity key (server to client) = 7424b05f3c44a72b4ebd281fb71f9cbe7b64d479
-+ */
-+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
-+{
-+	struct kdf_cavs test;
-+	int ret = 1;
-+	int opt = 0;
-+
-+	memset(&test, 0, sizeof(struct kdf_cavs));
-+	while((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "K:H:s:i:e:m:")) != -1)
-+	{
-+		size_t len = 0;
-+		switch(opt)
-+		{
-+			/*
-+			 * CAVS K is MPINT
-+			 * we want a hex (i.e. the caller must ensure the
-+			 * following transformations already happened):
-+			 * 	1. cut off first four bytes
-+			 * 	2. if most significant bit of value is
-+			 *	   1, prepend 0 byte
-+			 */
-+			case 'K':
-+				len = strlen(optarg);
-+				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
-+						    &test.K, &test.Klen);
-+				if (ret)
-+					goto out;
-+				break;
-+			case 'H':
-+				len = strlen(optarg);
-+				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
-+						    &test.H, &test.Hlen);
-+				if (ret)
-+					goto out;
-+				break;
-+			case 's':
-+				len = strlen(optarg);
-+				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
-+						    &test.session_id,
-+						    &test.session_id_len);
-+				if (ret)
-+					goto out;
-+				break;
-+			case 'i':
-+				test.iv_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
-+				break;
-+			case 'e':
-+				test.ek_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
-+				break;
-+			case 'm':
-+				test.ik_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
-+				break;
-+			default:
-+				usage();
-+				goto out;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	ret = sshkdf_cavs(&test);
-+
-+out:
-+	if (test.session_id)
-+		free(test.session_id);
-+	if (test.K)
-+		free(test.K);
-+	if (test.H)
-+		free(test.H);
-+	return ret;
-+
-+}
-diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl
--- openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl.kdf-cavs	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
-+#!/usr/bin/env perl
-+#
-+# CAVS test driver for OpenSSH
-+#
-+# Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
-+#
-+# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
-+# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
-+# in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
-+# to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
-+# copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
-+# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
-+#
-+# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
-+# all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
-+#
-+#                            NO WARRANTY
-+#
-+#    BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO WARRANTY
-+#    FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW.  EXCEPT WHEN
-+#    OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES
-+#    PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED
-+#    OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
-+#    MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  THE ENTIRE RISK AS
-+#    TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU.  SHOULD THE
-+#    PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING,
-+#    REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
-+#
-+#    IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING
-+#    WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MAY MODIFY AND/OR
-+#    REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES,
-+#    INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING
-+#    OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED
-+#    TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY
-+#    YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER
-+#    PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE
-+#    POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
-+#
-+use strict;
-+use warnings;
-+use IPC::Open2;
-+
-+# Executing a program by feeding STDIN and retrieving
-+# STDOUT
-+# $1: data string to be piped to the app on STDIN
-+# rest: program and args
-+# returns: STDOUT of program as string
-+sub pipe_through_program($@) {
-+	my $in = shift;
-+	my @args = @_;
-+
-+	my ($CO, $CI);
-+	my $pid = open2($CO, $CI, @args);
-+
-+	my $out = "";
-+	my $len = length($in);
-+	my $first = 1;
-+	while (1) {
-+		my $rin = "";
-+		my $win = "";
-+		# Output of prog is FD that we read
-+		vec($rin,fileno($CO),1) = 1;
-+		# Input of prog is FD that we write
-+		# check for $first is needed because we can have NULL input
-+		# that is to be written to the app
-+		if ( $len > 0 || $first) {
-+			(vec($win,fileno($CI),1) = 1);
-+			$first=0;
-+		}
-+		# Let us wait for 100ms
-+		my $nfound = select(my $rout=$rin, my $wout=$win, undef, 0.1);
-+		if ( $wout ) {
-+			my $written = syswrite($CI, $in, $len);
-+			die "broken pipe" if !defined $written;
-+			$len -= $written;
-+			substr($in, 0, $written) = "";
-+			if ($len <= 0) {
-+				close $CI or die "broken pipe: $!";
-+			}
-+		}
-+		if ( $rout ) {
-+			my $tmp_out = "";
-+			my $bytes_read = sysread($CO, $tmp_out, 4096);
-+			$out .= $tmp_out;
-+			last if ($bytes_read == 0);
-+		}
-+	}
-+	close $CO or die "broken pipe: $!";
-+	waitpid $pid, 0;
-+
-+	return $out;
-+}
-+
-+# Parser of CAVS test vector file
-+# $1: Test vector file
-+# $2: Output file for test results
-+# return: nothing
-+sub parse($$) {
-+	my $infile = shift;
-+	my $outfile = shift;
-+
-+	my $out = "";
-+
-+	my $K = "";
-+	my $H = "";
-+	my $session_id = "";
-+	my $ivlen = 0;
-+	my $eklen = "";
-+	my $iklen = "";
-+
-+	open(IN, "<$infile");
-+	while(<IN>) {
-+
-+		my $line = $_;
-+		chomp($line);
-+		$line =~ s/\r//;
-+
-+		if ($line =~ /\[SHA-1\]/) {
-+			$iklen = 20;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-256\]/) {
-+			$iklen = 32;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-384\]/) {
-+			$iklen = 48;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-512\]/) {
-+			$iklen = 64;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /^\[IV length\s*=\s*(.*)\]/) {
-+			$ivlen = $1;
-+			$ivlen = $ivlen / 8;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /^\[encryption key length\s*=\s*(.*)\]/) {
-+			$eklen = $1;
-+			$eklen = $eklen / 8;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /^K\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
-+			$K = $1;
-+			$K = substr($K, 8);
-+			$K = "00" . $K;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /^H\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
-+			$H = $1;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /^session_id\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
-+			$session_id = $1;
-+		}
-+		$out .= $line . "\n";
-+
-+		if ($K ne "" && $H ne "" && $session_id ne "" &&
-+		    $ivlen ne "" && $eklen ne "" && $iklen > 0) {
-+			$out .= pipe_through_program("", "./ssh-cavs -H $H -K $K -s $session_id -i $ivlen -e $eklen -m $iklen");
-+
-+			$K = "";
-+			$H = "";
-+			$session_id = "";
-+		}
-+	}
-+	close IN;
-+	$out =~ s/\n/\r\n/g; # make it a dos file
-+	open(OUT, ">$outfile") or die "Cannot create output file $outfile: $?";
-+	print OUT $out;
-+	close OUT;
-+}
-+
-+############################################################
-+#
-+# let us pretend to be C :-)
-+sub main() {
-+
-+	my $infile=$ARGV[0];
-+	die "Error: Test vector file $infile not found" if (! -f $infile);
-+
-+	my $outfile = $infile;
-+	# let us add .rsp regardless whether we could strip .req
-+	$outfile =~ s/\.req$//;
-+	$outfile .= ".rsp";
-+	if (-f $outfile) {
-+		die "Output file $outfile could not be removed: $?"
-+			unless unlink($outfile);
-+	}
-+	print STDERR "Performing tests from source file $infile with results stored in destination file $outfile\n";
-+
-+	# Do the job
-+	parse($infile, $outfile);
-+}
-+
-+###########################################
-+# Call it
-+main();
-+1;
--- a/openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
@ -13,33 +13,33 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
 +	struct sshbuf *m;
 +	int r, ret = 0;
 +
-+	debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
+	debug3_f("entering");
 +	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+ 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +	do {
 +		blen = atomicio(read, fdin, buf, sizeof(buf));
 +		if (blen == 0) /* closed pipe */
 +			break;
 +		if (blen != sizeof(buf)) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to read the buffer from child", __func__);
+			error_f("Failed to read the buffer from child");
 +			ret = -1;
 +			break;
 +		}
 +
 +		msg_len = get_u32(buf);
 +		if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
-+			fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len);
+			fatal_f("read: bad msg_len %d", msg_len);
 +		sshbuf_reset(m);
 +		if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, NULL)) != 0)
-+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+			fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +		if (atomicio(read, fdin, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to read the the buffer content from the child", __func__);
+			error_f("Failed to read the the buffer content from the child");
 +			ret = -1;
 +			break;
 +		}
 +		if (atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, buf, blen) != blen || 
 +		    atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to write the message to the monitor", __func__);
+			error_f("Failed to write the message to the monitor");
 +			ret = -1;
 +			break;
 +		}
--- a/openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644
 +	int ret = 0;
 +
 +	ret = ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb_context, &k5login_directory);
-+	debug3("%s: k5login_directory = %s (rv=%d)", __func__, k5login_directory, ret);
+	debug3_f("k5login_directory = %s (rv=%d)", k5login_directory, ret);
 +	if (k5login_directory == NULL || ret != 0) {
 +		/* If not set, the library will look for  k5login
 +		 * files in the user's home directory, with the filename  .k5login.
@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644
 +			k5login_directory[strlen(k5login_directory)-1] != '/' ? "/" : "",
 +			pw->pw_name);
 +	}
-+	debug("%s: Checking existence of file %s", __func__, file);
+	debug_f("Checking existence of file %s", file);
 
 -	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir);
 	return access(file, F_OK) == 0;
--- a/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
--- a/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
@ -2,9 +2,9 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
 --- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.188821236 +0200
 +++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
+ 
+ /* import */
 extern ServerOptions options;
- extern u_char *session_id2;
- extern u_int session_id2_len;
 +extern int inetd_flag;
 +extern int rexeced_flag;
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
@ -12,59 +12,59 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
 static char *
 format_key(const struct sshkey *key)
@@ -511,7 +514,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct ssh *ssh
- 
- 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", runas_pw, command,
+ 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command,
 	    ac, av, &f,
-	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
-+	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
+ 	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
+-	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
+	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
 +	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
 		goto out;
 
 	uid_swapped = 1;
@@ -981,7 +985,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct ssh *ss
- 
- 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", runas_pw, command,
+ 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", command,
 	    ac, av, &f,
-	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
-+	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
+	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
+-	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
+	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
 +	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
 		goto out;
 
 	uid_swapped = 1;
-diff -up openssh/auth.c.refactor openssh/auth.c
--- openssh/auth.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.235821686 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
+diff -up openssh/misc.c.refactor openssh/misc.c
+--- openssh/misc.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.235821686 +0200
+++ openssh/misc.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
@@ -756,7 +756,8 @@ auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *
-  */
 pid_t
- subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command,
-    int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags)
-+    int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags, int inetd,
-+    void *the_authctxt)
+ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
+     int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags,
+-    struct passwd *pw, privdrop_fn *drop_privs, privrestore_fn *restore_privs)
+    struct passwd *pw, privdrop_fn *drop_privs,
+    privrestore_fn *restore_privs, int inetd, void *the_authctxt)
 {
 	FILE *f = NULL;
 	struct stat st;
@@ -872,7 +873,7 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
+ 			_exit(1);
 		}
- 
 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 -		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
 +		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(inetd, the_authctxt) < 0) {
 			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
 			    strerror(errno));
 			_exit(127);
-diff -up openssh/auth.h.refactor openssh/auth.h
--- openssh/auth.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.251821839 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
+diff -up openssh/misc.h.refactor openssh/misc.h
+--- openssh/misc.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.251821839 +0200
+++ openssh/misc.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ struct passwd *fakepw(void);
- #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE  (1<<1)  /* Redirect stdout */
- #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD  (1<<2)  /* Discard stderr */
- pid_t	subprocess(const char *, struct passwd *,
-    const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int flags);
-+    const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int flags, int, void *);
- 
- int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
+ #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH	(1<<3)	/* Don't check for safe cmd */
+ #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV	(1<<4)	/* Keep parent environment */
+ pid_t subprocess(const char *, const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int,
+-    struct passwd *, privdrop_fn *, privrestore_fn *);
+    struct passwd *, privdrop_fn *, privrestore_fn *, int, void *);
 
+ typedef struct arglist arglist;
+ struct arglist {
 diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
 --- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200
 +++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
 	char *role;
@@ -342,11 +339,11 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it
 
- 	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+ 	debug3_f("setting execution context");
 
 -	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
 +	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl, the_authctxt);
@ -203,10 +203,10 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
 +		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(inetd, pam_setenv, authctxt)) {
 			switch (security_getenforce()) {
 			case -1:
- 				fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+ 				fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed");
@@ -410,7 +411,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
 
- 	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+ 	debug3_f("setting execution context");
 
 -	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
 +	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx, inetd, authctxt);
@ -269,3 +269,15 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.refactor openssh/sshd.c
 #endif
 #ifdef USE_PAM
 	if (options.use_pam) {
+diff -up openssh/sshconnect.c.refactor openssh/sshconnect.c
+--- openssh/sshconnect.c.refactor	2021-02-24 00:12:03.065325046 +0100
+++ openssh/sshconnect.c	2021-02-24 00:12:12.126449544 +0100
+@@ -892,7 +892,7 @@ load_hostkeys_command(struct hostkeys *h
+ 
+ 	if ((pid = subprocess(tag, command, ac, av, &f,
+ 	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH|
+-	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == 0)
+	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL)) == 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+ 	load_hostkeys_file(hostkeys, hostfile_hostname, tag, f, 1);
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/cipher-ctr.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.326525641 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/cipher-ctr.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.401526401 +0200
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/cipher-ctr.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:02.994577324 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/cipher-ctr.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.064577862 +0200
@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ evp_aes_128_ctr(void)
 	aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr;
 #ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/cipher-ctr.c
 #endif
 	return (&aes_ctr);
 }
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/dh.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/dh.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/dh.c.fips	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/dh.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.401526401 +0200
-@@ -152,6 +152,12 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/dh.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/dh.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/dh.c.fips	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/dh.c	2021-04-19 16:58:47.750263410 +0200
+@@ -164,6 +164,12 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max
 	int best, bestcount, which, linenum;
 	struct dhgroup dhg;
 
@ -24,10 +24,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/dh.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/dh.c
 +		return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
 +	}
 +
- 	if ((f = fopen(_PATH_DH_MODULI, "r")) == NULL) {
+ 	if ((f = fopen(get_moduli_filename(), "r")) == NULL) {
 		logit("WARNING: could not open %s (%s), using fixed modulus",
- 		    _PATH_DH_MODULI, strerror(errno));
-@@ -489,4 +495,38 @@ dh_estimate(int bits)
+ 		    get_moduli_filename(), strerror(errno));
+@@ -502,4 +508,38 @@ dh_estimate(int bits)
 	return 8192;
 }
 
@ -66,21 +66,21 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/dh.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/dh.c
 +}
 +
 #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/dh.h.fips openssh-8.0p1/dh.h
--- openssh-8.0p1/dh.h.fips	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/dh.h	2019-07-23 14:55:45.401526401 +0200
-@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ DH	*dh_new_group_fallback(int);
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/dh.h.fips openssh-8.6p1/dh.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/dh.h.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.064577862 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/dh.h	2021-04-19 16:59:31.951616078 +0200
+@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ DH	*dh_new_group_fallback(int);
 
 int	 dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
 int	 dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *, const BIGNUM *);
 +int	 dh_is_known_group(const DH *);
 
 u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/kex.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/kex.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/kex.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.395526340 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/kex.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.402526411 +0200
-@@ -199,7 +199,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ void	 dh_set_moduli_file(const char *);
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.058577815 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/kex.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.065577869 +0200
+@@ -203,7 +203,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
 	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
 		if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
@ -92,9 +92,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/kex.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/kex.c
 			free(s);
 			return 0;
 		}
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/kexgexc.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/kexgexc.c.fips	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/kexgexc.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.402526411 +0200
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c.fips	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.065577869 +0200
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/kexgexc.c
 #include <sys/types.h>
 
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
-@@ -113,6 +114,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32
+@@ -115,6 +116,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32
 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		goto out;
 	}
@ -114,10 +114,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/kexgexc.c
 	p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
 
 	/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h
--- openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h.fips	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h	2019-07-23 14:55:45.402526411 +0200
-@@ -111,6 +111,20 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h.fips	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h	2021-04-19 16:53:03.065577869 +0200
+@@ -57,6 +57,20 @@
 	"rsa-sha2-256," \
 	"ssh-rsa"
 
@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h
 #define	KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
 	"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
 	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
-@@ -134,6 +142,27 @@
+@@ -78,6 +92,27 @@
 
 #define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
 
@ -165,11 +165,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h
 +
 /* Not a KEX value, but here so all the algorithm defaults are together */
 #define	SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS	\
- 	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.334525723 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.402526411 +0200
-@@ -2179,11 +2179,16 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ 	"ssh-ed25519," \
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:02.999577362 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.065577869 +0200
+@@ -2538,11 +2538,16 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
 	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
@ -191,10 +191,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c
 #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
 	do { \
 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.373526117 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.402526411 +0200
-@@ -137,6 +137,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.034577631 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.065577869 +0200
+@@ -160,6 +160,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
 #ifdef __NR_open
 	SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES),
 #endif
@ -204,10 +204,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sandbox-secco
 #ifdef __NR_openat
 	SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES),
 #endif
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.361525996 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.403526421 +0200
-@@ -208,11 +208,16 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.027577577 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.066577877 +0200
+@@ -226,11 +226,16 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
 	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
@ -229,10 +229,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c
 #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
 	do { \
 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.378526168 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.403526421 +0200
-@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.038577662 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.066577877 +0200
+@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #endif
@ -240,21 +240,21 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c
 #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
 
-@@ -614,6 +626,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		dump_client_config(&options, host);
+@@ -1516,6 +1517,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		exit(0);
 	}
-+
+ 
 +	if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
 +	}
- 
+
 	/* Expand SecurityKeyProvider if it refers to an environment variable */
 	if (options.sk_provider != NULL && *options.sk_provider == '$' &&
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.336525743 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.403526421 +0200
-@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@
+ 	    strlen(options.sk_provider) > 1) {
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.055577792 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.066577877 +0200
+@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@
 #include <vis.h>
 #endif
 
@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c
 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
-@@ -198,36 +203,41 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+@@ -269,36 +271,41 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
 
 #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
 	if (options.gss_keyex) {
@ -279,24 +279,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c
 -			 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
 -			if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
 -				free(gss_host);
-				gss_host = xstrdup(host);
-			}
-		} else {
-			gss_host = xstrdup(host);
-		}
-
-		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
-		    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
-		if (gss) {
-			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
-			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
-			    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-
-			/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
-			 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
-			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
-			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
-			    "%s,null", orig);
 +		if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
 +			options.gss_keyex = 0;
@ -316,9 +298,24 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c
 +					gss_host = xstrdup(host);
 +				}
 +			} else {
-+				gss_host = xstrdup(host);
-+			}
-+
+ 				gss_host = xstrdup(host);
+ 			}
+-		} else {
+-			gss_host = xstrdup(host);
+-		}
+ 
+-		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
+-		    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
+-		if (gss) {
+-			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
+-			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+-			    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+-
+-			/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
+-			 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
+-			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
+-			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+-			    "%s,null", orig);
 +			gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
 +			    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
 +			if (gss) {
@ -335,9 +332,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c
 		}
 	}
 #endif
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.398526371 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.403526421 +0200
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.060577831 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 16:57:45.827769340 +0200
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
 #include <grp.h>
 #include <pwd.h>
@ -354,7 +351,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c
 #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
 #endif
 
-@@ -1529,6 +1532,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -1619,6 +1621,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 #endif
 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
 
@ -362,7 +359,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c
 	/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
 	saved_argc = ac;
 	rexec_argc = ac;
-@@ -1992,6 +2007,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -2110,6 +2113,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	/* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
 	log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
 
@ -370,10 +367,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c
 +		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
 +	}
 +
- 	/* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
- 	   unmounted if desired. */
- 	if (chdir("/") == -1)
-@@ -2382,10 +2401,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
+ 	 * unmounted if desired.
+@@ -2494,10 +2501,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
 	if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
 		orig = NULL;
 
@ -392,9 +389,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c
 
 	if (gss && orig)
 		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshkey.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/sshkey.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.398526371 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshkey.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.404526431 +0200
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.061577838 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.067577885 +0200
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
@ -411,19 +408,19 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshkey.c
 #include "ssh-sk.h"
 
 #ifdef WITH_XMSS
-@@ -1591,6 +1593,8 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA
+@@ -1705,6 +1707,8 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA
 	}
 	if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) ||
 	    !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) {
 +			if (FIPS_mode())
-+				logit("%s: the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method", __func__);
+				logit_f("the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method");
 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		goto out;
 	}
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c
--- openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.391526300 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c	2019-07-23 14:57:54.118830056 +0200
-@@ -199,6 +199,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *na
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips	2021-04-19 16:53:03.038577662 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-04-19 16:53:03.068577892 +0200
+@@ -205,6 +205,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *na
 #endif
 	}
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
@ -436,7 +433,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c
 	switch (type) {
 	case KEY_DSA:
 		if (*bitsp != 1024)
-@@ -1029,9 +1035,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
+@@ -1098,9 +1104,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
 			first = 1;
 			printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
 		}
@ -454,4 +451,4 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c
 -		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
 		if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
 			error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s",
-			    prv_tmp, strerror(errno));
+ 			    prv_tmp, strerror(errno));
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
@ -1,7 +1,26 @@
-diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
-index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
--- a/auth-krb5.c
-+++ b/auth-krb5.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.820744325 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.h	2021-04-19 14:05:10.853744569 +0200
+@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
+ 	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
+ 	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
+ 	char		*krb5_ccname;
+	int		 krb5_set_env;
+ #endif
+ 	struct sshbuf	*loginmsg;
+ 
+@@ -231,7 +232,7 @@ struct passwd *fakepw(void);
+ int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
+ 
+ #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
+-krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
+krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #endif /* AUTH_H */
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c	2021-04-19 14:40:55.142832954 +0200
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <string.h>
@ -10,7 +29,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 
 extern ServerOptions	 options;
 
-@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
 #endif
 	krb5_error_code problem;
 	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
@ -19,24 +38,18 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 	char *client, *platform_client;
 	const char *errmsg;
 
-@@ -163,7 +164,8 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+@@ -163,8 +164,8 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+-	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+-	    &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
 +	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
 +	     &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, &authctxt->krb5_set_env);
 	if (problem)
 		goto out;
 
-@@ -172,21 +174,20 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
- 	if (problem)
- 		goto out;
- 
-	problem= krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache,
-+	problem = krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache,
- 				 &creds);
- 	if (problem)
+@@ -179,15 +180,14 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
 		goto out;
 #endif
 
@ -57,7 +70,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 		do_pam_putenv("KRB5CCNAME", authctxt->krb5_ccname);
 #endif
 
-@@ -222,11 +223,54 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+@@ -223,11 +223,54 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
 void
 krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
@ -113,7 +126,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 	if (authctxt->krb5_user) {
 		krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user);
 		authctxt->krb5_user = NULL;
-@@ -237,36 +281,188 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
+@@ -238,36 +281,188 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	}
 }
 
@ -151,7 +164,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +ssh_krb5_expand_template(char **result, const char *template) {
 +	char *p_n, *p_o, *r, *tmp_template;
 +
-+	debug3("%s: called, template = %s", __func__, template);
+	debug3_f("called, template = %s", template);
 +	if (template == NULL)
 +		return -1;
 +
@ -179,7 +192,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +		} else {
 +			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
 +			*p_o = '\0';
-+			debug("%s: unsupported token %s in %s", __func__, p_n, template);
+			debug_f("unsupported token %s in %s", p_n, template);
 +			/* unknown token, fallback to the default */
 +			goto cleanup;
 +		}
@ -198,16 +211,13 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +	return -1;
 +}
 +
- krb5_error_code
-ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
-	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
-	char ccname[40];
+krb5_error_code
 +ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(krb5_context ctx, char **ccname) {
 +	profile_t p;
 +	int ret = 0;
 +	char *value = NULL;
 +
-+	debug3("%s: called", __func__);
+	debug3_f("called");
 +	ret = krb5_get_profile(ctx, &p);
 +	if (ret)
 +		return ret;
@ -218,11 +228,14 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +
 +	ret = ssh_krb5_expand_template(ccname, value);
 +
-+	debug3("%s: returning with ccname = %s", __func__, *ccname);
+	debug3_f("returning with ccname = %s", *ccname);
 +	return ret;
 +}
 +
-+krb5_error_code
+ krb5_error_code
+-ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+-	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
+-	char ccname[40];
 +ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environment) {
 +	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno, type_len;
 +	char *ccname = NULL;
@ -242,7 +255,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 -		logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
 -		return oerrno;
 -	}
-+	debug3("%s: called", __func__);
+	debug3_f("called");
 +	if (need_environment)
 +		*need_environment = 0;
 +	ret = ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(ctx, &ccname);
@ -283,7 +296,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 -	close(tmpfd);
 
 -	return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
-+	debug3("%s: setting default ccname to %s", __func__, ccname);
+	debug3_f("setting default ccname to %s", ccname);
 +	/* set the default with already expanded user IDs */
 +	ret = krb5_cc_set_default_name(ctx, ccname);
 +	if (ret)
@ -304,13 +317,13 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +	 * a primary cache for this collection, if it supports that (non-FILE)
 +	 */
 +	if (krb5_cc_support_switch(ctx, type)) {
-+		debug3("%s: calling cc_new_unique(%s)", __func__, ccname);
+		debug3_f("calling cc_new_unique(%s)", ccname);
 +		ret = krb5_cc_new_unique(ctx, type, NULL, ccache);
 +		free(type);
 +		if (ret)
 +			return ret;
 +
-+		debug3("%s: calling cc_switch()", __func__);
+		debug3_f("calling cc_switch()");
 +		return krb5_cc_switch(ctx, *ccache);
 +	} else {
 +		/* Otherwise, we can not create a unique ccname here (either
@ -318,36 +331,47 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +		 * collections
 +		 */
 +		free(type);
-+		debug3("%s: calling cc_resolve(%s)", __func__, ccname);
+		debug3_f("calling cc_resolve(%s)", ccname);
 +		return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
 +	}
 }
 #endif /* !HEIMDAL */
 #endif /* KRB5 */
-diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
-index 29491df9..fdab5040 100644
--- a/auth.h
-+++ b/auth.h
-@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
- 	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
- 	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
- 	char		*krb5_ccname;
-+	int		 krb5_set_env;
- #endif
- 	struct sshbuf	*loginmsg;
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.844744503 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.854744577 +0200
+@@ -413,13 +413,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
+ }
 
-@@ -238,7 +239,7 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
- int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
+ /* As user */
+-void
+int
+ ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
+ {
+ 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
+-		(*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
+		return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
+ 	} else
+ 		debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
+
+	return 0;
+ }
 
- #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
-krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
-+krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
+ /* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the child's environment based
+@@ -499,9 +501,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) {
+ 	char *envstr;
 #endif
 
- #endif /* AUTH_H */
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
--- openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name	2019-03-01 15:17:42.708611802 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2019-03-01 15:17:42.713611844 +0100
+-	if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
+-	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
+-	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
+	if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
+ 		return;
+ 
+ 	ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.852744562 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.854744577 +0200
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
 /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
  * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
@ -450,7 +474,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
 		do_pam_putenv(client->store.envvar, client->store.envval);
 #endif
 
-@@ -361,7 +355,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+@@ -364,7 +354,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
 
 	client->store.data = krb_context;
 
@ -459,43 +483,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
 }
 
 int
-diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
-index 6cae720e..16e55cbc 100644
--- a/gss-serv.c
-+++ b/gss-serv.c
-@@ -320,13 +320,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- }
- 
- /* As user */
-void
-+int
- ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
- {
- 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
-		(*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
-+		return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
- 	} else
- 		debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
-+
-+	return 0;
- }
- 
- /* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the child's environment based
-@@ -498,9 +500,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() {
- 	char *envstr;
- #endif
- 
-	if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
-	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
-	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
-+	if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
- 		return;
- 
- 	ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
--- openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name	2019-03-01 15:17:42.704611768 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c	2019-03-01 15:17:42.713611844 +0100
-@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.848744532 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.854744577 +0200
+@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
 	options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1;
 	options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
 	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
@ -503,7 +494,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
 	options->gss_authentication=-1;
 	options->gss_keyex = -1;
 	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
-@@ -315,6 +316,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+@@ -359,6 +360,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
 		options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1;
 	if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1)
 		options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
@ -512,8 +503,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
 	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
 		options->gss_authentication = 0;
 	if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
-@@ -447,7 +450,8 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
+@@ -506,7 +509,8 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
 	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
 -	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
@ -522,7 +513,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
-@@ -526,11 +530,13 @@ static struct {
+@@ -593,11 +597,13 @@ static struct {
 #else
 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 #endif
@ -536,7 +527,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
 #endif
 	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1437,6 +1443,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+@@ -1573,6 +1579,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
 		intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token;
 		goto parse_flag;
 
@ -547,7 +538,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
 	case sGssAuthentication:
 		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
 		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -2507,6 +2517,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -2891,6 +2901,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
 # ifdef USE_AFS
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
 # endif
@ -555,11 +546,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
 #endif
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
-diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
-index db8362c6..4fa42d64 100644
--- a/servconf.h
-+++ b/servconf.h
-@@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ typedef struct {
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.848744532 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
+@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ typedef struct {
 						 * file on logout. */
 	int     kerberos_get_afs_token;		/* If true, try to get AFS token if
 						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
@ -568,11 +558,10 @@ index db8362c6..4fa42d64 100644
 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
 	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
-index 85df6a27..480a5ead 100644
--- a/session.c
-+++ b/session.c
-@@ -1033,7 +1033,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/session.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.852744562 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
+@@ -1038,7 +1038,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
 	/* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter
 	 * the child's environment as they see fit
 	 */
@ -582,7 +571,7 @@ index 85df6a27..480a5ead 100644
 #endif
 
 	/* Set basic environment. */
-@@ -1105,7 +1106,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
+@@ -1114,7 +1115,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
 	}
 #endif
 #ifdef KRB5
@ -591,33 +580,10 @@ index 85df6a27..480a5ead 100644
 		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
 		    s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
 #endif
-diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
-index 6593e422..245178af 100644
--- a/ssh-gss.h
-+++ b/ssh-gss.h
-@@ -83,7 +82,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
- 	int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
- 	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
- 	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
-	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
-+	int (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
- 	int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
- } ssh_gssapi_mech;
- 
-@@ -127,7 +126,7 @@ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
- void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
-void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
-+int ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
- const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
- 
- char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index edbe815c..89514e8a 100644
--- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -2162,7 +2162,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.849744540 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
+@@ -2284,7 +2284,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 	if (options.gss_authentication) {
 		temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
@ -626,11 +592,10 @@ index edbe815c..89514e8a 100644
 		restore_uid();
 	}
 #endif
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index c0683d4a..2349f477 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -860,6 +860,14 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.849744540 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5	2021-04-19 14:05:10.856744592 +0200
+@@ -939,6 +939,14 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
 file on logout.
 The default is
 .Cm yes .
@ -645,3 +610,24 @@ index c0683d4a..2349f477 100644
 .It Cm KexAlgorithms
 Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
 Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.852744562 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
+@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+ 	int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ 	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
+ 	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
+-	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+	int (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ 	int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ } ssh_gssapi_mech;
+ 
+@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
+ void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
+-void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
+int ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
+ const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
+ 
+ char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
--- a/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
--- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -1701,6 +1701,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no	2021-04-19 14:00:45.099735129 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 14:03:21.140920974 +0200
+@@ -1749,6 +1749,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
 	    cfg, &includes, NULL);
 
@ -9,13 +9,13 @@ diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
 +	if (! options.use_pam)
 +		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora and may cause several problems.");
 +
- 	/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
- 	fill_default_server_options(&options);
- 
-diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
--- a/sshd_config
-+++ b/sshd_config
-@@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ 	if (options.moduli_file != NULL)
+ 		dh_set_moduli_file(options.moduli_file);
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no	2021-04-19 14:00:45.098735121 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config	2021-04-19 14:00:45.099735129 +0200
+@@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
 # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
 # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
 # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
--- a/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
 	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
 	const char *displayname;
@@ -298,7 +299,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
- 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 	mic.value = p;
 	mic.length = len;
 -	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
 +#endif
 +		micuser = authctxt->user;
 +	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, micuser, authctxt->service,
- 	    "gssapi-with-mic");
+ 	    "gssapi-with-mic", ssh->kex->session_id);
 
 	if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
@@ -311,6 +318,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
 +++ openssh/auth2-hostbased.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
@@ -123,7 +123,16 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
 	/* reconstruct packet */
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 +	    (authctxt->role
@ -224,8 +224,8 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
 +	monitor_permit_authentications(1);
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->role, NULL)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+	debug3("%s: role=%s", __func__, authctxt->role);
+		fatal_f("buffer error: %s", ssh_err(r));
+	debug3_f("role=%s", authctxt->role);
 +
 +	if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
 +		free(authctxt->role);
@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
@@ -1251,6 +1280,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i
 		fail++;
 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
 +	if ((s = strchr(cp, '/')) != NULL)
 +		*s = '\0';
 	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
@@ -1308,6 +1339,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
 		fail++;
 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
 +	if ((s = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL)
 +		*s = '\0';
 	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
@ -305,12 +305,12 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.c
 +	int r;
 +	struct sshbuf *m;
 +
-+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+	debug3_f("entering");
 +
 +	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, role ? role : "")) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		fatal_f("buffer error: %s", ssh_err(r));
 +	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, m);
 +
 +	sshbuf_free(m);
@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/por
 -void
 -ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
 -{
-	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+-	char *user_ctx = NULL;
 -
 -	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
 -		return;
@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/por
 
 -	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
 +	if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) != 0) {
-+		error("%s: getexeccon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		error_f("getexeccon: %s", strerror(errno));
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +
@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/por
 diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
 --- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
 +++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,425 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,421 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
 + * Copyright (c) 2014 Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +	access_vector_t bit;
 +	security_class_t class;
 +
-+	debug("%s: src:%s dst:%s", __func__, src, dst);
+	debug_f("src:%s dst:%s", src, dst);
 +	class = string_to_security_class("context");
 +	if (!class) {
 +		error("string_to_security_class failed to translate security class context");
@ -692,7 +692,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +			    /* we actually don't change level */
 +			    reqlvl = "";
 +
-+			debug("%s: current connection level '%s'", __func__, reqlvl);
+			debug_f("current connection level '%s'", reqlvl);
 +
 +		}
 +
@ -720,8 +720,8 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +		}
 +	}
 +	if (r != 0) {
-+		error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
-+		    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+		error_f("Failed to get default SELinux security "
+		    "context for %s", pwname);
 +	}
 +
 +#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
@ -746,7 +746,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +	char *use_current;
 +	int rv;
 +
-+	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+	debug3_f("setting execution context");
 +
 +	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
 +
@ -783,32 +783,30 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) {
 +			switch (security_getenforce()) {
 +			case -1:
-+				fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+				fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed");
 +			case 0:
-+				error("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
-+				    __func__);
+				error_f("SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.");
 +			break;
 +			default:
-+				fatal("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.",
-+				    __func__);
+				fatal_f("SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.");
 +			}
 +		}
 +		return;
 +	}
 +
-+	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+	debug3_f("setting execution context");
 +
 +	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
 +	if (r >= 0) {
 +		r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
 +		if (r < 0) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s",
-+			    __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
+			error_f("Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s",
+			    user_ctx, pwname);
 +		}
 +#ifdef HAVE_SETKEYCREATECON
 +		else if (setkeycreatecon(user_ctx) < 0) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s",
-+			    __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
+			error_f("Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s",
+			    user_ctx, pwname);
 +		}
 +#endif
 +	}
@ -823,14 +821,12 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +	if (r < 0) {
 +		switch (security_getenforce()) {
 +		case -1:
-+			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+			fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed");
 +		case 0:
-+			error("%s: SELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
-+			    __func__);
+			error_f("ELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.");
 +			break;
 +		default:
-+			fatal("%s: SELinux failure. Aborting connection.",
-+			    __func__);
+			fatal_f("SELinux failure. Aborting connection.");
 +		}
 +	}
 +	if (user_ctx != NULL && user_ctx != default_ctx)
@ -838,7 +834,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +	if (default_ctx != NULL)
 +		freecon(default_ctx);
 +
-+	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+	debug3_f("done");
 +}
 +
 +#endif
--- a/openssh-7.9p1-ssh-copy-id.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.9p1-ssh-copy-id.patch
@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-From 22bfdcf060b632b5a6ff603f8f42ff166c211a66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2020 10:02:45 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Fail hard on the first failed attempt to write the
- authorized_keys_file
-
---
- ssh-copy-id | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-index 392f64f..e69a23f 100755
--- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-+++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ installkeys_sh() {
- 	cd;
- 	umask 077;
- 	mkdir -p $(dirname "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}") &&
-	  { [ -z \`tail -1c ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} 2>/dev/null\` ] || echo >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE}; } &&
-+	  { [ -z \`tail -1c ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} 2>/dev/null\` ] || echo >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} || exit 1; } &&
- 	  cat >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} ||
- 	  exit 1;
- 	if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-- 
-GitLab
-
-
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5
--- openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies	2020-03-26 14:40:44.546775605 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5	2020-03-26 14:52:20.700649727 +0100
-@@ -359,17 +359,17 @@ or
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5
+--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies	2021-04-19 15:18:32.071920379 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5	2021-04-19 15:21:18.400179265 +0200
+@@ -368,15 +368,13 @@ or
 .Qq *.c.example.com
 domains.
 .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
@ -14,19 +14,16 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5
 by certificate authorities (CAs).
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
 .Xr ssh 1
 will not accept host certificates signed using algorithms other than those
 specified.
-+.Pp
- .It Cm CertificateFile
- Specifies a file from which the user's certificate is read.
- A corresponding private key must be provided separately in order
-@@ -424,20 +424,25 @@ If the option is set to
- .Cm no ,
+@@ -436,20 +434,25 @@ If the option is set to
+ (the default),
 the check will not be executed.
 .It Cm Ciphers
 +The default is handled system-wide by
@ -55,7 +52,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5
 .Pp
 The supported ciphers are:
 .Bd -literal -offset indent
-@@ -453,13 +458,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+@@ -465,13 +468,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
 chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
 .Ed
 .Pp
@ -69,7 +66,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5
 The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
 .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
 .It Cm ClearAllForwardings
-@@ -812,6 +810,11 @@ command line will be passed untouched to
+@@ -826,6 +822,11 @@ command line will be passed untouched to
 The default is
 .Dq no .
 .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
@ -81,7 +78,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5
 The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI
 key exchange. Possible values are
 .Bd -literal -offset 3n
-@@ -824,10 +827,8 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-,
+@@ -838,10 +839,8 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-,
 gss-curve25519-sha256-
 .Ed
 .Pp
@ -93,7 +90,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5
 .It Cm HashKnownHosts
 Indicates that
 .Xr ssh 1
-@@ -1149,29 +1150,25 @@ it may be zero or more of:
+@@ -1169,29 +1168,25 @@ it may be zero or more of:
 and
 .Cm pam .
 .It Cm KexAlgorithms
@ -132,9 +129,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5
 .Pp
 The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
 .Qq ssh -Q kex .
-@@ -1231,37 +1228,33 @@ The default is INFO.
- DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
- DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output.
+@@ -1301,37 +1296,33 @@ function, and all code in the
+ file.
+ This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
 .It Cm MACs
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
@ -179,56 +176,57 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5
 The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
 .Qq ssh -Q mac .
 .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
-@@ -1394,36 +1387,25 @@ instead of continuing to execute and pas
+@@ -1503,37 +1494,25 @@ instead of continuing to execute and pas
 The default is
 .Cm no .
- .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
+ .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
- Specifies the key types that will be used for public key authentication
- as a comma-separated list of patterns.
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be used for public key
+ authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns.
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq +
-character, then the key types after it will be appended to the default
+-character, then the algorithms after it will be appended to the default
 -instead of replacing it.
-+character, then the key types after it will be appended to the built-in
+character, then the algorithms after it will be appended to the built-in
 +openssh default instead of replacing it.
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq -
- character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
 +from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq ^
- character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
 -default set.
 -The default for this option is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
-ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
 -.Ed
 +built-in openssh default set.
 .Pp
- The list of available key types may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes .
-diff -up openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5
--- openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies	2020-03-26 14:40:44.530775355 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5	2020-03-26 14:48:56.732468099 +0100
-@@ -375,16 +375,16 @@ If the argument is
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies	2021-04-19 15:18:32.062920311 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5	2021-04-19 15:20:42.591908243 +0200
+@@ -373,15 +373,13 @@ If the argument is
 then no banner is displayed.
 By default, no banner is displayed.
 .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
@ -241,17 +239,15 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5
 by certificate authorities (CAs).
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
 Certificates signed using other algorithms will not be accepted for
 public key or host-based authentication.
-+.Pp
 .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
- Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
- PAM or through authentication styles supported in
-@@ -446,20 +446,25 @@ The default is
+@@ -445,20 +443,25 @@ The default is
 indicating not to
 .Xr chroot 2 .
 .It Cm Ciphers
@ -281,7 +277,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5
 .Pp
 The supported ciphers are:
 .Pp
-@@ -486,13 +491,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+@@ -485,13 +488,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
 chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
 .El
 .Pp
@ -295,7 +291,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5
 The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
 .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
 .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
-@@ -681,22 +679,24 @@ For this to work
+@@ -680,21 +676,22 @@ For this to work
 .Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
 needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client.
 .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
@ -326,11 +322,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5
 -.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,
 -gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
 This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
-+.Pp
- .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
- Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication
- as a list of comma-separated patterns.
-@@ -793,25 +793,13 @@ is specified, the location of the socket
+ .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased
+@@ -794,26 +791,13 @@ is specified, the location of the socket
 .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
 environment variable.
 .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
@ -339,29 +333,30 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5
 +To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
- Specifies the host key algorithms
+ Specifies the host key signature algorithms
 that the server offers.
 -The default for this option is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
-ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
- The list of available key types may also be obtained using
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
 .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
 .It Cm IgnoreRhosts
-@@ -943,20 +931,25 @@ Specifies whether to look at .k5login fi
+@@ -958,20 +942,25 @@ Specifies whether to look at .k5login fi
 The default is
 .Cm yes .
 .It Cm KexAlgorithms
@ -391,8 +386,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5
 The supported algorithms are:
 .Pp
 .Bl -item -compact -offset indent
-@@ -988,15 +981,6 @@ ecdh-sha2-nistp521
- sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org
+@@ -1003,15 +992,6 @@ ecdh-sha2-nistp521
+ sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com
 .El
 .Pp
 -The default is:
@ -407,9 +402,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5
 The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
 .Qq ssh -Q KexAlgorithms .
 .It Cm ListenAddress
-@@ -1065,21 +1049,26 @@ DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
- DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output.
- Logging with a DEBUG level violates the privacy of users and is not recommended.
+@@ -1097,21 +1077,26 @@ function, and all code in the
+ file.
+ This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
 .It Cm MACs
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
@ -438,7 +433,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5
 .Pp
 The algorithms that contain
 .Qq -etm
-@@ -1122,15 +1111,6 @@ umac-64-etm@openssh.com
+@@ -1154,15 +1139,6 @@ umac-64-etm@openssh.com
 umac-128-etm@openssh.com
 .El
 .Pp
@ -454,49 +449,50 @@ diff -up openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5
 The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
 .Qq ssh -Q mac .
 .It Cm Match
-@@ -1480,36 +1460,25 @@ or equivalent.)
+@@ -1541,37 +1517,25 @@ or equivalent.)
 The default is
 .Cm yes .
- .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
+ .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
- Specifies the key types that will be accepted for public key authentication
- as a list of comma-separated patterns.
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for public key
+ authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
 Alternately if the specified list begins with a
 .Sq +
-character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
+-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
 -instead of replacing them.
-+character, then the specified key types will be appended to the built-in
+character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in
 +openssh default set instead of replacing them.
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq -
- character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
 +from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq ^
- character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
 -default set.
 -The default for this option is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
-ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
 -.Ed
 +built-in openssh default set.
 .Pp
- The list of available key types may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes .
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ index e7549470..b68c1710 100644
@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
 	kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
 	kexgexc.o kexgexs.o \
- 	sntrup4591761.o kexsntrup4591761x25519.o kexgen.o \
+ 	kexsntrup761x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \
 +	kexgssc.o \
 	sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \
 	sshbuf-io.o
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ index e7549470..b68c1710 100644
 -	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
 +	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
- 	sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+ 	srclimit.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
 	sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
 diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
 index 086b8ebb..687c57b4 100644
@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644
 --- a/auth2-gss.c
 +++ b/auth2-gss.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.29 2018/07/31 03:10:27 djm Exp $ */
+ /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.32 2021/01/27 10:15:08 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
 - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
@ -165,19 +165,19 @@ index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644
 +
 +	if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		fatal_fr(r, "parsing");
 +
 +	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +
 +	mic.value = p;
 +	mic.length = len;
 +
 +	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
-+	    "gssapi-keyex");
+	    "gssapi-keyex", ssh->kex->session_id);
 +
 +	if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed", __func__);
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed");
 +	gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
 +
 +	/* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644
  * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
@@ -260,7 +302,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
 	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
 
 -	authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
 +	authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 --- a/gss-genr.c
 +++ b/gss-genr.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.26 2018/07/10 09:13:30 djm Exp $ */
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.28 2021/01/27 10:05:28 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
 - * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -41,12 +41,36 @@
+@@ -41,9 +41,33 @@
 #include "sshbuf.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
@ -461,9 +461,6 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 
 #include "ssh-gss.h"
 
- extern u_char *session_id2;
- extern u_int session_id2_len;
- 
 +typedef struct {
 +	char *encoded;
 +	gss_OID oid;
@ -486,7 +483,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 /* sshbuf_get for gss_buffer_desc */
 int
 ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g)
-@@ -62,6 +86,162 @@ ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g)
+@@ -62,6 +86,159 @@ ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g)
 	return 0;
 }
 
@ -548,7 +545,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +	    (gss_supported->count + 1));
 +
 +	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +
 +	oidpos = 0;
 +	s = cp = xstrdup(kex);
@ -565,8 +562,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +			        gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
 +			        gss_supported->elements[i].length)) != 0 ||
 +			    (r = ssh_digest_final(md, digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+				fatal("%s: digest failed: %s", __func__,
-+				    ssh_err(r));
+				fatal_fr(r, "digest failed");
 +			ssh_digest_free(md);
 +			md = NULL;
 +
@ -581,12 +577,10 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +				(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
 +				if (sshbuf_len(buf) != 0 &&
 +				    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ',')) != 0)
-+					fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u8 error: %s",
-+					    __func__, ssh_err(r));
+					fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8 error");
 +				if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, p, strlen(p))) != 0 ||
 +				    (r = sshbuf_put(buf, encoded, enclen)) != 0)
-+					fatal("%s: sshbuf_put error: %s",
-+					    __func__, ssh_err(r));
+					fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put error");
 +			}
 +
 +			gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
@ -599,7 +593,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +	gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
 +
 +	if ((mechs = sshbuf_dup_string(buf)) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed");
 +
 +	sshbuf_free(buf);
 +
@ -721,7 +715,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +
 void
 ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service,
-     const char *context)
+     const char *context, const struct sshbuf *session_id)
@@ -273,11 +500,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service,
 }
 
@ -1123,10 +1117,10 @@ index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
 +
 +	if (gssapi_client.store.data != NULL) {
 +		if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(gssapi_client.store.data, gssapi_client.store.envval, &ccache))) {
-+			debug("%s: krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", __func__,
+			debug_f("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
 +				krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem));
 +		} else if ((problem = krb5_cc_destroy(gssapi_client.store.data, ccache))) {
-+			debug("%s: krb5_cc_destroy(): %.100s", __func__,
+			debug_f("krb5_cc_destroy(): %.100s",
 +				krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem));
 +		} else {
 +			krb5_free_context(gssapi_client.store.data);
@ -1375,7 +1369,7 @@ index ce85f043..574c7609 100644
@@ -698,6 +755,9 @@ kex_free(struct kex *kex)
 	sshbuf_free(kex->server_version);
 	sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub);
- 	free(kex->session_id);
+ 	sshbuf_free(kex->session_id);
 +#ifdef GSSAPI
 +	free(kex->gss_host);
 +#endif /* GSSAPI */
@ -1389,7 +1383,7 @@ index a5ae6ac0..fe714141 100644
@@ -102,6 +102,15 @@ enum kex_exchange {
 	KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
 	KEX_C25519_SHA256,
- 	KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512,
+ 	KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512,
 +#ifdef GSSAPI
 +	KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
 +	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
@ -1498,7 +1492,7 @@ new file mode 100644
 index 00000000..f6e1405e
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/kexgssc.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,606 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,599 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
 + *
@ -1597,7 +1591,7 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e
 +		r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex);
 +		break;
 +	default:
-+		fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
+		fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
 +	}
 +	if (r != 0)
 +		return r;
@ -1785,7 +1779,7 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e
 +	    server_blob,
 +	    shared_secret,
 +	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
+		fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
 +
 +	gssbuf.value = hash;
 +	gssbuf.length = hashlen;
@ -2074,13 +2068,6 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e
 +
 +	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
 +
-+	/* save session id */
-+	if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
-+		kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
-+		kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
-+		memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
-+	}
-+
 +	if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
 +		ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
 +
@ -2202,12 +2189,12 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +		free(mechs);
 +	}
 +
-+	debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name);
+	debug2_f("Identifying %s", kex->name);
 +	oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
 +	if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
 +	   fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
 +
-+	debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
+	debug2_f("Acquiring credentials");
 +
 +	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
 +		fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
@ -2242,7 +2229,7 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +				    &shared_secret);
 +				break;
 +			default:
-+				fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
+				fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
 +			}
 +			if (r != 0)
 +				goto out;
@ -2398,12 +2385,12 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +		if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms()))
 +			free(mechs);
 +
-+	debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name);
+	debug2_f("Identifying %s", kex->name);
 +	oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
 +	if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
 +	   fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
 +
-+	debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
+	debug2_f("Acquiring credentials");
 +
 +	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
 +		fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
@ -2641,44 +2628,44 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
@@ -1713,6 +1730,17 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
 # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- 		kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
 # endif
 +# ifdef GSSAPI
-+		if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+			kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+			kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+			kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256] = kexgss_server;
-+			kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512] = kexgss_server;
-+			kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgssgex_server;
-+			kex->kex[KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256] = kexgss_server;
-+			kex->kex[KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256] = kexgss_server;
-+		}
+	if (options.gss_keyex) {
+		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256] = kexgss_server;
+		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512] = kexgss_server;
+		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgssgex_server;
+		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256] = kexgss_server;
+		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256] = kexgss_server;
+	}
 +# endif
 #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
- 		kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
- 		kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
@@ -1806,8 +1834,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
 	u_char *p;
 	int r;
 
 -	if (!options.gss_authentication)
-		fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+-		fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
 +	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+		fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
+		fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled");
 
 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
@@ -1839,8 +1867,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
 	OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
 	int r;
 
 -	if (!options.gss_authentication)
-		fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+-		fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
 +	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+		fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
+		fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled");
 
 	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &in)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc");
@@ -1860,6 +1888,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
@ -2692,9 +2679,9 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
 	int r;
 
 -	if (!options.gss_authentication)
-		fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+-		fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
 +	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+		fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
+		fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled");
 
 	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &gssbuf)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &mic)) != 0)
@ -2707,13 +2694,13 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
 	const char *displayname;
 
 -	if (!options.gss_authentication)
-		fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+-		fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
 +	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+		fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
+		fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled");
 
 -	authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +
 +	authenticated = authctxt->valid &&
 +	    ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw, kex);
@ -2721,7 +2708,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
 	sshbuf_reset(m);
 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
@@ -1913,7 +1946,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
- 	debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
+ 	debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated);
 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
 
 -	auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
@ -2733,7 +2720,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
 
 	if ((displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
 		auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname);
-@@ -1921,5 +1958,85 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+@@ -1921,5 +1958,84 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
 	/* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
 	return (authenticated);
 }
@ -2749,16 +2736,15 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
 +	int r;
 +
 +	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+		fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
+		fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled");
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +	data.value = p;
 +	data.length = len;
 +	/* Lengths of SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512 hashes that are used */
 +	if (data.length != 20 && data.length != 32 && data.length != 64)
-+		fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__,
-+		    (int) data.length);
+		fatal_f("data length incorrect: %d", (int) data.length);
 +
 +	/* Save the session ID on the first time around */
 +	if (session_id2_len == 0) {
@ -2774,7 +2760,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +
 +	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
 +
@ -2795,12 +2781,12 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
 +	int r, ok;
 +
 +	if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+		fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
+		fatal_f("GSSAPI not enabled");
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, (u_char **)&store.filename, NULL)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, (u_char **)&store.envvar, NULL)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, (u_char **)&store.envval, NULL)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +
 +	ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
 +
@ -2810,7 +2796,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
 +
 +	sshbuf_reset(m);
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ok)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +
 +	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
 +
@ -2847,14 +2833,14 @@ index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644
 	int r, authenticated = 0;
 
 	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 
 	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, m);
 	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
@@ -1012,4 +1014,57 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
- 	debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
+ 	debug3_f("user %sauthenticated", authenticated ? "" : "not ");
 	return (authenticated);
 }
 +
@ -2866,16 +2852,16 @@ index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644
 +	int r;
 +
 +	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, data->value, data->length)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +
 +	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, m);
 +	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, hash)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +
 +	sshbuf_free(m);
 +
@ -2889,7 +2875,7 @@ index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644
 +	int r, ok;
 +
 +	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m,
 +	    store->filename ? store->filename : "")) != 0 ||
@ -2897,13 +2883,13 @@ index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644
 +	    store->envvar ? store->envvar : "")) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m,
 +	    store->envval ? store->envval : "")) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +
 +	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, m);
 +	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ok)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +
 +	sshbuf_free(m);
 +
@ -3124,7 +3110,7 @@ index 70f5f73f..191575a1 100644
 		options->password_authentication = 1;
 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
@@ -531,6 +543,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sHostKeyAlgorithms,
+ 	sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
 	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
 	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
 +	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
@ -3246,7 +3232,7 @@ index 36180d07..70dd3665 100644
 --- a/ssh-gss.h
 +++ b/ssh-gss.h
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.14 2018/07/10 09:13:30 djm Exp $ */
+ /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.15 2021/01/27 10:05:28 djm Exp $ */
 /*
 - * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
 + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
@ -3332,7 +3318,7 @@ index 36180d07..70dd3665 100644
@@ -123,17 +149,33 @@ void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
 OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
 void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *, const char *,
-     const char *, const char *);
+     const char *, const char *, const struct sshbuf *);
 -int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
 +int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
 +OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
@ -3382,7 +3368,7 @@ index 60de6087..db5c65bc 100644
 +.It GSSAPITrustDns
 .It HashKnownHosts
 .It Host
- .It HostbasedAuthentication
+ .It HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
@@ -579,6 +585,8 @@ flag),
 (supported message integrity codes),
 .Ar kex
@ -3526,9 +3512,9 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +
 	xxx_host = host;
 	xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
- 
+ 	xxx_conn_info = cinfo;
@@ -206,6 +209,42 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
- 		    compat_pkalg_proposal(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
+ 		    compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, options.hostkeyalgorithms);
 	}
 
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
@ -3588,7 +3574,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +# endif
 +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
 	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
- 	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
+	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
 	ssh->kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
 
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
@ -3604,7 +3590,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 
 	/* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */
 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] =
- 	    compat_kex_proposal(options.kex_algorithms);
+ 	    compat_kex_proposal(ssh, options.kex_algorithms);
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
 +	/* repair myproposal after it was crumpled by the */
 +	/* ext-info removal above */
@ -3616,7 +3602,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +	}
 +#endif
 	if ((r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, myproposal)) != 0)
- 		fatal("kex_prop2buf: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ 		fatal_r(r, "kex_prop2buf");
 
@@ -330,6 +392,7 @@ static int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
 static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
@ -3714,13 +3700,13 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +	}
 +
 +	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +
 +	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
-+	    "gssapi-keyex");
+	    "gssapi-keyex", ssh->kex->session_id);
 +
 +	if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed", __func__);
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed");
 +	gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
 +
 +	if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
@ -3734,7 +3720,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, mic.value, mic.length)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		fatal_fr(r, "parsing");
 +
 +	sshbuf_free(b);
 +	gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
@ -3751,11 +3737,11 @@ index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
 +++ b/sshd.c
@@ -817,8 +817,8 @@ notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
 	}
- 	debug3("%s: sent %u hostkeys", __func__, nkeys);
+ 	debug3_f("sent %u hostkeys", nkeys);
 	if (nkeys == 0)
-		fatal("%s: no hostkeys", __func__);
+-		fatal_f("no hostkeys");
 -	if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+		debug3("%s: no hostkeys", __func__);
+		debug3_f("no hostkeys");
 +	else if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
 		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send", __func__);
 	sshbuf_free(buf);
@ -3772,7 +3758,7 @@ index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
 	}
@@ -2347,6 +2348,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
- 	    list_hostkey_types());
+ 	    ssh, list_hostkey_types());
 
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
 +	{
@ -3818,7 +3804,7 @@ index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
 +
 	/* start key exchange */
 	if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
- 		fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ 		fatal_r(r, "kex_setup");
@@ -2362,7 +2405,18 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
 # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
 	kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
@ -3837,7 +3823,7 @@ index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
 +# endif
 +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
 	kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
- 	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
 	kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
 diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
 index 19b7c91a..2c48105f 100644
@ -3898,9 +3884,9 @@ index 70ccea44..f6b41a2f 100644
 +.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,
 +gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
 +This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
- .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
- Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication
- as a list of comma-separated patterns.
+ .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased
+ authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
 diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
 index 57995ee6..fd5b7724 100644
 --- a/sshkey.c
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-keygen-strip-doseol.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.0p1-keygen-strip-doseol.patch
@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.strip-doseol openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.strip-doseol	2021-03-18 17:41:34.472404994 +0100
+++ openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-03-18 17:41:55.255538761 +0100
+@@ -901,7 +901,7 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
+ 	while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
+ 		lnum++;
+ 		cp = line;
+-		cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0';
+		cp[strcspn(cp, "\r\n")] = '\0';
+ 		/* Trim leading space and comments */
+ 		cp = line + strspn(line, " \t");
+ 		if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0')
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ index b6f041f4..1fbce2bb 100644
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID,
-+	    kex->session_id, kex->session_id_len);
+	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->session_id), sshbuf_len(kex->session_id));
 +	if (r != 1) {
 +		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 +		goto out;
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c.preserve-pam-errors openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c.preserve-pam-errors	2021-03-31 17:03:15.618592347 +0200
+++ openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c	2021-03-31 17:06:58.115220014 +0200
+@@ -511,7 +511,11 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
+ 		goto auth_fail;
+ 
+ 	if (!do_pam_account()) {
+-		sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
+		/* Preserve PAM_PERM_DENIED and PAM_USER_UNKNOWN.
+		 * Backward compatibility for other errors. */
+		if (sshpam_err != PAM_PERM_DENIED
+			&& sshpam_err != PAM_USER_UNKNOWN)
+			sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
+ 		goto auth_fail;
+ 	}
+ 	if (sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange) {
+@@ -568,8 +572,10 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
+ 	    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err))) != 0)
+ 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 	/* XXX - can't do much about an error here */
+-	if (sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
+-		ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED, buffer);
+	if (sshpam_err == PAM_PERM_DENIED
+		|| sshpam_err == PAM_USER_UNKNOWN
+		|| sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
+		ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, sshpam_err, buffer);
+ 	else if (sshpam_maxtries_reached)
+ 		ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MAXTRIES, buffer);
+ 	else
+@@ -856,10 +862,12 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha
+ 			plen++;
+ 			free(msg);
+ 			break;
+		case PAM_USER_UNKNOWN:
+		case PAM_PERM_DENIED:
+ 		case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED:
+			sshpam_account_status = 0;
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+ 		case PAM_MAXTRIES:
+-			if (type == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
+-				sshpam_account_status = 0;
+ 			if (type == PAM_MAXTRIES)
+ 				sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1);
+ 			/* FALLTHROUGH */
--- a/openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
 			if (x11_use_localhost)
 				set_reuseaddr(sock);
 			if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
- 				debug2("%s: bind port %d: %.100s", __func__,
- 				    port, strerror(errno));
+ 				debug2_f("bind port %d: %.100s", port,
+ 				    strerror(errno));
 				close(sock);
 +
 +				/* do not remove successfully opened
--- a/openssh-8.4p1-debian-compat.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.4p1-debian-compat.patch
@ -37,8 +37,8 @@
 +	 * SHA2 signature types.
 +	 */
 +	if (alg == NULL &&
-+	    (key->type == KEY_RSA && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74))) {
-+		oallowed = allowed = xstrdup(options.pubkey_key_types);
+	    (key->type == KEY_RSA && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74))) {
+		oallowed = allowed = xstrdup(options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
 +		while ((cp = strsep(&allowed, ",")) != NULL) {
 +			if (sshkey_type_from_name(cp) != key->type)
 +				continue;
--- a/openssh-8.4p1-sandbox-seccomp.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.4p1-sandbox-seccomp.patch
@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-index e0768c06..5065ae7e 100644
--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -267,6 +267,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- #ifdef __NR_pselect6
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_pselect6_time64
-+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6_time64),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_read
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_read),
- #endif
--- a/openssh-8.4p1-ssh-copy-id.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.4p1-ssh-copy-id.patch
@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
-From 66f16e5425eb881570e82bfef7baeac2e7accc0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Oleg <Fallmay@users.noreply.github.com>
-Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2020 12:09:08 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix `EOF: command not found` error in ssh-copy-id
-
---
- contrib/ssh-copy-id | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-index 392f64f94..a76907717 100644
--- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-+++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ installkeys_sh() {
-   #    the -z `tail ...` checks for a trailing newline. The echo adds one if was missing
-   #    the cat adds the keys we're getting via STDIN
-   #    and if available restorecon is used to restore the SELinux context
-  INSTALLKEYS_SH=$(tr '\t\n' ' ' <<-EOF)
-+  INSTALLKEYS_SH=$(tr '\t\n' ' ' <<-EOF
- 	cd;
- 	umask 077;
- 	mkdir -p $(dirname "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}") &&
-@@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ installkeys_sh() {
- 	  restorecon -F .ssh ${AUTH_KEY_FILE};
- 	fi
- EOF
-+  )
- 
-   # to defend against quirky remote shells: use 'exec sh -c' to get POSIX;
-   printf "exec sh -c '%s'" "${INSTALLKEYS_SH}"
-
-From de59a431cdec833e3ec15691dd950402b4c052cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>
-Date: Sat, 3 Oct 2020 00:20:07 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] un-nest $() to make ksh cheerful
-
---
- ssh-copy-id | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-From 02ac2c3c3db5478a440dfb1b90d15f686f2cbfc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>
-Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2020 21:30:10 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] ksh doesn't grok 'local'
-
-and AFAICT it's not actually doing anything useful in the code, so let's
-see how things go without it.
---
- ssh-copy-id | 11 +++++------
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-index a769077..11c9463 100755
--- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-+++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ quote() {
- }
- 
- use_id_file() {
-  local L_ID_FILE="$1"
-+  L_ID_FILE="$1"
- 
-   if [ -z "$L_ID_FILE" ] ; then
-     printf '%s: ERROR: no ID file found\n' "$0"
-@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ use_id_file() {
-   # check that the files are readable
-   for f in "$PUB_ID_FILE" ${PRIV_ID_FILE:+"$PRIV_ID_FILE"} ; do
-     ErrMSG=$( { : < "$f" ; } 2>&1 ) || {
-      local L_PRIVMSG=""
-+      L_PRIVMSG=""
-       [ "$f" = "$PRIV_ID_FILE" ] && L_PRIVMSG="	(to install the contents of '$PUB_ID_FILE' anyway, look at the -f option)"
-       printf "\\n%s: ERROR: failed to open ID file '%s': %s\\n" "$0" "$f" "$(printf '%s\n%s\n' "$ErrMSG" "$L_PRIVMSG" | sed -e 's/.*: *//')"
-       exit 1
-@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ fi
- # populate_new_ids() uses several global variables ($USER_HOST, $SSH_OPTS ...)
- # and has the side effect of setting $NEW_IDS
- populate_new_ids() {
-  local L_SUCCESS="$1"
-+  L_SUCCESS="$1"
- 
-   # shellcheck disable=SC2086
-   if [ "$FORCED" ] ; then
-@@ -181,13 +181,12 @@ populate_new_ids() {
-   eval set -- "$SSH_OPTS"
- 
-   umask 0177
-  local L_TMP_ID_FILE
-   L_TMP_ID_FILE=$(mktemp ~/.ssh/ssh-copy-id_id.XXXXXXXXXX)
-   if test $? -ne 0 || test "x$L_TMP_ID_FILE" = "x" ; then
-     printf '%s: ERROR: mktemp failed\n' "$0" >&2
-     exit 1
-   fi
-  local L_CLEANUP="rm -f \"$L_TMP_ID_FILE\" \"${L_TMP_ID_FILE}.stderr\""
-+  L_CLEANUP="rm -f \"$L_TMP_ID_FILE\" \"${L_TMP_ID_FILE}.stderr\""
-   # shellcheck disable=SC2064
-   trap "$L_CLEANUP" EXIT TERM INT QUIT
-   printf '%s: INFO: attempting to log in with the new key(s), to filter out any that are already installed\n' "$0" >&2
-@@ -237,7 +236,7 @@ populate_new_ids() {
- #    produce a one-liner to add the keys to remote authorized_keys file
- #    optionally takes an alternative path for authorized_keys
- installkeys_sh() {
-  local AUTH_KEY_FILE=${1:-.ssh/authorized_keys}
-+  AUTH_KEY_FILE=${1:-.ssh/authorized_keys}
- 
-   # In setting INSTALLKEYS_SH:
-   #    the tr puts it all on one line (to placate tcsh)
-- 
-
-diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-index 11c9463..ee3f637 100755
--- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-+++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-@@ -237,6 +237,7 @@ populate_new_ids() {
- #    optionally takes an alternative path for authorized_keys
- installkeys_sh() {
-   AUTH_KEY_FILE=${1:-.ssh/authorized_keys}
-+  AUTH_KEY_DIR=$(dirname "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}")
- 
-   # In setting INSTALLKEYS_SH:
-   #    the tr puts it all on one line (to placate tcsh)
-@@ -249,7 +250,7 @@ installkeys_sh() {
-   INSTALLKEYS_SH=$(tr '\t\n' ' ' <<-EOF
- 	cd;
- 	umask 077;
-	mkdir -p $(dirname "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}") &&
-+	mkdir -p "${AUTH_KEY_DIR}" &&
- 	  { [ -z \`tail -1c ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} 2>/dev/null\` ] || echo >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} || exit 1; } &&
- 	  cat >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} ||
- 	  exit 1;
-- 
--- a/openssh.rpmlintrc
+++ b/openssh.rpmlintrc
@ -13,9 +13,8 @@ addFilter(r'openssh-(askpass|cavs).x86_64: W: no-documentation')
 # sshd config and sysconfig is not supposed to be world readable
 addFilter(r'non-readable /etc/(ssh/sshd_config|sysconfig/sshd)')

-# The /var/empty/sshd is supposed to have the given permissions
-addFilter(r'non-standard-dir-perm /var/empty/sshd 711')
-addFilter(r'non-standard-dir-in-var empty')
+# /usr/share/empty.sshd is required to have the given permissions
+addFilter(r'non-standard-dir-perm /usr/share/empty.sshd 711')

 # Spelling false-positives
 addFilter(r'spelling-error (Summary\(en_US\)|.* en_US) (mls|su|sudo|rlogin|rsh|untrusted) ')
--- a/openssh.spec
+++ b/openssh.spec
@ -50,10 +50,10 @@
 %{?static_openssl:%global static_libcrypto 1}

 # Do not forget to bump pam_ssh_agent_auth release if you rewind the main package release to 1
-%global openssh_ver 8.4p1
-%global openssh_rel 4
+%global openssh_ver 8.6p1
+%global openssh_rel 1
 %global pam_ssh_agent_ver 0.10.4
-%global pam_ssh_agent_rel 1
+%global pam_ssh_agent_rel 3

 Summary: An open source implementation of SSH protocol version 2
 Name: openssh
@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html
 Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
 Source1: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz.asc
 Source2: sshd.pam
-Source3: DJM-GPG-KEY.gpg
+Source3: gpgkey-736060BA.gpg
 Source4: https://github.com/jbeverly/pam_ssh_agent_auth/archive/pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}.tar.gz
 Source5: pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders
 Source6: ssh-keycat.pam
@ -74,8 +74,8 @@ Source10: sshd.socket
 Source11: sshd.service
 Source12: sshd-keygen@.service
 Source13: sshd-keygen
-Source14: sshd.tmpfiles
 Source15: sshd-keygen.target
+Source16: ssh-agent.service

 #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2581
 Patch100: openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
@ -133,10 +133,6 @@ Patch707: openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch
 Patch711: openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
 # make aes-ctr ciphers use EVP engines such as AES-NI from OpenSSL
 Patch712: openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch
-# add cavs test binary for the aes-ctr
-Patch713: openssh-6.6p1-ctr-cavstest.patch
-# add SSH KDF CAVS test driver
-Patch714: openssh-6.7p1-kdf-cavs.patch

 # GSSAPI Key Exchange (RFC 4462 + RFC 8732)
 # from https://github.com/openssh-gsskex/openssh-gsskex/tree/fedora/master
@ -183,9 +179,6 @@ Patch950: openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
 Patch951: openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
 # Unbreak scp between two IPv6 hosts (#1620333)
 Patch953: openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
-# ssh-copy-id is unmaintained: Aggreagete patches
-# https://gitlab.com/phil_hands/ssh-copy-id/-/merge_requests/2
-Patch958: openssh-7.9p1-ssh-copy-id.patch
 # Mention crypto-policies in manual pages (#1668325)
 Patch962: openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
 # Use OpenSSL high-level API to produce and verify signatures (#1707485)
@ -196,11 +189,12 @@ Patch964: openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
 Patch965: openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch
 # Do not break X11 without IPv6
 Patch966: openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
-Patch967: openssh-8.4p1-ssh-copy-id.patch
-# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3232
-Patch968: openssh-8.4p1-sandbox-seccomp.patch
 # https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3213
 Patch969: openssh-8.4p1-debian-compat.patch
+# ssh-keygen printing fingerprint issue with Windows keys (#1901518)
+Patch974: openssh-8.0p1-keygen-strip-doseol.patch
+# sshd provides PAM an incorrect error code (#1879503)
+Patch975: openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch

 License: BSD
 Requires: /sbin/nologin
@ -221,11 +215,13 @@ BuildRequires: pam-devel
 BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 0.9.8j
 BuildRequires: perl-podlators
 BuildRequires: systemd-devel
+BuildRequires: systemd-rpm-macros
 BuildRequires: gcc make
 BuildRequires: p11-kit-devel
 BuildRequires: libfido2-devel
 Recommends: p11-kit
 Obsoletes: openssh-ldap < 8.3p1-4
+Obsoletes: openssh-cavs < 8.4p1-5

 %if %{kerberos5}
 BuildRequires: krb5-devel
@ -267,14 +263,10 @@ Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
 Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and X
 Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}

-%package cavs
-Summary: CAVS tests for FIPS validation
-Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
-
 %package -n pam_ssh_agent_auth
 Summary: PAM module for authentication with ssh-agent
 Version: %{pam_ssh_agent_ver}
-Release: %{pam_ssh_agent_rel}.%{openssh_rel}%{?dist}.2
+Release: %{pam_ssh_agent_rel}.%{openssh_rel}%{?dist}
 License: BSD

 %description
@ -311,10 +303,6 @@ OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
 into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains
 an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH.

-%description cavs
-This package contains test binaries and scripts to make FIPS validation
-easier. Now contains CTR and KDF CAVS test driver.
-
 %description -n pam_ssh_agent_auth
 This package contains a PAM module which can be used to authenticate
 users using ssh keys stored in a ssh-agent. Through the use of the
@ -355,8 +343,6 @@ popd
 %patch707 -p1 -b .redhat
 %patch711 -p1 -b .log-usepam-no
 %patch712 -p1 -b .evp-ctr
-%patch713 -p1 -b .ctr-cavs
-%patch714 -p1 -b .kdf-cavs
 # 
 %patch800 -p1 -b .gsskex
 %patch801 -p1 -b .force_krb
@ -378,15 +364,14 @@ popd
 %patch950 -p1 -b .sandbox
 %patch951 -p1 -b .pkcs11-uri
 %patch953 -p1 -b .scp-ipv6
-%patch958 -p1 -b .ssh-copy-id
 %patch962 -p1 -b .crypto-policies
 %patch963 -p1 -b .openssl-evp
 %patch964 -p1 -b .openssl-kdf
 %patch965 -p1 -b .visibility
 %patch966 -p1 -b .x11-ipv6
-%patch967 -p1 -b .ssh-copy-id
-%patch968 -p1 -b .seccomp
 %patch969 -p0 -b .debian
+%patch974 -p1 -b .keygen-strip-doseol
+%patch975 -p1 -b .preserve-pam-errors

 %patch200 -p1 -b .audit
 %patch201 -p1 -b .audit-race
@ -438,7 +423,7 @@ fi
 	--datadir=%{_datadir}/openssh \
 	--with-default-path=/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/sbin \
 	--with-superuser-path=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin \
-	--with-privsep-path=%{_var}/empty/sshd \
+	--with-privsep-path=%{_datadir}/empty.sshd \
 	--disable-strip \
 	--without-zlib-version-check \
 	--with-ssl-engine \
@ -515,7 +500,6 @@ mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/ssh
 mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config.d
 mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config.d
 mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh
-mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_var}/empty/sshd
 %make_install

 install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/
@ -532,10 +516,12 @@ install -m644 %{SOURCE10} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/sshd.socket
 install -m644 %{SOURCE11} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/sshd.service
 install -m644 %{SOURCE12} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/sshd-keygen@.service
 install -m644 %{SOURCE15} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/sshd-keygen.target
+install -d -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_userunitdir}
+install -m644 %{SOURCE16} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_userunitdir}/ssh-agent.service
 install -m744 %{SOURCE13} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libexecdir}/openssh/sshd-keygen
 install -m755 contrib/ssh-copy-id $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/
 install contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/
-install -m644 -D %{SOURCE14} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_tmpfilesdir}/%{name}.conf
+install -d -m711 ${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}/%{_datadir}/empty.sshd

 %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
 install contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
@ -566,7 +552,7 @@ getent group ssh_keys >/dev/null || groupadd -r ssh_keys || :
 getent group sshd >/dev/null || groupadd -g %{sshd_uid} -r sshd || :
 getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \
  useradd -c "Privilege-separated SSH" -u %{sshd_uid} -g sshd \
-  -s /sbin/nologin -r -d /var/empty/sshd sshd 2> /dev/null || :
+  -s /sbin/nologin -r -d /usr/share/empty.sshd sshd 2> /dev/null || :

 %post server
 %systemd_post sshd.service sshd.socket
@ -588,6 +574,12 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
 %postun server
 %systemd_postun_with_restart sshd.service

+%post clients
+%systemd_user_post ssh-agent.service
+
+%preun clients
+%systemd_user_preun ssh-agent.service
+
 %files
 %license LICENCE
 %doc CREDITS ChangeLog OVERVIEW PROTOCOL* README README.platform README.privsep README.tun README.dns TODO
@ -622,9 +614,10 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-copy-id.1*
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8*
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-sk-helper.8*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_userunitdir}/ssh-agent.service

 %files server
-%dir %attr(0711,root,root) %{_var}/empty/sshd
+%dir %attr(0711,root,root) %{_datadir}/empty.sshd
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sftp-server
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sshd-keygen
@ -642,7 +635,6 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/sshd.socket
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/sshd-keygen@.service
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/sshd-keygen.target
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_tmpfilesdir}/openssh.conf

 %files keycat
 %doc HOWTO.ssh-keycat
@ -656,11 +648,6 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass
 %endif

-%files cavs
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ctr-cavstest
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-cavs
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-cavs_driver.pl
-
 %if %{pam_ssh_agent}
 %files -n pam_ssh_agent_auth
 %license pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}/OPENSSH_LICENSE
@ -669,6 +656,29 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
 %endif

 %changelog
+* Mon Apr 19 2021 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.6p1-1 + 0.10.4-3
+- New upstream release (#1950819)
+- ssh-keygen printing fingerprint issue with Windows keys (#1901518)
+- sshd provides PAM an incorrect error code (#1879503)
+
+* Tue Mar 09 2021 Rex Dieter <rdieter@fedoraproject.org> - 8.5p1-2
+- ssh-agent.serivce is user unit (#1761817#27)
+
+* Wed Mar 03 2021 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 8.5p1-1 + 0.10.4-2
+- New upstream release (#1934336)
+
+* Tue Mar 02 2021 Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek <zbyszek@in.waw.pl> - 8.4p1-5.2
+- Rebuilt for updated systemd-rpm-macros
+  See https://pagure.io/fesco/issue/2583.
+
+* Tue Jan 26 2021 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 8.4p1-5.1
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_34_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Fri Jan 22 2021 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 8.4p1-5 + 0.10.4-1
+- Use /usr/share/empty.sshd instead of /var/empty/sshd
+- Allow emptu labels in PKCS#11 tokens (#1919007)
+- Drop openssh-cavs subpackage
+
 * Tue Dec 01 2020 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 8.4p1-4 + 0.10.4-1
 - Remove "PasswordAuthentication yes" from vendor configuration as it is
  already default and it might be hard to override.
--- a/6
+++ b/6
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-SHA512 (openssh-8.4p1.tar.gz) = d65275b082c46c5efe7cf3264fa6794d6e99a36d4a54b50554fc56979d6c0837381587fd5399195e1db680d2a5ad1ef0b99a180eac2b4de5637906cb7a89e9ce
-SHA512 (openssh-8.4p1.tar.gz.asc) = 3d9a026db27729a5a56785db3824230ccf2a3beca4bb48ef465e44d869b944dbc5d443152a1b1be21bc9c213c465d3d7ca1f876a387d0a6b9682a0cfec3e6e32
+SHA512 (openssh-8.6p1.tar.gz) = 9854eda0b773c64c9f1f74844ce466b2b42ee8845f58ad062b73141d617af944fa4ebafdf72069f400106d2c2bd0a69c92fe805ec1fc26d4f0faadf06c3fbbe6
+SHA512 (openssh-8.6p1.tar.gz.asc) = ea75d7fe350fd1761ee5490b222249e9b8915b2a02a1d41979195f15d239def387e4c6467362ab9515d517087750fa66bc368f5baa15c325502f725172631967
 SHA512 (pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4.tar.gz) = caccf72174d15e43f4c86a459ac6448682e62116557cf1e1e828955f3d1731595b238df42adec57860e7f341e92daf5d8285020bcb5018f3b8a5145aa32ee1c2
-SHA512 (DJM-GPG-KEY.gpg) = db1191ed9b6495999e05eed2ef863fb5179bdb63e94850f192dad68eed8579836f88fbcfffd9f28524fe1457aff8cd248ee3e0afc112c8f609b99a34b80ecc0d
+SHA512 (gpgkey-736060BA.gpg) = df44f3fdbcd1d596705348c7f5aed3f738c5f626a55955e0642f7c6c082995cf36a1b1891bb41b8715cb2aff34fef1c877e0eff0d3507dd00a055ba695757a21
--- a/ssh-agent.service
+++ b/ssh-agent.service
@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# Requires SSH_AUTH_SOCK="$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/ssh-agent.socket"
+# set in environment, handled for example in plasma via
+# /etc/xdg/plasma-workspace/env/ssh-agent.sh
+[Unit]
+ConditionEnvironment=!SSH_AGENT_PID
+Description=OpenSSH key agent
+Documentation=man:ssh-agent(1) man:ssh-add(1) man:ssh(1)
+
+[Service]
+Environment=SSH_AUTH_SOCK=%t/ssh-agent.socket
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/ssh-agent -a $SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+PassEnvironment=SSH_AGENT_PID
+SuccessExitStatus=2
+Type=forking
--- a/sshd.tmpfiles
+++ b/sshd.tmpfiles
@ -1 +0,0 @@
-d /var/empty/sshd 711 root root -
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Dmitry Belyavskiy	ac2648baae	pam_auth version bump	2021-04-30 17:06:28 +02:00
Dmitry Belyavskiy	f0f3114095	pam_auth version bump	2021-04-30 16:57:20 +02:00
Dmitry Belyavskiy	df26987d52	Fixes from RHEL 8.5.0	2021-04-29 16:37:35 +02:00
Dmitry Belyavskiy	f32b842272	OpenSSH release update Resolves: rhbz#1950819 8.5p1 => 8.6p1	2021-04-29 16:37:35 +02:00
Dmitry Belyavskiy	446f300da0	Remove all the coverity warnings	2021-03-26 12:55:57 +01:00
Dmitry Belyavskiy	a2e7f72c3c	Fix coverity issues for openssh (#1938831 )	2021-03-25 10:53:25 +01:00
Rex Dieter	44aae310bd	create userunit dir before installing to it shrug, for posterity, consider using install -D ...	2021-03-09 09:33:17 -06:00
Rex Dieter	9979ff5307	ssh-agent.serivce is user unit (#1761817#27)	2021-03-09 09:19:14 -06:00
Rex Dieter	5f230a4999	-clients: provide ssh-agent.service (#1761817 )	2021-03-04 15:10:26 +01:00
Jakub Jelen	25c16c68f5	openssh-8.5p1-1 + 0.10.4-2	2021-03-03 11:08:52 +01:00
Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek	6e1851c5ba	Rebuilt for updated systemd-rpm-macros See https://pagure.io/fesco/issue/2583.	2021-03-02 16:13:10 +01:00
Fedora Release Engineering	7347a74385	- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_34_Mass_Rebuild Signed-off-by: Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org>	2021-01-26 22:36:09 +00:00
Jakub Jelen	ab05c4fa21	8.4p1-5 + 0.10.4-1 (forgotten version bump)	2021-01-22 17:35:02 +01:00
Jakub Jelen	106b283ba5	8.4p1-5 + 0.10.4-1	2021-01-22 12:58:02 +01:00
Timothée Ravier	a886069993	Use /usr/share/empty.ssh instead of /var/empty/sshd This has the following advantages: * Removes a dependency on a directory stored in /var * /usr is mounted read only on ostree based systems (CoreOS, Silverblue) This also removes the tmpfiles config. Edit Jakub Jelen: Removed the version bump from PR https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/pull-request/14	2021-01-22 12:57:36 +01:00
Jakub Jelen	1a45c5da8d	Remove openssh-cavs subpackage as it is no longer needed and broken anyway The CAVS drivers were used for FIPS certification when OpenSSH used to be a FIPS module. This is no longer the case and these leftovers were left in place until they work. This is no longer the case either so lets get rid of 1000 lines of patches.	2021-01-22 12:50:51 +01:00
Jakub Jelen	ee6f0fcc0a	Accept empty labels (#1919007 )	2021-01-22 12:22:08 +01:00