Fix malformed patch

This only version does incorrectly reports server_sig_algorithms
extension and in Fedora 33 with disabled SHA1, clients are unable
to connect to Debian servers

.gitignore

@@ -8,3 +8,40 @@ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2.tar.bz2
 /pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.tar.bz2
 /openssh-6.0p1-noacss.tar.bz2
 /openssh-6.1p1-noacss.tar.bz2
+/openssh-6.2p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-6.2p2.tar.gz
+/openssh-6.3p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-6.4p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-6.6p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-6.7p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-6.8p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-6.9p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.0p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.1p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.1p2.tar.gz
+/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2.tar.bz2
+/openssh-7.2p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.2p2.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.3p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.4p1.tar.gz
+/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3.tar.bz2
+/openssh-7.5p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.6p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.7p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.7p1.tar.gz.asc
+/DJM-GPG-KEY.gpg
+/openssh-7.8p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.8p1.tar.gz.asc
+/openssh-7.9p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.9p1.tar.gz.asc
+/openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz.asc
+/openssh-8.1p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-8.1p1.tar.gz.asc
+/openssh-8.2p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-8.2p1.tar.gz.asc
+/openssh-8.3p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-8.3p1.tar.gz.asc
+/openssh-8.4p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-8.4p1.tar.gz.asc
+/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4.tar.gz

openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
---- openssh-4.3p2/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info	2006-07-17 15:10:11.000000000 +0200
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
-+++ openssh-4.3p2/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2006-07-17 15:25:04.000000000 +0200
+--- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info	2016-12-23 13:31:22.645213115 +0100
-@@ -65,9 +65,12 @@
++++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2016-12-23 13:31:40.997216691 +0100
- 	err = gtk_message_dialog_new(NULL, 0,
+@@ -65,9 +65,12 @@ report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_wi
+ 	err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
  				     GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR,
  				     GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
 -				     "Could not grab %s. "
@@ -14,5 +15,5 @@
 +				     "Either close the application which grabs the %s or "
 +				     "log out and log in again to prevent this from happening.", what, what);
  	gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
- 	gtk_label_set_line_wrap(GTK_LABEL((GTK_MESSAGE_DIALOG(err))->label),
+ 
- 				TRUE);
+ 	gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(err));

openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch

@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
---- openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress	2008-07-23 19:05:26.000000000 +0200
+--- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2008-07-23 19:05:26.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2016-12-23 13:31:16.545211926 +0100
 @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
- #include <string.h>
  #include <unistd.h>
+ 
  #include <X11/Xlib.h>
 +#include <glib.h>
  #include <gtk/gtk.h>
  #include <gdk/gdkx.h>
- 
+ #include <gdk/gdkkeysyms.h>
-@@ -83,13 +84,24 @@ ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dia
+@@ -81,14 +82,25 @@ ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dia
- 	gtk_dialog_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
+ 	return 1;
  }
  
 +static void
@@ -25,55 +25,59 @@ diff -up openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-5.1p1/contr
 +}
 +
  static int
- passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+ passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
  {
  	const char *failed;
  	char *passphrase, *local;
  	int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer;
--	GtkWidget *dialog, *entry;
+ 	int buttons, default_response;
-+	GtkWidget *dialog, *entry, *progress, *hbox;
+-	GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry;
++	GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry, *progress, *hbox;
  	GdkGrabStatus status;
+ 	GdkColor fg, bg;
+ 	int fg_set = 0, bg_set = 0;
+@@ -104,14 +116,19 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+ 		gtk_widget_modify_bg(dialog, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
  
- 	grab_server = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER") != NULL);
+ 	if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY || prompt_type == PROMPT_NONE) {
-@@ -102,13 +114,31 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
++		hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
- 					"%s",
++		gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE,
- 					message);
++		    FALSE, 0);
- 
++		gtk_widget_show(hbox);
-+	hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
-+	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE,
-+	    FALSE, 0);
-+	gtk_widget_show(hbox);
 +
- 	entry = gtk_entry_new();
+		entry = gtk_entry_new();
--	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), entry, FALSE,
+		if (fg_set)
-+	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(hbox), entry, TRUE,
+			gtk_widget_modify_fg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &fg);
- 	    FALSE, 0);
+		if (bg_set)
-+	gtk_entry_set_width_chars(GTK_ENTRY(entry), 2);
+			gtk_widget_modify_bg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
- 	gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
+		gtk_box_pack_start(
- 	gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
+-		    GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))),
- 	gtk_widget_show(entry);
+-		    entry, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
- 
++		    GTK_BOX(hbox), entry, TRUE, FALSE, 0);
-+	hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
++		gtk_entry_set_width_chars(GTK_ENTRY(entry), 2);
-+	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE,
+ 		gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
-+	    FALSE, 8);
+ 		gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
-+	gtk_widget_show(hbox);
+ 		if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY) {
+@@ -130,6 +145,22 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+ 			g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "key_press_event",
+ 			                 G_CALLBACK(check_none), dialog);
+ 		}
 +
-+	progress = gtk_progress_bar_new();
++		hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
-+	
++		gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox),
-+	gtk_progress_bar_set_text(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress), "Passphrase length hidden intentionally");
++		    hbox, FALSE, FALSE, 8);
-+	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(hbox), progress, TRUE,
++		gtk_widget_show(hbox);
-+	    TRUE, 5);
-+	gtk_widget_show(progress);
 +
- 	gtk_window_set_title(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), "OpenSSH");
++		progress = gtk_progress_bar_new();
- 	gtk_window_set_position (GTK_WINDOW(dialog), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
++
- 	gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
++		gtk_progress_bar_set_text(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress),
-@@ -119,6 +149,8 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
++		    "Passphrase length hidden intentionally");
- 	gtk_dialog_set_default_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
++		gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(hbox), progress, TRUE,
- 	g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "activate",
++		    TRUE, 5);
- 			 G_CALLBACK(ok_dialog), dialog);
++		gtk_widget_show(progress);
-+	g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "changed",
++		g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "changed",
-+			 G_CALLBACK(move_progress), progress);
++				 G_CALLBACK(move_progress), progress);
- 
++
- 	gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
+ 	}
  
+ 	/* Grab focus */

openssh-5.1p1-scp-manpage.patch

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.1p1/scp.1.manpage openssh-5.1p1/scp.1
---- openssh-5.1p1/scp.1.manpage	2008-07-12 09:12:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.1p1/scp.1	2008-07-23 19:18:15.000000000 +0200
-@@ -66,6 +66,14 @@ treating file names containing
- as host specifiers.
- Copies between two remote hosts are also permitted.
- .Pp
-+When copying a source file to a target file which already exists,
-+.Nm 
-+will replace the contents of the target file (keeping the inode).
-+.Pp
-+If the target file does not yet exist, an empty file with the target
-+file name is created, then filled with the source file contents.
-+No attempt is made at "near-atomic" transfer using temporary files.
-+.Pp
- The options are as follows:
- .Bl -tag -width Ds
- .It Fl 1

openssh-5.2p1-allow-ip-opts.patch

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.2p1/canohost.c.ip-opts openssh-5.2p1/canohost.c
---- openssh-5.2p1/canohost.c.ip-opts	2009-02-14 06:28:21.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.2p1/canohost.c	2009-09-01 15:31:29.000000000 +0200
-@@ -169,12 +169,27 @@ check_ip_options(int sock, char *ipaddr)
- 	option_size = sizeof(options);
- 	if (getsockopt(sock, ipproto, IP_OPTIONS, options,
- 	    &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
--		text[0] = '\0';
--		for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
--			snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
--			    " %2.2x", options[i]);
--		fatal("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s",
--		    ipaddr, text);
-+		i = 0;
-+		do {
-+			switch (options[i]) {
-+				case 0:
-+				case 1:
-+					++i;
-+					break;
-+				case 131:
-+				case 137:
-+				/* Fail, fatally, if we detect either loose or strict
-+			 	 * source routing options. */
-+					text[0] = '\0';
-+					for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
-+						snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
-+							" %2.2x", options[i]);
-+					fatal("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s",
-+						ipaddr, text);
-+				default:
-+					i += options[i + 1];
-+			}
-+		} while (i < option_size);
- 	}
- #endif /* IP_OPTIONS */
- }

openssh-5.6p1-exit-deadlock.patch

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.6p1/channels.c.exit-deadlock openssh-5.6p1/channels.c
---- openssh-5.6p1/channels.c.exit-deadlock	2010-08-05 15:09:48.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.6p1/channels.c	2010-08-23 12:41:43.000000000 +0200
-@@ -1647,6 +1647,10 @@ channel_handle_wfd(Channel *c, fd_set *r
- 	u_int dlen, olen = 0;
- 	int len;
- 
-+	if(c->wfd != -1 && buffer_len(&c->output) > 0 && c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
-+		debug("channel %d: forcing write", c->self);
-+		FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset);
-+	}
- 	/* Send buffered output data to the socket. */
- 	if (c->wfd != -1 &&
- 	    FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) &&

openssh-5.8p1-audit0.patch

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-Don't audit SSH_INVALID_USER twice.
-
-PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow()) a few lines above already did this.
-
-diff -ur openssh/auth2.c openssh-5.8p1/auth2.c
---- openssh/auth2.c	2011-03-02 02:32:52.383773622 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1/auth2.c	2011-03-02 03:32:34.585110911 +0100
-@@ -250,9 +250,6 @@
- 		} else {
- 			logit("input_userauth_request: invalid user %s", user);
- 			authctxt->pw = fakepw();
--#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
--			PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER));
--#endif
- 		}
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- 		if (options.use_pam)

openssh-5.8p1-fingerprint.patch

@@ -1,421 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c.fingerprint openssh-5.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c.fingerprint	2010-08-05 05:04:50.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c	2011-02-25 09:17:18.000000000 +0100
-@@ -196,16 +196,18 @@ hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw,
- 
- 	if (host_status == HOST_OK) {
- 		if (key_is_cert(key)) {
--			fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
--			    SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
-+			    SSH_FP_HEX);
- 			verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by "
--			    "%s CA %s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id,
--			    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp,
-+			    "%s CA %s%s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id,
-+			    key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
-+			    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp,
- 			    cuser, lookup);
- 		} else {
--			fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
--			verbose("Accepted %s public key %s from %s@%s",
--			    key_type(key), fp, cuser, lookup);
-+			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+			verbose("Accepted %s public key %s%s from %s@%s",
-+			    key_type(key), key_fingerprint_prefix(),
-+			    fp, cuser, lookup);
- 		}
- 		xfree(fp);
- 	}
-diff -up openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c.fingerprint openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c.fingerprint	2010-12-01 01:50:14.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c	2011-02-25 09:17:18.000000000 +0100
-@@ -319,10 +319,10 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key
- 				continue;
- 			if (!key_is_cert_authority)
- 				continue;
--			fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5,
--			    SSH_FP_HEX);
--			debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s",
--			    file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
-+			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+			debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s%s",
-+			    file, linenum, key_type(found),
-+			    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
- 			/*
- 			 * If the user has specified a list of principals as
- 			 * a key option, then prefer that list to matching
-@@ -362,9 +362,9 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key
- 			found_key = 1;
- 			debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu",
- 			    file, linenum);
--			fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
--			verbose("Found matching %s key: %s",
--			    key_type(found), fp);
-+			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+			verbose("Found matching %s key: %s%s",
-+			    key_type(found), key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
- 			xfree(fp);
- 			break;
- 		}
-@@ -388,13 +388,13 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, 
- 	if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
- 		return 0;
- 
--	ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
--	    SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	ca_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
- 
- 	if (key_in_file(key->cert->signature_key,
- 	    options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1) != 1) {
--		debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s", __func__,
--		    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
-+		debug2("%s: CA %s%s %s is not listed in %s", __func__,
-+		    key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
-+		    key_fingerprint_prefix(), ca_fp,
- 		    options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-diff -up openssh-5.8p1/auth.c.fingerprint openssh-5.8p1/auth.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/auth.c.fingerprint	2010-12-01 02:21:51.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1/auth.c	2011-02-25 09:17:18.000000000 +0100
-@@ -639,9 +639,10 @@ auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key)
- 		return 1;
- 	case 1:
- 		/* Key revoked */
--		key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+		key_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
- 		error("WARNING: authentication attempt with a revoked "
--		    "%s key %s ", key_type(key), key_fp);
-+		    "%s key %s%s ", key_type(key),
-+		    key_fingerprint_prefix(), key_fp);
- 		xfree(key_fp);
- 		return 1;
- 	}
-diff -up openssh-5.8p1/auth-rsa.c.fingerprint openssh-5.8p1/auth-rsa.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/auth-rsa.c.fingerprint	2010-12-04 23:01:47.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1/auth-rsa.c	2011-02-25 09:17:18.000000000 +0100
-@@ -318,9 +318,9 @@ auth_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, BIGNUM *cli
- 	 * options; this will be reset if the options cause the
- 	 * authentication to be rejected.
- 	 */
--	fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
--	verbose("Found matching %s key: %s",
--	    key_type(key), fp);
-+	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	verbose("Found matching %s key: %s%s",
-+	    key_type(key), key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
- 	xfree(fp);
- 	key_free(key);
- 
-diff -up openssh-5.8p1/key.c.fingerprint openssh-5.8p1/key.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/key.c.fingerprint	2011-02-04 01:48:34.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1/key.c	2011-02-25 09:18:16.000000000 +0100
-@@ -594,6 +594,34 @@ key_fingerprint(Key *k, enum fp_type dgs
- 	return retval;
- }
- 
-+enum fp_type
-+key_fingerprint_selection(void)
-+{
-+	static enum fp_type rv;
-+	static char rv_defined = 0;
-+	char *env;
-+
-+	if (!rv_defined) {
-+		env = getenv("SSH_FINGERPRINT_TYPE");
-+		rv = (env && !strcmp (env, "sha")) ?
-+			SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
-+		rv_defined = 1;
-+	}
-+	return rv;
-+}
-+
-+char *
-+key_selected_fingerprint(Key *k, enum fp_rep dgst_rep)
-+{
-+	return key_fingerprint(k, key_fingerprint_selection(), dgst_rep);
-+}
-+
-+char *
-+key_fingerprint_prefix(void)
-+{
-+	return key_fingerprint_selection() == SSH_FP_SHA1 ? "sha1:" : "";
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Reads a multiple-precision integer in decimal from the buffer, and advances
-  * the pointer.  The integer must already be initialized.  This function is
-diff -up openssh-5.8p1/key.h.fingerprint openssh-5.8p1/key.h
---- openssh-5.8p1/key.h.fingerprint	2010-11-05 00:19:49.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1/key.h	2011-02-25 09:17:18.000000000 +0100
-@@ -96,6 +96,9 @@ int		 key_equal_public(const Key *, cons
- int		 key_equal(const Key *, const Key *);
- char		*key_fingerprint(Key *, enum fp_type, enum fp_rep);
- u_char		*key_fingerprint_raw(Key *, enum fp_type, u_int *);
-+enum fp_type	 key_fingerprint_selection(void);
-+char		*key_selected_fingerprint(Key *, enum fp_rep);
-+char		*key_fingerprint_prefix(void);
- const char	*key_type(const Key *);
- const char	*key_cert_type(const Key *);
- int		 key_write(const Key *, FILE *);
-diff -up openssh-5.8p1/ssh-add.c.fingerprint openssh-5.8p1/ssh-add.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/ssh-add.c.fingerprint	2010-11-11 04:17:02.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1/ssh-add.c	2011-02-25 09:17:18.000000000 +0100
-@@ -280,10 +280,10 @@ list_identities(AuthenticationConnection
- 		    key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, version)) {
- 			had_identities = 1;
- 			if (do_fp) {
--				fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5,
--				    SSH_FP_HEX);
--				printf("%d %s %s (%s)\n",
--				    key_size(key), fp, comment, key_type(key));
-+				fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+				printf("%d %s%s %s (%s)\n",
-+				    key_size(key), key_fingerprint_prefix(),
-+				    fp, comment, key_type(key));
- 				xfree(fp);
- 			} else {
- 				if (!key_write(key, stdout))
-diff -up openssh-5.8p1/ssh-agent.c.fingerprint openssh-5.8p1/ssh-agent.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/ssh-agent.c.fingerprint	2010-12-01 01:50:35.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1/ssh-agent.c	2011-02-25 09:17:18.000000000 +0100
-@@ -199,9 +199,9 @@ confirm_key(Identity *id)
- 	char *p;
- 	int ret = -1;
- 
--	p = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
--	if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.",
--	    id->comment, p))
-+	p = key_selected_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s%s.",
-+	    id->comment, key_fingerprint_prefix(), p))
- 		ret = 0;
- 	xfree(p);
- 
-diff -up openssh-5.8p1/sshconnect2.c.fingerprint openssh-5.8p1/sshconnect2.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/sshconnect2.c.fingerprint	2010-12-01 02:21:51.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1/sshconnect2.c	2011-02-25 09:17:18.000000000 +0100
-@@ -590,8 +590,9 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t
- 		    key->type, pktype);
- 		goto done;
- 	}
--	fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
--	debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp);
-+	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s%s",
-+	    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
- 	xfree(fp);
- 
- 	/*
-@@ -1203,8 +1204,9 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt,
- 	int have_sig = 1;
- 	char *fp;
- 
--	fp = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
--	debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s", key_type(id->key), fp);
-+	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s%s", key_type(id->key),
-+	    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
- 	xfree(fp);
- 
- 	if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {
-diff -up openssh-5.8p1/sshconnect.c.fingerprint openssh-5.8p1/sshconnect.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/sshconnect.c.fingerprint	2011-01-16 13:17:59.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1/sshconnect.c	2011-02-25 09:17:18.000000000 +0100
-@@ -798,10 +798,10 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
- 				    "key for IP address '%.128s' to the list "
- 				    "of known hosts.", type, ip);
- 		} else if (options.visual_host_key) {
--			fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
--			ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5,
--			    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
--			logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s\n", fp, ra);
-+			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+			ra = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+			logit("Host key fingerprint is %s%s\n%s\n",
-+			    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, ra);
- 			xfree(ra);
- 			xfree(fp);
- 		}
-@@ -838,9 +838,8 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
- 			else
- 				snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), ".");
- 			/* The default */
--			fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
--			ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5,
--			    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+			fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+			ra = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- 			msg2[0] = '\0';
- 			if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
- 				if (matching_host_key_dns)
-@@ -855,10 +854,11 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
- 			snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
- 			    "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be "
- 			    "established%s\n"
--			    "%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s"
-+			    "%s key fingerprint is %s%s.%s%s\n%s"
- 			    "Are you sure you want to continue connecting "
- 			    "(yes/no)? ",
--			    host, ip, msg1, type, fp,
-+			    host, ip, msg1, type,
-+			    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp,
- 			    options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "",
- 			    options.visual_host_key ? ra : "",
- 			    msg2);
-@@ -1104,8 +1104,9 @@ verify_host_key(char *host, struct socka
- 	int flags = 0;
- 	char *fp;
- 
--	fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
--	debug("Server host key: %s %s", key_type(host_key), fp);
-+	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	debug("Server host key: %s %s%s", key_type(host_key),
-+	    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
- 	xfree(fp);
- 
- 	/* XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS */
-@@ -1214,14 +1215,15 @@ show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkey
- 			continue;
- 		if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i], &found))
- 			continue;
--		fp = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
--		ra = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+		fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+		ra = key_selected_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- 		logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n"
- 		    "in %s:%lu\n"
--		    "%s key fingerprint %s.",
-+		    "%s key fingerprint %s%s.",
- 		    key_type(found->key),
- 		    found->host, found->file, found->line,
--		    key_type(found->key), fp);
-+		    key_type(found->key),
-+		    key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
- 		if (options.visual_host_key)
- 			logit("%s", ra);
- 		xfree(ra);
-@@ -1236,7 +1238,7 @@ warn_changed_key(Key *host_key)
- {
- 	char *fp;
- 
--	fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
- 
- 	error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
- 	error("@    WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED!     @");
-@@ -1244,8 +1246,8 @@ warn_changed_key(Key *host_key)
- 	error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!");
- 	error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!");
- 	error("It is also possible that a host key has just been changed.");
--	error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.",
--	    key_type(host_key), fp);
-+	error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s%s.",
-+	    key_type(host_key),key_fingerprint_prefix(),  fp);
- 	error("Please contact your system administrator.");
- 
- 	xfree(fp);
-diff -up openssh-5.8p1/ssh-keygen.c.fingerprint openssh-5.8p1/ssh-keygen.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/ssh-keygen.c.fingerprint	2011-01-11 07:20:31.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1/ssh-keygen.c	2011-02-25 09:17:18.000000000 +0100
-@@ -714,13 +714,14 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
- {
- 	FILE *f;
- 	Key *public;
--	char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024], *fp, *ra;
-+	char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024], *fp, *ra, *pfx;
- 	int i, skip = 0, num = 0, invalid = 1;
- 	enum fp_rep rep;
- 	enum fp_type fptype;
- 	struct stat st;
- 
--	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
-+	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fingerprint_selection();
-+	pfx =	 print_bubblebabble ? "" : key_fingerprint_prefix();
- 	rep =    print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
- 
- 	if (!have_identity)
-@@ -732,8 +733,8 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
- 	public = key_load_public(identity_file, &comment);
- 	if (public != NULL) {
- 		fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
--		ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
--		printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, comment,
-+		ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+		printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp, comment,
- 		    key_type(public));
- 		if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
- 			printf("%s\n", ra);
-@@ -798,8 +799,8 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
- 		}
- 		comment = *cp ? cp : comment;
- 		fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
--		ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
--		printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp,
-+		ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+		printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp,
- 		    comment ? comment : "no comment", key_type(public));
- 		if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
- 			printf("%s\n", ra);
-@@ -823,13 +824,15 @@ printhost(FILE *f, const char *name, Key
- 	if (print_fingerprint) {
- 		enum fp_rep rep;
- 		enum fp_type fptype;
--		char *fp, *ra;
-+		char *fp, *ra, *pfx;
- 
--		fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
-+		fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fingerprint_selection();
-+		pfx =	 print_bubblebabble ? "" : key_fingerprint_prefix();
- 		rep =    print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
-+
- 		fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
--		ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
--		printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, name,
-+		ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+		printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp, name,
- 		    key_type(public));
- 		if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
- 			printf("%s\n", ra);
-@@ -1695,16 +1698,17 @@ do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw)
- 		fatal("%s is not a certificate", identity_file);
- 	v00 = key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT_V00 || key->type == KEY_DSA_CERT_V00;
- 
--	key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
--	ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
--	    SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	key_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	ca_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
- 
- 	printf("%s:\n", identity_file);
- 	printf("        Type: %s %s certificate\n", key_ssh_name(key),
- 	    key_cert_type(key));
--	printf("        Public key: %s %s\n", key_type(key), key_fp);
--	printf("        Signing CA: %s %s\n",
--	    key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp);
-+	printf("        Public key: %s %s%s\n", key_type(key),
-+	    key_fingerprint_prefix(), key_fp);
-+	printf("        Signing CA: %s %s%s\n",
-+	    key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
-+	    key_fingerprint_prefix(), ca_fp);
- 	printf("        Key ID: \"%s\"\n", key->cert->key_id);
- 	if (!v00) {
- 		printf("        Serial: %llu\n",
-@@ -2249,13 +2253,12 @@ passphrase_again:
- 	fclose(f);
- 
- 	if (!quiet) {
--		char *fp = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
--		char *ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5,
--		    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+		char *fp = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+		char *ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- 		printf("Your public key has been saved in %s.\n",
- 		    identity_file);
- 		printf("The key fingerprint is:\n");
--		printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment);
-+		printf("%s%s %s\n", key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, comment);
- 		printf("The key's randomart image is:\n");
- 		printf("%s\n", ra);
- 		xfree(ra);

openssh-5.8p1-getaddrinfo.patch

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.6p1/channels.c.getaddrinfo openssh-5.6p1/channels.c
---- openssh-5.6p1/channels.c.getaddrinfo	2012-02-14 16:12:54.427852524 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.6p1/channels.c	2012-02-14 16:13:22.818928690 +0100
-@@ -3275,6 +3275,9 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
- 		memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- 		hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
- 		hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE;
-+#ifdef AI_ADDRCONFIG
-+		hints.ai_flags |= AI_ADDRCONFIG;
-+#endif
- 		hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
- 		snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
- 		if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(NULL, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
-diff -up openssh-5.6p1/sshconnect.c.getaddrinfo openssh-5.6p1/sshconnect.c
---- openssh-5.6p1/sshconnect.c.getaddrinfo	2012-02-14 16:09:25.057964291 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.6p1/sshconnect.c	2012-02-14 16:09:25.106047007 +0100
-@@ -343,6 +343,7 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct soc
- 	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- 	hints.ai_family = family;
- 	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
-+	hints.ai_flags = AI_V4MAPPED | AI_ADDRCONFIG;
- 	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port);
- 	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: Could not resolve hostname %.100s: %s", __progname,

openssh-5.8p1-glob.patch

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.8p1/sftp-glob.c.glob openssh-5.8p1/sftp-glob.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/sftp-glob.c.glob	2011-03-07 20:17:34.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1/sftp-glob.c	2011-03-07 20:18:47.000000000 +0100
-@@ -145,5 +145,5 @@ remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
- 	memset(&cur, 0, sizeof(cur));
- 	cur.conn = conn;
- 
--	return(glob(pattern, flags | GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC, errfunc, pglob));
-+	return(glob(pattern, flags | GLOB_LIMIT | GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC, errfunc, pglob));
- }

openssh-5.8p1-keyperm.patch

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.8p1/authfile.c.keyperm openssh-5.8p1/authfile.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/authfile.c.keyperm	2010-12-01 02:03:39.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1/authfile.c	2011-04-21 16:43:36.859648916 +0200
-@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
- #include <stdlib.h>
- #include <string.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
-+#include <grp.h>
- 
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "cipher.h"
-@@ -600,6 +612,13 @@ key_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename
- #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
- 	if (check_ntsec(filename))
- #endif
-+	if (st.st_mode & 040) {
-+		struct group *gr;
-+
-+		if ((gr = getgrnam("ssh_keys")) && (st.st_gid == gr->gr_gid))
-+			st.st_mode &= ~040;
-+	}
-+
- 	if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
- 		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
- 		error("@         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @");

openssh-5.8p1-localdomain.patch

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config.localdomain openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config
---- openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config.localdomain	2011-04-22 11:37:49.273648812 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config	2011-04-22 11:39:31.758648401 +0200
-@@ -130,6 +130,10 @@ X11Forwarding yes
- # override default of no subsystems
- Subsystem	sftp	/usr/libexec/sftp-server
- 
-+# Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain
-+#Host *.local
-+#	CheckHostIP no
-+
- # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
- #Match User anoncvs
- #	X11Forwarding no

openssh-5.8p1-packet.patch

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.8p1/packet.c.packet openssh-5.8p1/packet.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/packet.c.packet	2011-04-05 13:29:06.998648899 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.8p1/packet.c	2011-04-05 13:30:32.967648596 +0200
-@@ -294,6 +294,8 @@ packet_connection_is_on_socket(void)
- 	struct sockaddr_storage from, to;
- 	socklen_t fromlen, tolen;
- 
-+	if (!active_state)
-+		return 0;
- 	/* filedescriptors in and out are the same, so it's a socket */
- 	if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out)
- 		return 1;

openssh-5.8p2-remove-stale-control-socket.patch

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.8p2/mux.c.remove_stale openssh-5.8p2/mux.c
---- openssh-5.8p2/mux.c.remove_stale	2011-01-14 02:01:32.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p2/mux.c	2011-06-09 15:27:42.556360291 +0200
-@@ -1867,6 +1867,9 @@ muxclient(const char *path)
- 			unlink(path);
- 		} else if (errno == ENOENT) {
- 			debug("Control socket \"%.100s\" does not exist", path);
-+		} else if (errno == ECONNREFUSED) {
-+			debug("Removing stale control socket \"%.100s\"", path);
-+			unlink(path);
- 		} else {
- 			error("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path,
- 			    strerror(errno));

openssh-5.9p1-audit2.patch

@@ -1,353 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.9p0/audit-bsm.c.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/audit-bsm.c
---- openssh-5.9p0/audit-bsm.c.audit2	2011-08-30 10:55:35.281025258 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p0/audit-bsm.c	2011-08-30 10:55:37.500052231 +0200
-@@ -329,6 +329,12 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li
- 	/* not implemented */
- }
- 
-+int
-+audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)
-+{
-+	/* not implemented */
-+}
-+
- void
- audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
- {
-diff -up openssh-5.9p0/audit-linux.c.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/audit-linux.c
---- openssh-5.9p0/audit-linux.c.audit2	2011-08-30 10:55:35.385102905 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p0/audit-linux.c	2011-08-30 10:55:38.009088040 +0200
-@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@
- #include "servconf.h"
- #include "canohost.h"
- 
-+#define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 128
-+
- extern ServerOptions options;
- extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
- extern u_int utmp_len;
-@@ -130,6 +132,37 @@ fatal_report:
- 	}
- }
- 
-+int
-+audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)
-+{
-+	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
-+	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
-+
-+	audit_fd = audit_open();
-+	if (audit_fd < 0) {
-+		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
-+					 errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
-+			return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */
-+		else                                                                                                                                       
-+			return 0; /* Must prevent login */
-+	}
-+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth rport=%d", host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", get_remote_port());
-+	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
-+		buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv);
-+	if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
-+		goto out;
-+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "key algo=%s size=%d fp=%s%s rport=%d",
-+			type, bits, key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, get_remote_port());
-+	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
-+		buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv);
-+out:
-+	saved_errno = errno;
-+	audit_close(audit_fd);
-+	errno = saved_errno;
-+	/* do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
-+	return (rc >= 0) || ((rc == -EPERM) && (getuid() != 0));
-+}
-+
- static int user_login_count = 0;
- 
- /* Below is the sshd audit API code */
-diff -up openssh-5.9p0/audit.c.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/audit.c
---- openssh-5.9p0/audit.c.audit2	2011-08-30 10:55:35.523141273 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p0/audit.c	2011-08-30 10:55:37.658024710 +0200
-@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
- #include "key.h"
- #include "hostfile.h"
- #include "auth.h"
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
- 
- /*
-  * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when
-@@ -111,6 +112,22 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)
- 	return(event_lookup[i].name);
- }
- 
-+void
-+audit_key(int host_user, int *rv, const Key *key)
-+{
-+	char *fp;
-+	const char *crypto_name;
-+
-+	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	if (key->type == KEY_RSA1)
-+		crypto_name = "ssh-rsa1";
-+	else
-+		crypto_name = key_ssh_name(key);
-+	if (audit_keyusage(host_user, crypto_name, key_size(key), fp, *rv) == 0)
-+		*rv = 0;
-+	xfree(fp);
-+}
-+
- # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- /*
-  * Null implementations of audit functions.
-@@ -209,5 +226,17 @@ audit_end_command(int handle, const char
- 	    audit_username(), command);
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * This will be called when user is successfully autherized by the RSA1/RSA/DSA key.
-+ *
-+ * Type is the key type, len is the key length(byte) and fp is the fingerprint of the key.
-+ */
-+int
-+audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)
-+{
-+	debug("audit %s key usage euid %d user %s key type %s key length %d fingerprint %s%s, result %d", 
-+		host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(), type, bits,
-+		key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, rv);
-+}
- # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff -up openssh-5.9p0/audit.h.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/audit.h
---- openssh-5.9p0/audit.h.audit2	2011-08-30 10:55:35.723122290 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p0/audit.h	2011-08-30 10:55:37.905212176 +0200
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
- # define _SSH_AUDIT_H
- 
- #include "loginrec.h"
-+#include "key.h"
- 
- enum ssh_audit_event_type {
- 	SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES,
-@@ -55,5 +56,7 @@ void	audit_session_close(struct logininf
- int	audit_run_command(const char *);
- void 	audit_end_command(int, const char *);
- ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
-+int	audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int);
-+void	audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);
- 
- #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
-diff -up openssh-5.9p0/auth-rsa.c.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/auth-rsa.c
---- openssh-5.9p0/auth-rsa.c.audit2	2011-08-30 10:55:33.120097071 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p0/auth-rsa.c	2011-08-30 10:55:38.729025376 +0200
-@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNU
- {
- 	u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16];
- 	MD5_CTX md;
--	int len;
-+	int len, rv;
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	char *fp;
-+#endif
- 
- 	/* don't allow short keys */
- 	if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
-@@ -113,12 +116,18 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNU
- 	MD5_Final(mdbuf, &md);
- 
- 	/* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */
--	if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) {
--		/* Wrong answer. */
--		return (0);
-+	rv = timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) == 0;
-+
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	if (audit_keyusage(1, "ssh-rsa1", RSA_size(key->rsa) * 8, fp, rv) == 0) {
-+		debug("unsuccessful audit");
-+		rv = 0;
- 	}
--	/* Correct answer. */
--	return (1);
-+	xfree(fp);
-+#endif
-+
-+	return rv;
- }
- 
- /*
-diff -up openssh-5.9p0/auth.h.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/auth.h
---- openssh-5.9p0/auth.h.audit2	2011-05-29 13:39:38.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p0/auth.h	2011-08-30 10:57:43.238087347 +0200
-@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ void	abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt
- 
- char	*expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw);
- char	*authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *);
-+int	 user_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
- 
- FILE	*auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
- FILE	*auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
-@@ -185,6 +186,7 @@ Key	*get_hostkey_public_by_type(int);
- Key	*get_hostkey_private_by_type(int);
- int	 get_hostkey_index(Key *);
- int	 ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *);
-+int	 hostbased_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
- 
- /* debug messages during authentication */
- void	 auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
-diff -up openssh-5.9p0/auth2-hostbased.c.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/auth2-hostbased.c
---- openssh-5.9p0/auth2-hostbased.c.audit2	2011-08-30 10:55:32.696212587 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p0/auth2-hostbased.c	2011-08-30 10:55:38.120068864 +0200
-@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 	/* test for allowed key and correct signature */
- 	authenticated = 0;
- 	if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) &&
--	    PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
-+	    PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
- 			buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
- 		authenticated = 1;
- 
-@@ -136,6 +136,18 @@ done:
- 	return authenticated;
- }
- 
-+int
-+hostbased_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-+{
-+	int rv;
-+
-+	rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen);
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	audit_key(0, &rv, key);
-+#endif
-+	return rv;
-+}
-+
- /* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */
- int
- hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost,
-diff -up openssh-5.9p0/auth2-pubkey.c.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/auth2-pubkey.c
---- openssh-5.9p0/auth2-pubkey.c.audit2	2011-08-30 10:55:32.803126151 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p0/auth2-pubkey.c	2011-08-30 10:55:38.426108672 +0200
-@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 		/* test for correct signature */
- 		authenticated = 0;
- 		if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) &&
--		    PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
-+		    PRIVSEP(user_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
- 		    buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
- 			authenticated = 1;
- 		buffer_free(&b);
-@@ -177,6 +177,18 @@ done:
- 	return authenticated;
- }
- 
-+int
-+user_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-+{
-+	int rv;
-+
-+	rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen);
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	audit_key(1, &rv, key);
-+#endif
-+	return rv;
-+}
-+
- static int
- match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct KeyCert *cert)
- {
-diff -up openssh-5.9p0/monitor.c.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/monitor.c
---- openssh-5.9p0/monitor.c.audit2	2011-08-30 10:55:35.849023496 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p0/monitor.c	2011-08-30 10:55:38.848024600 +0200
-@@ -1318,9 +1318,11 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
- 	Key *key;
- 	u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
- 	u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
-+	int type = 0;
- 	int verified = 0;
- 	int valid_data = 0;
- 
-+	type = buffer_get_int(m);
- 	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
- 	signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
- 	data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
-@@ -1328,6 +1330,8 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
- 	if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
- 	  !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
- 		fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
-+	if (type != key_blobtype)
-+		fatal("%s: bad key type", __func__);
- 
- 	key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
- 	if (key == NULL)
-@@ -1348,7 +1352,17 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
- 	if (!valid_data)
- 		fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
- 
--	verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
-+	switch (key_blobtype) {
-+	case MM_USERKEY:
-+		verified = user_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
-+		break;
-+	case MM_HOSTKEY:
-+		verified = hostbased_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
-+		break;
-+	default:
-+		verified = 0;
-+		break;
-+	}
- 	debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
- 	    __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
- 
-diff -up openssh-5.9p0/monitor_wrap.c.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/monitor_wrap.c
---- openssh-5.9p0/monitor_wrap.c.audit2	2011-08-30 10:55:36.431043533 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p0/monitor_wrap.c	2011-08-30 10:55:39.074038187 +0200
-@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, cha
-  */
- 
- int
--mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-+mm_key_verify(enum mm_keytype type, Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
- {
- 	Buffer m;
- 	u_char *blob;
-@@ -445,6 +445,7 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_i
- 		return (0);
- 
- 	buffer_init(&m);
-+	buffer_put_int(&m, type);
- 	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len);
- 	buffer_put_string(&m, sig, siglen);
- 	buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen);
-@@ -462,6 +463,19 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_i
- 	return (verified);
- }
- 
-+int
-+mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-+{
-+	return mm_key_verify(MM_HOSTKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen);
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_user_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-+{
-+	return mm_key_verify(MM_USERKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen);
-+}
-+
-+
- /* Export key state after authentication */
- Newkeys *
- mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *blob, int blen)
-diff -up openssh-5.9p0/monitor_wrap.h.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/monitor_wrap.h
---- openssh-5.9p0/monitor_wrap.h.audit2	2011-08-30 10:55:36.550088263 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p0/monitor_wrap.h	2011-08-30 10:55:39.282151179 +0200
-@@ -49,7 +49,8 @@ int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, char
- int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);
- int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
- int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
--int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
-+int mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
-+int mm_user_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
- int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **);
- int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char *);
- BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);

openssh-5.9p1-audit3.patch

@@ -1,528 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in.audit3 openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in
---- openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in.audit3	2011-08-05 22:15:18.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in	2011-09-14 07:05:58.337520327 +0200
-@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=acss.o authfd.o authfile.o b
- 	monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
- 	kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \
- 	msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o jpake.o \
--	schnorr.o ssh-pkcs11.o
-+	schnorr.o ssh-pkcs11.o auditstub.o
- 
- SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
- 	sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/audit-bsm.c.audit3 openssh-5.9p1/audit-bsm.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/audit-bsm.c.audit3	2011-09-14 07:05:56.719459048 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/audit-bsm.c	2011-09-14 07:05:58.430520147 +0200
-@@ -396,4 +396,16 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
- 		debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
- 	}
- }
-+
-+void
-+audit_unsupported_body(int what)
-+{
-+	/* not implemented */
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	/* not implemented */
-+}
- #endif /* BSM */
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/audit-linux.c.audit3 openssh-5.9p1/audit-linux.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/audit-linux.c.audit3	2011-09-14 07:05:56.820460613 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/audit-linux.c	2011-09-14 07:07:29.651459660 +0200
-@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@
- #include "auth.h"
- #include "servconf.h"
- #include "canohost.h"
-+#include "packet.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
- 
- #define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 128
- 
-@@ -269,4 +271,60 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
- 	}
- }
- 
-+void
-+audit_unsupported_body(int what)
-+{
-+#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
-+	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
-+	const static char *name[] = { "cipher", "mac", "comp" };
-+	char *s;
-+	int audit_fd;
-+
-+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=unsupported-%s direction=? cipher=? ksize=? rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
-+		name[what], get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())),
-+		get_local_port());
-+	xfree(s);
-+	audit_fd = audit_open();
-+	if (audit_fd < 0)
-+		/* no problem, the next instruction will be fatal() */
-+		return;
-+	audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION,
-+			buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 0);
-+	audit_close(audit_fd);
-+#endif
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
-+	       uid_t uid)
-+{
-+#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
-+	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
-+	int audit_fd, audit_ok;
-+	const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
-+	Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc);
-+	char *s;
-+
-+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=start direction=%s cipher=%s ksize=%d spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
-+		direction[ctos], enc, cipher ? 8 * cipher->key_len : 0,
-+		(intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid,
-+		get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), get_local_port());
-+	xfree(s);
-+	audit_fd = audit_open();
-+	if (audit_fd < 0) {
-+		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
-+					 errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
-+			return; /* No audit support in kernel */
-+		else                                                                                                                                       
-+			fatal("cannot open audit"); /* Must prevent login */
-+	}
-+	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION,
-+			buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1);
-+	audit_close(audit_fd);
-+	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
-+	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
-+		fatal("cannot write into audit"); /* Must prevent login */
-+#endif
-+}
-+
- #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/audit.c.audit3 openssh-5.9p1/audit.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/audit.c.audit3	2011-09-14 07:05:56.937585272 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/audit.c	2011-09-14 07:05:58.646521393 +0200
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
- 
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <string.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
- 
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- 
-@@ -36,6 +37,8 @@
- #include "key.h"
- #include "hostfile.h"
- #include "auth.h"
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- 
- /*
-@@ -128,6 +131,18 @@ audit_key(int host_user, int *rv, const
- 	xfree(fp);
- }
- 
-+void
-+audit_unsupported(int what)
-+{
-+	PRIVSEP(audit_unsupported_body(what));
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp)
-+{
-+	PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, getpid(), getuid()));
-+}
-+
- # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- /*
-  * Null implementations of audit functions.
-@@ -238,5 +253,26 @@ audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char
- 		host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(), type, bits,
- 		key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, rv);
- }
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called when the protocol negotiation fails.
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_unsupported_body(int what)
-+{
-+	debug("audit unsupported protocol euid %d type %d", geteuid(), what);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called on succesfull protocol negotiation.
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
-+	       uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s from pid %ld uid %u",
-+		(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, (long)pid,
-+	        (unsigned)uid);
-+}
- # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/audit.h.audit3 openssh-5.9p1/audit.h
---- openssh-5.9p1/audit.h.audit3	2011-09-14 07:05:57.391522394 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/audit.h	2011-09-14 07:05:58.766586362 +0200
-@@ -58,5 +58,9 @@ void 	audit_end_command(int, const char
- ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
- int	audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int);
- void	audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);
-+void	audit_unsupported(int);
-+void	audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *);
-+void	audit_unsupported_body(int);
-+void	audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
- 
- #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/auditstub.c.audit3 openssh-5.9p1/auditstub.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/auditstub.c.audit3	2011-09-14 07:05:58.866461077 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/auditstub.c	2011-09-14 07:05:58.870569033 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
-+/* $Id: auditstub.c,v 1.1 jfch Exp $ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc.  All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ *
-+ * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
-+ */
-+
-+void
-+audit_unsupported(int n)
-+{
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp)
-+{
-+}
-+
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/cipher.c.audit3 openssh-5.9p1/cipher.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/cipher.c.audit3	2011-09-07 15:05:09.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/cipher.c	2011-09-14 07:05:58.955582581 +0200
-@@ -60,15 +60,7 @@ extern void ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX
- extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_128_ctr(void);
- extern void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, u_int);
- 
--struct Cipher {
--	char	*name;
--	int	number;		/* for ssh1 only */
--	u_int	block_size;
--	u_int	key_len;
--	u_int	discard_len;
--	u_int	cbc_mode;
--	const EVP_CIPHER	*(*evptype)(void);
--} ciphers[] = {
-+struct Cipher ciphers[] = {
- 	{ "none",		SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null },
- 	{ "des",		SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc },
- 	{ "3des",		SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_3des },
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/cipher.h.audit3 openssh-5.9p1/cipher.h
---- openssh-5.9p1/cipher.h.audit3	2009-01-28 06:38:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/cipher.h	2011-09-14 07:05:59.063459363 +0200
-@@ -61,7 +61,16 @@
- typedef struct Cipher Cipher;
- typedef struct CipherContext CipherContext;
- 
--struct Cipher;
-+struct Cipher {
-+	char	*name;
-+	int	number;		/* for ssh1 only */
-+	u_int	block_size;
-+	u_int	key_len;
-+	u_int	discard_len;
-+	u_int	cbc_mode;
-+	const EVP_CIPHER	*(*evptype)(void);
-+};
-+
- struct CipherContext {
- 	int	plaintext;
- 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX evp;
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/kex.c.audit3 openssh-5.9p1/kex.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/kex.c.audit3	2010-09-24 14:11:14.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/kex.c	2011-09-14 07:05:59.171457800 +0200
-@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
- #include "dispatch.h"
- #include "monitor.h"
- #include "roaming.h"
-+#include "audit.h"
- 
- #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
- # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
-@@ -286,9 +287,13 @@ static void
- choose_enc(Enc *enc, char *client, char *server)
- {
- 	char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
--	if (name == NULL)
-+	if (name == NULL) {
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+		audit_unsupported(0);
-+#endif
- 		fatal("no matching cipher found: client %s server %s",
- 		    client, server);
-+	}
- 	if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL)
- 		fatal("matching cipher is not supported: %s", name);
- 	enc->name = name;
-@@ -303,9 +308,13 @@ static void
- choose_mac(Mac *mac, char *client, char *server)
- {
- 	char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
--	if (name == NULL)
-+	if (name == NULL) {
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+		audit_unsupported(1);
-+#endif
- 		fatal("no matching mac found: client %s server %s",
- 		    client, server);
-+	}
- 	if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0)
- 		fatal("unsupported mac %s", name);
- 	/* truncate the key */
-@@ -320,8 +329,12 @@ static void
- choose_comp(Comp *comp, char *client, char *server)
- {
- 	char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
--	if (name == NULL)
-+	if (name == NULL) {
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+		audit_unsupported(2);
-+#endif
- 		fatal("no matching comp found: client %s server %s", client, server);
-+	}
- 	if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) {
- 		comp->type = COMP_DELAYED;
- 	} else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) {
-@@ -446,6 +459,9 @@ kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex)
- 		    newkeys->enc.name,
- 		    newkeys->mac.name,
- 		    newkeys->comp.name);
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+		audit_kex(ctos, newkeys->enc.name, newkeys->mac.name, newkeys->comp.name);
-+#endif
- 	}
- 	choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
- 	choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/monitor.c.audit3 openssh-5.9p1/monitor.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/monitor.c.audit3	2011-09-14 07:05:57.952459820 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/monitor.c	2011-09-14 07:05:59.272520466 +0200
-@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@
- #include "ssh2.h"
- #include "jpake.h"
- #include "roaming.h"
-+#include "audit.h"
- 
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
-@@ -187,6 +188,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *
- int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *);
-+int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *);
-+int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *);
- #endif
- 
- static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
-@@ -237,6 +240,8 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
- #endif
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
- #endif
- #ifdef BSD_AUTH
-     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
-@@ -275,6 +280,8 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
- #endif
-     {0, 0, NULL}
- };
-@@ -306,6 +313,8 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[]
- #endif
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
- #endif
-     {0, 0, NULL}
- };
-@@ -318,6 +327,8 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
- #endif
-     {0, 0, NULL}
- };
-@@ -2383,3 +2394,47 @@ mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int sock,
- }
- 
- #endif /* JPAKE */
-+
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+int
-+mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
-+{
-+	int what;
-+
-+	what = buffer_get_int(m);
-+
-+	audit_unsupported_body(what);
-+
-+	buffer_clear(m);
-+
-+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, m);
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
-+{
-+	int ctos, len;
-+	char *cipher, *mac, *compress;
-+	pid_t pid;
-+	uid_t uid;
-+
-+	ctos = buffer_get_int(m);
-+	cipher = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-+	mac = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-+	compress = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-+	pid = buffer_get_int64(m);
-+	uid = buffer_get_int64(m);
-+
-+	audit_kex_body(ctos, cipher, mac, compress, pid, uid);
-+
-+	xfree(cipher);
-+	xfree(mac);
-+	xfree(compress);
-+	buffer_clear(m);
-+
-+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, m);
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/monitor.h.audit3 openssh-5.9p1/monitor.h
---- openssh-5.9p1/monitor.h.audit3	2011-09-14 07:05:55.510580908 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/monitor.h	2011-09-14 07:05:59.378647273 +0200
-@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND,
- 	MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND,
-+	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED,
-+	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_TERM,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA,
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit3 openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit3	2011-09-14 07:05:58.059501118 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.c	2011-09-14 07:05:59.511503364 +0200
-@@ -1505,3 +1505,41 @@ mm_jpake_check_confirm(const BIGNUM *k,
- 	return success;
- }
- #endif /* JPAKE */
-+
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+void
-+mm_audit_unsupported_body(int what)
-+{
-+	Buffer m;
-+
-+	buffer_init(&m);
-+	buffer_put_int(&m, what);
-+
-+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, &m);
-+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED,
-+				  &m);
-+
-+	buffer_free(&m);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
-+		  uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	Buffer m;
-+
-+	buffer_init(&m);
-+	buffer_put_int(&m, ctos);
-+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, cipher);
-+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, mac);
-+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, compress);
-+	buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
-+	buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
-+
-+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, &m);
-+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX,
-+				  &m);
-+
-+	buffer_free(&m);
-+}
-+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit3 openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.h
---- openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit3	2011-09-14 07:05:58.171521245 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.h	2011-09-14 07:05:59.624646515 +0200
-@@ -78,6 +78,8 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
- void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
- int mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
- void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *);
-+void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
-+void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
- #endif
- 
- struct Session;
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c.audit3 openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c.audit3	2011-09-14 07:05:56.554583874 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c	2011-09-14 07:05:59.828466112 +0200
-@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@
- #endif
- #include "monitor_wrap.h"
- #include "roaming.h"
-+#include "audit.h"
- #include "ssh-sandbox.h"
- #include "version.h"
- 
-@@ -2209,6 +2210,10 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
- 		if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char())
- 			packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match.");
- 
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	audit_kex(2, cipher_name(cipher_type), "crc", "none");
-+#endif
-+
- 	debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type));
- 
- 	/* Get the encrypted integer. */

openssh-5.9p1-copy-id-restorecon.patch

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.restorecon openssh-5.9p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id
---- openssh-5.9p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.restorecon	2011-08-17 04:05:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id	2011-11-21 08:40:56.000000000 +0100
-@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ fi
- # strip any trailing colon
- host=`echo $1 | sed 's/:$//'`
- 
--{ eval "$GET_ID" ; } | ssh $host "umask 077; test -d ~/.ssh || mkdir ~/.ssh ; cat >> ~/.ssh/authorized_keys" || exit 1
-+{ eval "$GET_ID" ; } | ssh $host "umask 077; test -d ~/.ssh || mkdir ~/.ssh ; cat >> ~/.ssh/authorized_keys && (test -x /sbin/restorecon && /sbin/restorecon ~/.ssh ~/.ssh/authorized_keys >/dev/null 2>&1 || true)" || exit 1
- 
- cat <<EOF
- Now try logging into the machine, with "ssh '$host'", and check in:

openssh-5.9p1-edns.patch

@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/dns.c.edns openssh-5.9p1/dns.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/dns.c.edns	2010-08-31 14:41:14.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/dns.c	2011-09-09 08:05:27.782440497 +0200
-@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname
- {
- 	u_int counter;
- 	int result;
-+	unsigned int rrset_flags = 0;
- 	struct rrsetinfo *fingerprints = NULL;
- 
- 	u_int8_t hostkey_algorithm;
-@@ -200,8 +201,19 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- 
-+	/*
-+	 * Original getrrsetbyname function, found on OpenBSD for example,
-+	 * doesn't accept any flag and prerequisite for obtaining AD bit in
-+	 * DNS response is set by "options edns0" in resolv.conf.
-+	 *
-+	 * Our version is more clever and use RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 flag.
-+	 */
-+#ifndef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME
-+	rrset_flags |= RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0;
-+#endif
- 	result = getrrsetbyname(hostname, DNS_RDATACLASS_IN,
--	    DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, 0, &fingerprints);
-+	    DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, rrset_flags, &fingerprints);
-+
- 	if (result) {
- 		verbose("DNS lookup error: %s", dns_result_totext(result));
- 		return -1;
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c.edns openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c.edns	2009-07-13 03:38:23.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c	2011-09-09 15:03:39.930500801 +0200
-@@ -209,8 +209,8 @@ getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, uns
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
- 
--	/* don't allow flags yet, unimplemented */
--	if (flags) {
-+	/* Allow RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 flag only. */
-+	if ((flags & ~RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0) != 0) {
- 		result = ERRSET_INVAL;
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
-@@ -226,9 +226,9 @@ getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, uns
- #endif /* DEBUG */
- 
- #ifdef RES_USE_DNSSEC
--	/* turn on DNSSEC if EDNS0 is configured */
--	if (_resp->options & RES_USE_EDNS0)
--		_resp->options |= RES_USE_DNSSEC;
-+	/* turn on DNSSEC if required  */
-+	if (flags & RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0)
-+		_resp->options |= (RES_USE_EDNS0|RES_USE_DNSSEC);
- #endif /* RES_USE_DNSEC */
- 
- 	/* make query */
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h.edns openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
---- openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h.edns	2007-10-26 08:26:50.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h	2011-09-09 08:05:27.965438689 +0200
-@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
- #ifndef RRSET_VALIDATED
- # define RRSET_VALIDATED	1
- #endif
-+#ifndef RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0
-+# define RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0	0x0001
-+#endif
- 
- /*
-  * Return codes for getrrsetbyname()

openssh-5.9p1-fips.patch

@@ -1,532 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/authfile.c.fips openssh-5.9p1/authfile.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/authfile.c.fips	2012-07-17 20:57:35.078155160 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/authfile.c	2012-07-17 20:57:35.086155338 +0200
-@@ -148,8 +148,14 @@ key_private_rsa1_to_blob(Key *key, Buffe
- 	/* Allocate space for the private part of the key in the buffer. */
- 	cp = buffer_append_space(&encrypted, buffer_len(&buffer));
- 
--	cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase,
--	    CIPHER_ENCRYPT);
-+	if (cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase,
-+	    CIPHER_ENCRYPT) < 0) {
-+	    error("cipher_set_key_string failed.");
-+	    buffer_free(&encrypted);
-+	    buffer_free(&buffer);
-+	    return 0;
-+	}
-+
- 	cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, cp,
- 	    buffer_ptr(&buffer), buffer_len(&buffer));
- 	cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext);
-@@ -472,8 +478,13 @@ key_parse_private_rsa1(Buffer *blob, con
- 	cp = buffer_append_space(&decrypted, buffer_len(&copy));
- 
- 	/* Rest of the buffer is encrypted.  Decrypt it using the passphrase. */
--	cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase,
--	    CIPHER_DECRYPT);
-+	if (cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase,
-+	    CIPHER_DECRYPT) < 0) {
-+	    error("cipher_set_key_string failed.");
-+	    buffer_free(&decrypted);
-+	    goto fail;
-+	}
-+
- 	cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, cp,
- 	    buffer_ptr(&copy), buffer_len(&copy));
- 	cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext);
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/cipher.c.fips openssh-5.9p1/cipher.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/cipher.c.fips	2012-07-17 20:57:34.988153164 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/cipher.c	2012-07-17 20:57:35.086155338 +0200
-@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
- #include <sys/types.h>
- 
- #include <openssl/md5.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- 
- #include <string.h>
- #include <stdarg.h>
-@@ -86,6 +87,22 @@ struct Cipher ciphers[] = {
- 	{ NULL,			SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
- };
- 
-+struct Cipher fips_ciphers[] = {
-+	{ "none",		SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null },
-+	{ "3des",		SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_3des },
-+
-+	{ "3des-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, 1, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
-+	{ "aes128-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 1, EVP_aes_128_cbc },
-+	{ "aes192-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 1, EVP_aes_192_cbc },
-+	{ "aes256-cbc",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
-+	{ "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se",
-+				SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
-+	{ "aes128-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr },
-+	{ "aes192-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr },
-+	{ "aes256-ctr",		SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr },
-+	{ NULL,			SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
-+};
-+
- /*--*/
- 
- u_int
-@@ -128,7 +145,7 @@ Cipher *
- cipher_by_name(const char *name)
- {
- 	Cipher *c;
--	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
-+	for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
- 		if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0)
- 			return c;
- 	return NULL;
-@@ -138,7 +155,7 @@ Cipher *
- cipher_by_number(int id)
- {
- 	Cipher *c;
--	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
-+	for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
- 		if (c->number == id)
- 			return c;
- 	return NULL;
-@@ -182,7 +199,7 @@ cipher_number(const char *name)
- 	Cipher *c;
- 	if (name == NULL)
- 		return -1;
--	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
-+	for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
- 		if (strcasecmp(c->name, name) == 0)
- 			return c->number;
- 	return -1;
-@@ -289,14 +306,15 @@ cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *cc)
-  * passphrase and using the resulting 16 bytes as the key.
-  */
- 
--void
-+int
- cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *cc, Cipher *cipher,
-     const char *passphrase, int do_encrypt)
- {
- 	MD5_CTX md;
- 	u_char digest[16];
- 
--	MD5_Init(&md);
-+	if (MD5_Init(&md) <= 0)
-+		return -1;
- 	MD5_Update(&md, (const u_char *)passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
- 	MD5_Final(digest, &md);
- 
-@@ -304,6 +322,7 @@ cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *cc,
- 
- 	memset(digest, 0, sizeof(digest));
- 	memset(&md, 0, sizeof(md));
-+	return 0;
- }
- 
- /*
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips	2010-10-07 13:06:42.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c	2012-07-17 20:57:35.086155338 +0200
-@@ -140,7 +140,8 @@ evp_aes_128_ctr(void)
- 	aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr;
- #ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
- 	aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH |
--	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV;
-+	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV |
-+	    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS;
- #endif
- 	return (&aes_ctr);
- }
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/cipher.h.fips openssh-5.9p1/cipher.h
---- openssh-5.9p1/cipher.h.fips	2012-07-17 20:57:34.989153186 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/cipher.h	2012-07-17 20:57:35.087155360 +0200
-@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ void	 cipher_init(CipherContext *, Ciphe
-     const u_char *, u_int, int);
- void	 cipher_crypt(CipherContext *, u_char *, const u_char *, u_int);
- void	 cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *);
--void	 cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *, Cipher *, const char *, int);
-+int	 cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *, Cipher *, const char *, int);
- u_int	 cipher_blocksize(const Cipher *);
- u_int	 cipher_keylen(const Cipher *);
- u_int	 cipher_is_cbc(const Cipher *);
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/key.c.fips openssh-5.9p1/key.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/key.c.fips	2012-07-17 20:57:35.007153585 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/key.c	2012-07-17 20:57:35.087155360 +0200
-@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
- #include <sys/types.h>
- 
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- #include <openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h>
- 
- #include <stdarg.h>
-@@ -602,9 +603,13 @@ key_fingerprint_selection(void)
- 	char *env;
- 
- 	if (!rv_defined) {
--		env = getenv("SSH_FINGERPRINT_TYPE");
--		rv = (env && !strcmp (env, "sha")) ?
--			SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
-+		if (FIPS_mode())
-+			rv = SSH_FP_SHA1;
-+		else {
-+			env = getenv("SSH_FINGERPRINT_TYPE");
-+			rv = (env && !strcmp (env, "sha")) ?
-+				SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
-+		}
- 		rv_defined = 1;
- 	}
- 	return rv;
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/mac.c.fips openssh-5.9p1/mac.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/mac.c.fips	2012-07-17 20:57:34.996153341 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/mac.c	2012-07-17 20:58:35.584497499 +0200
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
- #include <sys/types.h>
- 
- #include <openssl/hmac.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- 
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <string.h>
-@@ -47,14 +48,14 @@
- #define SSH_EVP		1	/* OpenSSL EVP-based MAC */
- #define SSH_UMAC	2	/* UMAC (not integrated with OpenSSL) */
- 
--struct {
-+struct Macs {
- 	char		*name;
- 	int		type;
- 	const EVP_MD *	(*mdfunc)(void);
- 	int		truncatebits;	/* truncate digest if != 0 */
- 	int		key_len;	/* just for UMAC */
- 	int		len;		/* just for UMAC */
--} macs[] = {
-+} all_macs[] = {
- 	{ "hmac-sha1",			SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 0, -1, -1 },
- 	{ "hmac-sha1-96",		SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 96, -1, -1 },
- #ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
-@@ -71,9 +72,19 @@ struct {
- 	{ NULL,				0, NULL, 0, -1, -1 }
- };
- 
-+struct Macs fips_macs[] = {
-+	{ "hmac-sha1",			SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 0, -1, -1 },
-+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
-+	{ "hmac-sha2-256",		SSH_EVP, EVP_sha256, 0, -1, -1 },
-+	{ "hmac-sha2-512",		SSH_EVP, EVP_sha512, 0, -1, -1 },
-+#endif
-+	{ NULL,				0, NULL, 0, -1, -1 }
-+};
-+
- static void
- mac_setup_by_id(Mac *mac, int which)
- {
-+	struct Macs *macs = FIPS_mode() ? fips_macs : all_macs;
- 	int evp_len;
- 	mac->type = macs[which].type;
- 	if (mac->type == SSH_EVP) {
-@@ -94,6 +105,7 @@ int
- mac_setup(Mac *mac, char *name)
- {
- 	int i;
-+	struct Macs *macs = FIPS_mode() ? fips_macs : all_macs;
- 
- 	for (i = 0; macs[i].name; i++) {
- 		if (strcmp(name, macs[i].name) == 0) {
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in.fips openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in
---- openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in.fips	2012-07-17 20:57:35.069154962 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in	2012-07-17 20:57:35.086155338 +0200
-@@ -142,25 +142,25 @@ libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS)
- 	$(RANLIB) $@
- 
- ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS)
--	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS)
-+	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS)
- 
- sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a	$(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS)
--	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS)
-+	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS)
- 
- scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
- 
- ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-add.o
--	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
- 
- ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o
--	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
- 
- ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o
--	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
- 
- ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o roaming_dummy.o readconf.o
--	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
- 
- ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS)
- 
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o
--	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
- 
- sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-5.9p1/myproposal.h
---- openssh-5.9p1/myproposal.h.fips	2011-08-17 02:29:03.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/myproposal.h	2012-07-17 21:01:12.685982807 +0200
-@@ -97,6 +97,19 @@
- #define	KEX_DEFAULT_COMP	"none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib"
- #define	KEX_DEFAULT_LANG	""
- 
-+#define	KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \
-+	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
-+	"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \
-+	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se"
-+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
-+#define	KEX_FIPS_MAC \
-+	"hmac-sha1," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-256," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-512"
-+#else
-+#define	KEX_FIPS_MAC \
-+	"hmac-sha1"
-+#endif
- 
- static char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {
- 	KEX_DEFAULT_KEX,
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c.fips openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c.fips	2010-03-25 22:52:02.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c	2012-07-17 20:57:35.087155360 +0200
-@@ -37,25 +37,18 @@
- #define REKEY_BYTES	(1 << 24)
- 
- static int rc4_ready = 0;
--static RC4_KEY rc4;
- 
- unsigned int
- arc4random(void)
- {
- 	unsigned int r = 0;
--	static int first_time = 1;
-+	void *rp = &r;
- 
--	if (rc4_ready <= 0) {
--		if (first_time)
--			seed_rng();
--		first_time = 0;
-+	if (!rc4_ready) {
- 		arc4random_stir();
- 	}
-+	RAND_bytes(rp, sizeof(r));
- 
--	RC4(&rc4, sizeof(r), (unsigned char *)&r, (unsigned char *)&r);
--
--	rc4_ready -= sizeof(r);
--	
- 	return(r);
- }
- 
-@@ -63,24 +56,11 @@ void
- arc4random_stir(void)
- {
- 	unsigned char rand_buf[SEED_SIZE];
--	int i;
- 
--	memset(&rc4, 0, sizeof(rc4));
- 	if (RAND_bytes(rand_buf, sizeof(rand_buf)) <= 0)
- 		fatal("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error %ld)",
- 		    ERR_get_error());
--	RC4_set_key(&rc4, sizeof(rand_buf), rand_buf);
--
--	/*
--	 * Discard early keystream, as per recommendations in:
--	 * http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~itsik/RC4/Papers/Rc4_ksa.ps
--	 */
--	for(i = 0; i <= 256; i += sizeof(rand_buf))
--		RC4(&rc4, sizeof(rand_buf), rand_buf, rand_buf);
--
--	memset(rand_buf, 0, sizeof(rand_buf));
--
--	rc4_ready = REKEY_BYTES;
-+	rc4_ready = 1;
- }
- #endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */
- 
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-5.9p1/ssh.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/ssh.c.fips	2011-08-05 22:18:16.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/ssh.c	2012-07-17 20:57:35.088155382 +0200
-@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@
- 
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
-+#include <fipscheck.h>
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- 
-@@ -253,6 +255,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	sanitise_stdfd();
- 
- 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
-+        SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
-+        if (FIPS_mode() && !FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)) {
-+                fatal("FIPS integrity verification test failed.");
-+        }
- 
- #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
- 	/* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
-@@ -329,6 +335,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	    "ACD:F:I:KL:MNO:PR:S:TVw:W:XYy")) != -1) {
- 		switch (opt) {
- 		case '1':
-+			if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+				fatal("Protocol 1 not allowed in the FIPS mode.");
-+			}
- 			options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_1;
- 			break;
- 		case '2':
-@@ -630,7 +639,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	if (!host)
- 		usage();
- 
--	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
- 	ERR_load_crypto_strings();
- 
- 	/* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */
-@@ -721,6 +729,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 
- 	seed_rng();
- 
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		logit("FIPS mode initialized");
-+	}
-+
- 	if (options.user == NULL)
- 		options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
- 
-@@ -789,6 +801,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 
- 	timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000;
- 
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		options.protocol &= SSH_PROTO_2;
-+		if (options.protocol == 0)
-+			fatal("Protocol 2 disabled by configuration but required in the FIPS mode.");
-+	}
-+
- 	/* Open a connection to the remote host. */
- 	if (ssh_connect(host, &hostaddr, options.port,
- 	    options.address_family, options.connection_attempts, &timeout_ms,
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-5.9p1/sshconnect2.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/sshconnect2.c.fips	2012-07-17 20:57:34.955152432 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/sshconnect2.c	2012-07-17 20:57:35.088155382 +0200
-@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@
- #include <vis.h>
- #endif
- 
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
-+
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- 
- #include "xmalloc.h"
-@@ -170,6 +172,10 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
- 	if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers;
-+	} else if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT;
-+
- 	}
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- 	    compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
-@@ -185,7 +191,11 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
- 	if (options.macs != NULL) {
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
-+	} else if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_MAC;
- 	}
-+
- 	if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL)
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
- 		    options.hostkeyalgorithms;
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c.fips	2012-07-17 20:57:35.049154517 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c	2012-07-17 20:57:35.089155405 +0200
-@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/md5.h>
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
-+#include <fipscheck.h>
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- 
- #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
-@@ -1395,6 +1397,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- #endif
- 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
- 
-+        SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
-+        if (FIPS_mode() && !FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)) {
-+                fatal("FIPS integrity verification test failed.");
-+        }
-+
- 	/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
- 	saved_argc = ac;
- 	rexec_argc = ac;
-@@ -1554,8 +1561,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	else
- 		closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD);
- 
--	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
--
- 	/*
- 	 * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host
- 	 * key (unless started from inetd)
-@@ -1673,6 +1678,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		debug("private host key: #%d type %d %s", i, key->type,
- 		    key_type(key));
- 	}
-+	if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && FIPS_mode()) {
-+		logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Not allowed in the FIPS mode.");
-+		options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
-+	}
- 	if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) {
- 		logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
- 		options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
-@@ -1837,6 +1846,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	/* Initialize the random number generator. */
- 	arc4random_stir();
- 
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		logit("FIPS mode initialized");
-+	}
-+
- 	/* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
- 	   unmounted if desired. */
- 	(void) chdir("/");
-@@ -2379,6 +2392,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
- 	if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers;
-+	} else if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT;
- 	}
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- 	    compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
-@@ -2388,6 +2404,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
- 	if (options.macs != NULL) {
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
-+	} else if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_MAC;
- 	}
- 	if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) {
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =

openssh-5.9p1-keygen.patch

@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.0.keygen openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.0
---- openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.0.keygen	2011-08-29 16:30:02.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.0	2011-08-30 13:47:56.208087184 +0200
-@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ NAME
-      ssh-keygen - authentication key generation, management and conversion
- 
- SYNOPSIS
--     ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] -t type [-N new_passphrase] [-C comment]
-+     ssh-keygen [-q] [-o] [-b bits] -t type [-N new_passphrase] [-C comment]
-                 [-f output_keyfile]
-      ssh-keygen -p [-P old_passphrase] [-N new_passphrase] [-f keyfile]
-      ssh-keygen -i [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile]
-@@ -181,6 +181,8 @@ DESCRIPTION
-              principals may be specified, separated by commas.  Please see the
-              CERTIFICATES section for details.
- 
-+     -o      Overwrite the key without prompting user.
-+
-      -O option
-              Specify a certificate option when signing a key.  This option may
-              be specified multiple times.  Please see the CERTIFICATES section
-diff -up openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.1.keygen openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.1
---- openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.1.keygen	2011-08-30 13:32:30.787149917 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.1	2011-08-30 13:46:42.638087171 +0200
-@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
- .Bk -words
- .Nm ssh-keygen
- .Op Fl q
-+.Op Fl o
- .Op Fl b Ar bits
- .Fl t Ar type
- .Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase
-@@ -339,6 +340,8 @@ Multiple principals may be specified, se
- Please see the
- .Sx CERTIFICATES
- section for details.
-+.It Fl o
-+Overwrite the key without prompting user.
- .It Fl O Ar option
- Specify a certificate option when signing a key.
- This option may be specified multiple times.
-diff -up openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.c.keygen openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.c
---- openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.c.keygen	2011-08-30 13:32:20.268149992 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.c	2011-08-30 13:39:34.550214102 +0200
-@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ int change_passphrase = 0;
- int change_comment = 0;
- 
- int quiet = 0;
-+int overwrite = 0;
- 
- int log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
- 
-@@ -1959,7 +1960,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 		exit(1);
- 	}
- 
--	while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "AegiqpclBHLhvxXyF:b:f:t:D:I:P:m:N:n:"
-+	while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "AegiqopclBHLhvxXyF:b:f:t:D:I:P:m:N:n:"
- 	    "O:C:r:g:R:T:G:M:S:s:a:V:W:z:")) != -1) {
- 		switch (opt) {
- 		case 'A':
-@@ -2042,6 +2043,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 		case 'q':
- 			quiet = 1;
- 			break;
-+		case 'o':
-+			overwrite = 1;
-+			break;
- 		case 'e':
- 		case 'x':
- 			/* export key */
-@@ -2278,7 +2282,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 		}
- 	}
- 	/* If the file already exists, ask the user to confirm. */
--	if (stat(identity_file, &st) >= 0) {
-+	if (!overwrite && stat(identity_file, &st) >= 0) {
- 		char yesno[3];
- 		printf("%s already exists.\n", identity_file);
- 		printf("Overwrite (y/n)? ");

openssh-5.9p1-randclean.patch

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.9p0/entropy.c.randclean openssh-5.9p0/entropy.c
---- openssh-5.9p0/entropy.c.randclean	2011-08-30 13:52:45.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p0/entropy.c	2011-08-30 13:57:44.630111338 +0200
-@@ -217,6 +217,9 @@ seed_rng(void)
- 		fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you "
- 		    "have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay());
- 
-+	/* clean the PRNG status when exiting the program */
-+	atexit(RAND_cleanup);
-+
- #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
- 	if (RAND_status() == 1) {
- 		debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding");

openssh-5.9p1-sesandbox.patch

@@ -1,321 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in
---- openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in.sesandbox	2011-09-19 04:10:05.706521484 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in	2011-09-19 04:10:15.092646473 +0200
-@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passw
- 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
- 	sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
- 	roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o \
--	sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o
-+	sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o sandbox-selinux.o
- 
- MANPAGES	= moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out
- MANPAGES_IN	= moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/configure.ac.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/configure.ac
---- openssh-5.9p1/configure.ac.sesandbox	2011-08-18 06:48:24.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/configure.ac	2011-09-19 04:10:15.193521356 +0200
-@@ -2476,7 +2476,7 @@ AC_SUBST([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER])
- # Decide which sandbox style to use
- sandbox_arg=""
- AC_ARG_WITH([sandbox],
--	[  --with-sandbox=style    Specify privilege separation sandbox (no, darwin, rlimit, systrace)],
-+	[  --with-sandbox=style    Specify privilege separation sandbox (no, darwin, rlimit, systrace, selinux)],
- 	[
- 		if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
- 			sandbox_arg=""
-@@ -2499,6 +2499,10 @@ elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xdarwin" ||
- 		AC_MSG_ERROR([Darwin seatbelt sandbox requires sandbox.h and sandbox_init function])
- 	SANDBOX_STYLE="darwin"
- 	AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_DARWIN], [1], [Sandbox using Darwin sandbox_init(3)])
-+elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xselinux"  || \
-+    test "x$WITH_SELINUX" = "x1"; then
-+	SANDBOX_STYLE="selinux"
-+	AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SELINUX], [1], [Sandbox using selinux(8)])
- elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xrlimit" || \
-      ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" = "xyes" ) ; then
- 	test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" != "xyes" && \
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.sesandbox	2011-09-19 04:10:14.731521450 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2011-09-19 04:10:15.292521265 +0200
-@@ -459,24 +459,24 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, cons
- 	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
- }
- 
--void
-+int
- ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname)
- {
--	int len, newlen;
-+	int len, newlen, rv = -1;
- 	char *oldctx, *newctx, *cx;
- 	void (*switchlog) (const char *fmt,...) = logit;
- 
- 	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
--		return;
-+		return -2;
- 
- 	if (getcon((security_context_t *)&oldctx) < 0) {
- 		logit("%s: getcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
--		return;
-+		return -1;
- 	}
- 	if ((cx = index(oldctx, ':')) == NULL || (cx = index(cx + 1, ':')) ==
- 	    NULL) {
- 		logit ("%s: unparseable context %s", __func__, oldctx);
--		return;
-+		return -1;
- 	}
- 
- 	/*
-@@ -484,8 +484,10 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *n
- 	 * security context.
- 	 */
- 	if (strncmp(cx, SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE,
--	    sizeof(SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE) - 1) == 0)
-+	    sizeof(SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE) - 1) == 0) {
- 		switchlog = debug3;
-+		rv = -2;
-+	}
- 
- 	newlen = strlen(oldctx) + strlen(newname) + 1;
- 	newctx = xmalloc(newlen);
-@@ -499,8 +501,11 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *n
- 	if (setcon(newctx) < 0)
- 		switchlog("%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s", __func__,
- 		    newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno));
-+	else
-+		rv = 0;
- 	xfree(oldctx);
- 	xfree(newctx);
-+	return rv;
- }
- 
- void
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
---- openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.sesandbox	2011-09-19 04:10:14.817647868 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2011-09-19 04:10:15.401648009 +0200
-@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
- int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
- void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
--void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
-+int ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_chopy_context(void);
- void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
- #endif
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-darwin.c.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-darwin.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-darwin.c.sesandbox	2011-06-26 23:18:21.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-darwin.c	2011-09-19 04:10:15.490523231 +0200
-@@ -83,6 +83,12 @@ ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *bo
- }
- 
- void
-+ssh_sandbox_privileged_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
-+{
-+	/* empty */
-+}
-+
-+void
- ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
- {
- 	free(box);
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-null.c.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-null.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-null.c.sesandbox	2011-06-23 11:45:51.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-null.c	2011-09-19 04:10:15.599458687 +0200
-@@ -58,6 +58,12 @@ ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *bo
- }
- 
- void
-+ssh_sandbox_privileged_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
-+{
-+	/* empty */
-+}
-+
-+void
- ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
- {
- 	free(box);
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-rlimit.c.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-rlimit.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-rlimit.c.sesandbox	2011-06-23 11:45:51.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-rlimit.c	2011-09-19 04:10:16.077647289 +0200
-@@ -78,6 +78,12 @@ ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *bo
- }
- 
- void
-+ssh_sandbox_privileged_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
-+{
-+	/* empty */
-+}
-+
-+void
- ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
- {
- 	free(box);
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-selinux.c.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-selinux.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-selinux.c.sesandbox	2011-09-19 04:10:16.179526059 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-selinux.c	2011-09-19 04:39:00.058646230 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
-+/* $Id: sandbox-selinux.c,v 1.0 2011/01/17 10:15:30 jfch Exp $ */
-+ 
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2011 Red Hat, Inc.  All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ *
-+ * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
-+ */
-+
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#ifdef SANDBOX_SELINUX
-+
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+
-+#include <errno.h>
-+#include <stdarg.h>
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#include <sys/resource.h>
-+
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "openbsd-compat/port-linux.h"
-+
-+/* selinux based sandbox */
-+
-+struct ssh_sandbox {
-+	pid_t child_pid;
-+};
-+
-+struct ssh_sandbox *
-+ssh_sandbox_init(void)
-+{
-+	struct ssh_sandbox *box;
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need
-+	 * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API.
-+	 */
-+	debug3("selinux sandbox init");
-+	box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
-+	box->child_pid = 0;
-+	return box;
-+}
-+
-+void
-+ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
-+{
-+	struct rlimit rl_zero;
-+
-+	rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
-+
-+	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1)
-+		fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
-+			__func__, strerror(errno));
-+	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero) == -1)
-+		fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
-+			__func__, strerror(errno));
-+#ifdef HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC
-+	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1)
-+		fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s",
-+			__func__, strerror(errno));
-+#endif
-+}
-+
-+void
-+ssh_sandbox_privileged_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
-+{
-+	switch (ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_sandbox_t")) {
-+	case 0:
-+		debug3("selinux sandbox child sucessfully enabled");
-+		break;
-+	case -2:
-+		logit("selinux sandbox not useful");
-+		break;
-+	case -1:
-+		fatal("cannot set up selinux sandbox");
-+	default:
-+		fatal("inmternal error in selinux sandbox");
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+void
-+ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
-+{
-+	free(box);
-+	debug3("%s: finished", __func__);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
-+{
-+	debug3("selinux sandbox parent sucessfully enabled");
-+	box->child_pid = child_pid;
-+}
-+
-+#endif /* SANDBOX_NULL */
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-systrace.c.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-systrace.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-systrace.c.sesandbox	2011-08-05 22:16:23.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-systrace.c	2011-09-19 04:10:16.268646532 +0200
-@@ -109,6 +109,12 @@ ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *bo
- 	close(box->child_sock);
- }
- 
-+void
-+ssh_sandbox_privileged_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
-+{
-+	/* empty */
-+}
-+
- static void
- ssh_sandbox_parent(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid,
-     const struct sandbox_policy *allowed_syscalls)
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/ssh-sandbox.h.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/ssh-sandbox.h
---- openssh-5.9p1/ssh-sandbox.h.sesandbox	2011-06-23 11:45:51.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/ssh-sandbox.h	2011-09-19 04:10:16.392523931 +0200
-@@ -19,5 +19,6 @@ struct ssh_sandbox;
- 
- struct ssh_sandbox *ssh_sandbox_init(void);
- void ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *);
-+void ssh_sandbox_privileged_child(struct ssh_sandbox *);
- void ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *);
- void ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *, pid_t);
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c.sesandbox	2011-09-19 04:10:14.564467584 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c	2011-09-19 04:36:43.324520132 +0200
-@@ -728,10 +730,12 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 		set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
- 
- 		/* Demote the child */
--		if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
-+		if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) {
-+			ssh_sandbox_privileged_child(box);
- 			privsep_preauth_child();
-+		}
- 		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
- 		if (box != NULL) {
- 			ssh_sandbox_child(box);
- 			xfree(box);
- 		}

openssh-5.9p1-sftp-chroot.patch

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.9p0/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.sftp-chroot openssh-5.9p0/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
---- openssh-5.9p0/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.sftp-chroot	2011-09-01 04:12:22.743024608 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p0/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2011-09-01 04:12:23.069088065 +0200
-@@ -503,6 +503,23 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *n
- 	xfree(newctx);
- }
- 
-+void
-+ssh_selinux_copy_context(void)
-+{
-+	char *ctx;
-+
-+	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
-+		return;
-+
-+	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) < 0) {
-+		logit("%s: getcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror (errno));
-+		return;
-+	}
-+	if (setcon(ctx) < 0)
-+		logit("%s: setcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror (errno));
-+	xfree(ctx);
-+}
-+
- #endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
- 
- #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-diff -up openssh-5.9p0/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.sftp-chroot openssh-5.9p0/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
---- openssh-5.9p0/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.sftp-chroot	2011-01-25 02:16:18.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.9p0/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2011-09-01 04:12:23.163088777 +0200
-@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
- void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
- void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
-+void ssh_selinux_chopy_context(void);
- void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
- #endif
- 
-diff -up openssh-5.9p0/session.c.sftp-chroot openssh-5.9p0/session.c
---- openssh-5.9p0/session.c.sftp-chroot	2011-09-01 04:12:19.698049195 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p0/session.c	2011-09-01 04:40:03.598148719 +0200
-@@ -1519,6 +1519,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
- 			    pw->pw_uid);
- 			chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
- 			    "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+			ssh_selinux_change_context("chroot_user_t");
-+#endif
- 			safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
- 			free(tmp);
- 			free(chroot_path);
-@@ -1788,7 +1791,10 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
- 		optind = optreset = 1;
- 		__progname = argv[0];
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--		ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
-+		if (options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
-+		    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) {
-+			ssh_selinux_copy_context();
-+		}
- #endif
- 		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
- 	}

openssh-5.9p1-wIm.patch

@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in.wIm openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in
---- openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in.wIm	2011-08-05 22:15:18.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in	2011-09-12 16:24:18.643674014 +0200
-@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=acss.o authfd.o authfile.o b
- 	cipher-bf1.o cipher-ctr.o cipher-3des1.o cleanup.o \
- 	compat.o compress.o crc32.o deattack.o fatal.o hostfile.o \
- 	log.o match.o md-sha256.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o \
--	readpass.o rsa.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addrmatch.o \
-+	readpass.o rsa.o ttymodes.o whereIam.o xmalloc.o addrmatch.o \
- 	atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
- 	monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
- 	kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/log.h.wIm openssh-5.9p1/log.h
---- openssh-5.9p1/log.h.wIm	2011-06-20 06:42:23.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/log.h	2011-09-12 16:34:52.984674326 +0200
-@@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ void     verbose(const char *, ...) __at
- void     debug(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
- void     debug2(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
- void     debug3(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
-+void	 _debug_wIm_body(const char *, int, const char *, const char *, int);
-+#define	debug_wIm(a,b) _debug_wIm_body(a,b,__func__,__FILE__,__LINE__)
- 
- 
- void	 set_log_handler(log_handler_fn *, void *);
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c.wIm openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c.wIm	2011-06-23 11:45:51.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c	2011-09-12 16:38:35.787816490 +0200
-@@ -140,6 +140,9 @@ int deny_severity;
- 
- extern char *__progname;
- 
-+/* trace of fork processes */
-+extern int whereIam;
-+
- /* Server configuration options. */
- ServerOptions options;
- 
-@@ -666,6 +669,7 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 		return 1;
- 	} else {
- 		/* child */
-+		whereIam = 1;
- 		close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
- 		close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
- 
-@@ -715,6 +719,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 
- 	/* child */
- 
-+	whereIam = 2;
- 	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
- 	pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
- 
-@@ -1325,6 +1330,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	Key *key;
- 	Authctxt *authctxt;
- 
-+	whereIam = 0;
-+
- #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
- 	(void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
- #endif
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/whereIam.c.wIm openssh-5.9p1/whereIam.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/whereIam.c.wIm	2011-09-12 16:24:18.722674167 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/whereIam.c	2011-09-12 16:24:18.724674418 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
-+
-+int whereIam = -1;
-+
-+void _debug_wIm_body(const char *txt, int val, const char *func, const char *file, int line)
-+{
-+	if (txt)
-+		debug("%s=%d, %s(%s:%d) wIm = %d, uid=%d, euid=%d", txt, val, func, file, line, whereIam, getuid(), geteuid());
-+	else
-+		debug("%s(%s:%d) wIm = %d, uid=%d, euid=%d", func, file, line, whereIam, getuid(), geteuid());
-+}
-+
-+

openssh-6.0p1-audit1.patch

@@ -1,641 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.0p1/audit-bsm.c.audit1 openssh-6.0p1/audit-bsm.c
---- openssh-6.0p1/audit-bsm.c.audit1	2012-02-24 00:40:43.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.0p1/audit-bsm.c	2012-08-06 20:33:24.416382804 +0200
-@@ -375,10 +375,23 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host,
- #endif
- }
- 
--void
-+int
- audit_run_command(const char *command)
- {
- 	/* not implemented */
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
-+{
-+	/* not implemented */
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_count_session_open(void)
-+{
-+	/* not necessary */
- }
- 
- void
-diff -up openssh-6.0p1/audit.c.audit1 openssh-6.0p1/audit.c
---- openssh-6.0p1/audit.c.audit1	2011-01-17 11:15:30.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.0p1/audit.c	2012-08-06 20:33:24.417382801 +0200
-@@ -140,6 +140,17 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
- }
- 
- /*
-+ * Called when a child process has called, or will soon call,
-+ * audit_session_open.
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_count_session_open(void)
-+{
-+	debug("audit count session open euid %d user %s", geteuid(),
-+	      audit_username());
-+}
-+
-+/*
-  * Called when a user session is started.  Argument is the tty allocated to
-  * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated.
-  *
-@@ -174,13 +185,29 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li
- /*
-  * This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command.  Note that
-  * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
-- * multiple sessions within a single connection.
-+ * multiple sessions within a single connection.  Returns a "handle" for
-+ * audit_end_command.
-  */
--void
-+int
- audit_run_command(const char *command)
- {
- 	debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
- 	    audit_username(), command);
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called when the non-interactive command finishes.  Note that
-+ * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
-+ * multiple sessions within a single connection.  "handle" should come from
-+ * the corresponding audit_run_command.
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
-+{
-+	debug("audit end nopty exec  euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
-+	    audit_username(), command);
- }
-+
- # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff -up openssh-6.0p1/audit.h.audit1 openssh-6.0p1/audit.h
---- openssh-6.0p1/audit.h.audit1	2011-01-17 11:15:30.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.0p1/audit.h	2012-08-06 20:33:24.417382801 +0200
-@@ -49,9 +49,11 @@ typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_au
- 
- void	audit_connection_from(const char *, int);
- void	audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
-+void	audit_count_session_open(void);
- void	audit_session_open(struct logininfo *);
- void	audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
--void	audit_run_command(const char *);
-+int	audit_run_command(const char *);
-+void 	audit_end_command(int, const char *);
- ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
- 
- #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
-diff -up openssh-6.0p1/audit-linux.c.audit1 openssh-6.0p1/audit-linux.c
---- openssh-6.0p1/audit-linux.c.audit1	2011-01-17 11:15:30.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.0p1/audit-linux.c	2012-08-06 20:33:24.416382804 +0200
-@@ -35,13 +35,20 @@
- 
- #include "log.h"
- #include "audit.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "hostfile.h"
-+#include "auth.h"
-+#include "servconf.h"
- #include "canohost.h"
- 
-+extern ServerOptions options;
-+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
-+extern u_int utmp_len;
- const char* audit_username(void);
- 
--int
--linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username,
--    const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success)
-+static void
-+linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username,
-+    const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
- {
- 	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
- 
-@@ -49,11 +56,11 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const
- 	if (audit_fd < 0) {
- 		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
- 		    errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
--			return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */
-+			return; /* No audit support in kernel */
- 		else
--			return 0; /* Must prevent login */
-+			goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
- 	}
--	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN,
-+	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event,
- 	    NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
- 	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
- 	saved_errno = errno;
-@@ -65,35 +72,119 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const
- 	if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
- 		rc = 0;
- 	errno = saved_errno;
--	return (rc >= 0);
-+	if (rc < 0) {
-+fatal_report:
-+		fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+static void
-+linux_audit_user_auth(int uid, const char *username,
-+    const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
-+{
-+	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
-+	static const char *event_name[] = {
-+		"maxtries exceeded",
-+		"root denied",
-+		"success",
-+		"none",
-+		"password",
-+		"challenge-response",
-+		"pubkey",
-+		"hostbased",
-+		"gssapi",
-+		"invalid user",
-+		"nologin",
-+		"connection closed",
-+		"connection abandoned",
-+		"unknown"
-+	};
-+
-+	audit_fd = audit_open();
-+	if (audit_fd < 0) {
-+		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
-+		    errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
-+			return; /* No audit support in kernel */
-+		else
-+			goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
-+	}
-+	
-+	if ((event < 0) || (event > SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN))
-+		event = SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN;
-+
-+	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH,
-+	    NULL, event_name[event], username ? username : "(unknown)",
-+	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
-+	saved_errno = errno;
-+	close(audit_fd);
-+	/*
-+	 * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non
-+	 * root user.
-+	 */
-+	if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
-+		rc = 0;
-+	errno = saved_errno;
-+	if (rc < 0) {
-+fatal_report:
-+		fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
-+	}
- }
- 
-+static int user_login_count = 0;
-+
- /* Below is the sshd audit API code */
- 
- void
- audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
- {
--}
- 	/* not implemented */
-+}
- 
--void
-+int
- audit_run_command(const char *command)
- {
--	/* not implemented */
-+	if (!user_login_count++) 
-+		linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
-+		    NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
-+	linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
-+	    NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
-+{
-+	linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
-+	    NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
-+	if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) 
-+		linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
-+		    NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_count_session_open(void)
-+{
-+	user_login_count++;
- }
- 
- void
- audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
- {
--	if (linux_audit_record_event(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
--	    NULL, li->line, 1) == 0)
--		fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
-+	if (!user_login_count++) 
-+		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
-+		    NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
-+	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
-+	    NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
- }
- 
- void
- audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
- {
--	/* not implemented */
-+	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
-+	    NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
-+	if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) 
-+		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
-+		    NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
- }
- 
- void
-@@ -101,21 +192,43 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
- {
- 	switch(event) {
- 	case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS:
--	case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
-+		linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
-+			get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 1, event);
-+		break;
-+
- 	case SSH_NOLOGIN:
--	case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
- 	case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
-+		linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
-+			get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, event);
-+		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
-+			get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
- 		break;
- 
-+	case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
- 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE:
- 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
- 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
- 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
- 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
- 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
-+		linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
-+			get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, event);
-+		break;
-+
-+	case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
-+		if (user_login_count) {
-+			while (user_login_count--)
-+				linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
-+				    NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
-+			linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
-+			    NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
-+		}
-+		break;
-+
-+	case SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON:
- 	case SSH_INVALID_USER:
--		linux_audit_record_event(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
--			get_remote_ipaddr(), "sshd", 0);
-+		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
-+			get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
- 		break;
- 
- 	default:
-diff -up openssh-6.0p1/monitor.c.audit1 openssh-6.0p1/monitor.c
---- openssh-6.0p1/monitor.c.audit1	2012-08-06 20:33:24.410382828 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.0p1/monitor.c	2012-08-06 20:33:24.418382797 +0200
-@@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
-+int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *);
- #endif
- 
- static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
-@@ -272,6 +273,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
- #endif
-     {0, 0, NULL}
- };
-@@ -314,6 +316,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
- #endif
-     {0, 0, NULL}
- };
-@@ -1427,6 +1430,12 @@ mm_session_close(Session *s)
- 		debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
- 		session_pty_cleanup2(s);
- 	}
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	if (s->command != NULL) {
-+		debug3("%s: command %d", __func__, s->command_handle);
-+		session_end_command2(s);
-+	}
-+#endif
- 	session_unused(s->self);
- }
- 
-@@ -1751,11 +1760,44 @@ mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buff
- {
- 	u_int len;
- 	char *cmd;
-+	Session *s;
- 
- 	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
- 	cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-+
- 	/* sanity check command, if so how? */
--	audit_run_command(cmd);
-+	s = session_new();
-+	if (s == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: error allocating a session", __func__);
-+	s->command = cmd;
-+	s->command_handle = audit_run_command(cmd);
-+
-+	buffer_clear(m);
-+	buffer_put_int(m, s->self);
-+
-+	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, m);
-+
-+	return (0);
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_answer_audit_end_command(int socket, Buffer *m)
-+{
-+	int handle;
-+	u_int len;
-+	char *cmd;
-+	Session *s;
-+
-+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-+	handle = buffer_get_int(m);
-+	cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-+
-+	s = session_by_id(handle);
-+	if (s == NULL || s->ttyfd != -1 || s->command == NULL ||
-+	    strcmp(s->command, cmd) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: invalid handle", __func__);
-+	mm_session_close(s);
-+
- 	xfree(cmd);
- 	return (0);
- }
-diff -up openssh-6.0p1/monitor.h.audit1 openssh-6.0p1/monitor.h
---- openssh-6.0p1/monitor.h.audit1	2011-06-20 06:42:23.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.0p1/monitor.h	2012-08-06 20:33:24.418382797 +0200
-@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND,
-+	MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_TERM,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA,
-diff -up openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit1 openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.c
---- openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit1	2012-08-06 20:33:24.384382930 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.c	2012-08-06 20:33:24.419382793 +0200
-@@ -1188,10 +1188,11 @@ mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
- 	buffer_free(&m);
- }
- 
--void
-+int
- mm_audit_run_command(const char *command)
- {
- 	Buffer m;
-+	int handle;
- 
- 	debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
- 
-@@ -1199,6 +1200,26 @@ mm_audit_run_command(const char *command
- 	buffer_put_cstring(&m, command);
- 
- 	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
-+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
-+
-+	handle = buffer_get_int(&m);
-+	buffer_free(&m);
-+
-+	return (handle);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+mm_audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
-+{
-+	Buffer m;
-+
-+	debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
-+
-+	buffer_init(&m);
-+	buffer_put_int(&m, handle);
-+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, command);
-+
-+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, &m);
- 	buffer_free(&m);
- }
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff -up openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit1 openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.h
---- openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit1	2011-06-20 06:42:23.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.h	2012-08-06 20:33:24.419382793 +0200
-@@ -74,7 +74,8 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- #include "audit.h"
- void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
--void mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
-+int mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
-+void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *);
- #endif
- 
- struct Session;
-diff -up openssh-6.0p1/session.c.audit1 openssh-6.0p1/session.c
---- openssh-6.0p1/session.c.audit1	2011-11-04 00:55:24.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.0p1/session.c	2012-08-06 20:33:24.420382789 +0200
-@@ -742,6 +742,14 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm
- 	/* Parent.  Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */
- 	close(ttyfd);
- 
-+#ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
-+	/* do_login in the child did not affect state in this process,
-+	   compensate.  From an architectural standpoint, this is extremely
-+	   ugly. */
-+	if (!(options.use_login && command == NULL))
-+		audit_count_session_open();
-+#endif
-+
- 	/* Enter interactive session. */
- 	s->ptymaster = ptymaster;
- 	packet_set_interactive(1, 
-@@ -813,15 +821,19 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
- 	}
- 
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1)
-+		fatal("do_exec: command already set");
- 	if (command != NULL)
--		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
-+		s->command = xstrdup(command);
- 	else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
- 		char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell;
- 
- 		if (shell[0] == '\0')	/* empty shell means /bin/sh */
- 			shell =_PATH_BSHELL;
--		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell));
-+		s->command = xstrdup(shell);
- 	}
-+	if (s->command != NULL)
-+		s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(s->command));
- #endif
- 	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
- 		ret = do_exec_pty(s, command);
-@@ -1848,6 +1860,7 @@ session_unused(int id)
- 	sessions[id].ttyfd = -1;
- 	sessions[id].ptymaster = -1;
- 	sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL;
-+	sessions[id].command_handle = -1;
- 	sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused;
- 	sessions_first_unused = id;
- }
-@@ -1930,6 +1943,19 @@ session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int cha
- }
- 
- Session *
-+session_by_id(int id)
-+{
-+	if (id >= 0 && id < sessions_nalloc) {
-+		Session *s = &sessions[id];
-+		if (s->used)
-+			return s;
-+	}
-+	debug("session_by_id: unknown id %d", id);
-+	session_dump();
-+	return NULL;
-+}
-+
-+Session *
- session_by_tty(char *tty)
- {
- 	int i;
-@@ -2455,6 +2481,30 @@ session_exit_message(Session *s, int sta
- 		chan_write_failed(c);
- }
- 
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+void
-+session_end_command2(Session *s)
-+{
-+	if (s->command != NULL) {
-+		audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command);
-+		xfree(s->command);
-+		s->command = NULL;
-+		s->command_handle = -1;
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+static void
-+session_end_command(Session *s)
-+{
-+	if (s->command != NULL) {
-+		PRIVSEP(audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command));
-+		xfree(s->command);
-+		s->command = NULL;
-+		s->command_handle = -1;
-+	}
-+}
-+#endif
-+
- void
- session_close(Session *s)
- {
-@@ -2463,6 +2513,10 @@ session_close(Session *s)
- 	debug("session_close: session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid);
- 	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
- 		session_pty_cleanup(s);
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	if (s->command)
-+		session_end_command(s);
-+#endif
- 	if (s->term)
- 		xfree(s->term);
- 	if (s->display)
-@@ -2682,6 +2736,15 @@ do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 	server_loop2(authctxt);
- }
- 
-+static void
-+do_cleanup_one_session(Session *s)
-+{
-+	session_pty_cleanup2(s);
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	session_end_command2(s);
-+#endif
-+}
-+
- void
- do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
- {
-@@ -2730,5 +2793,5 @@ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 	 * or if running in monitor.
- 	 */
- 	if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
--		session_destroy_all(session_pty_cleanup2);
-+		session_destroy_all(do_cleanup_one_session);
- }
-diff -up openssh-6.0p1/session.h.audit1 openssh-6.0p1/session.h
---- openssh-6.0p1/session.h.audit1	2008-05-19 07:34:50.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.0p1/session.h	2012-08-06 20:33:24.420382789 +0200
-@@ -60,6 +60,12 @@ struct Session {
- 		char	*name;
- 		char	*val;
- 	} *env;
-+
-+	/* exec */
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	int	command_handle;
-+	char	*command;
-+#endif
- };
- 
- void	 do_authenticated(Authctxt *);
-@@ -72,8 +78,10 @@ void	 session_close_by_pid(pid_t, int);
- void	 session_close_by_channel(int, void *);
- void	 session_destroy_all(void (*)(Session *));
- void	 session_pty_cleanup2(Session *);
-+void	 session_end_command2(Session *);
- 
- Session	*session_new(void);
-+Session *session_by_id(int);
- Session	*session_by_tty(char *);
- void	 session_close(Session *);
- void	 do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
-diff -up openssh-6.0p1/sshd.c.audit1 openssh-6.0p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-6.0p1/sshd.c.audit1	2012-08-06 20:33:24.392382898 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.0p1/sshd.c	2012-08-06 20:33:24.421382785 +0200
-@@ -2381,7 +2381,8 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
- 	}
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- 	/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
--	if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
-+	if ((the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) &&
-+	    (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
- 		audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
- #endif
- 	_exit(i);

openssh-6.0p1-audit5.patch

@@ -1,486 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.0p1/audit-bsm.c.audit5 openssh-6.0p1/audit-bsm.c
---- openssh-6.0p1/audit-bsm.c.audit5	2012-08-06 20:37:50.036345216 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.0p1/audit-bsm.c	2012-08-06 20:37:50.046345177 +0200
-@@ -491,4 +491,22 @@ audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pi
- {
- 	/* not implemented */
- }
-+
-+void
-+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp)
-+{
-+	/* not implemented */
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	/* not implemented */
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp)
-+{
-+	/* not implemented */
-+}
- #endif /* BSM */
-diff -up openssh-6.0p1/audit.c.audit5 openssh-6.0p1/audit.c
---- openssh-6.0p1/audit.c.audit5	2012-08-06 20:37:50.036345216 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.0p1/audit.c	2012-08-06 20:37:50.047345173 +0200
-@@ -290,5 +290,24 @@ audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pi
- 	debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u",
- 		(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
- }
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called on destroy private part of the server key
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	debug("audit destroy sensitive data euid %d fingerprint %s from pid %ld uid %u",
-+		geteuid(), fp, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called on generation of the ephemeral server key
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *)
-+{
-+	debug("audit create ephemeral server key euid %d fingerprint %s", geteuid(), fp);
-+}
- # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff -up openssh-6.0p1/audit.h.audit5 openssh-6.0p1/audit.h
---- openssh-6.0p1/audit.h.audit5	2012-08-06 20:37:50.037345212 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.0p1/audit.h	2012-08-06 20:37:50.047345173 +0200
-@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ enum ssh_audit_event_type {
- };
- typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t;
- 
-+int	listening_for_clients(void);
-+
- void	audit_connection_from(const char *, int);
- void	audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
- void	audit_count_session_open(void);
-@@ -64,5 +66,7 @@ void	audit_unsupported_body(int);
- void	audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
- void	audit_session_key_free(int ctos);
- void	audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
-+void	audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
-+void	audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *);
- 
- #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
-diff -up openssh-6.0p1/audit-linux.c.audit5 openssh-6.0p1/audit-linux.c
---- openssh-6.0p1/audit-linux.c.audit5	2012-08-06 20:37:50.037345212 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.0p1/audit-linux.c	2012-08-06 20:37:50.046345177 +0200
-@@ -356,4 +356,50 @@ audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pi
- 		error("cannot write into audit");
- }
- 
-+void
-+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
-+	int audit_fd, audit_ok;
-+
-+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=server fp=%s direction=? spid=%jd suid=%jd ",
-+		fp, (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid);
-+	audit_fd = audit_open();
-+	if (audit_fd < 0) {
-+		if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
-+					 errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
-+			error("cannot open audit");
-+		return;
-+	}
-+	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
-+			buf, NULL,
-+			listening_for_clients() ? NULL : get_remote_ipaddr(),
-+			NULL, 1);
-+	audit_close(audit_fd);
-+	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
-+	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
-+		error("cannot write into audit");
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp)
-+{
-+	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
-+	int audit_fd, audit_ok;
-+
-+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=create kind=server fp=%s direction=? ", fp);
-+	audit_fd = audit_open();
-+	if (audit_fd < 0) {
-+		if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
-+					 errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
-+			error("cannot open audit");
-+		return;
-+	}
-+	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
-+			buf, NULL, 0, NULL, 1);
-+	audit_close(audit_fd);
-+	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
-+	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
-+		error("cannot write into audit");
-+}
- #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
-diff -up openssh-6.0p1/key.c.audit5 openssh-6.0p1/key.c
---- openssh-6.0p1/key.c.audit5	2012-08-06 20:37:49.992345388 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.0p1/key.c	2012-08-06 20:37:50.048345169 +0200
-@@ -1794,6 +1794,30 @@ key_demote(const Key *k)
- }
- 
- int
-+key_is_private(const Key *k)
-+{
-+	switch (k->type) {
-+	case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
-+	case KEY_RSA_CERT:
-+	case KEY_RSA1:
-+	case KEY_RSA:
-+		return k->rsa->d != NULL;
-+	case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
-+	case KEY_DSA_CERT:
-+	case KEY_DSA:
-+		return k->dsa->priv_key != NULL;
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-+	case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
-+	case KEY_ECDSA:
-+		return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa) != NULL;
-+#endif
-+	default:
-+		fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type);
-+		return 1;
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+int
- key_is_cert(const Key *k)
- {
- 	if (k == NULL)
-diff -up openssh-6.0p1/key.h.audit5 openssh-6.0p1/key.h
---- openssh-6.0p1/key.h.audit5	2012-08-06 20:37:49.993345384 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.0p1/key.h	2012-08-06 20:37:50.049345165 +0200
-@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ Key	*key_generate(int, u_int);
- Key	*key_from_private(const Key *);
- int	 key_type_from_name(char *);
- int	 key_is_cert(const Key *);
-+int	 key_is_private(const Key *k);
- int	 key_type_plain(int);
- int	 key_to_certified(Key *, int);
- int	 key_drop_cert(Key *);
-diff -up openssh-6.0p1/monitor.c.audit5 openssh-6.0p1/monitor.c
---- openssh-6.0p1/monitor.c.audit5	2012-08-06 20:37:50.040345200 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.0p1/monitor.c	2012-08-06 20:37:50.049345165 +0200
-@@ -114,6 +114,8 @@ extern Buffer auth_debug;
- extern int auth_debug_init;
- extern Buffer loginmsg;
- 
-+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int);
-+
- /* State exported from the child */
- 
- struct {
-@@ -190,6 +192,7 @@ int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buf
- int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int, Buffer *);
-+int mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int, Buffer *);
- #endif
- 
- static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
-@@ -244,6 +247,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
- #endif
- #ifdef BSD_AUTH
-     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
-@@ -284,6 +288,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
- #endif
-     {0, 0, NULL}
- };
-@@ -318,6 +323,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[]
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
- #endif
-     {0, 0, NULL}
- };
-@@ -333,6 +339,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
- #endif
-     {0, 0, NULL}
- };
-@@ -1744,6 +1751,8 @@ mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
- 		sshpam_cleanup();
- #endif
- 
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(0);
-+
- 	while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
- 		if (errno != EINTR)
- 			exit(1);
-@@ -2485,4 +2494,25 @@ mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(in
- 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m);
- 	return 0;
- }
-+
-+int
-+mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int sock, Buffer *m)
-+{
-+	int len;
-+	char *fp;
-+	pid_t pid;
-+	uid_t uid;
-+
-+	fp = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-+	pid = buffer_get_int64(m);
-+	uid = buffer_get_int64(m);
-+
-+	audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid);
-+
-+	xfree(fp);
-+	buffer_clear(m);
-+
-+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m);
-+	return 0;
-+}
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff -up openssh-6.0p1/monitor.h.audit5 openssh-6.0p1/monitor.h
---- openssh-6.0p1/monitor.h.audit5	2012-08-06 20:37:50.040345200 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.0p1/monitor.h	2012-08-06 20:37:50.050345161 +0200
-@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
- 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE,
-+	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_TERM,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA,
-diff -up openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit5 openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.c
---- openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit5	2012-08-06 20:37:50.041345196 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.c	2012-08-06 20:37:50.050345161 +0200
-@@ -1539,4 +1539,20 @@ mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos,
- 				  &m);
- 	buffer_free(&m);
- }
-+
-+void
-+mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	Buffer m;
-+
-+	buffer_init(&m);
-+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, fp);
-+	buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
-+	buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
-+
-+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, &m);
-+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE,
-+				  &m);
-+	buffer_free(&m);
-+}
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff -up openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit5 openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.h
---- openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit5	2012-08-06 20:37:50.041345196 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.h	2012-08-06 20:37:50.051345157 +0200
-@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ void mm_audit_end_command(int, const cha
- void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
- void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
- void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t);
-+void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
- #endif
- 
- struct Session;
-diff -up openssh-6.0p1/session.c.audit5 openssh-6.0p1/session.c
---- openssh-6.0p1/session.c.audit5	2012-08-06 20:37:50.043345189 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.0p1/session.c	2012-08-06 20:37:50.052345153 +0200
-@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ extern int log_stderr;
- extern int debug_flag;
- extern u_int utmp_len;
- extern int startup_pipe;
--extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
-+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int);
- extern Buffer loginmsg;
- 
- /* original command from peer. */
-@@ -1633,7 +1633,7 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
- 	int r = 0;
- 
- 	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
--	destroy_sensitive_data();
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(1);
- 	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
- 	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
- 	packet_destroy_all(0, 1);
-diff -up openssh-6.0p1/sshd.c.audit5 openssh-6.0p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-6.0p1/sshd.c.audit5	2012-08-06 20:37:50.044345185 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.0p1/sshd.c	2012-08-06 20:37:50.053345149 +0200
-@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ Buffer loginmsg;
- struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
- 
- /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
--void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
-+void destroy_sensitive_data(int);
- void demote_sensitive_data(void);
- 
- static void do_ssh1_kex(void);
-@@ -274,6 +274,15 @@ close_listen_socks(void)
- 	num_listen_socks = -1;
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * Is this process listening for clients (i.e. not specific to any specific
-+ * client connection?)
-+ */
-+int listening_for_clients(void)
-+{
-+	return num_listen_socks > 0;
-+}
-+
- static void
- close_startup_pipes(void)
- {
-@@ -534,22 +543,47 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in
- 	}
- }
- 
--/* Destroy the host and server keys.  They will no longer be needed. */
-+/*
-+ * Destroy the host and server keys.  They will no longer be needed.  Careful,
-+ * this can be called from cleanup_exit() - i.e. from just about anywhere.
-+ */
- void
--destroy_sensitive_data(void)
-+destroy_sensitive_data(int privsep)
- {
- 	int i;
-+	pid_t pid;
-+	uid_t uid;
- 
- 	if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
- 		key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
- 		sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
- 	}
-+	pid = getpid();
-+	uid = getuid();
- 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
- 		if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
-+			char *fp;
-+
-+			if (key_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]))
-+				fp = key_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i],
-+					FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5,
-+					SSH_FP_HEX);
-+			else
-+				fp = NULL;
- 			key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
- 			sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
-+			if (fp != NULL) {
-+				if (privsep)
-+					PRIVSEP(audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp,
-+						pid, uid));
-+				else
-+					audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp,
-+						pid, uid);
-+				xfree(fp);
-+			}
- 		}
--		if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) {
-+		if (sensitive_data.host_certificates
-+		    && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) {
- 			key_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]);
- 			sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
- 		}
-@@ -563,6 +597,8 @@ void
- demote_sensitive_data(void)
- {
- 	Key *tmp;
-+	pid_t pid;
-+	uid_t uid;
- 	int i;
- 
- 	if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
-@@ -571,13 +607,27 @@ demote_sensitive_data(void)
- 		sensitive_data.server_key = tmp;
- 	}
- 
-+	pid = getpid();
-+	uid = getuid();
- 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
- 		if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
-+			char *fp;
-+
-+			if (key_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]))
-+				fp = key_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i],
-+					FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5,
-+					SSH_FP_HEX);
-+			else
-+				fp = NULL;
- 			tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
- 			key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
- 			sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
- 			if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1)
- 				sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp;
-+			if (fp != NULL) {
-+				audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid);
-+				xfree(fp);
-+			}
- 		}
- 		/* Certs do not need demotion */
- 	}
-@@ -1149,6 +1199,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
- 		if (received_sigterm) {
- 			logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
- 			    (int) received_sigterm);
-+			destroy_sensitive_data(0);
- 			close_listen_socks();
- 			unlink(options.pid_file);
- 			exit(received_sigterm == SIGTERM ? 0 : 255);
-@@ -2054,7 +2105,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		privsep_postauth(authctxt);
- 		/* the monitor process [priv] will not return */
- 		if (!compat20)
--			destroy_sensitive_data();
-+			destroy_sensitive_data(0);
- 	}
- 
- 	packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval,
-@@ -2065,6 +2116,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 
- 	/* The connection has been terminated. */
- 	packet_destroy_all(1, 1);
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(1);
- 
- 	packet_get_state(MODE_IN, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ibytes);
- 	packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, NULL, NULL, NULL, &obytes);
-@@ -2293,7 +2345,7 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
- 			session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16];
- 	}
- 	/* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */
--	destroy_sensitive_data();
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(0);
- 
- 	if (use_privsep)
- 		mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id);
-@@ -2404,6 +2456,8 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
- 		}
- 	}
- 	is_privsep_child = use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && !mm_is_monitor();
-+	if (sensitive_data.host_keys != NULL)
-+		destroy_sensitive_data(is_privsep_child);
- 	packet_destroy_all(1, is_privsep_child);
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- 	/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */

openssh-6.0p1-entropy.patch

@@ -1,272 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.0p1/entropy.c.entropy openssh-6.0p1/entropy.c
---- openssh-6.0p1/entropy.c.entropy	2012-08-06 20:51:59.131033413 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.0p1/entropy.c	2012-08-06 20:51:59.171033257 +0200
-@@ -237,6 +237,9 @@ seed_rng(void)
- 	memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
- 
- #endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
-+#ifdef __linux__
-+	linux_seed();
-+#endif /* __linux__ */
- 	if (RAND_status() != 1)
- 		fatal("PRNG is not seeded");
- }
-diff -up openssh-6.0p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.entropy openssh-6.0p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
---- openssh-6.0p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.entropy	2012-08-06 20:51:59.100033534 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.0p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in	2012-08-06 20:51:59.171033257 +0200
-@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bindresvport
- 
- COMPAT=bsd-arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o
- 
--PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux_part_2.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
-+PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux_part_2.o port-linux-prng.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
- 
- .c.o:
- 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
-diff -up openssh-6.0p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c.entropy openssh-6.0p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
---- openssh-6.0p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c.entropy	2012-08-06 20:51:59.171033257 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.0p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c	2012-08-06 20:51:59.171033257 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
-+/* $Id: port-linux.c,v 1.11.4.2 2011/02/04 00:43:08 djm Exp $ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
-+ *
-+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
-+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
-+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
-+ *
-+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
-+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
-+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
-+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
-+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
-+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
-+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
-+ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * Linux-specific portability code - prng support
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#include <errno.h>
-+#include <stdarg.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <openssl/rand.h>
-+
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "servconf.h"
-+#include "port-linux.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "hostfile.h"
-+#include "auth.h"
-+
-+void
-+linux_seed(void)
-+{
-+	int len;
-+	char *env = getenv("SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG");
-+	char *random = "/dev/random";
-+	size_t ienv, randlen = 6;
-+
-+	if (!env || !strcmp(env, "0"))
-+		random = "/dev/urandom";
-+	else if ((ienv = atoi(env)) > 6)
-+		randlen = ienv;
-+
-+	errno = 0;
-+	if ((len = RAND_load_file(random, randlen)) != randlen) {
-+		if (errno)
-+			fatal ("cannot read from %s, %s", random, strerror(errno));
-+		else
-+			fatal ("EOF reading %s", random);
-+	}
-+}
-diff -up openssh-6.0p1/ssh.1.entropy openssh-6.0p1/ssh.1
---- openssh-6.0p1/ssh.1.entropy	2012-08-06 20:51:59.139033382 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.0p1/ssh.1	2012-08-06 20:51:59.174033245 +0200
-@@ -1269,6 +1269,23 @@ For more information, see the
- .Cm PermitUserEnvironment
- option in
- .Xr sshd_config 5 .
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-+.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm /dev/urandom .
-+If the 
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm /dev/random .
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
-+Minimum is 6 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
-+.El
- .Sh FILES
- .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
- .It Pa ~/.rhosts
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/ssh-add.0.entropy openssh-6.1p1/ssh-add.0
---- openssh-6.1p1/ssh-add.0.entropy	2012-11-12 13:11:42.717393364 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/ssh-add.0	2012-11-12 13:12:46.288108790 +0100
-@@ -81,6 +81,16 @@ ENVIRONMENT
-              Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to communicate
-              with the agent.
- 
-+     SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+             The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done
-+             from /dev/urandom.  If the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG environment vari-
-+             able is set to value other than 0 the OpenSSL random generator is
-+             reseeded from /dev/random.  The number of bytes read is defined
-+             by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.  Minimum is 6 bytes.  This set-
-+             ting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+             random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connec-
-+             tion to be blocked until enough entropy is available.
-+
- FILES
-      ~/.ssh/identity
-              Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/ssh-add.1.entropy openssh-6.1p1/ssh-add.1
---- openssh-6.1p1/ssh-add.1.entropy	2011-10-18 07:06:33.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/ssh-add.1	2012-11-12 13:11:24.711476108 +0100
-@@ -160,6 +160,20 @@ to make this work.)
- Identifies the path of a
- .Ux Ns -domain
- socket used to communicate with the agent.
-+.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm /dev/urandom .
-+If the 
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm /dev/random .
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
-+Minimum is 6 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
- .El
- .Sh FILES
- .Bl -tag -width Ds
- .It Pa ~/.ssh/identity
-diff -up openssh-6.0p1/ssh-agent.1.entropy openssh-6.0p1/ssh-agent.1
---- openssh-6.0p1/ssh-agent.1.entropy	2010-12-01 01:50:35.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.0p1/ssh-agent.1	2012-08-06 20:51:59.172033253 +0200
-@@ -198,6 +198,24 @@ sockets used to contain the connection t
- These sockets should only be readable by the owner.
- The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits.
- .El
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-+.Pp
-+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm /dev/urandom .
-+If the 
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm /dev/random .
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
-+Minimum is 6 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
-+.El
- .Sh SEE ALSO
- .Xr ssh 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
-diff -up openssh-6.0p1/sshd.8.entropy openssh-6.0p1/sshd.8
---- openssh-6.0p1/sshd.8.entropy	2012-08-06 20:51:59.139033382 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.0p1/sshd.8	2012-08-06 20:51:59.174033245 +0200
-@@ -943,6 +943,24 @@ concurrently for different ports, this c
- started last).
- The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
- .El
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-+.Pp
-+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm /dev/urandom .
-+If the 
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm /dev/random .
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
-+Minimum is 6 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
-+.El
- .Sh IPV6
- IPv6 address can be used everywhere where IPv4 address. In all entries must be the IPv6 address enclosed in square brackets. Note: The square brackets are metacharacters for the shell and must be escaped in shell.
- .Sh SEE ALSO
-diff -up openssh-6.0p1/ssh-keygen.1.entropy openssh-6.0p1/ssh-keygen.1
---- openssh-6.0p1/ssh-keygen.1.entropy	2011-10-18 07:05:21.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.0p1/ssh-keygen.1	2012-08-06 20:51:59.173033249 +0200
-@@ -675,6 +675,24 @@ Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for
- The file format is described in
- .Xr moduli 5 .
- .El
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-+.Pp
-+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm /dev/urandom .
-+If the 
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm /dev/random .
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
-+Minimum is 6 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
-+.El
- .Sh SEE ALSO
- .Xr ssh 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
-diff -up openssh-6.0p1/ssh-keysign.8.entropy openssh-6.0p1/ssh-keysign.8
---- openssh-6.0p1/ssh-keysign.8.entropy	2010-08-31 14:41:14.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.0p1/ssh-keysign.8	2012-08-06 20:51:59.173033249 +0200
-@@ -78,6 +78,24 @@ must be set-uid root if host-based authe
- If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate
- information corresponding with the private keys above.
- .El
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-+.Pp
-+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm /dev/urandom .
-+If the 
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm /dev/random .
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. 
-+Minimum is 6 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to 
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
-+.El
- .Sh SEE ALSO
- .Xr ssh 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,

openssh-6.1p1-akc.patch

@@ -1,565 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c.akc openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c.akc	2012-11-28 17:12:43.238524384 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c	2012-11-28 17:12:43.263524297 +0100
-@@ -27,9 +27,13 @@
- 
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <sys/stat.h>
-+#include <sys/wait.h>
- 
-+#include <errno.h>
- #include <fcntl.h>
-+#include <paths.h>
- #include <pwd.h>
-+#include <signal.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <string.h>
-@@ -260,7 +264,7 @@ match_principals_file(char *file, struct
- 			if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) == 0) {
- 				debug3("matched principal \"%.100s\" "
- 				    "from file \"%s\" on line %lu",
--			    	    cert->principals[i], file, linenum);
-+				    cert->principals[i], file, linenum);
- 				if (auth_parse_options(pw, line_opts,
- 				    file, linenum) != 1)
- 					continue;
-@@ -273,31 +277,22 @@ match_principals_file(char *file, struct
- 	fclose(f);
- 	restore_uid();
- 	return 0;
--}	
-+}
- 
--/* return 1 if user allows given key */
-+/*
-+ * Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file,
-+ * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
-+ */
- static int
--user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
-+check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
- {
- 	char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
- 	const char *reason;
- 	int found_key = 0;
--	FILE *f;
- 	u_long linenum = 0;
- 	Key *found;
- 	char *fp;
- 
--	/* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
--	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
--
--	debug("trying public key file %s", file);
--	f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes);
--
--	if (!f) {
--		restore_uid();
--		return 0;
--	}
--
- 	found_key = 0;
- 	found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type);
- 
-@@ -390,8 +385,6 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key
- 			break;
- 		}
- 	}
--	restore_uid();
--	fclose(f);
- 	key_free(found);
- 	if (!found_key)
- 		debug2("key not found");
-@@ -453,7 +446,173 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw,
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
--/* check whether given key is in .ssh/authorized_keys* */
-+/*
-+ * Checks whether key is allowed in file.
-+ * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
-+ */
-+static int
-+user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
-+{
-+	FILE *f;
-+	int found_key = 0;
-+
-+	/* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
-+	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-+
-+	debug("trying public key file %s", file);
-+	if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) != NULL) {
-+		found_key = check_authkeys_file(f, file, key, pw);
-+		fclose(f);
-+	}
-+
-+	restore_uid();
-+	return found_key;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Checks whether key is allowed in output of command.
-+ * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
-+ */
-+static int
-+user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
-+{
-+	FILE *f;
-+	int ok, found_key = 0;
-+	struct passwd *pw;
-+	struct stat st;
-+	int status, devnull, p[2], i;
-+	pid_t pid;
-+	char errmsg[512];
-+
-+	if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL ||
-+	    options.authorized_keys_command[0] != '/')
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	/* If no user specified to run commands the default to target user */
-+	if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL)
-+		pw = user_pw;
-+	else {
-+		pw = getpwnam(options.authorized_keys_command_user);
-+		if (pw == NULL) {
-+			error("AuthorizedKeyCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
-+			    options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
-+			return 0;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-+	if (stat(options.authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) {
-+		error("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s",
-+		    options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (auth_secure_path(options.authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0,
-+	    errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
-+		error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* open the pipe and read the keys */
-+	if (pipe(p) != 0) {
-+		error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+		goto out;
-+ 	}
-+
-+	debug3("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\"",
-+	    options.authorized_keys_command, pw->pw_name);
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
-+	 * run cleanup_exit() code.
-+	 */
-+	restore_uid();
-+
-+	switch ((pid = fork())) {
-+	case -1: /* error */
-+		error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+		close(p[0]);
-+		close(p[1]);
-+		return 0;
-+	case 0: /* child */
-+		for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
-+			signal(i, SIG_DFL);
-+
-+		/* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
-+		if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
-+			error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
-+			    strerror(errno));
-+			_exit(1);
-+		}
-+		if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
-+			error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
-+			    strerror(errno));
-+			_exit(1);
-+		}
-+
-+		close(p[0]);
-+		if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
-+			error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
-+			    strerror(errno));
-+			_exit(1);
-+		}
-+		if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
-+		    dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1 ||
-+		    dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
-+			error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+			_exit(1);
-+		}
-+		closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
-+
-+		execl(options.authorized_keys_command,
-+		    options.authorized_keys_command, pw->pw_name, NULL);
-+
-+		error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
-+		    options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
-+		_exit(127);
-+	default: /* parent */
-+		break;
-+	}
-+	
-+	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-+
-+	close(p[1]);
-+	if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
-+		error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+		close(p[0]);
-+		/* Don't leave zombie child */
-+		while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
-+			;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	ok = check_authkeys_file(f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw);
-+	fclose(f);
-+
-+	while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
-+		if (errno != EINTR) {
-+			error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+	}
-+	if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
-+		error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
-+		    options.authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status));
-+		goto out;
-+	} else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
-+		error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
-+		    options.authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status));
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	found_key = ok;
-+ out:
-+	restore_uid();
-+
-+	return found_key;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user.
-+ */
- int
- user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
- {
-@@ -469,6 +628,10 @@ user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key
- 	if (success)
- 		return success;
- 
-+	success = user_key_command_allowed2(pw, key);
-+	if (success > 0)
-+		return success;
-+
- 	for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) {
- 		file = expand_authorized_keys(
- 		    options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw);
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth.c.akc openssh-6.1p1/auth.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/auth.c.akc	2012-11-28 17:12:43.187524558 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/auth.c	2012-11-28 17:12:43.263524297 +0100
-@@ -411,39 +411,41 @@ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw
- 
- 
- /*
-- * Check a given file for security. This is defined as all components
-+ * Check a given path for security. This is defined as all components
-  * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of
-  * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
-  *
-  * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
-  *
-- * Takes an open file descriptor, the file name, a uid and and
-+ * Takes an the file name, its stat information (preferably from fstat() to
-+ * avoid races), the uid of the expected owner, their home directory and an
-  * error buffer plus max size as arguments.
-  *
-  * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
-  */
--static int
--secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
--    char *err, size_t errlen)
-+int
-+auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
-+    uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen)
- {
--	uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid;
- 	char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN];
- 	char *cp;
- 	int comparehome = 0;
- 	struct stat st;
- 
--	if (realpath(file, buf) == NULL) {
--		snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", file,
-+	if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
-+		snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
- 		    strerror(errno));
- 		return -1;
- 	}
--	if (realpath(pw->pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
-+	if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
- 		comparehome = 1;
- 
--	/* check the open file to avoid races */
--	if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0 ||
--	    (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
--	    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
-+	if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) {
-+		snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+	if ((stp->st_uid != 0 && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
-+	    (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) {
- 		snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
- 		    buf);
- 		return -1;
-@@ -479,6 +481,31 @@ secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *fil
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * Version of secure_path() that accepts an open file descriptor to
-+ * avoid races.
-+ *
-+ * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
-+ */
-+static int
-+secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
-+    char *err, size_t errlen)
-+{
-+	uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid;
-+	char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN];
-+	char *cp;
-+	int comparehome = 0;
-+	struct stat st;
-+
-+	/* check the open file to avoid races */
-+	if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0) {
-+		snprintf(err, errlen, "cannot stat file %s: %s",
-+		    buf, strerror(errno));
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+	return auth_secure_path(file, &st, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, err, errlen);
-+}
-+
- static FILE *
- auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes,
-     int log_missing, char *file_type)
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth.h.akc openssh-6.1p1/auth.h
---- openssh-6.1p1/auth.h.akc	2012-11-28 17:12:43.239524381 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/auth.h	2012-11-28 17:12:43.263524297 +0100
-@@ -125,6 +125,10 @@ int	 auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct
- int	 hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *, Key *);
- int	 user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);
- 
-+struct stat;
-+int	 auth_secure_path(const char *, struct stat *, const char *, uid_t,
-+    char *, size_t);
-+
- #ifdef KRB5
- int	auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client, krb5_data *);
- int	auth_krb5_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *tgt);
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c.akc openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c.akc	2012-11-28 17:12:43.198524521 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c	2012-11-28 17:14:50.314005026 +0100
-@@ -137,6 +137,8 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
- 	options->num_permitted_opens = -1;
- 	options->adm_forced_command = NULL;
- 	options->chroot_directory = NULL;
-+	options->authorized_keys_command = NULL;
-+	options->authorized_keys_command_user = NULL;
- 	options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = -1;
- 	options->revoked_keys_file = NULL;
- 	options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL;
-@@ -331,6 +333,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate,
- 	sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
- 	sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
-+	sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser,
- 	sAuthenticationMethods,
- 	sDeprecated, sUnsupported
- } ServerOpCodes;
-@@ -457,6 +460,9 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+	{ "authorizedkeyscommandrunas", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+	{ "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
- };
-@@ -1520,6 +1526,26 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 		}
- 		return 0;
- 
-+	case sAuthorizedKeysCommand:
-+		len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
-+		if (*activep && options->authorized_keys_command == NULL) {
-+			options->authorized_keys_command = xstrdup(cp + len);
-+			if (*options->authorized_keys_command != '/') {
-+				fatal("%.200s line %d: AuthorizedKeysCommand "
-+				    "must be an absolute path",
-+				    filename, linenum);
-+			}
-+		}
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	case sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser:
-+		charptr = &options->authorized_keys_command_user;
-+
-+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
-+		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
-+			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
-+		break;
-+
- 	case sDeprecated:
- 		logit("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s",
- 		    filename, linenum, arg);
-@@ -1670,6 +1696,8 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(kbd_interactive_authentication);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(zero_knowledge_password_authentication);
-+	M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command);
-+	M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command_user);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_root_login);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_empty_passwd);
- 
-@@ -1930,6 +1958,8 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- 	dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
- 	    o->authorized_principals_file);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sVersionAddendum, o->version_addendum);
-+	dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommand, o->authorized_keys_command);
-+	dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, o->authorized_keys_command_user);
- 
- 	/* string arguments requiring a lookup */
- 	dump_cfg_string(sLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level));
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h.akc openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h
---- openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h.akc	2012-11-28 17:12:43.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h	2012-11-28 17:18:41.217055157 +0100
-@@ -167,6 +167,8 @@ typedef struct {
- 	char   *revoked_keys_file;
- 	char   *trusted_user_ca_keys;
- 	char   *authorized_principals_file;
-+	char   *authorized_keys_command;
-+	char   *authorized_keys_command_user;
- 
- 	char   *version_addendum;	/* Appended to SSH banner */
- 
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.akc openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.akc	2012-11-28 17:12:43.245524360 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c	2012-11-28 17:12:43.265524291 +0100
-@@ -366,9 +366,20 @@ main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
- static void
- grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
- {
-+	pid_t pgid;
-+
- 	if (use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 0)
- 		kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGALRM);
- 
-+	/*
-+	 * Try to kill any processes that we have spawned, E.g. authorized
-+	 * keys command helpers.
-+	 */
-+	if ((pgid = getpgid(0)) == getpid()) {
-+		signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN);
-+		killpg(pgid, SIGTERM);
-+	}
-+
- 	/* Log error and exit. */
- 	sigdie("Timeout before authentication for %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
- }
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0.akc openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0
---- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0.akc	2012-08-29 02:53:04.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0	2012-11-28 17:12:43.265524291 +0100
-@@ -71,6 +71,23 @@ DESCRIPTION
- 
-              See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.
- 
-+     AuthorizedKeysCommand
-+
-+             Specifies a program to be used for lookup of the user's
-+	     public keys.  The program will be invoked with its first
-+	     argument the name of the user being authorized, and should produce
-+	     on standard output AuthorizedKeys lines (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS
-+	     in sshd(8)).  By default (or when set to the empty string) there is no
-+	     AuthorizedKeysCommand run.  If the AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully
-+	     authorize the user, authorization falls through to the
-+	     AuthorizedKeysFile.  Note that this option has an effect
-+	     only with PubkeyAuthentication turned on.
-+
-+     AuthorizedKeysCommandRunAs
-+             Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedKeysCommand is run.
-+             Empty string (the default value) means the user being authorized
-+             is used.
-+
-      AuthorizedKeysFile
-              Specifies the file that contains the public keys that can be used
-              for user authentication.  The format is described in the
-@@ -402,7 +419,8 @@ DESCRIPTION
-              Only a subset of keywords may be used on the lines following a
-              Match keyword.  Available keywords are AcceptEnv,
-              AllowAgentForwarding, AllowGroups, AllowTcpForwarding,
--             AllowUsers, AuthorizedKeysFile, AuthorizedPrincipalsFile, Banner,
-+             AllowUsers, AuthorizedKeysFile, AuthorizedKeysCommand,
-+             AuthorizedKeysCommandRunAs, AuthorizedPrincipalsFile, Banner,
-              ChrootDirectory, DenyGroups, DenyUsers, ForceCommand,
-              GatewayPorts, GSSAPIAuthentication, HostbasedAuthentication,
-              HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, KbdInteractiveAuthentication,
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5.akc openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5.akc	2012-11-28 17:12:43.199524517 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5	2012-11-28 17:16:23.736624980 +0100
-@@ -173,6 +173,20 @@ Note that each authentication method lis
- in the configuration.
- The default is not to require multiple authentication; successful completion
- of a single authentication method is sufficient.
-+.It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
-+Specifies a program to be used for lookup of the user's public keys.
-+The program will be invoked with a single argument of the username
-+being authenticated, and should produce on standard output zero or
-+more lines of authorized_keys output (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS in
-+.Xr sshd 8 )
-+If a key supplied by AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully authenticate
-+and authorize the user then public key authentication continues using the usual
-+.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
-+files.
-+By default, no AuthorizedKeysCommand is run.
-+.It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser
-+Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedKeysCommand is run.
-+The default is the user being authenticated.
- .It Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
- Specifies the file that contains the public keys that can be used
- for user authentication.
-@@ -734,6 +748,8 @@ Available keywords are
- .Cm AllowTcpForwarding ,
- .Cm AllowUsers ,
- .Cm AuthenticationMethods ,
-+.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand ,
-+.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ,
- .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile ,
- .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile ,
- .Cm Banner ,
-@@ -749,6 +765,7 @@ Available keywords are
- .Cm KerberosAuthentication ,
- .Cm MaxAuthTries ,
- .Cm MaxSessions ,
-+.Cm PubkeyAuthentication ,
- .Cm PasswordAuthentication ,
- .Cm PermitEmptyPasswords ,
- .Cm PermitOpen ,
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.akc openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config
---- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.akc	2012-07-31 04:21:34.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config	2012-11-28 17:12:43.265524291 +0100
-@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@
- # but this is overridden so installations will only check .ssh/authorized_keys
- AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
- 
-+#AuthorizedKeysCommand none
-+#AuthorizedKeysCommandUser nobody
-+
- #AuthorizedPrincipalsFile none
- 
- # For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts

openssh-6.1p1-askpass-ld.patch

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/contrib/Makefile.askpass-ld openssh-6.1p1/contrib/Makefile
---- openssh-6.1p1/contrib/Makefile.askpass-ld	2012-05-19 07:24:37.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/contrib/Makefile	2012-09-14 20:35:47.565704718 +0200
-@@ -4,12 +4,12 @@ all:
- 	@echo "Valid targets: gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass2"
- 
- gnome-ssh-askpass1: gnome-ssh-askpass1.c
--	$(CC) `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \
-+	$(CC) ${CFLAGS} `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \
- 		gnome-ssh-askpass1.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass1 \
- 		`gnome-config --libs gnome gnomeui`
- 
- gnome-ssh-askpass2: gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
--	$(CC) `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags gtk+-2.0` \
-+	$(CC) ${CFLAGS} `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags gtk+-2.0` \
- 		gnome-ssh-askpass2.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass2 \
- 		`$(PKG_CONFIG) --libs gtk+-2.0 x11`
- 

openssh-6.1p1-audit4.patch

@@ -1,672 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/audit-bsm.c.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/audit-bsm.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/audit-bsm.c.audit4	2012-11-28 14:20:38.990185823 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/audit-bsm.c	2012-11-28 14:20:38.995185800 +0100
-@@ -485,4 +485,10 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char
- {
- 	/* not implemented */
- }
-+
-+void
-+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	/* not implemented */
-+}
- #endif /* BSM */
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/audit.c.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/audit.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/audit.c.audit4	2012-11-28 14:20:38.990185823 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/audit.c	2012-11-28 14:20:38.995185800 +0100
-@@ -143,6 +143,12 @@ audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac
- 	PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, getpid(), getuid()));
- }
- 
-+void
-+audit_session_key_free(int ctos)
-+{
-+	PRIVSEP(audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, getpid(), getuid()));
-+}
-+
- # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- /*
-  * Null implementations of audit functions.
-@@ -274,5 +280,15 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char
- 		(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, (long)pid,
- 	        (unsigned)uid);
- }
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called on succesfull session key discard
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u",
-+		(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
-+}
- # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/audit.h.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/audit.h
---- openssh-6.1p1/audit.h.audit4	2012-11-28 14:20:38.990185823 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/audit.h	2012-11-28 14:20:38.995185800 +0100
-@@ -62,5 +62,7 @@ void	audit_unsupported(int);
- void	audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *);
- void	audit_unsupported_body(int);
- void	audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
-+void	audit_session_key_free(int ctos);
-+void	audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
- 
- #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/audit-linux.c.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/audit-linux.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/audit-linux.c.audit4	2012-11-28 14:20:38.990185823 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/audit-linux.c	2012-11-28 14:20:38.995185800 +0100
-@@ -294,6 +294,8 @@ audit_unsupported_body(int what)
- #endif
- }
- 
-+const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
-+
- void
- audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
- 	       uid_t uid)
-@@ -301,7 +303,6 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char
- #ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
- 	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
- 	int audit_fd, audit_ok;
--	const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
- 	Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc);
- 	char *s;
- 
-@@ -327,4 +328,32 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char
- #endif
- }
- 
-+void
-+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
-+	int audit_fd, audit_ok;
-+	char *s;
-+
-+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=session fp=? direction=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
-+		 direction[ctos], (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid,
-+		 get_remote_port(),
-+		 (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())),
-+		 get_local_port());
-+	xfree(s);
-+	audit_fd = audit_open();
-+	if (audit_fd < 0) {
-+		if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
-+					 errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
-+			error("cannot open audit");
-+		return;
-+	}
-+	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
-+			buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1);
-+	audit_close(audit_fd);
-+	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
-+	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
-+		error("cannot write into audit");
-+}
-+
- #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auditstub.c.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/auditstub.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/auditstub.c.audit4	2012-11-28 14:20:38.990185823 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/auditstub.c	2012-11-28 14:20:38.995185800 +0100
-@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
-  * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
-  */
- 
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+
- void
- audit_unsupported(int n)
- {
-@@ -37,3 +39,12 @@ audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac
- {
- }
- 
-+void
-+audit_session_key_free(int ctos)
-+{
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+}
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/kex.c.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/kex.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/kex.c.audit4	2012-11-28 14:20:38.991185818 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/kex.c	2012-11-28 14:20:38.995185800 +0100
-@@ -624,3 +624,34 @@ dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, i
- 	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- }
- #endif
-+
-+static void
-+enc_destroy(Enc *enc)
-+{
-+	if (enc == NULL)
-+		return;
-+
-+	if (enc->key) {
-+		memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len);
-+		xfree(enc->key);
-+	}
-+
-+	if (enc->iv) {
-+		memset(enc->iv,  0, enc->block_size);
-+		xfree(enc->iv);
-+	}
-+
-+	memset(enc, 0, sizeof(*enc));
-+}
-+
-+void
-+newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys)
-+{
-+	if (newkeys == NULL)
-+		return;
-+
-+	enc_destroy(&newkeys->enc);
-+	mac_destroy(&newkeys->mac);
-+	memset(&newkeys->comp, 0, sizeof(newkeys->comp));
-+}
-+
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/kex.h.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/kex.h
---- openssh-6.1p1/kex.h.audit4	2010-09-24 14:11:14.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/kex.h	2012-11-28 14:20:38.996185795 +0100
-@@ -156,6 +156,8 @@ void	 kexgex_server(Kex *);
- void	 kexecdh_client(Kex *);
- void	 kexecdh_server(Kex *);
- 
-+void	newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys);
-+
- void
- kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,
-     BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/mac.c.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/mac.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/mac.c.audit4	2012-06-30 00:34:59.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/mac.c	2012-11-28 14:20:38.996185795 +0100
-@@ -169,6 +169,20 @@ mac_clear(Mac *mac)
- 	mac->umac_ctx = NULL;
- }
- 
-+void
-+mac_destroy(Mac *mac)
-+{
-+	if (mac == NULL)
-+		return;
-+
-+	if (mac->key) {
-+		memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len);
-+		xfree(mac->key);
-+	}
-+
-+	memset(mac, 0, sizeof(*mac));
-+}
-+
- /* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */
- #define	MAC_SEP	","
- int
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/mac.h.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/mac.h
---- openssh-6.1p1/mac.h.audit4	2007-06-11 06:01:42.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/mac.h	2012-11-28 14:20:38.996185795 +0100
-@@ -28,3 +28,4 @@ int	 mac_setup(Mac *, char *);
- int	 mac_init(Mac *);
- u_char	*mac_compute(Mac *, u_int32_t, u_char *, int);
- void	 mac_clear(Mac *);
-+void	 mac_destroy(Mac *);
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/monitor.c.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/monitor.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/monitor.c.audit4	2012-11-28 14:20:38.992185813 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/monitor.c	2012-11-28 17:02:17.677045093 +0100
-@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer
- int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *);
-+int mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int, Buffer *);
- #endif
- 
- static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
-@@ -241,6 +242,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
- #endif
- #ifdef BSD_AUTH
-     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
-@@ -280,6 +282,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
- #endif
-     {0, 0, NULL}
- };
-@@ -313,6 +316,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[]
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
- #endif
-     {0, 0, NULL}
- };
-@@ -327,6 +331,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
- #endif
-     {0, 0, NULL}
- };
-@@ -448,10 +453,6 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
- #endif
- 	}
- 
--	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
--	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
--		;
--
- 	if (!authctxt->valid)
- 		fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
- 	if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
-@@ -1950,11 +1951,13 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor
- 
- 	blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
- 	current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
-+	memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
- 	xfree(blob);
- 
- 	debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __func__);
- 	blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
- 	current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
-+	memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
- 	xfree(blob);
- 
- 	/* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */
-@@ -2000,6 +2003,21 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor
- 	}
- 
- 	buffer_free(&m);
-+
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	if (compat20) {
-+		buffer_init(&m);
-+		mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd,
-+					  MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m);
-+		mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
-+		buffer_free(&m);
-+	}
-+#endif
-+
-+	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
-+	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
-+		;
-+
- }
- 
- 
-@@ -2444,4 +2462,22 @@ mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, Buffe
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-+int
-+mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
-+{
-+	int ctos;
-+	pid_t pid;
-+	uid_t uid;
-+
-+	ctos = buffer_get_int(m);
-+	pid = buffer_get_int64(m);
-+	uid = buffer_get_int64(m);
-+
-+	audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, pid, uid);
-+
-+	buffer_clear(m);
-+
-+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m);
-+	return 0;
-+}
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/monitor.h.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/monitor.h
---- openssh-6.1p1/monitor.h.audit4	2012-11-28 14:20:38.992185813 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/monitor.h	2012-11-28 14:20:38.997185790 +0100
-@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
- 	MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX,
-+	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_TERM,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA,
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit4	2012-11-28 14:20:38.992185813 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.c	2012-11-28 14:20:38.997185790 +0100
-@@ -653,12 +653,14 @@ mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor
- 		fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__);
- 
- 	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);
-+	memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
- 	xfree(blob);
- 
- 	if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_IN, &blob, &bloblen))
- 		fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__);
- 
- 	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);
-+	memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
- 	xfree(blob);
- 
- 	packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, &seqnr, &blocks, &packets, &bytes);
-@@ -1522,4 +1524,19 @@ mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher
- 
- 	buffer_free(&m);
- }
-+
-+void
-+mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	Buffer m;
-+
-+	buffer_init(&m);
-+	buffer_put_int(&m, ctos);
-+	buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
-+	buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
-+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m);
-+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE,
-+				  &m);
-+	buffer_free(&m);
-+}
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.h
---- openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit4	2012-11-28 14:20:38.992185813 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.h	2012-11-28 14:20:38.997185790 +0100
-@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ int mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
- void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *);
- void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
- void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
-+void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t);
- #endif
- 
- struct Session;
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/packet.c.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/packet.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/packet.c.audit4	2012-11-28 14:20:38.973185902 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/packet.c	2012-11-28 14:20:38.998185785 +0100
-@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
- #include <signal.h>
- 
- #include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "audit.h"
- #include "buffer.h"
- #include "packet.h"
- #include "crc32.h"
-@@ -470,6 +471,13 @@ packet_get_connection_out(void)
- 	return active_state->connection_out;
- }
- 
-+static int
-+packet_state_has_keys (const struct session_state *state)
-+{
-+	return state != NULL &&
-+		(state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL || state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL);
-+}
-+
- /* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */
- 
- void
-@@ -478,13 +486,6 @@ packet_close(void)
- 	if (!active_state->initialized)
- 		return;
- 	active_state->initialized = 0;
--	if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) {
--		shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
--		close(active_state->connection_out);
--	} else {
--		close(active_state->connection_in);
--		close(active_state->connection_out);
--	}
- 	buffer_free(&active_state->input);
- 	buffer_free(&active_state->output);
- 	buffer_free(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
-@@ -493,8 +494,18 @@ packet_close(void)
- 		buffer_free(&active_state->compression_buffer);
- 		buffer_compress_uninit();
- 	}
--	cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context);
--	cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context);
-+	if (packet_state_has_keys(active_state)) {
-+		cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context);
-+		cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context);
-+		audit_session_key_free(2);
-+	}
-+	if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) {
-+		shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
-+		close(active_state->connection_out);
-+	} else {
-+		close(active_state->connection_in);
-+		close(active_state->connection_out);
-+	}
- }
- 
- /* Sets remote side protocol flags. */
-@@ -729,6 +740,23 @@ packet_send1(void)
- 	 */
- }
- 
-+static void
-+newkeys_destroy_and_free(Newkeys *newkeys)
-+{
-+	if (newkeys == NULL)
-+		return;
-+
-+	xfree(newkeys->enc.name);
-+
-+	mac_clear(&newkeys->mac);
-+	xfree(newkeys->mac.name);
-+
-+	xfree(newkeys->comp.name);
-+
-+	newkeys_destroy(newkeys);
-+	xfree(newkeys);
-+}
-+
- void
- set_newkeys(int mode)
- {
-@@ -754,18 +782,9 @@ set_newkeys(int mode)
- 	}
- 	if (active_state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) {
- 		debug("set_newkeys: rekeying");
-+		audit_session_key_free(mode);
- 		cipher_cleanup(cc);
--		enc  = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
--		mac  = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
--		comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
--		mac_clear(mac);
--		xfree(enc->name);
--		xfree(enc->iv);
--		xfree(enc->key);
--		xfree(mac->name);
--		xfree(mac->key);
--		xfree(comp->name);
--		xfree(active_state->newkeys[mode]);
-+		newkeys_destroy_and_free(active_state->newkeys[mode]);
- 	}
- 	active_state->newkeys[mode] = kex_get_newkeys(mode);
- 	if (active_state->newkeys[mode] == NULL)
-@@ -1921,6 +1940,47 @@ packet_get_newkeys(int mode)
- 	return (void *)active_state->newkeys[mode];
- }
- 
-+static void
-+packet_destroy_state(struct session_state *state)
-+{
-+	if (state == NULL)
-+		return;
-+
-+	cipher_cleanup(&state->receive_context);
-+	cipher_cleanup(&state->send_context);
-+
-+	buffer_free(&state->input);
-+	buffer_free(&state->output);
-+	buffer_free(&state->outgoing_packet);
-+	buffer_free(&state->incoming_packet);
-+	buffer_free(&state->compression_buffer);
-+	newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_IN]);
-+	state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = NULL;
-+	newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]);
-+	state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
-+	mac_destroy(state->packet_discard_mac);
-+//	TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing;
-+//	memset(state, 0, sizeof(state));
-+}
-+
-+void
-+packet_destroy_all(int audit_it, int privsep)
-+{
-+	if (audit_it)
-+		audit_it = packet_state_has_keys (active_state) ||
-+			packet_state_has_keys (backup_state);
-+	packet_destroy_state(active_state);
-+	packet_destroy_state(backup_state);
-+	if (audit_it) {
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+		if (privsep)
-+			audit_session_key_free(2);
-+		else
-+			audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid());
-+#endif
-+	}
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Save the state for the real connection, and use a separate state when
-  * resuming a suspended connection.
-@@ -1928,18 +1988,12 @@ packet_get_newkeys(int mode)
- void
- packet_backup_state(void)
- {
--	struct session_state *tmp;
--
- 	close(active_state->connection_in);
- 	active_state->connection_in = -1;
- 	close(active_state->connection_out);
- 	active_state->connection_out = -1;
--	if (backup_state)
--		tmp = backup_state;
--	else
--		tmp = alloc_session_state();
- 	backup_state = active_state;
--	active_state = tmp;
-+	active_state = alloc_session_state();
- }
- 
- /*
-@@ -1956,9 +2010,7 @@ packet_restore_state(void)
- 	backup_state = active_state;
- 	active_state = tmp;
- 	active_state->connection_in = backup_state->connection_in;
--	backup_state->connection_in = -1;
- 	active_state->connection_out = backup_state->connection_out;
--	backup_state->connection_out = -1;
- 	len = buffer_len(&backup_state->input);
- 	if (len > 0) {
- 		buf = buffer_ptr(&backup_state->input);
-@@ -1966,4 +2018,10 @@ packet_restore_state(void)
- 		buffer_clear(&backup_state->input);
- 		add_recv_bytes(len);
- 	}
-+	backup_state->connection_in = -1;
-+	backup_state->connection_out = -1;
-+	packet_destroy_state(backup_state);
-+	xfree(backup_state);
-+	backup_state = NULL;
- }
-+
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/packet.h.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/packet.h
---- openssh-6.1p1/packet.h.audit4	2012-02-10 22:19:21.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/packet.h	2012-11-28 14:20:38.998185785 +0100
-@@ -123,4 +123,5 @@ void	 packet_restore_state(void);
- void	*packet_get_input(void);
- void	*packet_get_output(void);
- 
-+void	 packet_destroy_all(int, int);
- #endif				/* PACKET_H */
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/session.c.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/session.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/session.c.audit4	2012-11-28 14:20:38.983185855 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/session.c	2012-11-28 14:20:38.998185785 +0100
-@@ -1634,6 +1634,9 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
- 
- 	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
- 	destroy_sensitive_data();
-+	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
-+	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
-+	packet_destroy_all(0, 1);
- 
- 	/* Force a password change */
- 	if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.audit4 openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.audit4	2012-11-28 14:20:38.993185808 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c	2012-11-28 14:20:38.999185780 +0100
-@@ -692,6 +692,8 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 	}
- }
- 
-+extern Newkeys *current_keys[];
-+
- static void
- privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- {
-@@ -716,6 +718,10 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 	else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
- 		verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
- 		buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
-+ 		newkeys_destroy(current_keys[MODE_OUT]);
-+		newkeys_destroy(current_keys[MODE_IN]);
-+		audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid());
-+		packet_destroy_all(0, 0);
- 		monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor);
- 
- 		/* NEVERREACHED */
-@@ -2016,6 +2022,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	 */
- 	if (use_privsep) {
- 		mm_send_keystate(pmonitor);
-+		packet_destroy_all(1, 1);
- 		exit(0);
- 	}
- 
-@@ -2068,6 +2075,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	do_authenticated(authctxt);
- 
- 	/* The connection has been terminated. */
-+	packet_destroy_all(1, 1);
-+
- 	packet_get_state(MODE_IN, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ibytes);
- 	packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, NULL, NULL, NULL, &obytes);
- 	verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes",
-@@ -2385,6 +2394,16 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
- void
- cleanup_exit(int i)
- {
-+	static int in_cleanup = 0;
-+	int is_privsep_child;
-+
-+	/* cleanup_exit can be called at the very least from the privsep
-+	   wrappers used for auditing.  Make sure we don't recurse
-+	   indefinitely. */
-+	if (in_cleanup)
-+		_exit(i);
-+	in_cleanup = 1;
-+
- 	if (the_authctxt) {
- 		do_cleanup(the_authctxt);
- 		if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) {
-@@ -2395,6 +2414,8 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
- 				    pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno));
- 		}
- 	}
-+	is_privsep_child = use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && !mm_is_monitor();
-+	packet_destroy_all(1, is_privsep_child);
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- 	/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
- 	if ((the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) &&

openssh-6.1p1-authenticationmethods.patch

@@ -1,841 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
-index ee0cb05..1b2fc2b 100644
---- a/auth.c
-+++ b/auth.c
-@@ -251,7 +251,8 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
- }
- 
- void
--auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
-+auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial,
-+    const char *method, const char *submethod, const char *info)
- {
- 	void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
- 	char *authmsg;
-@@ -268,12 +269,15 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
- 
- 	if (authctxt->postponed)
- 		authmsg = "Postponed";
-+	else if (partial)
-+		authmsg = "Partial";
- 	else
- 		authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
- 
--	authlog("%s %s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s",
-+	authlog("%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s",
- 	    authmsg,
- 	    method,
-+	    submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod,
- 	    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
- 	    authctxt->user,
- 	    get_remote_ipaddr(),
-@@ -303,7 +307,7 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
-  * Check whether root logins are disallowed.
-  */
- int
--auth_root_allowed(char *method)
-+auth_root_allowed(const char *method)
- {
- 	switch (options.permit_root_login) {
- 	case PERMIT_YES:
-diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
-index 0d786c4..29823bb 100644
---- a/auth.h
-+++ b/auth.h
-@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ struct Authctxt {
- #ifdef BSD_AUTH
- 	auth_session_t	*as;
- #endif
-+	char		**auth_methods;	/* modified from server config */
-+	u_int		 num_auth_methods;
- #ifdef KRB5
- 	krb5_context	 krb5_ctx;
- 	krb5_ccache	 krb5_fwd_ccache;
-@@ -142,12 +144,17 @@ void disable_forwarding(void);
- void	do_authentication(Authctxt *);
- void	do_authentication2(Authctxt *);
- 
--void	auth_log(Authctxt *, int, char *, char *);
--void	userauth_finish(Authctxt *, int, char *);
-+void	auth_log(Authctxt *, int, int, const char *, const char *,
-+    const char *);
-+void	userauth_finish(Authctxt *, int, const char *, const char *);
-+int	auth_root_allowed(const char *);
-+
- void	userauth_send_banner(const char *);
--int	auth_root_allowed(char *);
- 
- char	*auth2_read_banner(void);
-+int	 auth2_methods_valid(const char *, int);
-+int	 auth2_update_methods_lists(Authctxt *, const char *);
-+int	 auth2_setup_methods_lists(Authctxt *);
- 
- void	privsep_challenge_enable(void);
- 
-diff --git a/auth1.c b/auth1.c
-index cc85aec..458a110 100644
---- a/auth1.c
-+++ b/auth1.c
-@@ -253,7 +253,8 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 		if (options.use_pam && (PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())))
- #endif
- 		{
--			auth_log(authctxt, 1, "without authentication", "");
-+			auth_log(authctxt, 1, 0, "without authentication",
-+			    NULL, "");
- 			return;
- 		}
- 	}
-@@ -352,7 +353,8 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 
-  skip:
- 		/* Log before sending the reply */
--		auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, get_authname(type), info);
-+		auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, 0, get_authname(type),
-+		    NULL, info);
- 
- 		if (client_user != NULL) {
- 			xfree(client_user);
-@@ -406,6 +408,11 @@ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 		authctxt->pw = fakepw();
- 	}
- 
-+	/* Configuration may have changed as a result of Match */
-+	if (options.num_auth_methods != 0)
-+		fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported with SSH "
-+		    "protocol 1");
-+
- 	setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
- 	    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
- 
-diff --git a/auth2-chall.c b/auth2-chall.c
-index e6dbffe..5f7ec6d 100644
---- a/auth2-chall.c
-+++ b/auth2-chall.c
-@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
- 	KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
- 	int authenticated = 0, res;
- 	u_int i, nresp;
--	char **response = NULL, *method;
-+	char *devicename = NULL, **response = NULL;
- 
- 	if (authctxt == NULL)
- 		fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no authctxt");
-@@ -329,9 +329,7 @@ input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
- 		/* Failure! */
- 		break;
- 	}
--
--	xasprintf(&method, "keyboard-interactive/%s", kbdintctxt->device->name);
--
-+	devicename = kbdintctxt->device->name;
- 	if (!authctxt->postponed) {
- 		if (authenticated) {
- 			auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt);
-@@ -341,8 +339,8 @@ input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
- 			auth2_challenge_start(authctxt);
- 		}
- 	}
--	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method);
--	xfree(method);
-+	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "keyboard-interactive",
-+	    devicename);
- }
- 
- void
-diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
-index 0d59b21..338c748 100644
---- a/auth2-gss.c
-+++ b/auth2-gss.c
-@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
- 		}
- 		authctxt->postponed = 0;
- 		dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
--		userauth_finish(authctxt, 0, "gssapi-with-mic");
-+		userauth_finish(authctxt, 0, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
- 	} else {
- 		if (send_tok.length != 0) {
- 			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN);
-@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
- 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
- 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL);
- 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
--	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic");
-+	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
- }
- 
- static void
-@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
- 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
- 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL);
- 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
--	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic");
-+	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
- }
- 
- Authmethod method_gssapi = {
-diff --git a/auth2-jpake.c b/auth2-jpake.c
-index a460e82..e4ba9aa 100644
---- a/auth2-jpake.c
-+++ b/auth2-jpake.c
-@@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ input_userauth_jpake_client_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
- 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
- 	jpake_free(authctxt->jpake_ctx);
- 	authctxt->jpake_ctx = NULL;
--	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method_jpake.name);
-+	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method_jpake.name, NULL);
- }
- 
- #endif /* JPAKE */
-diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
-index b66bef6..ea0fd92 100644
---- a/auth2.c
-+++ b/auth2.c
-@@ -96,8 +96,10 @@ static void input_service_request(int, u_int32_t, void *);
- static void input_userauth_request(int, u_int32_t, void *);
- 
- /* helper */
--static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(const char *);
--static char *authmethods_get(void);
-+static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(Authctxt *, const char *);
-+static char *authmethods_get(Authctxt *authctxt);
-+static int method_allowed(Authctxt *, const char *);
-+static int list_starts_with(const char *, const char *);
- 
- char *
- auth2_read_banner(void)
-@@ -255,6 +257,8 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
- 		if (use_privsep)
- 			mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
- 		userauth_banner();
-+		if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
-+			packet_disconnect("no authentication methods enabled");
- 	} else if (strcmp(user, authctxt->user) != 0 ||
- 	    strcmp(service, authctxt->service) != 0) {
- 		packet_disconnect("Change of username or service not allowed: "
-@@ -277,12 +281,12 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
- 	authctxt->server_caused_failure = 0;
- 
- 	/* try to authenticate user */
--	m = authmethod_lookup(method);
-+	m = authmethod_lookup(authctxt, method);
- 	if (m != NULL && authctxt->failures < options.max_authtries) {
- 		debug2("input_userauth_request: try method %s", method);
- 		authenticated =	m->userauth(authctxt);
- 	}
--	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method);
-+	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method, NULL);
- 
- 	xfree(service);
- 	xfree(user);
-@@ -290,13 +294,17 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
- }
- 
- void
--userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
-+userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, const char *method,
-+    const char *submethod)
- {
- 	char *methods;
-+	int partial = 0;
- 
- 	if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated)
- 		fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s",
- 		    authctxt->user);
-+	if (authenticated && authctxt->postponed)
-+		fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated and postponed");
- 
- 	/* Special handling for root */
- 	if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
-@@ -307,6 +315,19 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
- #endif
- 	}
- 
-+	if (authenticated && options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
-+		if (!auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt, method)) {
-+			authenticated = 0;
-+			partial = 1;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	/* Log before sending the reply */
-+	auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial, method, submethod, " ssh2");
-+
-+	if (authctxt->postponed)
-+		return;
-+
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- 	if (options.use_pam && authenticated) {
- 		if (!PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())) {
-@@ -325,17 +346,10 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
- #ifdef _UNICOS
- 	if (authenticated && cray_access_denied(authctxt->user)) {
- 		authenticated = 0;
--		fatal("Access denied for user %s.",authctxt->user);
-+		fatal("Access denied for user %s.", authctxt->user);
- 	}
- #endif /* _UNICOS */
- 
--	/* Log before sending the reply */
--	auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, method, " ssh2");
--
--	if (authctxt->postponed)
--		return;
--
--	/* XXX todo: check if multiple auth methods are needed */
- 	if (authenticated == 1) {
- 		/* turn off userauth */
- 		dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, &dispatch_protocol_ignore);
-@@ -348,7 +362,8 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
- 
- 		/* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */
- 		if (!authctxt->server_caused_failure &&
--		    (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0))
-+		    (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0) &&
-+		    partial == 0)
- 			authctxt->failures++;
- 		if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) {
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-@@ -356,34 +371,61 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
- #endif
- 			packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user);
- 		}
--		methods = authmethods_get();
-+		methods = authmethods_get(authctxt);
-+		debug3("%s: failure partial=%d next methods=\"%s\"", __func__,
-+		    partial, methods);
- 		packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE);
- 		packet_put_cstring(methods);
--		packet_put_char(0);	/* XXX partial success, unused */
-+		packet_put_char(partial);
- 		packet_send();
- 		packet_write_wait();
- 		xfree(methods);
- 	}
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * Checks whether method is allowed by at least one AuthenticationMethods
-+ * methods list. Returns 1 if allowed, or no methods lists configured.
-+ * 0 otherwise.
-+ */
-+static int
-+method_allowed(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method)
-+{
-+	u_int i;
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * NB. authctxt->num_auth_methods might be zero as a result of
-+	 * auth2_setup_methods_lists(), so check the configuration.
-+	 */
-+	if (options.num_auth_methods == 0)
-+		return 1;
-+	for (i = 0; i < authctxt->num_auth_methods; i++) {
-+		if (list_starts_with(authctxt->auth_methods[i], method))
-+			return 1;
-+	}
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
- static char *
--authmethods_get(void)
-+authmethods_get(Authctxt *authctxt)
- {
- 	Buffer b;
- 	char *list;
--	int i;
-+	u_int i;
- 
- 	buffer_init(&b);
- 	for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) {
- 		if (strcmp(authmethods[i]->name, "none") == 0)
- 			continue;
--		if (authmethods[i]->enabled != NULL &&
--		    *(authmethods[i]->enabled) != 0) {
--			if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
--				buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
--			buffer_append(&b, authmethods[i]->name,
--			    strlen(authmethods[i]->name));
--		}
-+		if (authmethods[i]->enabled == NULL ||
-+		    *(authmethods[i]->enabled) == 0)
-+			continue;
-+		if (!method_allowed(authctxt, authmethods[i]->name))
-+			continue;
-+		if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
-+			buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
-+		buffer_append(&b, authmethods[i]->name,
-+		    strlen(authmethods[i]->name));
- 	}
- 	buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1);
- 	list = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b));
-@@ -392,7 +434,7 @@ authmethods_get(void)
- }
- 
- static Authmethod *
--authmethod_lookup(const char *name)
-+authmethod_lookup(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *name)
- {
- 	int i;
- 
-@@ -400,10 +442,152 @@ authmethod_lookup(const char *name)
- 		for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++)
- 			if (authmethods[i]->enabled != NULL &&
- 			    *(authmethods[i]->enabled) != 0 &&
--			    strcmp(name, authmethods[i]->name) == 0)
-+			    strcmp(name, authmethods[i]->name) == 0 &&
-+			    method_allowed(authctxt, authmethods[i]->name))
- 				return authmethods[i];
- 	debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s",
- 	    name ? name : "NULL");
- 	return NULL;
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * Check a comma-separated list of methods for validity. Is need_enable is
-+ * non-zero, then also require that the methods are enabled.
-+ * Returns 0 on success or -1 if the methods list is invalid.
-+ */
-+int
-+auth2_methods_valid(const char *_methods, int need_enable)
-+{
-+	char *methods, *omethods, *method;
-+	u_int i, found;
-+	int ret = -1;
-+
-+	if (*_methods == '\0') {
-+		error("empty authentication method list");
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+	omethods = methods = xstrdup(_methods);
-+	while ((method = strsep(&methods, ",")) != NULL) {
-+		for (found = i = 0; !found && authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) {
-+			if (strcmp(method, authmethods[i]->name) != 0)
-+				continue;
-+			if (need_enable) {
-+				if (authmethods[i]->enabled == NULL ||
-+				    *(authmethods[i]->enabled) == 0) {
-+					error("Disabled method \"%s\" in "
-+					    "AuthenticationMethods list \"%s\"",
-+					    method, _methods);
-+					goto out;
-+				}
-+			}
-+			found = 1;
-+			break;
-+		}
-+		if (!found) {
-+			error("Unknown authentication method \"%s\" in list",
-+			    method);
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+	}
-+	ret = 0;
-+ out:
-+	free(omethods);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Prune the AuthenticationMethods supplied in the configuration, removing
-+ * any methods lists that include disabled methods. Note that this might
-+ * leave authctxt->num_auth_methods == 0, even when multiple required auth
-+ * has been requested. For this reason, all tests for whether multiple is
-+ * enabled should consult options.num_auth_methods directly.
-+ */
-+int
-+auth2_setup_methods_lists(Authctxt *authctxt)
-+{
-+	u_int i;
-+
-+	if (options.num_auth_methods == 0)
-+		return 0;
-+	debug3("%s: checking methods", __func__);
-+	authctxt->auth_methods = xcalloc(options.num_auth_methods,
-+	    sizeof(*authctxt->auth_methods));
-+	authctxt->num_auth_methods = 0;
-+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_auth_methods; i++) {
-+		if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[i], 1) != 0) {
-+			logit("Authentication methods list \"%s\" contains "
-+			    "disabled method, skipping",
-+			    options.auth_methods[i]);
-+			continue;
-+		}
-+		debug("authentication methods list %d: %s",
-+		    authctxt->num_auth_methods, options.auth_methods[i]);
-+		authctxt->auth_methods[authctxt->num_auth_methods++] =
-+		    xstrdup(options.auth_methods[i]);
-+	}
-+	if (authctxt->num_auth_methods == 0) {
-+		error("No AuthenticationMethods left after eliminating "
-+		    "disabled methods");
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+list_starts_with(const char *methods, const char *method)
-+{
-+	size_t l = strlen(method);
-+
-+	if (strncmp(methods, method, l) != 0)
-+		return 0;
-+	if (methods[l] != ',' && methods[l] != '\0')
-+		return 0;
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Remove method from the start of a comma-separated list of methods.
-+ * Returns 0 if the list of methods did not start with that method or 1
-+ * if it did.
-+ */
-+static int
-+remove_method(char **methods, const char *method)
-+{
-+	char *omethods = *methods;
-+	size_t l = strlen(method);
-+
-+	if (!list_starts_with(omethods, method))
-+		return 0;
-+	*methods = xstrdup(omethods + l + (omethods[l] == ',' ? 1 : 0));
-+	free(omethods);
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Called after successful authentication. Will remove the successful method
-+ * from the start of each list in which it occurs. If it was the last method
-+ * in any list, then authentication is deemed successful.
-+ * Returns 1 if the method completed any authentication list or 0 otherwise.
-+ */
-+int
-+auth2_update_methods_lists(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method)
-+{
-+	u_int i, found = 0;
-+
-+	debug3("%s: updating methods list after \"%s\"", __func__, method);
-+	for (i = 0; i < authctxt->num_auth_methods; i++) {
-+		if (!remove_method(&(authctxt->auth_methods[i]), method))
-+			continue;
-+		found = 1;
-+		if (*authctxt->auth_methods[i] == '\0') {
-+			debug2("authentication methods list %d complete", i);
-+			return 1;
-+		}
-+		debug3("authentication methods list %d remaining: \"%s\"",
-+		    i, authctxt->auth_methods[i]);
-+	}
-+	/* This should not happen, but would be bad if it did */
-+	if (!found)
-+		fatal("%s: method not in AuthenticationMethods", __func__);
-+	return 0;
-+}
-diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
-index 1dc42f5..66f3eea 100644
---- a/monitor.c
-+++ b/monitor.c
-@@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
- static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
- static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
- static char *auth_method = "unknown";
-+static char *auth_submethod = NULL;
- static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
- static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
- static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
-@@ -352,7 +353,7 @@ void
- monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
- {
- 	struct mon_table *ent;
--	int authenticated = 0;
-+	int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
- 
- 	debug3("preauth child monitor started");
- 
-@@ -379,8 +380,26 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
- 
- 	/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
- 	while (!authenticated) {
-+		partial = 0;
- 		auth_method = "unknown";
-+		auth_submethod = NULL;
- 		authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
-+
-+		/* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
-+		if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
-+			if (!compat20)
-+				fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported"
-+				    "with SSH protocol 1");
-+			if (authenticated &&
-+			    !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
-+			    auth_method)) {
-+				debug3("%s: method %s: partial", __func__,
-+				    auth_method);
-+				authenticated = 0;
-+				partial = 1;
-+			}
-+		}
-+
- 		if (authenticated) {
- 			if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
- 				fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
-@@ -403,9 +422,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
- 		}
- 
- 		if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
--			auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, auth_method,
-+			auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial,
-+			    auth_method, auth_submethod,
- 			    compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
--			if (!authenticated)
-+			if (!authenticated && !partial)
- 				authctxt->failures++;
- 		}
- #ifdef JPAKE
-@@ -781,7 +801,17 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
- 	COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
- #undef M_CP_STROPT
- #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
--	
-+
-+	/* Create valid auth method lists */
-+	if (compat20 && auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
-+		/*
-+		 * The monitor will continue long enough to let the child
-+		 * run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
-+		 * authentication to succeed.
-+		 */
-+		debug("%s: no valid authentication method lists", __func__);
-+	}
-+
- 	debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
- 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
- 
-@@ -918,7 +948,11 @@ mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
- 	debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
- 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
- 
--	auth_method = "bsdauth";
-+	if (compat20)
-+		auth_method = "keyboard-interactive"; /* XXX auth_submethod */
-+	else
-+		auth_method = "bsdauth";
-+
- 
- 	return (authok != 0);
- }
-@@ -1057,7 +1091,9 @@ mm_answer_pam_query(int sock, Buffer *m)
- 		xfree(prompts);
- 	if (echo_on != NULL)
- 		xfree(echo_on);
--	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive/pam";
-+	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
-+	auth_submethod = "pam";
-+
- 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m);
- 	return (0);
- }
-@@ -1086,7 +1122,8 @@ mm_answer_pam_respond(int sock, Buffer *m)
- 	buffer_clear(m);
- 	buffer_put_int(m, ret);
- 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m);
--	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive/pam";
-+	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
-+	auth_submethod= "pam";
- 	if (ret == 0)
- 		sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
- 	return (0);
-@@ -1100,7 +1137,8 @@ mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
- 	(sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt);
- 	buffer_clear(m);
- 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
--	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive/pam";
-+	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
-+	auth_submethod = "pam";
- 	return (sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt);
- }
- #endif
-@@ -1178,7 +1216,8 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
- 		hostbased_chost = chost;
- 	} else {
- 		/* Log failed attempt */
--		auth_log(authctxt, 0, auth_method, compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
-+		auth_log(authctxt, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL,
-+		    compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
- 		xfree(blob);
- 		xfree(cuser);
- 		xfree(chost);
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index 906778f..2c84993 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@
- #include "groupaccess.h"
- #include "canohost.h"
- #include "packet.h"
-+#include "hostfile.h"
-+#include "auth.h"
- 
- static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int);
- static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int);
-@@ -329,6 +331,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate,
- 	sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
- 	sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
-+	sAuthenticationMethods,
- 	sDeprecated, sUnsupported
- } ServerOpCodes;
- 
-@@ -454,6 +457,7 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
- };
- 
-@@ -1498,6 +1502,24 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
- 		}
- 		return 0;
- 
-+	case sAuthenticationMethods:
-+		if (*activep && options->num_auth_methods == 0) {
-+			while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
-+				if (options->num_auth_methods >=
-+				    MAX_AUTH_METHODS)
-+					fatal("%s line %d: "
-+					    "too many authentication methods.",
-+					    filename, linenum);
-+				if (auth2_methods_valid(arg, 0) != 0)
-+					fatal("%s line %d: invalid "
-+					    "authentication method list.",
-+					    filename, linenum);
-+				options->auth_methods[
-+				    options->num_auth_methods++] = xstrdup(arg);
-+			}
-+		}
-+		return 0;
-+
- 	case sDeprecated:
- 		logit("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s",
- 		    filename, linenum, arg);
-@@ -1925,6 +1947,8 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- 	dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowGroups, o->num_allow_groups, o->allow_groups);
- 	dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyGroups, o->num_deny_groups, o->deny_groups);
- 	dump_cfg_strarray(sAcceptEnv, o->num_accept_env, o->accept_env);
-+	dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sAuthenticationMethods,
-+		o->num_auth_methods, o->auth_methods);
- 
- 	/* other arguments */
- 	for (i = 0; i < o->num_subsystems; i++)
-diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
-index 096d596..ef80eef 100644
---- a/servconf.h
-+++ b/servconf.h
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
- #define MAX_ACCEPT_ENV		256	/* Max # of env vars. */
- #define MAX_MATCH_GROUPS	256	/* Max # of groups for Match. */
- #define MAX_AUTHKEYS_FILES	256	/* Max # of authorized_keys files. */
-+#define MAX_AUTH_METHODS	256	/* Max # of AuthenticationMethods. */
- 
- /* permit_root_login */
- #define	PERMIT_NOT_SET		-1
-@@ -168,6 +169,9 @@ typedef struct {
- 	char   *authorized_principals_file;
- 
- 	char   *version_addendum;	/* Appended to SSH banner */
-+
-+	u_int	num_auth_methods;
-+	char   *auth_methods[MAX_AUTH_METHODS];
- }       ServerOptions;
- 
- /* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
-@@ -197,6 +201,7 @@ struct connection_info {
- 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_groups, num_allow_groups); \
- 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_groups, num_deny_groups); \
- 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(accept_env, num_accept_env); \
-+		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(auth_methods, num_auth_methods); \
- 	} while (0)
- 
- struct connection_info *get_connection_info(int, int);
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index d5ec4e6..cb4bdd3 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -1333,6 +1333,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	int remote_port;
- 	char *line;
- 	int config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 };
-+	u_int n;
- 	u_int64_t ibytes, obytes;
- 	mode_t new_umask;
- 	Key *key;
-@@ -1555,6 +1556,26 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
- 		options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
- 
-+	/*
-+	 * Check whether there is any path through configured auth methods.
-+	 * Unfortunately it is not possible to verify this generally before
-+	 * daemonisation in the presence of Match block, but this catches
-+	 * and warns for trivial misconfigurations that could break login.
-+	 */
-+	if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
-+		if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1))
-+			fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported with "
-+			    "SSH protocol 1");
-+		for (n = 0; n < options.num_auth_methods; n++) {
-+			if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[n],
-+			    1) == 0)
-+				break;
-+		}
-+		if (n >= options.num_auth_methods)
-+			fatal("AuthenticationMethods cannot be satisfied by "
-+			    "enabled authentication methods");
-+	}
-+
- 	/* set default channel AF */
- 	channel_set_af(options.address_family);
- 
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index 314ecfb..ed81ac8 100644
---- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -151,6 +151,28 @@ See
- in
- .Xr ssh_config 5
- for more information on patterns.
-+.It Cm AuthenticationMethods
-+Specifies the authentication methods that must be successfully completed
-+for a user to be granted access.
-+This option must be followed by one or more comma-separated lists of
-+authentication method names.
-+Successful authentication requires completion of every method in at least
-+one of these lists.
-+.Pp
-+For example, an argument of
-+.Dq publickey,password publickey,keyboard-interactive
-+would require the user to complete public key authentication, followed by
-+either password or keyboard interactive authentication.
-+Only methods that are next in one or more lists are offered at each stage,
-+so for this example, it would not be possible to attempt password or
-+keyboard-interactive authentication before public key.
-+.Pp
-+This option is only available for SSH protocol 2 and will yield a fatal
-+error if enabled if protocol 1 is also enabled.
-+Note that each authentication method listed should also be explicitly enabled
-+in the configuration.
-+The default is not to require multiple authentication; successful completion
-+of a single authentication method is sufficient.
- .It Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
- Specifies the file that contains the public keys that can be used
- for user authentication.
-@@ -711,6 +733,7 @@ Available keywords are
- .Cm AllowGroups ,
- .Cm AllowTcpForwarding ,
- .Cm AllowUsers ,
-+.Cm AuthenticationMethods ,
- .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile ,
- .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile ,
- .Cm Banner ,

openssh-6.1p1-coverity.patch

@@ -1,806 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth-pam.c.coverity openssh-6.1p1/auth-pam.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/auth-pam.c.coverity	2009-07-12 14:07:21.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/auth-pam.c	2012-09-14 21:16:41.264906486 +0200
-@@ -216,7 +216,12 @@ pthread_join(sp_pthread_t thread, void *
- 	if (sshpam_thread_status != -1)
- 		return (sshpam_thread_status);
- 	signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig);
--	waitpid(thread, &status, 0);
-+	while (waitpid(thread, &status, 0) < 0) {                     
-+		if (errno == EINTR)                                
-+			continue;
-+		fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,         
-+				strerror(errno));                      
-+	}
- 	return (status);
- }
- #endif
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/clientloop.c.coverity openssh-6.1p1/clientloop.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/clientloop.c.coverity	2012-06-20 14:31:27.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/clientloop.c	2012-09-14 21:16:41.267906501 +0200
-@@ -2006,14 +2006,15 @@ client_input_global_request(int type, u_
- 	char *rtype;
- 	int want_reply;
- 	int success = 0;
-+/* success is still 0 the packet is allways SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, isn't it? */
- 
- 	rtype = packet_get_string(NULL);
- 	want_reply = packet_get_char();
- 	debug("client_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d",
- 	    rtype, want_reply);
- 	if (want_reply) {
--		packet_start(success ?
--		    SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
-+		packet_start(/*success ?
-+		    SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS :*/ SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
- 		packet_send();
- 		packet_write_wait();
- 	}
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/channels.c.coverity openssh-6.1p1/channels.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/channels.c.coverity	2012-04-23 10:21:05.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/channels.c	2012-09-14 21:16:41.272906528 +0200
-@@ -232,11 +232,11 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd
- 	channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, wfd);
- 	channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, efd);
- 
--	if (rfd != -1)
-+	if (rfd >= 0)
- 		fcntl(rfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
--	if (wfd != -1 && wfd != rfd)
-+	if (wfd >= 0 && wfd != rfd)
- 		fcntl(wfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
--	if (efd != -1 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
-+	if (efd >= 0 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
- 		fcntl(efd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
- 
- 	c->rfd = rfd;
-@@ -251,11 +251,11 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd
- 
- 	/* enable nonblocking mode */
- 	if (nonblock) {
--		if (rfd != -1)
-+		if (rfd >= 0)
- 			set_nonblock(rfd);
--		if (wfd != -1)
-+		if (wfd >= 0)
- 			set_nonblock(wfd);
--		if (efd != -1)
-+		if (efd >= 0)
- 			set_nonblock(efd);
- 	}
- }
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/key.c.coverity openssh-6.1p1/key.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/key.c.coverity	2012-06-30 12:05:02.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/key.c	2012-09-14 21:16:41.274906537 +0200
-@@ -808,8 +808,10 @@ key_read(Key *ret, char **cpp)
- 		success = 1;
- /*XXXX*/
- 		key_free(k);
-+/*XXXX
- 		if (success != 1)
- 			break;
-+XXXX*/
- 		/* advance cp: skip whitespace and data */
- 		while (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t')
- 			cp++;
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-6.1p1/monitor.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/monitor.c.coverity	2012-06-30 00:33:17.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/monitor.c	2012-09-14 21:16:41.277906552 +0200
-@@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
- 	}
- 
- 	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
--	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
-+	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
- 		;
- 
- 	if (!authctxt->valid)
-@@ -1159,6 +1159,10 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m
- 			break;
- 		}
- 	}
-+
-+	debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
-+	    __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
-+
- 	if (key != NULL)
- 		key_free(key);
- 
-@@ -1180,9 +1184,6 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m
- 		xfree(chost);
- 	}
- 
--	debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
--	    __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
--
- 	buffer_clear(m);
- 	buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
- 	buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity	2011-06-20 06:42:23.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.c	2012-09-14 21:16:41.280906568 +0200
-@@ -707,10 +707,10 @@ mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd,
- 	if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
- 	    (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
- 		error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__);
--		if (tmp1 > 0)
-+		if (tmp1 >= 0)
- 			close(tmp1);
--		if (tmp2 > 0)
--			close(tmp2);
-+		/*DEAD CODE if (tmp2 >= 0)
-+			close(tmp2);*/
- 		return 0;
- 	}
- 	close(tmp1);
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity	2010-12-03 00:50:26.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c	2012-09-14 21:16:41.281906573 +0200
-@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr
- 	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
- 	u_int16_t *portp;
- 	u_int16_t port;
--	socklen_t salen;
-+	socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
- 	int i;
- 
- 	if (sa == NULL) {
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/packet.c.coverity openssh-6.1p1/packet.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/packet.c.coverity	2012-03-09 00:28:07.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/packet.c	2012-09-14 21:16:41.284906588 +0200
-@@ -1177,6 +1177,7 @@ packet_read_poll1(void)
- 		case DEATTACK_DETECTED:
- 			packet_disconnect("crc32 compensation attack: "
- 			    "network attack detected");
-+			break;
- 		case DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED:
- 			packet_disconnect("deattack denial of "
- 			    "service detected");
-@@ -1678,7 +1679,7 @@ void
- packet_write_wait(void)
- {
- 	fd_set *setp;
--	int ret, ms_remain;
-+	int ret, ms_remain = 0;
- 	struct timeval start, timeout, *timeoutp = NULL;
- 
- 	setp = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(active_state->connection_out + 1,
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/progressmeter.c.coverity openssh-6.1p1/progressmeter.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/progressmeter.c.coverity	2006-08-05 04:39:40.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/progressmeter.c	2012-09-14 21:16:41.285906593 +0200
-@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static void update_progress_meter(int);
- 
- static time_t start;		/* start progress */
- static time_t last_update;	/* last progress update */
--static char *file;		/* name of the file being transferred */
-+static const char *file;	/* name of the file being transferred */
- static off_t end_pos;		/* ending position of transfer */
- static off_t cur_pos;		/* transfer position as of last refresh */
- static volatile off_t *counter;	/* progress counter */
-@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ update_progress_meter(int ignore)
- }
- 
- void
--start_progress_meter(char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr)
-+start_progress_meter(const char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr)
- {
- 	start = last_update = time(NULL);
- 	file = f;
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/progressmeter.h.coverity openssh-6.1p1/progressmeter.h
---- openssh-6.1p1/progressmeter.h.coverity	2006-03-26 05:30:02.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/progressmeter.h	2012-09-14 21:16:41.286906598 +0200
-@@ -23,5 +23,5 @@
-  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-  */
- 
--void	start_progress_meter(char *, off_t, off_t *);
-+void	start_progress_meter(const char *, off_t, off_t *);
- void	stop_progress_meter(void);
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/scp.c.coverity openssh-6.1p1/scp.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/scp.c.coverity	2011-09-22 13:38:01.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/scp.c	2012-09-14 21:16:41.288906608 +0200
-@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
- {
- 	if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
- 		kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
--		waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
-+		(void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
- 	}
- 
- 	if (signo)
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c.coverity openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c.coverity	2012-07-31 04:22:38.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c	2012-09-14 21:16:41.291906623 +0200
-@@ -1249,7 +1249,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.",
- 			    filename, linenum);
- 		if (!*activep) {
--			arg = strdelim(&cp);
-+			/*arg =*/ (void) strdelim(&cp);
- 			break;
- 		}
- 		for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++)
-@@ -1340,8 +1340,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
- 			*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
- 			/* increase optional counter */
--			if (intptr != NULL)
--				*intptr = *intptr + 1;
-+			/* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;)
-+  			 if (intptr != NULL)
-+				*intptr = *intptr + 1; */
- 		}
- 		break;
- 
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-6.1p1/serverloop.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/serverloop.c.coverity	2012-06-20 14:31:27.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/serverloop.c	2012-09-14 21:16:41.294906638 +0200
-@@ -147,13 +147,13 @@ notify_setup(void)
- static void
- notify_parent(void)
- {
--	if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
- 		write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
- }
- static void
- notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
- {
--	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
- 		FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
- }
- static void
-@@ -161,8 +161,8 @@ notify_done(fd_set *readset)
- {
- 	char c;
- 
--	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
--		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
-+		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
- 			debug2("notify_done: reading");
- }
- 
-@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **rea
- 		 * If we have buffered data, try to write some of that data
- 		 * to the program.
- 		 */
--		if (fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0)
-+		if (fdin >= 0 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0)
- 			FD_SET(fdin, *writesetp);
- 	}
- 	notify_prepare(*readsetp);
-@@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ process_output(fd_set *writeset)
- 	int len;
- 
- 	/* Write buffered data to program stdin. */
--	if (!compat20 && fdin != -1 && FD_ISSET(fdin, writeset)) {
-+	if (!compat20 && fdin >= 0 && FD_ISSET(fdin, writeset)) {
- 		data = buffer_ptr(&stdin_buffer);
- 		dlen = buffer_len(&stdin_buffer);
- 		len = write(fdin, data, dlen);
-@@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int
- 	set_nonblock(fdin);
- 	set_nonblock(fdout);
- 	/* we don't have stderr for interactive terminal sessions, see below */
--	if (fderr != -1)
-+	if (fderr >= 0)
- 		set_nonblock(fderr);
- 
- 	if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG) && isatty(fdin))
-@@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int
- 	max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out);
- 	max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdin);
- 	max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdout);
--	if (fderr != -1)
-+	if (fderr >= 0)
- 		max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fderr);
- #endif
- 
-@@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int
- 		 * If we have received eof, and there is no more pending
- 		 * input data, cause a real eof by closing fdin.
- 		 */
--		if (stdin_eof && fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) {
-+		if (stdin_eof && fdin >= 0 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) {
- 			if (fdin != fdout)
- 				close(fdin);
- 			else
-@@ -741,15 +741,15 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int
- 	buffer_free(&stderr_buffer);
- 
- 	/* Close the file descriptors. */
--	if (fdout != -1)
-+	if (fdout >= 0)
- 		close(fdout);
- 	fdout = -1;
- 	fdout_eof = 1;
--	if (fderr != -1)
-+	if (fderr >= 0)
- 		close(fderr);
- 	fderr = -1;
- 	fderr_eof = 1;
--	if (fdin != -1)
-+	if (fdin >= 0)
- 		close(fdin);
- 	fdin = -1;
- 
-@@ -943,7 +943,7 @@ server_input_window_size(int type, u_int
- 
- 	debug("Window change received.");
- 	packet_check_eom();
--	if (fdin != -1)
-+	if (fdin >= 0)
- 		pty_change_window_size(fdin, row, col, xpixel, ypixel);
- }
- 
-@@ -996,7 +996,7 @@ server_request_tun(void)
- 	}
- 
- 	tun = packet_get_int();
--	if (forced_tun_device != -1) {
-+	if (forced_tun_device >= 0) {
- 		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY && forced_tun_device != tun)
- 			goto done;
- 		tun = forced_tun_device;
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sftp.c.coverity openssh-6.1p1/sftp.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/sftp.c.coverity	2012-06-30 00:33:32.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/sftp.c	2012-09-14 21:16:41.297906653 +0200
-@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
- {
- 	if (sshpid > 1) {
- 		kill(sshpid, SIGTERM);
--		waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
-+		(void) waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
- 	}
- 
- 	_exit(1);
-@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ local_do_ls(const char *args)
- 
- /* Strip one path (usually the pwd) from the start of another */
- static char *
--path_strip(char *path, char *strip)
-+path_strip(const char *path, const char *strip)
- {
- 	size_t len;
- 
-@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ path_strip(char *path, char *strip)
- }
- 
- static char *
--make_absolute(char *p, char *pwd)
-+make_absolute(char *p, const char *pwd)
- {
- 	char *abs_str;
- 
-@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ parse_df_flags(const char *cmd, char **a
- }
- 
- static int
--is_dir(char *path)
-+is_dir(const char *path)
- {
- 	struct stat sb;
- 
-@@ -494,7 +494,7 @@ is_dir(char *path)
- }
- 
- static int
--remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
-+remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
- {
- 	Attrib *a;
- 
-@@ -508,7 +508,7 @@ remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, ch
- 
- /* Check whether path returned from glob(..., GLOB_MARK, ...) is a directory */
- static int
--pathname_is_dir(char *pathname)
-+pathname_is_dir(const char *pathname)
- {
- 	size_t l = strlen(pathname);
- 
-@@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ pathname_is_dir(char *pathname)
- }
- 
- static int
--process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, char *pwd,
-+process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, const char *pwd,
-     int pflag, int rflag)
- {
- 	char *abs_src = NULL;
-@@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ out:
- }
- 
- static int
--process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, char *pwd,
-+process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, const char *pwd,
-     int pflag, int rflag)
- {
- 	char *tmp_dst = NULL;
-@@ -695,7 +695,7 @@ sdirent_comp(const void *aa, const void
- 
- /* sftp ls.1 replacement for directories */
- static int
--do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path, int lflag)
-+do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, const char *strip_path, int lflag)
- {
- 	int n;
- 	u_int c = 1, colspace = 0, columns = 1;
-@@ -780,7 +780,7 @@ do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *
- 
- /* sftp ls.1 replacement which handles path globs */
- static int
--do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path,
-+do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, const char *strip_path,
-     int lflag)
- {
- 	char *fname, *lname;
-@@ -861,7 +861,7 @@ do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, ch
- }
- 
- static int
--do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int hflag, int iflag)
-+do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int hflag, int iflag)
- {
- 	struct sftp_statvfs st;
- 	char s_used[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sftp-client.c.coverity openssh-6.1p1/sftp-client.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/sftp-client.c.coverity	2012-07-02 14:15:39.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/sftp-client.c	2012-09-14 21:18:16.891332281 +0200
-@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ get_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, Buffer *
- }
- 
- static void
--send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, char *s,
-+send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, const char *s,
-     u_int len)
- {
- 	Buffer msg;
-@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *co
- 
- static void
- send_string_attrs_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code,
--    char *s, u_int len, Attrib *a)
-+    const char *s, u_int len, Attrib *a)
- {
- 	Buffer msg;
- 
-@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *con
- }
- 
- int
--do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len)
-+do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *handle, u_int handle_len)
- {
- 	u_int id, status;
- 	Buffer msg;
-@@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *h
- 
- 
- static int
--do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int printflag,
-+do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int printflag,
-     SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
- {
- 	Buffer msg;
-@@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, cha
- }
- 
- int
--do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
-+do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
- {
- 	return(do_lsreaddir(conn, path, 0, dir));
- }
-@@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **s)
- }
- 
- int
--do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
-+do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
- {
- 	u_int status, id;
- 
-@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path
- }
- 
- int
--do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, Attrib *a, int printflag)
-+do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a, int printflag)
- {
- 	u_int status, id;
- 
-@@ -621,7 +621,7 @@ do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *p
- }
- 
- int
--do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
-+do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
- {
- 	u_int status, id;
- 
-@@ -637,7 +637,7 @@ do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *p
- }
- 
- Attrib *
--do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int quiet)
-+do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet)
- {
- 	u_int id;
- 
-@@ -651,7 +651,7 @@ do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *pa
- }
- 
- Attrib *
--do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int quiet)
-+do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet)
- {
- 	u_int id;
- 
-@@ -685,7 +685,7 @@ do_fstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *h
- #endif
- 
- int
--do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, Attrib *a)
-+do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a)
- {
- 	u_int status, id;
- 
-@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char
- }
- 
- int
--do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len,
-+do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *handle, u_int handle_len,
-     Attrib *a)
- {
- 	u_int status, id;
-@@ -719,7 +719,7 @@ do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char
- }
- 
- char *
--do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
-+do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
- {
- 	Buffer msg;
- 	u_int type, expected_id, count, id;
-@@ -768,7 +768,7 @@ do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, char
- }
- 
- int
--do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath)
-+do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath)
- {
- 	Buffer msg;
- 	u_int status, id;
-@@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *
- }
- 
- int
--do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath)
-+do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath)
- {
- 	Buffer msg;
- 	u_int status, id;
-@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char
- }
- 
- int
--do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath)
-+do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath)
- {
- 	Buffer msg;
- 	u_int status, id;
-@@ -987,7 +987,7 @@ send_read_request(struct sftp_conn *conn
- }
- 
- int
--do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path, char *local_path,
-+do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *remote_path, const char *local_path,
-     Attrib *a, int pflag)
- {
- 	Attrib junk;
-@@ -1226,7 +1226,7 @@ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, char
- }
- 
- static int
--download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst,
-+download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
-     Attrib *dirattrib, int pflag, int printflag, int depth)
- {
- 	int i, ret = 0;
-@@ -1316,7 +1316,7 @@ download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *
- }
- 
- int
--download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst,
-+download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
-     Attrib *dirattrib, int pflag, int printflag)
- {
- 	char *src_canon;
-@@ -1334,7 +1334,7 @@ download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, cha
- }
- 
- int
--do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *local_path, char *remote_path,
-+do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *local_path, const char *remote_path,
-     int pflag)
- {
- 	int local_fd;
-@@ -1517,7 +1517,7 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *
- }
- 
- static int
--upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst,
-+upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
-     int pflag, int printflag, int depth)
- {
- 	int ret = 0, status;
-@@ -1608,7 +1608,7 @@ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *co
- }
- 
- int
--upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, int printflag,
-+upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, int printflag,
-     int pflag)
- {
- 	char *dst_canon;
-@@ -1625,7 +1625,7 @@ upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char
- }
- 
- char *
--path_append(char *p1, char *p2)
-+path_append(const char *p1, const char *p2)
- {
- 	char *ret;
- 	size_t len = strlen(p1) + strlen(p2) + 2;
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sftp-client.h.coverity openssh-6.1p1/sftp-client.h
---- openssh-6.1p1/sftp-client.h.coverity	2010-12-04 23:02:48.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/sftp-client.h	2012-09-14 21:16:41.301906674 +0200
-@@ -56,49 +56,49 @@ struct sftp_conn *do_init(int, int, u_in
- u_int sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *);
- 
- /* Close file referred to by 'handle' */
--int do_close(struct sftp_conn *, char *, u_int);
-+int do_close(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, u_int);
- 
- /* Read contents of 'path' to NULL-terminated array 'dir' */
--int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, SFTP_DIRENT ***);
-+int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, SFTP_DIRENT ***);
- 
- /* Frees a NULL-terminated array of SFTP_DIRENTs (eg. from do_readdir) */
- void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **);
- 
- /* Delete file 'path' */
--int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *, char *);
-+int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
- 
- /* Create directory 'path' */
--int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, Attrib *, int);
-+int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, Attrib *, int);
- 
- /* Remove directory 'path' */
--int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *);
-+int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
- 
- /* Get file attributes of 'path' (follows symlinks) */
--Attrib *do_stat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, int);
-+Attrib *do_stat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int);
- 
- /* Get file attributes of 'path' (does not follow symlinks) */
--Attrib *do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, int);
-+Attrib *do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int);
- 
- /* Set file attributes of 'path' */
--int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, Attrib *);
-+int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, Attrib *);
- 
- /* Set file attributes of open file 'handle' */
--int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, u_int, Attrib *);
-+int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, u_int, Attrib *);
- 
- /* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */
--char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, char *);
-+char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
- 
- /* Get statistics for filesystem hosting file at "path" */
- int do_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, struct sftp_statvfs *, int);
- 
- /* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
--int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *);
-+int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *);
- 
- /* Link 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
--int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *);
-+int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *);
- 
--/* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
--int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *);
-+/* Symlink 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
-+int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *);
- 
- /* XXX: add callbacks to do_download/do_upload so we can do progress meter */
- 
-@@ -106,27 +106,27 @@ int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, char
-  * Download 'remote_path' to 'local_path'. Preserve permissions and times
-  * if 'pflag' is set
-  */
--int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, Attrib *, int);
-+int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *, int);
- 
- /*
-  * Recursively download 'remote_directory' to 'local_directory'. Preserve 
-  * times if 'pflag' is set
-  */
--int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, Attrib *, int, int);
-+int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *, int, int);
- 
- /*
-  * Upload 'local_path' to 'remote_path'. Preserve permissions and times
-  * if 'pflag' is set
-  */
--int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, int);
-+int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int);
- 
- /*
-  * Recursively upload 'local_directory' to 'remote_directory'. Preserve 
-  * times if 'pflag' is set
-  */
--int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, int, int);
-+int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int);
- 
- /* Concatenate paths, taking care of slashes. Caller must free result. */
--char *path_append(char *, char *);
-+char *path_append(const char *, const char *);
- 
- #endif
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-6.1p1/ssh-agent.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity	2011-06-03 06:14:16.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/ssh-agent.c	2012-09-14 21:16:41.303906683 +0200
-@@ -1147,8 +1147,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	sanitise_stdfd();
- 
- 	/* drop */
--	setegid(getgid());
--	setgid(getgid());
-+	(void) setegid(getgid());
-+	(void) setgid(getgid());
- 
- #if defined(HAVE_PRCTL) && defined(PR_SET_DUMPABLE)
- 	/* Disable ptrace on Linux without sgid bit */
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.coverity	2012-07-31 04:21:34.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c	2012-09-14 21:16:41.307906705 +0200
-@@ -682,8 +682,10 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 		if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
- 			privsep_preauth_child();
- 		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
--		if (box != NULL)
-+		if (box != NULL) {
- 			ssh_sandbox_child(box);
-+			xfree(box);
-+		}
- 
- 		return 0;
- 	}
-@@ -1311,6 +1313,9 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
- 		if (num_listen_socks < 0)
- 			break;
- 	}
-+
-+	if (fdset != NULL)
-+		xfree(fdset);
- }
- 
- 
-@@ -1768,7 +1773,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 
- 	/* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
- 	   unmounted if desired. */
--	chdir("/");
-+	(void) chdir("/");
- 
- 	/* ignore SIGPIPE */
- 	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);

openssh-6.1p1-gssapi-canohost.patch

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c.canohost openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c.canohost	2012-10-30 10:52:59.593301692 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c	2012-10-30 11:01:12.870301632 +0100
-@@ -699,12 +699,15 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 	static u_int mech = 0;
- 	OM_uint32 min;
- 	int ok = 0;
--	const char *gss_host;
-+	const char *gss_host = NULL;
- 
- 	if (options.gss_server_identity)
- 		gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
--	else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
-+	else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
- 		gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1);
-+		if ( strcmp( gss_host, "UNKNOWN" )  == 0 )
-+			gss_host = authctxt->host;
-+	}
- 	else
- 		gss_host = authctxt->host;
- 

openssh-6.1p1-kuserok.patch

@@ -1,167 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-6.1p1/auth-krb5.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok	2012-09-14 21:08:16.941496194 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/auth-krb5.c	2012-09-14 21:08:17.063496896 +0200
-@@ -55,6 +55,20 @@
- 
- extern ServerOptions	 options;
- 
-+int
-+ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context krb5_ctx, krb5_principal krb5_user, const char *client)
-+{
-+	if (options.use_kuserok)
-+		return krb5_kuserok(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, client);
-+	else {
-+		char kuser[65];
-+
-+		if (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, sizeof(kuser), kuser))
-+			return 0;
-+		return strcmp(kuser, client) == 0;
-+	}
-+}
-+
- static int
- krb5_init(void *context)
- {
-@@ -147,7 +161,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
- 	if (problem)
- 		goto out;
- 
--	if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, client)) {
-+	if (!ssh_krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, client)) {
- 		problem = -1;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-6.1p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok	2012-09-14 21:08:17.019496642 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2012-09-14 21:08:17.065496906 +0200
-@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_pr
-     int);
- 
- static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
-+extern int ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context, krb5_principal, const char *);
- 
- /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
- 
-@@ -115,7 +116,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client
- 	/* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user,
- 	 * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials
- 	 * to access these files aren't available yet. */
--	if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, luser) && k5login_exists) {
-+	if (ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, luser) && k5login_exists) {
- 		retval = 1;
- 		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
- 		    luser, (char *)client->displayname.value);
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c.kuserok	2012-09-14 21:08:16.989496471 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c	2012-09-14 21:09:30.864868698 +0200
-@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
- 	options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
- 	options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
- 	options->version_addendum = NULL;
-+	options->use_kuserok = -1;
- }
- 
- void
-@@ -301,6 +302,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
- 		options->version_addendum = xstrdup("");
- 	if (options->show_patchlevel == -1)
- 		options->show_patchlevel = 0;
-+	if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
-+		options->use_kuserok = 1;
- 
- 	/* Turn privilege separation on by default */
- 	if (use_privsep == -1)
-@@ -327,7 +330,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
- 	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
- 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
--	sKerberosGetAFSToken,
-+	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUseKuserok,
- 	sKerberosTgtPassing, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
- 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
- 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
-@@ -399,11 +402,13 @@ static struct {
- #else
- 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #endif
-+	{ "kerberosusekuserok", sKerberosUseKuserok, SSHCFG_ALL },
- #else
- 	{ "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "kerberosusekuserok", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- #endif
- 	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1486,6 +1491,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 		*activep = value;
- 		break;
- 
-+	case sKerberosUseKuserok:
-+		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
- 	case sPermitOpen:
- 		arg = strdelim(&cp);
- 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
-@@ -1769,6 +1778,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(max_authtries);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
-+	M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok);
- 
- 	/* See comment in servconf.h */
- 	COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
-@@ -2005,6 +2015,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep);
-+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
- 
- 	/* string arguments */
- 	dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file);
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h.kuserok openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h
---- openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h.kuserok	2012-09-14 21:08:16.990496476 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h	2012-09-14 21:08:17.071496942 +0200
-@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ typedef struct {
- 
- 	int	num_permitted_opens;
- 
-+	int	use_kuserok;
- 	char   *chroot_directory;
- 	char   *revoked_keys_file;
- 	char   *trusted_user_ca_keys;
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.kuserok openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config
---- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.kuserok	2012-09-14 21:08:17.002496545 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config	2012-09-14 21:08:17.074496957 +0200
-@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
- #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
- #KerberosTicketCleanup yes
- #KerberosGetAFSToken no
-+#KerberosUseKuserok yes
- 
- # GSSAPI options
- #GSSAPIAuthentication no
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok	2012-09-14 21:08:17.004496556 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5	2012-09-14 21:08:17.073496952 +0200
-@@ -618,6 +618,10 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
- file on logout.
- The default is
- .Dq yes .
-+.It Cm KerberosUseKuserok
-+Specifies whether to look at .k5login file for user's aliases.
-+The default is
-+.Dq yes .
- .It Cm KexAlgorithms
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
-@@ -767,6 +771,7 @@ Available keywords are
- .Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly ,
- .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication ,
- .Cm KerberosAuthentication ,
-+.Cm KerberosUseKuserok ,
- .Cm MaxAuthTries ,
- .Cm MaxSessions ,
- .Cm PubkeyAuthentication ,

openssh-6.1p1-man-moduli.patch

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/moduli.0.man-moduli openssh-6.1p1/moduli.0
---- openssh-6.1p1/moduli.0.man-moduli	2012-11-06 09:42:13.677062887 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/moduli.0	2012-11-06 09:42:58.693543381 +0100
-@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ DESCRIPTION
- 
-                         0     Unknown, not tested.
-                         2     "Safe" prime; (p-1)/2 is also prime.
--                        4     Sophie Germain; (p+1)*2 is also prime.
-+                        4     Sophie Germain; (p*2)+1 is also prime.
- 
-                         Moduli candidates initially produced by ssh-keygen(1)
-                         are Sophie Germain primes (type 4).  Further primality
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/moduli.5.man-moduli openssh-6.1p1/moduli.5
---- openssh-6.1p1/moduli.5.man-moduli	2012-11-06 09:42:17.730035388 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/moduli.5	2012-11-06 09:43:31.403180375 +0100
-@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ Unknown, not tested.
- .It 2
- "Safe" prime; (p-1)/2 is also prime.
- .It 4
--Sophie Germain; (p+1)*2 is also prime.
-+Sophie Germain; (p*2)+1 is also prime.
- .El
- .Pp
- Moduli candidates initially produced by

openssh-6.1p1-privsep-selinux.patch

@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.privsep-selinux openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.privsep-selinux	2012-11-05 14:46:39.334809203 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2012-11-05 14:54:32.614504884 +0100
-@@ -505,6 +505,25 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *n
- 	xfree(newctx);
- }
- 
-+void
-+ssh_selinux_copy_context(void)
-+{
-+	security_context_t *ctx;
-+
-+	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
-+		return;
-+
-+	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
-+		logit("%s: getcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror (errno));
-+		return;
-+	}
-+	if (ctx != NULL) {
-+		if (setcon(ctx) != 0)
-+			logit("%s: setcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror (errno));
-+		freecon(ctx);
-+	}
-+}
-+
- #endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
- 
- #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
---- openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux	2011-01-25 02:16:18.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2012-11-05 14:46:39.339809234 +0100
-@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
- void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
- void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
-+void ssh_selinux_copy_context(void);
- void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
- #endif
- 
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/session.c.privsep-selinux openssh-6.1p1/session.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/session.c.privsep-selinux	2012-12-03 09:43:11.727505761 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/session.c	2012-12-03 09:54:50.455688902 +0100
-@@ -1519,6 +1519,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
- 			    pw->pw_uid);
- 			chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
- 			    "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+			ssh_selinux_copy_context();
-+#endif
- 			safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
- 			free(tmp);
- 			free(chroot_path);
-@@ -1533,6 +1536,12 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
- 		/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
- 		permanently_set_uid(pw);
- #endif
-+
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+		if (options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
-+		    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0)
-+			ssh_selinux_copy_context();
-+#endif
- 	}
- 
- 	if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid)
-@@ -1787,9 +1796,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
- 		argv[i] = NULL;
- 		optind = optreset = 1;
- 		__progname = argv[0];
--#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--		ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
--#endif
- 		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
- 	}
- 
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux	2012-11-05 14:46:39.335809209 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c	2012-11-05 14:46:39.341809247 +0100
-@@ -794,6 +794,13 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 	do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
- 
-  skip:
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	/* switch SELinux content for root too */
-+	if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) {
-+		ssh_selinux_copy_context();
-+	}
-+#endif
-+
- 	/* It is safe now to apply the key state */
- 	monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
- 

openssh-6.1p1-redhat.patch

@@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/ssh_config.redhat openssh-6.1p1/ssh_config
---- openssh-6.1p1/ssh_config.redhat	2010-01-12 09:40:27.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/ssh_config	2012-10-26 16:28:51.820340584 +0200
-@@ -45,3 +45,14 @@
- #   PermitLocalCommand no
- #   VisualHostKey no
- #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
-+Host *
-+	GSSAPIAuthentication yes
-+# If this option is set to yes then remote X11 clients will have full access
-+# to the original X11 display. As virtually no X11 client supports the untrusted
-+# mode correctly we set this to yes.
-+	ForwardX11Trusted yes
-+# Send locale-related environment variables
-+	SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES 
-+	SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT 
-+	SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
-+	SendEnv XMODIFIERS
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0
---- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0.redhat	2012-10-26 16:28:51.762340584 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0	2012-10-26 16:28:51.821340584 +0200
-@@ -583,9 +583,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
- 
-      SyslogFacility
-              Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
--             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0,
--             LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.  The
--             default is AUTH.
-+             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV,
-+             LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
-+             The default is AUTH.
- 
-      TCPKeepAlive
-              Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5.redhat	2012-10-26 16:28:51.763340584 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5	2012-10-26 16:28:51.822340584 +0200
-@@ -1015,7 +1015,7 @@ Note that this option applies to protoco
- .It Cm SyslogFacility
- Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
- .Xr sshd 8 .
--The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
-+The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
- LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
- The default is AUTH.
- .It Cm TCPKeepAlive
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.redhat openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config
---- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.redhat	2012-10-26 16:28:51.819340584 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config	2012-10-26 16:31:44.773340564 +0200
-@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@
- # possible, but leave them commented.  Uncommented options override the
- # default value.
- 
-+# If you want to change the port on a SELinux system, you have to tell
-+# SELinux about this change.
-+# semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER
-+#
- #Port 22
- #AddressFamily any
- #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
-@@ -32,6 +36,7 @@
- # Logging
- # obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging
- #SyslogFacility AUTH
-+SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
- #LogLevel INFO
- 
- # Authentication:
-@@ -67,9 +72,11 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
- # To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
- #PasswordAuthentication yes
- #PermitEmptyPasswords no
-+PasswordAuthentication yes
- 
- # Change to no to disable s/key passwords
- #ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes
-+ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
- 
- # Kerberos options
- #KerberosAuthentication no
-@@ -79,7 +86,9 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
- 
- # GSSAPI options
- #GSSAPIAuthentication no
-+GSSAPIAuthentication yes
- #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
-+GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
- 
- # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, 
- # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will 
-@@ -91,11 +100,13 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
- # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
- # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
- #UsePAM no
-+UsePAM yes
- 
- #AllowAgentForwarding yes
- #AllowTcpForwarding yes
- #GatewayPorts no
- #X11Forwarding no
-+X11Forwarding yes
- #X11DisplayOffset 10
- #X11UseLocalhost yes
- #PrintMotd yes
-@@ -117,6 +128,12 @@ UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox		# Defaul
- # no default banner path
- #Banner none
- 
-+# Accept locale-related environment variables
-+AcceptEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
-+AcceptEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
-+AcceptEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
-+AcceptEnv XMODIFIERS
-+
- # override default of no subsystems
- Subsystem	sftp	/usr/libexec/sftp-server
- 

openssh-6.1p1-required-authentications.patch

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c.required-authentication openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c.required-authentication	2012-11-30 21:13:14.375382453 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c	2012-11-30 21:33:56.972017545 +0100
-@@ -495,6 +495,8 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "authorizedkeyscommandrunas", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+	{ "requiredauthentications1", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+	{ "requiredauthentications2", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
- };
- 
-@@ -1560,6 +1562,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 		return 0;
- 
- 	case sAuthenticationMethods:
-+		if (strncasecmp(arg, "requiredauthentications", 23) == 0)
-+			logit("%s line %d: Option %s is obsolete. Please use AuthenticationMethods",
-+			    filename, linenum, arg);
- 		if (*activep && options->num_auth_methods == 0) {
- 			while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
- 				if (options->num_auth_methods >=

openssh-6.1p1-role-mls.patch

@@ -1,934 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth1.c.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/auth1.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/auth1.c.role-mls	2012-11-28 17:06:43.657990103 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/auth1.c	2012-11-28 17:06:43.699989959 +0100
-@@ -384,6 +384,9 @@ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
- {
- 	u_int ulen;
- 	char *user, *style = NULL;
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	char *role=NULL;
-+#endif
- 
- 	/* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */
- 	packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_USER);
-@@ -392,11 +395,24 @@ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 	user = packet_get_cstring(&ulen);
- 	packet_check_eom();
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
-+		*role++ = '\0';
-+#endif
-+
- 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
- 		*style++ = '\0';
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	else
-+		if (role && (style = strchr(role, ':')) != NULL)
-+			*style++ = '\0';
-+#endif
- 
- 	authctxt->user = user;
- 	authctxt->style = style;
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	authctxt->role = role;
-+#endif
- 
- 	/* Verify that the user is a valid user. */
- 	if ((authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user))) != NULL)
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth2.c.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/auth2.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/auth2.c.role-mls	2012-11-28 17:06:43.661990089 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/auth2.c	2012-11-28 17:11:09.058916613 +0100
-@@ -218,6 +218,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
- 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
- 	Authmethod *m = NULL;
- 	char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL;
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	char *role = NULL;
-+#endif
- 	int authenticated = 0;
- 
- 	if (authctxt == NULL)
-@@ -229,6 +232,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
- 	debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
- 	debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
-+		*role++ = 0;
-+#endif
-+
- 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
- 		*style++ = 0;
- 
-@@ -251,8 +259,15 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
- 		    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
- 		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
- 		authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
--		if (use_privsep)
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+		authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
-+#endif
-+		if (use_privsep) {
- 			mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+			mm_inform_authrole(role);
-+#endif
-+		}
- 		userauth_banner();
- 		if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
- 			packet_disconnect("no authentication methods enabled");
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/auth2-gss.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/auth2-gss.c.role-mls	2011-05-05 06:04:11.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/auth2-gss.c	2012-11-28 17:06:43.700989956 +0100
-@@ -260,6 +260,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
- 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
- 	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
- 	int authenticated = 0;
-+	char *micuser;
- 	Buffer b;
- 	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
- 	u_int len;
-@@ -272,7 +273,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
- 	mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
- 	mic.length = len;
- 
--	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	if (authctxt->role && (strlen(authctxt->role) > 0))
-+		xasprintf(&micuser, "%s/%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->role);
-+	else
-+#endif
-+		micuser = authctxt->user;
-+	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, micuser, authctxt->service,
- 	    "gssapi-with-mic");
- 
- 	gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
-@@ -284,6 +291,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
- 		logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
- 
- 	buffer_free(&b);
-+	if (micuser != authctxt->user)
-+		xfree(micuser);
- 	xfree(mic.value);
- 
- 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/auth2-hostbased.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls	2012-11-28 17:06:43.669990062 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/auth2-hostbased.c	2012-11-28 17:06:43.700989956 +0100
-@@ -106,7 +106,15 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 	buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
- 	/* reconstruct packet */
- 	buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
--	buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	if (authctxt->role) {
-+		buffer_put_int(&b, strlen(authctxt->user)+strlen(authctxt->role)+1);
-+		buffer_append(&b, authctxt->user, strlen(authctxt->user));
-+		buffer_put_char(&b, '/');
-+		buffer_append(&b, authctxt->role, strlen(authctxt->role));
-+	} else 
-+#endif
-+		buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
- 	buffer_put_cstring(&b, service);
- 	buffer_put_cstring(&b, "hostbased");
- 	buffer_put_string(&b, pkalg, alen);
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls	2012-11-28 17:06:43.669990062 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c	2012-11-28 17:06:43.700989956 +0100
-@@ -121,7 +121,15 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 		}
- 		/* reconstruct packet */
- 		buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
--		buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+		if (authctxt->role) {
-+			buffer_put_int(&b, strlen(authctxt->user)+strlen(authctxt->role)+1);
-+			buffer_append(&b, authctxt->user, strlen(authctxt->user));
-+			buffer_put_char(&b, '/');
-+			buffer_append(&b, authctxt->role, strlen(authctxt->role));
-+		} else 
-+#endif
-+			buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
- 		buffer_put_cstring(&b,
- 		    datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ?
- 		    "ssh-userauth" :
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth.h.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/auth.h
---- openssh-6.1p1/auth.h.role-mls	2012-11-28 17:06:43.669990062 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/auth.h	2012-11-28 17:06:43.699989959 +0100
-@@ -59,6 +59,9 @@ struct Authctxt {
- 	char		*service;
- 	struct passwd	*pw;		/* set if 'valid' */
- 	char		*style;
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	char		*role;
-+#endif
- 	void		*kbdintctxt;
- 	void		*jpake_ctx;
- #ifdef BSD_AUTH
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth-pam.c.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/auth-pam.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/auth-pam.c.role-mls	2012-11-28 17:06:43.638990168 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/auth-pam.c	2012-11-28 17:06:43.699989959 +0100
-@@ -1074,7 +1074,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void)
-  * during the ssh authentication process.
-  */
- int
--do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
-+do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value)
- {
- 	int ret = 1;
- #ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth-pam.h.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/auth-pam.h
---- openssh-6.1p1/auth-pam.h.role-mls	2004-09-11 14:17:26.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/auth-pam.h	2012-11-28 17:06:43.699989959 +0100
-@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void do_pam_session(void);
- void do_pam_set_tty(const char *);
- void do_pam_setcred(int );
- void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
--int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
-+int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *);
- char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
- char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
- void free_pam_environment(char **);
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/misc.c.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/misc.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/misc.c.role-mls	2011-09-22 13:34:36.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/misc.c	2012-11-28 17:06:43.701989952 +0100
-@@ -427,6 +427,7 @@ char *
- colon(char *cp)
- {
- 	int flag = 0;
-+	int start = 1;
- 
- 	if (*cp == ':')		/* Leading colon is part of file name. */
- 		return NULL;
-@@ -442,6 +443,13 @@ colon(char *cp)
- 			return (cp);
- 		if (*cp == '/')
- 			return NULL;
-+		if (start) {
-+		/* Slash on beginning or after dots only denotes file name. */
-+			if (*cp == '/')
-+				return (0);
-+			if (*cp != '.')
-+				start = 0;
-+		}
- 	}
- 	return NULL;
- }
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/monitor.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/monitor.c.role-mls	2012-11-28 17:06:43.686990004 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/monitor.c	2012-11-28 17:06:43.701989952 +0100
-@@ -148,6 +148,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+int mm_answer_authrole(int, Buffer *);
-+#endif
- int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
-@@ -231,6 +234,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
-     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole},
-+#endif
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
- #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -838,6 +844,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m
- 	else {
- 		/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
- 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1);
-+#endif
- 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
- 	}
- #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -881,6 +890,25 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
- 	return (0);
- }
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+int
-+mm_answer_authrole(int sock, Buffer *m)
-+{
-+	monitor_permit_authentications(1);
-+
-+	authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-+	debug3("%s: role=%s",
-+	    __func__, authctxt->role);
-+
-+	if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
-+		xfree(authctxt->role);
-+		authctxt->role = NULL;
-+	}
-+
-+	return (0);
-+}
-+#endif
-+
- int
- mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
- {
-@@ -1251,7 +1279,7 @@ static int
- monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
- {
- 	Buffer b;
--	char *p;
-+	char *p, *r;
- 	u_int len;
- 	int fail = 0;
- 
-@@ -1277,6 +1305,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i
- 	if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
- 		fail++;
- 	p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
-+	if ((r = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL)
-+		*r = '\0';
- 	if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) {
- 		logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
- 		    authctxt->user, p);
-@@ -1308,7 +1338,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
-     char *chost)
- {
- 	Buffer b;
--	char *p;
-+	char *p, *r;
- 	u_int len;
- 	int fail = 0;
- 
-@@ -1325,6 +1355,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
- 	if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
- 		fail++;
- 	p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
-+	if ((r = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL)
-+		*r = '\0';
- 	if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) {
- 		logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
- 		    authctxt->user, p);
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/monitor.h.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/monitor.h
---- openssh-6.1p1/monitor.h.role-mls	2012-11-28 17:06:43.686990004 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/monitor.h	2012-11-28 17:06:43.701989952 +0100
-@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@
- enum monitor_reqtype {
- 	MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_FREE, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV,
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE,
-+#endif
- 	MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER,
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls	2012-11-28 17:06:43.686990004 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.c	2012-11-28 17:06:43.702989948 +0100
-@@ -336,6 +336,25 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *
- 	buffer_free(&m);
- }
- 
-+/* Inform the privileged process about role */
-+
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+void
-+mm_inform_authrole(char *role)
-+{
-+	Buffer m;
-+
-+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-+
-+	buffer_init(&m);
-+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : "");
-+
-+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, &m);
-+
-+	buffer_free(&m);
-+}
-+#endif
-+
- /* Do the password authentication */
- int
- mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password)
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.h
---- openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls	2012-11-28 17:06:43.686990004 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/monitor_wrap.h	2012-11-28 17:06:43.702989948 +0100
-@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ int mm_is_monitor(void);
- DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
- int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int);
- void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+void mm_inform_authrole(char *);
-+#endif
- struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
- char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
- int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *);
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
---- openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls	2011-11-04 01:25:25.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in	2012-11-28 17:06:43.702989948 +0100
-@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bindresvport
- 
- COMPAT=bsd-arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o
- 
--PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
-+PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux_part_2.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
- 
- .c.o:
- 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls	2012-03-09 00:25:18.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2012-11-28 17:06:43.702989948 +0100
-@@ -31,68 +31,271 @@
- 
- #include "log.h"
- #include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "servconf.h"
- #include "port-linux.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "hostfile.h"
-+#include "auth.h"
- 
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- #include <selinux/selinux.h>
- #include <selinux/flask.h>
-+#include <selinux/context.h>
- #include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
-+#include <selinux/get_default_type.h>
-+#include <selinux/av_permissions.h>
-+
-+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
-+#include <libaudit.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#endif
- 
- #ifndef SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE
- # define SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE ":unconfined_t:"
- #endif
- 
--/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
--int
--ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
-+extern ServerOptions options;
-+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
-+extern int inetd_flag;
-+extern int rexeced_flag;
-+
-+/* Send audit message */
-+static int
-+send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context,
-+		       security_context_t selected_context)
-+{
-+	int rc=0;
-+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
-+	char *msg = NULL;
-+	int audit_fd = audit_open();
-+	security_context_t default_raw=NULL;
-+	security_context_t selected_raw=NULL;
-+	rc = -1;
-+	if (audit_fd < 0) {
-+		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
-+					errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
-+				return 0; /* No audit support in kernel */
-+		error("Error connecting to audit system.");
-+		return rc;
-+	}
-+	if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(default_context, &default_raw) < 0) {
-+		error("Error translating default context.");
-+		default_raw = NULL;
-+	}
-+	if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(selected_context, &selected_raw) < 0) {
-+		error("Error translating selected context.");
-+		selected_raw = NULL;
-+	}
-+	if (asprintf(&msg, "sshd: default-context=%s selected-context=%s",
-+		     default_raw ? default_raw : (default_context ? default_context: "?"),
-+		     selected_context ? selected_raw : (selected_context ? selected_context :"?")) < 0) {
-+		error("Error allocating memory.");
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_ROLE_CHANGE,
-+				   msg, NULL, NULL, NULL, success) <= 0) {
-+		error("Error sending audit message.");
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	rc = 0;
-+      out:
-+	free(msg);
-+	freecon(default_raw);
-+	freecon(selected_raw);
-+	close(audit_fd);
-+#endif
-+	return rc;
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+mls_range_allowed(security_context_t src, security_context_t dst)
- {
--	static int enabled = -1;
-+	struct av_decision avd;
-+	int retval;
-+	unsigned int bit = CONTEXT__CONTAINS;
-+
-+	debug("%s: src:%s dst:%s", __func__, src, dst);
-+	retval = security_compute_av(src, dst, SECCLASS_CONTEXT, bit, &avd);
-+	if (retval || ((bit & avd.allowed) != bit))
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+get_user_context(const char *sename, const char *role, const char *lvl,
-+	security_context_t *sc) {
-+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
-+	if (lvl == NULL || lvl[0] == '\0' || get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, sc) != 0) {
-+	        /* User may have requested a level completely outside of his 
-+	           allowed range. We get a context just for auditing as the
-+	           range check below will certainly fail for default context. */
-+#endif
-+		if (get_default_context(sename, NULL, sc) != 0) {
-+			*sc = NULL;
-+			return -1;
-+		}
-+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
-+	}
-+#endif
-+	if (role != NULL && role[0]) {
-+		context_t con;
-+		char *type=NULL;
-+		if (get_default_type(role, &type) != 0) {
-+			error("get_default_type: failed to get default type for '%s'",
-+				role);
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+		con = context_new(*sc);
-+		if (!con) {
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+		context_role_set(con, role);
-+		context_type_set(con, type);
-+		freecon(*sc);
-+		*sc = strdup(context_str(con));
-+		context_free(con);
-+		if (!*sc) 
-+			return -1;
-+	}
-+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
-+	if (lvl != NULL && lvl[0]) {
-+		/* verify that the requested range is obtained */
-+		context_t con;
-+		security_context_t obtained_raw;
-+		security_context_t requested_raw;
-+		con = context_new(*sc);
-+		if (!con) {
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+		context_range_set(con, lvl);
-+		if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(*sc, &obtained_raw) < 0) {
-+			context_free(con);
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+		if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(context_str(con), &requested_raw) < 0) {
-+			freecon(obtained_raw);
-+			context_free(con);
-+			goto out;
-+		}
- 
--	if (enabled == -1) {
--		enabled = (is_selinux_enabled() == 1);
--		debug("SELinux support %s", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled");
-+		debug("get_user_context: obtained context '%s' requested context '%s'",
-+			obtained_raw, requested_raw);
-+		if (strcmp(obtained_raw, requested_raw)) {
-+			/* set the context to the real requested one but fail */
-+			freecon(requested_raw);
-+			freecon(obtained_raw);
-+			freecon(*sc);
-+			*sc = strdup(context_str(con));
-+			context_free(con);
-+			return -1;
-+		}
-+		freecon(requested_raw);
-+		freecon(obtained_raw);
-+		context_free(con);
- 	}
-+#endif
-+	return 0;
-+      out:
-+	freecon(*sc);
-+	*sc = NULL;
-+	return -1;
-+}
- 
--	return (enabled);
-+static void
-+ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level)
-+{
-+	*role = NULL;
-+	*level = NULL;
-+	if (the_authctxt) {
-+		if (the_authctxt->role != NULL) {
-+			char *slash;
-+			*role = xstrdup(the_authctxt->role);
-+			if ((slash = strchr(*role, '/')) != NULL) {
-+				*slash = '\0';
-+				*level = slash + 1;
-+			}
-+		}
-+	}
- }
- 
- /* Return the default security context for the given username */
- static security_context_t
--ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
-+ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
-+	security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc)
- {
--	security_context_t sc = NULL;
--	char *sename = NULL, *lvl = NULL;
--	int r;
-+	char *sename, *lvl;
-+	char *role;
-+	const char *reqlvl;
-+	int r = 0;
-+	context_t con = NULL;
-+ 
-+	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
- 
- #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
--	if (getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl) != 0)
--		return NULL;
-+	if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) {
-+		sename = NULL;
-+		lvl = NULL;
-+	}
- #else
- 	sename = pwname;
--	lvl = NULL;
-+	lvl = "";
- #endif
- 
-+	if (r == 0) {
- #ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
--	r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
-+		r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, default_sc);
- #else
--	r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
-+		r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, default_sc);
- #endif
-+	}
-+
-+	if (r == 0) {
-+		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
-+		if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
-+			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
-+
-+			if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
-+				fatal("failed to allocate security context");
-+
-+			if ((con=context_new(sshdsc)) == NULL)
-+				fatal("failed to allocate selinux context");
-+			reqlvl = context_range_get(con);
-+			freecon(sshdsc);
-+			if (reqlvl !=NULL && lvl != NULL && strcmp(reqlvl, lvl) == 0)
-+			    /* we actually don't change level */
-+			    reqlvl = "";
-+
-+			debug("%s: current connection level '%s'", __func__, reqlvl);
- 
--	if (r != 0) {
--		switch (security_getenforce()) {
--		case -1:
--			fatal("%s: ssh_selinux_getctxbyname: "
--			    "security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
--		case 0:
--			error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
--			    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
--			sc = NULL;
--			break;
--		default:
--			fatal("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
--			    "context for %s (in enforcing mode)",
--			    __func__, pwname);
- 		}
-+		
-+		if ((reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) || (role != NULL && role[0])) {
-+			r = get_user_context(sename, role, reqlvl, user_sc);
-+		
-+			if (r == 0 && reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) {
-+				security_context_t default_level_sc = *default_sc;
-+				if (role != NULL && role[0]) {
-+					if (get_user_context(sename, role, lvl, &default_level_sc) < 0)
-+						default_level_sc = *default_sc;
-+				}
-+				/* verify that the requested range is contained in the user range */
-+				if (mls_range_allowed(default_level_sc, *user_sc)) {
-+					logit("permit MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
-+				} else {
-+					r = -1;
-+					error("deny MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
-+				}
-+				if (default_level_sc != *default_sc)
-+					freecon(default_level_sc);
-+			}
-+		} else {
-+			*user_sc = *default_sc;
-+		}
-+	}
-+	if (r != 0) {
-+		error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
-+		    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
- 	}
- 
- #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
-@@ -102,7 +305,42 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
- 		xfree(lvl);
- #endif
- 
--	return sc;
-+	if (role != NULL)
-+		xfree(role);
-+	if (con)
-+		context_free(con);
-+ 
-+	return (r);
-+}
-+
-+/* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
-+static int
-+ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
-+{
-+	const char *reqlvl;
-+	char *role;
-+	char *use_current;
-+	int rv;
-+
-+	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
-+
-+	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
-+
-+	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
-+	
-+	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
-+		use_current = "1";
-+	} else {
-+		use_current = "";
-+		rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: "");
-+	}
-+
-+	rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current);
-+
-+	if (role != NULL)
-+		xfree(role);
-+	
-+	return rv;
- }
- 
- /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
-@@ -110,28 +348,71 @@ void
- ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
- {
- 	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
-+	int r = 0;
-+	security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
- 
- 	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
- 		return;
- 
-+	if (options.use_pam) {
-+		/* do not compute context, just setup environment for pam_selinux */
-+		if (ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) {
-+			switch (security_getenforce()) {
-+			case -1:
-+				fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
-+			case 0:
-+				error("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
-+				    __func__);
-+			break;
-+			default:
-+				fatal("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.",
-+				    __func__);
-+			}
-+		}
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
- 	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
- 
--	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
--	if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
-+	r = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
-+	if (r >= 0) {
-+		r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
-+		if (r < 0) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s",
-+			    __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
-+		} 
-+#ifdef HAVE_SETKEYCREATECON
-+		else if (setkeycreatecon(user_ctx) < 0) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s",
-+			    __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
-+		}
-+#endif
-+	}
-+	if (user_ctx == NULL) {
-+		user_ctx = default_ctx;
-+	}
-+	if (r < 0 || user_ctx != default_ctx) {
-+		/* audit just the case when user changed a role or there was
-+		   a failure */
-+		send_audit_message(r >= 0, default_ctx, user_ctx);
-+	}
-+	if (r < 0) {
- 		switch (security_getenforce()) {
- 		case -1:
- 			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
- 		case 0:
--			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
--			    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
-+			error("%s: SELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
-+			    __func__);
- 			break;
- 		default:
--			fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
--			    "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
-+			fatal("%s: SELinux failure. Aborting connection.",
-+			    __func__);
- 		}
- 	}
--	if (user_ctx != NULL)
-+	if (user_ctx != NULL && user_ctx != default_ctx)
- 		freecon(user_ctx);
-+	if (default_ctx != NULL)
-+		freecon(default_ctx);
- 
- 	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
- }
-@@ -149,7 +430,10 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, cons
- 
- 	debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
- 
--	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
-+	if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) < 0) {
-+		error("%s: getexeccon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+		goto out;
-+	}
- 
- 	/* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
- 
-@@ -221,21 +505,6 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *n
- 	xfree(newctx);
- }
- 
--void
--ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *path)
--{
--	security_context_t context;
--
--	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
--		return;
--	if (path == NULL) {
--		setfscreatecon(NULL);
--		return;
--	}
--	if (matchpathcon(path, 0700, &context) == 0)
--		setfscreatecon(context);
--}
--
- #endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
- 
- #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux_part_2.c.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux_part_2.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux_part_2.c.role-mls	2012-11-28 17:06:43.703989944 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux_part_2.c	2012-11-28 17:06:43.703989944 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
-+/* $Id: port-linux.c,v 1.11.4.2 2011/02/04 00:43:08 djm Exp $ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
-+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
-+ *
-+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
-+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
-+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
-+ *
-+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
-+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
-+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
-+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
-+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
-+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
-+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
-+ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * Linux-specific portability code - just SELinux support at present
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#if defined(WITH_SELINUX) || defined(LINUX_OOM_ADJUST)
-+#include <errno.h>
-+#include <stdarg.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "port-linux.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "hostfile.h"
-+#include "auth.h"
-+
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
-+#include <selinux/flask.h>
-+#include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
-+
-+/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
-+int
-+ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
-+{
-+	static int enabled = -1;
-+
-+	if (enabled == -1) {
-+		enabled = (is_selinux_enabled() == 1);
-+		debug("SELinux support %s", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled");
-+	}
-+
-+	return (enabled);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *path)
-+{
-+	security_context_t context;
-+
-+	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
-+		return;
-+	if (path == NULL) {
-+		setfscreatecon(NULL);
-+		return;
-+	}
-+	if (matchpathcon(path, 0700, &context) == 0)
-+		setfscreatecon(context);
-+}
-+
-+#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
-+
-+#endif /* WITH_SELINUX || LINUX_OOM_ADJUST */
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.role-mls openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.role-mls	2012-11-28 17:06:43.688989996 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c	2012-11-28 17:06:43.703989944 +0100
-@@ -2101,6 +2101,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		restore_uid();
- 	}
- #endif
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
-+#endif
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- 	if (options.use_pam) {
- 		do_pam_setcred(1);

openssh-6.1p1-vendor.patch

@@ -1,158 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/configure.ac.vendor openssh-6.1p1/configure.ac
---- openssh-6.1p1/configure.ac.vendor	2012-09-14 20:36:49.153085211 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/configure.ac	2012-09-14 20:36:49.559088133 +0200
-@@ -4303,6 +4303,12 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([lastlog],
- 		fi
- 	]
- )
-+AC_ARG_ENABLE(vendor-patchlevel,
-+  [  --enable-vendor-patchlevel=TAG  specify a vendor patch level],
-+  [AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL,[SSH_RELEASE "-" "$enableval"],[Define to your vendor patch level, if it has been modified from the upstream source release.])
-+   SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL="$enableval"],
-+  [AC_DEFINE(SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL,SSH_RELEASE,[Define to your vendor patch level, if it has been modified from the upstream source release.])
-+   SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL=none])
- 
- dnl lastlog, [uw]tmpx? detection
- dnl  NOTE: set the paths in the platform section to avoid the
-@@ -4529,6 +4535,7 @@ echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack
- echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
- echo "              Random number source: $RAND_MSG"
- echo "             Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE"
-+echo "                Vendor patch level: $SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL"
- 
- echo ""
- 
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c.vendor openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c.vendor	2012-09-14 20:36:49.124085002 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c	2012-09-14 20:50:34.995972516 +0200
-@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
- 	options->max_authtries = -1;
- 	options->max_sessions = -1;
- 	options->banner = NULL;
-+	options->show_patchlevel = -1;
- 	options->use_dns = -1;
- 	options->client_alive_interval = -1;
- 	options->client_alive_count_max = -1;
-@@ -289,6 +290,9 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
- 		options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_THROUGHPUT;
- 	if (options->version_addendum == NULL)
- 		options->version_addendum = xstrdup("");
-+	if (options->show_patchlevel == -1)
-+		options->show_patchlevel = 0;
-+
- 	/* Turn privilege separation on by default */
- 	if (use_privsep == -1)
- 		use_privsep = PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX;
-@@ -326,7 +330,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sProtocol, sPidFile,
- 	sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem,
- 	sMaxStartups, sMaxAuthTries, sMaxSessions,
--	sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
-+	sBanner, sShowPatchLevel, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
- 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
- 	sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
- 	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
-@@ -441,6 +445,7 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "maxauthtries", sMaxAuthTries, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "maxsessions", sMaxSessions, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "banner", sBanner, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+	{ "showpatchlevel", sShowPatchLevel, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "usedns", sUseDNS, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "verifyreversemapping", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1162,6 +1167,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 		multistate_ptr = multistate_privsep;
- 		goto parse_multistate;
- 
-+	case sShowPatchLevel:
-+		intptr = &options->show_patchlevel;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
- 	case sAllowUsers:
- 		while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
- 			if (options->num_allow_users >= MAX_ALLOW_USERS)
-@@ -1956,6 +1965,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseLogin, o->use_login);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sCompression, o->compression);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGatewayPorts, o->gateway_ports);
-+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sShowPatchLevel, o->show_patchlevel);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep);
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h.vendor openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h
---- openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h.vendor	2012-09-14 20:36:49.125085009 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h	2012-09-14 20:36:49.564088168 +0200
-@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ typedef struct {
- 	int	max_authtries;
- 	int	max_sessions;
- 	char   *banner;			/* SSH-2 banner message */
-+	int	show_patchlevel;	/* Show vendor patch level to clients */
- 	int	use_dns;
- 	int	client_alive_interval;	/*
- 					 * poke the client this often to
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.vendor openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config
---- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.vendor	2012-09-14 20:36:49.507087759 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config	2012-09-14 20:36:49.565088175 +0200
-@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox		# Defaul
- #Compression delayed
- #ClientAliveInterval 0
- #ClientAliveCountMax 3
-+#ShowPatchLevel no
- #UseDNS yes
- #PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid
- #MaxStartups 10
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0.vendor openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0
---- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0.vendor	2012-09-14 20:36:49.510087780 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0	2012-09-14 20:36:49.567088190 +0200
-@@ -558,6 +558,11 @@ DESCRIPTION
-              Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1
-              server key.  The minimum value is 512, and the default is 1024.
- 
-+     ShowPatchLevel
-+	     Specifies whether sshd will display the specific patch level of
-+	     the binary in the server identification string.  The patch level
-+	     is set at compile-time.  The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
-+
-      StrictModes
-              Specifies whether sshd(8) should check file modes and ownership
-              of the user's files and home directory before accepting login.
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5.vendor openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5.vendor	2012-09-14 20:36:49.512087794 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5	2012-09-14 20:36:49.568088198 +0200
-@@ -978,6 +978,14 @@ This option applies to protocol version
- .It Cm ServerKeyBits
- Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key.
- The minimum value is 512, and the default is 1024.
-+.It Cm ShowPatchLevel 
-+Specifies whether 
-+.Nm sshd 
-+will display the patch level of the binary in the identification string. 
-+The patch level is set at compile-time. 
-+The default is 
-+.Dq no . 
-+This option applies to protocol version 1 only. 
- .It Cm StrictModes
- Specifies whether
- .Xr sshd 8
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.vendor openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.vendor	2012-09-14 20:36:49.399086981 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c	2012-09-14 20:47:30.696088744 +0200
-@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in
- 	}
- 
- 	xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s",
--	    major, minor, SSH_VERSION,
-+	    major, minor, (options.show_patchlevel == 1) ? SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL : SSH_VERSION,
- 	    *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
- 	    options.version_addendum, newline);
- 
-@@ -1635,7 +1635,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		exit(1);
- 	}
- 
--	debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_RELEASE);
-+	debug("sshd version %.100s",
-+	      (options.show_patchlevel == 1) ? SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL : SSH_RELEASE);
- 
- 	/* Store privilege separation user for later use if required. */
- 	if ((privsep_pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL) {

openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch

@@ -97,5 +97,5 @@ diff -up openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c
  	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
 +		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->ecbctx);
  		memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
- 		xfree(c);
+ 		free(c);
  		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);

openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index d98fa67..25d347b 100644
+--- a/scp.c
++++ b/scp.c
+@@ -638,7 +638,10 @@ toremote(char *targ, int argc, char **argv)
+ 			addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program);
+ 			addargs(&alist, "-x");
+ 			addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes");
+-			addargs(&alist, "-n");
++			if (isatty(fileno(stdin)))
++				addargs(&alist, "-t");
++			else
++				addargs(&alist, "-n");
+ 			for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) {
+ 				addargs(&alist, "%s",
+ 				    remote_remote_args.list[j]);

openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/log.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100
+@@ -250,6 +250,11 @@ debug3(const char *fmt,...)
+ void
+ log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr)
+ {
++	log_init_handler(av0, level, facility, on_stderr, 1);
++}
++
++void
++log_init_handler(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr, int reset_handler) {
+ #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
+ 	struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
+ #endif
+@@ -273,8 +278,10 @@ log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, Sysl
+ 		exit(1);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	log_handler = NULL;
+-	log_handler_ctx = NULL;
++	if (reset_handler) {
++		log_handler = NULL;
++		log_handler_ctx = NULL;
++	}
+ 
+ 	log_on_stderr = on_stderr;
+ 	if (on_stderr)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/log.h.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/log.h	2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100
+@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, const char *, void *);
+ 
+ void     log_init(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
++void     log_init_handler(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int, int);
+ LogLevel log_level_get(void);
+ int      log_change_level(LogLevel);
+ int      log_is_on_stderr(void);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.311168085 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c	2016-12-23 15:16:42.154193100 +0100
+@@ -307,6 +307,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
+ 		close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
+ 	pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
+ 
++	pmonitor->m_state = "preauth";
++
+ 	authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
+ 	memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
+ 	ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
+@@ -405,6 +407,8 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *p
+ 	close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
+ 	pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
+ 
++	pmonitor->m_state = "postauth";
++
+ 	monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
+ 	ssh_signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
+ 	ssh_signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
+@@ -472,7 +476,7 @@ monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonito
+ 	if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
+ 		fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
+ 		    __func__, level);
+-	do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
++	do_log2(level, "%s [%s]", msg, pmonitor->m_state);
+ 
+ 	sshbuf_free(logmsg);
+ 	free(msg);
+@@ -1719,13 +1723,28 @@ monitor_init(void)
+ 	mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
+ 	monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
+ 
++	mon->m_state = "";
++
+ 	return mon;
+ }
+ 
+ void
+-monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
++monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon, const char *chroot_dir)
+ {
+-	monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
++	struct stat dev_log_stat;
++	char *dev_log_path;
++	int do_logfds = 0;
++
++	if (chroot_dir != NULL) {
++		xasprintf(&dev_log_path, "%s/dev/log", chroot_dir);
++
++		if (stat(dev_log_path, &dev_log_stat) != 0) {
++			debug("%s: /dev/log doesn't exist in %s chroot - will try to log via monitor using [postauth] suffix", __func__, chroot_dir);
++			do_logfds = 1;
++		}
++		free(dev_log_path);
++	}
++	monitor_openfds(mon, do_logfds);
+ }
+ 
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h	2016-12-23 15:16:28.372190424 +0100
+@@ -83,10 +83,11 @@ struct monitor {
+ 	int			 m_log_sendfd;
+ 	struct kex		**m_pkex;
+ 	pid_t			 m_pid;
++	char		*m_state;
+ };
+ 
+ struct monitor *monitor_init(void);
+-void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *);
++void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *, const char *);
+ 
+ struct Authctxt;
+ void monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *, struct monitor *);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.319168086 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 15:18:18.742211853 +0100
+@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ login_cap_t *lc;
+ 
+ static int is_child = 0;
+ static int in_chroot = 0;
++static int have_dev_log = 1;
+ 
+ /* File containing userauth info, if ExposeAuthInfo set */
+ static char *auth_info_file = NULL;
+@@ -619,6 +620,7 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 	int ret;
+ 	const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL;
+ 	char session_type[1024];
++	struct stat dev_log_stat;
+ 
+ 	if (options.adm_forced_command) {
+ 		original_command = command;
+@@ -676,6 +678,10 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 			tty += 5;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (lstat("/dev/log", &dev_log_stat) != 0) {
++		have_dev_log = 0;
++	}
++
+ 	verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
+ 	    session_type,
+ 	    tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
+@@ -1486,14 +1492,6 @@ child_close_fds(void)
+ 
+ 	/* Stop directing logs to a high-numbered fd before we close it */
+ 	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
+-	 * hanging around in clients.  Note that we want to do this after
+-	 * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
+-	 * descriptors open.
+-	 */
+-	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -1629,8 +1627,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+ 			exit(1);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+-
+ 	do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell);
+ 
+ 	/* restore SIGPIPE for child */
+@@ -1653,9 +1649,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+ 		argv[i] = NULL;
+ 		optind = optreset = 1;
+ 		__progname = argv[0];
+-		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
++		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw, have_dev_log));
+ 	}
+ 
++	/*
++	 * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
++	 * hanging around in clients.  Note that we want to do this after
++	 * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
++	 * descriptors open.
++	 */
++	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
++
+ 	fflush(NULL);
+ 
+ 	/* Get the last component of the shell name. */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h	2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100
+@@ -97,5 +97,5 @@
+ 
+ struct passwd;
+ 
+-int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *);
++int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *, int);
+ void	sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100
+@@ -1497,7 +1497,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
++sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handler)
+ {
+ 	fd_set *rset, *wset;
+ 	int i, r, in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
+@@ -1511,7 +1511,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+ 	extern char *__progname;
+ 
+ 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+-	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
++	log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler);
+ 
+ 	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
+ 
+@@ -1582,7 +1582,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+-	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
++	log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler);
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * On platforms where we can, avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps}
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100
+@@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 		return 1;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
++	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw, 0));
+ }
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.328168088 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.332168088 +0100
+@@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* New socket pair */
+-	monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
++	monitor_reinit(pmonitor, options.chroot_directory);
+ 
+ 	pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
+ 	if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
+@@ -668,6 +668,11 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 
+ 	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+ 	pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
++	close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
++	pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
++
++	if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd != -1)
++		set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
+ 
+ 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
+ 	demote_sensitive_data();

openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+--- a/scp.c	
++++ a/scp.c	
+@@ -1084,6 +1084,10 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
+ 			free(vect[0]);
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
++		if (buf[0] == 'C' && ! exists && np[strlen(np)-1] == '/') {
++			errno = ENOTDIR;
++			goto bad;
++		}
+ 		omode = mode;
+ 		mode |= S_IWUSR;
+ 		if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) == -1) {
+-- 

openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
+ #include "misc.h"      /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
+ #include "servconf.h"
+ #include "port-linux.h"
++#include "misc.h"
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "hostfile.h"
+ #include "auth.h"
+@@ -445,7 +446,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+ void
+ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
+ {
+-	security_context_t *ctx;
++	char *ctx;
+ 
+ 	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
+ 		return;
+@@ -461,6 +462,72 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
++void
++sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void)
++{
++	int len;
++	char line[1024], *preauth_context = NULL, *cp, *arg;
++	const char *contexts_path;
++	FILE *contexts_file;
++	struct stat sb;
++
++	contexts_path = selinux_openssh_contexts_path();
++	if (contexts_path == NULL) {
++		debug3("%s: Failed to get the path to SELinux context", __func__);
++		return;
++	}
++
++	if ((contexts_file = fopen(contexts_path, "r")) == NULL) {
++		debug("%s: Failed to open SELinux context file", __func__);
++		return;
++	}
++
++	if (fstat(fileno(contexts_file), &sb) != 0 ||
++	    sb.st_uid != 0 || (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
++		logit("%s: SELinux context file needs to be owned by root"
++		    " and not writable by anyone else", __func__);
++		fclose(contexts_file);
++		return;
++	}
++
++	while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), contexts_file)) {
++		/* Strip trailing whitespace */
++		for (len = strlen(line) - 1; len > 0; len--) {
++			if (strchr(" \t\r\n", line[len]) == NULL)
++				break;
++			line[len] = '\0';
++		}
++
++		if (line[0] == '\0')
++			continue;
++
++		cp = line;
++		arg = strdelim(&cp);
++		if (arg && *arg == '\0')
++			arg = strdelim(&cp);
++
++		if (arg && strcmp(arg, "privsep_preauth") == 0) {
++			arg = strdelim(&cp);
++			if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
++				debug("%s: privsep_preauth is empty", __func__);
++				fclose(contexts_file);
++				return;
++			}
++			preauth_context = xstrdup(arg);
++		}
++	}
++	fclose(contexts_file);
++
++	if (preauth_context == NULL) {
++		debug("%s: Unable to find 'privsep_preauth' option in"
++		    " SELinux context file", __func__);
++		return;
++	}
++
++	ssh_selinux_change_context(preauth_context);
++	free(preauth_context);
++}
++
+ #endif
+ #endif
+ 
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+index 22ea8ef..1fc963d 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname)
+ 	strlcpy(newctx + len, newname, newlen - len);
+ 	if ((cx = index(cx + 1, ':')))
+ 		strlcat(newctx, cx, newlen);
+-	debug3("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
++	debug("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
+ 	    oldctx, newctx);
+ 	if (setcon(newctx) < 0)
+ 		switchlog("%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s", __func__,
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+index cb51f99..8b7cda2 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
++void sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 2871fe9..39b9c08 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
+ 	demote_sensitive_data();
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-	ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t");
++	sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context();
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	/* Demote the child */

openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.615216100 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2016-12-23 15:18:40.628216102 +0100
+@@ -279,7 +279,6 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
+ 	FILE *fp;
+ 	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
+ 	char *line = NULL;
+-	char kuser[65]; /* match krb5_kuserok() */
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
+ 	int found_principal = 0;
+@@ -288,7 +287,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
+ 
+ 	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
+ 	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
+-	if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) {
++	if ( !options.enable_k5users || (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1))) {
+                 return ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, principal, luser,
+                                         k5login_exists);
+ 	}
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.615216100 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 15:35:36.354401156 +0100
+@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ 	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
+ 	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
+ 	options->use_kuserok = -1;
++	options->enable_k5users = -1;
+ 	options->password_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+@@ -345,6 +346,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ #endif
+ 	if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
+ 		options->use_kuserok = 1;
++	if (options->enable_k5users == -1)
++		options->enable_k5users = 0;
+ 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->password_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+@@ -418,7 +421,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes,
+ 	sHostKeyAlgorithms,
+ 	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
+-	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
++	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+ 	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
+ 	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+ 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+@@ -497,14 +500,16 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #else
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "gssapienablek5users", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1653,6 +1658,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case sGssEnablek5users:
++		intptr = &options->enable_k5users;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case sPermitListen:
+ 	case sPermitOpen:
+ 		if (opcode == sPermitListen) {
+@@ -2026,6 +2035,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok);
++	M_CP_INTOPT(enable_k5users);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
+@@ -2320,6 +2330,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ # endif
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssEnablek5users, o->enable_k5users);
+ #endif
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.616216100 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2016-12-23 15:18:40.629216102 +0100
+@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ typedef struct {
+	int     kerberos_unique_ccache;		/* If true, the acquired ticket will
+						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
+ 	int	use_kuserok;
++	int		enable_k5users;
+ 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
+ 	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
+ 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.630216103 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2016-12-23 15:36:21.607408435 +0100
+@@ -628,6 +628,12 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
+ on logout.
+ The default is
+ .Cm yes .
++.It Cm GSSAPIEnablek5users
++Specifies whether to look at .k5users file for GSSAPI authentication
++access control. Further details are described in
++.Xr ksu 1 .
++The default is
++.Cm no .
+ .It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
+ Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
+ doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.616216100 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config	2016-12-23 15:18:40.631216103 +0100
+@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ GSSAPIAuthentication yes
+ #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
+ #GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
+ #GSSAPIKeyExchange no
++#GSSAPIEnablek5users no
+ 
+ # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will

openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c
+--- openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts	2016-07-25 13:58:48.998507834 +0200
++++ openssh/sshd.c	2016-07-25 14:01:28.346469878 +0200
+@@ -1507,12 +1507,29 @@ check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 
+ 	if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts,
+ 	    &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
+-		text[0] = '\0';
+-		for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
+-			snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
+-			    " %2.2x", opts[i]);
+-		fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP opts: %.800s",
+-		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text);
++		i = 0;
++		do {
++			switch (opts[i]) {
++				case 0:
++				case 1:
++					++i;
++					break;
++				case 130:
++				case 133:
++				case 134:
++					i += opts[i + 1];
++					break;
++				default:
++				/* Fail, fatally, if we detect either loose or strict
++			 	 * source routing options. */
++					text[0] = '\0';
++					for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
++						snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
++							" %2.2x", opts[i]);
++					fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP options:%.800s",
++						ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text);
++			}
++		} while (i < option_size);
+ 	}
+ 	return;
+ #endif /* IP_OPTIONS */

openssh-6.6p1-ctr-cavstest.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,45 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-5.9p1/ctr-cavstest.c
+diff -up openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in
---- openssh-5.9p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs	2012-01-13 15:59:06.584283289 +0100
+--- openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs	2015-03-18 11:22:05.493289018 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/ctr-cavstest.c	2012-01-13 18:21:33.791941027 +0100
++++ openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in	2015-03-18 11:22:44.504196316 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
+ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
+ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
+ SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
++CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest
+ SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+ SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
+@@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+ 
+ .SUFFIXES: .lo
+ 
+-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
++TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
+ 
+ XMSS_OBJS=\
+ 	ssh-xmss.o \
+@@ -194,6 +195,9 @@ ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) l
+ ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS)
+ 
++ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o
++	$(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
++
+ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 
+@@ -326,6 +330,7 @@ install-files:
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
++	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
+diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c
+--- openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs	2015-03-18 11:22:05.521288952 +0100
++++ openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c	2015-03-18 11:22:05.521288952 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
 +/*
 + *
 + * invocation (all of the following are equal):
@@ -22,6 +60,7 @@ diff -up openssh-5.9p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-5.9p1/ctr-cavstest.c
 +
 +#include "xmalloc.h"
 +#include "log.h"
++#include "ssherr.h"
 +#include "cipher.h"
 +
 +/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
@@ -95,7 +134,7 @@ diff -up openssh-5.9p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-5.9p1/ctr-cavstest.c
 +                        break;
 +
 +                total += n;
-+                buf = xrealloc(buf, total + READ_CHUNK, 1);
++                buf = xreallocarray(buf, total + READ_CHUNK, 1);
 +        } while(total < MAX_READ_SIZE);
 +        return buf;
 +}
@@ -103,14 +142,14 @@ diff -up openssh-5.9p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-5.9p1/ctr-cavstest.c
 +int main (int argc, char *argv[])
 +{
 +
-+        Cipher *c;
++        const struct sshcipher *c;
-+        CipherContext cc;
++        struct sshcipher_ctx *cc;
 +        char *algo = "aes128-ctr";
 +        char *hexkey = NULL;
 +        char *hexiv = "00000000000000000000000000000000";
 +        char *hexdata = NULL;
 +        char *p;
-+        int i;
++        int i, r;
 +        int encrypt = 1;
 +        void *key;
 +        size_t keylen;
@@ -148,7 +187,7 @@ diff -up openssh-5.9p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-5.9p1/ctr-cavstest.c
 +                usage();
 +        }
 +
-+	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
++	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
 +
 +	c = cipher_by_name(algo);
 +	if (c == NULL) {
@@ -183,10 +222,13 @@ diff -up openssh-5.9p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-5.9p1/ctr-cavstest.c
 +		return 2;
 +	}
 +
-+	cipher_init(&cc, c, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, encrypt);
++	if ((r = cipher_init(&cc, c, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, encrypt)) != 0) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "Error: cipher_init failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
++		return 2;
++	}
 +
-+        xfree(key);
++	free(key);
-+        xfree(iv);
++	free(iv);
 +
 +	outdata = malloc(datalen);
 +	if(outdata == NULL) {
@@ -194,57 +236,22 @@ diff -up openssh-5.9p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-5.9p1/ctr-cavstest.c
 +		return 2;
 +	}
 +
-+	cipher_crypt(&cc, outdata, data, datalen);
++	if ((r = cipher_crypt(cc, 0, outdata, data, datalen, 0, 0)) != 0) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "Error: cipher_crypt failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
++		return 2;
++	}
 +
-+        xfree(data);
++	free(data);
 +
-+	cipher_cleanup(&cc);
++	cipher_free(cc);
 +
 +        for (p = outdata; datalen > 0; ++p, --datalen) {
 +		printf("%02X", (unsigned char)*p);
 +	}
 +
-+        xfree(outdata);
++        free(outdata);
 +
 +        printf("\n");
 +        return 0;
 +}
 +
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in
---- openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs	2012-01-13 15:59:06.539282357 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in	2012-01-13 15:59:06.588283373 +0100
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
- SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper
- SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper
- SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
-+CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest
- SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
- PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
- SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
-@@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
- MANFMT=@MANFMT@
- INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@
- 
--TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
- 
- LIBSSH_OBJS=acss.o authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
- 	canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-acss.o cipher-aes.o \
-@@ -171,6 +172,9 @@ ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) l
- ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS)
- 
-+ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
-+
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
- 
-@@ -271,6 +275,7 @@ install-files:
- 		$(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \
- 	fi
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
-+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1

openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.8p2/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb openssh-5.8p2/gss-serv-krb5.c
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
---- openssh-5.8p2/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb	2006-09-01 07:38:36.000000000 +0200
+index 413b845..54dd383 100644
-+++ openssh-5.8p2/gss-serv-krb5.c	2011-05-19 03:41:45.801109545 +0200
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
 @@ -32,7 +32,9 @@
  #include <sys/types.h>
  
@@ -10,28 +11,19 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p2/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb openssh-5.8p2/gss-serv-krb5.c
 +#include <unistd.h>
  
  #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "key.h"
+ #include "sshkey.h"
-@@ -40,12 +42,11 @@
+@@ -45,6 +47,7 @@
- #include "auth.h"
- #include "log.h"
- #include "servconf.h"
-+#include "misc.h"
  
- #include "buffer.h"
  #include "ssh-gss.h"
  
--extern ServerOptions options;
++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
--
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+ 
  #ifdef HEIMDAL
- # include <krb5.h>
+@@ -56,6 +59,13 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
- #else
+ # include <gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h>
-@@ -56,6 +57,16 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
- # endif
  #endif
  
-+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
-+extern ServerOptions options;
-+
 +/* all commands are allowed by default */
 +char **k5users_allowed_cmds = NULL;
 +
@@ -42,21 +34,16 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p2/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb openssh-5.8p2/gss-serv-krb5.c
  static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
  
  /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
-@@ -83,10 +94,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
+@@ -88,6 +98,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
-  */
- 
- static int
--ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
-+ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *luser)
- {
  	krb5_principal princ;
  	int retval;
+ 	const char *errmsg;
 +	int k5login_exists;
  
  	if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0)
  		return 0;
-@@ -97,10 +109,22 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client
+@@ -99,10 +110,22 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
- 		    krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, retval));
+ 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
  		return 0;
  	}
 -	if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name)) {
@@ -66,21 +53,20 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p2/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb openssh-5.8p2/gss-serv-krb5.c
 +	/* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user,
 +	 * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials
 +	 * to access these files aren't available yet. */
-+	if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, luser) && k5login_exists) {
++	if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) {
  		retval = 1;
  		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
--		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
+ 		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
-+		    luser, (char *)client->displayname.value);
 +	} else if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(princ, client->exportedname.value,
-+		luser, k5login_exists)) {
++		name, k5login_exists)) {
 +		retval = 1;
 +		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s "
 +		    "(ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok)",
-+		    luser, (char *)client->displayname.value);
++		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
  	} else
  		retval = 0;
  
-@@ -108,6 +132,135 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client
+@@ -110,6 +133,137 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
  	return retval;
  }
  
@@ -111,13 +97,14 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p2/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb openssh-5.8p2/gss-serv-krb5.c
 +{
 +	FILE *fp;
 +	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
-+	char line[BUFSIZ];
++	char *line = NULL;
 +	char kuser[65]; /* match krb5_kuserok() */
 +	struct stat st;
 +	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
 +	int found_principal = 0;
 +	int ncommands = 0, allcommands = 0;
-+	u_long linenum;
++	u_long linenum = 0;
++	size_t linesize = 0;
 +
 +	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
 +	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
@@ -161,9 +148,9 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p2/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb openssh-5.8p2/gss-serv-krb5.c
 +	k5users_allowed_cmds = xcalloc(++ncommands,
 +	    sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds));
 +
-+	/* Check each line.  ksu allows unlimited length lines.  We don't. */
++	/* Check each line.  ksu allows unlimited length lines. */
-+	while (!allcommands && read_keyfile_line(fp, file, line, sizeof(line),
++	while (!allcommands && getline(&line, &linesize, fp) != -1) {
-+	    &linenum) != -1) {
++		linenum++;
 +		char *token;
 +
 +		/* we parse just like ksu, even though we could do better */
@@ -177,7 +164,7 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p2/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb openssh-5.8p2/gss-serv-krb5.c
 +				k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] =
 +				    xstrdup(pw->pw_shell);
 +				k5users_allowed_cmds =
-+				    xrealloc(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands,
++				    xreallocarray(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands,
 +					sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds));
 +				break;
 +			}
@@ -190,12 +177,13 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p2/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb openssh-5.8p2/gss-serv-krb5.c
 +				k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] =
 +				    xstrdup(token);
 +				k5users_allowed_cmds =
-+				    xrealloc(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands,
++				    xreallocarray(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands,
 +					sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds));
 +				token = strtok(NULL, " \t\n");
 +			}
 +		}
 +       }
++	free(line);
 +	if (k5users_allowed_cmds) {
 +		/* terminate vector */
 +		k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] = NULL;
@@ -216,19 +204,20 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p2/gss-serv-krb5.c.force_krb openssh-5.8p2/gss-serv-krb5.c
  
  /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
   * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
-diff -up openssh-5.8p2/session.c.force_krb openssh-5.8p2/session.c
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
---- openssh-5.8p2/session.c.force_krb	2011-05-19 03:41:41.000000000 +0200
+index 28659ec..9c94d8e 100644
-+++ openssh-5.8p2/session.c	2011-05-19 03:43:32.437173662 +0200
+--- a/session.c
-@@ -820,6 +820,29 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
++++ b/session.c
- 		debug("Forced command (key option) '%.900s'", command);
+@@ -789,6 +789,29 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 		command = auth_opts->force_command;
+ 		forced = "(key-option)";
  	}
- 
 +#ifdef GSSAPI
 +#ifdef KRB5 /* k5users_allowed_cmds only available w/ GSSAPI+KRB5 */
 +	else if (k5users_allowed_cmds) {
 +		const char *match = command;
 +		int allowed = 0, i = 0;
-+ 
++
 +		if (!match)
 +			match = s->pw->pw_shell;
 +		while (k5users_allowed_cmds[i]) {
@@ -246,13 +235,29 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p2/session.c.force_krb openssh-5.8p2/session.c
 +#endif
 +#endif
 +
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ 	s->forced = 0;
- 	if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1)
+ 	if (forced != NULL) {
- 		fatal("do_exec: command already set");
+ 		s->forced = 1;
-diff -up openssh-5.8p2/sshd.8.force_krb openssh-5.8p2/sshd.8
+diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
---- openssh-5.8p2/sshd.8.force_krb	2011-05-19 03:41:30.582114401 +0200
+index 0374c88..509109a 100644
-+++ openssh-5.8p2/sshd.8	2011-05-19 03:41:46.159106308 +0200
+--- a/ssh-gss.h
-@@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ Finally, the server and the client enter
++++ b/ssh-gss.h
+@@ -49,6 +49,10 @@
+ #  endif /* !HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_... */
+ 
+ # endif /* !HEIMDAL */
++
++/* .k5users support */
++extern char **k5users_allowed_cmds;
++
+ #endif /* KRB5 */
+ 
+ /* draft-ietf-secsh-gsskeyex-06 */
+diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
+index adcaaf9..824163b 100644
+--- a/sshd.8
++++ b/sshd.8
+@@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.
  The client tries to authenticate itself using
  host-based authentication,
  public key authentication,
@@ -260,7 +265,7 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p2/sshd.8.force_krb openssh-5.8p2/sshd.8
  challenge-response authentication,
  or password authentication.
  .Pp
-@@ -796,6 +797,12 @@ This file is used in exactly the same wa
+@@ -800,6 +801,12 @@ This file is used in exactly the same way as
  but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
  rlogin/rsh.
  .Pp
@@ -273,17 +278,3 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p2/sshd.8.force_krb openssh-5.8p2/sshd.8
  .It Pa ~/.ssh/
  This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
  and authentication information.
-diff -up openssh-5.8p2/ssh-gss.h.force_krb openssh-5.8p2/ssh-gss.h
---- openssh-5.8p2/ssh-gss.h.force_krb	2007-06-12 15:40:39.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.8p2/ssh-gss.h	2011-05-19 03:41:46.302234118 +0200
-@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@
- #define GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE gss_nt_service_name
- #endif /* GSS_C_NT_... */
- #endif /* !HEIMDAL */
-+
-+/* .k5users support */
-+extern char **k5users_allowed_cmds;
-+
- #endif /* KRB5 */
- 
- /* draft-ietf-secsh-gsskeyex-06 */

openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch

@@ -1,24 +1,24 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c.keycat openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c
+diff -up openssh/auth.c.keycat openssh/misc.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c.keycat	2012-11-01 13:37:59.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh/auth.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.158849606 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c	2012-11-01 14:03:47.402279914 +0100
++++ openssh/auth.c	2015-06-24 11:04:23.989868638 +0200
-@@ -564,6 +564,14 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd 
+@@ -966,6 +966,14 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
+ 			_exit(1);
  		}
- 		closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
  
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+		if (ssh_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
++		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
 +			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
 +			    strerror(errno));
 +			_exit(127);
 +		}
 +#endif
 +
- 		execl(options.authorized_keys_command,
+ 		execve(av[0], av, child_env);
- 		    options.authorized_keys_command, pw->pw_name, NULL);
+ 		error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno));
- 
+ 		_exit(127);
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh-6.1p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
+diff -up openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
---- openssh-6.1p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat	2012-11-01 13:37:59.417280097 +0100
+--- openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat	2012-11-01 13:37:59.417280097 +0100
++++ openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
 @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
 +The ssh-keycat retrieves the content of the ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
 +of an user in any environment. This includes environments with
@@ -26,69 +26,112 @@ diff -up openssh-6.1p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh-6.1p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
 +
 +To use ssh-keycat, set these options in /etc/ssh/sshd_config file:
 +        AuthorizedKeysCommand /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keycat
-+        AuthorizedKeysCommandRunAs root
++        AuthorizedKeysCommandUser root
 +
 +Do not forget to enable public key authentication:
 +        PubkeyAuthentication yes
 +
 +
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/Makefile.in.keycat openssh-6.1p1/Makefile.in
+diff -up openssh/Makefile.in.keycat openssh/Makefile.in
---- openssh-6.1p1/Makefile.in.keycat	2012-11-01 13:37:59.413280097 +0100
+--- openssh/Makefile.in.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.152849621 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/Makefile.in	2012-11-01 13:37:59.418280097 +0100
++++ openssh/Makefile.in	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
 @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
+ ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
+ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
  SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
- SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper
- SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper
 +SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
  SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+ SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
  PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
- SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
+@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
-@@ -62,7 +63,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
- MANFMT=@MANFMT@
+ GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
- INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@
+ SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
++KEYCATLIBS=@KEYCATLIBS@
+ LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
+ LIBFIDO2=@LIBFIDO2@
+ AR=@AR@
+@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
  
--TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT)
+ .SUFFIXES: .lo
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
  
- LIBSSH_OBJS=acss.o authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
+-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT)
- 	canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-acss.o cipher-aes.o \
++TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
-@@ -168,6 +169,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT)
- ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
  
-+ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o
+ XMSS_OBJS=\
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS)
+ 	ssh-xmss.o \
+@@ -190,6 +191,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT)
+ ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SKHELPER_OBJS)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2)
+ 
++ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o
++	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS)
 +
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o
+ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
  
-@@ -267,6 +271,7 @@ install-files:
+@@ -321,6 +325,7 @@ install-files:
- 		$(INSTALL) -m 0700 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-ldap-helper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_HELPER) ; \
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
- 		$(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	fi
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
 +	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
  	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
  	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
  	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.keycat openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
---- openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.keycat	2012-11-01 13:37:59.367280097 +0100
+--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.150849626 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2012-11-01 13:37:59.419280097 +0100
++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2015-06-24 10:57:50.160849601 +0200
-@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+@@ -25,8 +25,10 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+ 
++int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
++int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.150849626 +0200
++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2015-06-24 10:57:50.159849603 +0200
+@@ -54,6 +54,20 @@ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+ extern int inetd_flag;
+ extern int rexeced_flag;
+ 
++/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
++int
++sshd_selinux_enabled(void)
++{
++	static int enabled = -1;
++
++	if (enabled == -1) {
++		enabled = (is_selinux_enabled() == 1);
++		debug("SELinux support %s", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled");
++	}
++
++	return (enabled);
++}
++
+ /* Send audit message */
+ static int
+ sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context,
+@@ -308,7 +322,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
  
  /* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
  static int
--ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+-sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
-+ssh_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(const char *, const char *))
++sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *))
  {
  	const char *reqlvl;
  	char *role;
-@@ -326,16 +326,16 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+@@ -319,16 +333,16 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
  
  	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
  
 -	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
 +	rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
- 	
+ 
  	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
  		use_current = "1";
  	} else {
@@ -101,36 +144,66 @@ diff -up openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.keycat openssh-6.1p1/openbsd-
 +	rv = rv || set_it("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current);
  
  	if (role != NULL)
- 		xfree(role);
+ 		free(role);
-@@ -343,6 +343,24 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+@@ -336,6 +350,24 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
  	return rv;
  }
  
 +static int
-+ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
++sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
 +{
-+	return ssh_selinux_setup_variables(do_pam_putenv);
++	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_pam_putenv);
 +}
 +
 +static int
-+do_setenv(char *name, char *value)
++do_setenv(char *name, const char *value)
 +{
 +	return setenv(name, value, 1);
 +}
 +
 +int
-+ssh_selinux_setup_env_variables(void)
++sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void)
 +{
-+	return ssh_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv);
++	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv);
 +}
 +
  /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
  void
- ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh-6.1p1/ssh-keycat.c
+@@ -344,7 +376,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
---- openssh-6.1p1/ssh-keycat.c.keycat	2012-11-01 13:37:59.420280097 +0100
+ 	int r = 0;
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/ssh-keycat.c	2012-11-01 13:37:59.420280097 +0100
+ 	security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
-@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+ 
+-	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
++	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
+ 		return;
+ 
+ 	if (options.use_pam) {
+@@ -415,7 +447,7 @@ sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
+ {
+ 	security_context_t *ctx;
+ 
+-	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
++	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
+ 		return;
+ 
+ 	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
+diff -up openssh/platform.c.keycat openssh/platform.c
+--- openssh/platform.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.147849633 +0200
++++ openssh/platform.c	2015-06-24 10:57:50.160849601 +0200
+@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *p
+ {
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ 	/* Cache selinux status for later use */
+-	(void)ssh_selinux_enabled();
++	(void)sshd_selinux_enabled();
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS
+diff -up openssh/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh/ssh-keycat.c
+--- openssh/ssh-keycat.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.161849599 +0200
++++ openssh/ssh-keycat.c	2015-06-24 10:57:50.161849599 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
 +/*
 + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -180,6 +253,9 @@ diff -up openssh-6.1p1/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh-6.1p1/ssh-keycat.c
 +#include <pwd.h>
 +#include <fcntl.h>
 +#include <unistd.h>
++#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
++#include <stdint.h>
++#endif
 +
 +#include <security/pam_appl.h>
 +
@@ -369,3 +445,41 @@ diff -up openssh-6.1p1/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh-6.1p1/ssh-keycat.c
 +	}
 +	return ev;
 +}
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 3bbccfd..6481f1f 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -2952,6 +2952,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
+ 			PAM_MSG="yes"
+ 
+ 			SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam"
++			KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -lpam"
+ 			AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1],
+ 				[Define if you want to enable PAM support])
+ 
+@@ -3105,6 +3106,7 @@
+ 					;;
+ 				*)
+ 					SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl"
++					KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -ldl"
+ 					;;
+ 				esac
+ 			fi
+@@ -4042,6 +4044,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
+ 	fi ]
+ )
+ AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
++AC_SUBST([KEYCATLIBS])
+ 
+ # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
+ KRB5_MSG="no"
+@@ -5031,6 +5034,9 @@ fi
+ if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then
+ echo "         +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}"
+ fi
++if test ! -z "${KEYCATLIBS}"; then
++echo "   +for ssh-keycat: ${KEYCATLIBS}"
++fi
+ 
+ echo ""
+ 

openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c.keyperm openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c
+--- openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c.keyperm	2020-02-14 01:40:54.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c	2020-02-17 11:55:12.841729758 +0100
+@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <fcntl.h>
++#include <grp.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+@@ -101,7 +102,19 @@ sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filen
+ #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ 	if (check_ntsec(filename))
+ #endif
++
+ 	if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
++		if (st.st_mode & 040) {
++			struct group *gr;
++
++			if ((gr = getgrnam("ssh_keys")) && (st.st_gid == gr->gr_gid)) {
++				/* The only additional bit is read
++				 * for ssh_keys group, which is fine */
++				if ((st.st_mode & 077) == 040 ) {
++					return 0;
++				}
++			}
++		}
+ 		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+ 		error("@         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @");
+ 		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");

openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.640465939 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c	2016-12-23 14:36:07.644465936 +0100
+@@ -56,6 +56,21 @@
+ 
+ extern ServerOptions	 options;
+ 
++int
++ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context krb5_ctx, krb5_principal krb5_user, const char *client,
++                 int k5login_exists)
++{
++	if (options.use_kuserok || !k5login_exists)
++		return krb5_kuserok(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, client);
++	else {
++		char kuser[65];
++
++		if (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, sizeof(kuser), kuser))
++			return 0;
++		return strcmp(kuser, client) == 0;
++	}
++}
++
+ static int
+ krb5_init(void *context)
+ {
+@@ -160,8 +175,9 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+ 	if (problem)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+-	if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
+-	    authctxt->pw->pw_name)) {
++	/* Use !options.use_kuserok here to make ssh_krb5_kuserok() not
++	 * depend on the existance of .k5login */
++	if (!ssh_krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, authctxt->pw->pw_name, !options.use_kuserok)) {
+ 		problem = -1;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.640465939 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2016-12-23 14:36:07.644465936 +0100
+@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_pr
+     int);
+ 
+ static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
++extern int ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context, krb5_principal, const char *, int);
+ 
+ /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
+ 
+@@ -92,6 +93,103 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
+  * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0
+  */
+ 
++/* The purpose of the function is to find out if a Kerberos principal is
++ * allowed to log in as the given local user. This is a general problem with
++ * Kerberized services because by design the Kerberos principals are
++ * completely independent from the local user names. This is one of the
++ * reasons why Kerberos is working well on different operating systems like
++ * Windows and UNIX/Linux. Nevertheless a relationship between a Kerberos
++ * principal and a local user name must be established because otherwise every
++ * access would be granted for every principal with a valid ticket.
++ *
++ * Since it is a general issue libkrb5 provides some functions for
++ * applications to find out about the relationship between the Kerberos
++ * principal and a local user name. They are krb5_kuserok() and
++ * krb5_aname_to_localname().
++ *
++ * krb5_kuserok() can be used to "Determine if a principal is authorized to
++ * log in as a local user" (from the MIT Kerberos documentation of this
++ * function). Which is exactly what we are looking for and should be the
++ * preferred choice. It accepts the Kerberos principal and a local user name
++ * and let libkrb5 or its plugins determine if they relate to each other or
++ * not.
++ *
++ * krb5_aname_to_localname() can use used to "Convert a principal name to a
++ * local name" (from the MIT Kerberos documentation of this function). It
++ * accepts a Kerberos principle and returns a local name and it is up to the
++ * application to do any additional checks. There are two issues using
++ * krb5_aname_to_localname(). First, since POSIX user names are case
++ * sensitive, the calling application in general has no other choice than
++ * doing a case-sensitive string comparison between the name returned by
++ * krb5_aname_to_localname() and the name used at the login prompt. When the
++ * users are provided by a case in-sensitive server, e.g. Active Directory,
++ * this might lead to login failures because the user typing the name at the
++ * login prompt might not be aware of the right case. Another issue might be
++ * caused if there are multiple alias names available for a single user. E.g.
++ * the canonical name of a user is user@group.department.example.com but there
++ * exists a shorter login name, e.g. user@example.com, to safe typing at the
++ * login prompt. Here krb5_aname_to_localname() can only return the canonical
++ * name, but if the short alias is used at the login prompt authentication
++ * will fail as well. All this can be avoided by using krb5_kuserok() and
++ * configuring krb5.conf or using a suitable plugin to meet the needs of the
++ * given environment.
++ *
++ * The Fedora and RHEL version of openssh contain two patches which modify the
++ * access control behavior:
++ *  - openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
++ *  - openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
++ *
++ * openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch adds a new option KerberosUseKuserok for
++ * sshd_config which controls if krb5_kuserok() is used to check if the
++ * principle is authorized or if krb5_aname_to_localname() should be used.
++ * The reason to add this patch was that krb5_kuserok() by default checks if
++ * a .k5login file exits in the users home-directory. With this the user can
++ * give access to his account for any given principal which might be
++ * in violation with company policies and it would be useful if this can be
++ * rejected. Nevertheless the patch ignores the fact that krb5_kuserok() does
++ * no only check .k5login but other sources as well and checking .k5login can
++ * be disabled for all applications in krb5.conf as well. With this new
++ * option KerberosUseKuserok set to 'no' (and this is the default for RHEL7
++ * and Fedora 21) openssh can only use krb5_aname_to_localname() with the
++ * restrictions mentioned above.
++ *
++ * openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch adds a ksu like behaviour to ssh, i.e. when
++ * using GSSAPI authentication only commands configured in the .k5user can be
++ * executed. Here the wrong assumption that krb5_kuserok() only checks
++ * .k5login is made as well. In contrast ksu checks .k5login directly and
++ * does not use krb5_kuserok() which might be more useful for the given
++ * purpose. Additionally this patch is not synced with
++ * openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch.
++ *
++ * The current patch tries to restore the usage of krb5_kuserok() so that e.g.
++ * localauth plugins can be used. It does so by adding a forth parameter to
++ * ssh_krb5_kuserok() which indicates whether .k5login exists or not. If it
++ * does not exists krb5_kuserok() is called even if KerberosUseKuserok is set
++ * to 'no' because the intent of the option is to not check .k5login and if it
++ * does not exists krb5_kuserok() returns a result without checking .k5login.
++ * If .k5login does exists and KerberosUseKuserok is 'no' we fall back to
++ * krb5_aname_to_localname(). This is in my point of view an acceptable
++ * limitation and does not break the current behaviour.
++ *
++ * Additionally with this patch ssh_krb5_kuserok() is called in
++ * ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok() instead of only krb5_aname_to_localname() is
++ * neither .k5login nor .k5users exists to allow plugin evaluation via
++ * krb5_kuserok() as well.
++ *
++ * I tried to keep the patch as minimal as possible, nevertheless I see some
++ * areas for improvement which, if they make sense, have to be evaluated
++ * carefully because they might change existing behaviour and cause breaks
++ * during upgrade:
++ * - I wonder if disabling .k5login usage make sense in sshd or if it should
++ *   be better disabled globally in krb5.conf
++ * - if really needed openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch should be fixed to really
++ *   only disable checking .k5login and maybe .k5users
++ * - the ksu behaviour should be configurable and maybe check the .k5login and
++ *   .k5users files directly like ksu itself does
++ * - to make krb5_aname_to_localname() more useful an option for sshd to use
++ *   the canonical name (the one returned by getpwnam()) instead of the name
++ *   given at the login prompt might be useful */
++
+ static int
+ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+ {
+@@ -116,7 +214,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client
+ 	/* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user,
+ 	 * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials
+ 	 * to access these files aren't available yet. */
+-	if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) {
++	if (ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)
++			&& k5login_exists) {
+ 		retval = 1;
+ 		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
+ 		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
+@@ -190,9 +289,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
+ 	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
+ 	/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
+ 	if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) {
+-		return (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb_context, principal,
+-		    sizeof(kuser), kuser) == 0) &&
+-		    (strcmp(kuser, luser) == 0);
++                return ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, principal, luser,
++                                        k5login_exists);
+ 	}
+ 	if ((fp = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL) {
+ 		int saved_errno = errno;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.630465944 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 15:11:52.278133344 +0100
+@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ 	options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
+ 	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
+ 	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
++	options->use_kuserok = -1;
+ 	options->password_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+@@ -278,6 +279,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 	if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
+ 		options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX);
+ #endif
++	if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
++		options->use_kuserok = 1;
+ 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->password_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+@@ -399,7 +402,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
+ 	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
+ 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
+-	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache,
++	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok,
+ 	sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
+ 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+ 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+@@ -478,12 +481,14 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "kerberosuniqueccache", sKerberosUniqueCCache, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "kerberosusekuserok", sKerberosUseKuserok, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #else
+ 	{ "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "kerberosuniqueccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "kerberosusekuserok", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1644,6 +1649,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 		*inc_flags &= ~SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY;
+ 		break;
+ 
++	case sKerberosUseKuserok:
++		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case sPermitListen:
+ 	case sPermitOpen:
+ 		if (opcode == sPermitListen) {
+@@ -2016,6 +2025,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_interval);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
++	M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
+@@ -2309,6 +2319,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
+ # endif
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
+ #endif
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.630465944 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2016-12-23 14:36:07.645465936 +0100
+@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
+ 	int     kerberos_unique_ccache;		/* If true, the acquired ticket will
+ 						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
++	int	use_kuserok;
+ 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
+ 	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
+ 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.637465940 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2016-12-23 15:14:03.117162222 +0100
+@@ -850,6 +850,10 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
+ .Cm no
+ can lead to overwriting previous tickets by subseqent connections to the same
+ user account.
++.It Cm KerberosUseKuserok
++Specifies whether to look at .k5login file for user's aliases.
++The default is
++.Cm yes .
+ .It Cm KexAlgorithms
+ Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
+ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+@@ -1078,6 +1082,7 @@ Available keywords are
+ .Cm IPQoS ,
+ .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication ,
+ .Cm KerberosAuthentication ,
++.Cm KerberosUseKuserok ,
+ .Cm LogLevel ,
+ .Cm MaxAuthTries ,
+ .Cm MaxSessions ,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.kuserok	2016-12-23 14:36:07.631465943 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config	2016-12-23 14:36:07.646465935 +0100
+@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
+ #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
+ #KerberosTicketCleanup yes
+ #KerberosGetAFSToken no
++#KerberosUseKuserok yes
+ 
+ # GSSAPI options
+ #GSSAPIAuthentication no

openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.972122201 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+ 
++void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
+@@ -419,6 +419,28 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
+ 	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+ }
+ 
++void
++sshd_selinux_copy_context(void)
++{
++	security_context_t *ctx;
++
++	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
++		return;
++
++	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
++		logit("%s: getexeccon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++		return;
++	}
++	if (ctx != NULL) {
++		/* unset exec context before we will lose this capabililty */
++		if (setexeccon(NULL) != 0)
++			fatal("%s: setexeccon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++		if (setcon(ctx) != 0)
++			fatal("%s: setcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++		freecon(ctx);
++	}
++}
++
+ #endif
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/session.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
+@@ -1331,7 +1331,7 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+ 
+ 	platform_setusercontext(pw);
+ 
+-	if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) {
++	if (platform_privileged_uidswap() && (!is_child || !use_privsep)) {
+ #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ 		if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
+ 		    (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) {
+@@ -1361,6 +1361,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+			    (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
+			chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
+			    "u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++			sshd_selinux_copy_context();
++#endif
+ 			safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
+ 			free(tmp);
+ 			free(chroot_path);
+@@ -1396,6 +1399,11 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+ 		/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
+ 		permanently_set_uid(pw);
+ #endif
++
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++		if (in_chroot == 0)
++			sshd_selinux_copy_context();
++#endif
+ 	} else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
+ 	    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
+ 		fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory");
+@@ -1413,9 +1421,6 @@ do_pwchange(Session *s)
+ 	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+ 		fprintf(stderr,
+ 		    "You must change your password now and login again!\n");
+-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-		setexeccon(NULL);
+-#endif
+ #ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME
+ 		execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name,
+ 		    (char *)NULL);
+@@ -1625,9 +1630,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+ 		argv[i] = NULL;
+ 		optind = optreset = 1;
+ 		__progname = argv[0];
+-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-		ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
+-#endif
+ 		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
+ 	}
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 18:59:13.808124269 +0100
+@@ -540,6 +540,10 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
+ 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
+ 	demote_sensitive_data();
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t");
++#endif
++
+ 	/* Demote the child */
+ 	if (privsep_chroot) {
+ 		/* Change our root directory */
+@@ -633,6 +637,9 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ {
+ #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
+ 	if (1) {
++#elif defined(WITH_SELINUX)
++	if (0) {
++		/* even root user can be confined by SELinux */
+ #else
+ 	if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) {
+ #endif

openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.881788686 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c	2016-12-23 16:42:36.244818763 +0100
+@@ -288,11 +288,11 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd
+ 
+ 	/* enable nonblocking mode */
+ 	if (nonblock) {
+-		if (rfd != -1)
++		if (rfd >= 0)
+ 			set_nonblock(rfd);
+-		if (wfd != -1)
++		if (wfd >= 0)
+ 			set_nonblock(wfd);
+-		if (efd != -1)
++		if (efd >= 0)
+ 			set_nonblock(efd);
+ 	}
+ }
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.888788688 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
+@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
+ 	mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
+ 
+ 	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
+-	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
++	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
+ 		;
+ 
+ 	if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.892788689 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
+@@ -525,10 +525,10 @@ mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd,
+ 	if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
+ 	    (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
+ 		error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__);
+-		if (tmp1 > 0)
++		if (tmp1 >= 0)
+ 			close(tmp1);
+-		if (tmp2 > 0)
+-			close(tmp2);
++		/*DEAD CODE if (tmp2 >= 0)
++			close(tmp2);*/
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 	close(tmp1);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
+@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr
+ 	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
+ 	u_int16_t *portp;
+ 	u_int16_t port;
+-	socklen_t salen;
++	socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
+ 	int i;
+ 
+ 	if (sa == NULL) {
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/scp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/scp.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/scp.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.856788681 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/scp.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
+@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
+ {
+ 	if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
+ 		kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
+-		waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
++		(void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (signo)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.896788690 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
+@@ -1547,7 +1547,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.",
+ 			    filename, linenum);
+ 		if (!*activep) {
+-			arg = strdelim(&cp);
++			/*arg =*/ (void) strdelim(&cp);
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+ 		for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++)
+@@ -1638,8 +1638,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
+ 			*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
+ 			/* increase optional counter */
+-			if (intptr != NULL)
+-				*intptr = *intptr + 1;
++			/* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;)
++  			 if (intptr != NULL)
++				*intptr = *intptr + 1; */
+ 		}
+ 		break;
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.902788691 +0100
+@@ -125,13 +125,13 @@ notify_setup(void)
+ static void
+ notify_parent(void)
+ {
+-	if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
+ 		(void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
+ }
+ static void
+ notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
+ {
+-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
+ 		FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
+ }
+ static void
+@@ -139,8 +139,8 @@ notify_done(fd_set *readset)
+ {
+ 	char c;
+ 
+-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
+-		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
++		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
+ 			debug2("%s: reading", __func__);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ server_request_tun(void)
+ 		debug("%s: invalid tun", __func__);
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
+-	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) {
++	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device >= 0) {
+ 		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY &&
+ 		    auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun)
+ 			goto done;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
+@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
+ 	pid = sshpid;
+ 	if (pid > 1) {
+ 		kill(pid, SIGTERM);
+-		waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
++		(void) waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	_exit(1);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
+@@ -1220,8 +1220,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	sanitise_stdfd();
+ 
+ 	/* drop */
+-	setegid(getgid());
+-	setgid(getgid());
++	(void) setegid(getgid());
++	(void) setgid(getgid());
+ 
+ 	platform_disable_tracing(0);	/* strict=no */
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.897788690 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.904788692 +0100
+@@ -691,8 +691,10 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 
+ 		privsep_preauth_child(ssh);
+ 		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
+-		if (box != NULL)
++		if (box != NULL) {
+ 			ssh_sandbox_child(box);
++			free(box);
++		}
+ 
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+@@ -1386,6 +1388,9 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
+ 			explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+ 		}
+ 	}
++
++	if (fdset != NULL)
++		free(fdset);
+ }
+ 
+ /*

openssh-6.7p1-kdf-cavs.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,618 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.kdf-cavs	2015-03-18 11:23:46.346049359 +0100
++++ openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in	2015-03-18 11:24:20.395968445 +0100
+@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-h
+ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
+ SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
+ CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest
++SSH_CAVS=$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs
+ SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+ SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
+@@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+ 
+ .SUFFIXES: .lo
+ 
+-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
++TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT)
+ 
+ XMSS_OBJS=\
+ 	ssh-xmss.o \
+@@ -198,6 +199,9 @@ ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHD
+ ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 
++ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-cavs.o $(SKOBJS)
++	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-cavs.o $(SKOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
++
+ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 
+@@ -331,6 +335,8 @@ install-files:
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
++	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT)
++	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-cavs_driver.pl $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs_driver.pl
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
+diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c
+--- openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c.kdf-cavs	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
++++ openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
++ *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
++ *    products derived from this software without specific prior
++ *    written permission.
++ *
++ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
++ * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2
++ * are required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
++ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
++ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
++ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
++ * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
++ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
++ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
++ * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
++ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
++ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
++ * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
++ * DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <errno.h>
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <string.h>
++
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "sshbuf.h"
++#include "sshkey.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "kex.h"
++#include "packet.h"
++#include "digest.h"
++
++static int bin_char(unsigned char hex)
++{
++	if (48 <= hex && 57 >= hex)
++		return (hex - 48);
++	if (65 <= hex && 70 >= hex)
++		return (hex - 55);
++	if (97 <= hex && 102 >= hex)
++		return (hex - 87);
++	return 0;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Convert hex representation into binary string
++ * @hex input buffer with hex representation
++ * @hexlen length of hex
++ * @bin output buffer with binary data
++ * @binlen length of already allocated bin buffer (should be at least
++ *	   half of hexlen -- if not, only a fraction of hexlen is converted)
++ */
++static void hex2bin(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
++		    unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen)
++{
++	size_t i = 0;
++	size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
++		bin[i] = bin_char(hex[(i*2)]) << 4;
++		bin[i] |= bin_char(hex[((i*2)+1)]);
++	}
++}
++
++/*
++ * Allocate sufficient space for binary representation of hex
++ * and convert hex into bin
++ *
++ * Caller must free bin
++ * @hex input buffer with hex representation
++ * @hexlen length of hex
++ * @bin return value holding the pointer to the newly allocated buffer
++ * @binlen return value holding the allocated size of bin
++ *
++ * return: 0 on success, !0 otherwise
++ */
++static int hex2bin_alloc(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
++			 unsigned char **bin, size_t *binlen)
++{
++	unsigned char *out = NULL;
++	size_t outlen = 0;
++
++	if (!hexlen)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	outlen = (hexlen + 1) / 2;
++
++	out = calloc(1, outlen);
++	if (!out)
++		return -errno;
++
++	hex2bin(hex, hexlen, out, outlen);
++	*bin = out;
++	*binlen = outlen;
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static char hex_char_map_l[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
++				 '8', '9', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f' };
++static char hex_char_map_u[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
++				 '8', '9', 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F' };
++static char hex_char(unsigned int bin, int u)
++{
++	if (bin < sizeof(hex_char_map_l))
++		return (u) ? hex_char_map_u[bin] : hex_char_map_l[bin];
++	return 'X';
++}
++
++/*
++ * Convert binary string into hex representation
++ * @bin input buffer with binary data
++ * @binlen length of bin
++ * @hex output buffer to store hex data
++ * @hexlen length of already allocated hex buffer (should be at least
++ *	   twice binlen -- if not, only a fraction of binlen is converted)
++ * @u case of hex characters (0=>lower case, 1=>upper case)
++ */
++static void bin2hex(const unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen,
++		    char *hex, size_t hexlen, int u)
++{
++	size_t i = 0;
++	size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
++		hex[(i*2)] = hex_char((bin[i] >> 4), u);
++		hex[((i*2)+1)] = hex_char((bin[i] & 0x0f), u);
++	}
++}
++
++struct kdf_cavs {
++	unsigned char *K;
++	size_t Klen;
++	unsigned char *H;
++	size_t Hlen;
++	unsigned char *session_id;
++	size_t session_id_len;
++
++	unsigned int iv_len;
++	unsigned int ek_len;
++	unsigned int ik_len;
++};
++
++static int sshkdf_cavs(struct kdf_cavs *test)
++{
++	int ret = 0;
++	struct kex kex;
++	struct sshbuf *Kb = NULL;
++	BIGNUM *Kbn = NULL;
++	int mode = 0;
++	struct newkeys *ctoskeys;
++	struct newkeys *stockeys;
++	struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
++
++#define HEXOUTLEN 500
++	char hex[HEXOUTLEN];
++
++	memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(struct kex));
++
++	Kbn = BN_new();
++	BN_bin2bn(test->K, test->Klen, Kbn);
++	if (!Kbn) {
++		printf("cannot convert K into bignum\n");
++		ret = 1;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	Kb = sshbuf_new();
++	if (!Kb) {
++		printf("cannot convert K into sshbuf\n");
++		ret = 1;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	sshbuf_put_bignum2(Kb, Kbn);
++
++	kex.session_id = test->session_id;
++	kex.session_id_len = test->session_id_len;
++
++	/* setup kex */
++
++	/* select the right hash based on struct ssh_digest digests */
++	switch (test->ik_len) {
++		case 20:
++			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
++			break;
++		case 32:
++			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA256;
++			break;
++		case 48:
++			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA384;
++			break;
++		case 64:
++			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA512;
++			break;
++		default:
++			printf("Wrong hash type %u\n", test->ik_len);
++			ret = 1;
++			goto out;
++	}
++
++	/* implement choose_enc */
++	for (mode = 0; mode < 2; mode++) {
++		kex.newkeys[mode] = calloc(1, sizeof(struct newkeys));
++		if (!kex.newkeys[mode]) {
++			printf("allocation of newkeys failed\n");
++			ret = 1;
++			goto out;
++		}
++		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.iv_len = test->iv_len;
++		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.key_len = test->ek_len;
++		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.block_size = (test->iv_len == 64) ? 8 : 16;
++		kex.newkeys[mode]->mac.key_len = test->ik_len;
++	}
++
++	/* implement kex_choose_conf */
++	kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.key_len;
++	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size)
++		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size;
++	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len)
++		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len;
++	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len)
++		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len;
++
++	/* MODE_OUT (1) -> server to client
++	 * MODE_IN (0) -> client to server */
++	kex.server = 1;
++
++	/* do it */
++	if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, -1, -1)) == NULL){
++		printf("Allocation error\n");
++		goto out;
++	}
++	ssh->kex = &kex;
++	kex_derive_keys(ssh, test->H, test->Hlen, Kb);
++
++	ctoskeys = kex.newkeys[0];
++	stockeys = kex.newkeys[1];
++
++	/* get data */
++	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
++	bin2hex(ctoskeys->enc.iv, (size_t)ctoskeys->enc.iv_len,
++		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
++	printf("Initial IV (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
++	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
++	bin2hex(stockeys->enc.iv, (size_t)stockeys->enc.iv_len,
++		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
++	printf("Initial IV (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
++
++	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
++	bin2hex(ctoskeys->enc.key, (size_t)ctoskeys->enc.key_len,
++		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
++	printf("Encryption key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
++	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
++	bin2hex(stockeys->enc.key, (size_t)stockeys->enc.key_len,
++		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
++	printf("Encryption key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
++
++	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
++	bin2hex(ctoskeys->mac.key, (size_t)ctoskeys->mac.key_len,
++		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
++	printf("Integrity key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
++	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
++	bin2hex(stockeys->mac.key, (size_t)stockeys->mac.key_len,
++		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
++	printf("Integrity key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
++
++out:
++	if (Kbn)
++		BN_free(Kbn);
++	if (Kb)
++		sshbuf_free(Kb);
++	if (ssh)
++		ssh_packet_close(ssh);
++	return ret;
++}
++
++static void usage(void)
++{
++	fprintf(stderr, "\nOpenSSH KDF CAVS Test\n\n");
++	fprintf(stderr, "Usage:\n");
++	fprintf(stderr, "\t-K\tShared secret string\n");
++	fprintf(stderr, "\t-H\tHash string\n");
++	fprintf(stderr, "\t-s\tSession ID string\n");
++	fprintf(stderr, "\t-i\tIV length to be generated\n");
++	fprintf(stderr, "\t-e\tEncryption key length to be generated\n");
++	fprintf(stderr, "\t-m\tMAC key length to be generated\n");
++}
++
++/*
++ * Test command example:
++ * ./ssh-cavs -K 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 -H d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -s d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -i 8 -e 24 -m 20
++ *
++ * Initial IV (client to server) = 4bb320d1679dfd3a
++ * Initial IV (server to client) = 43dea6fdf263a308
++ * Encryption key (client to server) = 13048cc600b9d3cf9095aa6cf8e2ff9cf1c54ca0520c89ed
++ * Encryption key (server to client) = 1e483c5134e901aa11fc4e0a524e7ec7b75556148a222bb0
++ * Integrity key (client to server) = ecef63a092b0dcc585bdc757e01b2740af57d640
++ * Integrity key (server to client) = 7424b05f3c44a72b4ebd281fb71f9cbe7b64d479
++ */
++int main(int argc, char *argv[])
++{
++	struct kdf_cavs test;
++	int ret = 1;
++	int opt = 0;
++
++	memset(&test, 0, sizeof(struct kdf_cavs));
++	while((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "K:H:s:i:e:m:")) != -1)
++	{
++		size_t len = 0;
++		switch(opt)
++		{
++			/*
++			 * CAVS K is MPINT
++			 * we want a hex (i.e. the caller must ensure the
++			 * following transformations already happened):
++			 * 	1. cut off first four bytes
++			 * 	2. if most significant bit of value is
++			 *	   1, prepend 0 byte
++			 */
++			case 'K':
++				len = strlen(optarg);
++				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
++						    &test.K, &test.Klen);
++				if (ret)
++					goto out;
++				break;
++			case 'H':
++				len = strlen(optarg);
++				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
++						    &test.H, &test.Hlen);
++				if (ret)
++					goto out;
++				break;
++			case 's':
++				len = strlen(optarg);
++				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
++						    &test.session_id,
++						    &test.session_id_len);
++				if (ret)
++					goto out;
++				break;
++			case 'i':
++				test.iv_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
++				break;
++			case 'e':
++				test.ek_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
++				break;
++			case 'm':
++				test.ik_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
++				break;
++			default:
++				usage();
++				goto out;
++		}
++	}
++
++	ret = sshkdf_cavs(&test);
++
++out:
++	if (test.session_id)
++		free(test.session_id);
++	if (test.K)
++		free(test.K);
++	if (test.H)
++		free(test.H);
++	return ret;
++
++}
+diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl
+--- openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl.kdf-cavs	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
++++ openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
++#!/usr/bin/env perl
++#
++# CAVS test driver for OpenSSH
++#
++# Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
++#
++# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
++# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
++# in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
++# to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
++# copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
++# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
++#
++# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
++# all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
++#
++#                            NO WARRANTY
++#
++#    BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO WARRANTY
++#    FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW.  EXCEPT WHEN
++#    OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES
++#    PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED
++#    OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
++#    MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  THE ENTIRE RISK AS
++#    TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU.  SHOULD THE
++#    PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING,
++#    REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
++#
++#    IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING
++#    WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MAY MODIFY AND/OR
++#    REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES,
++#    INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING
++#    OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED
++#    TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY
++#    YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER
++#    PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE
++#    POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
++#
++use strict;
++use warnings;
++use IPC::Open2;
++
++# Executing a program by feeding STDIN and retrieving
++# STDOUT
++# $1: data string to be piped to the app on STDIN
++# rest: program and args
++# returns: STDOUT of program as string
++sub pipe_through_program($@) {
++	my $in = shift;
++	my @args = @_;
++
++	my ($CO, $CI);
++	my $pid = open2($CO, $CI, @args);
++
++	my $out = "";
++	my $len = length($in);
++	my $first = 1;
++	while (1) {
++		my $rin = "";
++		my $win = "";
++		# Output of prog is FD that we read
++		vec($rin,fileno($CO),1) = 1;
++		# Input of prog is FD that we write
++		# check for $first is needed because we can have NULL input
++		# that is to be written to the app
++		if ( $len > 0 || $first) {
++			(vec($win,fileno($CI),1) = 1);
++			$first=0;
++		}
++		# Let us wait for 100ms
++		my $nfound = select(my $rout=$rin, my $wout=$win, undef, 0.1);
++		if ( $wout ) {
++			my $written = syswrite($CI, $in, $len);
++			die "broken pipe" if !defined $written;
++			$len -= $written;
++			substr($in, 0, $written) = "";
++			if ($len <= 0) {
++				close $CI or die "broken pipe: $!";
++			}
++		}
++		if ( $rout ) {
++			my $tmp_out = "";
++			my $bytes_read = sysread($CO, $tmp_out, 4096);
++			$out .= $tmp_out;
++			last if ($bytes_read == 0);
++		}
++	}
++	close $CO or die "broken pipe: $!";
++	waitpid $pid, 0;
++
++	return $out;
++}
++
++# Parser of CAVS test vector file
++# $1: Test vector file
++# $2: Output file for test results
++# return: nothing
++sub parse($$) {
++	my $infile = shift;
++	my $outfile = shift;
++
++	my $out = "";
++
++	my $K = "";
++	my $H = "";
++	my $session_id = "";
++	my $ivlen = 0;
++	my $eklen = "";
++	my $iklen = "";
++
++	open(IN, "<$infile");
++	while(<IN>) {
++
++		my $line = $_;
++		chomp($line);
++		$line =~ s/\r//;
++
++		if ($line =~ /\[SHA-1\]/) {
++			$iklen = 20;
++		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-256\]/) {
++			$iklen = 32;
++		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-384\]/) {
++			$iklen = 48;
++		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-512\]/) {
++			$iklen = 64;
++		} elsif ($line =~ /^\[IV length\s*=\s*(.*)\]/) {
++			$ivlen = $1;
++			$ivlen = $ivlen / 8;
++		} elsif ($line =~ /^\[encryption key length\s*=\s*(.*)\]/) {
++			$eklen = $1;
++			$eklen = $eklen / 8;
++		} elsif ($line =~ /^K\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
++			$K = $1;
++			$K = substr($K, 8);
++			$K = "00" . $K;
++		} elsif ($line =~ /^H\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
++			$H = $1;
++		} elsif ($line =~ /^session_id\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
++			$session_id = $1;
++		}
++		$out .= $line . "\n";
++
++		if ($K ne "" && $H ne "" && $session_id ne "" &&
++		    $ivlen ne "" && $eklen ne "" && $iklen > 0) {
++			$out .= pipe_through_program("", "./ssh-cavs -H $H -K $K -s $session_id -i $ivlen -e $eklen -m $iklen");
++
++			$K = "";
++			$H = "";
++			$session_id = "";
++		}
++	}
++	close IN;
++	$out =~ s/\n/\r\n/g; # make it a dos file
++	open(OUT, ">$outfile") or die "Cannot create output file $outfile: $?";
++	print OUT $out;
++	close OUT;
++}
++
++############################################################
++#
++# let us pretend to be C :-)
++sub main() {
++
++	my $infile=$ARGV[0];
++	die "Error: Test vector file $infile not found" if (! -f $infile);
++
++	my $outfile = $infile;
++	# let us add .rsp regardless whether we could strip .req
++	$outfile =~ s/\.req$//;
++	$outfile .= ".rsp";
++	if (-f $outfile) {
++		die "Output file $outfile could not be removed: $?"
++			unless unlink($outfile);
++	}
++	print STDERR "Performing tests from source file $infile with results stored in destination file $outfile\n";
++
++	# Do the job
++	parse($infile, $outfile);
++}
++
++###########################################
++# Call it
++main();
++1;

openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8
+--- openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode	2016-03-09 19:04:48.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8	2016-06-23 16:18:20.463854117 +0200
+@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
+ .Op Fl P Ar denied_requests
+ .Op Fl p Ar allowed_requests
+ .Op Fl u Ar umask
++.Op Fl m Ar force_file_perms
+ .Ek
+ .Nm
+ .Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
+@@ -138,6 +139,12 @@ Sets an explicit
+ .Xr umask 2
+ to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the
+ user's default mask.
++.It Fl m Ar force_file_perms
++Sets explicit file permissions to be applied to newly-created files instead
++of the default or client requested mode.  Numeric values include:
++777, 755, 750, 666, 644, 640, etc.  Using both -m and -u switches makes the
++umask (-u) effective only for newly created directories and explicit mode (-m)
++for newly created files.
+ .El
+ .Pp
+ On some systems,
+diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
+--- openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode	2016-06-23 16:18:20.446854128 +0200
++++ openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c	2016-06-23 16:20:37.950766082 +0200
+@@ -69,6 +69,10 @@ struct sshbuf *oqueue;
+ /* Version of client */
+ static u_int version;
+ 
++/* Force file permissions */
++int permforce = 0;
++long permforcemode;
++
+ /* SSH2_FXP_INIT received */
+ static int init_done;
+ 
+@@ -683,6 +687,7 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+ 	Attrib a;
+ 	char *name;
+ 	int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
++	mode_t old_umask = 0;
+ 
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */
+@@ -692,6 +697,10 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+ 	debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
+ 	flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
+ 	mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
++	if (permforce == 1) {   /* Force perm if -m is set */
++		mode = permforcemode;
++		old_umask = umask(0); /* so umask does not interfere */
++	}	
+ 	logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
+ 	    name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
+ 	if (readonly &&
+@@ -713,6 +722,8 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 	}
++	if (permforce == 1)
++		(void) umask(old_umask); /* restore umask to something sane */
+ 	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ 		send_status(id, status);
+ 	free(name);
+@@ -1494,7 +1505,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
+ 	fprintf(stderr,
+ 	    "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
+ 	    "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P denied_requests] "
+-	    "[-p allowed_requests] [-u umask]\n"
++	    "[-p allowed_requests] [-u umask] [-m force_file_perms]\n"
+ 	    "       %s -Q protocol_feature\n",
+ 	    __progname, __progname);
+ 	exit(1);
+@@ -1520,7 +1531,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+ 	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
+ 
+ 	while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
+-	    "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:cehR")) != -1) {
++	    "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:m:cehR")) != -1) {
+ 		switch (ch) {
+ 		case 'Q':
+ 			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) {
+@@ -1580,6 +1591,15 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+ 				fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
+ 			(void)umask((mode_t)mask);
+ 			break;
++		case 'm':
++			/* Force permissions on file received via sftp */
++			permforce = 1;
++			permforcemode = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8);
++			if (permforcemode < 0 || permforcemode > 0777 ||
++			    *cp != '\0' || (permforcemode == 0 &&
++			    errno != 0))
++				fatal("Invalid file mode \"%s\"", optarg);
++			break;
+ 		case 'h':
+ 		default:
+ 			sftp_server_usage();

openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -up openssh/servconf.c.sshdt openssh/servconf.c
+--- openssh/servconf.c.sshdt	2015-06-24 11:42:29.041078704 +0200
++++ openssh/servconf.c	2015-06-24 11:44:39.734745802 +0200
+@@ -2317,7 +2317,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs);
+-	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner);
++	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner != NULL ? o->banner : "none");
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys);

openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race	2016-12-23 16:35:52.694685771 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c	2016-12-23 16:35:52.697685772 +0100
+@@ -1107,4 +1107,50 @@ mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const ch
+ 	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m);
+ 	sshbuf_free(m);
+ }
++
++int mm_forward_audit_messages(int fdin)
++{
++	u_char buf[4];
++	u_int blen, msg_len;
++	struct sshbuf *m;
++	int r, ret = 0;
++
++	debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
++	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++ 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
++	do {
++		blen = atomicio(read, fdin, buf, sizeof(buf));
++		if (blen == 0) /* closed pipe */
++			break;
++		if (blen != sizeof(buf)) {
++			error("%s: Failed to read the buffer from child", __func__);
++			ret = -1;
++			break;
++		}
++
++		msg_len = get_u32(buf);
++		if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
++			fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len);
++		sshbuf_reset(m);
++		if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, NULL)) != 0)
++			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		if (atomicio(read, fdin, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
++			error("%s: Failed to read the the buffer content from the child", __func__);
++			ret = -1;
++			break;
++		}
++		if (atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, buf, blen) != blen || 
++		    atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
++			error("%s: Failed to write the message to the monitor", __func__);
++			ret = -1;
++			break;
++		}
++	} while (1);
++	sshbuf_free(m);
++	return ret;
++}
++void mm_set_monitor_pipe(int fd)
++{
++	pmonitor->m_recvfd = fd;
++}
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race	2016-12-23 16:35:52.694685771 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h	2016-12-23 16:35:52.698685772 +0100
+@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
+ void mm_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+ void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int, pid_t, uid_t);
+ void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
++int mm_forward_audit_messages(int);
++void mm_set_monitor_pipe(int);
+ #endif
+ 
+ struct Session;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race	2016-12-23 16:35:52.695685771 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 16:37:26.339730596 +0100
+@@ -162,6 +162,10 @@ static Session *sessions = NULL;
+ login_cap_t *lc;
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++int paudit[2];
++#endif
++
+ static int is_child = 0;
+ static int in_chroot = 0;
+ static int have_dev_log = 1;
+@@ -289,6 +293,8 @@ xauth_valid_string(const char *s)
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
++void child_destory_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh);
++
+ #define USE_PIPES 1
+ /*
+  * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty.  This
+@@ -424,6 +430,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *c
+ 		close(err[0]);
+ #endif
+ 
++		child_destory_sensitive_data(ssh);
++
+ 		/* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */
+ 		do_child(ssh, s, command);
+ 		/* NOTREACHED */
+@@ -547,6 +555,9 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm
+ 		/* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */
+ 		close(ttyfd);
+ 
++		/* Do this early, so we will not block large MOTDs */
++		child_destory_sensitive_data(ssh);
++
+ 		/* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */
+ #ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+ 		do_login(ssh, s, command);
+@@ -717,6 +728,8 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 	}
+ 	if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1)
+ 		s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(ssh, s->command));
++	if (pipe(paudit) < 0)
++		fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+ #endif
+ 	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+ 		ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command);
+@@ -732,6 +745,20 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ 	 */
+ 	sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
+ 
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	close(paudit[1]);
++	if (use_privsep && ret == 0) {
++		/*
++		 * Read the audit messages from forked child and send them
++		 * back to monitor. We don't want to communicate directly,
++		 * because the messages might get mixed up.
++		 * Continue after the pipe gets closed (all messages sent).
++		 */
++		ret = mm_forward_audit_messages(paudit[0]);
++	}
++	close(paudit[0]);
++#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
++
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1538,6 +1565,34 @@ child_close_fds(void)
+ 	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
+ }
+ 
++void
++child_destory_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	int pparent = paudit[1];
++	close(paudit[0]);
++	/* Hack the monitor pipe to avoid race condition with parent */
++	if (use_privsep)
++		mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent);
++#endif
++
++	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
++	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, use_privsep);
++	/*
++	 * We can audit this, because we hacked the pipe to direct the
++	 * messages over postauth child. But this message requires answer
++	 * which we can't do using one-way pipe.
++	 */
++	packet_destroy_all(ssh, 0, 1);
++	/* XXX this will clean the rest but should not audit anymore */
++	/* packet_clear_keys(ssh); */
++
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++	/* Notify parent that we are done */
++	close(pparent);
++#endif
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the
+  * environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group
+@@ -1554,13 +1608,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+ 
+ 	sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
+ 
+-	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
+-	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1);
+-	ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
+-	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
+-	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
+-	packet_destroy_all(ssh, 0, 1);
+-
+ 	/* Force a password change */
+ 	if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
+ 		do_setusercontext(pw);

openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
+index 2b02a04..19b9364 100644
+--- a/auth-krb5.c
++++ b/auth-krb5.c
+@@ -375,5 +375,21 @@ cleanup:
+ 		return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
+ 	}
+ }
++
++/*
++ * Reads  k5login_directory  option from the  krb5.conf
++ */
++krb5_error_code
++ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb5_context ctx, char **k5login_directory) {
++	profile_t p;
++	int ret = 0;
++
++	ret = krb5_get_profile(ctx, &p);
++	if (ret)
++		return ret;
++
++	return profile_get_string(p, "libdefaults", "k5login_directory", NULL, NULL,
++		k5login_directory);
++}
+ #endif /* !HEIMDAL */
+ #endif /* KRB5 */
+diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
+index f9d191c..c432d2f 100644
+--- a/auth.h
++++ b/auth.h
+@@ -222,6 +222,8 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
+ 
+ #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
+ krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
++krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb5_context ctx,
++	char **k5login_directory);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #endif /* AUTH_H */
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+@@ -244,8 +244,27 @@ ssh_gssapi_k5login_exists()
+ {
+ 	char file[MAXPATHLEN];
+ 	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
++	char *k5login_directory = NULL;
++	int ret = 0;
++
++	ret = ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb_context, &k5login_directory);
++	debug3("%s: k5login_directory = %s (rv=%d)", __func__, k5login_directory, ret);
++	if (k5login_directory == NULL || ret != 0) {
++		/* If not set, the library will look for  k5login
++		 * files in the user's home directory, with the filename  .k5login.
++		 */
++		snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir);
++	} else {
++		/* If set, the library will look for a local user's k5login file
++		 * within the named directory, with a filename corresponding to the
++		 * local username.
++		 */
++		snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s%s%s", k5login_directory, 
++			k5login_directory[strlen(k5login_directory)-1] != '/' ? "/" : "",
++			pw->pw_name);
++	}
++	debug("%s: Checking existence of file %s", __func__, file);
+ 
+-	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir);
+ 	return access(file, F_OK) == 0;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
+index 5c4f15b..135e290 100644
+--- a/sshd.8
++++ b/sshd.8
+@@ -806,6 +806,10 @@ rlogin/rsh.
+ These files enforce GSSAPI/Kerberos authentication access control.
+ Further details are described in
+ .Xr ksu 1 .
++The location of the k5login file depends on the configuration option
++.Cm k5login_directory
++in the
++.Xr krb5.conf 5 .
+ .Pp
+ .It Pa ~/.ssh/
+ This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration

openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+Zseries only: Leave the hardware filedescriptors open.
+
+All filedescriptors above 2 are getting closed when a new
+sshd process to handle a new client connection is
+spawned. As the process also chroot into an empty filesystem
+without any device nodes, there is no chance to reopen the
+files. This patch filters out the reqired fds in the
+closefrom function so these are skipped in the close loop.
+
+Author: Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>
+
+---
+ openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c |   26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
+@@ -82,7 +82,33 @@ closefrom(int lowfd)
+ 	    fd = strtol(dent->d_name, &endp, 10);
+ 	    if (dent->d_name != endp && *endp == '\0' &&
+ 		fd >= 0 && fd < INT_MAX && fd >= lowfd && fd != dirfd(dirp))
++#ifdef __s390__
++		{
++		    /*
++		     * the filedescriptors used to communicate with
++		     * the device drivers to provide hardware support
++		     * should survive. HF <freude@de.ibm.com>
++		     */
++		    char fpath[PATH_MAX], lpath[PATH_MAX];
++		    len = snprintf(fpath, sizeof(fpath), "%s/%s",
++				   fdpath, dent->d_name);
++		    if (len > 0 && (size_t)len <= sizeof(fpath)) {
++			len = readlink(fpath, lpath, sizeof(lpath));
++			if (len > 0) {
++			    lpath[len] = 0;
++			    if (strstr(lpath, "dev/z90crypt")
++				|| strstr(lpath, "dev/zcrypt")
++				|| strstr(lpath, "dev/prandom")
++				|| strstr(lpath, "dev/shm/icastats"))
++				fd = -1;
++			}
++		    }
++		    if (fd >= 0)
++			(void) close((int) fd);
++		}
++#else
+ 		(void) close((int) fd);
++#endif
+ 	}
+ 	(void) closedir(dirp);
+ 	return;
+

openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.3p1/channels.c.bz595935 openssh-5.3p1/channels.c
+diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
---- openssh-5.3p1/channels.c.bz595935	2010-08-12 14:19:28.000000000 +0200
+--- openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11	2016-03-09 19:04:48.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.3p1/channels.c	2010-08-12 14:33:51.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-7.2p2/channels.c	2016-06-03 10:42:04.775164520 +0200
-@@ -3185,7 +3185,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+@@ -3990,21 +3990,24 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
  }
  
  static int
@@ -10,14 +10,16 @@ diff -up openssh-5.3p1/channels.c.bz595935 openssh-5.3p1/channels.c
  {
  	int sock;
  	struct sockaddr_un addr;
-@@ -3195,11 +3195,14 @@ connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *p
+ 
++	if (len <= 0)
++		return -1;
+ 	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ 	if (sock == -1)
  		error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
  	memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
  	addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
 -	strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path);
 -	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0)
-+	if (len <= 0)
-+		return -1;
 +	if (len > sizeof addr.sun_path)
 +		len = sizeof addr.sun_path;
 +	memcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, len);
@@ -28,16 +30,13 @@ diff -up openssh-5.3p1/channels.c.bz595935 openssh-5.3p1/channels.c
  	return -1;
  }
  
-@@ -3207,8 +3210,21 @@ static int
+@@ -4012,8 +4015,18 @@ static int
  connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
  {
  	char buf[1024];
 -	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr);
 -	return connect_local_xsocket_path(buf);
-+	int len;
++	int len, ret;
-+#ifdef linux
-+	int ret;
-+#endif
 +	len = snprintf(buf + 1, sizeof (buf) - 1, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr);
 +#ifdef linux
 +	/* try abstract socket first */
@@ -51,4 +50,4 @@ diff -up openssh-5.3p1/channels.c.bz595935 openssh-5.3p1/channels.c
 +	return -1;
  }
  
- int
+ #ifdef __APPLE__

openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.071506625 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c	2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100
+@@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ static int all_opens_permitted = 0;
+ #define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST	"*"
+ 
+ /* -- X11 forwarding */
+-/* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
+-#define MAX_DISPLAYS  1000
++/* Minimum port number for X11 forwarding */
++#define X11_PORT_MIN 6000
+ 
+ /* Per-channel callback for pre/post select() actions */
+ typedef void chan_fn(struct ssh *, Channel *c,
+@@ -4228,7 +4228,7 @@ channel_send_window_changes(void)
+  */
+ int
+ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
+-    int x11_use_localhost, int single_connection,
++    int x11_use_localhost, int x11_max_displays, int single_connection,
+     u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids)
+ {
+ 	Channel *nc = NULL;
+@@ -4240,10 +4241,15 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+ 	if (chanids == NULL)
+ 		return -1;
+ 
++	/* Try to bind ports starting at 6000+X11DisplayOffset */
++	x11_max_displays = x11_max_displays + x11_display_offset;
++
+ 	for (display_number = x11_display_offset;
+-	    display_number < MAX_DISPLAYS;
++	    display_number < x11_max_displays;
+ 	    display_number++) {
+-		port = 6000 + display_number;
++		port = X11_PORT_MIN + display_number;
++		if (port < X11_PORT_MIN) /* overflow */
++			break;
+ 		memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ 		hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
+ 		hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE;
+@@ -4295,7 +4301,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+ 		if (num_socks > 0)
+ 			break;
+ 	}
+-	if (display_number >= MAX_DISPLAYS) {
++	if (display_number >= x11_max_displays || port < X11_PORT_MIN ) {
+ 		error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket.");
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+@@ -4441,7 +4447,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
+ 	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ 	hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
+ 	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+-	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number);
++	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", X11_PORT_MIN + display_number);
+ 	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
+ 		error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf,
+ 		ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+@@ -4457,7 +4463,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
+ 		/* Connect it to the display. */
+ 		if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
+ 			debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
+-			    6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
++			    X11_PORT_MIN + display_number, strerror(errno));
+ 			close(sock);
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
+@@ -4466,8 +4472,8 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
+ 	}
+ 	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+ 	if (!ai) {
+-		error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
+-		    6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
++		error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
++		    X11_PORT_MIN + display_number, strerror(errno));
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 	set_nodelay(sock);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.h	2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100
+@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ int	 permitopen_port(const char *);
+ 
+ void	 channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, u_int);
+ int	 x11_connect_display(struct ssh *);
+-int	 x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
++int	 x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
+ void	 x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(struct ssh *, int,
+ 	    const char *, const char *, const char *, int);
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.133506635 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 15:47:27.320519121 +0100
+@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ 	options->print_lastlog = -1;
+ 	options->x11_forwarding = -1;
+ 	options->x11_display_offset = -1;
++	options->x11_max_displays = -1;
+ 	options->x11_use_localhost = -1;
+ 	options->permit_tty = -1;
+ 	options->permit_user_rc = -1;
+@@ -243,6 +244,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 		options->x11_forwarding = 0;
+ 	if (options->x11_display_offset == -1)
+ 		options->x11_display_offset = 10;
++	if (options->x11_max_displays == -1)
++		options->x11_max_displays = DEFAULT_MAX_DISPLAYS;
+ 	if (options->x11_use_localhost == -1)
+ 		options->x11_use_localhost = 1;
+ 	if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
+@@ -419,7 +422,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+ 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+ 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+-	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
++	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11MaxDisplays, sX11UseLocalhost,
+ 	sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
+ 	sPermitUserEnvironment, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
+ 	sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups,
+@@ -540,6 +543,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "x11maxdisplays", sX11MaxDisplays, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1316,6 +1320,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 			*intptr = value;
+ 		break;
+ 
++	case sX11MaxDisplays:
++		intptr = &options->x11_max_displays;
++		goto parse_int;
++
+ 	case sX11UseLocalhost:
+ 		intptr = &options->x11_use_localhost;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -2063,6 +2071,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_display_offset);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_forwarding);
++	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_max_displays);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_use_localhost);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tty);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_user_rc);
+@@ -2315,6 +2324,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ #endif
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset);
++	dump_cfg_int(sX11MaxDisplays, o->x11_max_displays);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.133506635 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h	2016-12-23 15:46:32.140506636 +0100
+@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
+ 
+ #define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX	6	/* Default for MaxAuthTries */
+ #define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX	10	/* Default for MaxSessions */
++#define DEFAULT_MAX_DISPLAYS	1000 /* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
+ 
+ /* Magic name for internal sftp-server */
+ #define INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME	"internal-sftp"
+@@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	int     x11_forwarding;	/* If true, permit inet (spoofing) X11 fwd. */
+ 	int     x11_display_offset;	/* What DISPLAY number to start
+ 					 * searching at */
++	int 	x11_max_displays; /* Number of displays to search */
+ 	int     x11_use_localhost;	/* If true, use localhost for fake X11 server. */
+ 	char   *xauth_location;	/* Location of xauth program */
+ 	int	permit_tty;	/* If false, deny pty allocation */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/session.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.136506636 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 15:46:32.141506636 +0100
+@@ -2518,8 +2518,9 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+	if (x11_create_display_inet(ssh, options.x11_display_offset,
+-	    options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection,
+-	    &s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
++	    options.x11_use_localhost, options.x11_max_displays,
++	    s->single_connection, &s->display_number,
++	    &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
+ 		debug("x11_create_display_inet failed.");
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.134506635 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2016-12-23 15:46:32.141506636 +0100
+@@ -1133,6 +1133,7 @@ Available keywords are
+ .Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink ,
+ .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys ,
+ .Cm X11DisplayOffset ,
++.Cm X11MaxDisplays ,
+ .Cm X11Forwarding
+ and
+ .Cm X11UseLocalhost .
+@@ -1566,6 +1567,12 @@ Specifies the first display number avail
+ X11 forwarding.
+ This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers.
+ The default is 10.
++.It Cm X11MaxDisplays
++Specifies the maximum number of displays available for
++.Xr sshd 8 Ns 's
++X11 forwarding.
++This prevents sshd from exhausting local ports.
++The default is 1000.
+ .It Cm X11Forwarding
+ Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted.
+ The argument must be

openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+commit 0e22b79bfde45a7cf7a2e51a68ec11c4285f3b31
+Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date:   Mon Nov 21 15:04:06 2016 +0100
+
+    systemd stuff
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 2ffc369..162ce92 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -4265,6 +4265,30 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
+ AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
+ AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
+ 
++# Check whether user wants systemd support
++SYSTEMD_MSG="no"
++AC_ARG_WITH(systemd,
++	[  --with-systemd          Enable systemd support],
++	[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
++		AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
++		if test "$PKGCONFIG" != "no"; then
++			AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libsystemd])
++			if $PKGCONFIG --exists libsystemd; then
++				SYSTEMD_CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags libsystemd`
++				SYSTEMD_LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libsystemd`
++				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $SYSTEMD_CFLAGS"
++				SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $SYSTEMD_LIBS"
++				AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
++				AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYSTEMD, 1, [Define if you want systemd support.])
++				SYSTEMD_MSG="yes"
++			else
++				AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
++			fi
++		fi
++	fi ]
++)
++
++
+ # Looking for programs, paths and files
+ 
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
+@@ -5097,6 +5121,7 @@ echo "                   libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
+ echo "  Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
+ echo "           Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
+ echo "         Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
++echo "                   systemd support: $SYSTEMD_MSG"
+ echo "       IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
+ echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
+ echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
+diff --git a/contrib/sshd.service b/contrib/sshd.service
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..e0d4923
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/contrib/sshd.service
+@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
++[Unit]
++Description=OpenSSH server daemon
++Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
++After=network.target
++
++[Service]
++Type=notify
++ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS
++ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
++KillMode=process
++Restart=on-failure
++RestartPreventExitStatus=255
++
++[Install]
++WantedBy=multi-user.target
++
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 816611c..b8b9d13 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@
+ #include <prot.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
++#include <systemd/sd-daemon.h>
++#endif
++
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "ssh.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+@@ -1888,6 +1892,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 
++#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
++		/* Signal systemd that we are ready to accept connections */
++		sd_notify(0, "READY=1");
++#endif
++
+ 		/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
+ 		server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
+ 		    &newsock, config_s);

openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+In order to use the OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11 engine it is needed to allow flock
+and ipc calls, because this engine calls OpenCryptoki (a PKCS#11
+implementation) which calls the libraries that will communicate with the
+crypto cards. OpenCryptoki makes use of flock and ipc and, as of now,
+this is only need on s390 architecture.
+
+Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
+---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index ca75cc7..6e7de31 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -166,6 +166,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_exit_group
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group),
+ #endif
++#if defined(__NR_flock) && defined(__s390__)
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_flock),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_futex
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_futex),
+ #endif
+@@ -178,6 +181,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday),
+ #endif
++#if defined(__NR_ipc) && defined(__s390__)
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_ipc),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getuid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
+ #endif
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
+getuid and geteuid are needed when using an openssl engine that calls a
+crypto card, e.g. ICA (libica).
+Those syscalls are also needed by the distros for audit code.
+
+Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
+---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index 6e7de31..e86aa2c 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -175,6 +175,18 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_getpid
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_getuid
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_getuid32
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_geteuid
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getrandom
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
+ #endif
+-- 1.9.1
+1.9.1
+diff -up openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+--- openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox	2017-12-12 13:59:30.563874059 +0100
++++ openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2017-12-12 13:59:14.842784083 +0100
+@@ -190,6 +190,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+ #ifdef __NR_geteuid32
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_gettid
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettid),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getrandom
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
+ #endif
+

openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
+diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
+--- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.188821236 +0200
++++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
+@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+ extern u_char *session_id2;
+ extern u_int session_id2_len;
++extern int inetd_flag;
++extern int rexeced_flag;
++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+ 
+ static char *
+ format_key(const struct sshkey *key)
+@@ -511,7 +514,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct ssh *ssh
+ 
+ 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", runas_pw, command,
+ 	    ac, av, &f,
+-	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
++	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
++	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+ 	uid_swapped = 1;
+@@ -981,7 +985,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct ssh *ss
+ 
+ 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", runas_pw, command,
+ 	    ac, av, &f,
+-	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
++	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
++	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+ 	uid_swapped = 1;
+diff -up openssh/auth.c.refactor openssh/auth.c
+--- openssh/auth.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.235821686 +0200
++++ openssh/auth.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
+@@ -756,7 +756,8 @@ auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *
+  */
+ pid_t
+ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command,
+-    int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags)
++    int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags, int inetd,
++    void *the_authctxt)
+ {
+ 	FILE *f = NULL;
+ 	struct stat st;
+@@ -872,7 +873,7 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
+ 		}
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
++		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(inetd, the_authctxt) < 0) {
+ 			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
+ 			    strerror(errno));
+ 			_exit(127);
+diff -up openssh/auth.h.refactor openssh/auth.h
+--- openssh/auth.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.251821839 +0200
++++ openssh/auth.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
+@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ struct passwd *fakepw(void);
+ #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE  (1<<1)  /* Redirect stdout */
+ #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD  (1<<2)  /* Discard stderr */
+ pid_t	subprocess(const char *, struct passwd *,
+-    const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int flags);
++    const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int flags, int, void *);
+ 
+ int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
+ 
+diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200
++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
+@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const ch
+ 
+ int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
+-void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+-int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
++void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *, int, int(char *, const char *), void *, int);
++int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(int inetd, void *);
+ void sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context(void);
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200
++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
+@@ -49,11 +49,6 @@
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+-extern ServerOptions options;
+-extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+-extern int inetd_flag;
+-extern int rexeced_flag;
+-
+ /* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
+ int
+ sshd_selinux_enabled(void)
+@@ -223,7 +218,8 @@ get_user_context(const char *sename, con
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+-ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level)
++ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level,
++    Authctxt *the_authctxt)
+ {
+ 	*role = NULL;
+ 	*level = NULL;
+@@ -241,8 +237,8 @@ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role,
+ 
+ /* Return the default security context for the given username */
+ static int
+-sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+-	security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc)
++sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, security_context_t *default_sc,
++    security_context_t *user_sc, int inetd, Authctxt *the_authctxt)
+ {
+ 	char *sename, *lvl;
+ 	char *role;
+@@ -250,7 +246,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+ 	int r = 0;
+ 	context_t con = NULL;
+ 
+-	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
++	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl, the_authctxt);
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+ 	if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) {
+@@ -272,7 +268,7 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+ 
+ 	if (r == 0) {
+ 		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
+-		if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
++		if (inetd) {
+ 			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
+ 
+ 			if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
+@@ -333,7 +329,8 @@ sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+ 
+ /* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
+ static int
+-sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *))
++sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(char *, const char *), int inetd,
++    Authctxt *the_authctxt)
+ {
+ 	const char *reqlvl;
+ 	char *role;
+@@ -342,11 +339,11 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it
+ 
+ 	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+ 
+-	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
++	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl, the_authctxt);
+ 
+ 	rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
+ 
+-	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
++	if (inetd) {
+ 		use_current = "1";
+ 	} else {
+ 		use_current = "";
+@@ -362,9 +359,10 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
++sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(int inetd,
++    int(pam_setenv)(char *, const char *), Authctxt *the_authctxt)
+ {
+-	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_pam_putenv);
++	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(pam_setenv, inetd, the_authctxt);
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+@@ -374,25 +372,28 @@ do_setenv(char *name, const char *value)
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void)
++sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(int inetd, void *the_authctxt)
+ {
+-	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv);
++	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *) the_authctxt;
++	return sshd_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv, inetd, authctxt);
+ }
+ 
+ /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
+ void
+-sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
++sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname, int inetd,
++    int(pam_setenv)(char *, const char *), void *the_authctxt, int use_pam)
+ {
+ 	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+ 	int r = 0;
+ 	security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
++	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *) the_authctxt;
+ 
+ 	if (!sshd_selinux_enabled())
+ 		return;
+ 
+-	if (options.use_pam) {
++	if (use_pam) {
+ 		/* do not compute context, just setup environment for pam_selinux */
+-		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) {
++		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(inetd, pam_setenv, authctxt)) {
+ 			switch (security_getenforce()) {
+ 			case -1:
+ 				fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+@@ -410,7 +411,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
+ 
+ 	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+ 
+-	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
++	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx, inetd, authctxt);
+ 	if (r >= 0) {
+ 		r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
+ 		if (r < 0) {
+diff -up openssh/platform.c.refactor openssh/platform.c
+--- openssh/platform.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.204821389 +0200
++++ openssh/platform.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.277822088 +0200
+@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@
+ 
+ extern int use_privsep;
+ extern ServerOptions options;
++extern int inetd_flag;
++extern int rexeced_flag;
++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+ 
+ void
+ platform_pre_listen(void)
+@@ -183,7 +186,9 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru
+ 	}
+ #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
++	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name,
++	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
++	    options.use_pam);
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+diff -up openssh/sshd.c.refactor openssh/sshd.c
+--- openssh/sshd.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.275822068 +0200
++++ openssh/sshd.c	2019-04-04 13:19:51.270195262 +0200
+@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ int debug_flag = 0;
+ static int test_flag = 0;
+ 
+ /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
+-static int inetd_flag = 0;
++int inetd_flag = 0;
+ 
+ /* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
+ static int no_daemon_flag = 0;
+@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ static char **saved_argv;
+ static int saved_argc;
+ 
+ /* re-exec */
+-static int rexeced_flag = 0;
++int rexeced_flag = 0;
+ static int rexec_flag = 1;
+ static int rexec_argc = 0;
+ static char **rexec_argv;
+@@ -2192,7 +2192,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
++	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name,
++	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
++	    options.use_pam);
+ #endif
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	if (options.use_pam) {

openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,457 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/cipher-ctr.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.326525641 +0200
++++ openssh-8.0p1/cipher-ctr.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.401526401 +0200
+@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ evp_aes_128_ctr(void)
+ 	aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr;
+ #ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
+ 	aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH |
+-	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV;
++	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV |
++	    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS;
+ #endif
+ 	return (&aes_ctr);
+ }
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/dh.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/dh.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/dh.c.fips	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.0p1/dh.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.401526401 +0200
+@@ -152,6 +152,12 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max
+ 	int best, bestcount, which, linenum;
+ 	struct dhgroup dhg;
+ 
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		logit("Using arbitrary primes is not allowed in FIPS mode."
++		    " Falling back to known groups.");
++		return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
++	}
++
+ 	if ((f = fopen(_PATH_DH_MODULI, "r")) == NULL) {
+ 		logit("WARNING: could not open %s (%s), using fixed modulus",
+ 		    _PATH_DH_MODULI, strerror(errno));
+@@ -489,4 +495,38 @@ dh_estimate(int bits)
+ 	return 8192;
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * Compares the received DH parameters with known-good groups,
++ * which might be either from group14, group16 or group18.
++ */
++int
++dh_is_known_group(const DH *dh)
++{
++	const BIGNUM *p, *g;
++	const BIGNUM *known_p, *known_g;
++	DH *known = NULL;
++	int bits = 0, rv = 0;
++
++	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, &g);
++	bits = BN_num_bits(p);
++
++	if (bits <= 3072) {
++		known = dh_new_group14();
++	} else if (bits <= 6144) {
++		known = dh_new_group16();
++	} else {
++		known = dh_new_group18();
++	}
++
++	DH_get0_pqg(known, &known_p, NULL, &known_g);
++
++	if (BN_cmp(g, known_g) == 0 &&
++	    BN_cmp(p, known_p) == 0) {
++		rv = 1;
++	}
++
++	DH_free(known);
++	return rv;
++}
++
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/dh.h.fips openssh-8.0p1/dh.h
+--- openssh-8.0p1/dh.h.fips	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.0p1/dh.h	2019-07-23 14:55:45.401526401 +0200
+@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ DH	*dh_new_group_fallback(int);
+ 
+ int	 dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
+ int	 dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *, const BIGNUM *);
++int	 dh_is_known_group(const DH *);
+ 
+ u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/kex.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/kex.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/kex.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.395526340 +0200
++++ openssh-8.0p1/kex.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.402526411 +0200
+@@ -199,7 +199,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
+ 	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+ 		if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
+-			error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
++			if (FIPS_mode())
++				error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p);
++			else
++				error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
+ 			free(s);
+ 			return 0;
+ 		}
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/kexgexc.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/kexgexc.c.fips	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.0p1/kexgexc.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.402526411 +0200
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ 
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ 
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+@@ -113,6 +114,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
++	if (FIPS_mode() && dh_is_known_group(kex->dh) == 0) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		goto out;
++	}
+ 	p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
+ 
+ 	/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h
+--- openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h.fips	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.0p1/myproposal.h	2019-07-23 14:55:45.402526411 +0200
+@@ -111,6 +111,20 @@
+ 	"rsa-sha2-256," \
+ 	"ssh-rsa"
+ 
++#define	KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG	\
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521," \
++	"rsa-sha2-512," \
++	"rsa-sha2-256," \
++	"ssh-rsa"
++
+ #define	KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
+ 	"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
+ 	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
+@@ -134,6 +142,27 @@
+ 
+ #define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
+ 
++#define	KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \
++	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
++	"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \
++	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se," \
++	"aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
++#define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS		\
++	"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
++	"ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \
++	"ecdh-sha2-nistp521," \
++	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," \
++	"diffie-hellman-group16-sha512," \
++	"diffie-hellman-group18-sha512," \
++	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha256"
++#define KEX_FIPS_MAC \
++	"hmac-sha1," \
++	"hmac-sha2-256," \
++	"hmac-sha2-512," \
++	"hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
++	"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
++	"hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
++
+ /* Not a KEX value, but here so all the algorithm defaults are together */
+ #define	SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS	\
+ 	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.334525723 +0200
++++ openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.402526411 +0200
+@@ -2179,11 +2179,16 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
+ 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
+ 	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
+-	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
+-	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_MAC, all_mac);
+-	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_KEX, all_kex);
+-	def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
+-	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
++	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT), all_cipher);
++	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_CLIENT_MAC), all_mac);
++	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_CLIENT_KEX), all_kex);
++	def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key);
++	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig);
+ #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
+ 	do { \
+ 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.373526117 +0200
++++ openssh-8.0p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.402526411 +0200
+@@ -137,6 +137,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+ #ifdef __NR_open
+ 	SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_socket
++	SC_DENY(__NR_socket, EACCES),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_openat
+ 	SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES),
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.361525996 +0200
++++ openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.403526421 +0200
+@@ -208,11 +208,16 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
+ 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
+ 	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
+-	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
+-	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac);
+-	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex);
+-	def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
+-	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
++	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT), all_cipher);
++	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_SERVER_MAC), all_mac);
++	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_SERVER_KEX), all_kex);
++	def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key);
++	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig);
+ #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
+ 	do { \
+ 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.378526168 +0200
++++ openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.403526421 +0200
+@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+ #endif
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ 
+@@ -614,6 +626,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		dump_client_config(&options, host);
+ 		exit(0);
+ 	}
++
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
++	}
+ 
+ 	/* Expand SecurityKeyProvider if it refers to an environment variable */
+ 	if (options.sk_provider != NULL && *options.sk_provider == '$' &&
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.336525743 +0200
++++ openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.403526421 +0200
+@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@
+ #include <vis.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ 
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+@@ -198,36 +203,41 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+ 
+ #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+ 	if (options.gss_keyex) {
+-		/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
+-		 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
+-		orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+-
+-		if (options.gss_server_identity) {
+-			gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
+-		} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
+-			gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
+-			/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
+-			 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
+-			if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
+-				free(gss_host);
+-				gss_host = xstrdup(host);
+-			}
+-		} else {
+-			gss_host = xstrdup(host);
+-		}
+-
+-		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
+-		    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
+-		if (gss) {
+-			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
+-			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+-			    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+-
+-			/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
+-			 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
+-			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
+-			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+-			    "%s,null", orig);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
++			options.gss_keyex = 0;
++		} else {
++			/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
++			 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
++			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
++
++			if (options.gss_server_identity) {
++				gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
++			} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
++				gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
++				/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
++				 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
++				if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
++					free(gss_host);
++					gss_host = xstrdup(host);
++				}
++			} else {
++				gss_host = xstrdup(host);
++			}
++
++			gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
++			    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
++			if (gss) {
++				debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
++				xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
++				    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
++
++				/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
++				 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
++				orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
++				xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
++				    "%s,null", orig);
++			}
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.398526371 +0200
++++ openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.403526421 +0200
+@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
+ #include <grp.h>
+ #include <pwd.h>
+ #include <signal.h>
++#include <syslog.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/rand.h>
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -1529,6 +1532,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ #endif
+ 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
+ 
++	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+ 	/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
+ 	saved_argc = ac;
+ 	rexec_argc = ac;
+@@ -1992,6 +2007,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	/* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
+ 	log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+ 
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
++	}
++
+ 	/* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
+ 	   unmounted if desired. */
+ 	if (chdir("/") == -1)
+@@ -2382,10 +2401,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
+ 		orig = NULL;
+ 
+-	if (options.gss_keyex)
+-		gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
+-	else
+-		gss = NULL;
++	if (options.gss_keyex) {
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
++			options.gss_keyex = 0;
++		} else {
++			gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
++		}
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (gss && orig)
+ 		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/sshkey.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/sshkey.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.398526371 +0200
++++ openssh-8.0p1/sshkey.c	2019-07-23 14:55:45.404526431 +0200
+@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+ #include <openssl/pem.h>
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+ #include "crypto_api.h"
+@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@
+ #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "match.h"
++#include "log.h"
+ #include "ssh-sk.h"
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_XMSS
+@@ -1591,6 +1593,8 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA
+ 	}
+ 	if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) ||
+ 	    !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) {
++			if (FIPS_mode())
++				logit("%s: the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method", __func__);
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips	2019-07-23 14:55:45.391526300 +0200
++++ openssh-8.0p1/ssh-keygen.c	2019-07-23 14:57:54.118830056 +0200
+@@ -199,6 +199,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *na
+ #endif
+ 	}
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		if (type == KEY_DSA)
++			fatal("DSA keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		if (type == KEY_ED25519)
++			fatal("ED25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	}
+ 	switch (type) {
+ 	case KEY_DSA:
+ 		if (*bitsp != 1024)
+@@ -1029,9 +1035,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
+ 			first = 1;
+ 			printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
+ 		}
++		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
++
++		/* Skip the keys that are not supported in FIPS mode */
++		if (FIPS_mode() && (type == KEY_DSA || type == KEY_ED25519)) {
++			logit("Skipping %s key in FIPS mode",
++			    key_types[i].key_type_display);
++			goto next;
++		}
++
+ 		printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display);
+ 		fflush(stdout);
+-		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
+ 		if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
+ 			error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s",
+			    prv_tmp, strerror(errno));

openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,647 @@
+diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
+index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
+--- a/auth-krb5.c
++++ b/auth-krb5.c
+@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <krb5.h>
++#include <profile.h>
+ 
+ extern ServerOptions	 options;
+ 
+@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+ #endif
+ 	krb5_error_code problem;
+ 	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
+-	int len;
++	char *ticket_name = NULL;
+ 	char *client, *platform_client;
+ 	const char *errmsg;
+ 
+@@ -163,7 +164,8 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
++	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
++	     &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, &authctxt->krb5_set_env);
+ 	if (problem)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+@@ -172,21 +174,20 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+ 	if (problem)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+-	problem= krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache,
++	problem = krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache,
+ 				 &creds);
+ 	if (problem)
+ 		goto out;
+ #endif
+ 
+-	authctxt->krb5_ticket_file = (char *)krb5_cc_get_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
++	problem = krb5_cc_get_full_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
++	    authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, &ticket_name);
+ 
+-	len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
+-	authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
+-	snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
+-	    authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
++	authctxt->krb5_ccname = xstrdup(ticket_name);
++	krb5_free_string(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ticket_name);
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+-	if (options.use_pam)
++	if (options.use_pam && authctxt->krb5_set_env)
+ 		do_pam_putenv("KRB5CCNAME", authctxt->krb5_ccname);
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -222,11 +223,54 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+ void
+ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ {
++	struct stat krb5_ccname_stat;
++	char krb5_ccname[128], *krb5_ccname_dir_start, *krb5_ccname_dir_end;
++
+ 	debug("krb5_cleanup_proc called");
+ 	if (authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache) {
+-		krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
++		krb5_context ctx = authctxt->krb5_ctx;
++		krb5_cccol_cursor cursor;
++		krb5_ccache ccache;
++		int ret;
++
++		krb5_cc_destroy(ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+ 		authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache = NULL;
++
++		ret = krb5_cccol_cursor_new(ctx, &cursor);
++		if (ret)
++			goto out;
++
++		ret = krb5_cccol_cursor_next(ctx, cursor, &ccache);
++		if (ret == 0 && ccache != NULL) {
++			/* There is at least one other ccache in collection
++			 * we can switch to */
++			krb5_cc_switch(ctx, ccache);
++		} else if (authctxt->krb5_ccname != NULL) {
++			/* Clean up the collection too */
++			strncpy(krb5_ccname, authctxt->krb5_ccname, sizeof(krb5_ccname) - 10);
++			krb5_ccname_dir_start = strchr(krb5_ccname, ':') + 1;
++			*krb5_ccname_dir_start++ = '\0';
++			if (strcmp(krb5_ccname, "DIR") == 0) {
++
++				strcat(krb5_ccname_dir_start, "/primary");
++
++				if (stat(krb5_ccname_dir_start, &krb5_ccname_stat) == 0) {
++					if (unlink(krb5_ccname_dir_start) == 0) {
++						krb5_ccname_dir_end = strrchr(krb5_ccname_dir_start, '/');
++						*krb5_ccname_dir_end = '\0';
++						if (rmdir(krb5_ccname_dir_start) == -1)
++							debug("cache dir '%s' remove failed: %s",
++							    krb5_ccname_dir_start, strerror(errno));
++					}
++					else
++						debug("cache primary file '%s', remove failed: %s",
++						    krb5_ccname_dir_start, strerror(errno));
++				}
++			}
++		}
++		krb5_cccol_cursor_free(ctx, &cursor);
+ 	}
++out:
+ 	if (authctxt->krb5_user) {
+ 		krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user);
+ 		authctxt->krb5_user = NULL;
+@@ -237,36 +281,188 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+-#ifndef HEIMDAL
++
++#if !defined(HEIMDAL)
++int
++ssh_asprintf_append(char **dsc, const char *fmt, ...) {
++	char *src, *old;
++	va_list ap;
++	int i;
++
++	va_start(ap, fmt);
++	i = vasprintf(&src, fmt, ap);
++	va_end(ap);
++
++	if (i == -1 || src == NULL)
++		return -1;
++
++	old = *dsc;
++
++	i = asprintf(dsc, "%s%s", *dsc, src);
++	if (i == -1 || src == NULL) {
++		free(src);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	free(old);
++	free(src);
++
++	return i;
++}
++
++int
++ssh_krb5_expand_template(char **result, const char *template) {
++	char *p_n, *p_o, *r, *tmp_template;
++
++	debug3("%s: called, template = %s", __func__, template);
++	if (template == NULL)
++		return -1;
++
++	tmp_template = p_n = p_o = xstrdup(template);
++	r = xstrdup("");
++
++	while ((p_n = strstr(p_o, "%{")) != NULL) {
++
++		*p_n++ = '\0';
++		if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%s", p_o) == -1)
++			goto cleanup;
++
++		if (strncmp(p_n, "{uid}", 5) == 0 || strncmp(p_n, "{euid}", 6) == 0 ||
++			strncmp(p_n, "{USERID}", 8) == 0) {
++			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
++			if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%d", geteuid()) == -1)
++				goto cleanup;
++			continue;
++		}
++		else if (strncmp(p_n, "{TEMP}", 6) == 0) {
++			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
++			if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "/tmp") == -1)
++				goto cleanup;
++			continue;
++		} else {
++			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
++			*p_o = '\0';
++			debug("%s: unsupported token %s in %s", __func__, p_n, template);
++			/* unknown token, fallback to the default */
++			goto cleanup;
++		}
++	}
++
++	if (ssh_asprintf_append(&r, "%s", p_o) == -1)
++		goto cleanup;
++
++	*result = r;
++	free(tmp_template);
++	return 0;
++
++cleanup:
++	free(r);
++	free(tmp_template);
++	return -1;
++}
++
+ krb5_error_code
+-ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+-	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
+-	char ccname[40];
++ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(krb5_context ctx, char **ccname) {
++	profile_t p;
++	int ret = 0;
++	char *value = NULL;
++
++	debug3("%s: called", __func__);
++	ret = krb5_get_profile(ctx, &p);
++	if (ret)
++		return ret;
++
++	ret = profile_get_string(p, "libdefaults", "default_ccache_name", NULL, NULL, &value);
++	if (ret || !value)
++		return ret;
++
++	ret = ssh_krb5_expand_template(ccname, value);
++
++	debug3("%s: returning with ccname = %s", __func__, *ccname);
++	return ret;
++}
++
++krb5_error_code
++ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environment) {
++	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno, type_len;
++	char *ccname = NULL;
+ 	mode_t old_umask;
++	char *type = NULL, *colon = NULL;
+ 
+-	ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
+-	    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
+-	if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
+-		return ENOMEM;
+-
+-	old_umask = umask(0177);
+-	tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+-	oerrno = errno;
+-	umask(old_umask);
+-	if (tmpfd == -1) {
+-		logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+-		return oerrno;
+-	}
++	debug3("%s: called", __func__);
++	if (need_environment)
++		*need_environment = 0;
++	ret = ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(ctx, &ccname);
++	if (ret || !ccname || options.kerberos_unique_ccache) {
++		/* Otherwise, go with the old method */
++		if (ccname)
++			free(ccname);
++		ccname = NULL;
++
++		ret = asprintf(&ccname,
++		    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
++		if (ret < 0)
++			return ENOMEM;
+ 
+-	if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
++		old_umask = umask(0177);
++		tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+ 		oerrno = errno;
+-		logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
++		umask(old_umask);
++		if (tmpfd == -1) {
++			logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
++			return oerrno;
++		}
++
++		if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
++			oerrno = errno;
++			logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
++			close(tmpfd);
++			return oerrno;
++		}
++		/* make sure the KRB5CCNAME is set for non-standard location */
++		if (need_environment)
++			*need_environment = 1;
+ 		close(tmpfd);
+-		return oerrno;
+ 	}
+-	close(tmpfd);
+ 
+-	return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
++	debug3("%s: setting default ccname to %s", __func__, ccname);
++	/* set the default with already expanded user IDs */
++	ret = krb5_cc_set_default_name(ctx, ccname);
++	if (ret)
++		return ret;
++
++	if ((colon = strstr(ccname, ":")) != NULL) {
++		type_len = colon - ccname;
++		type = malloc((type_len + 1) * sizeof(char));
++		if (type == NULL)
++			return ENOMEM;
++		strncpy(type, ccname, type_len);
++		type[type_len] = 0;
++	} else {
++		type = strdup(ccname);
++	}
++
++	/* If we have a credential cache from krb5.conf, we need to switch
++	 * a primary cache for this collection, if it supports that (non-FILE)
++	 */
++	if (krb5_cc_support_switch(ctx, type)) {
++		debug3("%s: calling cc_new_unique(%s)", __func__, ccname);
++		ret = krb5_cc_new_unique(ctx, type, NULL, ccache);
++		free(type);
++		if (ret)
++			return ret;
++
++		debug3("%s: calling cc_switch()", __func__);
++		return krb5_cc_switch(ctx, *ccache);
++	} else {
++		/* Otherwise, we can not create a unique ccname here (either
++		 * it is already unique from above or the type does not support
++		 * collections
++		 */
++		free(type);
++		debug3("%s: calling cc_resolve(%s)", __func__, ccname);
++		return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
++	}
+ }
+ #endif /* !HEIMDAL */
+ #endif /* KRB5 */
+diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
+index 29491df9..fdab5040 100644
+--- a/auth.h
++++ b/auth.h
+@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
+ 	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
+ 	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
+ 	char		*krb5_ccname;
++	int		 krb5_set_env;
+ #endif
+ 	struct sshbuf	*loginmsg;
+ 
+@@ -238,7 +239,7 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
+ int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
+ 
+ #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
+-krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
++krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #endif /* AUTH_H */
+diff -up openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
+--- openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name	2019-03-01 15:17:42.708611802 +0100
++++ openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2019-03-01 15:17:42.713611844 +0100
+@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
+ /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
+  * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
+ 
+-static void
++static int
+ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ {
+ 	krb5_ccache ccache;
+@@ -276,14 +276,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+ 	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+ 	const char *new_ccname, *new_cctype;
+ 	const char *errmsg;
++	int set_env = 0;
+ 
+ 	if (client->creds == NULL) {
+ 		debug("No credentials stored");
+-		return;
++		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0)
+-		return;
++		return 0;
+ 
+ #ifdef HEIMDAL
+ # ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE
+@@ -297,14 +298,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+ 		krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+ # endif
+ 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
+-		return;
++		return 0;
+ 	}
+ #else
+-	if ((problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb_context, &ccache))) {
++	if ((problem = ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb_context, &ccache, &set_env)) != 0) {
+ 		errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem);
+-		logit("ssh_krb5_cc_gen(): %.100s", errmsg);
++		logit("ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(): %.100s", errmsg);
+ 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
+-		return;
++		return 0;
+ 	}
+ #endif	/* #ifdef HEIMDAL */
+ 
+@@ -313,7 +314,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+ 		errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem);
+ 		logit("krb5_parse_name(): %.100s", errmsg);
+ 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
+-		return;
++		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, princ))) {
+@@ -322,7 +323,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+ 		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
+ 		krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
+ 		krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
+-		return;
++		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
+@@ -331,32 +332,21 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+ 	    client->creds, ccache))) {
+ 		logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed");
+ 		krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
+-		return;
++		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	new_cctype = krb5_cc_get_type(krb_context, ccache);
+ 	new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
+-
+-	client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
+-#ifdef USE_CCAPI
+-	xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
+-	client->store.filename = NULL;
+-#else
+-	if (new_ccname[0] == ':')
+-		new_ccname++;
+ 	xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "%s:%s", new_cctype, new_ccname);
+-	if (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0) {
+-		char *p;
+-		p = strrchr(client->store.envval, '/');
+-		if (p)
+-			*p = '\0';
++
++	if (set_env) {
++		client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
+ 	}
+ 	if ((strcmp(new_cctype, "FILE") == 0) || (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0))
+ 		client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
+-#endif
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+-	if (options.use_pam)
++	if (options.use_pam && set_env)
+ 		do_pam_putenv(client->store.envvar, client->store.envval);
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -361,7 +355,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+ 
+ 	client->store.data = krb_context;
+ 
+-	return;
++	return set_env;
+ }
+ 
+ int
+diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
+index 6cae720e..16e55cbc 100644
+--- a/gss-serv.c
++++ b/gss-serv.c
+@@ -320,13 +320,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ }
+ 
+ /* As user */
+-void
++int
+ ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
+ {
+ 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
+-		(*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
++		return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
+ 	} else
+ 		debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
++
++	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ /* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the child's environment based
+@@ -498,9 +500,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() {
+ 	char *envstr;
+ #endif
+ 
+-	if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
+-	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
+-	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
++	if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
+ 		return;
+ 
+ 	ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
+diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name	2019-03-01 15:17:42.704611768 +0100
++++ openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c	2019-03-01 15:17:42.713611844 +0100
+@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ 	options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1;
+ 	options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
+ 	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
++	options->kerberos_unique_ccache = -1;
+ 	options->gss_authentication=-1;
+ 	options->gss_keyex = -1;
+ 	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
+@@ -315,6 +316,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 		options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1;
+ 	if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1)
+ 		options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
++	if (options->kerberos_unique_ccache == -1)
++		options->kerberos_unique_ccache = 0;
+ 	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->gss_authentication = 0;
+ 	if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
+@@ -447,7 +450,8 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
+ 	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
+ 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
+-	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
++	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache,
++	sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
+ 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+ 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+ 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+@@ -526,11 +530,13 @@ static struct {
+ #else
+ 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
++	{ "kerberosuniqueccache", sKerberosUniqueCCache, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #else
+ 	{ "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "kerberosuniqueccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1437,6 +1443,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 		intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case sKerberosUniqueCCache:
++		intptr = &options->kerberos_unique_ccache;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case sGssAuthentication:
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -2507,6 +2517,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ # ifdef USE_AFS
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
+ # endif
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUniqueCCache, o->kerberos_unique_ccache);
+ #endif
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index db8362c6..4fa42d64 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
++++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ typedef struct {
+ 						 * file on logout. */
+ 	int     kerberos_get_afs_token;		/* If true, try to get AFS token if
+ 						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
++	int     kerberos_unique_ccache;		/* If true, the acquired ticket will
++						 * be stored in per-session ccache */
+ 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
+ 	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
+ 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index 85df6a27..480a5ead 100644
+--- a/session.c
++++ b/session.c
+@@ -1033,7 +1033,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
+ 	/* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter
+ 	 * the child's environment as they see fit
+ 	 */
+-	ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
++	if (s->authctxt->krb5_set_env)
++		ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	/* Set basic environment. */
+@@ -1105,7 +1106,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ #ifdef KRB5
+-	if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname)
++	if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname && s->authctxt->krb5_set_env)
+ 		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
+ 		    s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
+ #endif
+diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
+index 6593e422..245178af 100644
+--- a/ssh-gss.h
++++ b/ssh-gss.h
+@@ -83,7 +82,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+ 	int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ 	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
+ 	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
+-	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
++	int (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ 	int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ } ssh_gssapi_mech;
+ 
+@@ -127,7 +126,7 @@ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
+ void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
+-void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
++int ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
+ const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
+ 
+ char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index edbe815c..89514e8a 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -2162,7 +2162,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ 	if (options.gss_authentication) {
+ 		temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
+-		ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
++		authctxt->krb5_set_env = ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
+ 		restore_uid();
+ 	}
+ #endif
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index c0683d4a..2349f477 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -860,6 +860,14 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache
+ file on logout.
+ The default is
+ .Cm yes .
++.It Cm KerberosUniqueCCache
++Specifies whether to store the acquired tickets in the per-session credential
++cache under /tmp/ or whether to use per-user credential cache as configured in
++.Pa /etc/krb5.conf .
++The default value
++.Cm no
++can lead to overwriting previous tickets by subseqent connections to the same
++user account.
+ .It Cm KexAlgorithms
+ Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
+ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.

openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+diff -up openssh/ssh_config.redhat openssh/ssh_config
+--- openssh/ssh_config.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh/ssh_config	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
+@@ -43,3 +43,10 @@
+ #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
+ #   RekeyLimit 1G 1h
+ #   UserKnownHostsFile ~/.ssh/known_hosts.d/%k
++#
++# This system is following system-wide crypto policy.
++# To modify the crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...), create a  *.conf
++#  file under  /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/  which will be automatically
++# included below. For more information, see manual page for
++#  update-crypto-policies(8)  and  ssh_config(5).
++Include /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/*.conf
+diff -up openssh/ssh_config_redhat.redhat openssh/ssh_config_redhat
+--- openssh/ssh_config_redhat.redhat	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
++++ openssh/ssh_config_redhat	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
++# The options here are in the "Match final block" to be applied as the last
++# options and could be potentially overwritten by the user configuration
++Match final all
++	# Follow system-wide Crypto Policy, if defined:
++	Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config
++
++	GSSAPIAuthentication yes
++
++# If this option is set to yes then remote X11 clients will have full access
++# to the original X11 display. As virtually no X11 client supports the untrusted
++# mode correctly we set this to yes.
++	ForwardX11Trusted yes
++
++# Send locale-related environment variables
++	SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
++	SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
++	SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
++	SendEnv XMODIFIERS
++
++# Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain
++# Host *.local
+diff -up openssh/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh/sshd_config.0
+--- openssh/sshd_config.0.redhat	2020-02-12 14:30:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh/sshd_config.0	2020-02-13 18:13:39.181641855 +0100
+@@ -970,9 +970,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
+ 
+      SyslogFacility
+              Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+-             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0,
+-             LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.  The
+-             default is AUTH.
++             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV,
++             LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
++             The default is AUTH.
+ 
+      TCPKeepAlive
+              Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
+diff -up openssh/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh/sshd_config.5.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh/sshd_config.5	2020-02-13 18:13:39.181641855 +0100
+@@ -1614,7 +1614,7 @@ By default no subsystems are defined.
+ .It Cm SyslogFacility
+ Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+ .Xr sshd 8 .
+-The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
++The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
+ LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
+ The default is AUTH.
+ .It Cm TCPKeepAlive
+diff -up openssh/sshd_config.redhat openssh/sshd_config
+--- openssh/sshd_config.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh/sshd_config	2020-02-13 18:20:16.349913681 +0100
+@@ -10,6 +10,14 @@
+ # possible, but leave them commented.  Uncommented options override the
+ # default value.
+
++# To modify the system-wide sshd configuration, create a  *.conf  file under
++#  /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/  which will be automatically included below
++Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/*.conf
++
++# If you want to change the port on a SELinux system, you have to tell
++# SELinux about this change.
++# semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER
++#
+ #Port 22
+ #AddressFamily any
+ #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
+diff -up openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat openssh/sshd_config_redhat
+--- openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat	2020-02-13 18:14:02.268006439 +0100
++++ openssh/sshd_config_redhat	2020-02-13 18:19:20.765035947 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
++# This system is following system-wide crypto policy. The changes to
++# crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...) will not have any effect in
++# this or following included files. To override some configuration option,
++# write it before this block or include it before this file.
++# Please, see manual pages for update-crypto-policies(8) and sshd_config(5).
++Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config
++
++SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
++
++ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
++
++GSSAPIAuthentication yes
++GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
++
++UsePAM yes
++
++X11Forwarding yes
++
++# It is recommended to use pam_motd in /etc/pam.d/sshd instead of PrintMotd,
++# as it is more configurable and versatile than the built-in version.
++PrintMotd no
++
++# Accept locale-related environment variables
++AcceptEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
++AcceptEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
++AcceptEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
++AcceptEnv XMODIFIERS
++

openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch

@@ -1,26 +1,26 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
---- openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no	2012-09-14 20:54:58.000000000 +0200
+--- a/sshd.c
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c	2012-09-14 20:55:42.289477749 +0200
++++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -1617,6 +1617,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -1701,6 +1701,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  	parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
- 	    &cfg, NULL);
+ 	    cfg, &includes, NULL);
  
 +	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora */
 +	if (! options.use_pam)
 +		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora and may cause several problems.");
 +
- 	seed_rng();
- 
  	/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config
+ 	fill_default_server_options(&options);
---- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no	2012-09-14 20:54:58.514255748 +0200
+ 
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config	2012-09-14 20:54:58.551255954 +0200
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
-@@ -95,6 +95,8 @@ GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
+--- a/sshd_config
++++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
  # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
  # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
  # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
 +# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora and may cause several
 +# problems.
  #UsePAM no
- UsePAM yes
  
+ #AllowAgentForwarding yes

openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,871 @@
+diff -up openssh/auth2.c.role-mls openssh/auth2.c
+--- openssh/auth2.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/auth2.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.815430916 +0200
+@@ -256,6 +256,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+ 	Authmethod *m = NULL;
+ 	char *user = NULL, *service = NULL, *method = NULL, *style = NULL;
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	char *role = NULL;
++#endif
+ 	int r, authenticated = 0;
+ 	double tstart = monotime_double();
+ 
+@@ -268,6 +271,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+ 	debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
+ 	debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
++		*role++ = 0;
++#endif
++
+ 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
+ 		*style++ = 0;
+ 
+@@ -296,8 +304,15 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+ 		    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
+ 		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
+ 		authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
+-		if (use_privsep)
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++		authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
++#endif
++		if (use_privsep) {
+ 			mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++			mm_inform_authrole(role);
++#endif
++		}
+ 		userauth_banner(ssh);
+ 		if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
+ 			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
+diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
+--- openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/auth2-gss.c	2018-08-22 11:15:42.459799171 +0200
+@@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+ 	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+ 	int r, authenticated = 0;
++	char *micuser;
+ 	struct sshbuf *b;
+ 	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
+ 	const char *displayname;
+@@ -298,7 +299,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ 	mic.value = p;
+ 	mic.length = len;
+-	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	if (authctxt->role && authctxt->role[0] != 0)
++		xasprintf(&micuser, "%s/%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->role);
++	else
++#endif
++		micuser = authctxt->user;
++	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, micuser, authctxt->service,
+ 	    "gssapi-with-mic");
+ 
+ 	if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
+@@ -311,6 +318,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ 		logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
+ 
+ 	sshbuf_free(b);
++	if (micuser != authctxt->user)
++		free(micuser);
+ 	free(mic.value);
+ 
+ 	if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
+diff -up openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
+--- openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/auth2-hostbased.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
+@@ -123,7 +123,16 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	/* reconstruct packet */
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	    (authctxt->role
++	    ? ( (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, strlen(authctxt->user)+strlen(authctxt->role)+1)) != 0 ||
++	        (r = sshbuf_put(b, authctxt->user, strlen(authctxt->user))) != 0 ||
++	        (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, '/') != 0) ||
++	        (r = sshbuf_put(b, authctxt->role, strlen(authctxt->role))) != 0)
++	    : (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0) ||
++#else
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0 ||
++#endif
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "hostbased")) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkalg, alen)) != 0 ||
+diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
+--- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
++++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c	2018-08-22 11:17:07.331483958 +0200
+@@ -169,9 +169,16 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 			goto done;
+ 		}
+ 		/* reconstruct packet */
+-		xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
++		xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
+ 		    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
+-		    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
++		    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "",
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++		    authctxt->role ? "/" : "",
++		    authctxt->role ? authctxt->role : ""
++#else
++		    "", ""
++#endif
++		    );
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+ 		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, userstyle)) != 0 ||
+ 		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
+diff -up openssh/auth.h.role-mls openssh/auth.h
+--- openssh/auth.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/auth.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
+@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ struct Authctxt {
+ 	char		*service;
+ 	struct passwd	*pw;		/* set if 'valid' */
+ 	char		*style;
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	char		*role;
++#endif
+ 
+ 	/* Method lists for multiple authentication */
+ 	char		**auth_methods;	/* modified from server config */
+diff -up openssh/auth-pam.c.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.c
+--- openssh/auth-pam.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/auth-pam.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
+@@ -1172,7 +1172,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void)
+  * during the ssh authentication process.
+  */
+ int
+-do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
++do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value)
+ {
+ 	int ret = 1;
+ 	char *compound;
+diff -up openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.h
+--- openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/auth-pam.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200
+@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ u_int do_pam_account(void);
+ void do_pam_session(struct ssh *);
+ void do_pam_setcred(int );
+ void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
+-int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
++int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *);
+ char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
+ char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
+ void free_pam_environment(char **);
+diff -up openssh/misc.c.role-mls openssh/misc.c
+--- openssh/misc.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/misc.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200
+@@ -542,6 +542,7 @@ char *
+ colon(char *cp)
+ {
+ 	int flag = 0;
++	int start = 1;
+ 
+ 	if (*cp == ':')		/* Leading colon is part of file name. */
+ 		return NULL;
+@@ -557,6 +558,13 @@ colon(char *cp)
+ 			return (cp);
+ 		if (*cp == '/')
+ 			return NULL;
++		if (start) {
++		/* Slash on beginning or after dots only denotes file name. */
++			if (*cp == '/')
++				return (0);
++			if (*cp != '.')
++				start = 0;
++		}
+ 	}
+ 	return NULL;
+ }
+diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
+--- openssh/monitor.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/monitor.c	2018-08-22 11:19:56.006844867 +0200
+@@ -115,6 +115,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, struct sshbuf *)
+ int mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+ int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+ int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++int mm_answer_authrole(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
++#endif
+ int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+ int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+ int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+@@ -189,6 +192,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
+     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole},
++#endif
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+@@ -796,6 +802,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, struct ss
+ 
+ 	/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
+ 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1);
++#endif
+ 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+@@ -842,6 +851,26 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, struct sshb
+ 	return found;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++int
++mm_answer_authrole(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
++{
++	int r;
++	monitor_permit_authentications(1);
++
++	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->role, NULL)) != 0)
++		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++	debug3("%s: role=%s", __func__, authctxt->role);
++
++	if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
++		free(authctxt->role);
++		authctxt->role = NULL;
++	}
++
++	return (0);
++}
++#endif
++
+ int
+ mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+ {
+@@ -1218,7 +1247,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i
+ {
+ 	struct sshbuf *b;
+ 	const u_char *p;
+-	char *userstyle, *cp;
++	char *userstyle, *s, *cp;
+ 	size_t len;
+ 	u_char type;
+ 	int r, fail = 0;
+@@ -1251,6 +1280,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i
+ 		fail++;
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
+ 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++	if ((s = strchr(cp, '/')) != NULL)
++		*s = '\0';
+ 	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
+ 	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
+ 	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
+@@ -1286,7 +1317,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
+ {
+ 	struct sshbuf *b;
+ 	const u_char *p;
+-	char *cp, *userstyle;
++	char *cp, *s, *userstyle;
+ 	size_t len;
+ 	int r, fail = 0;
+ 	u_char type;
+@@ -1308,6 +1339,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
+ 		fail++;
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
+ 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++	if ((s = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL)
++		*s = '\0';
+ 	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
+ 	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
+ 	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
+diff -up openssh/monitor.h.role-mls openssh/monitor.h
+--- openssh/monitor.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/monitor.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
+@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC = 48, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC = 49,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_TERM = 50,
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 80,
++#endif
++
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
+diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
++++ openssh/monitor_wrap.c	2018-08-22 11:21:47.938747968 +0200
+@@ -390,6 +390,27 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *
+ 	sshbuf_free(m);
+ }
+ 
++/* Inform the privileged process about role */
++
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++void
++mm_inform_authrole(char *role)
++{
++	int r;
++	struct sshbuf *m;
++
++	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
++
++	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
++	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, role ? role : "")) != 0)
++		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, m);
++
++	sshbuf_free(m);
++}
++#endif
++
+ /* Do the password authentication */
+ int
+ mm_auth_password(struct ssh *ssh, char *password)
+diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.h
+--- openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
++++ openssh/monitor_wrap.h	2018-08-22 11:22:10.439929513 +0200
+@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
+     const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *,
+     const char *, u_int compat);
+ void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++void mm_inform_authrole(char *);
++#endif
+ struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(struct ssh *, const char *);
+ char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
+ int mm_auth_password(struct ssh *, char *);
+diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+--- openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
+@@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ PORTS=	port-aix.o \
+ 	port-linux.o \
+ 	port-solaris.o \
+ 	port-net.o \
+-	port-uw.o
++	port-uw.o \
++	port-linux-sshd.o
+ 
+ .c.o:
+ 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS_NOPIE) $(PICFLAG) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
+diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
+@@ -100,37 +100,6 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+ 	return sc;
+ }
+ 
+-/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
+-void
+-ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+-{
+-	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+-
+-	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+-		return;
+-
+-	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+-
+-	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+-	if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
+-		switch (security_getenforce()) {
+-		case -1:
+-			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+-		case 0:
+-			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
+-			    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+-			break;
+-		default:
+-			fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
+-			    "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
+-		}
+-	}
+-	if (user_ctx != NULL)
+-		freecon(user_ctx);
+-
+-	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+-}
+-
+ /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
+ void
+ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
+@@ -145,7 +114,11 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, cons
+ 
+ 	debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
+ 
+-	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
++	if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) != 0) {
++		error("%s: getexeccon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++		goto out;
++	}
++
+ 
+ 	/* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
+ 
+diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
+@@ -20,9 +20,10 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
+-void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
++
++void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
++++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,425 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
++ * Copyright (c) 2014 Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
++ *
++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
++ *
++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
++ */
++
++/*
++ * Linux-specific portability code - just SELinux support for sshd at present
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#if defined(WITH_SELINUX) || defined(LINUX_OOM_ADJUST)
++#include <errno.h>
++#include <stdarg.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++
++#include "log.h"
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "misc.h"      /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
++#include "servconf.h"
++#include "port-linux.h"
++#include "sshkey.h"
++#include "hostfile.h"
++#include "auth.h"
++
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++#include <selinux/selinux.h>
++#include <selinux/context.h>
++#include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
++#include <selinux/get_default_type.h>
++
++#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
++#include <libaudit.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
++#endif
++
++extern ServerOptions options;
++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
++extern int inetd_flag;
++extern int rexeced_flag;
++
++/* Send audit message */
++static int
++sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context,
++		       security_context_t selected_context)
++{
++	int rc=0;
++#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
++	char *msg = NULL;
++	int audit_fd = audit_open();
++	security_context_t default_raw=NULL;
++	security_context_t selected_raw=NULL;
++	rc = -1;
++	if (audit_fd < 0) {
++		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
++					errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
++				return 0; /* No audit support in kernel */
++		error("Error connecting to audit system.");
++		return rc;
++	}
++	if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(default_context, &default_raw) < 0) {
++		error("Error translating default context.");
++		default_raw = NULL;
++	}
++	if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(selected_context, &selected_raw) < 0) {
++		error("Error translating selected context.");
++		selected_raw = NULL;
++	}
++	if (asprintf(&msg, "sshd: default-context=%s selected-context=%s",
++		     default_raw ? default_raw : (default_context ? default_context: "?"),
++		     selected_context ? selected_raw : (selected_context ? selected_context :"?")) < 0) {
++		error("Error allocating memory.");
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_ROLE_CHANGE,
++				   msg, NULL, NULL, NULL, success) <= 0) {
++		error("Error sending audit message.");
++		goto out;
++	}
++	rc = 0;
++      out:
++	free(msg);
++	freecon(default_raw);
++	freecon(selected_raw);
++	close(audit_fd);
++#endif
++	return rc;
++}
++
++static int
++mls_range_allowed(security_context_t src, security_context_t dst)
++{
++	struct av_decision avd;
++	int retval;
++	access_vector_t bit;
++	security_class_t class;
++
++	debug("%s: src:%s dst:%s", __func__, src, dst);
++	class = string_to_security_class("context");
++	if (!class) {
++		error("string_to_security_class failed to translate security class context");
++		return 1;
++	}
++	bit = string_to_av_perm(class, "contains");
++	if (!bit) {
++		error("string_to_av_perm failed to translate av perm contains");
++		return 1;
++	}
++	retval = security_compute_av(src, dst, class, bit, &avd);
++	if (retval || ((bit & avd.allowed) != bit))
++		return 0;
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++static int
++get_user_context(const char *sename, const char *role, const char *lvl,
++	security_context_t *sc) {
++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
++	if (lvl == NULL || lvl[0] == '\0' || get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, sc) != 0) {
++	        /* User may have requested a level completely outside of his 
++	           allowed range. We get a context just for auditing as the
++	           range check below will certainly fail for default context. */
++#endif
++		if (get_default_context(sename, NULL, sc) != 0) {
++			*sc = NULL;
++			return -1;
++		}
++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
++	}
++#endif
++	if (role != NULL && role[0]) {
++		context_t con;
++		char *type=NULL;
++		if (get_default_type(role, &type) != 0) {
++			error("get_default_type: failed to get default type for '%s'",
++				role);
++			goto out;
++		}
++		con = context_new(*sc);
++		if (!con) {
++			goto out;
++		}
++		context_role_set(con, role);
++		context_type_set(con, type);
++		freecon(*sc);
++		*sc = strdup(context_str(con));
++		context_free(con);
++		if (!*sc)
++			return -1;
++	}
++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
++	if (lvl != NULL && lvl[0]) {
++		/* verify that the requested range is obtained */
++		context_t con;
++		security_context_t obtained_raw;
++		security_context_t requested_raw;
++		con = context_new(*sc);
++		if (!con) {
++			goto out;
++		}
++		context_range_set(con, lvl);
++		if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(*sc, &obtained_raw) < 0) {
++			context_free(con);
++			goto out;
++		}
++		if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(context_str(con), &requested_raw) < 0) {
++			freecon(obtained_raw);
++			context_free(con);
++			goto out;
++		}
++
++		debug("get_user_context: obtained context '%s' requested context '%s'",
++			obtained_raw, requested_raw);
++		if (strcmp(obtained_raw, requested_raw)) {
++			/* set the context to the real requested one but fail */
++			freecon(requested_raw);
++			freecon(obtained_raw);
++			freecon(*sc);
++			*sc = strdup(context_str(con));
++			context_free(con);
++			return -1;
++		}
++		freecon(requested_raw);
++		freecon(obtained_raw);
++		context_free(con);
++	}
++#endif
++	return 0;
++      out:
++	freecon(*sc);
++	*sc = NULL;
++	return -1;
++}
++
++static void
++ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level)
++{
++	*role = NULL;
++	*level = NULL;
++	if (the_authctxt) {
++		if (the_authctxt->role != NULL) {
++			char *slash;
++			*role = xstrdup(the_authctxt->role);
++			if ((slash = strchr(*role, '/')) != NULL) {
++				*slash = '\0';
++				*level = slash + 1;
++			}
++		}
++	}
++}
++
++/* Return the default security context for the given username */
++static int
++sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
++	security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc)
++{
++	char *sename, *lvl;
++	char *role;
++	const char *reqlvl;
++	int r = 0;
++	context_t con = NULL;
++
++	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
++
++#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
++	if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) {
++		sename = NULL;
++		lvl = NULL;
++	}
++#else
++	sename = pwname;
++	lvl = "";
++#endif
++
++	if (r == 0) {
++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
++		r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, default_sc);
++#else
++		r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, default_sc);
++#endif
++	}
++
++	if (r == 0) {
++		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
++		if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
++			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
++
++			if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
++				fatal("failed to allocate security context");
++
++			if ((con=context_new(sshdsc)) == NULL)
++				fatal("failed to allocate selinux context");
++			reqlvl = context_range_get(con);
++			freecon(sshdsc);
++			if (reqlvl !=NULL && lvl != NULL && strcmp(reqlvl, lvl) == 0)
++			    /* we actually don't change level */
++			    reqlvl = "";
++
++			debug("%s: current connection level '%s'", __func__, reqlvl);
++
++		}
++
++		if ((reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) || (role != NULL && role[0])) {
++			r = get_user_context(sename, role, reqlvl, user_sc);
++
++			if (r == 0 && reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) {
++				security_context_t default_level_sc = *default_sc;
++				if (role != NULL && role[0]) {
++					if (get_user_context(sename, role, lvl, &default_level_sc) < 0)
++						default_level_sc = *default_sc;
++				}
++				/* verify that the requested range is contained in the user range */
++				if (mls_range_allowed(default_level_sc, *user_sc)) {
++					logit("permit MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
++				} else {
++					r = -1;
++					error("deny MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
++				}
++				if (default_level_sc != *default_sc)
++					freecon(default_level_sc);
++			}
++		} else {
++			*user_sc = *default_sc;
++		}
++	}
++	if (r != 0) {
++		error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
++		    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
++	}
++
++#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
++	free(sename);
++	free(lvl);
++#endif
++
++	if (role != NULL)
++		free(role);
++	if (con)
++		context_free(con);
++
++	return (r);
++}
++
++/* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
++static int
++sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
++{
++	const char *reqlvl;
++	char *role;
++	char *use_current;
++	int rv;
++
++	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
++
++	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
++
++	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
++
++	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
++		use_current = "1";
++	} else {
++		use_current = "";
++		rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: "");
++	}
++
++	rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current);
++
++	if (role != NULL)
++		free(role);
++
++	return rv;
++}
++
++/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
++void
++sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
++{
++	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
++	int r = 0;
++	security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
++
++	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
++		return;
++
++	if (options.use_pam) {
++		/* do not compute context, just setup environment for pam_selinux */
++		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) {
++			switch (security_getenforce()) {
++			case -1:
++				fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
++			case 0:
++				error("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
++				    __func__);
++			break;
++			default:
++				fatal("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.",
++				    __func__);
++			}
++		}
++		return;
++	}
++
++	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
++
++	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
++	if (r >= 0) {
++		r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
++		if (r < 0) {
++			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s",
++			    __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
++		}
++#ifdef HAVE_SETKEYCREATECON
++		else if (setkeycreatecon(user_ctx) < 0) {
++			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s",
++			    __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
++		}
++#endif
++	}
++	if (user_ctx == NULL) {
++		user_ctx = default_ctx;
++	}
++	if (r < 0 || user_ctx != default_ctx) {
++		/* audit just the case when user changed a role or there was
++		   a failure */
++		sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(r >= 0, default_ctx, user_ctx);
++	}
++	if (r < 0) {
++		switch (security_getenforce()) {
++		case -1:
++			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
++		case 0:
++			error("%s: SELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
++			    __func__);
++			break;
++		default:
++			fatal("%s: SELinux failure. Aborting connection.",
++			    __func__);
++		}
++	}
++	if (user_ctx != NULL && user_ctx != default_ctx)
++		freecon(user_ctx);
++	if (default_ctx != NULL)
++		freecon(default_ctx);
++
++	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
++}
++
++#endif
++#endif
++
+diff -up openssh/platform.c.role-mls openssh/platform.c
+--- openssh/platform.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/platform.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
+@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru
+ 	}
+ #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-	ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
++	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+diff -up openssh/sshd.c.role-mls openssh/sshd.c
+--- openssh/sshd.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/sshd.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.820430957 +0200
+@@ -2186,6 +2186,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		restore_uid();
+ 	}
+ #endif
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
++#endif
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	if (options.use_pam) {
+ 		do_pam_setcred(1);

openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index 60682c68..9344806e 100644
+--- a/scp.c
++++ b/scp.c
+@@ -714,7 +714,9 @@ toremote(int argc, char **argv)
+ 			addargs(&alist, "%s", host);
+ 			addargs(&alist, "%s", cmd);
+ 			addargs(&alist, "%s", src);
+-			addargs(&alist, "%s%s%s:%s",
++			addargs(&alist,
++			    /* IPv6 address needs to be enclosed with sqare brackets */
++			    strchr(host, ':') != NULL ? "%s%s[%s]:%s" : "%s%s%s:%s",
+ 			    tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "",
+ 			    thost, targ);
+ 			if (do_local_cmd(&alist) != 0)
+

openssh-7.9p1-ssh-copy-id.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From 22bfdcf060b632b5a6ff603f8f42ff166c211a66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2020 10:02:45 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Fail hard on the first failed attempt to write the
+ authorized_keys_file
+
+---
+ ssh-copy-id | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
+index 392f64f..e69a23f 100755
+--- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
++++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
+@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ installkeys_sh() {
+ 	cd;
+ 	umask 077;
+ 	mkdir -p $(dirname "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}") &&
+-	  { [ -z \`tail -1c ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} 2>/dev/null\` ] || echo >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE}; } &&
++	  { [ -z \`tail -1c ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} 2>/dev/null\` ] || echo >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} || exit 1; } &&
+ 	  cat >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} ||
+ 	  exit 1;
+ 	if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+-- 
+GitLab
+
+

openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,502 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5
+--- openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies	2020-03-26 14:40:44.546775605 +0100
++++ openssh-8.2p1/ssh_config.5	2020-03-26 14:52:20.700649727 +0100
+@@ -359,17 +359,17 @@ or
+ .Qq *.c.example.com
+ domains.
+ .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
+ by certificate authorities (CAs).
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ .Xr ssh 1
+ will not accept host certificates signed using algorithms other than those
+ specified.
++.Pp
+ .It Cm CertificateFile
+ Specifies a file from which the user's certificate is read.
+ A corresponding private key must be provided separately in order
+@@ -424,20 +424,25 @@ If the option is set to
+ .Cm no ,
+ the check will not be executed.
+ .It Cm Ciphers
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference.
+ Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the built-in
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
++built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The supported ciphers are:
+ .Bd -literal -offset indent
+@@ -453,13 +458,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+ chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
+-aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
+-aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
+ .It Cm ClearAllForwardings
+@@ -812,6 +810,11 @@ command line will be passed untouched to
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+ .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI
+ key exchange. Possible values are
+ .Bd -literal -offset 3n
+@@ -824,10 +827,8 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-,
+ gss-curve25519-sha256-
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+-The default is
+-.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,
+-gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
+ This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
++.Pp
+ .It Cm HashKnownHosts
+ Indicates that
+ .Xr ssh 1
+@@ -1149,29 +1150,25 @@ it may be zero or more of:
+ and
+ .Cm pam .
+ .It Cm KexAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
+ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
+-ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
+-diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
+-diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,
+-diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
+-diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
+-.Ed
++built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q kex .
+@@ -1231,37 +1228,33 @@ The default is INFO.
+ DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
+ DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output.
+ .It Cm MACs
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms
+ in order of preference.
+ The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
+ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
++built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The algorithms that contain
+ .Qq -etm
+ calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac).
+ These are considered safer and their use recommended.
+ .Pp
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
+-hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
+-hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
+-umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
+-hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q mac .
+ .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+@@ -1394,36 +1387,25 @@ instead of continuing to execute and pas
+ The default is
+ .Cm no .
+ .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the key types that will be used for public key authentication
+ as a comma-separated list of patterns.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the key types after it will be appended to the default
+-instead of replacing it.
++character, then the key types after it will be appended to the built-in
++openssh default instead of replacing it.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
+-The default for this option is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-.Ed
++built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The list of available key types may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes .
+diff -up openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies	2020-03-26 14:40:44.530775355 +0100
++++ openssh-8.2p1/sshd_config.5	2020-03-26 14:48:56.732468099 +0100
+@@ -375,16 +375,16 @@ If the argument is
+ then no banner is displayed.
+ By default, no banner is displayed.
+ .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
+ by certificate authorities (CAs).
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ Certificates signed using other algorithms will not be accepted for
+ public key or host-based authentication.
++.Pp
+ .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+ Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
+ PAM or through authentication styles supported in
+@@ -446,20 +446,25 @@ The default is
+ indicating not to
+ .Xr chroot 2 .
+ .It Cm Ciphers
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the ciphers allowed.
+ Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the built-in
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
++built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The supported ciphers are:
+ .Pp
+@@ -486,13 +491,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+ chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
+ .El
+ .Pp
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
+-aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
+-aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
+ .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
+@@ -681,22 +679,24 @@ For this to work
+ .Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
+ needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client.
+ .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ The list of key exchange algorithms that are accepted by GSSAPI
+ key exchange. Possible values are
+ .Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-gss-gex-sha1-,
+-gss-group1-sha1-,
+-gss-group14-sha1-,
+-gss-group14-sha256-,
+-gss-group16-sha512-,
+-gss-nistp256-sha256-,
++gss-gex-sha1-
++gss-group1-sha1-
++gss-group14-sha1-
++gss-group14-sha256-
++gss-group16-sha512-
++gss-nistp256-sha256-
+ gss-curve25519-sha256-
+ .Ed
+-.Pp
+-The default is
+-.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,
+-gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
+ This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
++.Pp
+ .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
+ Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication
+ as a list of comma-separated patterns.
+@@ -793,25 +793,13 @@ is specified, the location of the socket
+ .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+ environment variable.
+ .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the host key algorithms
+ that the server offers.
+-The default for this option is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ The list of available key types may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
+ .It Cm IgnoreRhosts
+@@ -943,20 +931,25 @@ Specifies whether to look at .k5login fi
+ The default is
+ .Cm yes .
+ .It Cm KexAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
+ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ Alternately if the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
++built-in openssh default set.
+ The supported algorithms are:
+ .Pp
+ .Bl -item -compact -offset indent
+@@ -988,15 +981,6 @@ ecdh-sha2-nistp521
+ sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org
+ .El
+ .Pp
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
+-ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
+-diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
+-diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
+-diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q KexAlgorithms .
+ .It Cm ListenAddress
+@@ -1065,21 +1049,26 @@ DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
+ DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output.
+ Logging with a DEBUG level violates the privacy of users and is not recommended.
+ .It Cm MACs
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms.
+ The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
+ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
++built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The algorithms that contain
+ .Qq -etm
+@@ -1122,15 +1111,6 @@ umac-64-etm@openssh.com
+ umac-128-etm@openssh.com
+ .El
+ .Pp
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
+-hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
+-hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
+-umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
+-hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q mac .
+ .It Cm Match
+@@ -1480,36 +1460,25 @@ or equivalent.)
+ The default is
+ .Cm yes .
+ .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++To see the defaults and how to modify this default, see manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the key types that will be accepted for public key authentication
+ as a list of comma-separated patterns.
+ Alternately if the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified key types will be appended to the built-in
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
+-The default for this option is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-.Ed
++built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The list of available key types may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes .

openssh-8.0p1-openssl-evp.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,720 @@
+From ed7ec0cdf577ffbb0b15145340cf51596ca3eb89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 10:45:45 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Use high-level OpenSSL API for signatures
+
+---
+ digest-openssl.c |  16 ++++
+ digest.h         |   6 ++
+ ssh-dss.c        |  65 ++++++++++------
+ ssh-ecdsa.c      |  69 ++++++++++-------
+ ssh-rsa.c        | 193 +++++++++--------------------------------------
+ sshkey.c         |  77 +++++++++++++++++++
+ sshkey.h         |   4 +
+ 7 files changed, 221 insertions(+), 209 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/digest-openssl.c b/digest-openssl.c
+index da7ed72bc..6a21d8adb 100644
+--- a/digest-openssl.c
++++ b/digest-openssl.c
+@@ -63,6 +63,22 @@ const struct ssh_digest digests[] = {
+ 	{ -1,			NULL,		0,	NULL },
+ };
+ 
++const EVP_MD *
++ssh_digest_to_md(int digest_type)
++{
++	switch (digest_type) {
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
++		return EVP_sha1();
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
++		return EVP_sha256();
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
++		return EVP_sha384();
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
++		return EVP_sha512();
++	}
++	return NULL;
++}
++
+ static const struct ssh_digest *
+ ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg)
+ {
+diff --git a/digest.h b/digest.h
+index 274574d0e..c7ceeb36f 100644
+--- a/digest.h
++++ b/digest.h
+@@ -32,6 +32,12 @@
+ struct sshbuf;
+ struct ssh_digest_ctx;
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++/* Converts internal digest representation to the OpenSSL one */
++const EVP_MD *ssh_digest_to_md(int digest_type);
++#endif
++
+ /* Looks up a digest algorithm by name */
+ int ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name);
+ 
+diff --git a/ssh-dss.c b/ssh-dss.c
+index a23c383dc..ea45e7275 100644
+--- a/ssh-dss.c
++++ b/ssh-dss.c
+@@ -52,11 +52,15 @@ int
+ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
+ {
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ 	DSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+ 	const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
+-	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
+-	size_t rlen, slen, len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
++	u_char sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
++	size_t rlen, slen;
++	int len;
+ 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
++	u_char *sigb = NULL;
++	const u_char *psig = NULL;
+ 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 
+ 	if (lenp != NULL)
+@@ -67,17 +71,24 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ 	if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
+ 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+-	if (dlen == 0)
+-		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 
+-	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
+-	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
++	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1)
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &sigb, &len,
++	    data, datalen);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	if (ret < 0) {
+ 		goto out;
++	}
+ 
+-	if ((sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa)) == NULL) {
++	psig = sigb;
++	if ((sig = d2i_DSA_SIG(NULL, &psig, len)) == NULL) {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
++	free(sigb);
++	sigb = NULL;
+ 
+ 	DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s);
+ 	rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig_r);
+@@ -110,7 +121,7 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ 		*lenp = len;
+ 	ret = 0;
+  out:
+-	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
++	free(sigb);
+ 	DSA_SIG_free(sig);
+ 	sshbuf_free(b);
+ 	return ret;
+@@ -121,20 +132,20 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+     const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
+     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
+ {
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ 	DSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+ 	BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
+-	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob = NULL;
+-	size_t len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
++	u_char *sigblob = NULL;
++	size_t len, slen;
+ 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ 	char *ktype = NULL;
++	u_char *sigb = NULL, *psig = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
+ 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA ||
+ 	    signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+-	if (dlen == 0)
+-		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 
+ 	/* fetch signature */
+ 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
+@@ -176,25 +187,31 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 	}
+ 	sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
+ 
+-	/* sha1 the data */
+-	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
+-	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
++	if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(sig, NULL)) == 0) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+-
+-	switch (DSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->dsa)) {
+-	case 1:
+-		ret = 0;
+-		break;
+-	case 0:
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
++	}
++	if ((sigb = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+-	default:
++	}
++	psig = sigb;
++	if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(sig, &psig)) == 0) {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
++	    sigb, slen);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++
+  out:
+-	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
++	free(sigb);
+ 	DSA_SIG_free(sig);
+ 	BN_clear_free(sig_r);
+ 	BN_clear_free(sig_s);
+diff --git a/ssh-ecdsa.c b/ssh-ecdsa.c
+index 599c7199d..b036796e8 100644
+--- a/ssh-ecdsa.c
++++ b/ssh-ecdsa.c
+@@ -50,11 +50,13 @@ int
+ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
+ {
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ 	ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
++	unsigned char *sigb = NULL;
++	const unsigned char *psig;
+ 	const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
+ 	int hash_alg;
+-	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+-	size_t len, dlen;
++	int len;
+ 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL;
+ 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 
+@@ -67,18 +69,24 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 
+-	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
+-	    (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
++	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+-	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
+-	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
++
++	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1)
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sigb, &len, data,
++	    datalen);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	if (ret < 0) {
+ 		goto out;
++	}
+ 
+-	if ((sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->ecdsa)) == NULL) {
++	psig = sigb;
++	if ((sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &psig, len)) == NULL) {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-
+ 	if ((bb = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+@@ -102,7 +110,7 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ 		*lenp = len;
+ 	ret = 0;
+  out:
+-	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
++	free(sigb);
+ 	sshbuf_free(b);
+ 	sshbuf_free(bb);
+ 	ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
+@@ -115,22 +123,21 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+     const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
+     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
+ {
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ 	ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+ 	BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
+-	int hash_alg;
+-	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+-	size_t dlen;
++	int hash_alg, len;
+ 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL;
+ 	char *ktype = NULL;
++	unsigned char *sigb = NULL, *psig = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL ||
+ 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA ||
+ 	    signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 
+-	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
+-	    (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
++	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 
+ 	/* fetch signature */
+@@ -166,28 +173,36 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 	}
+ 	sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
+ 
+-	if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
++	/* Figure out the length */
++	if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, NULL)) == 0) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if ((sigb = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
+-	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
++	psig = sigb;
++	if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, &psig)) == 0) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
++	}
+ 
+-	switch (ECDSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->ecdsa)) {
+-	case 1:
+-		ret = 0;
+-		break;
+-	case 0:
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
++	if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
+ 		goto out;
+-	default:
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++	}
++
++	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1) {
++		ret =  SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
++	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, datalen, sigb, len);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ 
+  out:
+-	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
++	free(sigb);
+ 	sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
+ 	sshbuf_free(b);
+ 	ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
+diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
+index 9b14f9a9a..8ef3a6aca 100644
+--- a/ssh-rsa.c
++++ b/ssh-rsa.c
+@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
+ 
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ 
+-static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, RSA *);
++static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, const u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, EVP_PKEY *);
+ 
+ static const char *
+ rsa_hash_alg_ident(int hash_alg)
+@@ -90,21 +90,6 @@ rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(const char *alg)
+ 	return -1;
+ }
+ 
+-static int
+-rsa_hash_alg_nid(int type)
+-{
+-	switch (type) {
+-	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
+-		return NID_sha1;
+-	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
+-		return NID_sha256;
+-	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
+-		return NID_sha512;
+-	default:
+-		return -1;
+-	}
+-}
+-
+ int
+ ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(struct sshkey *key, const BIGNUM *iqmp)
+ {
+@@ -164,11 +149,10 @@ int
+ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg_ident)
+ {
+-	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
+-	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sig = NULL;
+-	size_t slen = 0;
+-	u_int dlen, len;
+-	int nid, hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++	u_char *sig = NULL;
++	int len, slen = 0;
++	int hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (lenp != NULL)
+@@ -180,33 +164,24 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ 		hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
+ 	else
+ 		hash_alg = rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(alg_ident);
++
+ 	if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || hash_alg == -1 ||
+ 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+-	RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
+-	if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
+-		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
+ 	slen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
+-	if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
+-		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+-
+-	/* hash the data */
+-	nid = rsa_hash_alg_nid(hash_alg);
+-	if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
+-		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+-	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
+-	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
+-		goto out;
++	if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
++		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
+ 
+-	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1)
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sig, &len, data,
++	    datalen);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	if (ret < 0) {
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa) != 1) {
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+-		goto out;
+-	}
+ 	if (len < slen) {
+ 		size_t diff = slen - len;
+ 		memmove(sig + diff, sig, len);
+@@ -215,6 +190,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
++
+ 	/* encode signature */
+ 	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+@@ -235,7 +211,6 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ 		*lenp = len;
+ 	ret = 0;
+  out:
+-	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
+ 	freezero(sig, slen);
+ 	sshbuf_free(b);
+ 	return ret;
+@@ -246,10 +221,10 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+     const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+     const char *alg)
+ {
+-	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ 	char *sigtype = NULL;
+ 	int hash_alg, want_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+-	size_t len = 0, diff, modlen, dlen;
++	size_t len = 0, diff, modlen;
+ 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ 	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *osigblob, *sigblob = NULL;
+ 
+@@ -257,8 +232,7 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA ||
+ 	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+-	RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
+-	if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
++	if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
+ 
+ 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
+@@ -310,16 +284,15 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 		explicit_bzero(sigblob, diff);
+ 		len = modlen;
+ 	}
+-	if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) {
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++
++	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
+-	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
+-		goto out;
++	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, data, datalen, sigblob, len, pkey);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ 
+-	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, digest, dlen, sigblob, len,
+-	    key->rsa);
+  out:
+ 	freezero(sigblob, len);
+ 	free(sigtype);
+@@ -328,122 +301,26 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-/*
+- * See:
+- * http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-1/
+- * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1.asn
+- */
+-
+-/*
+- * id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
+- *	oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 }
+- */
+-static const u_char id_sha1[] = {
+-	0x30, 0x21, /* type Sequence, length 0x21 (33) */
+-	0x30, 0x09, /* type Sequence, length 0x09 */
+-	0x06, 0x05, /* type OID, length 0x05 */
+-	0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, /* id-sha1 OID */
+-	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
+-	0x04, 0x14  /* Octet string, length 0x14 (20), followed by sha1 hash */
+-};
+-
+-/*
+- * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html
+- * id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840)
+- *      organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2)
+- *      id-sha256(1) }
+- */
+-static const u_char id_sha256[] = {
+-	0x30, 0x31, /* type Sequence, length 0x31 (49) */
+-	0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */
+-	0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */
+-	0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, /* id-sha256 */
+-	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
+-	0x04, 0x20  /* Octet string, length 0x20 (32), followed by sha256 hash */
+-};
+-
+-/*
+- * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html
+- * id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840)
+- *      organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2)
+- *      id-sha256(3) }
+- */
+-static const u_char id_sha512[] = {
+-	0x30, 0x51, /* type Sequence, length 0x51 (81) */
+-	0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */
+-	0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */
+-	0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, /* id-sha512 */
+-	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
+-	0x04, 0x40  /* Octet string, length 0x40 (64), followed by sha512 hash */
+-};
+-
+ static int
+-rsa_hash_alg_oid(int hash_alg, const u_char **oidp, size_t *oidlenp)
++openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
++    u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+ {
+-	switch (hash_alg) {
+-	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
+-		*oidp = id_sha1;
+-		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha1);
+-		break;
+-	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
+-		*oidp = id_sha256;
+-		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha256);
+-		break;
+-	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
+-		*oidp = id_sha512;
+-		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha512);
+-		break;
+-	default:
+-		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+-	}
+-	return 0;
+-}
++	size_t rsasize = 0;
++	const RSA *rsa;
++	int ret;
+ 
+-static int
+-openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, u_char *hash, size_t hashlen,
+-    u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa)
+-{
+-	size_t rsasize = 0, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0;
+-	int ret, len, oidmatch, hashmatch;
+-	const u_char *oid = NULL;
+-	u_char *decrypted = NULL;
+-
+-	if ((ret = rsa_hash_alg_oid(hash_alg, &oid, &oidlen)) != 0)
+-		return ret;
+-	ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+-	hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
+-	if (hashlen != hlen) {
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+-		goto done;
+-	}
++	rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey);
+ 	rsasize = RSA_size(rsa);
+ 	if (rsasize <= 0 || rsasize > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM ||
+ 	    siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
+-	if ((decrypted = malloc(rsasize)) == NULL) {
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+-		goto done;
+-	}
+-	if ((len = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sigbuf, decrypted, rsa,
+-	    RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) < 0) {
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+-		goto done;
+-	}
+-	if (len < 0 || (size_t)len != hlen + oidlen) {
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+-		goto done;
+-	}
+-	oidmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) == 0;
+-	hashmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) == 0;
+-	if (!oidmatch || !hashmatch) {
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+-		goto done;
+-	}
+-	ret = 0;
++
++	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, datalen,
++	    sigbuf, siglen);
++
+ done:
+-	freezero(decrypted, rsasize);
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
+index ad1957762..b95ed0b10 100644
+--- a/sshkey.c
++++ b/sshkey.c
+@@ -358,6 +358,83 @@ sshkey_type_plain(int type)
+ }
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++int
++sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, u_char **sigp,
++    int *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen)
++{
++	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	u_char *sig = NULL;
++	int ret, slen, len;
++
++	if (sigp == NULL || lenp == NULL) {
++		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	}
++
++	slen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
++	if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
++		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++
++	len = slen;
++	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	}
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto error;
++	}
++	if (EVP_SignInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
++	    EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0 ||
++	    EVP_SignFinal(ctx, sig, &len, pkey) <= 0) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto error;
++	}
++
++	*sigp = sig;
++	*lenp = len;
++	/* Now owned by the caller */
++	sig = NULL;
++	ret = 0;
++
++error:
++	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
++	free(sig);
++	return ret;
++}
++
++int
++sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, const u_char *data,
++    size_t datalen, u_char *sigbuf, int siglen)
++{
++	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	int ret;
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	}
++	if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
++	    EVP_VerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto done;
++	}
++	ret = EVP_VerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen, pkey);
++	switch (ret) {
++	case 1:
++		ret = 0;
++		break;
++	case 0:
++		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
++		break;
++	default:
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		break;
++	}
++
++done:
++	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
++	return ret;
++}
++
+ /* XXX: these are really begging for a table-driven approach */
+ int
+ sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name)
+diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
+index a91e60436..270901a87 100644
+--- a/sshkey.h
++++ b/sshkey.h
+@@ -179,6 +179,10 @@ const char	*sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *);
+ const char	*sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *);
+ int		 sshkey_names_valid2(const char *, int);
+ char		*sshkey_alg_list(int, int, int, char);
++int		 sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY*, int, u_char **,
++    int *, const u_char *, size_t);
++int		 sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *, int, const u_char *,
++    size_t, u_char *, int);
+ 
+ int	 sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **);
+ int	 sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **);
+

openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+commit 2c3ef499bfffce3cfd315edeebf202850ba4e00a
+Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date:   Tue Apr 16 15:35:18 2019 +0200
+
+    Use the new OpenSSL KDF
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 2a455e4e..e01c3d43 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -2712,6 +2712,7 @@ if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
+ 		HMAC_CTX_init \
+ 		RSA_generate_key_ex \
+ 		RSA_get_default_method \
++		EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id \
+ 	])
+ 
+ 	# OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms may be a macro.
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index b6f041f4..1fbce2bb 100644
+--- a/kex.c
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
++# ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID
++# include <openssl/kdf.h>
++# endif
+ #endif
+ 
+ #include "ssh.h"
+@@ -942,6 +945,95 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID
++static const EVP_MD *
++digest_to_md(int digest_type)
++{
++	switch (digest_type) {
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
++		return EVP_sha1();
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
++		return EVP_sha256();
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
++		return EVP_sha384();
++	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
++		return EVP_sha512();
++	}
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++static int
++derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
++    const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	u_char *key = NULL;
++	int r, key_len;
++
++	if ((key_len = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0)
++		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	key_len = ROUNDUP(need, key_len);
++	if ((key = calloc(1, key_len)) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_SSHKDF);
++	if (!ctx) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, digest_to_md(kex->hash_alg));
++	if (r != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY,
++	    sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret));
++	if (r != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_XCGHASH, hash, hashlen);
++	if (r != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_TYPE, id);
++	if (r != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID,
++	    kex->session_id, kex->session_id_len);
++	if (r != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	r = EVP_KDF_derive(ctx, key, key_len);
++	if (r != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
++	fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", id);
++	dump_digest("key", key, key_len);
++#endif
++	*keyp = key;
++	key = NULL;
++	r = 0;
++
++out:
++	free (key);
++	EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
++	if (r < 0) {
++		return r;
++	}
++	return 0;
++}
++#else
+ static int
+ derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
+     const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
+@@ -1004,6 +1096,7 @@ derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
+ 	ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
+ 	return r;
+ }
++#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID */
+ 
+ #define NKEYS	6
+ int
+

openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+diff --git a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
+index dca158de..afdcb1d2 100644
+--- a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
++++ b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
+@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+-uint32_t
++uint32_t __attribute__((visibility("default")))
+ sk_api_version(void)
+ {
+ 	return SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR;
+@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ check_options(struct sk_option **options)
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-int
++int __attribute__((visibility("default")))
+ sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
+     const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
+     struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response)
+@@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ sig_ed25519(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-int
++int __attribute__((visibility("default")))
+ sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen,
+     const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
+     uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-int
++int __attribute__((visibility("default")))
+ sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+     struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks)
+ {

openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
+--- a/channels.c
++++ b/channels.c
+@@ -3933,16 +3933,26 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+ 			if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
+ 				sock_set_v6only(sock);
+ 			if (x11_use_localhost)
+ 				set_reuseaddr(sock);
+ 			if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
+ 				debug2("%s: bind port %d: %.100s", __func__,
+ 				    port, strerror(errno));
+ 				close(sock);
++
++				/* do not remove successfully opened
++				 * sockets if the request failed because
++				 * the protocol IPv4/6 is not available
++				 * (e.g. IPv6 may be disabled while being
++				 * supported)
++				 */
++				if (EADDRNOTAVAIL == errno)
++    					continue;
++
+ 				for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++)
+ 					close(socks[n]);
+ 				num_socks = 0;
+ 				break;
+ 			}
+ 			socks[num_socks++] = sock;
+ 			if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS)
+ 				break;

openssh-8.4p1-debian-compat.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+--- compat.h.orig	2020-10-05 10:09:02.953505129 -0700
++++ compat.h	2020-10-05 10:10:17.587733113 -0700
+@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
+ 
+ #define SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE	0x00000001
+ #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE		0x00000002
+-/* #define unused		0x00000004 */
++#define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74	0x00000004
+ /* #define unused		0x00000008 */
+ #define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID	0x00000010
+ /* #define unused		0x00000020 */
+--- compat.c.orig	2020-10-05 10:25:02.088720562 -0700
++++ compat.c	2020-10-05 10:13:11.637282492 -0700
+@@ -65,11 +65,12 @@
+ 		{ "OpenSSH_6.5*,"
+ 		  "OpenSSH_6.6*",	SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|
+ 					SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE},
++		{ "OpenSSH_7.4*",	SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE|
++		  			SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74},
+ 		{ "OpenSSH_7.0*,"
+ 		  "OpenSSH_7.1*,"
+ 		  "OpenSSH_7.2*,"
+ 		  "OpenSSH_7.3*,"
+-		  "OpenSSH_7.4*,"
+ 		  "OpenSSH_7.5*,"
+ 		  "OpenSSH_7.6*,"
+ 		  "OpenSSH_7.7*",	SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE},
+--- sshconnect2.c.orig	2020-09-26 07:26:37.618010545 -0700
++++ sshconnect2.c	2020-10-05 10:47:22.116315148 -0700
+@@ -1305,6 +1305,26 @@
+ 			break;
+ 	}
+ 	free(oallowed);
++	/*
++	 * OpenSSH 7.4 supports SHA2 sig types, but fails to indicate its
++	 * support.  For that release, check the local policy against the
++	 * SHA2 signature types.
++	 */
++	if (alg == NULL &&
++	    (key->type == KEY_RSA && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74))) {
++		oallowed = allowed = xstrdup(options.pubkey_key_types);
++		while ((cp = strsep(&allowed, ",")) != NULL) {
++			if (sshkey_type_from_name(cp) != key->type)
++				continue;
++			tmp = match_list(sshkey_sigalg_by_name(cp), "rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-512", NULL);
++			if (tmp != NULL)
++				alg = xstrdup(cp);
++			free(tmp);
++			if (alg != NULL)
++				break;
++		}
++		free(oallowed);
++	}
+ 	return alg;
+ }
+ 
+

openssh-8.4p1-sandbox-seccomp.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index e0768c06..5065ae7e 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -267,6 +267,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_pselect6
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_pselect6_time64
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6_time64),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_read
+ 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_read),
+ #endif

openssh-8.4p1-ssh-copy-id.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+From 66f16e5425eb881570e82bfef7baeac2e7accc0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Oleg <Fallmay@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2020 12:09:08 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix `EOF: command not found` error in ssh-copy-id
+
+---
+ contrib/ssh-copy-id | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
+index 392f64f94..a76907717 100644
+--- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
++++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
+@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ installkeys_sh() {
+   #    the -z `tail ...` checks for a trailing newline. The echo adds one if was missing
+   #    the cat adds the keys we're getting via STDIN
+   #    and if available restorecon is used to restore the SELinux context
+-  INSTALLKEYS_SH=$(tr '\t\n' ' ' <<-EOF)
++  INSTALLKEYS_SH=$(tr '\t\n' ' ' <<-EOF
+ 	cd;
+ 	umask 077;
+ 	mkdir -p $(dirname "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}") &&
+@@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ installkeys_sh() {
+ 	  restorecon -F .ssh ${AUTH_KEY_FILE};
+ 	fi
+ EOF
++  )
+ 
+   # to defend against quirky remote shells: use 'exec sh -c' to get POSIX;
+   printf "exec sh -c '%s'" "${INSTALLKEYS_SH}"
+
+From de59a431cdec833e3ec15691dd950402b4c052cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>
+Date: Sat, 3 Oct 2020 00:20:07 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] un-nest $() to make ksh cheerful
+
+---
+ ssh-copy-id | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+From 02ac2c3c3db5478a440dfb1b90d15f686f2cbfc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>
+Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2020 21:30:10 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ksh doesn't grok 'local'
+
+and AFAICT it's not actually doing anything useful in the code, so let's
+see how things go without it.
+---
+ ssh-copy-id | 11 +++++------
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
+index a769077..11c9463 100755
+--- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
++++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
+@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ quote() {
+ }
+ 
+ use_id_file() {
+-  local L_ID_FILE="$1"
++  L_ID_FILE="$1"
+ 
+   if [ -z "$L_ID_FILE" ] ; then
+     printf '%s: ERROR: no ID file found\n' "$0"
+@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ use_id_file() {
+   # check that the files are readable
+   for f in "$PUB_ID_FILE" ${PRIV_ID_FILE:+"$PRIV_ID_FILE"} ; do
+     ErrMSG=$( { : < "$f" ; } 2>&1 ) || {
+-      local L_PRIVMSG=""
++      L_PRIVMSG=""
+       [ "$f" = "$PRIV_ID_FILE" ] && L_PRIVMSG="	(to install the contents of '$PUB_ID_FILE' anyway, look at the -f option)"
+       printf "\\n%s: ERROR: failed to open ID file '%s': %s\\n" "$0" "$f" "$(printf '%s\n%s\n' "$ErrMSG" "$L_PRIVMSG" | sed -e 's/.*: *//')"
+       exit 1
+@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ fi
+ # populate_new_ids() uses several global variables ($USER_HOST, $SSH_OPTS ...)
+ # and has the side effect of setting $NEW_IDS
+ populate_new_ids() {
+-  local L_SUCCESS="$1"
++  L_SUCCESS="$1"
+ 
+   # shellcheck disable=SC2086
+   if [ "$FORCED" ] ; then
+@@ -181,13 +181,12 @@ populate_new_ids() {
+   eval set -- "$SSH_OPTS"
+ 
+   umask 0177
+-  local L_TMP_ID_FILE
+   L_TMP_ID_FILE=$(mktemp ~/.ssh/ssh-copy-id_id.XXXXXXXXXX)
+   if test $? -ne 0 || test "x$L_TMP_ID_FILE" = "x" ; then
+     printf '%s: ERROR: mktemp failed\n' "$0" >&2
+     exit 1
+   fi
+-  local L_CLEANUP="rm -f \"$L_TMP_ID_FILE\" \"${L_TMP_ID_FILE}.stderr\""
++  L_CLEANUP="rm -f \"$L_TMP_ID_FILE\" \"${L_TMP_ID_FILE}.stderr\""
+   # shellcheck disable=SC2064
+   trap "$L_CLEANUP" EXIT TERM INT QUIT
+   printf '%s: INFO: attempting to log in with the new key(s), to filter out any that are already installed\n' "$0" >&2
+@@ -237,7 +236,7 @@ populate_new_ids() {
+ #    produce a one-liner to add the keys to remote authorized_keys file
+ #    optionally takes an alternative path for authorized_keys
+ installkeys_sh() {
+-  local AUTH_KEY_FILE=${1:-.ssh/authorized_keys}
++  AUTH_KEY_FILE=${1:-.ssh/authorized_keys}
+ 
+   # In setting INSTALLKEYS_SH:
+   #    the tr puts it all on one line (to placate tcsh)
+-- 
+
+diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
+index 11c9463..ee3f637 100755
+--- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
++++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
+@@ -237,6 +237,7 @@ populate_new_ids() {
+ #    optionally takes an alternative path for authorized_keys
+ installkeys_sh() {
+   AUTH_KEY_FILE=${1:-.ssh/authorized_keys}
++  AUTH_KEY_DIR=$(dirname "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}")
+ 
+   # In setting INSTALLKEYS_SH:
+   #    the tr puts it all on one line (to placate tcsh)
+@@ -249,7 +250,7 @@ installkeys_sh() {
+   INSTALLKEYS_SH=$(tr '\t\n' ' ' <<-EOF
+ 	cd;
+ 	umask 077;
+-	mkdir -p $(dirname "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}") &&
++	mkdir -p "${AUTH_KEY_DIR}" &&
+ 	  { [ -z \`tail -1c ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} 2>/dev/null\` ] || echo >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} || exit 1; } &&
+ 	  cat >> ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} ||
+ 	  exit 1;
+-- 

openssh-nukeacss.sh

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-#
-#  Remove the ACSS implementation from OpenSSH, and disable its use so that the
-#  rest of the package can still be built.
-#
-> acss.c
-patch -sp0 << EOF
---- cipher.c.orig       2005-07-17 09:02:10.000000000 +0200
-+++ cipher.c    2005-09-06 14:52:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@
-
- /* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-+#undef USE_CIPHER_ACSS
-+#undef EVP_acss
-+#define EVP_acss NULL
-
- extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_bf(void);
- extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(void);
-EOF
-echo "Well done."

openssh.rpmlintrc

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# I do not know about any better place where to put profile files
+addFilter(r'openssh-askpass.x86_64: W: non-conffile-in-etc /etc/profile.d/gnome-ssh-askpass.c?sh')
+
+# The ssh-keysign is not supposed to have standard permissions
+addFilter(r'openssh.x86_64: E: non-standard-executable-perm /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign 2555')
+addFilter(r'openssh.x86_64: E: setgid-binary /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign ssh_keys 2555')
+addFilter(r'openssh.x86_64: W: non-standard-gid /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign ssh_keys')
+
+# The -cavs subpackage is internal without documentation
+# The -askpass is not intended to be used directly so it is missing documentation
+addFilter(r'openssh-(askpass|cavs).x86_64: W: no-documentation')
+
+# sshd config and sysconfig is not supposed to be world readable
+addFilter(r'non-readable /etc/(ssh/sshd_config|sysconfig/sshd)')
+
+# The /var/empty/sshd is supposed to have the given permissions
+addFilter(r'non-standard-dir-perm /var/empty/sshd 711')
+addFilter(r'non-standard-dir-in-var empty')
+
+# Spelling false-positives
+addFilter(r'spelling-error (Summary\(en_US\)|.* en_US) (mls|su|sudo|rlogin|rsh|untrusted) ')

pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders

@@ -1,20 +1,36 @@
-atomicio.h
+authfd.c
 authfd.h
+atomicio.c
+atomicio.h
+bufaux.c
+bufbn.c
 buffer.h
+buffer.c
+cleanup.c
 cipher.h
 compat.h
-defines.h
+entropy.c
 entropy.h
+fatal.c
 includes.h
 kex.h
+key.c
 key.h
+log.c
 log.h
 match.h
+misc.c
 misc.h
 pathnames.h
 platform.h
 rsa.h
+ssh-dss.c
+ssh-rsa.c
 ssh.h
 ssh2.h
+uidswap.c
+uidswap.h
+uuencode.c
 uuencode.h
+xmalloc.c
 xmalloc.h

pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-compat.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,992 @@
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
+  * or implied, of Jamie Beverly.
+  */
+ 
++#include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+@@ -66,8 +67,8 @@ proc_pid_cmdline(char *** inargv)
+                 case EOF:
+                 case '\0':
+                     if (len > 0) { 
+-                        argv = pamsshagentauth_xrealloc(argv, count + 1, sizeof(*argv));
+-                        argv[count] = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof(*argv[count]));
++                        argv = xreallocarray(argv, count + 1, sizeof(*argv));
++                        argv[count] = xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof(*argv[count]));
+                         strncpy(argv[count++], argbuf, len);
+                         memset(argbuf, '\0', MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG + 1);
+                         len = 0;
+@@ -106,9 +107,9 @@ pamsshagentauth_free_command_line(char *
+ {
+     size_t i;
+     for (i = 0; i < n_args; i++)
+-        pamsshagentauth_xfree(argv[i]);
++        free(argv[i]);
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_xfree(argv);
++    free(argv);
+     return;
+ }
+ 
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+-#include "buffer.h"
+-#include "key.h"
++#include "sshbuf.h"
++#include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "authfd.h"
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ 
+@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ typedef struct idlist Idlist;
+ struct identity {
+     TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
+     AuthenticationConnection *ac;   /* set if agent supports key */
+-    Key *key;           /* public/private key */
++    struct sshkey *key;           /* public/private key */
+     char    *filename;      /* comment for agent-only keys */
+     int tried;
+     int isprivate;      /* key points to the private key */
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat	2020-09-23 10:52:16.421001434 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+-#include "buffer.h"
+-#include "key.h"
++#include "sshbuf.h"
++#include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "authfd.h"
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@
+ #include "get_command_line.h"
+ extern char **environ;
+ 
++#define PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1 101
++
+ /* 
+  * Added by Jamie Beverly, ensure socket fd points to a socket owned by the user 
+  * A cursory check is done, but to avoid race conditions, it is necessary 
+@@ -77,7 +79,7 @@ log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
+     if (count == 0)
+         return NULL;
+    
+-    buf = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc((count * MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG) + (count * 3), sizeof(*buf));
++    buf = xcalloc((count * MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG) + (count * 3), sizeof(*buf));
+     for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+         strcat(buf, (i > 0) ? " '" : "'");
+         strncat(buf, action[i], MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG);
+@@ -87,21 +89,25 @@ log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
+ }
+ 
+ void
+-agent_action(Buffer *buf, char ** action, size_t count)
++agent_action(struct sshbuf **buf, char ** action, size_t count)
+ {
+     size_t i;
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(buf);
++    int r;
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(buf, count);
++    if ((*buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++        fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
++    if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(*buf, count)) != 0)
++        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 
+     for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(buf, action[i]);
++        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*buf, action[i])) != 0)
++            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+     }
+ }
+ 
+ 
+-void
+-pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * session_id2, const char * user,
++static void
++pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(struct sshbuf ** session_id2, const char * user,
+                                 const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
+ {
+     u_char *cookie = NULL;
+@@ -114,22 +120,23 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
+     char ** reported_argv = NULL;
+     size_t count = 0;
+     char * action_logbuf = NULL;
+-    Buffer action_agentbuf;
++    struct sshbuf *action_agentbuf = NULL;
+     uint8_t free_logbuf = 0;
+     char * retc;
+     int32_t reti;
++    int r;
+ 
+-    rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
++    rnd = arc4random();
+     cookie_len = ((uint8_t) rnd);
+     while (cookie_len < 16) { 
+         cookie_len += 16;                                          /* Add 16 bytes to the size to ensure that while the length is random, the length is always reasonable; ticket #18 */
+     }
+ 
+-    cookie = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(1,cookie_len);
++    cookie = xcalloc(1, cookie_len);
+ 
+     for (i = 0; i < cookie_len; i++) {
+         if (i % 4 == 0) {
+-            rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
++            rnd = arc4random();
+         }
+         cookie[i] = (u_char) rnd;
+         rnd >>= 8;
+@@ -144,7 +151,8 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
+     }
+     else {
+         action_logbuf = "unknown on this platform";
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&action_agentbuf); /* stays empty, means unavailable */
++        if ((action_agentbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) /* stays empty, means unavailable */
++            fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+     }
+     
+     /*
+@@ -161,35 +169,39 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
+     retc = getcwd(pwd, sizeof(pwd) - 1);
+     time(&ts);
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(session_id2);
++    if ((*session_id2 = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++        fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(session_id2, PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1);
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("cookie: %s", pamsshagentauth_tohex(cookie, cookie_len)); */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(session_id2, cookie, cookie_len);
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("user: %s", user); */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, user);
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("ruser: %s", ruser); */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, ruser);
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("servicename: %s", servicename); */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, servicename);
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("pwd: %s", pwd); */
+-    if(retc)
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, pwd);
+-    else
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("action: %s", action_logbuf); */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(session_id2, action_agentbuf.buf + action_agentbuf.offset, action_agentbuf.end - action_agentbuf.offset);
++    if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(*session_id2, PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1)) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_string(*session_id2, cookie, cookie_len)) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, user)) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, ruser)) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, servicename)) != 0)
++        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++    if (retc) {
++        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, pwd)) != 0)
++            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++    } else {
++        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, "")) != 0)
++            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++    }
++    if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(*session_id2, action_agentbuf)) != 0)
++        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+     if (free_logbuf) { 
+-        pamsshagentauth_xfree(action_logbuf);
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&action_agentbuf);
++        free(action_logbuf);
++        sshbuf_free(action_agentbuf);
++    }
++    /* debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */
++    if (reti >= 0) {
++        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, hostname)) != 0)
++            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++    } else {
++        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, "")) != 0)
++            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+     }
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */
+-    if(reti >= 0)
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, hostname);
+-    else
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int64(session_id2, (uint64_t) ts);
++    /* debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */
++    if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(*session_id2, (uint64_t) ts)) != 0)
++        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 
+     free(cookie);
+     return;
+@@ -278,7 +290,8 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_ui
+ 
+ 	auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth));
+ 	auth->fd = sock;
+-	buffer_init(&auth->identities);
++	if ((auth->identities = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++           fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ 	auth->howmany = 0;
+ 
+ 	return auth;
+@@ -287,9 +300,9 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_ui
+ int
+ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(const char * user, const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
+ {
+-    Buffer session_id2 = { 0 };
++    struct sshbuf *session_id2 = NULL;
+     Identity *id;
+-    Key *key;
++    struct sshkey *key;
+     AuthenticationConnection *ac;
+     char *comment;
+     uint8_t retval = 0;
+@@ -299,31 +312,30 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
+     pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
+ 
+     if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
++        verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
+         for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) 
+         {
+             if(key != NULL) {
+-                id = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
++                id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
+                 id->key = key;
+                 id->filename = comment;
+                 id->ac = ac;
+-                if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, &session_id2)) {
++                if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, session_id2)) {
+                     retval = 1;
+                 }
+-                pamsshagentauth_xfree(id->filename);
+-                pamsshagentauth_key_free(id->key);
+-                pamsshagentauth_xfree(id);
++                free(id->filename);
++                key_free(id->key);
++                free(id);
+                 if(retval == 1)
+                     break;
+             }
+         }
+-        pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&session_id2);
++        sshbuf_free(session_id2);
+         ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
+     }
+     else {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
++        verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
+     }
+-    /* pamsshagentauth_xfree(session_id2); */
+     EVP_cleanup();
+     return retval;
+ }
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat	2020-09-23 10:52:16.423001461 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c	2020-09-23 10:53:10.631727657 +0200
+@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+  * a patch 8-)
+  */
+ #if ! HAVE___PROGNAME || HAVE_BUNDLE
+-    __progname = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup(servicename);
++    __progname = xstrdup(servicename);
+ #endif
+ 
+     for(i = argc, argv_ptr = (char **) argv; i > 0; ++argv_ptr, i--) {
+@@ -132,11 +132,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+ #endif
+     }
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_log_init(__progname, log_lvl, facility, getenv("PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_DEBUG") ? 1 : 0);
++    log_init(__progname, log_lvl, facility, getenv("PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_DEBUG") ? 1 : 0);
+     pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (void *) &user);
+     pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER, (void *) &ruser_ptr);
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_verbose("Beginning pam_ssh_agent_auth for user %s", user);
++    verbose("Beginning pam_ssh_agent_auth for user %s", user);
+ 
+     if(ruser_ptr) {
+         strncpy(ruser, ruser_ptr, sizeof(ruser) - 1);
+@@ -151,12 +151,12 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+ #ifdef ENABLE_SUDO_HACK
+         if( (strlen(sudo_service_name) > 0) && strncasecmp(servicename, sudo_service_name, sizeof(sudo_service_name) - 1) == 0 && getenv("SUDO_USER") ) {
+             strncpy(ruser, getenv("SUDO_USER"), sizeof(ruser) - 1 );
+-            pamsshagentauth_verbose( "Using environment variable SUDO_USER (%s)", ruser );
++            verbose( "Using environment variable SUDO_USER (%s)", ruser );
+         } else
+ #endif
+         {
+             if( ! getpwuid(getuid()) ) {
+-                pamsshagentauth_verbose("Unable to getpwuid(getuid())");
++                verbose("Unable to getpwuid(getuid())");
+                 goto cleanexit;
+             }
+             strncpy(ruser, getpwuid(getuid())->pw_name, sizeof(ruser) - 1);
+@@ -165,11 +165,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+ 
+     /* Might as well explicitely confirm the user exists here */
+     if(! getpwnam(ruser) ) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", ruser);
++        verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", ruser);
+         goto cleanexit;
+     }
+     if( ! getpwnam(user) ) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", user);
++        verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", user);
+         goto cleanexit;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -179,8 +179,8 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+          */
+         parse_authorized_key_file(user, authorized_keys_file_input);
+     } else {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys");
+-        authorized_keys_file = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys");
++        verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys");
++        authorized_keys_file = xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys");
+     }
+ 
+     /*
+@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+      */
+ 
+     if(user && strlen(ruser) > 0) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
++        verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+ 
+         /*
+          * Attempt to read data from the sshd if we're being called as an auth agent.
+@@ -197,10 +197,10 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+         const char* ssh_user_auth = pam_getenv(pamh, "SSH_AUTH_INFO_0");
+         int sshd_service = strncasecmp(servicename, sshd_service_name, sizeof(sshd_service_name) - 1);
+         if (sshd_service == 0 && ssh_user_auth != NULL) {
+-            pamsshagentauth_verbose("Got SSH_AUTH_INFO_0: `%.20s...'", ssh_user_auth);
++            verbose("Got SSH_AUTH_INFO_0: `%.20s...'", ssh_user_auth);
+             if (userauth_pubkey_from_pam(ruser, ssh_user_auth) > 0) {
+                 retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+-                pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated (sshd): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
++                logit("Authenticated (sshd): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+                 goto cleanexit;
+             }
+         }
+@@ -208,13 +208,13 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+          * this pw_uid is used to validate the SSH_AUTH_SOCK, and so must be the uid of the ruser invoking the program, not the target-user
+          */
+         if(pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(user, ruser, servicename)) { /* getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid)) { */
+-            pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated (agent): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
++            logit("Authenticated (agent): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+             retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+         } else {
+-            pamsshagentauth_logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
++            logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+         }
+     } else {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" );
++        logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" );
+     }
+ 
+ cleanexit:
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -66,8 +66,8 @@
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "match.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+-#include "buffer.h"
+-#include "key.h"
++#include "sshbuf.h"
++#include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ 
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+@@ -77,7 +77,6 @@
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+ #include "secure_filename.h"
+ 
+-#include "identity.h"
+ #include "pam_user_key_allowed2.h"
+ 
+ extern char *authorized_keys_file;
+@@ -117,12 +116,12 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
+         } else {
+             slash_ptr = strchr(auth_keys_file_buf, '/');
+             if(!slash_ptr)
+-                pamsshagentauth_fatal
++                fatal
+                     ("cannot expand tilde in path without a `/'");
+ 
+             owner_uname_len = slash_ptr - auth_keys_file_buf - 1;
+             if(owner_uname_len > (sizeof(owner_uname) - 1))
+-                pamsshagentauth_fatal("Username too long");
++                fatal("Username too long");
+ 
+             strncat(owner_uname, auth_keys_file_buf + 1, owner_uname_len);
+             if(!authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid)
+@@ -130,11 +129,11 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
+                     getpwnam(owner_uname)->pw_uid;
+         }
+         authorized_keys_file =
+-            pamsshagentauth_tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf,
++            tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf,
+                                                   authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid);
+         strncpy(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file,
+                 sizeof(auth_keys_file_buf) - 1);
+-        pamsshagentauth_xfree(authorized_keys_file)        /* when we
++        free(authorized_keys_file)        /* when we
+                                                               percent_expand
+                                                               later, we'd step
+                                                               on this, so free
+@@ -150,13 +149,13 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
+     strncat(hostname, fqdn, strcspn(fqdn, "."));
+ #endif
+     authorized_keys_file =
+-        pamsshagentauth_percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h",
++        percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h",
+                                        getpwnam(user)->pw_dir, "H", hostname,
+                                        "f", fqdn, "u", user, NULL);
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, Key * key)
++pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, struct sshkey * key)
+ {
+     return
+         pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid),
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
+ #define _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H
+ 
+ #include "identity.h"
+-int pam_user_key_allowed(const char *, Key *);
++int pam_user_key_allowed(const char *, struct sshkey *);
+ void parse_authorized_key_file(const char *, const char *);
+ 
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -45,44 +45,46 @@
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "ssh.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+-#include "buffer.h"
++#include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "compat.h"
+-#include "key.h"
++#include "digest.h"
++#include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "secure_filename.h"
+ #include "uidswap.h"
+-
+-#include "identity.h"
++#include <unistd.h>
+ 
+ /* return 1 if user allows given key */
+ /* Modified slightly from original found in auth2-pubkey.c */
+ static int
+-pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE * f, char *file, Key * key)
++pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE * f, char *file, struct sshkey * key)
+ {
+-    char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
++    char *line = NULL;
+     int found_key = 0;
+     u_long linenum = 0;
+-    Key *found;
++    struct sshkey *found;
+     char *fp;
++    size_t linesize = 0;
+ 
+     found_key = 0;
+-    found = pamsshagentauth_key_new(key->type);
++    found = sshkey_new(key->type);
+ 
+-    while(read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
++    while ((getline(&line, &linesize, f)) != -1) {
+         char *cp = NULL; /* *key_options = NULL; */
+ 
++        linenum++;
+         /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
+         for(cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++);
+         if(!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
+             continue;
+ 
+-        if(pamsshagentauth_key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
++        if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
+             /* no key? check if there are options for this key */
+             int quoted = 0;
+ 
+-            pamsshagentauth_verbose("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
++            verbose("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
+             /* key_options = cp; */
+             for(; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
+                 if(*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
+@@ -92,26 +94,27 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE
+             }
+             /* Skip remaining whitespace. */
+             for(; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++);
+-            if(pamsshagentauth_key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
+-                pamsshagentauth_verbose("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
++            if(sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
++                verbose("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
+                 /* still no key? advance to next line */
+                 continue;
+             }
+         }
+-        if(pamsshagentauth_key_equal(found, key)) {
++        if(sshkey_equal(found, key)) {
+             found_key = 1;
+-            pamsshagentauth_logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file,
++            logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file,
+                                   linenum);
+-            fp = pamsshagentauth_key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-            pamsshagentauth_logit("Found matching %s key: %s",
+-                                  pamsshagentauth_key_type(found), fp);
+-            pamsshagentauth_xfree(fp);
++            fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
++            logit("Found matching %s key: %s",
++                                  sshkey_type(found), fp);
++            free(fp);
+             break;
+         }
+     }
+-    pamsshagentauth_key_free(found);
++    free(line);
++    sshkey_free(found);
+     if(!found_key)
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("key not found");
++        verbose("key not found");
+     return found_key;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -120,19 +123,19 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE
+  * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
+  */
+ int
+-pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key * key, char *file)
++pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey * key, char *file)
+ {
+     FILE *f;
+     int found_key = 0;
+     struct stat st;
+-    char buf[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
++    char buf[256];
+ 
+     /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
+-    pamsshagentauth_verbose("trying public key file %s", file);
++    verbose("trying public key file %s", file);
+ 
+     /* Fail not so quietly if file does not exist */
+     if(stat(file, &st) < 0) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_verbose("File not found: %s", file);
++        verbose("File not found: %s", file);
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -144,7 +147,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct
+ 
+     if(pamsshagentauth_secure_filename(f, file, pw, buf, sizeof(buf)) != 0) {
+         fclose(f);
+-        pamsshagentauth_logit("Authentication refused: %s", buf);
++        logit("Authentication refused: %s", buf);
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -160,7 +163,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct
+ int
+ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *authorized_keys_command,
+                           char *authorized_keys_command_user,
+-                          struct passwd *user_pw, Key * key)
++                          struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey * key)
+ {
+     FILE *f;
+     int ok, found_key = 0;
+@@ -187,44 +190,44 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+     else {
+         pw = getpwnam(authorized_keys_command_user);
+         if(pw == NULL) {
+-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("authorized_keys_command_user \"%s\" not found: %s",
++            error("authorized_keys_command_user \"%s\" not found: %s",
+                  authorized_keys_command_user, strerror(errno));
+             return 0;
+         }
+     }
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_temporarily_use_uid(pw);
++    temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+ 
+     if(stat(authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror
++        error
+             ("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s",
+              authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
+         goto out;
+     }
+     if(pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path
+        (authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
++        error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
+         goto out;
+     }
+ 
+     /* open the pipe and read the keys */
+     if(pipe(p) != 0) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++        error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+         goto out;
+     }
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_debug("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\" with argument: \"%s\"",
++    debug("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\" with argument: \"%s\"",
+                           authorized_keys_command, pw->pw_name, username);
+ 
+     /* 
+      * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
+      * run cleanup_exit() code.
+      */
+-    pamsshagentauth_restore_uid();
++    restore_uid();
+ 
+     switch ((pid = fork())) {
+     case -1:                                              /* error */
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++        error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+         close(p[0]);
+         close(p[1]);
+         return 0;
+@@ -234,13 +237,13 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+ 
+         /* do this before the setresuid so thta they can be logged */
+         if((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
++            error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
+                                      strerror(errno));
+             _exit(1);
+         }
+         if(dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1
+            || dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
+-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++            error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+             _exit(1);
+         }
+ #if defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETRESGID)
+@@ -248,7 +251,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+ #else
+         if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) != 0 || setegid(pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
+ #endif
+-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid,
++            error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid,
+                                      strerror(errno));
+             _exit(1);
+         }
+@@ -258,7 +261,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+ #else
+         if (setuid(pw->pw_uid) != 0 || seteuid(pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
+ #endif
+-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid,
++            error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid,
+                                      strerror(errno));
+             _exit(1);
+         }
+@@ -270,18 +273,18 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+ 
+         /* pretty sure this will barf because we are now suid, but since we
+            should't reach this anyway, I'll leave it here */
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
++        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
+                                  authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
+         _exit(127);
+     default:                                              /* parent */
+         break;
+     }
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_temporarily_use_uid(pw);
++    temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+ 
+     close(p[1]);
+     if((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++        error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+         close(p[0]);
+         /* Don't leave zombie child */
+         while(waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR);
+@@ -292,22 +295,22 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+ 
+     while(waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
+         if(errno != EINTR) {
+-            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,
++            error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,
+                                      strerror(errno));
+             goto out;
+         }
+     }
+     if(WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
++        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
+                                  authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status));
+         goto out;
+     } else if(WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
+-        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
++        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
+                                  authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+         goto out;
+     }
+     found_key = ok;
+   out:
+-    pamsshagentauth_restore_uid();
++    restore_uid();
+     return found_key;
+ }
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
+ #define _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H
+ 
+ #include "identity.h"
+-int pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *, Key *, char *);
+-int pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *, char *, struct passwd *, Key *);
++int pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, char *);
++int pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *, char *, struct passwd *, struct sshkey *);
+ 
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -53,8 +53,8 @@
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "match.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+-#include "buffer.h"
+-#include "key.h"
++#include "sshbuf.h"
++#include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ 
+ 
+@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
+ 	int comparehome = 0;
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_verbose("auth_secure_filename: checking for uid: %u", uid);
++    verbose("auth_secure_filename: checking for uid: %u", uid);
+ 
+ 	if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
+ 		snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
+@@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
+ 			snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
+ 			return -1;
+ 		}
+-		pamsshagentauth_strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
++		strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
+ 
+-		pamsshagentauth_verbose("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
++		verbose("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
+ 		if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
+ 		    (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
+ 		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
+@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
+ 
+ 		/* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */
+ 		if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) {
+-			pamsshagentauth_verbose("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
++			verbose("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
+ 			    buf);
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -37,10 +37,11 @@
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "ssh.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+-#include "buffer.h"
++#include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "compat.h"
+-#include "key.h"
++#include "sshkey.h"
++#include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "secure_filename.h"
+@@ -48,54 +49,59 @@
+ #include "identity.h"
+ #include "pam_user_authorized_keys.h"
+ 
++#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST          54
++
+ /* extern u_char  *session_id2;
+ extern uint8_t  session_id_len;
+  */
+ 
+ int
+-userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruser, Identity * id, Buffer * session_id2)
++userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruser, Identity * id, struct sshbuf * session_id2)
+ {
+-    Buffer          b = { 0 };
++    struct sshbuf  *b = NULL;
+     char           *pkalg = NULL;
+     u_char         *pkblob = NULL, *sig = NULL;
+-    u_int           blen = 0, slen = 0;
+-    int             authenticated = 0;
++    size_t          blen = 0, slen = 0;
++    int             r, authenticated = 0;
+ 
+-    pkalg = (char *) key_ssh_name(id->key);
++    pkalg = (char *) sshkey_ssh_name(id->key);
+ 
+     /* first test if this key is even allowed */
+     if(! pam_user_key_allowed(ruser, id->key))
+-        goto user_auth_clean_exit;
++        goto user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer;
+ 
+-    if(pamsshagentauth_key_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) == 0)
+-        goto user_auth_clean_exit;
++    if(sshkey_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) != 0)
++        goto user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer;
+ 
+     /* construct packet to sign and test */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&b);
++    if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++        fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ 
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2->buf + session_id2->offset, session_id2->end - session_id2->offset);
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST); 
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, ruser);
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, "pam_ssh_agent_auth");
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&b, 1);
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
++    if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, sshbuf_ptr(session_id2), sshbuf_len(session_id2))) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, ruser)) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "pam_ssh_agent_auth")) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "publickey")) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 1)) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, pkalg)) != 0 ||
++        (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
++        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 
+-    if(ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, pamsshagentauth_buffer_ptr(&b), pamsshagentauth_buffer_len(&b)) != 0)
++    if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)) != 0)
+         goto user_auth_clean_exit;
+ 
+     /* test for correct signature */
+-    if(pamsshagentauth_key_verify(id->key, sig, slen, pamsshagentauth_buffer_ptr(&b), pamsshagentauth_buffer_len(&b)) == 1)
++    if (sshkey_verify(id->key, sig, slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0, NULL) == 0)
+         authenticated = 1;
+ 
+   user_auth_clean_exit:
+     /* if(&b != NULL) */
+-    pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&b);
++    sshbuf_free(b);
++  user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer:
+     if(sig != NULL)
+-        pamsshagentauth_xfree(sig);
++        free(sig);
+     if(pkblob != NULL)
+-        pamsshagentauth_xfree(pkblob);
++        free(pkblob);
+     CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
+     return authenticated;
+ }
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
+ #ifndef _USERAUTH_PUBKEY_FROM_ID_H
+ #define _USERAUTH_PUBKEY_FROM_ID_H
+ 
+-#include <identity.h>
+-int userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *, Identity *, Buffer *);
++#include "identity.h"
++int userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *, Identity *, struct sshbuf *);
+ 
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
+@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_uudecode(const char *src
+ 	/* and remove trailing whitespace because __b64_pton needs this */
+ 	*p = '\0';
+ 	len = pamsshagentauth___b64_pton(encoded, target, targsize);
+-	pamsshagentauth_xfree(encoded);
++	xfree(encoded);
+ 	return len;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_dump_base64(FILE *fp, co
+ 		fprintf(fp, "dump_base64: len > 65536\n");
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+-	buf = pamsshagentauth_xmalloc(2*len);
++	buf = malloc(2*len);
+ 	n = pamsshagentauth_uuencode(data, len, buf, 2*len);
+ 	for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ 		fprintf(fp, "%c", buf[i]);
+@@ -79,5 +79,5 @@ pamsshagentauth_dump_base64(FILE *fp, co
+ 	}
+ 	if (i % 70 != 69)
+ 		fprintf(fp, "\n");
+-	pamsshagentauth_xfree(buf);
++	free(buf);
+ }
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_pam.c.compat	2020-09-23 11:32:30.783695267 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_pam.c	2020-09-23 11:33:21.383389036 +0200
+@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@
+ #include <string.h>
+ 
+ #include "defines.h"
+-#include "key.h"
++#include <includes.h>
++#include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ 
+ #include "pam_user_authorized_keys.h"
+@@ -42,28 +42,28 @@
+     int authenticated = 0;
+     const char method[] = "publickey ";
+ 
+-    char* ai = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup(ssh_auth_info);
++    char* ai = xstrdup(ssh_auth_info);
+     char* saveptr;
+ 
+     char* auth_line = strtok_r(ai, "\n", &saveptr);
+     while (auth_line != NULL) {
+         if (strncmp(auth_line, method, sizeof(method) - 1) == 0) {
+             char* key_str = auth_line + sizeof(method) - 1;
+-            Key* key = pamsshagentauth_key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
++            struct sshkey* key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+             if (key == NULL) {
+                 continue;
+             }
+-            int r = pamsshagentauth_key_read(key, &key_str);
++            int r = sshkey_read(key, &key_str);
+             if (r == 1) {
+                 if (pam_user_key_allowed(ruser, key)) {
+                     authenticated = 1;
+-                    pamsshagentauth_key_free(key);
++                    sshkey_free(key);
+                     break;
+                 }
+             } else {
+-                pamsshagentauth_verbose("Failed to create key for %s: %d", auth_line, r);
++                verbose("Failed to create key for %s: %d", auth_line, r);
+             }
+-            pamsshagentauth_key_free(key);
++            sshkey_free(key);
+         }
+         auth_line = strtok_r(NULL, "\n", &saveptr);
+     }

pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-dereference.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
+--- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
++++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
+@@ -158,11 +158,12 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *user,
+ int
+ pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, struct sshkey * key)
+ {
++    struct passwd *pw;
+     return
+-        pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid),
+-                                          key, authorized_keys_file)
+-        || pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(0), key,
+-                                             authorized_keys_file)
++        ( (pw = getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid)) &&
++            pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(pw, key, authorized_keys_file))
++        || ((pw = getpwuid(0)) &&
++            pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(pw, key, authorized_keys_file))
+         || pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(authorized_keys_command,
+                                                      authorized_keys_command_user,
+                                                      getpwnam(ruser), key);

pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-seteuid.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-seteuid openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-seteuid	2017-02-07 15:41:53.172334151 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2017-02-07 15:41:53.174334149 +0100
+@@ -238,17 +238,26 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(ui
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	errno = 0; 
+-	seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
+-	             above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
+-	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
++	/* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
++	   above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
++	if (seteuid(uid) == -1) {
+ 		close(sock);
+-        if(errno == EACCES)
+-		fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
++		error("seteuid(%lu) failed with error: %s",
++		    (unsigned long) uid, strerror(errno));
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
++	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
++		close(sock);
++		sock = -1;
++		if(errno == EACCES)
++			fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
++	}
+ 
+-	seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
+-
++	/* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
++	if (0 != seteuid(0)) {
++		fatal("setuid(0) failed with error: %s", strerror(errno));
++		return -1;
++	}
+ 	return sock;
+ }
+ 

pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-seteuid.patch

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.seteuid pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.seteuid	2010-09-08 08:54:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2010-11-22 08:38:05.000000000 +0100
-@@ -131,13 +131,18 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(ui
- 	}
- 
- 	errno = 0; 
--	seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
--	             above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
-+	/* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
-+	   above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
-+	if (seteuid(uid) == -1) {
-+		close(sock);
-+		error("seteuid(%lu) failed", (unsigned long) uid);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
- 	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
- 		close(sock);
--        if(errno == EACCES)
--		fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
--		return -1;
-+		sock = -1;
-+		if(errno == EACCES)
-+			fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
- 	}
- 
- 	seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */

pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.visibility pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
+diff -up openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-visibility openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.visibility	2009-12-21 20:57:34.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-visibility	2014-03-31 19:35:17.000000000 +0200
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c	2012-06-21 20:01:31.356259429 +0200
++++ openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c	2016-01-22 15:22:40.984469774 +0100
-@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ char           *__progname;
+@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ char           *__progname;
  extern char    *__progname;
  #endif
  
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.visibility pam_ssh_agent_
  pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
  {
      char          **argv_ptr;
-@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ cleanexit:
  }
  
  
@@ -18,4 +18,4 @@ diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.visibility pam_ssh_agent_
 +PAM_EXTERN int __attribute__ ((visibility ("default")))
  pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
  {
-     return PAM_SUCCESS;
+     UNUSED(pamh);

pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-agent_structure.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-agent	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h	2017-09-27 14:25:49.421739027 +0200
+@@ -38,6 +38,12 @@
+ typedef struct identity Identity;
+ typedef struct idlist Idlist;
+ 
++typedef struct {
++       int     fd;
++       struct sshbuf *identities;
++       int     howmany;
++}      AuthenticationConnection;
++
+ struct identity {
+     TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
+     AuthenticationConnection *ac;   /* set if agent supports key */
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-agent	2017-09-27 14:25:49.420739021 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2017-09-27 14:25:49.421739027 +0200
+@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "authfd.h"
++#include "ssherr.h"
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+@@ -291,36 +292,43 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
+ {
+     struct sshbuf *session_id2 = NULL;
+     Identity *id;
+-    struct sshkey *key;
+     AuthenticationConnection *ac;
+-    char *comment;
+     uint8_t retval = 0;
+     uid_t uid = getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid;
++    struct ssh_identitylist *idlist;
++    int r;
++    unsigned int i;
+ 
+     OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
+     pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
+ 
+     if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
+         verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
+-        for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) 
+-        {
+-            if(key != NULL) {
++        if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(ac->fd, &idlist)) != 0) {
++            if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES)
++               fprintf(stderr, "error fetching identities for "
++                               "protocol %d: %s\n", 2, ssh_err(r));
++        } else {
++            for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++)
++            {
++              if (idlist->keys[i] != NULL) {
+                 id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
+-                id->key = key;
+-                id->filename = comment;
++                id->key = idlist->keys[i];
++                id->filename = idlist->comments[i];
+                 id->ac = ac;
+                 if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, session_id2)) {
+                     retval = 1;
+                 }
+-                free(id->filename);
+-                key_free(id->key);
+                 free(id);
+                 if(retval == 1)
+                     break;
+-            }
+-        }
++              }
++            }
+-        sshbuf_free(session_id2);
+-        ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
++            sshbuf_free(session_id2);
++            ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
++        }
++        ssh_close_authentication_socket(ac->fd);
++        free(ac);
+     }
+     else {
+         verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-agent	2017-09-27 14:25:49.420739021 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c	2017-09-27 14:25:49.422739032 +0200
+@@ -84,7 +85,7 @@ userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruse
+         (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
+         fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 
+-    if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)) != 0)
++    if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac->fd, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0) != 0)
+         goto user_auth_clean_exit;
+ 
+     /* test for correct signature */

pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch

@@ -1,12 +1,11 @@
-diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build	2010-01-13 03:17:01.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2012-06-21 20:14:56.432527764 +0200
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2017-02-07 14:29:41.626116675 +0100
-@@ -37,7 +37,16 @@
+@@ -43,12 +43,31 @@
- #include "buffer.h"
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include "key.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
- #include "authfd.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
 +#include "ssh.h"
- #include <stdio.h>
 +#include <sys/types.h>
 +#include <sys/stat.h>
 +#include <sys/socket.h>
@@ -15,12 +14,11 @@ diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build pam_ssh_ag
 +#include <stdlib.h>
 +#include <errno.h>
 +#include <fcntl.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
  
  #include "userauth_pubkey_from_id.h"
-@@ -69,6 +78,96 @@ session_id2_gen()
+ #include "identity.h"
-     return cookie;
+ #include "get_command_line.h"
- }
+ extern char **environ;
  
 +/* 
 + * Added by Jamie Beverly, ensure socket fd points to a socket owned by the user 
@@ -32,7 +30,31 @@ diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build pam_ssh_ag
 + * race condition; so a more "direct" log message is generated.
 + */
 +
-+int
+ static char *
+ log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
+ {
+@@ -85,7 +104,7 @@ void
+ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * session_id2, const char * user,
+                                 const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
+ {
+-    char *cookie = NULL;
++    u_char *cookie = NULL;
+     uint8_t i = 0;
+     uint32_t rnd = 0;
+     uint8_t cookie_len;
+@@ -112,7 +131,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
+         if (i % 4 == 0) {
+             rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
+         }
+-        cookie[i] = (char) rnd;
++        cookie[i] = (u_char) rnd;
+         rnd >>= 8;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -177,6 +196,86 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
+ }
+ 
+ int
 +ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(uid_t uid)
 +{
 +	const char *authsocket;
@@ -112,56 +134,54 @@ diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build pam_ssh_ag
 +	return auth;
 +}
 +
- int
++int
- find_authorized_keys(uid_t uid)
+ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(const char * user, const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
  {
-@@ -81,7 +180,7 @@ find_authorized_keys(uid_t uid)
+     Buffer session_id2 = { 0 };
+@@ -190,7 +289,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
      OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
-     session_id2 = session_id2_gen();
+     pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
  
 -    if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection(uid))) {
 +    if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
-         verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", getpwuid(uid)->pw_name, uid);
+         pamsshagentauth_verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
          for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) 
          {
-@@ -109,3 +208,4 @@ find_authorized_keys(uid_t uid)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in
-     EVP_cleanup();
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
-     return retval;
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in	2017-02-07 14:40:14.407566921 +0100
- }
+@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ PATHS=
-+
-diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/Makefile.in
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build	2009-10-27 21:19:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/Makefile.in	2012-06-21 20:14:56.432527764 +0200
-@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ PATHS=
  CC=@CC@
  LD=@LD@
  CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
 -CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
-+CPPFLAGS=-I.. -I$(srcdir) -I/usr/include/nss3 -I/usr/include/nspr4 @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
++CPPFLAGS=-I.. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
  LIBS=@LIBS@
  AR=@AR@
  AWK=@AWK@
-@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ INSTALL=@INSTALL@
+@@ -61,8 +61,8 @@ INSTALL=@INSTALL@
  PERL=@PERL@
  SED=@SED@
  ENT=@ENT@
 -LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
+-LDFLAGS_SHARED = @LDFLAGS_SHARED@
 +LDFLAGS=-L.. -L../openbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
- LDFLAGS_SHARED = @LDFLAGS_SHARED@
++LDFLAGS_SHARED =-Wl,-z,defs @LDFLAGS_SHARED@
  EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
  
-@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ PAM_MODULES=pam_ssh_agent_auth.so
+ INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS=@INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS@
+@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ SSHOBJS=xmalloc.o atomicio.o authfd.o bu
  
- SSHOBJS=xmalloc.o atomicio.o authfd.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o cleanup.o entropy.o fatal.o key.o log.o misc.o secure_filename.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o uuencode.o compat.o
+ ED25519OBJS=ed25519-donna/ed25519.o
  
--PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o
+-PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o get_command_line.o userauth_pubkey_from_pam.o
-+PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o secure_filename.o
++PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o get_command_line.o userauth_pubkey_from_pam.o secure_filename.o
  
  
  MANPAGES_IN	= pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod
-@@ -67,13 +67,13 @@ $(PAM_MODULES): Makefile.in config.h
+@@ -94,13 +94,13 @@ $(PAM_MODULES): Makefile.in config.h
  .c.o:
- 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
+ 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
  
 -LIBCOMPAT=openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
 +LIBCOMPAT=../openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
@@ -169,11 +189,10 @@ diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.
  	(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE))
  always:
  
--pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHOBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS)  pam_ssh_agent_auth.o
+-pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHOBJS) $(ED25519OBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS)  pam_ssh_agent_auth.o
--	$(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -lpam pam_ssh_agent_auth.o
+-	$(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(ED25519OBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lopenbsd-compat pam_ssh_agent_auth.o $(LIBS) -lpam
-+pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS)  pam_ssh_agent_auth.o
++pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS)  pam_ssh_agent_auth.o ../uidswap.o ../ssh-sk-client.o
-+	$(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -lpam -lnss3 pam_ssh_agent_auth.o
++	$(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) ../ssh-sk-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat pam_ssh_agent_auth.o ../uidswap.o $(LIBS) -lpam
  
  $(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
- 	pod2man --section=8 --release=v0.8 --name=pam_ssh_agent_auth --official --center "PAM" pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod > pam_ssh_agent_auth.8
+ 	pod2man --section=8 --release=v0.10.3 --name=pam_ssh_agent_auth --official --center "PAM" pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod > pam_ssh_agent_auth.8
-diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-build pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c

sources

@@ -1,2 +1,4 @@
-9872ca1983e566ff5a89c240529e223d  pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.tar.bz2
+SHA512 (openssh-8.4p1.tar.gz) = d65275b082c46c5efe7cf3264fa6794d6e99a36d4a54b50554fc56979d6c0837381587fd5399195e1db680d2a5ad1ef0b99a180eac2b4de5637906cb7a89e9ce
-688b37a843ea1c9217f45b1f5c21b791  openssh-6.1p1-noacss.tar.bz2
+SHA512 (openssh-8.4p1.tar.gz.asc) = 3d9a026db27729a5a56785db3824230ccf2a3beca4bb48ef465e44d869b944dbc5d443152a1b1be21bc9c213c465d3d7ca1f876a387d0a6b9682a0cfec3e6e32
+SHA512 (pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4.tar.gz) = caccf72174d15e43f4c86a459ac6448682e62116557cf1e1e828955f3d1731595b238df42adec57860e7f341e92daf5d8285020bcb5018f3b8a5145aa32ee1c2
+SHA512 (DJM-GPG-KEY.gpg) = db1191ed9b6495999e05eed2ef863fb5179bdb63e94850f192dad68eed8579836f88fbcfffd9f28524fe1457aff8cd248ee3e0afc112c8f609b99a34b80ecc0d

sshd-keygen

@@ -1,98 +1,40 @@
 #!/bin/bash
 
 # Create the host keys for the OpenSSH server.
-#
+KEYTYPE=$1
-# The creation is controlled by the $AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS environment
+case $KEYTYPE in
-# variable.
+	"dsa") ;& # disabled in FIPS
+	"ed25519")
+		FIPS=/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled
+		if [[ -r "$FIPS" && $(cat $FIPS) == "1" ]]; then
+			exit 0
+		fi ;;
+	"rsa") ;; # always ok
+	"ecdsa") ;;
+	*) # wrong argument
+		exit 12 ;;
+esac
+KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_${KEYTYPE}_key
 
-# source function library
-. /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions
-
-# pull in sysconfig settings
-[ -f /etc/sysconfig/sshd ] && . /etc/sysconfig/sshd
-
-# Some functions to make the below more readable
 KEYGEN=/usr/bin/ssh-keygen
-RSA1_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
+if [[ ! -x $KEYGEN ]]; then
-RSA_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+	exit 13
-DSA_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
-
-fips_enabled() {
-	if [ -r /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled ]; then
-		cat /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled
-	else
-		echo 0
-	fi
-}
-
-do_rsa1_keygen() {
-	if [ ! -s $RSA1_KEY -a `fips_enabled` -eq 0 ]; then
-		echo -n $"Generating SSH1 RSA host key: "
-		rm -f $RSA1_KEY
-		if test ! -f $RSA1_KEY && $KEYGEN -q -t rsa1 -f $RSA1_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
-			chgrp ssh_keys $RSA1_KEY
-			chmod 640 $RSA1_KEY
-			chmod 644 $RSA1_KEY.pub
-			if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then
-			    /sbin/restorecon $RSA1_KEY.pub
-			fi
-			success $"RSA1 key generation"
-			echo
-		else
-			failure $"RSA1 key generation"
-			echo
-			exit 1
-		fi
-	fi
-}
-
-do_rsa_keygen() {
-	if [ ! -s $RSA_KEY ]; then
-		echo -n $"Generating SSH2 RSA host key: "
-		rm -f $RSA_KEY
-		if test ! -f $RSA_KEY && $KEYGEN -q -t rsa -f $RSA_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
-			chgrp ssh_keys $RSA_KEY
-			chmod 640 $RSA_KEY
-			chmod 644 $RSA_KEY.pub
-			if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then
-			    /sbin/restorecon $RSA_KEY.pub
-			fi
-			success $"RSA key generation"
-			echo
-		else
-			failure $"RSA key generation"
-			echo
-			exit 1
-		fi
-	fi
-}
-
-do_dsa_keygen() {
-	if [ ! -s $DSA_KEY ]; then
-		echo -n $"Generating SSH2 DSA host key: "
-		rm -f $DSA_KEY
-		if test ! -f $DSA_KEY && $KEYGEN -q -t dsa -f $DSA_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
-			chgrp ssh_keys $DSA_KEY
-			chmod 640 $DSA_KEY
-			chmod 644 $DSA_KEY.pub
-			if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then
-			    /sbin/restorecon $DSA_KEY.pub
-			fi
-			success $"DSA key generation"
-			echo
-		else
-			failure $"DSA key generation"
-			echo
-			exit 1
-		fi
-	fi
-}
-
-# Create keys if necessary
-if [ "x${AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS}" != xNO ]; then
-	do_rsa_keygen
-	if [ "x${AUTOCREATE_SERVER_KEYS}" != xRSAONLY ]; then
-		do_rsa1_keygen
-		do_dsa_keygen
-	fi
 fi
+
+# remove old keys
+rm -f $KEY{,.pub}
+
+# create new keys
+if ! $KEYGEN -q -t $KEYTYPE -f $KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+# sanitize permissions
+/usr/bin/chgrp ssh_keys $KEY
+/usr/bin/chmod 640 $KEY
+/usr/bin/chmod 644 $KEY.pub
+if [[ -x /usr/sbin/restorecon ]]; then
+	/usr/sbin/restorecon $KEY{,.pub}
+fi
+
+exit 0

sshd-keygen.service

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=SSH server keys generation.
-After=syslog.target
-Before=sshd.service
-BindTo=sshd.service
-
-[Service]
-Type=oneshot
-EnvironmentFile=/etc/sysconfig/sshd
-ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd-keygen
-RemainAfterExit=yes

sshd-keygen.target

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+[Unit]
+Wants=sshd-keygen@rsa.service
+Wants=sshd-keygen@ecdsa.service
+Wants=sshd-keygen@ed25519.service
+PartOf=sshd.service