remove unused patches

This commit is contained in:
Petr Lautrbach 2012-11-27 15:01:12 +01:00
parent 251c8dbdae
commit e75a99b5f3
7 changed files with 0 additions and 1506 deletions

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@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
diff -up openssh-5.1p1/sshd.c.log-chroot openssh-5.1p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-5.1p1/sshd.c.log-chroot 2008-07-23 15:18:52.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.1p1/sshd.c 2008-07-23 15:18:52.000000000 +0200
@@ -591,6 +591,10 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
demote_sensitive_data();
+ /* Open the syslog permanently so the chrooted process still
+ can write to syslog. */
+ open_log();
+
/* Change our root directory */
if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,
diff -up openssh-5.1p1/log.c.log-chroot openssh-5.1p1/log.c
--- openssh-5.1p1/log.c.log-chroot 2008-06-10 15:01:51.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.1p1/log.c 2008-07-23 15:18:52.000000000 +0200
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
#include <syslog.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H)
# include <vis.h>
#endif
@@ -56,6 +57,7 @@
static int log_on_stderr = 1;
static int log_facility = LOG_AUTH;
static char *argv0;
+int log_fd_keep = 0;
extern char *__progname;
@@ -310,6 +312,8 @@
exit(1);
}
+ if (log_fd_keep != 0)
+ return;
/*
* If an external library (eg libwrap) attempts to use syslog
* immediately after reexec, syslog may be pointing to the wrong
@@ -392,10 +396,33 @@
syslog_r(pri, &sdata, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
closelog_r(&sdata);
#else
+ if (!log_fd_keep) {
openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility);
+ }
syslog(pri, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
+ if (!log_fd_keep) {
closelog();
+ }
#endif
}
errno = saved_errno;
}
+
+void
+open_log(void)
+{
+ int temp1, temp2;
+
+ temp1 = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY);
+ openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID|LOG_NDELAY, log_facility);
+ temp2 = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY);
+ if (temp1 + 2 == temp2)
+ log_fd_keep = temp1 + 1;
+ else
+ log_fd_keep = -1;
+
+ if (temp1 != -1)
+ close(temp1);
+ if (temp2 != -1)
+ close(temp2);
+}
diff -up openssh-5.1p1/log.h.log-chroot openssh-5.1p1/log.h
--- openssh-5.1p1/log.h.log-chroot 2008-06-13 02:22:54.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.1p1/log.h 2008-07-23 15:20:11.000000000 +0200
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@
SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET = -1
} LogLevel;
+
+extern int log_fd_keep;
+
void log_init(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
SyslogFacility log_facility_number(char *);
@@ -66,4 +69,6 @@
void do_log(LogLevel, const char *, va_list);
void cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
+
+void open_log(void);
#endif
--- openssh-5.2p1/session.c. 2009-03-20 18:32:01.004151364 +0100
+++ openssh-5.2p1/session.c 2009-03-20 19:00:28.328742384 +0100
@@ -1445,6 +1456,7 @@
if (chdir(path) == -1)
fatal("Unable to chdir to chroot path \"%s\": "
"%s", path, strerror(errno));
+ open_log ();
if (chroot(path) == -1)
fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", path, strerror(errno));
if (chdir("/") == -1)
@@ -1632,7 +1644,8 @@
* descriptors open.
*/
for (i = 3; i < 64; i++)
- close(i);
+ if (i != log_fd_keep)
+ close(i);
}
/*

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@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
diff -up openssh-5.6p1/ssh_config.redhat openssh-5.6p1/ssh_config
--- openssh-5.6p1/ssh_config.redhat 2010-01-12 09:40:27.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.6p1/ssh_config 2010-09-03 15:21:17.000000000 +0200
@@ -45,3 +45,16 @@
# PermitLocalCommand no
# VisualHostKey no
# ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
+Host *
+ GSSAPIAuthentication yes
+# If this option is set to yes then remote X11 clients will have full access
+# to the original X11 display. As virtually no X11 client supports the untrusted
+# mode correctly we set this to yes.
+ ForwardX11Trusted yes
+# Look up the host key SSHFP records
+ VerifyHostKeyDNS ask
+# Send locale-related environment variables
+ SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
+ SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
+ SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
+ SendEnv XMODIFIERS
diff -up openssh-5.6p1/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh-5.6p1/sshd_config.0
--- openssh-5.6p1/sshd_config.0.redhat 2010-08-23 05:24:16.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.6p1/sshd_config.0 2010-09-03 15:23:20.000000000 +0200
@@ -537,9 +537,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
SyslogFacility
Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
- sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0,
- LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The
- default is AUTH.
+ sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV,
+ LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
+ The default is AUTH.
TCPKeepAlive
Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
diff -up openssh-5.6p1/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh-5.6p1/sshd_config.5
--- openssh-5.6p1/sshd_config.5.redhat 2010-07-02 05:37:17.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.6p1/sshd_config.5 2010-09-03 15:21:17.000000000 +0200
@@ -919,7 +919,7 @@ Note that this option applies to protoco
.It Cm SyslogFacility
Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
.Xr sshd 8 .
-The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
+The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
The default is AUTH.
.It Cm TCPKeepAlive
diff -up openssh-5.6p1/sshd_config.redhat openssh-5.6p1/sshd_config
--- openssh-5.6p1/sshd_config.redhat 2009-10-11 12:51:09.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.6p1/sshd_config 2010-09-03 15:21:17.000000000 +0200
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
# Logging
# obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging
#SyslogFacility AUTH
+SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
#LogLevel INFO
# Authentication:
@@ -58,9 +59,11 @@
# To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
#PasswordAuthentication yes
#PermitEmptyPasswords no
+PasswordAuthentication yes
# Change to no to disable s/key passwords
#ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes
+ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
# Kerberos options
#KerberosAuthentication no
@@ -70,7 +73,9 @@
# GSSAPI options
#GSSAPIAuthentication no
+GSSAPIAuthentication yes
#GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
+GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
# Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
# and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
@@ -82,11 +87,19 @@
# PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
# and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
#UsePAM no
+UsePAM yes
+
+# Accept locale-related environment variables
+AcceptEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
+AcceptEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
+AcceptEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
+AcceptEnv XMODIFIERS
#AllowAgentForwarding yes
#AllowTcpForwarding yes
#GatewayPorts no
#X11Forwarding no
+X11Forwarding yes
#X11DisplayOffset 10
#X11UseLocalhost yes
#PrintMotd yes

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@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
diff -up openssh-5.6p1/configure.ac.selabel openssh-5.6p1/configure.ac
--- openssh-5.6p1/configure.ac.selabel 2010-09-13 11:20:47.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.6p1/configure.ac 2010-09-13 11:20:50.000000000 +0200
@@ -700,7 +700,6 @@ mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
[ AC_DEFINE(USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS, 1,
[Define if you have Solaris process contracts])
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lcontract"
- AC_SUBST(SSHDLIBS)
SPC_MSG="yes" ], )
],
)
@@ -3500,6 +3499,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(selinux,
],
AC_MSG_ERROR(SELinux support requires libselinux library))
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
+ SSHLIBS="$SSHLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
LIBS="$LIBS $LIBSELINUX"
AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level)
AC_CHECK_FUNCS(setkeycreatecon)
@@ -4269,6 +4269,8 @@ else
fi
AC_CHECK_DECL(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO, TEST_SSH_IPV6=no)
AC_SUBST(TEST_SSH_IPV6, $TEST_SSH_IPV6)
+AC_SUBST(SSHLIBS)
+AC_SUBST(SSHDLIBS)
AC_EXEEXT
AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile buildpkg.sh opensshd.init openssh.xml \
@@ -4345,6 +4347,9 @@ echo " Libraries: ${LIBS}"
if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then
echo " +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}"
fi
+if test ! -z "${SSHLIBS}"; then
+echo " +for ssh: ${SSHLIBS}"
+fi
echo ""
diff -up openssh-5.6p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.selabel openssh-5.6p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id
--- openssh-5.6p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.selabel 2010-08-10 05:36:09.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.6p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id 2010-09-13 11:20:50.000000000 +0200
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ fi
# strip any trailing colon
host=`echo $1 | sed 's/:$//'`
-{ eval "$GET_ID" ; } | ssh $host "umask 077; test -d ~/.ssh || mkdir ~/.ssh ; cat >> ~/.ssh/authorized_keys" || exit 1
+{ eval "$GET_ID" ; } | ssh $host "umask 077; test -d ~/.ssh || mkdir ~/.ssh ; cat >> ~/.ssh/authorized_keys; test -x /sbin/restorecon && /sbin/restorecon ~/.ssh ~/.ssh/authorized_keys" || exit 1
cat <<EOF
Now try logging into the machine, with "ssh '$host'", and check in:
diff -up openssh-5.6p1/Makefile.in.selabel openssh-5.6p1/Makefile.in
--- openssh-5.6p1/Makefile.in.selabel 2010-09-13 11:20:49.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.6p1/Makefile.in 2010-09-13 11:20:50.000000000 +0200
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ LD=@LD@
CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
LIBS=@LIBS@
+SSHLIBS=@SSHLIBS@
SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
AR=@AR@
@@ -141,7 +142,7 @@ libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS)
$(RANLIB) $@
ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS)
- $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS)
sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS)
$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS)
diff -up openssh-5.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.selabel openssh-5.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
--- openssh-5.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.selabel 2009-12-08 03:39:48.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.6p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h 2010-09-13 11:20:50.000000000 +0200
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#define _PORT_LINUX_H
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
diff -up openssh-5.6p1/ssh.c.selabel openssh-5.6p1/ssh.c
--- openssh-5.6p1/ssh.c.selabel 2010-09-13 11:20:50.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.6p1/ssh.c 2010-09-13 11:23:02.000000000 +0200
@@ -848,10 +848,21 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
*/
r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir,
strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? "/" : "", _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR);
- if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf) && stat(buf, &st) < 0)
+ if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf) && stat(buf, &st) < 0) {
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ char *scon;
+
+ if (matchpathcon(buf, 0700, &scon) != -1) {
+ setfscreatecon(scon);
+ matchpathcon_fini();
+ }
+#endif
if (mkdir(buf, 0700) < 0)
error("Could not create directory '%.200s'.", buf);
-
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ setfscreatecon(NULL);
+#endif
+ }
/* load options.identity_files */
load_public_identity_files();

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@ -1,156 +0,0 @@
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/auth-pam.c.pam_selinux openssh-5.8p1/auth-pam.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/auth-pam.c.pam_selinux 2009-07-12 14:07:21.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.8p1/auth-pam.c 2011-02-12 10:49:57.000000000 +0100
@@ -1069,7 +1069,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void)
* during the ssh authentication process.
*/
int
-do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
+do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value)
{
int ret = 1;
#ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/auth-pam.h.pam_selinux openssh-5.8p1/auth-pam.h
--- openssh-5.8p1/auth-pam.h.pam_selinux 2004-09-11 14:17:26.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.8p1/auth-pam.h 2011-02-12 10:49:57.000000000 +0100
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void do_pam_session(void);
void do_pam_set_tty(const char *);
void do_pam_setcred(int );
void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
-int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
+int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *);
char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
void free_pam_environment(char **);
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.pam_selinux openssh-5.8p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.pam_selinux 2011-02-12 10:49:57.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2011-02-12 10:55:52.000000000 +0100
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
#include <selinux/selinux.h>
@@ -50,6 +51,7 @@
#include <unistd.h>
#endif
+extern ServerOptions options;
extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
extern int inetd_flag;
extern int rexeced_flag;
@@ -197,29 +199,38 @@ get_user_context(const char *sename, con
return -1;
}
+static void
+ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level)
+{
+ *role = NULL;
+ *level = NULL;
+ if (the_authctxt) {
+ if (the_authctxt->role != NULL) {
+ char *slash;
+ *role = xstrdup(the_authctxt->role);
+ if ((slash = strchr(*role, '/')) != NULL) {
+ *slash = '\0';
+ *level = slash + 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
/* Return the default security context for the given username */
static int
ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc)
{
char *sename, *lvl;
- const char *reqlvl = NULL;
- char *role = NULL;
+ const char *reqlvl;
+ char *role;
int r = -1;
context_t con = NULL;
*default_sc = NULL;
*user_sc = NULL;
- if (the_authctxt) {
- if (the_authctxt->role != NULL) {
- char *slash;
- role = xstrdup(the_authctxt->role);
- if ((slash = strchr(role, '/')) != NULL) {
- *slash = '\0';
- reqlvl = slash + 1;
- }
- }
- }
+
+ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) {
@@ -300,6 +311,36 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
return (r);
}
+/* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
+static int
+ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+{
+ const char *reqlvl;
+ char *role;
+ char *use_current;
+ int rv;
+
+ debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+
+ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
+
+ rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
+
+ if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+ use_current = "1";
+ } else {
+ use_current = "";
+ rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: "");
+ }
+
+ rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current);
+
+ if (role != NULL)
+ xfree(role);
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
void
ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
@@ -311,6 +352,24 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwn
if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
return;
+ if (options.use_pam) {
+ /* do not compute context, just setup environment for pam_selinux */
+ if (ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) {
+ switch (security_getenforce()) {
+ case -1:
+ fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+ case 0:
+ error("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
+ __func__);
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.",
+ __func__);
+ }
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+
debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
r = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);

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@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.selinux openssh-5.8p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.selinux 2011-02-12 09:38:45.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2011-02-12 09:39:10.000000000 +0100
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *p
if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
return;
- if (path == NULL)
+ if (path == NULL) {
setfscreatecon(NULL);
return;
}

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@ -1,400 +0,0 @@
diff -up openssh-5.9p0/misc.c.mls openssh-5.9p0/misc.c
--- openssh-5.9p0/misc.c.mls 2011-05-05 06:14:34.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p0/misc.c 2011-08-30 12:29:29.157087474 +0200
@@ -427,6 +427,7 @@ char *
colon(char *cp)
{
int flag = 0;
+ int start = 1;
if (*cp == ':') /* Leading colon is part of file name. */
return NULL;
@@ -442,6 +443,13 @@ colon(char *cp)
return (cp);
if (*cp == '/')
return NULL;
+ if (start) {
+ /* Slash on beginning or after dots only denotes file name. */
+ if (*cp == '/')
+ return (0);
+ if (*cp != '.')
+ start = 0;
+ }
}
return NULL;
}
diff -up openssh-5.9p0/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.mls openssh-5.9p0/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
--- openssh-5.9p0/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.mls 2011-08-30 12:29:28.873086987 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p0/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2011-08-30 13:28:12.584149668 +0200
@@ -40,7 +40,15 @@
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
#include <selinux/selinux.h>
#include <selinux/flask.h>
+#include <selinux/context.h>
#include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
+#include <selinux/get_default_type.h>
+#include <selinux/av_permissions.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
+#include <libaudit.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif
#ifndef SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE
# define SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE ":unconfined_t:"
@@ -51,6 +59,149 @@ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
extern int inetd_flag;
extern int rexeced_flag;
+/* Send audit message */
+static int
+send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context,
+ security_context_t selected_context)
+{
+ int rc=0;
+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
+ char *msg = NULL;
+ int audit_fd = audit_open();
+ security_context_t default_raw=NULL;
+ security_context_t selected_raw=NULL;
+ rc = -1;
+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
+ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
+ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ return 0; /* No audit support in kernel */
+ error("Error connecting to audit system.");
+ return rc;
+ }
+ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(default_context, &default_raw) < 0) {
+ error("Error translating default context.");
+ default_raw = NULL;
+ }
+ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(selected_context, &selected_raw) < 0) {
+ error("Error translating selected context.");
+ selected_raw = NULL;
+ }
+ if (asprintf(&msg, "sshd: default-context=%s selected-context=%s",
+ default_raw ? default_raw : (default_context ? default_context: "?"),
+ selected_context ? selected_raw : (selected_context ? selected_context :"?")) < 0) {
+ error("Error allocating memory.");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_ROLE_CHANGE,
+ msg, NULL, NULL, NULL, success) <= 0) {
+ error("Error sending audit message.");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+ out:
+ free(msg);
+ freecon(default_raw);
+ freecon(selected_raw);
+ close(audit_fd);
+#endif
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int
+mls_range_allowed(security_context_t src, security_context_t dst)
+{
+ struct av_decision avd;
+ int retval;
+ unsigned int bit = CONTEXT__CONTAINS;
+
+ debug("%s: src:%s dst:%s", __func__, src, dst);
+ retval = security_compute_av(src, dst, SECCLASS_CONTEXT, bit, &avd);
+ if (retval || ((bit & avd.allowed) != bit))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+get_user_context(const char *sename, const char *role, const char *lvl,
+ security_context_t *sc) {
+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
+ if (lvl == NULL || lvl[0] == '\0' || get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, sc) != 0) {
+ /* User may have requested a level completely outside of his
+ allowed range. We get a context just for auditing as the
+ range check below will certainly fail for default context. */
+#endif
+ if (get_default_context(sename, NULL, sc) != 0) {
+ *sc = NULL;
+ return -1;
+ }
+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
+ }
+#endif
+ if (role != NULL && role[0]) {
+ context_t con;
+ char *type=NULL;
+ if (get_default_type(role, &type) != 0) {
+ error("get_default_type: failed to get default type for '%s'",
+ role);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ con = context_new(*sc);
+ if (!con) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ context_role_set(con, role);
+ context_type_set(con, type);
+ freecon(*sc);
+ *sc = strdup(context_str(con));
+ context_free(con);
+ if (!*sc)
+ return -1;
+ }
+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
+ if (lvl != NULL && lvl[0]) {
+ /* verify that the requested range is obtained */
+ context_t con;
+ security_context_t obtained_raw;
+ security_context_t requested_raw;
+ con = context_new(*sc);
+ if (!con) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ context_range_set(con, lvl);
+ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(*sc, &obtained_raw) < 0) {
+ context_free(con);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(context_str(con), &requested_raw) < 0) {
+ freecon(obtained_raw);
+ context_free(con);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ debug("get_user_context: obtained context '%s' requested context '%s'",
+ obtained_raw, requested_raw);
+ if (strcmp(obtained_raw, requested_raw)) {
+ /* set the context to the real requested one but fail */
+ freecon(requested_raw);
+ freecon(obtained_raw);
+ freecon(*sc);
+ *sc = strdup(context_str(con));
+ context_free(con);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ freecon(requested_raw);
+ freecon(obtained_raw);
+ context_free(con);
+ }
+#endif
+ return 0;
+ out:
+ freecon(*sc);
+ *sc = NULL;
+ return -1;
+}
+
static void
ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level)
{
@@ -69,14 +220,15 @@ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role,
}
/* Return the default security context for the given username */
-static security_context_t
-ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+static int
+ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
+ security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc)
{
- security_context_t sc = NULL;
char *sename, *lvl;
char *role;
const char *reqlvl;
int r = 0;
+ context_t con = NULL;
ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
@@ -87,37 +239,62 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
}
#else
sename = pwname;
- lvl = NULL;
+ lvl = "";
#endif
if (r == 0) {
#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
- if (role != NULL && role[0])
- r = get_default_context_with_rolelevel(sename, role, lvl, NULL, &sc);
- else
- r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
+ r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, default_sc);
#else
- if (role != NULL && role[0])
- r = get_default_context_with_role(sename, role, NULL, &sc);
- else
- r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
+ r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, default_sc);
#endif
}
- if (r != 0) {
- switch (security_getenforce()) {
- case -1:
- fatal("%s: ssh_selinux_getctxbyname: "
- "security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
- case 0:
- error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
- "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
- break;
- default:
- fatal("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
- "context for %s (in enforcing mode)",
- __func__, pwname);
+ if (r == 0) {
+ /* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
+ if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+ security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
+
+ if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
+ fatal("failed to allocate security context");
+
+ if ((con=context_new(sshdsc)) == NULL)
+ fatal("failed to allocate selinux context");
+ reqlvl = context_range_get(con);
+ freecon(sshdsc);
+ if (reqlvl !=NULL && lvl != NULL && strcmp(reqlvl, lvl) == 0)
+ /* we actually don't change level */
+ reqlvl = "";
+
+ debug("%s: current connection level '%s'", __func__, reqlvl);
}
+
+ if ((reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) || (role != NULL && role[0])) {
+ r = get_user_context(sename, role, reqlvl, user_sc);
+
+ if (r == 0 && reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) {
+ security_context_t default_level_sc = *default_sc;
+ if (role != NULL && role[0]) {
+ if (get_user_context(sename, role, lvl, &default_level_sc) < 0)
+ default_level_sc = *default_sc;
+ }
+ /* verify that the requested range is contained in the user range */
+ if (mls_range_allowed(default_level_sc, *user_sc)) {
+ logit("permit MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
+ } else {
+ r = -1;
+ error("deny MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
+ }
+ if (default_level_sc != *default_sc)
+ freecon(default_level_sc);
+ }
+ } else {
+ *user_sc = *default_sc;
+ }
+ }
+ if (r != 0) {
+ error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
+ "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
}
#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
@@ -126,8 +303,12 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
if (lvl != NULL)
xfree(lvl);
#endif
-
- return (sc);
+ if (role != NULL)
+ xfree(role);
+ if (con)
+ context_free(con);
+
+ return (r);
}
/* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
@@ -165,6 +346,8 @@ void
ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
{
security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+ int r = 0;
+ security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
return;
@@ -189,22 +372,45 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwn
debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
- if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
+ r = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
+ if (r >= 0) {
+ r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s",
+ __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
+ }
+#ifdef HAVE_SETKEYCREATECON
+ else if (setkeycreatecon(user_ctx) < 0) {
+ error("%s: Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s",
+ __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+ if (user_ctx == NULL) {
+ user_ctx = default_ctx;
+ }
+ if (r < 0 || user_ctx != default_ctx) {
+ /* audit just the case when user changed a role or there was
+ a failure */
+ send_audit_message(r >= 0, default_ctx, user_ctx);
+ }
+ if (r < 0) {
switch (security_getenforce()) {
case -1:
fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
case 0:
- error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
- "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+ error("%s: SELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
+ __func__);
break;
default:
- fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
- "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
+ fatal("%s: SELinux failure. Aborting connection.",
+ __func__);
}
}
- if (user_ctx != NULL)
+ if (user_ctx != NULL && user_ctx != default_ctx)
freecon(user_ctx);
+ if (default_ctx != NULL)
+ freecon(default_ctx);
debug3("%s: done", __func__);
}
@@ -222,7 +428,10 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, cons
debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+ if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) < 0) {
+ error("%s: getexeccon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ goto out;
+ }
/* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
diff -up openssh-5.9p0/sshd.c.mls openssh-5.9p0/sshd.c
--- openssh-5.9p0/sshd.c.mls 2011-08-30 12:29:22.663149706 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p0/sshd.c 2011-08-30 12:29:29.524024777 +0200
@@ -2082,6 +2082,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
restore_uid();
}
#endif
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
+#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam) {
do_pam_setcred(1);

View File

@ -1,613 +0,0 @@
diff -up openssh-5.9p1/auth.h.role openssh-5.9p1/auth.h
--- openssh-5.9p1/auth.h.role 2012-02-06 17:21:26.038970656 +0100
+++ openssh-5.9p1/auth.h 2012-02-06 17:21:59.477033401 +0100
@@ -59,6 +59,9 @@ struct Authctxt {
char *service;
struct passwd *pw; /* set if 'valid' */
char *style;
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ char *role;
+#endif
void *kbdintctxt;
void *jpake_ctx;
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
diff -up openssh-5.9p1/auth-pam.c.role openssh-5.9p1/auth-pam.c
--- openssh-5.9p1/auth-pam.c.role 2012-02-06 17:21:25.983793983 +0100
+++ openssh-5.9p1/auth-pam.c 2012-02-06 17:21:59.476038868 +0100
@@ -1074,7 +1074,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void)
* during the ssh authentication process.
*/
int
-do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
+do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value)
{
int ret = 1;
#ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
diff -up openssh-5.9p1/auth-pam.h.role openssh-5.9p1/auth-pam.h
--- openssh-5.9p1/auth-pam.h.role 2004-09-11 14:17:26.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p1/auth-pam.h 2012-02-06 17:21:59.477033401 +0100
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void do_pam_session(void);
void do_pam_set_tty(const char *);
void do_pam_setcred(int );
void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
-int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
+int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *);
char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
void free_pam_environment(char **);
diff -up openssh-5.9p1/auth1.c.role openssh-5.9p1/auth1.c
--- openssh-5.9p1/auth1.c.role 2012-02-06 17:21:26.016845827 +0100
+++ openssh-5.9p1/auth1.c 2012-02-06 17:21:59.478033396 +0100
@@ -468,6 +468,9 @@ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
u_int ulen;
char *user, *style = NULL;
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ char *role=NULL;
+#endif
/* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */
packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_USER);
@@ -476,11 +479,24 @@ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
user = packet_get_cstring(&ulen);
packet_check_eom();
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
+ *role++ = '\0';
+#endif
+
if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
*style++ = '\0';
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ else
+ if (role && (style = strchr(role, ':')) != NULL)
+ *style++ = '\0';
+#endif
authctxt->user = user;
authctxt->style = style;
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ authctxt->role = role;
+#endif
/* Verify that the user is a valid user. */
if ((authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user))) != NULL)
diff -up openssh-5.9p1/auth2.c.role openssh-5.9p1/auth2.c
--- openssh-5.9p1/auth2.c.role 2012-02-06 17:21:26.024976386 +0100
+++ openssh-5.9p1/auth2.c 2012-02-06 17:23:14.127811737 +0100
@@ -216,6 +216,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
Authmethod *m = NULL;
char *user, *service, *method, *active_methods, *style = NULL;
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ char *role = NULL;
+#endif
int authenticated = 0;
if (authctxt == NULL)
@@ -227,6 +230,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
+ *role++ = 0;
+#endif
+
if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
*style++ = 0;
@@ -249,8 +257,15 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
- if (use_privsep)
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
+#endif
+ if (use_privsep) {
mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ mm_inform_authrole(role);
+#endif
+ }
userauth_banner();
} else if (strcmp(user, authctxt->user) != 0 ||
strcmp(service, authctxt->service) != 0) {
diff -up openssh-5.9p1/auth2-gss.c.role openssh-5.9p1/auth2-gss.c
--- openssh-5.9p1/auth2-gss.c.role 2012-02-06 17:21:26.017853239 +0100
+++ openssh-5.9p1/auth2-gss.c 2012-02-06 17:21:59.479096211 +0100
@@ -260,6 +260,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
Gssctxt *gssctxt;
int authenticated = 0;
+ char *micuser;
Buffer b;
gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
u_int len;
@@ -272,7 +273,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
mic.length = len;
- ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (authctxt->role && (strlen(authctxt->role) > 0))
+ xasprintf(&micuser, "%s/%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->role);
+ else
+#endif
+ micuser = authctxt->user;
+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, micuser, authctxt->service,
"gssapi-with-mic");
gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
@@ -284,6 +291,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
buffer_free(&b);
+ if (micuser != authctxt->user)
+ xfree(micuser);
xfree(mic.value);
authctxt->postponed = 0;
diff -up openssh-5.9p1/auth2-hostbased.c.role openssh-5.9p1/auth2-hostbased.c
--- openssh-5.9p1/auth2-hostbased.c.role 2012-02-06 17:21:26.038970656 +0100
+++ openssh-5.9p1/auth2-hostbased.c 2012-02-06 17:21:59.479096211 +0100
@@ -106,7 +106,15 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
/* reconstruct packet */
buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (authctxt->role) {
+ buffer_put_int(&b, strlen(authctxt->user)+strlen(authctxt->role)+1);
+ buffer_append(&b, authctxt->user, strlen(authctxt->user));
+ buffer_put_char(&b, '/');
+ buffer_append(&b, authctxt->role, strlen(authctxt->role));
+ } else
+#endif
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
buffer_put_cstring(&b, service);
buffer_put_cstring(&b, "hostbased");
buffer_put_string(&b, pkalg, alen);
diff -up openssh-5.9p1/auth2-pubkey.c.role openssh-5.9p1/auth2-pubkey.c
--- openssh-5.9p1/auth2-pubkey.c.role 2012-02-06 17:21:26.039787441 +0100
+++ openssh-5.9p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2012-02-06 17:21:59.480096032 +0100
@@ -121,7 +121,15 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
}
/* reconstruct packet */
buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (authctxt->role) {
+ buffer_put_int(&b, strlen(authctxt->user)+strlen(authctxt->role)+1);
+ buffer_append(&b, authctxt->user, strlen(authctxt->user));
+ buffer_put_char(&b, '/');
+ buffer_append(&b, authctxt->role, strlen(authctxt->role));
+ } else
+#endif
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
buffer_put_cstring(&b,
datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ?
"ssh-userauth" :
diff -up openssh-5.9p1/monitor.c.role openssh-5.9p1/monitor.c
--- openssh-5.9p1/monitor.c.role 2012-02-06 17:21:26.071220592 +0100
+++ openssh-5.9p1/monitor.c 2012-02-06 17:21:59.481783500 +0100
@@ -148,6 +148,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+int mm_answer_authrole(int, Buffer *);
+#endif
int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
@@ -232,6 +235,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
{MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
{MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole},
+#endif
{MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
#ifdef USE_PAM
@@ -833,6 +839,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m
else {
/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1);
+#endif
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
}
#ifdef USE_PAM
@@ -876,6 +885,25 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
return (0);
}
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+int
+mm_answer_authrole(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ monitor_permit_authentications(1);
+
+ authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ debug3("%s: role=%s",
+ __func__, authctxt->role);
+
+ if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
+ xfree(authctxt->role);
+ authctxt->role = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return (0);
+}
+#endif
+
int
mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
@@ -1252,7 +1280,7 @@ static int
monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
{
Buffer b;
- char *p;
+ char *p, *r;
u_int len;
int fail = 0;
@@ -1278,6 +1306,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i
if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
fail++;
p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+ if ((r = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL)
+ *r = '\0';
if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) {
logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
authctxt->user, p);
@@ -1309,7 +1339,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
char *chost)
{
Buffer b;
- char *p;
+ char *p, *r;
u_int len;
int fail = 0;
@@ -1326,6 +1356,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
fail++;
p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+ if ((r = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL)
+ *r = '\0';
if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) {
logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
authctxt->user, p);
diff -up openssh-5.9p1/monitor.h.role openssh-5.9p1/monitor.h
--- openssh-5.9p1/monitor.h.role 2012-02-06 17:21:26.071852220 +0100
+++ openssh-5.9p1/monitor.h 2012-02-06 17:21:59.482846081 +0100
@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@
enum monitor_reqtype {
MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI,
MONITOR_REQ_FREE, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV,
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE,
+#endif
MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN,
MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM,
MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER,
diff -up openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.c.role openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.c
--- openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.c.role 2012-02-06 17:21:26.071852220 +0100
+++ openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.c 2012-02-06 17:21:59.483845610 +0100
@@ -336,6 +336,25 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *
buffer_free(&m);
}
+/* Inform the privileged process about role */
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+void
+mm_inform_authrole(char *role)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : "");
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, &m);
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+}
+#endif
+
/* Do the password authentication */
int
mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password)
diff -up openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.h.role openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.h
--- openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.h.role 2012-02-06 17:21:26.073192915 +0100
+++ openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.h 2012-02-06 17:21:59.483845610 +0100
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ int mm_is_monitor(void);
DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int);
void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+void mm_inform_authrole(char *);
+#endif
struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *);
diff -up openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
--- openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role 2010-10-07 13:19:24.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in 2012-02-06 17:21:59.484846191 +0100
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bindresvport
COMPAT=bsd-arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o
-PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
+PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux_part_2.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
.c.o:
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
diff -up openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
--- openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role 2011-08-29 08:09:57.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2012-02-06 17:21:59.484846191 +0100
@@ -31,7 +31,11 @@
#include "log.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
#include "port-linux.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
#include <selinux/selinux.h>
@@ -42,41 +46,63 @@
# define SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE ":unconfined_t:"
#endif
-/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
-int
-ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
-{
- static int enabled = -1;
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+extern int inetd_flag;
+extern int rexeced_flag;
- if (enabled == -1) {
- enabled = (is_selinux_enabled() == 1);
- debug("SELinux support %s", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled");
+static void
+ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level)
+{
+ *role = NULL;
+ *level = NULL;
+ if (the_authctxt) {
+ if (the_authctxt->role != NULL) {
+ char *slash;
+ *role = xstrdup(the_authctxt->role);
+ if ((slash = strchr(*role, '/')) != NULL) {
+ *slash = '\0';
+ *level = slash + 1;
+ }
+ }
}
-
- return (enabled);
}
/* Return the default security context for the given username */
static security_context_t
ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
{
- security_context_t sc;
- char *sename = NULL, *lvl = NULL;
- int r;
+ security_context_t sc = NULL;
+ char *sename, *lvl;
+ char *role;
+ const char *reqlvl;
+ int r = 0;
+
+ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
- if (getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl) != 0)
- return NULL;
+ if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) {
+ sename = NULL;
+ lvl = NULL;
+ }
#else
sename = pwname;
lvl = NULL;
#endif
+ if (r == 0) {
#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
- r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
+ if (role != NULL && role[0])
+ r = get_default_context_with_rolelevel(sename, role, lvl, NULL, &sc);
+ else
+ r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
#else
- r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
+ if (role != NULL && role[0])
+ r = get_default_context_with_role(sename, role, NULL, &sc);
+ else
+ r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
#endif
+ }
if (r != 0) {
switch (security_getenforce()) {
@@ -104,6 +130,36 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
return (sc);
}
+/* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
+static int
+ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+{
+ const char *reqlvl;
+ char *role;
+ char *use_current;
+ int rv;
+
+ debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+
+ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
+
+ rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
+
+ if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+ use_current = "1";
+ } else {
+ use_current = "";
+ rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: "");
+ }
+
+ rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current);
+
+ if (role != NULL)
+ xfree(role);
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
void
ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
@@ -113,6 +169,24 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwn
if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
return;
+ if (options.use_pam) {
+ /* do not compute context, just setup environment for pam_selinux */
+ if (ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) {
+ switch (security_getenforce()) {
+ case -1:
+ fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+ case 0:
+ error("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
+ __func__);
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.",
+ __func__);
+ }
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+
debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
@@ -220,21 +294,6 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *n
xfree(newctx);
}
-void
-ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *path)
-{
- security_context_t context;
-
- if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
- return;
- if (path == NULL) {
- setfscreatecon(NULL);
- return;
- }
- if (matchpathcon(path, 0700, &context) == 0)
- setfscreatecon(context);
-}
-
#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
diff -up openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux_part_2.c.role openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux_part_2.c
--- openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux_part_2.c.role 2012-02-06 17:21:59.485846294 +0100
+++ openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux_part_2.c 2012-02-06 17:21:59.485846294 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+/* $Id: port-linux.c,v 1.11.4.2 2011/02/04 00:43:08 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Linux-specific portability code - just SELinux support at present
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(WITH_SELINUX) || defined(LINUX_OOM_ADJUST)
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "port-linux.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#include <selinux/flask.h>
+#include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
+
+/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
+int
+ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
+{
+ static int enabled = -1;
+
+ if (enabled == -1) {
+ enabled = (is_selinux_enabled() == 1);
+ debug("SELinux support %s", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled");
+ }
+
+ return (enabled);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *path)
+{
+ security_context_t context;
+
+ if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+ return;
+ if (path == NULL) {
+ setfscreatecon(NULL);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (matchpathcon(path, 0700, &context) == 0)
+ setfscreatecon(context);
+}
+
+#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
+
+#endif /* WITH_SELINUX || LINUX_OOM_ADJUST */