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improove ssk-keycat (documentation)

This commit is contained in:
Jan F 2011-03-04 15:22:12 +01:00
parent 6ab8504ea2
commit 825921b7f3
10 changed files with 561 additions and 829 deletions
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17
openssh-5.8p1-audit0.patch
View File

@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
Don't audit SSH_INVALID_USER twice.
PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow()) a few lines above already did this.
diff -ur openssh/auth2.c openssh-5.8p1/auth2.c
--- openssh/auth2.c 2011-03-02 02:32:52.383773622 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/auth2.c 2011-03-02 03:32:34.585110911 +0100
@@ -250,9 +250,6 @@
} else {
logit("input_userauth_request: invalid user %s", user);
authctxt->pw = fakepw();
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER));
-#endif
}
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam)

17
openssh-5.8p1-audit0a.patch
View File

@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
Don't audit SSH_INVALID_USER twice.
PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow()) a few lines above already did this.
diff -ur openssh/auth2.c openssh-5.8p1/auth2.c
--- openssh/auth2.c 2011-03-02 02:32:52.383773622 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/auth2.c 2011-03-02 03:32:34.585110911 +0100
@@ -250,9 +250,6 @@
} else {
logit("input_userauth_request: invalid user %s", user);
authctxt->pw = fakepw();
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER));
-#endif
}
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam)

353
openssh-5.8p1-audit1.patch
View File

@ -1,55 +1,103 @@
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/audit-bsm.c.audit1 openssh-5.8p1/audit-bsm.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/audit-bsm.c.audit1 2011-01-17 11:15:29.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/audit-bsm.c 2011-02-28 22:39:02.000000000 +0100
@@ -305,6 +305,12 @@ audit_run_command(const char *command)
+++ openssh-5.8p1/audit-bsm.c 2011-03-04 14:16:25.000000000 +0100
@@ -298,10 +298,23 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host,
#endif
}
void
+audit_end_command(const char *command)
-void
+int
audit_run_command(const char *command)
{
/* not implemented */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
+{
+ /* not implemented */
+}
+
+void
audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
{
/* not implemented */
+audit_count_session_open(void)
+{
+ /* not necessary */
}
void
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/audit.c.audit1 openssh-5.8p1/audit.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/audit.c.audit1 2011-01-17 11:15:30.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/audit.c 2011-02-28 22:39:02.000000000 +0100
@@ -182,5 +182,18 @@ audit_run_command(const char *command)
+++ openssh-5.8p1/audit.c 2011-03-04 14:16:25.000000000 +0100
@@ -140,6 +140,17 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
}
/*
+ * Called when a child process has called, or will soon call,
+ * audit_session_open.
+ */
+void
+audit_count_session_open(void)
+{
+ debug("audit count session open euid %d user %s", geteuid(),
+ audit_username());
+}
+
+/*
* Called when a user session is started. Argument is the tty allocated to
* the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated.
*
@@ -174,13 +185,29 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li
/*
* This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command. Note that
* it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
- * multiple sessions within a single connection.
+ * multiple sessions within a single connection. Returns a "handle" for
+ * audit_end_command.
*/
-void
+int
audit_run_command(const char *command)
{
debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
audit_username(), command);
}
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This will be called when the non-interactive command finishes. Note that
+ * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
+ * multiple sessions within a single connection.
+ * multiple sessions within a single connection. "handle" should come from
+ * the corresponding audit_run_command.
+ */
+void
+audit_end_command(const char *command)
+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
+{
+ debug("audit end nopty exec euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
+ audit_username(), command);
+}
}
+
# endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/audit.h.audit1 openssh-5.8p1/audit.h
--- openssh-5.8p1/audit.h.audit1 2011-01-17 11:15:30.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/audit.h 2011-02-28 22:39:02.000000000 +0100
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ void audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
+++ openssh-5.8p1/audit.h 2011-03-04 14:16:25.000000000 +0100
@@ -49,9 +49,11 @@ typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_au
void audit_connection_from(const char *, int);
void audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
+void audit_count_session_open(void);
void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *);
void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
void audit_run_command(const char *);
+void audit_end_command(const char *);
-void audit_run_command(const char *);
+int audit_run_command(const char *);
+void audit_end_command(int, const char *);
ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
#endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c.audit1 openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c.audit1 2011-01-17 11:15:30.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c 2011-02-28 22:39:02.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c 2011-03-04 14:16:25.000000000 +0100
@@ -35,13 +35,20 @@
#include "log.h"
@ -89,7 +137,7 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c.audit1 openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c
NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
saved_errno = errno;
@@ -65,35 +72,112 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const
@@ -65,35 +72,119 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const
if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
rc = 0;
errno = saved_errno;
@ -163,7 +211,8 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c.audit1 openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c
/* not implemented */
+}
void
-void
+int
audit_run_command(const char *command)
{
- /* not implemented */
@ -172,16 +221,23 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c.audit1 openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c
+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+audit_end_command(const char *command)
+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
+{
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
+ if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
+}
+
+void
+audit_count_session_open(void)
+{
+ user_login_count++;
}
void
@ -209,7 +265,7 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c.audit1 openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c
}
void
@@ -101,21 +185,43 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
@@ -101,21 +192,43 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
{
switch(event) {
case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS:
@ -259,7 +315,7 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c.audit1 openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c
default:
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c.audit1 openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c.audit1 2010-09-10 03:23:34.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c 2011-02-28 22:39:02.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c 2011-03-04 14:16:25.000000000 +0100
@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
@ -284,126 +340,295 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c.audit1 openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
@@ -1618,6 +1621,20 @@ mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buff
xfree(cmd);
return (0);
@@ -1288,6 +1291,12 @@ mm_session_close(Session *s)
debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
session_pty_cleanup2(s);
}
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ if (s->command != NULL) {
+ debug3("%s: command %d", __func__, s->command_handle);
+ session_end_command2(s);
+ }
+#endif
session_unused(s->self);
}
@@ -1610,11 +1619,44 @@ mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buff
{
u_int len;
char *cmd;
+ Session *s;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+
/* sanity check command, if so how? */
- audit_run_command(cmd);
+ s = session_new();
+ if (s == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: error allocating a session", __func__);
+ s->command = cmd;
+ s->command_handle = audit_run_command(cmd);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, s->self);
+
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, m);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_audit_end_command(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ int handle;
+ u_int len;
+ char *cmd;
+ Session *s;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+ handle = buffer_get_int(m);
+ cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ /* sanity check command, if so how? */
+ audit_end_command(cmd);
+ xfree(cmd);
+ return (0);
+}
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
void
+
+ s = session_by_id(handle);
+ if (s == NULL || s->ttyfd != -1 || s->command == NULL ||
+ strcmp(s->command, cmd) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: invalid handle", __func__);
+ mm_session_close(s);
+
xfree(cmd);
return (0);
}
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/monitor.h.audit1 openssh-5.8p1/monitor.h
--- openssh-5.8p1/monitor.h.audit1 2008-11-05 06:20:46.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/monitor.h 2011-02-28 22:39:02.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/monitor.h 2011-03-04 14:16:25.000000000 +0100
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX,
MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND,
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND,
+ MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND,
MONITOR_REQ_TERM,
MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1,
MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA,
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit1 openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit1 2010-08-31 14:41:14.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.c 2011-02-28 22:39:02.000000000 +0100
@@ -1163,6 +1163,20 @@ mm_audit_run_command(const char *command
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
+++ openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.c 2011-03-04 14:16:25.000000000 +0100
@@ -1150,10 +1150,11 @@ mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
buffer_free(&m);
}
-void
+int
mm_audit_run_command(const char *command)
{
Buffer m;
+ int handle;
debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
@@ -1161,6 +1162,26 @@ mm_audit_run_command(const char *command
buffer_put_cstring(&m, command);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
+
+ handle = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ return (handle);
+}
+
+void
+mm_audit_end_command(const char *command)
+mm_audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+
+ debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, handle);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, command);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, &m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+}
buffer_free(&m);
}
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
#ifdef GSSAPI
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit1 openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.h
--- openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit1 2009-03-05 14:58:22.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.h 2011-02-28 22:39:02.000000000 +0100
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
+++ openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.h 2011-03-04 14:16:25.000000000 +0100
@@ -73,7 +73,8 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
#include "audit.h"
void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
void mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
+void mm_audit_end_command(const char *);
-void mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
+int mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
+void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *);
#endif
struct Session;
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/session.c.audit1 openssh-5.8p1/session.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/session.c.audit1 2010-12-01 02:02:59.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/session.c 2011-02-28 22:39:02.000000000 +0100
@@ -809,14 +809,16 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+++ openssh-5.8p1/session.c 2011-03-04 14:16:25.000000000 +0100
@@ -738,6 +738,14 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm
/* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */
close(ttyfd);
+#ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+ /* do_login in the child did not affect state in this process,
+ compensate. From an architectural standpoint, this is extremely
+ ugly. */
+ if (!(options.use_login && command == NULL))
+ audit_count_session_open();
+#endif
+
/* Enter interactive session. */
s->ptymaster = ptymaster;
packet_set_interactive(1,
@@ -809,15 +817,19 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
}
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- if (command != NULL)
+ if (command != NULL) {
PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
- else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
+ if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1)
+ fatal("do_exec: command already set");
if (command != NULL)
- PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
+ s->command = xstrdup(command);
+ } else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell;
if (shell[0] == '\0') /* empty shell means /bin/sh */
shell =_PATH_BSHELL;
PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell));
- PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell));
+ s->command = xstrdup(shell);
}
+ if (s->command != NULL)
+ s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(s->command));
#endif
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
@@ -2456,6 +2458,12 @@ session_close(Session *s)
ret = do_exec_pty(s, command);
@@ -1841,6 +1853,7 @@ session_unused(int id)
sessions[id].ttyfd = -1;
sessions[id].ptymaster = -1;
sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL;
+ sessions[id].command_handle = -1;
sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused;
sessions_first_unused = id;
}
@@ -1923,6 +1936,19 @@ session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int cha
}
Session *
+session_by_id(int id)
+{
+ if (id >= 0 && id < sessions_nalloc) {
+ Session *s = &sessions[id];
+ if (s->used)
+ return s;
+ }
+ debug("session_by_id: unknown id %d", id);
+ session_dump();
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+Session *
session_by_tty(char *tty)
{
int i;
@@ -2448,6 +2474,30 @@ session_exit_message(Session *s, int sta
chan_write_failed(c);
}
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+void
+session_end_command2(Session *s)
+{
+ if (s->command != NULL) {
+ audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command);
+ xfree(s->command);
+ s->command = NULL;
+ s->command_handle = -1;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+session_end_command(Session *s)
+{
+ if (s->command != NULL) {
+ PRIVSEP(audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command));
+ xfree(s->command);
+ s->command = NULL;
+ s->command_handle = -1;
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
void
session_close(Session *s)
{
@@ -2456,6 +2506,10 @@ session_close(Session *s)
debug("session_close: session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid);
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
session_pty_cleanup(s);
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ if (s->command) {
+ PRIVSEP(audit_end_command(s->command));
+ xfree(s->command);
+ }
+ if (s->command)
+ session_end_command(s);
+#endif
if (s->term)
xfree(s->term);
if (s->display)
@@ -2675,6 +2729,15 @@ do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt)
server_loop2(authctxt);
}
+static void
+do_cleanup_one_session(Session *s)
+{
+ session_pty_cleanup2(s);
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ session_end_command2(s);
+#endif
+}
+
void
do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
@@ -2723,5 +2786,5 @@ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
* or if running in monitor.
*/
if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
- session_destroy_all(session_pty_cleanup2);
+ session_destroy_all(do_cleanup_one_session);
}
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/session.h.audit1 openssh-5.8p1/session.h
--- openssh-5.8p1/session.h.audit1 2008-05-19 07:34:50.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.8p1/session.h 2011-02-28 22:39:02.000000000 +0100
@@ -60,6 +60,11 @@ struct Session {
+++ openssh-5.8p1/session.h 2011-03-04 14:16:25.000000000 +0100
@@ -60,6 +60,12 @@ struct Session {
char *name;
char *val;
} *env;
+
+ /* exec */
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ int command_handle;
+ char *command;
+#endif
};
void do_authenticated(Authctxt *);
@@ -72,8 +78,10 @@ void session_close_by_pid(pid_t, int);
void session_close_by_channel(int, void *);
void session_destroy_all(void (*)(Session *));
void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *);
+void session_end_command2(Session *);
Session *session_new(void);
+Session *session_by_id(int);
Session *session_by_tty(char *);
void session_close(Session *);
void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/sshd.c.audit1 openssh-5.8p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/sshd.c.audit1 2011-01-11 07:20:31.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/sshd.c 2011-02-28 22:39:02.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/sshd.c 2011-03-04 14:16:25.000000000 +0100
@@ -2342,7 +2342,8 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
do_cleanup(the_authctxt);
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS

429
openssh-5.8p1-audit1a.patch
View File

@ -1,429 +0,0 @@
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/audit-bsm.c.audit1a openssh-5.8p1/audit-bsm.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/audit-bsm.c.audit1a 2011-03-02 09:37:14.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/audit-bsm.c 2011-03-02 09:37:14.000000000 +0100
@@ -298,19 +298,26 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host,
#endif
}
-void
+int
audit_run_command(const char *command)
{
/* not implemented */
+ return 0;
}
void
-audit_end_command(const char *command)
+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
{
/* not implemented */
}
void
+audit_count_session_open(void)
+{
+ /* not necessary */
+}
+
+void
audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
{
/* not implemented */
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/audit.c.audit1a openssh-5.8p1/audit.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/audit.c.audit1a 2011-03-02 09:37:14.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/audit.c 2011-03-02 09:37:14.000000000 +0100
@@ -140,6 +140,17 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
}
/*
+ * Called when a child process has called, or will soon call,
+ * audit_session_open.
+ */
+void
+audit_count_session_open(void)
+{
+ debug("audit count session open euid %d user %s", geteuid(),
+ audit_username());
+}
+
+/*
* Called when a user session is started. Argument is the tty allocated to
* the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated.
*
@@ -174,22 +185,25 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li
/*
* This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command. Note that
* it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
- * multiple sessions within a single connection.
+ * multiple sessions within a single connection. Returns a "handle" for
+ * audit_end_command.
*/
-void
+int
audit_run_command(const char *command)
{
debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
audit_username(), command);
+ return 0;
}
/*
* This will be called when the non-interactive command finishes. Note that
* it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
- * multiple sessions within a single connection.
+ * multiple sessions within a single connection. "handle" should come from
+ * the corresponding audit_run_command.
*/
void
-audit_end_command(const char *command)
+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
{
debug("audit end nopty exec euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
audit_username(), command);
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/audit.h.audit1a openssh-5.8p1/audit.h
--- openssh-5.8p1/audit.h.audit1a 2011-03-02 09:37:14.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/audit.h 2011-03-02 09:37:14.000000000 +0100
@@ -49,10 +49,11 @@ typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_au
void audit_connection_from(const char *, int);
void audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
+void audit_count_session_open(void);
void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *);
void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
-void audit_run_command(const char *);
-void audit_end_command(const char *);
+int audit_run_command(const char *);
+void audit_end_command(int, const char *);
ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
#endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c.audit1a openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c.audit1a 2011-03-02 09:37:14.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c 2011-03-02 09:37:14.000000000 +0100
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host,
/* not implemented */
}
-void
+int
audit_run_command(const char *command)
{
if (!user_login_count++)
@@ -148,10 +148,11 @@ audit_run_command(const char *command)
NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
+ return 0;
}
void
-audit_end_command(const char *command)
+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
{
linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
@@ -161,6 +162,12 @@ audit_end_command(const char *command)
}
void
+audit_count_session_open(void)
+{
+ user_login_count++;
+}
+
+void
audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
{
if (!user_login_count++)
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c.audit1a openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c.audit1a 2011-03-02 09:37:14.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c 2011-03-02 09:37:14.000000000 +0100
@@ -1291,6 +1291,12 @@ mm_session_close(Session *s)
debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
session_pty_cleanup2(s);
}
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ if (s->command != NULL) {
+ debug3("%s: command %d", __func__, s->command_handle);
+ session_end_command2(s);
+ }
+#endif
session_unused(s->self);
}
@@ -1613,25 +1619,44 @@ mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buff
{
u_int len;
char *cmd;
+ Session *s;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+
/* sanity check command, if so how? */
- audit_run_command(cmd);
- xfree(cmd);
+ s = session_new();
+ if (s == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: error allocating a session", __func__);
+ s->command = cmd;
+ s->command_handle = audit_run_command(cmd);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, s->self);
+
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, m);
+
return (0);
}
int
mm_answer_audit_end_command(int socket, Buffer *m)
{
+ int handle;
u_int len;
char *cmd;
+ Session *s;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+ handle = buffer_get_int(m);
cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- /* sanity check command, if so how? */
- audit_end_command(cmd);
+
+ s = session_by_id(handle);
+ if (s == NULL || s->ttyfd != -1 || s->command == NULL ||
+ strcmp(s->command, cmd) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: invalid handle", __func__);
+ mm_session_close(s);
+
xfree(cmd);
return (0);
}
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/monitor.h.audit1a openssh-5.8p1/monitor.h
--- openssh-5.8p1/monitor.h.audit1a 2011-03-02 09:37:14.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/monitor.h 2011-03-02 09:37:15.000000000 +0100
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX,
MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND,
- MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND,
+ MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND,
MONITOR_REQ_TERM,
MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1,
MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA,
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit1a openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit1a 2011-03-02 09:37:14.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.c 2011-03-02 09:37:15.000000000 +0100
@@ -1150,10 +1150,11 @@ mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
buffer_free(&m);
}
-void
+int
mm_audit_run_command(const char *command)
{
Buffer m;
+ int handle;
debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
@@ -1161,17 +1162,23 @@ mm_audit_run_command(const char *command
buffer_put_cstring(&m, command);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
+
+ handle = buffer_get_int(&m);
buffer_free(&m);
+
+ return (handle);
}
void
-mm_audit_end_command(const char *command)
+mm_audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
{
Buffer m;
debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, handle);
buffer_put_cstring(&m, command);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, &m);
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit1a openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.h
--- openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit1a 2011-03-02 09:41:17.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.h 2011-03-02 09:44:35.000000000 +0100
@@ -73,8 +73,8 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
#include "audit.h"
void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
-void mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
-void mm_audit_end_command(const char *);
+int mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
+void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *);
#endif
struct Session;
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/session.c.audit1a openssh-5.8p1/session.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/session.c.audit1a 2011-03-02 09:37:14.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/session.c 2011-03-02 09:37:15.000000000 +0100
@@ -738,6 +738,14 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm
/* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */
close(ttyfd);
+#ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+ /* do_login in the child did not affect state in this process,
+ compensate. From an architectural standpoint, this is extremely
+ ugly. */
+ if (!(options.use_login && command == NULL))
+ audit_count_session_open();
+#endif
+
/* Enter interactive session. */
s->ptymaster = ptymaster;
packet_set_interactive(1,
@@ -809,17 +817,19 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
}
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- if (command != NULL) {
- PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
+ if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1)
+ fatal("do_exec: command already set");
+ if (command != NULL)
s->command = xstrdup(command);
- } else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
+ else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell;
if (shell[0] == '\0') /* empty shell means /bin/sh */
shell =_PATH_BSHELL;
- PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell));
s->command = xstrdup(shell);
}
+ if (s->command != NULL)
+ s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(s->command));
#endif
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
ret = do_exec_pty(s, command);
@@ -1843,6 +1853,7 @@ session_unused(int id)
sessions[id].ttyfd = -1;
sessions[id].ptymaster = -1;
sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL;
+ sessions[id].command_handle = -1;
sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused;
sessions_first_unused = id;
}
@@ -1925,6 +1936,19 @@ session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int cha
}
Session *
+session_by_id(int id)
+{
+ if (id >= 0 && id < sessions_nalloc) {
+ Session *s = &sessions[id];
+ if (s->used)
+ return s;
+ }
+ debug("session_by_id: unknown id %d", id);
+ session_dump();
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+Session *
session_by_tty(char *tty)
{
int i;
@@ -2450,6 +2474,30 @@ session_exit_message(Session *s, int sta
chan_write_failed(c);
}
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+void
+session_end_command2(Session *s)
+{
+ if (s->command != NULL) {
+ audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command);
+ xfree(s->command);
+ s->command = NULL;
+ s->command_handle = -1;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+session_end_command(Session *s)
+{
+ if (s->command != NULL) {
+ PRIVSEP(audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command));
+ xfree(s->command);
+ s->command = NULL;
+ s->command_handle = -1;
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
void
session_close(Session *s)
{
@@ -2459,10 +2507,8 @@ session_close(Session *s)
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
session_pty_cleanup(s);
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- if (s->command) {
- PRIVSEP(audit_end_command(s->command));
- xfree(s->command);
- }
+ if (s->command)
+ session_end_command(s);
#endif
if (s->term)
xfree(s->term);
@@ -2683,6 +2729,15 @@ do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt)
server_loop2(authctxt);
}
+static void
+do_cleanup_one_session(Session *s)
+{
+ session_pty_cleanup2(s);
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ session_end_command2(s);
+#endif
+}
+
void
do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
@@ -2731,5 +2786,5 @@ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
* or if running in monitor.
*/
if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
- session_destroy_all(session_pty_cleanup2);
+ session_destroy_all(do_cleanup_one_session);
}
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/session.h.audit1a openssh-5.8p1/session.h
--- openssh-5.8p1/session.h.audit1a 2011-03-02 09:37:14.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/session.h 2011-03-02 09:37:15.000000000 +0100
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ struct Session {
/* exec */
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ int command_handle;
char *command;
#endif
};
@@ -77,8 +78,10 @@ void session_close_by_pid(pid_t, int);
void session_close_by_channel(int, void *);
void session_destroy_all(void (*)(Session *));
void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *);
+void session_end_command2(Session *);
Session *session_new(void);
+Session *session_by_id(int);
Session *session_by_tty(char *);
void session_close(Session *);
void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);

140
openssh-5.8p1-audit2.patch
View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/audit-bsm.c.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/audit-bsm.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/audit-bsm.c.audit2 2011-03-02 08:23:54.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/audit-bsm.c 2011-03-02 08:23:54.000000000 +0100
--- openssh-5.8p1/audit-bsm.c.audit2 2011-03-04 14:28:16.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/audit-bsm.c 2011-03-04 14:28:17.000000000 +0100
@@ -329,6 +329,12 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li
/* not implemented */
}
@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p1/audit-bsm.c.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/audit-bsm.c
audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
{
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/audit.c.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/audit.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/audit.c.audit2 2011-03-02 08:23:54.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/audit.c 2011-03-02 08:23:55.000000000 +0100
--- openssh-5.8p1/audit.c.audit2 2011-03-04 14:28:16.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/audit.c 2011-03-04 14:28:17.000000000 +0100
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
@ -67,8 +67,8 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p1/audit.c.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/audit.c
# endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/audit.h.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/audit.h
--- openssh-5.8p1/audit.h.audit2 2011-03-02 08:23:54.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/audit.h 2011-03-02 08:25:02.000000000 +0100
--- openssh-5.8p1/audit.h.audit2 2011-03-04 14:28:16.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/audit.h 2011-03-04 14:28:17.000000000 +0100
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
# define _SSH_AUDIT_H
@ -86,8 +86,8 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p1/audit.h.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/audit.h
#endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c.audit2 2011-03-02 08:23:54.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c 2011-03-02 08:23:55.000000000 +0100
--- openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c.audit2 2011-03-04 14:28:16.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c 2011-03-04 14:28:17.000000000 +0100
@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@
#include "servconf.h"
#include "canohost.h"
@ -136,14 +136,23 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/audit-linux.c
/* Below is the sshd audit API code */
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit2 2011-03-02 08:23:53.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c 2011-03-02 08:23:55.000000000 +0100
--- openssh-5.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit2 2011-03-04 14:28:16.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c 2011-03-04 14:28:17.000000000 +0100
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
/* test for allowed key and correct signature */
authenticated = 0;
if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) &&
- PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
+ PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
authenticated = 1;
@@ -136,6 +136,18 @@ done:
return authenticated;
}
+int
+hostkey_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+hostbased_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+ int rv;
+
@ -158,14 +167,23 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c
int
hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost,
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit2 2011-03-02 08:23:53.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2011-03-02 08:23:55.000000000 +0100
--- openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit2 2011-03-04 14:28:16.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2011-03-04 14:28:17.000000000 +0100
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
/* test for correct signature */
authenticated = 0;
if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) &&
- PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
+ PRIVSEP(user_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
authenticated = 1;
buffer_free(&b);
@@ -177,6 +177,18 @@ done:
return authenticated;
}
+int
+pubkey_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+user_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+ int rv;
+
@ -181,12 +199,12 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c
{
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/auth.h.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/auth.h
--- openssh-5.8p1/auth.h.audit2 2010-05-10 03:58:03.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.8p1/auth.h 2011-03-02 08:23:55.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/auth.h 2011-03-04 14:28:17.000000000 +0100
@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ void abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt
char *authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *);
char *authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *);
char *authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *);
+int pubkey_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
+int user_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
@ -194,13 +212,13 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p1/auth.h.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/auth.h
Key *get_hostkey_private_by_type(int);
int get_hostkey_index(Key *);
int ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *);
+int hostkey_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
+int hostbased_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
/* debug messages during authentication */
void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/auth-rsa.c.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/auth-rsa.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/auth-rsa.c.audit2 2011-03-02 08:23:53.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/auth-rsa.c 2011-03-02 08:23:55.000000000 +0100
--- openssh-5.8p1/auth-rsa.c.audit2 2011-03-04 14:28:16.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/auth-rsa.c 2011-03-04 14:28:17.000000000 +0100
@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNU
{
u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16];
@ -238,19 +256,40 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p1/auth-rsa.c.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/auth-rsa.c
/*
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c.audit2 2011-03-02 08:23:54.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c 2011-03-02 08:23:55.000000000 +0100
@@ -1238,7 +1238,17 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
--- openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c.audit2 2011-03-04 14:28:16.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c 2011-03-04 14:28:17.000000000 +0100
@@ -1208,9 +1208,11 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
Key *key;
u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
+ int type = 0;
int verified = 0;
int valid_data = 0;
+ type = buffer_get_int(m);
blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
@@ -1218,6 +1220,8 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
!monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
+ if (type != key_blobtype)
+ fatal("%s: bad key type", __func__);
key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
if (key == NULL)
@@ -1238,7 +1242,17 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
if (!valid_data)
fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
- verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
+ switch (key_blobtype) {
+ case MM_USERKEY:
+ verified = pubkey_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
+ verified = user_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
+ break;
+ case MM_HOSTKEY:
+ verified = hostkey_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
+ verified = hostbased_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
+ break;
+ default:
+ verified = 0;
@ -259,3 +298,56 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c
debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
__func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit2 2011-03-04 14:28:16.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.c 2011-03-04 14:28:17.000000000 +0100
@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, cha
*/
int
-mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+mm_key_verify(enum mm_keytype type, Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
{
Buffer m;
u_char *blob;
@@ -407,6 +407,7 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_i
return (0);
buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, type);
buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len);
buffer_put_string(&m, sig, siglen);
buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen);
@@ -424,6 +425,19 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_i
return (verified);
}
+int
+mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+ return mm_key_verify(MM_HOSTKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen);
+}
+
+int
+mm_user_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+ return mm_key_verify(MM_USERKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen);
+}
+
+
/* Export key state after authentication */
Newkeys *
mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *blob, int blen)
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit2 openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.h
--- openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit2 2011-03-04 14:28:16.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.h 2011-03-04 14:28:17.000000000 +0100
@@ -48,7 +48,8 @@ int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, char
int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);
int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
-int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
+int mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
+int mm_user_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **);
int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char *);
BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);

153
openssh-5.8p1-audit2a.patch
View File

@ -1,153 +0,0 @@
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit2a openssh-5.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit2a 2011-03-02 08:26:16.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c 2011-03-02 08:26:17.000000000 +0100
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
/* test for allowed key and correct signature */
authenticated = 0;
if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) &&
- PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
+ PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
authenticated = 1;
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ done:
}
int
-hostkey_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+hostbased_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
{
int rv;
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit2a openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit2a 2011-03-02 08:26:16.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2011-03-02 08:26:17.000000000 +0100
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
/* test for correct signature */
authenticated = 0;
if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) &&
- PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
+ PRIVSEP(user_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
authenticated = 1;
buffer_free(&b);
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ done:
}
int
-pubkey_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+user_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
{
int rv;
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/auth.h.audit2a openssh-5.8p1/auth.h
--- openssh-5.8p1/auth.h.audit2a 2011-03-02 08:26:16.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/auth.h 2011-03-02 08:26:17.000000000 +0100
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ void abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt
char *authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *);
char *authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *);
char *authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *);
-int pubkey_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
+int user_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ Key *get_hostkey_public_by_type(int);
Key *get_hostkey_private_by_type(int);
int get_hostkey_index(Key *);
int ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *);
-int hostkey_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
+int hostbased_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
/* debug messages during authentication */
void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c.audit2a openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c.audit2a 2011-03-02 08:26:17.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c 2011-03-02 08:26:17.000000000 +0100
@@ -1208,9 +1208,11 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
Key *key;
u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
+ int type = 0;
int verified = 0;
int valid_data = 0;
+ type = buffer_get_int(m);
blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
@@ -1218,6 +1220,8 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
!monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
+ if (type != key_blobtype)
+ fatal("%s: bad key type", __func__);
key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
if (key == NULL)
@@ -1240,10 +1244,10 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
switch (key_blobtype) {
case MM_USERKEY:
- verified = pubkey_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
+ verified = user_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
break;
case MM_HOSTKEY:
- verified = hostkey_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
+ verified = hostbased_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
break;
default:
verified = 0;
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit2a openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit2a 2011-03-02 08:26:16.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.c 2011-03-02 08:26:17.000000000 +0100
@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, cha
*/
int
-mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+mm_key_verify(enum mm_keytype type, Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
{
Buffer m;
u_char *blob;
@@ -407,6 +407,7 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_i
return (0);
buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, type);
buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len);
buffer_put_string(&m, sig, siglen);
buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen);
@@ -424,6 +425,19 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_i
return (verified);
}
+int
+mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+ return mm_key_verify(MM_HOSTKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen);
+}
+
+int
+mm_user_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+ return mm_key_verify(MM_USERKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen);
+}
+
+
/* Export key state after authentication */
Newkeys *
mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *blob, int blen)
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit2a openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.h
--- openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit2a 2011-03-02 08:26:16.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.h 2011-03-02 08:26:17.000000000 +0100
@@ -48,7 +48,8 @@ int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, char
int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);
int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
-int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
+int mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
+int mm_user_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **);
int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char *);
BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);

139
openssh-5.8p1-keycat.patch
View File

@ -1,6 +1,41 @@
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c.keycat openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c.keycat 2011-03-04 14:40:23.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2011-03-04 14:40:23.000000000 +0100
@@ -579,6 +579,14 @@ user_key_via_command_allowed2(struct pas
close(i);
}
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (ssh_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
+ error ("failed to copy environment: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ _exit(127);
+ }
+#endif
+
execl(options.authorized_keys_command, options.authorized_keys_command, pw->pw_name, NULL);
/* if we got here, it didn't work */
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh-5.8p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
--- openssh-5.8p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat 2011-03-04 14:53:14.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat 2011-03-04 14:56:39.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+
+The ssh-keycat returns the content of the ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+in the stdandard out of any user in any environment, including
+polyinstatination and mls.
+
+To use it set:
+ AuthorizedKeysCommand /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keycat
+ AuthorizedKeysCommandRunAs root
+
+Do not forget to set
+ PubkeyAuthentication yes
+
+
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/Makefile.in.keycat openssh-5.8p1/Makefile.in
--- openssh-5.8p1/Makefile.in.keycat 2011-02-28 12:06:55.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/Makefile.in 2011-02-28 12:11:18.000000000 +0100
--- openssh-5.8p1/Makefile.in.keycat 2011-03-04 14:40:23.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/Makefile.in 2011-03-04 14:40:23.000000000 +0100
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper
@ -18,7 +53,7 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p1/Makefile.in.keycat openssh-5.8p1/Makefile.in
LIBSSH_OBJS=acss.o authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-acss.o cipher-aes.o \
@@ -173,6 +174,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT)
@@ -172,6 +173,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT)
ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o
$(LD) -o $@ ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
@ -28,7 +63,7 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p1/Makefile.in.keycat openssh-5.8p1/Makefile.in
ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o
$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
@@ -281,6 +285,7 @@ install-files:
@@ -280,6 +284,7 @@ install-files:
$(INSTALL) -m 0700 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-ldap-helper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_HELPER) ; \
$(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \
fi
@ -36,10 +71,67 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p1/Makefile.in.keycat openssh-5.8p1/Makefile.in
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.keycat openssh-5.8p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.keycat 2011-03-04 14:40:23.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2011-03-04 14:40:23.000000000 +0100
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
/* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
static int
-ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+ssh_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(const char *, const char *))
{
const char *reqlvl;
char *role;
@@ -320,16 +320,16 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
- rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
+ rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
use_current = "1";
} else {
use_current = "";
- rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: "");
+ rv = rv || set_it("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: "");
}
- rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current);
+ rv = rv || set_it("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current);
if (role != NULL)
xfree(role);
@@ -337,6 +337,24 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
return rv;
}
+static int
+ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+{
+ return ssh_selinux_setup_variables(do_pam_putenv);
+}
+
+static int
+do_setenv(char *name, char *value)
+{
+ return setenv(name, value, 1);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_selinux_setup_env_variables(void)
+{
+ return ssh_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv);
+}
+
/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
void
ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh-5.8p1/ssh-keycat.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/ssh-keycat.c.keycat 2011-02-28 12:06:28.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/ssh-keycat.c 2011-02-25 18:46:31.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
--- openssh-5.8p1/ssh-keycat.c.keycat 2011-03-04 14:40:23.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/ssh-keycat.c 2011-03-04 14:40:23.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+/*
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@ -107,6 +199,7 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p1/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh-5.8p1/ssh-keycat.c
+#define ERR_FDOPEN 10
+#define ERR_STAT 11
+#define ERR_WRITE 12
+#define ERR_PAM_PUTENV 13
+#define BUFLEN 4096
+
+/* Just ignore the messages in the conversation function */
@ -208,6 +301,34 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p1/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh-5.8p1/ssh-keycat.c
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static const char *env_names[] = { "SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED",
+ "SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED",
+ "SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE"
+};
+
+extern char **environ;
+
+int
+set_pam_environment(pam_handle_t *pamh)
+{
+ int i;
+ size_t j;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < sizeof(env_names)/sizeof(env_names[0]); ++j) {
+ int len = strlen(env_names[j]);
+
+ for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; ++i) {
+ if (strncmp(env_names[j], environ[i], len) == 0 &&
+ environ[i][len] == '=') {
+ if (pam_putenv(pamh, environ[i]) != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ return ERR_PAM_PUTENV;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
@ -225,6 +346,10 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p1/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh-5.8p1/ssh-keycat.c
+ return ERR_PAM_START;
+ }
+
+ ev = set_pam_environment(pamh);
+ if (ev != 0)
+ goto finish;
+
+ retval = pam_open_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ ev = ERR_OPEN_SESSION;

132
openssh-5.8p1-keycat2.patch
View File

@ -1,132 +0,0 @@
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c.keycat2 openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c.keycat2 2011-03-01 06:57:03.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2011-03-01 07:25:04.000000000 +0100
@@ -579,6 +579,14 @@ user_key_via_command_allowed2(struct pas
close(i);
}
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (ssh_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
+ error ("failed to copy environment: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ _exit(127);
+ }
+#endif
+
execl(options.authorized_keys_command, options.authorized_keys_command, pw->pw_name, NULL);
/* if we got here, it didn't work */
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.keycat2 openssh-5.8p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.keycat2 2011-03-01 07:00:32.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2011-03-01 07:23:13.000000000 +0100
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
/* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
static int
-ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+ssh_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it)(const char *, const char *))
{
const char *reqlvl;
char *role;
@@ -320,16 +320,16 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
- rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
+ rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
use_current = "1";
} else {
use_current = "";
- rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: "");
+ rv = rv || set_it("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: "");
}
- rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current);
+ rv = rv || set_it("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current);
if (role != NULL)
xfree(role);
@@ -337,6 +337,24 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
return rv;
}
+static int
+ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
+{
+ return ssh_selinux_setup_variables(do_pam_putenv);
+}
+
+static int
+do_setenv(char *name, char *value)
+{
+ return setenv(name, value, 1);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_selinux_setup_env_variables(void)
+{
+ return ssh_selinux_setup_variables(do_setenv);
+}
+
/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
void
ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
diff -up openssh-5.8p1/ssh-keycat.c.keycat2 openssh-5.8p1/ssh-keycat.c
--- openssh-5.8p1/ssh-keycat.c.keycat2 2011-03-01 06:56:02.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/ssh-keycat.c 2011-03-01 06:56:02.000000000 +0100
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
#define ERR_FDOPEN 10
#define ERR_STAT 11
#define ERR_WRITE 12
+#define ERR_PAM_PUTENV 13
#define BUFLEN 4096
/* Just ignore the messages in the conversation function */
@@ -166,6 +167,34 @@ fail:
return rv;
}
+static const char *env_names[] = { "SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED",
+ "SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED",
+ "SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE"
+};
+
+extern char **environ;
+
+int
+set_pam_environment(pam_handle_t *pamh)
+{
+ int i;
+ size_t j;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < sizeof(env_names)/sizeof(env_names[0]); ++j) {
+ int len = strlen(env_names[j]);
+
+ for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; ++i) {
+ if (strncmp(env_names[j], environ[i], len) == 0 &&
+ environ[i][len] == '=') {
+ if (pam_putenv(pamh, environ[i]) != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ return ERR_PAM_PUTENV;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
@@ -183,6 +212,10 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
return ERR_PAM_START;
}
+ ev = set_pam_environment(pamh);
+ if (ev != 0)
+ goto finish;
+
retval = pam_open_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
ev = ERR_OPEN_SESSION;

6
openssh.spec
View File

@ -71,7 +71,7 @@
# Do not forget to bump pam_ssh_agent_auth release if you rewind the main package release to 1
%define openssh_ver 5.8p1
%define openssh_rel 13
%define openssh_rel 14
%define pam_ssh_agent_ver 0.9.2
%define pam_ssh_agent_rel 30
@ -628,6 +628,7 @@ fi
%files keycat
%defattr(-,root,root)
%doc HOWTO.ssh-keycat
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-keycat
%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/ssh-keycat
@ -648,6 +649,9 @@ fi
%endif
%changelog
* Fri Mar 4 2011 Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com> - 5.8p1-14 + 0.9.2-30
- improove ssk-keycat (documentation)
* Thu Mar 3 2011 Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com> - 5.8p1-13 + 0.9.2-30
- improve audit of logins and auths

4
ssh-keycat.pam
View File

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
# pam_selinux.so close should be the first session rule
session required pam_selinux.so close
session required pam_loginuid.so
# pam_selinux.so open should only be followed by sessions to be executed in the
user context
# pam_selinux.so open should only be followed by sessions to be executed in the user context
session required pam_selinux.so open env_params
session required pam_namespace.so