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- properly restore euid in case connect to the ssh-agent socket fails

This commit is contained in:
Jan F 2010-11-24 07:49:04 +01:00
parent d2ed53bfc6
commit bb5eb00d2d
2 changed files with 31 additions and 28 deletions
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6
openssh.spec
View File

@ -73,7 +73,7 @@
%define openssh_ver 5.6p1
%define openssh_rel 19
%define pam_ssh_agent_ver 0.9.2
%define pam_ssh_agent_rel 28
%define pam_ssh_agent_rel 29
Summary: An open source implementation of SSH protocol versions 1 and 2
Name: openssh
@ -591,9 +591,11 @@ fi
%endif
%changelog
* Wed Nov 24 2010 Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com> - 5.6p1-19 + 0.9.2-29
- properly restore euid in case connect to the ssh-agent socket fails
* Mon Nov 22 2010 Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com> - 5.6p1-19 + 0.9.2-28
- striped read permissions from suid and sgid binaries
- properly restore euid in case connect to the ssh-agent socket fails
* Mon Nov 15 2010 Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com> - 5.6p1-18 + 0.9.2-27
- used upstream version of the biguid patch

53
pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-seteuid.patch
View File

@ -1,26 +1,27 @@
diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.seteuid pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.seteuid 2010-09-08 08:54:29.000000000 +0200
+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c 2010-11-22 08:38:05.000000000 +0100
@@ -131,13 +131,17 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(ui
}
errno = 0;
- seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
- above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
+ /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
+ above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
+ if (seteuid(uid) == -1) {
+ error("seteuid(%lu) failed", (unsigned long) uid);
+ return -1;
+ }
if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
close(sock);
- if(errno == EACCES)
- fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
- return -1;
+ sock = -1;
+ if(errno == EACCES)
+ fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
}
seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.seteuid pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
--- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.seteuid 2010-09-08 08:54:29.000000000 +0200
+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c 2010-11-22 08:38:05.000000000 +0100
@@ -131,13 +131,18 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(ui
}
errno = 0;
- seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
- above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
+ /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
+ above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
+ if (seteuid(uid) == -1) {
+ close(sock);
+ error("seteuid(%lu) failed", (unsigned long) uid);
+ return -1;
+ }
if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
close(sock);
- if(errno == EACCES)
- fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
- return -1;
+ sock = -1;
+ if(errno == EACCES)
+ fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
}
seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */