Fix CVE-2018-15473 (#1619064)

This commit is contained in:
Jakub Jelen 2018-08-25 14:25:30 +02:00
parent 1b87361339
commit 8ebd1ac76b
2 changed files with 149 additions and 0 deletions

View File

@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
From 779974d35b4859c07bc3cb8a12c74b43b0a7d1e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: djm <djm@openbsd.org>
Date: Tue, 31 Jul 2018 03:10:27 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?delay=20bailout=20for=20invalid=20authenticatin?=
=?UTF-8?q?g=20user=20until=20after=20the=20packet=20containing=20the=20re?=
=?UTF-8?q?quest=20has=20been=20fully=20parsed.=20Reported=20by=20Dariusz?=
=?UTF-8?q?=20Tytko=20and=20Micha=C5=82=20Sajdak;=20ok=20deraadt?=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
---
usr.bin/ssh/auth2-gss.c | 11 +++++++----
usr.bin/ssh/auth2-hostbased.c | 11 ++++++-----
usr.bin/ssh/auth2-pubkey.c | 25 +++++++++++++++----------
3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/auth2-gss.c b/usr.bin/ssh/auth2-gss.c
index 649c830916a..c919ef4c353 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/auth2-gss.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/auth2-gss.c
@@ -65,9 +65,6 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
u_int len;
u_char *doid = NULL;
- if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL)
- return (0);
-
mechs = packet_get_int();
if (mechs == 0) {
debug("Mechanism negotiation is not supported");
@@ -101,6 +98,12 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
return (0);
}
+ if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
+ debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__);
+ free(doid);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, &goid)))) {
if (ctxt != NULL)
ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/auth2-hostbased.c b/usr.bin/ssh/auth2-hostbased.c
index ad335555934..fb5e5f42272 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/auth2-hostbased.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/auth2-hostbased.c
@@ -66,10 +66,6 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
size_t alen, blen, slen;
int r, pktype, authenticated = 0;
- if (!authctxt->valid) {
- debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__);
- return 0;
- }
/* XXX use sshkey_froms() */
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, &alen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0 ||
@@ -116,6 +112,11 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
goto done;
}
+ if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
+ debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
service = ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" :
authctxt->service;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/auth2-pubkey.c b/usr.bin/ssh/auth2-pubkey.c
index 195da5e2111..af9e5f04c45 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -86,18 +86,14 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
- struct sshbuf *b;
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
- char *pkalg, *userstyle = NULL, *fp = NULL;
- u_char *pkblob, *sig, have_sig;
+ char *pkalg = NULL, *userstyle = NULL, *fp = NULL;
+ u_char *pkblob = NULL, *sig = NULL, have_sig;
size_t blen, slen;
int r, pktype;
int authenticated = 0;
- if (!authctxt->valid) {
- debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__);
- return 0;
- }
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &have_sig)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshpkt_get_u8 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
@@ -164,6 +160,11 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_string session id: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
+ if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
+ debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user",
+ __func__);
+ goto done;
+ }
/* reconstruct packet */
xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
@@ -180,7 +181,6 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
#endif
-
/* test for correct signature */
authenticated = 0;
if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 1)) &&
@@ -191,7 +191,6 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
authenticated = 1;
}
sshbuf_free(b);
- free(sig);
auth2_record_key(authctxt, authenticated, key);
} else {
debug("%s: test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable for %s %s",
@@ -202,6 +201,11 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
+ debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user",
+ __func__);
+ goto done;
+ }
/* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */
/*
* XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed
@@ -235,6 +239,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
free(pkalg);
free(pkblob);
free(fp);
+ free(sig);
return authenticated;
}

View File

@ -233,6 +233,8 @@ Patch949: openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
Patch950: openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
# PermitOpen bug in OpenSSH 7.6:
Patch951: openssh-7.6p1-permitopen-bug.patch
# CVE-2018-15473: User "enumeration" via malformed packets in authentication requests
Patch952: openssh-7.6p1-CVE-2018-15473.patch
License: BSD
@ -456,6 +458,7 @@ popd
%patch949 -p1 -b .refactor
%patch950 -p1 -b .sandbox
%patch951 -p1 -b .permitOpen
%patch952 -p3 -b .enumeration
%patch200 -p1 -b .audit
%patch201 -p1 -b .audit-race