- upgrade to latest upstream

- use libedit in sftp (#203009)
- fixed audit log injection problem (CVE-2007-3102)

.cvsignore

@@ -1 +1 @@
-openssh-4.5p1-noacss.tar.bz2
+openssh-4.7p1-noacss.tar.bz2

openssh-3.9p1-log-in-chroot.patch

@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
---- openssh-3.9p1/log.h.log-chroot	2006-02-22 10:54:04.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-3.9p1/log.h	2006-02-22 10:53:29.000000000 +0100
-@@ -63,4 +63,6 @@
- 
- void	 do_log(LogLevel, const char *, va_list);
- void	 cleanup_exit(int) __dead;
-+
-+void     open_log(void);
- #endif
---- openssh-3.9p1/log.c.log-chroot	2006-02-22 13:29:48.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-3.9p1/log.c	2006-02-22 10:56:01.000000000 +0100
-@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
- static int log_on_stderr = 1;
- static int log_facility = LOG_AUTH;
- static char *argv0;
-+static int log_fd_keep;
- 
- extern char *__progname;
- 
-@@ -330,9 +331,20 @@
- 		syslog_r(pri, &sdata, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
- 		closelog_r(&sdata);
- #else
-+	    if (!log_fd_keep) {
- 		openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility);
-+	    }
- 		syslog(pri, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
-+	    if (!log_fd_keep) {
- 		closelog();
-+	    }
- #endif
- 	}
- }
-+
-+void
-+open_log(void)
-+{
-+	openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID|LOG_NDELAY, log_facility);
-+	log_fd_keep = 1;
-+}
---- openssh-3.9p1/sshd.c.log-chroot	2006-01-11 13:42:32.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-3.9p1/sshd.c	2006-02-22 18:58:24.000000000 +0100
-@@ -565,6 +565,10 @@
- 	memset(pw->pw_passwd, 0, strlen(pw->pw_passwd));
- 	endpwent();
- 
-+	/* Open the syslog permanently so the chrooted process still
-+	   can write to syslog. */
-+	open_log();
-+	
- 	/* Change our root directory */
- 	if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
- 		fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,

openssh-4.3p2-cve-2007-3102.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+--- openssh-4.3p2/loginrec.c.inject-fix	2007-06-20 21:18:00.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-4.3p2/loginrec.c	2007-07-13 15:25:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -1389,11 +1389,44 @@
+ #endif /* USE_WTMPX */
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
++static void
++_audit_hexscape(const char *what, char *where, unsigned int size)
++{
++	const char *ptr = what;
++	const char *hex = "0123456789ABCDEF";
++
++	while (*ptr) {
++		if (*ptr == '"' || *ptr < 0x21 || *ptr > 0x7E) {
++			unsigned int i;
++			ptr = what;
++			for (i = 0; *ptr && i+2 < size; i += 2) {
++				where[i] = hex[((unsigned)*ptr & 0xF0)>>4]; /* Upper nibble */
++				where[i+1] = hex[(unsigned)*ptr & 0x0F];   /* Lower nibble */
++				ptr++;
++			}
++			where[i] = '\0';
++			return;
++		}
++		ptr++;
++	}
++	where[0] = '"';
++	if ((unsigned)(ptr - what) < size - 3)
++	{
++		size = ptr - what + 3;
++	}
++	strncpy(where + 1, what, size - 3);
++	where[size-2] = '"';
++	where[size-1] = '\0';
++}
++
++#define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 128
++#define AUDIT_ACCT_SIZE (AUDIT_LOG_SIZE - 8)
++
+ int
+ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username,
+ 	const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success)
+ {
+-	char buf[64];
++	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ 	int audit_fd, rc;
+ 
+ 	audit_fd = audit_open();
+@@ -1406,8 +1439,11 @@
+ 	}
+ 	if (username == NULL)
+ 		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "uid=%d", uid);
+-	else
+-		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "acct=%s", username);
++	else {
++		char encoded[AUDIT_ACCT_SIZE];
++		_audit_hexscape(username, encoded, sizeof(encoded));
++		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "acct=%s", encoded);
++	}
+ 	rc = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN,
+ 		buf, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
+ 	close(audit_fd);

openssh-4.7p1-audit.patch

@@ -1,6 +1,34 @@
---- openssh-4.5p1/loginrec.c.audit	2006-09-07 14:57:54.000000000 +0200
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/auth.c.audit openssh-4.7p1/auth.c
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/loginrec.c	2006-12-21 12:17:35.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-4.7p1/auth.c.audit	2007-03-26 18:35:28.000000000 +0200
-@@ -175,6 +175,10 @@
++++ openssh-4.7p1/auth.c	2007-09-06 17:07:44.000000000 +0200
+@@ -286,6 +286,12 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authent
+ 		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh", &loginmsg);
+ # endif
+ #endif
++#if HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
++	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed) {
++		linux_audit_record_event(-1, authctxt->user, NULL,
++			get_remote_ipaddr(), "sshd", 0);
++	}
++#endif
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ 	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed)
+ 		audit_event(audit_classify_auth(method));
+@@ -492,6 +498,10 @@ getpwnamallow(const char *user)
+ 		record_failed_login(user,
+ 		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
+ #endif
++#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
++		linux_audit_record_event(-1, user, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(),
++			"sshd", 0);
++#endif
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ 		audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER);
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/loginrec.c.audit openssh-4.7p1/loginrec.c
+--- openssh-4.7p1/loginrec.c.audit	2007-04-29 04:10:58.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-4.7p1/loginrec.c	2007-09-06 17:07:44.000000000 +0200
+@@ -176,6 +176,10 @@
  #include "auth.h"
  #include "buffer.h"
  
@@ -11,7 +39,7 @@
  #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
  # include <util.h>
  #endif
-@@ -201,6 +205,9 @@
+@@ -202,6 +206,9 @@ int utmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *l
  int utmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
  int wtmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
  int wtmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
@@ -21,7 +49,7 @@
  int lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
  int syslogin_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
  
-@@ -439,6 +446,10 @@
+@@ -440,6 +447,10 @@ login_write(struct logininfo *li)
  
  	/* set the timestamp */
  	login_set_current_time(li);
@@ -32,7 +60,7 @@
  #ifdef USE_LOGIN
  	syslogin_write_entry(li);
  #endif
-@@ -1393,6 +1404,51 @@
+@@ -1394,6 +1405,51 @@ wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
  }
  #endif /* USE_WTMPX */
  
@@ -84,40 +112,10 @@
  /**
   ** Low-level libutil login() functions
   **/
---- openssh-4.5p1/loginrec.h.audit	2006-08-05 04:39:40.000000000 +0200
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/config.h.in.audit openssh-4.7p1/config.h.in
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/loginrec.h	2006-12-21 12:17:35.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-4.7p1/config.h.in.audit	2007-09-04 08:50:04.000000000 +0200
-@@ -127,5 +127,9 @@
++++ openssh-4.7p1/config.h.in	2007-09-06 17:07:44.000000000 +0200
- char *line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize);
+@@ -1334,6 +1334,9 @@
- 
- void record_failed_login(const char *, const char *, const char *);
-+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
-+int linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username,
-+	const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success);
-+#endif /* HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT */
- 
- #endif /* _HAVE_LOGINREC_H_ */
---- openssh-4.5p1/Makefile.in.audit	2006-10-23 23:44:47.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/Makefile.in	2006-12-21 12:19:39.000000000 +0100
-@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
- CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
- LIBS=@LIBS@
- LIBSELINUX=@LIBSELINUX@
-+LIBAUDIT=@LIBAUDIT@
- SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
- LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
- LIBPAM=@LIBPAM@
-@@ -139,7 +140,7 @@
- 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
- 
- sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a	$(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS)
--	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBWRAP) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBSELINUX) $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS)
-+	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBWRAP) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBAUDIT) $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS)
- 
- scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
---- openssh-4.5p1/config.h.in.audit	2006-11-07 14:07:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/config.h.in	2006-12-21 12:17:35.000000000 +0100
-@@ -1305,6 +1305,9 @@
  /* Define if you want SELinux support. */
  #undef WITH_SELINUX
  
@@ -127,30 +125,42 @@
  /* Define to 1 if your processor stores words with the most significant byte
     first (like Motorola and SPARC, unlike Intel and VAX). */
  #undef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
---- openssh-4.5p1/configure.ac.audit	2006-12-21 12:17:34.000000000 +0100
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/loginrec.h.audit openssh-4.7p1/loginrec.h
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/configure.ac	2006-12-21 12:17:35.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-4.7p1/loginrec.h.audit	2006-08-05 04:39:40.000000000 +0200
-@@ -3161,6 +3161,20 @@
++++ openssh-4.7p1/loginrec.h	2007-09-06 17:07:44.000000000 +0200
+@@ -127,5 +127,9 @@ char *line_stripname(char *dst, const ch
+ char *line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize);
+ 
+ void record_failed_login(const char *, const char *, const char *);
++#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
++int linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username,
++	const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success);
++#endif /* HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT */
+ 
+ #endif /* _HAVE_LOGINREC_H_ */
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/configure.ac.audit openssh-4.7p1/configure.ac
+--- openssh-4.7p1/configure.ac.audit	2007-09-06 17:07:44.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-4.7p1/configure.ac	2007-09-06 17:15:23.000000000 +0200
+@@ -3216,6 +3216,18 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(selinux,
+ 	fi ]
  )
- AC_SUBST(LIBSELINUX)
  
 +# Check whether user wants Linux audit support
 +LINUX_AUDIT_MSG="no"
-+LIBAUDIT=""
 +AC_ARG_WITH(linux-audit,
 +	[  --with-linux-audit   Enable Linux audit support],
 +	[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
 +		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT,1,[Define if you want Linux audit support.])
 +		LINUX_AUDIT_MSG="yes"
 +		AC_CHECK_HEADERS(libaudit.h)
-+		LIBAUDIT="-laudit"
++		SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -laudit"
-+	fi
++	fi ]
-+	])
++)
-+AC_SUBST(LIBAUDIT)
 +
  # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
  KRB5_MSG="no"
  AC_ARG_WITH(kerberos5,
-@@ -3982,6 +3996,7 @@
+@@ -4037,6 +4049,7 @@ echo "                       PAM support
  echo "                   OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG"
  echo "                 KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
  echo "                   SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
@@ -158,29 +168,3 @@
  echo "                 Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"
  echo "                     S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"
  echo "              TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG"
---- openssh-4.5p1/auth.c.audit	2006-10-27 17:10:16.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/auth.c	2006-12-21 12:17:35.000000000 +0100
-@@ -286,6 +286,12 @@
- 		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh", &loginmsg);
- # endif
- #endif
-+#if HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
-+	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed) {
-+		linux_audit_record_event(-1, authctxt->user, NULL,
-+			get_remote_ipaddr(), "sshd", 0);
-+	}
-+#endif
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- 	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed)
- 		audit_event(audit_classify_auth(method));
-@@ -492,6 +498,10 @@
- 		record_failed_login(user,
- 		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
- #endif
-+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
-+		linux_audit_record_event(-1, user, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(),
-+			"sshd", 0);
-+#endif
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- 		audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER);
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */

openssh-4.7p1-log-in-chroot.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/sshd.c.log-chroot openssh-4.7p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-4.7p1/sshd.c.log-chroot	2007-09-06 17:24:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-4.7p1/sshd.c	2007-09-06 17:24:13.000000000 +0200
+@@ -596,6 +596,10 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
+ 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
+ 	demote_sensitive_data();
+ 
++	/* Open the syslog permanently so the chrooted process still
++	   can write to syslog. */
++	open_log();
++	
+ 	/* Change our root directory */
+ 	if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
+ 		fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/log.c.log-chroot openssh-4.7p1/log.c
+--- openssh-4.7p1/log.c.log-chroot	2007-05-20 07:08:16.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-4.7p1/log.c	2007-09-06 17:29:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL
+ static int log_on_stderr = 1;
+ static int log_facility = LOG_AUTH;
+ static char *argv0;
++static int log_fd_keep;
+ 
+ extern char *__progname;
+ 
+@@ -370,10 +371,21 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, 
+ 		syslog_r(pri, &sdata, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
+ 		closelog_r(&sdata);
+ #else
++	    if (!log_fd_keep) {
+ 		openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility);
++	    }
+ 		syslog(pri, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
++	    if (!log_fd_keep) {
+ 		closelog();
++	    }
+ #endif
+ 	}
+ 	errno = saved_errno;
+ }
++
++void
++open_log(void)
++{
++	openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID|LOG_NDELAY, log_facility);
++	log_fd_keep = 1;
++}
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/log.h.log-chroot openssh-4.7p1/log.h
+--- openssh-4.7p1/log.h.log-chroot	2006-08-18 16:32:21.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-4.7p1/log.h	2007-09-06 17:24:13.000000000 +0200
+@@ -62,4 +62,6 @@ void     debug3(const char *, ...) __att
+ 
+ void	 do_log(LogLevel, const char *, va_list);
+ void	 cleanup_exit(int) __dead;
++
++void     open_log(void);
+ #endif

openssh-4.7p1-mls.patch

@@ -1,5 +1,53 @@
---- openssh-4.5p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.mls	2007-01-16 22:13:32.000000000 +0100
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/misc.c.mls openssh-4.7p1/misc.c
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2007-03-20 10:07:39.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-4.7p1/misc.c.mls	2007-01-05 06:24:48.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-4.7p1/misc.c	2007-09-06 17:39:28.000000000 +0200
+@@ -418,6 +418,7 @@ char *
+ colon(char *cp)
+ {
+ 	int flag = 0;
++	int start = 1;
+ 
+ 	if (*cp == ':')		/* Leading colon is part of file name. */
+ 		return (0);
+@@ -431,8 +432,13 @@ colon(char *cp)
+ 			return (cp+1);
+ 		if (*cp == ':' && !flag)
+ 			return (cp);
+-		if (*cp == '/')
+-			return (0);
++		if (start) {
++		/* Slash on beginning or after dots only denotes file name. */
++			if (*cp == '/')
++				return (0);
++			if (*cp != '.')
++				start = 0;
++		}
+ 	}
+ 	return (0);
+ }
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/session.c.mls openssh-4.7p1/session.c
+--- openssh-4.7p1/session.c.mls	2007-09-06 17:39:28.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-4.7p1/session.c	2007-09-06 17:39:28.000000000 +0200
+@@ -1347,10 +1347,6 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+ #endif
+ 	if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid)
+ 		fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int) pw->pw_uid);
+-
+-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-	ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
+-#endif
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.mls openssh-4.7p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+--- openssh-4.7p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.mls	2007-09-06 17:39:28.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-4.7p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2007-08-07 17:38:18.000000000 +0200
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $Id: port-linux.c,v 1.4 2007/06/27 22:48:03 djm Exp $ */
++/* $Id: port-linux.c,v 1.3 2006/09/01 05:38:41 djm Exp $ */
+ 
+ /*
+  * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
 @@ -33,12 +33,23 @@
  #include "key.h"
  #include "hostfile.h"
@@ -24,7 +72,7 @@
  
  /* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
  static int
-@@ -54,17 +65,173 @@
+@@ -54,17 +65,173 @@ ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
  	return (enabled);
  }
  
@@ -204,7 +252,7 @@
  #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
  	if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) {
  		sename = NULL;
-@@ -72,37 +239,63 @@
+@@ -72,37 +239,62 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
  	}
  #else
  	sename = pwname;
@@ -236,6 +284,7 @@
 -		case 0:
 -			error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
 -			    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+-			break;
 -		default:
 -			fatal("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
 -			    "context for %s (in enforcing mode)",
@@ -257,7 +306,7 @@
 +			    reqlvl = "";
 +
 +			debug("%s: current connection level '%s'", __func__, reqlvl);
-+		}
+ 		}
 +		
 +		if ((reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) || (role != NULL && role[0])) {
 +			r = get_user_context(sename, role, reqlvl, user_sc);
@@ -280,16 +329,15 @@
 +			}
 +		} else {
 +			*user_sc = *default_sc;
- 		}
++		}
- 	}
++	}
 +	if (r != 0) {
 +		error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
 +		    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
-+	}
+ 	}
  
  #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
- 	if (sename != NULL)
+@@ -111,14 +303,20 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
-@@ -110,14 +303,20 @@
  	if (lvl != NULL)
  		xfree(lvl);
  #endif
@@ -311,7 +359,7 @@
  	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
  
  	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
-@@ -125,21 +324,39 @@
+@@ -126,22 +324,39 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwn
  
  	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
  
@@ -342,7 +390,7 @@
 -			    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
 +			error("%s: SELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
 +			    __func__);
-+			break;
+ 			break;
  		default:
 -			fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
 -			    "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
@@ -358,7 +406,7 @@
  
  	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
  }
-@@ -157,7 +374,10 @@
+@@ -159,7 +374,10 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, cons
  
  	debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
  
@@ -370,9 +418,10 @@
  
  	/* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
  
---- openssh-4.5p1/sshd.c.mls	2007-01-16 22:13:32.000000000 +0100
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/sshd.c.mls openssh-4.7p1/sshd.c
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/sshd.c	2007-01-16 22:13:32.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-4.7p1/sshd.c.mls	2007-09-06 17:39:28.000000000 +0200
-@@ -1833,6 +1833,9 @@
++++ openssh-4.7p1/sshd.c	2007-09-06 17:39:28.000000000 +0200
+@@ -1838,6 +1838,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  		restore_uid();
  	}
  #endif
@@ -382,42 +431,3 @@
  #ifdef USE_PAM
  	if (options.use_pam) {
  		do_pam_setcred(1);
---- openssh-4.5p1/misc.c.mls	2006-08-05 04:39:40.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/misc.c	2007-01-16 22:13:32.000000000 +0100
-@@ -418,6 +418,7 @@
- colon(char *cp)
- {
- 	int flag = 0;
-+	int start = 1;
- 
- 	if (*cp == ':')		/* Leading colon is part of file name. */
- 		return (0);
-@@ -431,8 +432,13 @@
- 			return (cp+1);
- 		if (*cp == ':' && !flag)
- 			return (cp);
--		if (*cp == '/')
--			return (0);
-+		if (start) {
-+		/* Slash on beginning or after dots only denotes file name. */
-+			if (*cp == '/')
-+				return (0);
-+			if (*cp != '.')
-+				start = 0;
-+		}
- 	}
- 	return (0);
- }
---- openssh-4.5p1/session.c.mls	2007-01-16 22:13:32.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/session.c	2007-01-16 22:13:32.000000000 +0100
-@@ -1347,10 +1347,6 @@
- #endif
- 	if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid)
- 		fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int) pw->pw_uid);
--
--#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--	ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
--#endif
- }
- 
- static void

openssh-4.7p1-pam-session.patch

@@ -1,28 +1,80 @@
---- openssh-4.3p2/auth-pam.c.pam-session	2006-11-27 17:39:08.000000000 +0100
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/session.c.pam-session openssh-4.7p1/session.c
-+++ openssh-4.3p2/auth-pam.c	2006-11-27 19:31:41.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-4.7p1/session.c.pam-session	2007-08-16 15:28:04.000000000 +0200
-@@ -563,15 +563,17 @@
++++ openssh-4.7p1/session.c	2007-09-06 17:37:46.000000000 +0200
- void
+@@ -422,11 +422,6 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *c
- sshpam_cleanup(void)
+ 
- {
+ 	session_proctitle(s);
--	debug("PAM: cleanup");
+ 
--	if (sshpam_handle == NULL)
+-#if defined(USE_PAM)
-+	if (sshpam_handle == NULL || (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor()))
+-	if (options.use_pam && !use_privsep)
- 		return;
+-		do_pam_setcred(1);
-+	debug("PAM: cleanup");
+-#endif /* USE_PAM */
- 	pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&null_conv);
+-
- 	if (sshpam_cred_established) {
+ 	/* Fork the child. */
-+		debug("PAM: deleting credentials");
+ 	if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
- 		pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_DELETE_CRED);
+ 		is_child = 1;
- 		sshpam_cred_established = 0;
+@@ -557,14 +552,6 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm
- 	}
+ 	ptyfd = s->ptyfd;
- 	if (sshpam_session_open) {
+ 	ttyfd = s->ttyfd;
-+		debug("PAM: closing session");
+ 
- 		pam_close_session(sshpam_handle, PAM_SILENT);
+-#if defined(USE_PAM)
- 		sshpam_session_open = 0;
+-	if (options.use_pam) {
- 	}
+-		do_pam_set_tty(s->tty);
---- openssh-4.3p2/sshd.c.pam-session	2006-11-27 17:29:44.000000000 +0100
+-		if (!use_privsep)
-+++ openssh-4.3p2/sshd.c	2006-11-28 21:21:52.000000000 +0100
+-			do_pam_setcred(1);
-@@ -1745,7 +1745,21 @@
+-	}
+-#endif
+-
+ 	/* Fork the child. */
+ 	if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
+ 		is_child = 1;
+@@ -1300,17 +1287,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+ # ifdef __bsdi__
+ 		setpgid(0, 0);
+ # endif
+-#ifdef GSSAPI
+-		if (options.gss_authentication) {
+-			temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+-			ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
+-			restore_uid();
+-		}
+-#endif
+ # ifdef USE_PAM
+ 		if (options.use_pam) {
+-			do_pam_session();
+-			do_pam_setcred(use_privsep);
++			do_pam_setcred(0);
+ 		}
+ # endif /* USE_PAM */
+ 		if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
+@@ -1337,13 +1316,6 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+ 			exit(1);
+ 		}
+ 		endgrent();
+-#ifdef GSSAPI
+-		if (options.gss_authentication) {
+-			temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+-			ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
+-			restore_uid();
+-		}
+-#endif
+ # ifdef USE_PAM
+ 		/*
+ 		 * PAM credentials may take the form of supplementary groups.
+@@ -1351,8 +1323,7 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+ 		 * Reestablish them here.
+ 		 */
+ 		if (options.use_pam) {
+-			do_pam_session();
+-			do_pam_setcred(use_privsep);
++			do_pam_setcred(0);
+ 		}
+ # endif /* USE_PAM */
+ # if defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY)
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/sshd.c.pam-session openssh-4.7p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-4.7p1/sshd.c.pam-session	2007-09-06 17:37:46.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-4.7p1/sshd.c	2007-09-06 17:37:46.000000000 +0200
+@@ -1831,7 +1831,21 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  	audit_event(SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS);
  #endif
  
@@ -45,9 +97,10 @@
  	 * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare
  	 * file descriptor passing.
  	 */
---- openssh-4.3p2/monitor.c.pam-session	2006-11-27 17:29:44.000000000 +0100
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/monitor.c.pam-session openssh-4.7p1/monitor.c
-+++ openssh-4.3p2/monitor.c	2006-11-28 14:01:23.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-4.7p1/monitor.c.pam-session	2007-09-06 17:37:46.000000000 +0200
-@@ -1539,6 +1539,11 @@
++++ openssh-4.7p1/monitor.c	2007-09-06 17:37:46.000000000 +0200
+@@ -1566,6 +1566,11 @@ mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
  	/* The child is terminating */
  	session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close);
  
@@ -59,71 +112,26 @@
  	while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
  		if (errno != EINTR)
  			exit(1);
---- openssh-4.3p2/session.c.pam-session	2006-11-27 17:29:43.000000000 +0100
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/auth-pam.c.pam-session openssh-4.7p1/auth-pam.c
-+++ openssh-4.3p2/session.c	2006-11-28 21:17:56.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-4.7p1/auth-pam.c.pam-session	2007-08-10 06:32:34.000000000 +0200
-@@ -395,11 +395,6 @@
++++ openssh-4.7p1/auth-pam.c	2007-09-06 17:37:46.000000000 +0200
- 
+@@ -598,15 +598,17 @@ static struct pam_conv store_conv = { ss
- 	session_proctitle(s);
+ void
- 
+ sshpam_cleanup(void)
--#if defined(USE_PAM)
+ {
--	if (options.use_pam && !use_privsep)
+-	debug("PAM: cleanup");
--		do_pam_setcred(1);
+-	if (sshpam_handle == NULL)
--#endif /* USE_PAM */
++	if (sshpam_handle == NULL || (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor()))
--
+ 		return;
- 	/* Fork the child. */
++	debug("PAM: cleanup");
- 	if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
+ 	pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&null_conv);
- 		is_child = 1;
+ 	if (sshpam_cred_established) {
-@@ -530,14 +525,6 @@
++		debug("PAM: deleting credentials");
- 	ptyfd = s->ptyfd;
+ 		pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_DELETE_CRED);
- 	ttyfd = s->ttyfd;
+ 		sshpam_cred_established = 0;
- 
+ 	}
--#if defined(USE_PAM)
+ 	if (sshpam_session_open) {
--	if (options.use_pam) {
++		debug("PAM: closing session");
--		do_pam_set_tty(s->tty);
+ 		pam_close_session(sshpam_handle, PAM_SILENT);
--		if (!use_privsep)
+ 		sshpam_session_open = 0;
--			do_pam_setcred(1);
+ 	}
--	}
--#endif
--
- 	/* Fork the child. */
- 	if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
- 		is_child = 1;
-@@ -1266,16 +1253,8 @@
- # ifdef __bsdi__
- 		setpgid(0, 0);
- # endif
--#ifdef GSSAPI
--		if (options.gss_authentication) {
--			temporarily_use_uid(pw);
--			ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
--			restore_uid();
--		}
--#endif
- # ifdef USE_PAM
- 		if (options.use_pam) {
--			do_pam_session();
- 			do_pam_setcred(0);
- 		}
- # endif /* USE_PAM */
-@@ -1303,13 +1282,6 @@
- 			exit(1);
- 		}
- 		endgrent();
--#ifdef GSSAPI
--		if (options.gss_authentication) {
--			temporarily_use_uid(pw);
--			ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
--			restore_uid();
--		}
--#endif
- # ifdef USE_PAM
- 		/*
- 		 * PAM credentials may take the form of supplementary groups.
-@@ -1317,7 +1289,6 @@
- 		 * Reestablish them here.
- 		 */
- 		if (options.use_pam) {
--			do_pam_session();
- 			do_pam_setcred(0);
- 		}
- # endif /* USE_PAM */

openssh-4.7p1-redhat.patch

@@ -1,29 +1,7 @@
---- openssh-4.5p1/sshd_config.0.redhat	2006-11-07 14:07:28.000000000 +0100
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/sshd_config.redhat openssh-4.7p1/sshd_config
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/sshd_config.0	2006-12-20 22:04:16.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-4.7p1/sshd_config.redhat	2007-03-21 10:42:25.000000000 +0100
-@@ -430,9 +430,9 @@
++++ openssh-4.7p1/sshd_config	2007-09-06 16:23:58.000000000 +0200
- 
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ Protocol 2
-      SyslogFacility
-              Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
--             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0,
--             LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.  The de-
--             fault is AUTH.
-+             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV,
-+             LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
-+             The default is AUTH.
- 
-      TCPKeepAlive
-              Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
---- openssh-4.5p1/sshd_config.redhat	2006-07-24 06:06:47.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/sshd_config	2006-12-20 21:59:15.000000000 +0100
-@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
- 
- #Port 22
- #Protocol 2,1
-+Protocol 2
- #AddressFamily any
- #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
- #ListenAddress ::
-@@ -29,6 +30,7 @@
  # Logging
  # obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging
  #SyslogFacility AUTH
@@ -31,7 +9,7 @@
  #LogLevel INFO
  
  # Authentication:
-@@ -55,9 +57,11 @@
+@@ -59,9 +60,11 @@ Protocol 2
  # To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
  #PasswordAuthentication yes
  #PermitEmptyPasswords no
@@ -43,7 +21,7 @@
  
  # Kerberos options
  #KerberosAuthentication no
-@@ -67,7 +71,9 @@
+@@ -71,7 +74,9 @@ Protocol 2
  
  # GSSAPI options
  #GSSAPIAuthentication no
@@ -53,7 +31,7 @@
  
  # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, 
  # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will 
-@@ -79,10 +85,16 @@
+@@ -83,10 +88,16 @@ Protocol 2
  # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
  # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
  #UsePAM no
@@ -70,9 +48,10 @@
  #X11DisplayOffset 10
  #X11UseLocalhost yes
  #PrintMotd yes
---- openssh-4.5p1/ssh_config.redhat	2006-06-13 05:01:10.000000000 +0200
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/ssh_config.redhat openssh-4.7p1/ssh_config
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/ssh_config	2006-12-20 21:59:15.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-4.7p1/ssh_config.redhat	2007-06-11 06:04:42.000000000 +0200
-@@ -42,3 +42,13 @@
++++ openssh-4.7p1/ssh_config	2007-09-06 16:21:49.000000000 +0200
+@@ -43,3 +43,13 @@
  #   Tunnel no
  #   TunnelDevice any:any
  #   PermitLocalCommand no
@@ -86,9 +65,26 @@
 +	SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES 
 +	SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT 
 +	SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL
---- openssh-4.5p1/sshd_config.5.redhat	2006-08-30 03:06:34.000000000 +0200
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh-4.7p1/sshd_config.0
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/sshd_config.5	2006-12-20 22:05:18.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-4.7p1/sshd_config.0.redhat	2007-09-04 08:50:11.000000000 +0200
-@@ -740,7 +740,7 @@
++++ openssh-4.7p1/sshd_config.0	2007-09-06 16:21:49.000000000 +0200
+@@ -435,9 +435,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
+ 
+      SyslogFacility
+              Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+-             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0,
+-             LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.  The de-
+-             fault is AUTH.
++             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV,
++             LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
++             The default is AUTH.
+ 
+      TCPKeepAlive
+              Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh-4.7p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-4.7p1/sshd_config.5.redhat	2007-06-11 06:07:13.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-4.7p1/sshd_config.5	2007-09-06 16:21:49.000000000 +0200
+@@ -748,7 +748,7 @@ Note that this option applies to protoco
  .It Cm SyslogFacility
  Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
  .Xr sshd 8 .

openssh-4.7p1-selinux.patch

@@ -1,16 +1,18 @@
---- openssh-4.5p1/auth.h.selinux	2006-08-18 16:32:46.000000000 +0200
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/configure.ac.selinux openssh-4.7p1/configure.ac
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/auth.h	2006-12-20 22:10:48.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-4.7p1/configure.ac.selinux	2007-09-06 19:46:32.000000000 +0200
-@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
++++ openssh-4.7p1/configure.ac	2007-09-06 19:52:23.000000000 +0200
- 	char		*service;
+@@ -3211,6 +3211,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(selinux,
- 	struct passwd	*pw;		/* set if 'valid' */
+ 		AC_CHECK_LIB(selinux, setexeccon, [ LIBSELINUX="-lselinux" ],
- 	char		*style;
+ 		    AC_MSG_ERROR(SELinux support requires libselinux library))
-+	char		*role;
+ 		SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
- 	void		*kbdintctxt;
++		LIBS="$LIBS $LIBSELINUX"
- #ifdef BSD_AUTH
+ 		AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level)
- 	auth_session_t	*as;
+ 		LIBS="$save_LIBS"
---- openssh-4.5p1/auth1.c.selinux	2006-12-20 22:10:35.000000000 +0100
+ 	fi ]
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/auth1.c	2006-12-20 22:10:48.000000000 +0100
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/auth1.c.selinux openssh-4.7p1/auth1.c
-@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@
+--- openssh-4.7p1/auth1.c.selinux	2007-09-06 19:46:32.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-4.7p1/auth1.c	2007-09-06 19:46:32.000000000 +0200
+@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ void
  do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
  {
  	u_int ulen;
@@ -19,7 +21,7 @@
  
  	/* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */
  	packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_USER);
-@@ -397,11 +397,19 @@
+@@ -397,11 +397,19 @@ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
  	user = packet_get_string(&ulen);
  	packet_check_eom();
  
@@ -39,58 +41,59 @@
  
  	/* Verify that the user is a valid user. */
  	if ((authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user))) != NULL)
---- openssh-4.5p1/monitor.c.selinux	2006-11-07 13:16:08.000000000 +0100
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/monitor_wrap.h.selinux openssh-4.7p1/monitor_wrap.h
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/monitor.c	2006-12-20 22:10:48.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-4.7p1/monitor_wrap.h.selinux	2006-08-05 04:39:40.000000000 +0200
-@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@
++++ openssh-4.7p1/monitor_wrap.h	2007-09-06 19:46:32.000000000 +0200
- int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
+@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ int mm_is_monitor(void);
- int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
+ DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
- int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int);
-+int mm_answer_authrole(int, Buffer *);
+ void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
- int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
++void mm_inform_authrole(char *);
- int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
+ struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
- int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
+ char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
-@@ -204,6 +205,7 @@
+ int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *);
-     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/monitor.h.selinux openssh-4.7p1/monitor.h
-     {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
+--- openssh-4.7p1/monitor.h.selinux	2006-03-26 05:30:02.000000000 +0200
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
++++ openssh-4.7p1/monitor.h	2007-09-06 19:46:32.000000000 +0200
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole},
+@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
- #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -653,6 +655,7 @@
- 	else {
- 		/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
- 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
-+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1);
- 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
- 	}
  
-@@ -698,6 +701,23 @@
+ enum monitor_reqtype {
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI,
+-	MONITOR_REQ_FREE, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV,
++	MONITOR_REQ_FREE, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV,MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM,
+ 	MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER,
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/monitor_wrap.c.selinux openssh-4.7p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh-4.7p1/monitor_wrap.c.selinux	2007-06-11 06:01:42.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-4.7p1/monitor_wrap.c	2007-09-06 19:46:32.000000000 +0200
+@@ -294,6 +294,23 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *
+ 	buffer_free(&m);
  }
  
- int
++/* Inform the privileged process about role */
-+mm_answer_authrole(int sock, Buffer *m)
++
++void
++mm_inform_authrole(char *role)
 +{
-+	monitor_permit_authentications(1);
++	Buffer m;
 +
-+	authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
++	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-+	debug3("%s: role=%s",
-+	    __func__, authctxt->role);
 +
-+	if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
++	buffer_init(&m);
-+		xfree(authctxt->role);
++	buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : "");
-+		authctxt->role = NULL;
-+	}
 +
-+	return (0);
++	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, &m);
++
++	buffer_free(&m);
 +}
 +
-+int
+ /* Do the password authentication */
- mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ int
- {
+ mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password)
- 	static int call_count;
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.selinux openssh-4.7p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
---- openssh-4.5p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.selinux	2006-09-01 07:38:41.000000000 +0200
+--- openssh-4.7p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.selinux	2007-06-28 00:48:03.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2006-12-21 12:15:59.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-4.7p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2007-09-06 19:46:32.000000000 +0200
 @@ -30,11 +30,16 @@
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
  #include "log.h"
@@ -108,7 +111,7 @@
  /* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
  static int
  ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
-@@ -53,23 +58,36 @@
+@@ -53,23 +58,36 @@ ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
  static security_context_t
  ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
  {
@@ -152,29 +155,21 @@
  
  	if (r != 0) {
  		switch (security_getenforce()) {
---- openssh-4.5p1/configure.ac.selinux	2006-12-20 22:10:35.000000000 +0100
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/auth.h.selinux openssh-4.7p1/auth.h
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/configure.ac	2006-12-21 11:18:48.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-4.7p1/auth.h.selinux	2006-08-18 16:32:46.000000000 +0200
-@@ -3137,8 +3137,16 @@
++++ openssh-4.7p1/auth.h	2007-09-06 19:46:32.000000000 +0200
- SELINUX_MSG="no"
+@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
- LIBSELINUX=""
+ 	char		*service;
- AC_ARG_WITH(selinux,
+ 	struct passwd	*pw;		/* set if 'valid' */
--	[  --with-selinux   Enable SELinux support],
+ 	char		*style;
-+	[  --with-selinux[[=LIBSELINUX-PATH]]   Enable SELinux support],
++	char		*role;
- 	[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ 	void		*kbdintctxt;
-+		if test "x$withval" != "xyes"; then
+ #ifdef BSD_AUTH
-+			CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
+ 	auth_session_t	*as;
-+			if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/auth2.c.selinux openssh-4.7p1/auth2.c
-+				LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+--- openssh-4.7p1/auth2.c.selinux	2007-05-20 06:58:41.000000000 +0200
-+			else
++++ openssh-4.7p1/auth2.c	2007-09-06 19:46:32.000000000 +0200
-+				LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
-+			fi
-+        	fi 
- 		AC_DEFINE(WITH_SELINUX,1,[Define if you want SELinux support.])
- 		SELINUX_MSG="yes"
- 		AC_CHECK_HEADER([selinux/selinux.h], ,
---- openssh-4.5p1/auth2.c.selinux	2006-08-05 04:39:39.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/auth2.c	2006-12-20 22:10:48.000000000 +0100
-@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@
  {
  	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
  	Authmethod *m = NULL;
@@ -183,7 +178,7 @@
  	int authenticated = 0;
  
  	if (authctxt == NULL)
-@@ -157,6 +157,9 @@
+@@ -153,6 +153,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
  	debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
  	debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
  
@@ -193,7 +188,7 @@
  	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
  		*style++ = 0;
  
-@@ -182,8 +185,11 @@
+@@ -178,8 +181,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
  		    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
  		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
  		authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
@@ -206,50 +201,54 @@
  	} else if (strcmp(user, authctxt->user) != 0 ||
  	    strcmp(service, authctxt->service) != 0) {
  		packet_disconnect("Change of username or service not allowed: "
---- openssh-4.5p1/monitor_wrap.h.selinux	2006-08-05 04:39:40.000000000 +0200
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/monitor.c.selinux openssh-4.7p1/monitor.c
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/monitor_wrap.h	2006-12-20 22:10:48.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-4.7p1/monitor.c.selinux	2007-05-20 07:10:16.000000000 +0200
-@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
++++ openssh-4.7p1/monitor.c	2007-09-06 19:46:32.000000000 +0200
- DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
+@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int);
+ int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
- void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
+ int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
-+void mm_inform_authrole(char *);
+ int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
- struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
++int mm_answer_authrole(int, Buffer *);
- char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
+ int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *);
+ int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
---- openssh-4.5p1/monitor_wrap.c.selinux	2006-09-01 07:38:37.000000000 +0200
+ int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/monitor_wrap.c	2006-12-20 22:10:48.000000000 +0100
+@@ -204,6 +205,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] 
-@@ -282,6 +282,23 @@
+     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
- 	buffer_free(&m);
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
++    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+@@ -657,6 +659,7 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m
+ 	else {
+ 		/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
+ 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
++		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1);
+ 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -702,6 +705,23 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
  }
  
-+/* Inform the privileged process about role */
+ int
-+
++mm_answer_authrole(int sock, Buffer *m)
-+void
-+mm_inform_authrole(char *role)
 +{
-+	Buffer m;
++	monitor_permit_authentications(1);
 +
-+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
++	authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
++	debug3("%s: role=%s",
++	    __func__, authctxt->role);
 +
-+	buffer_init(&m);
++	if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
-+	buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : "");
++		xfree(authctxt->role);
++		authctxt->role = NULL;
++	}
 +
-+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, &m);
++	return (0);
-+
-+	buffer_free(&m);
 +}
 +
- /* Do the password authentication */
++int
- int
+ mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
- mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password)
+ {
---- openssh-4.5p1/monitor.h.selinux	2006-03-26 05:30:02.000000000 +0200
+ 	static int call_count;
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/monitor.h	2006-12-20 22:10:35.000000000 +0100
-@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
- 
- enum monitor_reqtype {
- 	MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI,
--	MONITOR_REQ_FREE, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV,
-+	MONITOR_REQ_FREE, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV,MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER,

openssh-4.7p1-sftp-drain-acks.patch

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-diff -up openssh-4.5p1/sftp-client.c.drain-acks openssh-4.5p1/sftp-client.c
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/sftp-client.c.drain-acks openssh-4.7p1/sftp-client.c
---- openssh-4.5p1/sftp-client.c.drain-acks	2006-10-23 19:03:02.000000000 +0200
+--- openssh-4.7p1/sftp-client.c.drain-acks	2007-02-19 12:13:39.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/sftp-client.c	2007-08-07 17:46:16.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-4.7p1/sftp-client.c	2007-09-06 17:54:41.000000000 +0200
 @@ -992,7 +992,8 @@ int
  do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *local_path, char *remote_path,
      int pflag)
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ diff -up openssh-4.5p1/sftp-client.c.drain-acks openssh-4.5p1/sftp-client.c
  			len = 0;
  		else do
  			len = read(local_fd, data, conn->transfer_buflen);
-@@ -1131,17 +1132,6 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *
+@@ -1131,18 +1132,6 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *
  				fatal("Can't find request for ID %u", r_id);
  			TAILQ_REMOVE(&acks, ack, tq);
  
@@ -33,12 +33,13 @@ diff -up openssh-4.5p1/sftp-client.c.drain-acks openssh-4.5p1/sftp-client.c
 -				close(local_fd);
 -				xfree(data);
 -				xfree(ack);
+-				status = -1;
 -				goto done;
 -			}
  			debug3("In write loop, ack for %u %u bytes at %llu",
  			    ack->id, ack->len, (unsigned long long)ack->offset);
  			++ackid;
-@@ -1153,21 +1143,25 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *
+@@ -1154,21 +1143,25 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *
  		stop_progress_meter();
  	xfree(data);
  

openssh-4.7p1-vendor.patch

@@ -1,48 +1,7 @@
---- openssh-4.5p1/servconf.h.vendor	2006-08-18 16:23:15.000000000 +0200
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/configure.ac.vendor openssh-4.7p1/configure.ac
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/servconf.h	2006-12-20 22:06:27.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-4.7p1/configure.ac.vendor	2007-09-06 16:27:47.000000000 +0200
-@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@
++++ openssh-4.7p1/configure.ac	2007-09-06 16:27:47.000000000 +0200
- 	int	max_startups;
+@@ -3792,6 +3792,12 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(lastlog,
- 	int	max_authtries;
- 	char   *banner;			/* SSH-2 banner message */
-+	int	show_patchlevel;	/* Show vendor patch level to clients */
- 	int	use_dns;
- 	int	client_alive_interval;	/*
- 					 * poke the client this often to
---- openssh-4.5p1/sshd_config.vendor	2006-12-20 22:06:27.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/sshd_config	2006-12-20 22:06:27.000000000 +0100
-@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@
- #Compression delayed
- #ClientAliveInterval 0
- #ClientAliveCountMax 3
-+#ShowPatchLevel no
- #UseDNS yes
- #PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid
- #MaxStartups 10
---- openssh-4.5p1/sshd.c.vendor	2006-11-07 13:14:42.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/sshd.c	2006-12-20 22:06:27.000000000 +0100
-@@ -418,7 +418,8 @@
- 		major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1;
- 		minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1;
- 	}
--	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n", major, minor, SSH_VERSION);
-+	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n", major, minor,
-+		 (options.show_patchlevel == 1) ? SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL : SSH_VERSION);
- 	server_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
- 
- 	/* Send our protocol version identification. */
-@@ -1429,7 +1430,8 @@
- 		exit(1);
- 	}
- 
--	debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_RELEASE);
-+	debug("sshd version %.100s",
-+	      (options.show_patchlevel == 1) ? SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL : SSH_RELEASE);
- 
- 	/* Store privilege separation user for later use if required. */
- 	if ((privsep_pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL) {
---- openssh-4.5p1/configure.ac.vendor	2006-12-20 22:06:27.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/configure.ac	2006-12-20 22:06:27.000000000 +0100
-@@ -3729,6 +3729,12 @@
  		fi
  	]
  )
@@ -55,7 +14,7 @@
  
  dnl lastlog, [uw]tmpx? detection
  dnl  NOTE: set the paths in the platform section to avoid the
-@@ -3978,6 +3984,7 @@
+@@ -4041,6 +4047,7 @@ echo "       IP address in \$DISPLAY hac
  echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
  echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
  echo "              Random number source: $RAND_MSG"
@@ -63,70 +22,10 @@
  if test ! -z "$USE_RAND_HELPER" ; then
  echo "     ssh-rand-helper collects from: $RAND_HELPER_MSG"
  fi
---- openssh-4.5p1/sshd_config.0.vendor	2006-12-20 22:06:27.000000000 +0100
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/sshd_config.5.vendor openssh-4.7p1/sshd_config.5
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/sshd_config.0	2006-12-20 22:06:27.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-4.7p1/sshd_config.5.vendor	2007-09-06 16:27:47.000000000 +0200
-@@ -413,6 +413,11 @@
++++ openssh-4.7p1/sshd_config.5	2007-09-06 16:27:47.000000000 +0200
-              Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1
+@@ -725,6 +725,14 @@ This option applies to protocol version 
-              server key.  The minimum value is 512, and the default is 768.
- 
-+     ShowPatchLevel
-+	     Specifies whether sshd will display the specific patch level of
-+	     the binary in the server identification string.  The patch level
-+	     is set at compile-time.  The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
-+
-      StrictModes
-              Specifies whether sshd(8) should check file modes and ownership
-              of the user's files and home directory before accepting login.
---- openssh-4.5p1/servconf.c.vendor	2006-08-18 16:23:15.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/servconf.c	2006-12-20 22:08:41.000000000 +0100
-@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@
- 	options->max_startups = -1;
- 	options->max_authtries = -1;
- 	options->banner = NULL;
-+	options->show_patchlevel = -1;
- 	options->use_dns = -1;
- 	options->client_alive_interval = -1;
- 	options->client_alive_count_max = -1;
-@@ -250,6 +251,9 @@
- 	if (options->permit_tun == -1)
- 		options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
- 
-+	if (options->show_patchlevel == -1)
-+		options->show_patchlevel = 0;
-+
- 	/* Turn privilege separation on by default */
- 	if (use_privsep == -1)
- 		use_privsep = 1;
-@@ -293,6 +297,7 @@
- 	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
- 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand,
- 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation,
-+	sShowPatchLevel,
- 	sDeprecated, sUnsupported
- } ServerOpCodes;
- 
-@@ -390,6 +395,7 @@
- 	{ "maxstartups", sMaxStartups, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "maxauthtries", sMaxAuthTries, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "banner", sBanner, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "showpatchlevel", sShowPatchLevel, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "usedns", sUseDNS, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "verifyreversemapping", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1006,6 +1012,10 @@
- 		intptr = &use_privsep;
- 		goto parse_flag;
- 
-+	case sShowPatchLevel:
-+		intptr = &options->show_patchlevel;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
- 	case sAllowUsers:
- 		while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
- 			if (options->num_allow_users >= MAX_ALLOW_USERS)
---- openssh-4.5p1/sshd_config.5.vendor	2006-12-20 22:06:27.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/sshd_config.5	2006-12-20 22:06:27.000000000 +0100
-@@ -717,6 +717,14 @@
  .It Cm ServerKeyBits
  Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key.
  The minimum value is 512, and the default is 768.
@@ -141,3 +40,111 @@
  .It Cm StrictModes
  Specifies whether
  .Xr sshd 8
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/servconf.h.vendor openssh-4.7p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-4.7p1/servconf.h.vendor	2007-02-19 12:25:38.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-4.7p1/servconf.h	2007-09-06 16:27:47.000000000 +0200
+@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	int	max_startups;
+ 	int	max_authtries;
+ 	char   *banner;			/* SSH-2 banner message */
++	int	show_patchlevel;	/* Show vendor patch level to clients */
+ 	int	use_dns;
+ 	int	client_alive_interval;	/*
+ 					 * poke the client this often to
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/servconf.c.vendor openssh-4.7p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-4.7p1/servconf.c.vendor	2007-05-20 07:03:16.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-4.7p1/servconf.c	2007-09-06 16:29:11.000000000 +0200
+@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions 
+ 	options->max_startups = -1;
+ 	options->max_authtries = -1;
+ 	options->banner = NULL;
++	options->show_patchlevel = -1;
+ 	options->use_dns = -1;
+ 	options->client_alive_interval = -1;
+ 	options->client_alive_count_max = -1;
+@@ -250,6 +251,9 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 	if (options->permit_tun == -1)
+ 		options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
+ 
++	if (options->show_patchlevel == -1)
++		options->show_patchlevel = 0;
++
+ 	/* Turn privilege separation on by default */
+ 	if (use_privsep == -1)
+ 		use_privsep = 1;
+@@ -293,6 +297,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+ 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand,
+ 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation,
++	sShowPatchLevel,
+ 	sDeprecated, sUnsupported
+ } ServerOpCodes;
+ 
+@@ -390,6 +395,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "maxstartups", sMaxStartups, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "maxauthtries", sMaxAuthTries, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "banner", sBanner, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "showpatchlevel", sShowPatchLevel, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "usedns", sUseDNS, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "verifyreversemapping", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1005,6 +1011,10 @@ parse_flag:
+ 		intptr = &use_privsep;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case sShowPatchLevel:
++		intptr = &options->show_patchlevel;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case sAllowUsers:
+ 		while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
+ 			if (options->num_allow_users >= MAX_ALLOW_USERS)
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/sshd_config.0.vendor openssh-4.7p1/sshd_config.0
+--- openssh-4.7p1/sshd_config.0.vendor	2007-09-06 16:27:47.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-4.7p1/sshd_config.0	2007-09-06 16:27:47.000000000 +0200
+@@ -418,6 +418,11 @@ DESCRIPTION
+              Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1
+              server key.  The minimum value is 512, and the default is 768.
+ 
++     ShowPatchLevel
++	     Specifies whether sshd will display the specific patch level of
++	     the binary in the server identification string.  The patch level
++	     is set at compile-time.  The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
++
+      StrictModes
+              Specifies whether sshd(8) should check file modes and ownership
+              of the user's files and home directory before accepting login.
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/sshd_config.vendor openssh-4.7p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-4.7p1/sshd_config.vendor	2007-09-06 16:27:47.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-4.7p1/sshd_config	2007-09-06 16:27:47.000000000 +0200
+@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ X11Forwarding yes
+ #Compression delayed
+ #ClientAliveInterval 0
+ #ClientAliveCountMax 3
++#ShowPatchLevel no
+ #UseDNS yes
+ #PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid
+ #MaxStartups 10
+diff -up openssh-4.7p1/sshd.c.vendor openssh-4.7p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-4.7p1/sshd.c.vendor	2007-06-05 10:22:32.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-4.7p1/sshd.c	2007-09-06 16:27:47.000000000 +0200
+@@ -419,7 +419,8 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in
+ 		major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1;
+ 		minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1;
+ 	}
+-	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n", major, minor, SSH_VERSION);
++	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n", major, minor,
++		 (options.show_patchlevel == 1) ? SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL : SSH_VERSION);
+ 	server_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
+ 
+ 	/* Send our protocol version identification. */
+@@ -1434,7 +1435,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		exit(1);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_RELEASE);
++	debug("sshd version %.100s",
++	      (options.show_patchlevel == 1) ? SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL : SSH_RELEASE);
+ 
+ 	/* Store privilege separation user for later use if required. */
+ 	if ((privsep_pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL) {

openssh.spec

@@ -1,10 +1,5 @@
+# Do we want SELinux & Audit
 %define WITH_SELINUX 1
-%if %{WITH_SELINUX}
-# Audit patch applicable only over SELinux patch
-%define WITH_AUDIT 1
-%else
-%define WITH_AUDIT 0
-%endif
 
 # OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID
 %define sshd_uid    74
@@ -28,6 +23,9 @@
 # Do we want kerberos5 support (1=yes 0=no)
 %define kerberos5 1
 
+# Do we want libedit support
+%define libedit 1
+
 # Do we want NSS tokens support
 %define nss 1
 
@@ -59,42 +57,44 @@
 # Turn off some stuff for resuce builds
 %if %{rescue}
 %define kerberos5 0
+%define libedit 0
 %endif
 
 Summary: The OpenSSH implementation of SSH protocol versions 1 and 2
 Name: openssh
-Version: 4.5p1
+Version: 4.7p1
-Release: 8%{?dist}%{?rescue_rel}
+Release: 1%{?dist}%{?rescue_rel}
 URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html
 #Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
-#Source1: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz.sig
+#Source1: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz.asc
 # This package differs from the upstream OpenSSH tarball in that
 # the ACSS cipher is removed by running openssh-nukeacss.sh in
 # the unpacked source directory.
 Source0: openssh-%{version}-noacss.tar.bz2
 Source1: openssh-nukeacss.sh
-Patch0: openssh-4.5p1-redhat.patch
+Patch0: openssh-4.7p1-redhat.patch
 Patch2: openssh-3.8.1p1-skip-initial.patch
 Patch3: openssh-3.8.1p1-krb5-config.patch
-Patch4: openssh-4.5p1-vendor.patch
+Patch4: openssh-4.7p1-vendor.patch
 Patch5: openssh-4.3p2-initscript.patch
-Patch12: openssh-4.5p1-selinux.patch
+Patch10: openssh-4.7p1-pam-session.patch
-Patch16: openssh-4.5p1-audit.patch
+Patch12: openssh-4.7p1-selinux.patch
+Patch13: openssh-4.7p1-mls.patch
+Patch16: openssh-4.7p1-audit.patch
+Patch17: openssh-4.3p2-cve-2007-3102.patch
 Patch22: openssh-3.9p1-askpass-keep-above.patch
 Patch24: openssh-4.3p1-fromto-remote.patch
 Patch26: openssh-4.2p1-pam-no-stack.patch
-Patch27: openssh-3.9p1-log-in-chroot.patch
+Patch27: openssh-4.7p1-log-in-chroot.patch
 Patch30: openssh-4.0p1-exit-deadlock.patch
 Patch31: openssh-3.9p1-skip-used.patch
 Patch35: openssh-4.2p1-askpass-progress.patch
 Patch38: openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
 Patch39: openssh-4.3p2-no-v6only.patch
 Patch44: openssh-4.3p2-allow-ip-opts.patch
-Patch48: openssh-4.3p2-pam-session.patch
 Patch49: openssh-4.3p2-gssapi-canohost.patch
-Patch50: openssh-4.5p1-mls.patch
+Patch51: openssh-4.7p1-nss-keys.patch
-Patch51: openssh-4.5p1-nss-keys.patch
+Patch52: openssh-4.7p1-sftp-drain-acks.patch
-Patch52: openssh-4.5p1-sftp-drain-acks.patch
 License: BSD
 Group: Applications/Internet
 BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-%{release}-root-%(%{__id_u} -n)
@@ -126,6 +126,10 @@ BuildRequires: tcp_wrappers-devel
 BuildRequires: krb5-devel
 %endif
 
+%if %{libedit}
+BuildRequires: libedit-devel
+%endif
+
 %if %{nss}
 BuildRequires: nss-devel
 %endif
@@ -133,9 +137,6 @@ BuildRequires: nss-devel
 %if %{WITH_SELINUX}
 Requires: libselinux >= 1.27.7
 BuildRequires: libselinux-devel >= 1.27.7
-%endif
-
-%if %{WITH_AUDIT}
 Requires: audit-libs >= 1.0.8
 BuildRequires: audit-libs >= 1.0.8
 %endif
@@ -204,13 +205,14 @@ an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH.
 %patch4 -p1 -b .vendor
 %patch5 -p1 -b .initscript
 
+%patch10 -p1 -b .pam-session
+
 %if %{WITH_SELINUX}
 #SELinux
 %patch12 -p1 -b .selinux
-%endif
+%patch13 -p1 -b .mls
-
-%if %{WITH_AUDIT}
 %patch16 -p1 -b .audit
+%patch17 -p1 -b .inject-fix
 %endif
 
 %patch22 -p1 -b .keep-above
@@ -223,9 +225,7 @@ an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH.
 %patch38 -p1 -b .grab-info
 %patch39 -p1 -b .no-v6only
 %patch44 -p1 -b .ip-opts
-%patch48 -p1 -b .pam-sesssion
 %patch49 -p1 -b .canohost
-%patch50 -p1 -b .mls
 %patch51 -p1 -b .nss-keys
 %patch52 -p1 -b .drain-acks
 
@@ -282,15 +282,17 @@ fi
 	--with-pam \
 %endif
 %if %{WITH_SELINUX}
-	--with-selinux \
+	--with-selinux --with-linux-audit \
-%endif
-%if %{WITH_AUDIT}
-	--with-linux-audit \
 %endif
 %if %{kerberos5}
-	--with-kerberos5${krb5_prefix:+=${krb5_prefix}}
+	--with-kerberos5${krb5_prefix:+=${krb5_prefix}} \
 %else
-	--without-kerberos5
+	--without-kerberos5 \
+%endif
+%if %{libedit}
+	--with-libedit
+%else
+	--without-libedit
 %endif
 
 %if %{static_libcrypto}
@@ -478,6 +480,11 @@ fi
 %endif
 
 %changelog
+* Thu Sep  6 2007 Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 4.7p1-1
+- upgrade to latest upstream
+- use libedit in sftp (#203009)
+- fixed audit log injection problem (CVE-2007-3102)
+
 * Thu Aug  9 2007 Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 4.5p1-8
 - fix sftp client problems on write error (#247802)
 - allow disabling autocreation of server keys (#235466)

sources

@@ -1 +1 @@
-9ef9bf019945105f2ac1760c95c9b339  openssh-4.5p1-noacss.tar.bz2
+21634329a8f1cd0e7a7974ade7280bdc  openssh-4.7p1-noacss.tar.bz2