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When doing chroot 

* we should not drop any capabilities for root
 * we should not clear bounding capabilities for other users
 * we should probably retain the supplement groups
This commit is contained in:
Jakub Jelen 2016-10-21 14:50:42 +02:00
parent 0408223488
commit 567d83cf01
1 changed files with 3 additions and 2 deletions
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5
openssh-7.2p2-chroot-capabilities.patch
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@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ index 6cfcba4..80d2806 100644
platform_setusercontext(pw);
@@ -1619,10 +1624,24 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
@@ -1619,10 +1624,25 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
pw->pw_uid);
chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
"u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
@ -71,7 +71,8 @@ index 6cfcba4..80d2806 100644
+ /* drop suid soon, retain SYS_CHROOT capability */
+ capng_clear(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH);
+ capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_EFFECTIVE|CAPNG_PERMITTED, CAP_SYS_CHROOT);
+ if ((dropped_suid = capng_change_id(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid, CAPNG_DROP_SUPP_GRP | CAPNG_CLEAR_BOUNDING)) != 0)
+ if (pw->pw_uid != 0 &&
+ (dropped_suid = capng_change_id(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid, CAPNG_INIT_SUPP_GRP)) != 0)
+ logit("capng_change_id() = %d (failure): Try to drop UID later", dropped_suid);
+#endif
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX