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cleanup spec file and patches

This commit is contained in:
Petr Lautrbach 2013-04-16 18:28:39 +02:00
parent c276d31b49
commit 1d76d11f64
17 changed files with 1 additions and 4759 deletions
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17
openssh-5.8p1-audit0.patch
View File

@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
Don't audit SSH_INVALID_USER twice.
PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow()) a few lines above already did this.
diff -ur openssh/auth2.c openssh-5.8p1/auth2.c
--- openssh/auth2.c 2011-03-02 02:32:52.383773622 +0100
+++ openssh-5.8p1/auth2.c 2011-03-02 03:32:34.585110911 +0100
@@ -250,9 +250,6 @@
} else {
logit("input_userauth_request: invalid user %s", user);
authctxt->pw = fakepw();
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER));
-#endif
}
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam)

353
openssh-5.9p1-audit2.patch
View File

@ -1,353 +0,0 @@
diff -up openssh-5.9p0/audit-bsm.c.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/audit-bsm.c
--- openssh-5.9p0/audit-bsm.c.audit2 2011-08-30 10:55:35.281025258 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p0/audit-bsm.c 2011-08-30 10:55:37.500052231 +0200
@@ -329,6 +329,12 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li
/* not implemented */
}
+int
+audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)
+{
+ /* not implemented */
+}
+
void
audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
{
diff -up openssh-5.9p0/audit-linux.c.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/audit-linux.c
--- openssh-5.9p0/audit-linux.c.audit2 2011-08-30 10:55:35.385102905 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p0/audit-linux.c 2011-08-30 10:55:38.009088040 +0200
@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@
#include "servconf.h"
#include "canohost.h"
+#define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 128
+
extern ServerOptions options;
extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
extern u_int utmp_len;
@@ -130,6 +132,37 @@ fatal_report:
}
}
+int
+audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)
+{
+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
+
+ audit_fd = audit_open();
+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
+ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
+ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */
+ else
+ return 0; /* Must prevent login */
+ }
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth rport=%d", host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", get_remote_port());
+ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
+ buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv);
+ if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+ goto out;
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "key algo=%s size=%d fp=%s%s rport=%d",
+ type, bits, key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, get_remote_port());
+ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
+ buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv);
+out:
+ saved_errno = errno;
+ audit_close(audit_fd);
+ errno = saved_errno;
+ /* do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
+ return (rc >= 0) || ((rc == -EPERM) && (getuid() != 0));
+}
+
static int user_login_count = 0;
/* Below is the sshd audit API code */
diff -up openssh-5.9p0/audit.c.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/audit.c
--- openssh-5.9p0/audit.c.audit2 2011-08-30 10:55:35.523141273 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p0/audit.c 2011-08-30 10:55:37.658024710 +0200
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
/*
* Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when
@@ -111,6 +112,22 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)
return(event_lookup[i].name);
}
+void
+audit_key(int host_user, int *rv, const Key *key)
+{
+ char *fp;
+ const char *crypto_name;
+
+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ if (key->type == KEY_RSA1)
+ crypto_name = "ssh-rsa1";
+ else
+ crypto_name = key_ssh_name(key);
+ if (audit_keyusage(host_user, crypto_name, key_size(key), fp, *rv) == 0)
+ *rv = 0;
+ xfree(fp);
+}
+
# ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
/*
* Null implementations of audit functions.
@@ -209,5 +226,17 @@ audit_end_command(int handle, const char
audit_username(), command);
}
+/*
+ * This will be called when user is successfully autherized by the RSA1/RSA/DSA key.
+ *
+ * Type is the key type, len is the key length(byte) and fp is the fingerprint of the key.
+ */
+int
+audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)
+{
+ debug("audit %s key usage euid %d user %s key type %s key length %d fingerprint %s%s, result %d",
+ host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(), type, bits,
+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, rv);
+}
# endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff -up openssh-5.9p0/audit.h.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/audit.h
--- openssh-5.9p0/audit.h.audit2 2011-08-30 10:55:35.723122290 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p0/audit.h 2011-08-30 10:55:37.905212176 +0200
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
# define _SSH_AUDIT_H
#include "loginrec.h"
+#include "key.h"
enum ssh_audit_event_type {
SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES,
@@ -55,5 +56,7 @@ void audit_session_close(struct logininf
int audit_run_command(const char *);
void audit_end_command(int, const char *);
ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
+int audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int);
+void audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);
#endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
diff -up openssh-5.9p0/auth-rsa.c.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/auth-rsa.c
--- openssh-5.9p0/auth-rsa.c.audit2 2011-08-30 10:55:33.120097071 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p0/auth-rsa.c 2011-08-30 10:55:38.729025376 +0200
@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNU
{
u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16];
MD5_CTX md;
- int len;
+ int len, rv;
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ char *fp;
+#endif
/* don't allow short keys */
if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
@@ -113,12 +116,18 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNU
MD5_Final(mdbuf, &md);
/* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */
- if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) {
- /* Wrong answer. */
- return (0);
+ rv = timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) == 0;
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ if (audit_keyusage(1, "ssh-rsa1", RSA_size(key->rsa) * 8, fp, rv) == 0) {
+ debug("unsuccessful audit");
+ rv = 0;
}
- /* Correct answer. */
- return (1);
+ xfree(fp);
+#endif
+
+ return rv;
}
/*
diff -up openssh-5.9p0/auth.h.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/auth.h
--- openssh-5.9p0/auth.h.audit2 2011-05-29 13:39:38.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p0/auth.h 2011-08-30 10:57:43.238087347 +0200
@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ void abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt
char *expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw);
char *authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *);
+int user_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
@@ -185,6 +186,7 @@ Key *get_hostkey_public_by_type(int);
Key *get_hostkey_private_by_type(int);
int get_hostkey_index(Key *);
int ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *);
+int hostbased_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
/* debug messages during authentication */
void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
diff -up openssh-5.9p0/auth2-hostbased.c.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/auth2-hostbased.c
--- openssh-5.9p0/auth2-hostbased.c.audit2 2011-08-30 10:55:32.696212587 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p0/auth2-hostbased.c 2011-08-30 10:55:38.120068864 +0200
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
/* test for allowed key and correct signature */
authenticated = 0;
if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) &&
- PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
+ PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
authenticated = 1;
@@ -136,6 +136,18 @@ done:
return authenticated;
}
+int
+hostbased_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+ int rv;
+
+ rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen);
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ audit_key(0, &rv, key);
+#endif
+ return rv;
+}
+
/* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */
int
hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost,
diff -up openssh-5.9p0/auth2-pubkey.c.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/auth2-pubkey.c
--- openssh-5.9p0/auth2-pubkey.c.audit2 2011-08-30 10:55:32.803126151 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p0/auth2-pubkey.c 2011-08-30 10:55:38.426108672 +0200
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
/* test for correct signature */
authenticated = 0;
if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) &&
- PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
+ PRIVSEP(user_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
authenticated = 1;
buffer_free(&b);
@@ -177,6 +177,18 @@ done:
return authenticated;
}
+int
+user_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+ int rv;
+
+ rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen);
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ audit_key(1, &rv, key);
+#endif
+ return rv;
+}
+
static int
match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct KeyCert *cert)
{
diff -up openssh-5.9p0/monitor.c.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/monitor.c
--- openssh-5.9p0/monitor.c.audit2 2011-08-30 10:55:35.849023496 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p0/monitor.c 2011-08-30 10:55:38.848024600 +0200
@@ -1318,9 +1318,11 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
Key *key;
u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
+ int type = 0;
int verified = 0;
int valid_data = 0;
+ type = buffer_get_int(m);
blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
@@ -1328,6 +1330,8 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
!monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
+ if (type != key_blobtype)
+ fatal("%s: bad key type", __func__);
key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
if (key == NULL)
@@ -1348,7 +1352,17 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
if (!valid_data)
fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
- verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
+ switch (key_blobtype) {
+ case MM_USERKEY:
+ verified = user_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
+ break;
+ case MM_HOSTKEY:
+ verified = hostbased_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
+ break;
+ default:
+ verified = 0;
+ break;
+ }
debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
__func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
diff -up openssh-5.9p0/monitor_wrap.c.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/monitor_wrap.c
--- openssh-5.9p0/monitor_wrap.c.audit2 2011-08-30 10:55:36.431043533 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p0/monitor_wrap.c 2011-08-30 10:55:39.074038187 +0200
@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, cha
*/
int
-mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+mm_key_verify(enum mm_keytype type, Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
{
Buffer m;
u_char *blob;
@@ -445,6 +445,7 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_i
return (0);
buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, type);
buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len);
buffer_put_string(&m, sig, siglen);
buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen);
@@ -462,6 +463,19 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_i
return (verified);
}
+int
+mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+ return mm_key_verify(MM_HOSTKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen);
+}
+
+int
+mm_user_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+ return mm_key_verify(MM_USERKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen);
+}
+
+
/* Export key state after authentication */
Newkeys *
mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *blob, int blen)
diff -up openssh-5.9p0/monitor_wrap.h.audit2 openssh-5.9p0/monitor_wrap.h
--- openssh-5.9p0/monitor_wrap.h.audit2 2011-08-30 10:55:36.550088263 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p0/monitor_wrap.h 2011-08-30 10:55:39.282151179 +0200
@@ -49,7 +49,8 @@ int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, char
int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);
int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
-int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
+int mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
+int mm_user_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **);
int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char *);
BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);

12
openssh-5.9p1-copy-id-restorecon.patch
View File

@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
diff -up openssh-5.9p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.restorecon openssh-5.9p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id
--- openssh-5.9p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.restorecon 2011-08-17 04:05:49.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id 2011-11-21 08:40:56.000000000 +0100
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ fi
# strip any trailing colon
host=`echo $1 | sed 's/:$//'`
-{ eval "$GET_ID" ; } | ssh $host "umask 077; test -d ~/.ssh || mkdir ~/.ssh ; cat >> ~/.ssh/authorized_keys" || exit 1
+{ eval "$GET_ID" ; } | ssh $host "umask 077; test -d ~/.ssh || mkdir ~/.ssh ; cat >> ~/.ssh/authorized_keys && (test -x /sbin/restorecon && /sbin/restorecon ~/.ssh ~/.ssh/authorized_keys >/dev/null 2>&1 || true)" || exit 1
cat <<EOF
Now try logging into the machine, with "ssh '$host'", and check in:

80
openssh-5.9p1-keygen.patch
View File

@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
diff -up openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.0.keygen openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.0
--- openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.0.keygen 2011-08-29 16:30:02.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.0 2011-08-30 13:47:56.208087184 +0200
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ NAME
ssh-keygen - authentication key generation, management and conversion
SYNOPSIS
- ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] -t type [-N new_passphrase] [-C comment]
+ ssh-keygen [-q] [-o] [-b bits] -t type [-N new_passphrase] [-C comment]
[-f output_keyfile]
ssh-keygen -p [-P old_passphrase] [-N new_passphrase] [-f keyfile]
ssh-keygen -i [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile]
@@ -181,6 +181,8 @@ DESCRIPTION
principals may be specified, separated by commas. Please see the
CERTIFICATES section for details.
+ -o Overwrite the key without prompting user.
+
-O option
Specify a certificate option when signing a key. This option may
be specified multiple times. Please see the CERTIFICATES section
diff -up openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.1.keygen openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.1
--- openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.1.keygen 2011-08-30 13:32:30.787149917 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.1 2011-08-30 13:46:42.638087171 +0200
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
.Bk -words
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Op Fl q
+.Op Fl o
.Op Fl b Ar bits
.Fl t Ar type
.Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase
@@ -339,6 +340,8 @@ Multiple principals may be specified, se
Please see the
.Sx CERTIFICATES
section for details.
+.It Fl o
+Overwrite the key without prompting user.
.It Fl O Ar option
Specify a certificate option when signing a key.
This option may be specified multiple times.
diff -up openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.c.keygen openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.c
--- openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.c.keygen 2011-08-30 13:32:20.268149992 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p0/ssh-keygen.c 2011-08-30 13:39:34.550214102 +0200
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ int change_passphrase = 0;
int change_comment = 0;
int quiet = 0;
+int overwrite = 0;
int log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
@@ -1959,7 +1960,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
exit(1);
}
- while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "AegiqpclBHLhvxXyF:b:f:t:D:I:P:m:N:n:"
+ while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "AegiqopclBHLhvxXyF:b:f:t:D:I:P:m:N:n:"
"O:C:r:g:R:T:G:M:S:s:a:V:W:z:")) != -1) {
switch (opt) {
case 'A':
@@ -2042,6 +2043,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
case 'q':
quiet = 1;
break;
+ case 'o':
+ overwrite = 1;
+ break;
case 'e':
case 'x':
/* export key */
@@ -2278,7 +2282,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
}
}
/* If the file already exists, ask the user to confirm. */
- if (stat(identity_file, &st) >= 0) {
+ if (!overwrite && stat(identity_file, &st) >= 0) {
char yesno[3];
printf("%s already exists.\n", identity_file);
printf("Overwrite (y/n)? ");

321
openssh-5.9p1-sesandbox.patch
View File

@ -1,321 +0,0 @@
diff -up openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in
--- openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in.sesandbox 2011-09-19 04:10:05.706521484 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in 2011-09-19 04:10:15.092646473 +0200
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passw
loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o \
- sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o
+ sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o sandbox-selinux.o
MANPAGES = moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out
MANPAGES_IN = moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5
diff -up openssh-5.9p1/configure.ac.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/configure.ac
--- openssh-5.9p1/configure.ac.sesandbox 2011-08-18 06:48:24.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p1/configure.ac 2011-09-19 04:10:15.193521356 +0200
@@ -2476,7 +2476,7 @@ AC_SUBST([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER])
# Decide which sandbox style to use
sandbox_arg=""
AC_ARG_WITH([sandbox],
- [ --with-sandbox=style Specify privilege separation sandbox (no, darwin, rlimit, systrace)],
+ [ --with-sandbox=style Specify privilege separation sandbox (no, darwin, rlimit, systrace, selinux)],
[
if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
sandbox_arg=""
@@ -2499,6 +2499,10 @@ elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xdarwin" ||
AC_MSG_ERROR([Darwin seatbelt sandbox requires sandbox.h and sandbox_init function])
SANDBOX_STYLE="darwin"
AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_DARWIN], [1], [Sandbox using Darwin sandbox_init(3)])
+elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xselinux" || \
+ test "x$WITH_SELINUX" = "x1"; then
+ SANDBOX_STYLE="selinux"
+ AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SELINUX], [1], [Sandbox using selinux(8)])
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xrlimit" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" = "xyes" ) ; then
test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" != "xyes" && \
diff -up openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
--- openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.sesandbox 2011-09-19 04:10:14.731521450 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2011-09-19 04:10:15.292521265 +0200
@@ -459,24 +459,24 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, cons
debug3("%s: done", __func__);
}
-void
+int
ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname)
{
- int len, newlen;
+ int len, newlen, rv = -1;
char *oldctx, *newctx, *cx;
void (*switchlog) (const char *fmt,...) = logit;
if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
- return;
+ return -2;
if (getcon((security_context_t *)&oldctx) < 0) {
logit("%s: getcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- return;
+ return -1;
}
if ((cx = index(oldctx, ':')) == NULL || (cx = index(cx + 1, ':')) ==
NULL) {
logit ("%s: unparseable context %s", __func__, oldctx);
- return;
+ return -1;
}
/*
@@ -484,8 +484,10 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *n
* security context.
*/
if (strncmp(cx, SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE,
- sizeof(SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE) - 1) == 0)
+ sizeof(SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE) - 1) == 0) {
switchlog = debug3;
+ rv = -2;
+ }
newlen = strlen(oldctx) + strlen(newname) + 1;
newctx = xmalloc(newlen);
@@ -499,8 +501,11 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *n
if (setcon(newctx) < 0)
switchlog("%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s", __func__,
newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno));
+ else
+ rv = 0;
xfree(oldctx);
xfree(newctx);
+ return rv;
}
void
diff -up openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
--- openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.sesandbox 2011-09-19 04:10:14.817647868 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h 2011-09-19 04:10:15.401648009 +0200
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
-void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+int ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
void ssh_selinux_chopy_context(void);
void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
#endif
diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-darwin.c.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-darwin.c
--- openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-darwin.c.sesandbox 2011-06-26 23:18:21.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-darwin.c 2011-09-19 04:10:15.490523231 +0200
@@ -83,6 +83,12 @@ ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *bo
}
void
+ssh_sandbox_privileged_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+ /* empty */
+}
+
+void
ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
{
free(box);
diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-null.c.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-null.c
--- openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-null.c.sesandbox 2011-06-23 11:45:51.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-null.c 2011-09-19 04:10:15.599458687 +0200
@@ -58,6 +58,12 @@ ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *bo
}
void
+ssh_sandbox_privileged_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+ /* empty */
+}
+
+void
ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
{
free(box);
diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-rlimit.c.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-rlimit.c
--- openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-rlimit.c.sesandbox 2011-06-23 11:45:51.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-rlimit.c 2011-09-19 04:10:16.077647289 +0200
@@ -78,6 +78,12 @@ ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *bo
}
void
+ssh_sandbox_privileged_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+ /* empty */
+}
+
+void
ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
{
free(box);
diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-selinux.c.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-selinux.c
--- openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-selinux.c.sesandbox 2011-09-19 04:10:16.179526059 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-selinux.c 2011-09-19 04:39:00.058646230 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+/* $Id: sandbox-selinux.c,v 1.0 2011/01/17 10:15:30 jfch Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 2011 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Use is subject to license terms.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
+ */
+
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef SANDBOX_SELINUX
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "openbsd-compat/port-linux.h"
+
+/* selinux based sandbox */
+
+struct ssh_sandbox {
+ pid_t child_pid;
+};
+
+struct ssh_sandbox *
+ssh_sandbox_init(void)
+{
+ struct ssh_sandbox *box;
+
+ /*
+ * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need
+ * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API.
+ */
+ debug3("selinux sandbox init");
+ box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
+ box->child_pid = 0;
+ return box;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+ struct rlimit rl_zero;
+
+ rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
+
+ if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+ __func__, strerror(errno));
+ if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+ __func__, strerror(errno));
+#ifdef HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC
+ if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+ __func__, strerror(errno));
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_privileged_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+ switch (ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t")) {
+ case 0:
+ debug3("selinux sandbox child sucessfully enabled");
+ break;
+ case -2:
+ logit("selinux sandbox not useful");
+ break;
+ case -1:
+ fatal("cannot set up selinux sandbox");
+ default:
+ fatal("inmternal error in selinux sandbox");
+ }
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+ free(box);
+ debug3("%s: finished", __func__);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
+{
+ debug3("selinux sandbox parent sucessfully enabled");
+ box->child_pid = child_pid;
+}
+
+#endif /* SANDBOX_NULL */
diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-systrace.c.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-systrace.c
--- openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-systrace.c.sesandbox 2011-08-05 22:16:23.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p1/sandbox-systrace.c 2011-09-19 04:10:16.268646532 +0200
@@ -109,6 +109,12 @@ ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *bo
close(box->child_sock);
}
+void
+ssh_sandbox_privileged_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+ /* empty */
+}
+
static void
ssh_sandbox_parent(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid,
const struct sandbox_policy *allowed_syscalls)
diff -up openssh-5.9p1/ssh-sandbox.h.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/ssh-sandbox.h
--- openssh-5.9p1/ssh-sandbox.h.sesandbox 2011-06-23 11:45:51.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p1/ssh-sandbox.h 2011-09-19 04:10:16.392523931 +0200
@@ -19,5 +19,6 @@ struct ssh_sandbox;
struct ssh_sandbox *ssh_sandbox_init(void);
void ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *);
+void ssh_sandbox_privileged_child(struct ssh_sandbox *);
void ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *);
void ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *, pid_t);
diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c.sesandbox openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c.sesandbox 2011-09-19 04:10:14.564467584 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c 2011-09-19 04:36:43.324520132 +0200
@@ -728,10 +730,12 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
/* Demote the child */
- if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
+ if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) {
+ ssh_sandbox_privileged_child(box);
privsep_preauth_child();
+ }
setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
if (box != NULL) {
ssh_sandbox_child(box);
xfree(box);
}

63
openssh-5.9p1-sftp-chroot.patch
View File

@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
diff -up openssh-5.9p0/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.sftp-chroot openssh-5.9p0/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
--- openssh-5.9p0/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.sftp-chroot 2011-09-01 04:12:22.743024608 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p0/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2011-09-01 04:12:23.069088065 +0200
@@ -503,6 +503,23 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *n
xfree(newctx);
}
+void
+ssh_selinux_copy_context(void)
+{
+ char *ctx;
+
+ if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+ return;
+
+ if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) < 0) {
+ logit("%s: getcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror (errno));
+ return;
+ }
+ if (setcon(ctx) < 0)
+ logit("%s: setcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror (errno));
+ xfree(ctx);
+}
+
#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
diff -up openssh-5.9p0/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.sftp-chroot openssh-5.9p0/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
--- openssh-5.9p0/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.sftp-chroot 2011-01-25 02:16:18.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.9p0/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h 2011-09-01 04:12:23.163088777 +0200
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+void ssh_selinux_chopy_context(void);
void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
#endif
diff -up openssh-5.9p0/session.c.sftp-chroot openssh-5.9p0/session.c
--- openssh-5.9p0/session.c.sftp-chroot 2011-09-01 04:12:19.698049195 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p0/session.c 2011-09-01 04:40:03.598148719 +0200
@@ -1519,6 +1519,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
pw->pw_uid);
chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
"u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ ssh_selinux_change_context("chroot_user_t");
+#endif
safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
free(tmp);
free(chroot_path);
@@ -1788,7 +1791,10 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
optind = optreset = 1;
__progname = argv[0];
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
+ if (options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
+ strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) {
+ ssh_selinux_copy_context();
+ }
#endif
exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
}

579
openssh-6.1p1-akc.patch
View File

@ -1,579 +0,0 @@
diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c.akc openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c
--- openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c.akc 2013-02-14 17:46:45.259546968 +0100
+++ openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2013-02-14 17:48:19.072137541 +0100
@@ -27,9 +27,13 @@
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <paths.h>
#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -260,7 +264,7 @@ match_principals_file(char *file, struct
if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) == 0) {
debug3("matched principal \"%.100s\" "
"from file \"%s\" on line %lu",
- cert->principals[i], file, linenum);
+ cert->principals[i], file, linenum);
if (auth_parse_options(pw, line_opts,
file, linenum) != 1)
continue;
@@ -273,31 +277,22 @@ match_principals_file(char *file, struct
fclose(f);
restore_uid();
return 0;
-}
+}
-/* return 1 if user allows given key */
+/*
+ * Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file,
+ * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
+ */
static int
-user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
+check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
{
char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
const char *reason;
int found_key = 0;
- FILE *f;
u_long linenum = 0;
Key *found;
char *fp;
- /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
- temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-
- debug("trying public key file %s", file);
- f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes);
-
- if (!f) {
- restore_uid();
- return 0;
- }
-
found_key = 0;
found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type);
@@ -390,8 +385,6 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key
break;
}
}
- restore_uid();
- fclose(f);
key_free(found);
if (!found_key)
debug2("key not found");
@@ -453,7 +446,180 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw,
return ret;
}
-/* check whether given key is in .ssh/authorized_keys* */
+/*
+ * Checks whether key is allowed in file.
+ * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ int found_key = 0;
+
+ /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+ debug("trying public key file %s", file);
+ if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) != NULL) {
+ found_key = check_authkeys_file(f, file, key, pw);
+ fclose(f);
+ }
+
+ restore_uid();
+ return found_key;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks whether key is allowed in output of command.
+ * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ int ok, found_key = 0;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ struct stat st;
+ int status, devnull, p[2], i;
+ pid_t pid;
+ char *username, errmsg[512];
+
+ if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL ||
+ options.authorized_keys_command[0] != '/')
+ return 0;
+
+ if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) {
+ error("No user for AuthorizedKeysCommand specified, skipping");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ username = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command_user,
+ "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
+ pw = getpwnam(username);
+ if (pw == NULL) {
+ error("AuthorizedKeyCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
+ username, strerror(errno));
+ free(username);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ free(username);
+
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+ if (stat(options.authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) {
+ error("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s",
+ options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (auth_secure_path(options.authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0,
+ errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
+ error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (pipe(p) != 0) {
+ error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ debug3("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s %s\" as \"%s\"",
+ options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, pw->pw_name);
+
+ /*
+ * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
+ * run cleanup_exit() code.
+ */
+ restore_uid();
+
+ switch ((pid = fork())) {
+ case -1: /* error */
+ error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ close(p[0]);
+ close(p[1]);
+ return 0;
+ case 0: /* child */
+ for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
+ signal(i, SIG_DFL);
+
+ if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+ error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
+ strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+ /* Keep stderr around a while longer to catch errors */
+ if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
+ dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
+ error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+
+ /* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
+ if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
+ error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
+ strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+ if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
+ error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
+ strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+ /* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */
+ if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
+ error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+
+ execl(options.authorized_keys_command,
+ options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, NULL);
+
+ error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
+ options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
+ _exit(127);
+ default: /* parent */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+ close(p[1]);
+ if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ close(p[0]);
+ /* Don't leave zombie child */
+ kill(pid, SIGTERM);
+ while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
+ ;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ok = check_authkeys_file(f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw);
+ fclose(f);
+
+ while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
+ if (errno != EINTR) {
+ error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
+ error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
+ options.authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status));
+ goto out;
+ } else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
+ error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
+ options.authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ found_key = ok;
+ out:
+ restore_uid();
+ return found_key;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user.
+ */
int
user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
{
@@ -469,9 +635,17 @@ user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key
if (success)
return success;
+ success = user_key_command_allowed2(pw, key);
+ if (success > 0)
+ return success;
+
for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) {
+
+ if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0)
+ continue;
file = expand_authorized_keys(
options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw);
+
success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file);
xfree(file);
}
diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth.c.akc openssh-6.1p1/auth.c
--- openssh-6.1p1/auth.c.akc 2013-02-14 17:46:45.189547274 +0100
+++ openssh-6.1p1/auth.c 2013-02-14 17:46:45.273546907 +0100
@@ -415,39 +415,41 @@ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw
/*
- * Check a given file for security. This is defined as all components
+ * Check a given path for security. This is defined as all components
* of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of
* of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
*
* XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
*
- * Takes an open file descriptor, the file name, a uid and and
+ * Takes an the file name, its stat information (preferably from fstat() to
+ * avoid races), the uid of the expected owner, their home directory and an
* error buffer plus max size as arguments.
*
* Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
*/
-static int
-secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
- char *err, size_t errlen)
+int
+auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
+ uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen)
{
- uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid;
char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN];
char *cp;
int comparehome = 0;
struct stat st;
- if (realpath(file, buf) == NULL) {
- snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", file,
+ if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
+ snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
- if (realpath(pw->pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
+ if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
comparehome = 1;
- /* check the open file to avoid races */
- if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0 ||
- (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
+ if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) {
+ snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if ((stp->st_uid != 0 && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
+ (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) {
snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
buf);
return -1;
@@ -483,6 +485,31 @@ secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *fil
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Version of secure_path() that accepts an open file descriptor to
+ * avoid races.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
+ */
+static int
+secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
+ char *err, size_t errlen)
+{
+ uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid;
+ char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN];
+ char *cp;
+ int comparehome = 0;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ /* check the open file to avoid races */
+ if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0) {
+ snprintf(err, errlen, "cannot stat file %s: %s",
+ buf, strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return auth_secure_path(file, &st, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, err, errlen);
+}
+
static FILE *
auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes,
int log_missing, char *file_type)
diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth.h.akc openssh-6.1p1/auth.h
--- openssh-6.1p1/auth.h.akc 2013-02-14 17:46:45.259546968 +0100
+++ openssh-6.1p1/auth.h 2013-02-14 17:46:45.274546903 +0100
@@ -125,6 +125,10 @@ int auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct
int hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *, Key *);
int user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);
+struct stat;
+int auth_secure_path(const char *, struct stat *, const char *, uid_t,
+ char *, size_t);
+
#ifdef KRB5
int auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client, krb5_data *);
int auth_krb5_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *tgt);
diff -up openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c.akc openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c
--- openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c.akc 2013-02-14 17:46:45.193547257 +0100
+++ openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c 2013-02-14 17:46:45.274546903 +0100
@@ -137,6 +137,8 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
options->num_permitted_opens = -1;
options->adm_forced_command = NULL;
options->chroot_directory = NULL;
+ options->authorized_keys_command = NULL;
+ options->authorized_keys_command_user = NULL;
options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = -1;
options->revoked_keys_file = NULL;
options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL;
@@ -331,6 +333,7 @@ typedef enum {
sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate,
sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
+ sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser,
sAuthenticationMethods,
sDeprecated, sUnsupported
} ServerOpCodes;
@@ -457,6 +460,9 @@ static struct {
{ "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "authorizedkeyscommandrunas", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
};
@@ -1520,6 +1526,26 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
}
return 0;
+ case sAuthorizedKeysCommand:
+ len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
+ if (*activep && options->authorized_keys_command == NULL) {
+ options->authorized_keys_command = xstrdup(cp + len);
+ if (*options->authorized_keys_command != '/') {
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: AuthorizedKeysCommand "
+ "must be an absolute path",
+ filename, linenum);
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+ case sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser:
+ charptr = &options->authorized_keys_command_user;
+
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+ *charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+ break;
+
case sDeprecated:
logit("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s",
filename, linenum, arg);
@@ -1670,6 +1696,8 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only);
M_CP_INTOPT(kbd_interactive_authentication);
M_CP_INTOPT(zero_knowledge_password_authentication);
+ M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command);
+ M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command_user);
M_CP_INTOPT(permit_root_login);
M_CP_INTOPT(permit_empty_passwd);
@@ -1930,6 +1958,8 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
o->authorized_principals_file);
dump_cfg_string(sVersionAddendum, o->version_addendum);
+ dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommand, o->authorized_keys_command);
+ dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, o->authorized_keys_command_user);
/* string arguments requiring a lookup */
dump_cfg_string(sLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level));
diff -up openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h.akc openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h
--- openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h.akc 2013-02-14 17:46:45.194547252 +0100
+++ openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h 2013-02-14 17:46:45.275546898 +0100
@@ -167,6 +167,8 @@ typedef struct {
char *revoked_keys_file;
char *trusted_user_ca_keys;
char *authorized_principals_file;
+ char *authorized_keys_command;
+ char *authorized_keys_command_user;
char *version_addendum; /* Appended to SSH banner */
diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.akc openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c.akc 2013-02-14 17:46:45.270546920 +0100
+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd.c 2013-02-14 17:46:45.276546894 +0100
@@ -366,9 +366,20 @@ main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
static void
grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
{
+ pid_t pgid;
+
if (use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 0)
kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGALRM);
+ /*
+ * Try to kill any processes that we have spawned, E.g. authorized
+ * keys command helpers.
+ */
+ if ((pgid = getpgid(0)) == getpid()) {
+ signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN);
+ killpg(pgid, SIGTERM);
+ }
+
/* Log error and exit. */
sigdie("Timeout before authentication for %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
}
diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0.akc openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0
--- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0.akc 2012-08-29 02:53:04.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0 2013-02-14 17:46:45.276546894 +0100
@@ -71,6 +71,23 @@ DESCRIPTION
See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.
+ AuthorizedKeysCommand
+
+ Specifies a program to be used for lookup of the user's
+ public keys. The program will be invoked with its first
+ argument the name of the user being authorized, and should produce
+ on standard output AuthorizedKeys lines (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS
+ in sshd(8)). By default (or when set to the empty string) there is no
+ AuthorizedKeysCommand run. If the AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully
+ authorize the user, authorization falls through to the
+ AuthorizedKeysFile. Note that this option has an effect
+ only with PubkeyAuthentication turned on.
+
+ AuthorizedKeysCommandRunAs
+ Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedKeysCommand is run.
+ Empty string (the default value) means the user being authorized
+ is used.
+
AuthorizedKeysFile
Specifies the file that contains the public keys that can be used
for user authentication. The format is described in the
@@ -402,7 +419,8 @@ DESCRIPTION
Only a subset of keywords may be used on the lines following a
Match keyword. Available keywords are AcceptEnv,
AllowAgentForwarding, AllowGroups, AllowTcpForwarding,
- AllowUsers, AuthorizedKeysFile, AuthorizedPrincipalsFile, Banner,
+ AllowUsers, AuthorizedKeysFile, AuthorizedKeysCommand,
+ AuthorizedKeysCommandRunAs, AuthorizedPrincipalsFile, Banner,
ChrootDirectory, DenyGroups, DenyUsers, ForceCommand,
GatewayPorts, GSSAPIAuthentication, HostbasedAuthentication,
HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, KbdInteractiveAuthentication,
diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5.akc openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5
--- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5.akc 2013-02-14 17:46:45.195547248 +0100
+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5 2013-02-14 17:46:45.277546890 +0100
@@ -173,6 +173,20 @@ Note that each authentication method lis
in the configuration.
The default is not to require multiple authentication; successful completion
of a single authentication method is sufficient.
+.It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
+Specifies a program to be used for lookup of the user's public keys.
+The program will be invoked with a single argument of the username
+being authenticated, and should produce on standard output zero or
+more lines of authorized_keys output (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS in
+.Xr sshd 8 )
+If a key supplied by AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully authenticate
+and authorize the user then public key authentication continues using the usual
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
+files.
+By default, no AuthorizedKeysCommand is run.
+.It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser
+Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedKeysCommand is run.
+The default is the user being authenticated.
.It Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
Specifies the file that contains the public keys that can be used
for user authentication.
@@ -734,6 +748,8 @@ Available keywords are
.Cm AllowTcpForwarding ,
.Cm AllowUsers ,
.Cm AuthenticationMethods ,
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand ,
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ,
.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile ,
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile ,
.Cm Banner ,
@@ -749,6 +765,7 @@ Available keywords are
.Cm KerberosAuthentication ,
.Cm MaxAuthTries ,
.Cm MaxSessions ,
+.Cm PubkeyAuthentication ,
.Cm PasswordAuthentication ,
.Cm PermitEmptyPasswords ,
.Cm PermitOpen ,
diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.akc openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config
--- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.akc 2012-07-31 04:21:34.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config 2013-02-14 17:46:45.277546890 +0100
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@
# but this is overridden so installations will only check .ssh/authorized_keys
AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
+#AuthorizedKeysCommand none
+#AuthorizedKeysCommandUser nobody
+
#AuthorizedPrincipalsFile none
# For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts

841
openssh-6.1p1-authenticationmethods.patch
View File

@ -1,841 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index ee0cb05..1b2fc2b 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -251,7 +251,8 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
}
void
-auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
+auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial,
+ const char *method, const char *submethod, const char *info)
{
void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
char *authmsg;
@@ -268,12 +269,15 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
if (authctxt->postponed)
authmsg = "Postponed";
+ else if (partial)
+ authmsg = "Partial";
else
authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
- authlog("%s %s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s",
+ authlog("%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s",
authmsg,
method,
+ submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod,
authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
authctxt->user,
get_remote_ipaddr(),
@@ -303,7 +307,7 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
* Check whether root logins are disallowed.
*/
int
-auth_root_allowed(char *method)
+auth_root_allowed(const char *method)
{
switch (options.permit_root_login) {
case PERMIT_YES:
diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
index 0d786c4..29823bb 100644
--- a/auth.h
+++ b/auth.h
@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ struct Authctxt {
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
auth_session_t *as;
#endif
+ char **auth_methods; /* modified from server config */
+ u_int num_auth_methods;
#ifdef KRB5
krb5_context krb5_ctx;
krb5_ccache krb5_fwd_ccache;
@@ -142,12 +144,17 @@ void disable_forwarding(void);
void do_authentication(Authctxt *);
void do_authentication2(Authctxt *);
-void auth_log(Authctxt *, int, char *, char *);
-void userauth_finish(Authctxt *, int, char *);
+void auth_log(Authctxt *, int, int, const char *, const char *,
+ const char *);
+void userauth_finish(Authctxt *, int, const char *, const char *);
+int auth_root_allowed(const char *);
+
void userauth_send_banner(const char *);
-int auth_root_allowed(char *);
char *auth2_read_banner(void);
+int auth2_methods_valid(const char *, int);
+int auth2_update_methods_lists(Authctxt *, const char *);
+int auth2_setup_methods_lists(Authctxt *);
void privsep_challenge_enable(void);
diff --git a/auth1.c b/auth1.c
index cc85aec..458a110 100644
--- a/auth1.c
+++ b/auth1.c
@@ -253,7 +253,8 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
if (options.use_pam && (PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())))
#endif
{
- auth_log(authctxt, 1, "without authentication", "");
+ auth_log(authctxt, 1, 0, "without authentication",
+ NULL, "");
return;
}
}
@@ -352,7 +353,8 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
skip:
/* Log before sending the reply */
- auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, get_authname(type), info);
+ auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, 0, get_authname(type),
+ NULL, info);
if (client_user != NULL) {
xfree(client_user);
@@ -406,6 +408,11 @@ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
authctxt->pw = fakepw();
}
+ /* Configuration may have changed as a result of Match */
+ if (options.num_auth_methods != 0)
+ fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported with SSH "
+ "protocol 1");
+
setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
diff --git a/auth2-chall.c b/auth2-chall.c
index e6dbffe..5f7ec6d 100644
--- a/auth2-chall.c
+++ b/auth2-chall.c
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
int authenticated = 0, res;
u_int i, nresp;
- char **response = NULL, *method;
+ char *devicename = NULL, **response = NULL;
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no authctxt");
@@ -329,9 +329,7 @@ input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
/* Failure! */
break;
}
-
- xasprintf(&method, "keyboard-interactive/%s", kbdintctxt->device->name);
-
+ devicename = kbdintctxt->device->name;
if (!authctxt->postponed) {
if (authenticated) {
auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt);
@@ -341,8 +339,8 @@ input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
auth2_challenge_start(authctxt);
}
}
- userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method);
- xfree(method);
+ userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "keyboard-interactive",
+ devicename);
}
void
diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
index 0d59b21..338c748 100644
--- a/auth2-gss.c
+++ b/auth2-gss.c
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
}
authctxt->postponed = 0;
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
- userauth_finish(authctxt, 0, "gssapi-with-mic");
+ userauth_finish(authctxt, 0, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
} else {
if (send_tok.length != 0) {
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN);
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL);
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
- userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic");
+ userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
}
static void
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL);
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
- userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic");
+ userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
}
Authmethod method_gssapi = {
diff --git a/auth2-jpake.c b/auth2-jpake.c
index a460e82..e4ba9aa 100644
--- a/auth2-jpake.c
+++ b/auth2-jpake.c
@@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ input_userauth_jpake_client_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
authctxt->postponed = 0;
jpake_free(authctxt->jpake_ctx);
authctxt->jpake_ctx = NULL;
- userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method_jpake.name);
+ userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method_jpake.name, NULL);
}
#endif /* JPAKE */
diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
index b66bef6..ea0fd92 100644
--- a/auth2.c
+++ b/auth2.c
@@ -96,8 +96,10 @@ static void input_service_request(int, u_int32_t, void *);
static void input_userauth_request(int, u_int32_t, void *);
/* helper */
-static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(const char *);
-static char *authmethods_get(void);
+static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(Authctxt *, const char *);
+static char *authmethods_get(Authctxt *authctxt);
+static int method_allowed(Authctxt *, const char *);
+static int list_starts_with(const char *, const char *);
char *
auth2_read_banner(void)
@@ -255,6 +257,8 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
if (use_privsep)
mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
userauth_banner();
+ if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
+ packet_disconnect("no authentication methods enabled");
} else if (strcmp(user, authctxt->user) != 0 ||
strcmp(service, authctxt->service) != 0) {
packet_disconnect("Change of username or service not allowed: "
@@ -277,12 +281,12 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
authctxt->server_caused_failure = 0;
/* try to authenticate user */
- m = authmethod_lookup(method);
+ m = authmethod_lookup(authctxt, method);
if (m != NULL && authctxt->failures < options.max_authtries) {
debug2("input_userauth_request: try method %s", method);
authenticated = m->userauth(authctxt);
}
- userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method);
+ userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method, NULL);
xfree(service);
xfree(user);
@@ -290,13 +294,17 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
}
void
-userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
+userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, const char *method,
+ const char *submethod)
{
char *methods;
+ int partial = 0;
if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated)
fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s",
authctxt->user);
+ if (authenticated && authctxt->postponed)
+ fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated and postponed");
/* Special handling for root */
if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
@@ -307,6 +315,19 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
#endif
}
+ if (authenticated && options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
+ if (!auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt, method)) {
+ authenticated = 0;
+ partial = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Log before sending the reply */
+ auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial, method, submethod, " ssh2");
+
+ if (authctxt->postponed)
+ return;
+
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam && authenticated) {
if (!PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())) {
@@ -325,17 +346,10 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
#ifdef _UNICOS
if (authenticated && cray_access_denied(authctxt->user)) {
authenticated = 0;
- fatal("Access denied for user %s.",authctxt->user);
+ fatal("Access denied for user %s.", authctxt->user);
}
#endif /* _UNICOS */
- /* Log before sending the reply */
- auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, method, " ssh2");
-
- if (authctxt->postponed)
- return;
-
- /* XXX todo: check if multiple auth methods are needed */
if (authenticated == 1) {
/* turn off userauth */
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, &dispatch_protocol_ignore);
@@ -348,7 +362,8 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
/* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */
if (!authctxt->server_caused_failure &&
- (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0))
+ (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0) &&
+ partial == 0)
authctxt->failures++;
if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) {
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
@@ -356,34 +371,61 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
#endif
packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user);
}
- methods = authmethods_get();
+ methods = authmethods_get(authctxt);
+ debug3("%s: failure partial=%d next methods=\"%s\"", __func__,
+ partial, methods);
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE);
packet_put_cstring(methods);
- packet_put_char(0); /* XXX partial success, unused */
+ packet_put_char(partial);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
xfree(methods);
}
}
+/*
+ * Checks whether method is allowed by at least one AuthenticationMethods
+ * methods list. Returns 1 if allowed, or no methods lists configured.
+ * 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+method_allowed(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ /*
+ * NB. authctxt->num_auth_methods might be zero as a result of
+ * auth2_setup_methods_lists(), so check the configuration.
+ */
+ if (options.num_auth_methods == 0)
+ return 1;
+ for (i = 0; i < authctxt->num_auth_methods; i++) {
+ if (list_starts_with(authctxt->auth_methods[i], method))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
static char *
-authmethods_get(void)
+authmethods_get(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
Buffer b;
char *list;
- int i;
+ u_int i;
buffer_init(&b);
for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) {
if (strcmp(authmethods[i]->name, "none") == 0)
continue;
- if (authmethods[i]->enabled != NULL &&
- *(authmethods[i]->enabled) != 0) {
- if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
- buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
- buffer_append(&b, authmethods[i]->name,
- strlen(authmethods[i]->name));
- }
+ if (authmethods[i]->enabled == NULL ||
+ *(authmethods[i]->enabled) == 0)
+ continue;
+ if (!method_allowed(authctxt, authmethods[i]->name))
+ continue;
+ if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
+ buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
+ buffer_append(&b, authmethods[i]->name,
+ strlen(authmethods[i]->name));
}
buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1);
list = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b));
@@ -392,7 +434,7 @@ authmethods_get(void)
}
static Authmethod *
-authmethod_lookup(const char *name)
+authmethod_lookup(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *name)
{
int i;
@@ -400,10 +442,152 @@ authmethod_lookup(const char *name)
for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++)
if (authmethods[i]->enabled != NULL &&
*(authmethods[i]->enabled) != 0 &&
- strcmp(name, authmethods[i]->name) == 0)
+ strcmp(name, authmethods[i]->name) == 0 &&
+ method_allowed(authctxt, authmethods[i]->name))
return authmethods[i];
debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s",
name ? name : "NULL");
return NULL;
}
+/*
+ * Check a comma-separated list of methods for validity. Is need_enable is
+ * non-zero, then also require that the methods are enabled.
+ * Returns 0 on success or -1 if the methods list is invalid.
+ */
+int
+auth2_methods_valid(const char *_methods, int need_enable)
+{
+ char *methods, *omethods, *method;
+ u_int i, found;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ if (*_methods == '\0') {
+ error("empty authentication method list");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ omethods = methods = xstrdup(_methods);
+ while ((method = strsep(&methods, ",")) != NULL) {
+ for (found = i = 0; !found && authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(method, authmethods[i]->name) != 0)
+ continue;
+ if (need_enable) {
+ if (authmethods[i]->enabled == NULL ||
+ *(authmethods[i]->enabled) == 0) {
+ error("Disabled method \"%s\" in "
+ "AuthenticationMethods list \"%s\"",
+ method, _methods);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ found = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!found) {
+ error("Unknown authentication method \"%s\" in list",
+ method);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ free(omethods);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Prune the AuthenticationMethods supplied in the configuration, removing
+ * any methods lists that include disabled methods. Note that this might
+ * leave authctxt->num_auth_methods == 0, even when multiple required auth
+ * has been requested. For this reason, all tests for whether multiple is
+ * enabled should consult options.num_auth_methods directly.
+ */
+int
+auth2_setup_methods_lists(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ if (options.num_auth_methods == 0)
+ return 0;
+ debug3("%s: checking methods", __func__);
+ authctxt->auth_methods = xcalloc(options.num_auth_methods,
+ sizeof(*authctxt->auth_methods));
+ authctxt->num_auth_methods = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_auth_methods; i++) {
+ if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[i], 1) != 0) {
+ logit("Authentication methods list \"%s\" contains "
+ "disabled method, skipping",
+ options.auth_methods[i]);
+ continue;
+ }
+ debug("authentication methods list %d: %s",
+ authctxt->num_auth_methods, options.auth_methods[i]);
+ authctxt->auth_methods[authctxt->num_auth_methods++] =
+ xstrdup(options.auth_methods[i]);
+ }
+ if (authctxt->num_auth_methods == 0) {
+ error("No AuthenticationMethods left after eliminating "
+ "disabled methods");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+list_starts_with(const char *methods, const char *method)
+{
+ size_t l = strlen(method);
+
+ if (strncmp(methods, method, l) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (methods[l] != ',' && methods[l] != '\0')
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Remove method from the start of a comma-separated list of methods.
+ * Returns 0 if the list of methods did not start with that method or 1
+ * if it did.
+ */
+static int
+remove_method(char **methods, const char *method)
+{
+ char *omethods = *methods;
+ size_t l = strlen(method);
+
+ if (!list_starts_with(omethods, method))
+ return 0;
+ *methods = xstrdup(omethods + l + (omethods[l] == ',' ? 1 : 0));
+ free(omethods);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called after successful authentication. Will remove the successful method
+ * from the start of each list in which it occurs. If it was the last method
+ * in any list, then authentication is deemed successful.
+ * Returns 1 if the method completed any authentication list or 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int
+auth2_update_methods_lists(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method)
+{
+ u_int i, found = 0;
+
+ debug3("%s: updating methods list after \"%s\"", __func__, method);
+ for (i = 0; i < authctxt->num_auth_methods; i++) {
+ if (!remove_method(&(authctxt->auth_methods[i]), method))
+ continue;
+ found = 1;
+ if (*authctxt->auth_methods[i] == '\0') {
+ debug2("authentication methods list %d complete", i);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ debug3("authentication methods list %d remaining: \"%s\"",
+ i, authctxt->auth_methods[i]);
+ }
+ /* This should not happen, but would be bad if it did */
+ if (!found)
+ fatal("%s: method not in AuthenticationMethods", __func__);
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index 1dc42f5..66f3eea 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
static char *auth_method = "unknown";
+static char *auth_submethod = NULL;
static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
@@ -352,7 +353,7 @@ void
monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
struct mon_table *ent;
- int authenticated = 0;
+ int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
debug3("preauth child monitor started");
@@ -379,8 +380,26 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
while (!authenticated) {
+ partial = 0;
auth_method = "unknown";
+ auth_submethod = NULL;
authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
+
+ /* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
+ if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
+ if (!compat20)
+ fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported"
+ "with SSH protocol 1");
+ if (authenticated &&
+ !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
+ auth_method)) {
+ debug3("%s: method %s: partial", __func__,
+ auth_method);
+ authenticated = 0;
+ partial = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
if (authenticated) {
if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
@@ -403,9 +422,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
}
if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
- auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, auth_method,
+ auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial,
+ auth_method, auth_submethod,
compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
- if (!authenticated)
+ if (!authenticated && !partial)
authctxt->failures++;
}
#ifdef JPAKE
@@ -781,7 +801,17 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
#undef M_CP_STROPT
#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
-
+
+ /* Create valid auth method lists */
+ if (compat20 && auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * The monitor will continue long enough to let the child
+ * run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
+ * authentication to succeed.
+ */
+ debug("%s: no valid authentication method lists", __func__);
+ }
+
debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
@@ -918,7 +948,11 @@ mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
- auth_method = "bsdauth";
+ if (compat20)
+ auth_method = "keyboard-interactive"; /* XXX auth_submethod */
+ else
+ auth_method = "bsdauth";
+
return (authok != 0);
}
@@ -1057,7 +1091,9 @@ mm_answer_pam_query(int sock, Buffer *m)
xfree(prompts);
if (echo_on != NULL)
xfree(echo_on);
- auth_method = "keyboard-interactive/pam";
+ auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
+ auth_submethod = "pam";
+
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m);
return (0);
}
@@ -1086,7 +1122,8 @@ mm_answer_pam_respond(int sock, Buffer *m)
buffer_clear(m);
buffer_put_int(m, ret);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m);
- auth_method = "keyboard-interactive/pam";
+ auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
+ auth_submethod= "pam";
if (ret == 0)
sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
return (0);
@@ -1100,7 +1137,8 @@ mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
(sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt);
buffer_clear(m);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
- auth_method = "keyboard-interactive/pam";
+ auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
+ auth_submethod = "pam";
return (sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt);
}
#endif
@@ -1178,7 +1216,8 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
hostbased_chost = chost;
} else {
/* Log failed attempt */
- auth_log(authctxt, 0, auth_method, compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
+ auth_log(authctxt, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL,
+ compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
xfree(blob);
xfree(cuser);
xfree(chost);
diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
index 906778f..2c84993 100644
--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@
#include "groupaccess.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "packet.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int);
static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int);
@@ -329,6 +331,7 @@ typedef enum {
sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate,
sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
+ sAuthenticationMethods,
sDeprecated, sUnsupported
} ServerOpCodes;
@@ -454,6 +457,7 @@ static struct {
{ "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
};
@@ -1498,6 +1502,24 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
}
return 0;
+ case sAuthenticationMethods:
+ if (*activep && options->num_auth_methods == 0) {
+ while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
+ if (options->num_auth_methods >=
+ MAX_AUTH_METHODS)
+ fatal("%s line %d: "
+ "too many authentication methods.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (auth2_methods_valid(arg, 0) != 0)
+ fatal("%s line %d: invalid "
+ "authentication method list.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ options->auth_methods[
+ options->num_auth_methods++] = xstrdup(arg);
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+
case sDeprecated:
logit("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s",
filename, linenum, arg);
@@ -1925,6 +1947,8 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowGroups, o->num_allow_groups, o->allow_groups);
dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyGroups, o->num_deny_groups, o->deny_groups);
dump_cfg_strarray(sAcceptEnv, o->num_accept_env, o->accept_env);
+ dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sAuthenticationMethods,
+ o->num_auth_methods, o->auth_methods);
/* other arguments */
for (i = 0; i < o->num_subsystems; i++)
diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
index 096d596..ef80eef 100644
--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#define MAX_ACCEPT_ENV 256 /* Max # of env vars. */
#define MAX_MATCH_GROUPS 256 /* Max # of groups for Match. */
#define MAX_AUTHKEYS_FILES 256 /* Max # of authorized_keys files. */
+#define MAX_AUTH_METHODS 256 /* Max # of AuthenticationMethods. */
/* permit_root_login */
#define PERMIT_NOT_SET -1
@@ -168,6 +169,9 @@ typedef struct {
char *authorized_principals_file;
char *version_addendum; /* Appended to SSH banner */
+
+ u_int num_auth_methods;
+ char *auth_methods[MAX_AUTH_METHODS];
} ServerOptions;
/* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
@@ -197,6 +201,7 @@ struct connection_info {
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_groups, num_allow_groups); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_groups, num_deny_groups); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(accept_env, num_accept_env); \
+ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(auth_methods, num_auth_methods); \
} while (0)
struct connection_info *get_connection_info(int, int);
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index d5ec4e6..cb4bdd3 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1333,6 +1333,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
int remote_port;
char *line;
int config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 };
+ u_int n;
u_int64_t ibytes, obytes;
mode_t new_umask;
Key *key;
@@ -1555,6 +1556,26 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
+ /*
+ * Check whether there is any path through configured auth methods.
+ * Unfortunately it is not possible to verify this generally before
+ * daemonisation in the presence of Match block, but this catches
+ * and warns for trivial misconfigurations that could break login.
+ */
+ if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
+ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1))
+ fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported with "
+ "SSH protocol 1");
+ for (n = 0; n < options.num_auth_methods; n++) {
+ if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[n],
+ 1) == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (n >= options.num_auth_methods)
+ fatal("AuthenticationMethods cannot be satisfied by "
+ "enabled authentication methods");
+ }
+
/* set default channel AF */
channel_set_af(options.address_family);
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index 314ecfb..ed81ac8 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -151,6 +151,28 @@ See
in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for more information on patterns.
+.It Cm AuthenticationMethods
+Specifies the authentication methods that must be successfully completed
+for a user to be granted access.
+This option must be followed by one or more comma-separated lists of
+authentication method names.
+Successful authentication requires completion of every method in at least
+one of these lists.
+.Pp
+For example, an argument of
+.Dq publickey,password publickey,keyboard-interactive
+would require the user to complete public key authentication, followed by
+either password or keyboard interactive authentication.
+Only methods that are next in one or more lists are offered at each stage,
+so for this example, it would not be possible to attempt password or
+keyboard-interactive authentication before public key.
+.Pp
+This option is only available for SSH protocol 2 and will yield a fatal
+error if enabled if protocol 1 is also enabled.
+Note that each authentication method listed should also be explicitly enabled
+in the configuration.
+The default is not to require multiple authentication; successful completion
+of a single authentication method is sufficient.
.It Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
Specifies the file that contains the public keys that can be used
for user authentication.
@@ -711,6 +733,7 @@ Available keywords are
.Cm AllowGroups ,
.Cm AllowTcpForwarding ,
.Cm AllowUsers ,
+.Cm AuthenticationMethods ,
.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile ,
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile ,
.Cm Banner ,

45
openssh-6.1p1-change-max-startups.patch
View File

@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
index 684fbb4..a230c7b 100644
--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
@@ -267,11 +267,11 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
if (options->gateway_ports == -1)
options->gateway_ports = 0;
if (options->max_startups == -1)
- options->max_startups = 10;
+ options->max_startups = 100;
if (options->max_startups_rate == -1)
- options->max_startups_rate = 100; /* 100% */
+ options->max_startups_rate = 30; /* 30% */
if (options->max_startups_begin == -1)
- options->max_startups_begin = options->max_startups;
+ options->max_startups_begin = 10;
if (options->max_authtries == -1)
options->max_authtries = DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX;
if (options->max_sessions == -1)
diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
index d1b85d0..5c03fd9 100644
--- a/sshd_config
+++ b/sshd_config
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox # Default for new installations.
#ShowPatchLevel no
#UseDNS yes
#PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid
-#MaxStartups 10
+#MaxStartups 10:30:100
#PermitTunnel no
#ChrootDirectory none
#VersionAddendum none
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index fd0d35a..f02f6cc 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -826,7 +826,7 @@ SSH daemon.
Additional connections will be dropped until authentication succeeds or the
.Cm LoginGraceTime
expires for a connection.
-The default is 10.
+The default is 10:30:100.
.Pp
Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by specifying
the three colon separated values

24
openssh-6.1p1-man-moduli.patch
View File

@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
diff -up openssh-6.1p1/moduli.0.man-moduli openssh-6.1p1/moduli.0
--- openssh-6.1p1/moduli.0.man-moduli 2012-11-06 09:42:13.677062887 +0100
+++ openssh-6.1p1/moduli.0 2012-11-06 09:42:58.693543381 +0100
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ DESCRIPTION
0 Unknown, not tested.
2 "Safe" prime; (p-1)/2 is also prime.
- 4 Sophie Germain; (p+1)*2 is also prime.
+ 4 Sophie Germain; (p*2)+1 is also prime.
Moduli candidates initially produced by ssh-keygen(1)
are Sophie Germain primes (type 4). Further primality
diff -up openssh-6.1p1/moduli.5.man-moduli openssh-6.1p1/moduli.5
--- openssh-6.1p1/moduli.5.man-moduli 2012-11-06 09:42:17.730035388 +0100
+++ openssh-6.1p1/moduli.5 2012-11-06 09:43:31.403180375 +0100
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ Unknown, not tested.
.It 2
"Safe" prime; (p-1)/2 is also prime.
.It 4
-Sophie Germain; (p+1)*2 is also prime.
+Sophie Germain; (p*2)+1 is also prime.
.El
.Pp
Moduli candidates initially produced by

22
openssh-6.1p1-required-authentications.patch
View File

@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
diff -up openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c.required-authentication openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c
--- openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c.required-authentication 2012-11-30 21:13:14.375382453 +0100
+++ openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c 2012-11-30 21:33:56.972017545 +0100
@@ -495,6 +495,8 @@ static struct {
{ "authorizedkeyscommandrunas", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "requiredauthentications1", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "requiredauthentications2", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
};
@@ -1560,6 +1562,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
return 0;
case sAuthenticationMethods:
+ if (strncasecmp(arg, "requiredauthentications", 23) == 0)
+ logit("%s line %d: Option %s is obsolete. Please use AuthenticationMethods",
+ filename, linenum, arg);
if (*activep && options->num_auth_methods == 0) {
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
if (options->num_auth_methods >=

644
openssh-6.2p1-audit1.patch
View File

@ -1,644 +0,0 @@
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/audit-bsm.c.audit1 openssh-6.2p1/audit-bsm.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/audit-bsm.c.audit1 2012-02-24 00:40:43.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/audit-bsm.c 2013-03-25 17:18:30.934758118 +0100
@@ -375,10 +375,23 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host,
#endif
}
-void
+int
audit_run_command(const char *command)
{
/* not implemented */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
+{
+ /* not implemented */
+}
+
+void
+audit_count_session_open(void)
+{
+ /* not necessary */
}
void
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/audit.c.audit1 openssh-6.2p1/audit.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/audit.c.audit1 2011-01-17 11:15:30.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/audit.c 2013-03-25 17:18:30.934758118 +0100
@@ -140,6 +140,17 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
}
/*
+ * Called when a child process has called, or will soon call,
+ * audit_session_open.
+ */
+void
+audit_count_session_open(void)
+{
+ debug("audit count session open euid %d user %s", geteuid(),
+ audit_username());
+}
+
+/*
* Called when a user session is started. Argument is the tty allocated to
* the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated.
*
@@ -174,13 +185,29 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li
/*
* This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command. Note that
* it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
- * multiple sessions within a single connection.
+ * multiple sessions within a single connection. Returns a "handle" for
+ * audit_end_command.
*/
-void
+int
audit_run_command(const char *command)
{
debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
audit_username(), command);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This will be called when the non-interactive command finishes. Note that
+ * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
+ * multiple sessions within a single connection. "handle" should come from
+ * the corresponding audit_run_command.
+ */
+void
+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
+{
+ debug("audit end nopty exec euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
+ audit_username(), command);
}
+
# endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/audit.h.audit1 openssh-6.2p1/audit.h
--- openssh-6.2p1/audit.h.audit1 2011-01-17 11:15:30.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/audit.h 2013-03-25 17:18:30.934758118 +0100
@@ -49,9 +49,11 @@ typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_au
void audit_connection_from(const char *, int);
void audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
+void audit_count_session_open(void);
void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *);
void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
-void audit_run_command(const char *);
+int audit_run_command(const char *);
+void audit_end_command(int, const char *);
ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
#endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/audit-linux.c.audit1 openssh-6.2p1/audit-linux.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/audit-linux.c.audit1 2011-01-17 11:15:30.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/audit-linux.c 2013-03-25 17:18:30.934758118 +0100
@@ -35,13 +35,20 @@
#include "log.h"
#include "audit.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
#include "canohost.h"
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+extern u_int utmp_len;
const char* audit_username(void);
-int
-linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username,
- const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success)
+static void
+linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username,
+ const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
{
int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
@@ -49,11 +56,11 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const
if (audit_fd < 0) {
if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
- return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */
+ return; /* No audit support in kernel */
else
- return 0; /* Must prevent login */
+ goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
}
- rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN,
+ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event,
NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
saved_errno = errno;
@@ -65,35 +72,119 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const
if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
rc = 0;
errno = saved_errno;
- return (rc >= 0);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+fatal_report:
+ fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+linux_audit_user_auth(int uid, const char *username,
+ const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
+{
+ int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
+ static const char *event_name[] = {
+ "maxtries exceeded",
+ "root denied",
+ "success",
+ "none",
+ "password",
+ "challenge-response",
+ "pubkey",
+ "hostbased",
+ "gssapi",
+ "invalid user",
+ "nologin",
+ "connection closed",
+ "connection abandoned",
+ "unknown"
+ };
+
+ audit_fd = audit_open();
+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
+ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
+ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ return; /* No audit support in kernel */
+ else
+ goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
+ }
+
+ if ((event < 0) || (event > SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN))
+ event = SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN;
+
+ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH,
+ NULL, event_name[event], username ? username : "(unknown)",
+ username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
+ saved_errno = errno;
+ close(audit_fd);
+ /*
+ * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non
+ * root user.
+ */
+ if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
+ rc = 0;
+ errno = saved_errno;
+ if (rc < 0) {
+fatal_report:
+ fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+ }
}
+static int user_login_count = 0;
+
/* Below is the sshd audit API code */
void
audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
{
-}
/* not implemented */
+}
-void
+int
audit_run_command(const char *command)
{
- /* not implemented */
+ if (!user_login_count++)
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
+{
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
+ if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
+}
+
+void
+audit_count_session_open(void)
+{
+ user_login_count++;
}
void
audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
{
- if (linux_audit_record_event(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
- NULL, li->line, 1) == 0)
- fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (!user_login_count++)
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
+ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
+ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
}
void
audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
{
- /* not implemented */
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
+ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
+ if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
+ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
}
void
@@ -101,21 +192,43 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
{
switch(event) {
case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS:
- case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
+ linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
+ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 1, event);
+ break;
+
case SSH_NOLOGIN:
- case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
+ linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
+ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, event);
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
+ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
break;
+ case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
+ linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
+ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, event);
+ break;
+
+ case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
+ if (user_login_count) {
+ while (user_login_count--)
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON:
case SSH_INVALID_USER:
- linux_audit_record_event(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
- get_remote_ipaddr(), "sshd", 0);
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
+ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
break;
default:
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/monitor.c.audit1 openssh-6.2p1/monitor.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/monitor.c.audit1 2013-03-25 17:18:30.913757986 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/monitor.c 2013-03-25 17:18:30.935758124 +0100
@@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *);
#endif
static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
@@ -272,6 +273,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
@@ -314,6 +316,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
@@ -1433,6 +1436,12 @@ mm_session_close(Session *s)
debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
session_pty_cleanup2(s);
}
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ if (s->command != NULL) {
+ debug3("%s: command %d", __func__, s->command_handle);
+ session_end_command2(s);
+ }
+#endif
session_unused(s->self);
}
@@ -1755,11 +1764,44 @@ mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buff
{
u_int len;
char *cmd;
+ Session *s;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+
/* sanity check command, if so how? */
- audit_run_command(cmd);
+ s = session_new();
+ if (s == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: error allocating a session", __func__);
+ s->command = cmd;
+ s->command_handle = audit_run_command(cmd);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, s->self);
+
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, m);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_audit_end_command(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ int handle;
+ u_int len;
+ char *cmd;
+ Session *s;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+ handle = buffer_get_int(m);
+ cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+
+ s = session_by_id(handle);
+ if (s == NULL || s->ttyfd != -1 || s->command == NULL ||
+ strcmp(s->command, cmd) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: invalid handle", __func__);
+ mm_session_close(s);
+
xfree(cmd);
return (0);
}
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/monitor.h.audit1 openssh-6.2p1/monitor.h
--- openssh-6.2p1/monitor.h.audit1 2013-03-25 17:18:30.935758124 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/monitor.h 2013-03-25 17:24:53.474078078 +0100
@@ -68,7 +68,9 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
- MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112,
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 114, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND = 115,
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 116
};
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit1 openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit1 2013-03-25 17:18:30.913757986 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.c 2013-03-25 17:18:30.936758131 +0100
@@ -1189,10 +1189,11 @@ mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
buffer_free(&m);
}
-void
+int
mm_audit_run_command(const char *command)
{
Buffer m;
+ int handle;
debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
@@ -1200,6 +1201,26 @@ mm_audit_run_command(const char *command
buffer_put_cstring(&m, command);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
+
+ handle = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ return (handle);
+}
+
+void
+mm_audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+
+ debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, handle);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, command);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, &m);
buffer_free(&m);
}
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit1 openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.h
--- openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit1 2011-06-20 06:42:23.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.h 2013-03-25 17:18:30.936758131 +0100
@@ -74,7 +74,8 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
#include "audit.h"
void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
-void mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
+int mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
+void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *);
#endif
struct Session;
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/session.c.audit1 openssh-6.2p1/session.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/session.c.audit1 2013-03-15 01:22:37.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/session.c 2013-03-25 17:18:30.937758137 +0100
@@ -745,6 +745,14 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm
/* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */
close(ttyfd);
+#ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+ /* do_login in the child did not affect state in this process,
+ compensate. From an architectural standpoint, this is extremely
+ ugly. */
+ if (!(options.use_login && command == NULL))
+ audit_count_session_open();
+#endif
+
/* Enter interactive session. */
s->ptymaster = ptymaster;
packet_set_interactive(1,
@@ -816,15 +824,19 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
}
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1)
+ fatal("do_exec: command already set");
if (command != NULL)
- PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
+ s->command = xstrdup(command);
else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell;
if (shell[0] == '\0') /* empty shell means /bin/sh */
shell =_PATH_BSHELL;
- PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell));
+ s->command = xstrdup(shell);
}
+ if (s->command != NULL)
+ s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(s->command));
#endif
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
ret = do_exec_pty(s, command);
@@ -1856,6 +1868,7 @@ session_unused(int id)
sessions[id].ttyfd = -1;
sessions[id].ptymaster = -1;
sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL;
+ sessions[id].command_handle = -1;
sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused;
sessions_first_unused = id;
}
@@ -1938,6 +1951,19 @@ session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int cha
}
Session *
+session_by_id(int id)
+{
+ if (id >= 0 && id < sessions_nalloc) {
+ Session *s = &sessions[id];
+ if (s->used)
+ return s;
+ }
+ debug("session_by_id: unknown id %d", id);
+ session_dump();
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+Session *
session_by_tty(char *tty)
{
int i;
@@ -2463,6 +2489,30 @@ session_exit_message(Session *s, int sta
chan_write_failed(c);
}
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+void
+session_end_command2(Session *s)
+{
+ if (s->command != NULL) {
+ audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command);
+ xfree(s->command);
+ s->command = NULL;
+ s->command_handle = -1;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+session_end_command(Session *s)
+{
+ if (s->command != NULL) {
+ PRIVSEP(audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command));
+ xfree(s->command);
+ s->command = NULL;
+ s->command_handle = -1;
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
void
session_close(Session *s)
{
@@ -2471,6 +2521,10 @@ session_close(Session *s)
debug("session_close: session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid);
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
session_pty_cleanup(s);
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ if (s->command)
+ session_end_command(s);
+#endif
if (s->term)
xfree(s->term);
if (s->display)
@@ -2690,6 +2744,15 @@ do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt)
server_loop2(authctxt);
}
+static void
+do_cleanup_one_session(Session *s)
+{
+ session_pty_cleanup2(s);
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ session_end_command2(s);
+#endif
+}
+
void
do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
@@ -2738,5 +2801,5 @@ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
* or if running in monitor.
*/
if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
- session_destroy_all(session_pty_cleanup2);
+ session_destroy_all(do_cleanup_one_session);
}
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/session.h.audit1 openssh-6.2p1/session.h
--- openssh-6.2p1/session.h.audit1 2008-05-19 07:34:50.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-6.2p1/session.h 2013-03-25 17:18:30.937758137 +0100
@@ -60,6 +60,12 @@ struct Session {
char *name;
char *val;
} *env;
+
+ /* exec */
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ int command_handle;
+ char *command;
+#endif
};
void do_authenticated(Authctxt *);
@@ -72,8 +78,10 @@ void session_close_by_pid(pid_t, int);
void session_close_by_channel(int, void *);
void session_destroy_all(void (*)(Session *));
void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *);
+void session_end_command2(Session *);
Session *session_new(void);
+Session *session_by_id(int);
Session *session_by_tty(char *);
void session_close(Session *);
void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c.audit1 openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c.audit1 2013-03-25 17:18:30.919758024 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c 2013-03-25 17:18:30.937758137 +0100
@@ -2409,7 +2409,8 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
}
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
- if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
+ if ((the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) &&
+ (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
#endif
_exit(i);

534
openssh-6.2p1-audit3.patch
View File

@ -1,534 +0,0 @@
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/audit-bsm.c.audit3 openssh-6.2p1/audit-bsm.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/audit-bsm.c.audit3 2013-03-25 17:30:41.329102631 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/audit-bsm.c 2013-03-25 17:30:41.338102682 +0100
@@ -473,4 +473,16 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
}
}
+
+void
+audit_unsupported_body(int what)
+{
+ /* not implemented */
+}
+
+void
+audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+ /* not implemented */
+}
#endif /* BSM */
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/audit.c.audit3 openssh-6.2p1/audit.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/audit.c.audit3 2013-03-25 17:30:41.330102636 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/audit.c 2013-03-25 17:30:41.339102688 +0100
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
@@ -36,6 +37,8 @@
#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
/*
@@ -128,6 +131,18 @@ audit_key(int host_user, int *rv, const
xfree(fp);
}
+void
+audit_unsupported(int what)
+{
+ PRIVSEP(audit_unsupported_body(what));
+}
+
+void
+audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp)
+{
+ PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, getpid(), getuid()));
+}
+
# ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
/*
* Null implementations of audit functions.
@@ -238,5 +253,26 @@ audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char
host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(), type, bits,
key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, rv);
}
+
+/*
+ * This will be called when the protocol negotiation fails.
+ */
+void
+audit_unsupported_body(int what)
+{
+ debug("audit unsupported protocol euid %d type %d", geteuid(), what);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This will be called on succesfull protocol negotiation.
+ */
+void
+audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
+ uid_t uid)
+{
+ debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s from pid %ld uid %u",
+ (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, (long)pid,
+ (unsigned)uid);
+}
# endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/audit.h.audit3 openssh-6.2p1/audit.h
--- openssh-6.2p1/audit.h.audit3 2013-03-25 17:30:41.330102636 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/audit.h 2013-03-25 17:30:41.339102688 +0100
@@ -58,5 +58,9 @@ void audit_end_command(int, const char
ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
int audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int);
void audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);
+void audit_unsupported(int);
+void audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *);
+void audit_unsupported_body(int);
+void audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
#endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/audit-linux.c.audit3 openssh-6.2p1/audit-linux.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/audit-linux.c.audit3 2013-03-25 17:30:41.331102642 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/audit-linux.c 2013-03-25 17:30:41.339102688 +0100
@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@
#include "auth.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "canohost.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
#define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 128
@@ -269,4 +271,60 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
}
}
+void
+audit_unsupported_body(int what)
+{
+#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ const static char *name[] = { "cipher", "mac", "comp" };
+ char *s;
+ int audit_fd;
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=unsupported-%s direction=? cipher=? ksize=? rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
+ name[what], get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())),
+ get_local_port());
+ xfree(s);
+ audit_fd = audit_open();
+ if (audit_fd < 0)
+ /* no problem, the next instruction will be fatal() */
+ return;
+ audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION,
+ buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 0);
+ audit_close(audit_fd);
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
+ uid_t uid)
+{
+#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ int audit_fd, audit_ok;
+ const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
+ Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc);
+ char *s;
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=start direction=%s cipher=%s ksize=%d spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
+ direction[ctos], enc, cipher ? 8 * cipher->key_len : 0,
+ (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid,
+ get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), get_local_port());
+ xfree(s);
+ audit_fd = audit_open();
+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
+ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
+ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ return; /* No audit support in kernel */
+ else
+ fatal("cannot open audit"); /* Must prevent login */
+ }
+ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION,
+ buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1);
+ audit_close(audit_fd);
+ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
+ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+ fatal("cannot write into audit"); /* Must prevent login */
+#endif
+}
+
#endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/auditstub.c.audit3 openssh-6.2p1/auditstub.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/auditstub.c.audit3 2013-03-25 17:30:41.340102694 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/auditstub.c 2013-03-25 17:30:41.340102694 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+/* $Id: auditstub.c,v 1.1 jfch Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Use is subject to license terms.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
+ */
+
+void
+audit_unsupported(int n)
+{
+}
+
+void
+audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp)
+{
+}
+
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/cipher.c.audit3 openssh-6.2p1/cipher.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/cipher.c.audit3 2013-03-25 17:30:41.340102694 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/cipher.c 2013-03-25 17:32:33.117743548 +0100
@@ -58,17 +58,7 @@ extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_bf(voi
extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(void);
extern void ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int);
-struct Cipher {
- char *name;
- int number; /* for ssh1 only */
- u_int block_size;
- u_int key_len;
- u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */
- u_int auth_len;
- u_int discard_len;
- u_int cbc_mode;
- const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void);
-} ciphers[] = {
+struct Cipher ciphers[] = {
{ "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null },
{ "des", SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc },
{ "3des", SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_3des },
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/cipher.h.audit3 openssh-6.2p1/cipher.h
--- openssh-6.2p1/cipher.h.audit3 2013-03-25 17:30:41.341102699 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/cipher.h 2013-03-25 17:32:45.338813408 +0100
@@ -61,7 +61,18 @@
typedef struct Cipher Cipher;
typedef struct CipherContext CipherContext;
-struct Cipher;
+struct Cipher {
+ char *name;
+ int number; /* for ssh1 only */
+ u_int block_size;
+ u_int key_len;
+ u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */
+ u_int auth_len;
+ u_int discard_len;
+ u_int cbc_mode;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void);
+};
+
struct CipherContext {
int plaintext;
int encrypt;
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/kex.c.audit3 openssh-6.2p1/kex.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/kex.c.audit3 2013-01-09 06:12:19.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/kex.c 2013-03-25 17:33:40.352129450 +0100
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "monitor.h"
#include "roaming.h"
+#include "audit.h"
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
# if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
@@ -296,9 +297,13 @@ static void
choose_enc(Enc *enc, char *client, char *server)
{
char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
- if (name == NULL)
+ if (name == NULL) {
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ audit_unsupported(0);
+#endif
fatal("no matching cipher found: client %s server %s",
client, server);
+ }
if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL)
fatal("matching cipher is not supported: %s", name);
enc->name = name;
@@ -314,9 +319,13 @@ static void
choose_mac(Mac *mac, char *client, char *server)
{
char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
- if (name == NULL)
+ if (name == NULL) {
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ audit_unsupported(1);
+#endif
fatal("no matching mac found: client %s server %s",
client, server);
+ }
if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0)
fatal("unsupported mac %s", name);
/* truncate the key */
@@ -331,8 +340,12 @@ static void
choose_comp(Comp *comp, char *client, char *server)
{
char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
- if (name == NULL)
+ if (name == NULL) {
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ audit_unsupported(2);
+#endif
fatal("no matching comp found: client %s server %s", client, server);
+ }
if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) {
comp->type = COMP_DELAYED;
} else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) {
@@ -460,6 +473,9 @@ kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex)
newkeys->enc.name,
authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "<implicit>",
newkeys->comp.name);
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ audit_kex(ctos, newkeys->enc.name, newkeys->mac.name, newkeys->comp.name);
+#endif
}
choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/Makefile.in.audit3 openssh-6.2p1/Makefile.in
--- openssh-6.2p1/Makefile.in.audit3 2013-03-25 17:30:41.337102676 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/Makefile.in 2013-03-25 17:33:18.833004685 +0100
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o
monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \
msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
- jpake.o schnorr.o ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o
+ jpake.o schnorr.o ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o auditstub.o
SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/monitor.c.audit3 openssh-6.2p1/monitor.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/monitor.c.audit3 2013-03-25 17:30:41.333102653 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/monitor.c 2013-03-25 17:30:41.344102717 +0100
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "jpake.h"
#include "roaming.h"
+#include "audit.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
@@ -186,6 +187,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *
int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *);
#endif
static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
@@ -237,6 +240,8 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
#endif
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
{MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
@@ -274,6 +279,8 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
@@ -305,6 +312,8 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[]
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
@@ -317,6 +326,8 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
@@ -2397,3 +2408,47 @@ mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int sock,
}
#endif /* JPAKE */
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+int
+mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ int what;
+
+ what = buffer_get_int(m);
+
+ audit_unsupported_body(what);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, m);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ int ctos, len;
+ char *cipher, *mac, *compress;
+ pid_t pid;
+ uid_t uid;
+
+ ctos = buffer_get_int(m);
+ cipher = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ mac = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ compress = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ pid = buffer_get_int64(m);
+ uid = buffer_get_int64(m);
+
+ audit_kex_body(ctos, cipher, mac, compress, pid, uid);
+
+ xfree(cipher);
+ xfree(mac);
+ xfree(compress);
+ buffer_clear(m);
+
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, m);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/monitor.h.audit3 openssh-6.2p1/monitor.h
--- openssh-6.2p1/monitor.h.audit3 2013-03-25 17:30:41.345102722 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/monitor.h 2013-03-25 17:31:57.314538661 +0100
@@ -70,7 +70,9 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112,
MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 114, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND = 115,
- MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 116
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 116,
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 118, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 119,
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX = 120, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX = 121
};
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit3 openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit3 2013-03-25 17:30:41.334102659 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.c 2013-03-25 17:30:41.346102728 +0100
@@ -1486,3 +1486,41 @@ mm_jpake_check_confirm(const BIGNUM *k,
return success;
}
#endif /* JPAKE */
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+void
+mm_audit_unsupported_body(int what)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, what);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, &m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED,
+ &m);
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+void
+mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
+ uid_t uid)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, ctos);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, cipher);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, mac);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, compress);
+ buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
+ buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, &m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX,
+ &m);
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+}
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit3 openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.h
--- openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit3 2013-03-25 17:30:41.334102659 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.h 2013-03-25 17:30:41.346102728 +0100
@@ -77,6 +77,8 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
int mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *);
+void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
+void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
#endif
struct Session;
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c.audit3 openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c.audit3 2013-03-25 17:30:41.326102613 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c 2013-03-25 17:30:41.348102740 +0100
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "roaming.h"
+#include "audit.h"
#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
#include "version.h"
@@ -2241,6 +2242,10 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char())
packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match.");
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ audit_kex(2, cipher_name(cipher_type), "crc", "none");
+#endif
+
debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type));
/* Get the encrypted integer. */

666
openssh-6.2p1-audit4.patch
View File

@ -1,666 +0,0 @@
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/audit-bsm.c.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/audit-bsm.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/audit-bsm.c.audit4 2013-03-25 17:34:16.034337746 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/audit-bsm.c 2013-03-25 17:34:16.042337793 +0100
@@ -485,4 +485,10 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char
{
/* not implemented */
}
+
+void
+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+ /* not implemented */
+}
#endif /* BSM */
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/audit.c.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/audit.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/audit.c.audit4 2013-03-25 17:34:16.035337752 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/audit.c 2013-03-25 17:34:16.042337793 +0100
@@ -143,6 +143,12 @@ audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac
PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, getpid(), getuid()));
}
+void
+audit_session_key_free(int ctos)
+{
+ PRIVSEP(audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, getpid(), getuid()));
+}
+
# ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
/*
* Null implementations of audit functions.
@@ -274,5 +280,15 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char
(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, (long)pid,
(unsigned)uid);
}
+
+/*
+ * This will be called on succesfull session key discard
+ */
+void
+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+ debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u",
+ (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
+}
# endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/audit.h.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/audit.h
--- openssh-6.2p1/audit.h.audit4 2013-03-25 17:34:16.035337752 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/audit.h 2013-03-25 17:34:16.043337799 +0100
@@ -62,5 +62,7 @@ void audit_unsupported(int);
void audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *);
void audit_unsupported_body(int);
void audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+void audit_session_key_free(int ctos);
+void audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
#endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/audit-linux.c.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/audit-linux.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/audit-linux.c.audit4 2013-03-25 17:34:16.035337752 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/audit-linux.c 2013-03-25 17:34:16.043337799 +0100
@@ -294,6 +294,8 @@ audit_unsupported_body(int what)
#endif
}
+const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
+
void
audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
uid_t uid)
@@ -301,7 +303,6 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char
#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
int audit_fd, audit_ok;
- const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc);
char *s;
@@ -327,4 +328,32 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char
#endif
}
+void
+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ int audit_fd, audit_ok;
+ char *s;
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=session fp=? direction=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
+ direction[ctos], (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid,
+ get_remote_port(),
+ (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())),
+ get_local_port());
+ xfree(s);
+ audit_fd = audit_open();
+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
+ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
+ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ error("cannot open audit");
+ return;
+ }
+ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
+ buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1);
+ audit_close(audit_fd);
+ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
+ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+ error("cannot write into audit");
+}
+
#endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/auditstub.c.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/auditstub.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/auditstub.c.audit4 2013-03-25 17:34:16.035337752 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/auditstub.c 2013-03-25 17:34:16.043337799 +0100
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
* Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
*/
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
void
audit_unsupported(int n)
{
@@ -37,3 +39,12 @@ audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac
{
}
+void
+audit_session_key_free(int ctos)
+{
+}
+
+void
+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+}
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/kex.c.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/kex.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/kex.c.audit4 2013-03-25 17:34:16.036337758 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/kex.c 2013-03-25 17:34:16.044337804 +0100
@@ -640,3 +640,34 @@ dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, i
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
#endif
+
+static void
+enc_destroy(Enc *enc)
+{
+ if (enc == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ if (enc->key) {
+ memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len);
+ xfree(enc->key);
+ }
+
+ if (enc->iv) {
+ memset(enc->iv, 0, enc->block_size);
+ xfree(enc->iv);
+ }
+
+ memset(enc, 0, sizeof(*enc));
+}
+
+void
+newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys)
+{
+ if (newkeys == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ enc_destroy(&newkeys->enc);
+ mac_destroy(&newkeys->mac);
+ memset(&newkeys->comp, 0, sizeof(newkeys->comp));
+}
+
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/kex.h.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/kex.h
--- openssh-6.2p1/kex.h.audit4 2013-01-09 06:12:19.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/kex.h 2013-03-25 17:34:16.044337804 +0100
@@ -158,6 +158,8 @@ void kexgex_server(Kex *);
void kexecdh_client(Kex *);
void kexecdh_server(Kex *);
+void newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys);
+
void
kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,
BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/mac.c.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/mac.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/mac.c.audit4 2012-12-12 01:00:37.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/mac.c 2013-03-25 17:34:16.044337804 +0100
@@ -199,6 +199,20 @@ mac_clear(Mac *mac)
mac->umac_ctx = NULL;
}
+void
+mac_destroy(Mac *mac)
+{
+ if (mac == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ if (mac->key) {
+ memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len);
+ xfree(mac->key);
+ }
+
+ memset(mac, 0, sizeof(*mac));
+}
+
/* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */
#define MAC_SEP ","
int
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/mac.h.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/mac.h
--- openssh-6.2p1/mac.h.audit4 2007-06-11 06:01:42.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-6.2p1/mac.h 2013-03-25 17:34:16.045337810 +0100
@@ -28,3 +28,4 @@ int mac_setup(Mac *, char *);
int mac_init(Mac *);
u_char *mac_compute(Mac *, u_int32_t, u_char *, int);
void mac_clear(Mac *);
+void mac_destroy(Mac *);
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/monitor.c.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/monitor.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/monitor.c.audit4 2013-03-25 17:34:16.037337763 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/monitor.c 2013-03-25 17:34:16.046337816 +0100
@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer
int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int, Buffer *);
#endif
static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
@@ -242,6 +243,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
#endif
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
{MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
@@ -281,6 +283,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
@@ -314,6 +317,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[]
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
@@ -328,6 +332,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
@@ -1957,11 +1962,13 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor
blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+ memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
xfree(blob);
debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __func__);
blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+ memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
xfree(blob);
/* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */
@@ -2007,6 +2014,21 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor
}
buffer_free(&m);
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ if (compat20) {
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd,
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m);
+ mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
+ while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
+ ;
+
}
@@ -2451,4 +2473,22 @@ mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, Buffe
return 0;
}
+int
+mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ int ctos;
+ pid_t pid;
+ uid_t uid;
+
+ ctos = buffer_get_int(m);
+ pid = buffer_get_int64(m);
+ uid = buffer_get_int64(m);
+
+ audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, pid, uid);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m);
+ return 0;
+}
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/monitor.h.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/monitor.h
--- openssh-6.2p1/monitor.h.audit4 2013-03-25 17:34:16.046337816 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/monitor.h 2013-03-25 17:35:01.408602217 +0100
@@ -72,7 +72,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 114, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND = 115,
MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 116,
MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 118, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 119,
- MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX = 120, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX = 121
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX = 120, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX = 121,
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 122, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 123
};
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit4 2013-03-25 17:34:16.038337769 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.c 2013-03-25 17:34:16.047337822 +0100
@@ -654,12 +654,14 @@ mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor
fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__);
buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);
+ memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
xfree(blob);
if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_IN, &blob, &bloblen))
fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__);
buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);
+ memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
xfree(blob);
packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, &seqnr, &blocks, &packets, &bytes);
@@ -1523,4 +1525,19 @@ mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher
buffer_free(&m);
}
+
+void
+mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, ctos);
+ buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
+ buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE,
+ &m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+}
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.h
--- openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit4 2013-03-25 17:34:16.039337775 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.h 2013-03-25 17:34:16.047337822 +0100
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ int mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *);
void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t);
#endif
struct Session;
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/packet.c.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/packet.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/packet.c.audit4 2013-03-25 17:34:16.014337629 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/packet.c 2013-03-25 17:42:26.519176337 +0100
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
#include <signal.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "audit.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "crc32.h"
@@ -470,6 +471,13 @@ packet_get_connection_out(void)
return active_state->connection_out;
}
+static int
+packet_state_has_keys (const struct session_state *state)
+{
+ return state != NULL &&
+ (state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL || state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL);
+}
+
/* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */
void
@@ -478,13 +486,6 @@ packet_close(void)
if (!active_state->initialized)
return;
active_state->initialized = 0;
- if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) {
- shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
- close(active_state->connection_out);
- } else {
- close(active_state->connection_in);
- close(active_state->connection_out);
- }
buffer_free(&active_state->input);
buffer_free(&active_state->output);
buffer_free(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
@@ -493,8 +494,18 @@ packet_close(void)
buffer_free(&active_state->compression_buffer);
buffer_compress_uninit();
}
- cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context);
- cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context);
+ if (packet_state_has_keys(active_state)) {
+ cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context);
+ cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context);
+ audit_session_key_free(2);
+ }
+ if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) {
+ shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
+ close(active_state->connection_out);
+ } else {
+ close(active_state->connection_in);
+ close(active_state->connection_out);
+ }
}
/* Sets remote side protocol flags. */
@@ -729,6 +740,23 @@ packet_send1(void)
*/
}
+static void
+newkeys_destroy_and_free(Newkeys *newkeys)
+{
+ if (newkeys == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ xfree(newkeys->enc.name);
+
+ mac_clear(&newkeys->mac);
+ xfree(newkeys->mac.name);
+
+ xfree(newkeys->comp.name);
+
+ newkeys_destroy(newkeys);
+ xfree(newkeys);
+}
+
void
set_newkeys(int mode)
{
@@ -754,21 +782,9 @@ set_newkeys(int mode)
}
if (active_state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) {
debug("set_newkeys: rekeying");
+ audit_session_key_free(mode);
cipher_cleanup(cc);
- enc = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
- mac = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
- comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
- mac_clear(mac);
- memset(enc->iv, 0, enc->iv_len);
- memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len);
- memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len);
- xfree(enc->name);
- xfree(enc->iv);
- xfree(enc->key);
- xfree(mac->name);
- xfree(mac->key);
- xfree(comp->name);
- xfree(active_state->newkeys[mode]);
+ newkeys_destroy_and_free(active_state->newkeys[mode]);
}
active_state->newkeys[mode] = kex_get_newkeys(mode);
if (active_state->newkeys[mode] == NULL)
@@ -1971,6 +1987,47 @@ packet_get_newkeys(int mode)
return (void *)active_state->newkeys[mode];
}
+static void
+packet_destroy_state(struct session_state *state)
+{
+ if (state == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ cipher_cleanup(&state->receive_context);
+ cipher_cleanup(&state->send_context);
+
+ buffer_free(&state->input);
+ buffer_free(&state->output);
+ buffer_free(&state->outgoing_packet);
+ buffer_free(&state->incoming_packet);
+ buffer_free(&state->compression_buffer);
+ newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_IN]);
+ state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = NULL;
+ newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]);
+ state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
+ mac_destroy(state->packet_discard_mac);
+// TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing;
+// memset(state, 0, sizeof(state));
+}
+
+void
+packet_destroy_all(int audit_it, int privsep)
+{
+ if (audit_it)
+ audit_it = packet_state_has_keys (active_state) ||
+ packet_state_has_keys (backup_state);
+ packet_destroy_state(active_state);
+ packet_destroy_state(backup_state);
+ if (audit_it) {
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ if (privsep)
+ audit_session_key_free(2);
+ else
+ audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid());
+#endif
+ }
+}
+
/*
* Save the state for the real connection, and use a separate state when
* resuming a suspended connection.
@@ -1978,18 +2035,12 @@ packet_get_newkeys(int mode)
void
packet_backup_state(void)
{
- struct session_state *tmp;
-
close(active_state->connection_in);
active_state->connection_in = -1;
close(active_state->connection_out);
active_state->connection_out = -1;
- if (backup_state)
- tmp = backup_state;
- else
- tmp = alloc_session_state();
backup_state = active_state;
- active_state = tmp;
+ active_state = alloc_session_state();
}
/*
@@ -2006,9 +2057,7 @@ packet_restore_state(void)
backup_state = active_state;
active_state = tmp;
active_state->connection_in = backup_state->connection_in;
- backup_state->connection_in = -1;
active_state->connection_out = backup_state->connection_out;
- backup_state->connection_out = -1;
len = buffer_len(&backup_state->input);
if (len > 0) {
buf = buffer_ptr(&backup_state->input);
@@ -2016,4 +2065,10 @@ packet_restore_state(void)
buffer_clear(&backup_state->input);
add_recv_bytes(len);
}
+ backup_state->connection_in = -1;
+ backup_state->connection_out = -1;
+ packet_destroy_state(backup_state);
+ xfree(backup_state);
+ backup_state = NULL;
}
+
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/packet.h.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/packet.h
--- openssh-6.2p1/packet.h.audit4 2012-02-10 22:19:21.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/packet.h 2013-03-25 17:34:16.049337834 +0100
@@ -123,4 +123,5 @@ void packet_restore_state(void);
void *packet_get_input(void);
void *packet_get_output(void);
+void packet_destroy_all(int, int);
#endif /* PACKET_H */
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/session.c.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/session.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/session.c.audit4 2013-03-25 17:34:16.023337682 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/session.c 2013-03-25 17:34:16.050337839 +0100
@@ -1642,6 +1642,9 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
destroy_sensitive_data();
+ /* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
+ monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
+ packet_destroy_all(0, 1);
/* Force a password change */
if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c.audit4 openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c.audit4 2013-03-25 17:34:16.039337775 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c 2013-03-25 17:34:16.050337839 +0100
@@ -701,6 +701,8 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
}
}
+extern Newkeys *current_keys[];
+
static void
privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
@@ -725,6 +727,10 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
+ newkeys_destroy(current_keys[MODE_OUT]);
+ newkeys_destroy(current_keys[MODE_IN]);
+ audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid());
+ packet_destroy_all(0, 0);
monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor);
/* NEVERREACHED */
@@ -2033,6 +2039,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
*/
if (use_privsep) {
mm_send_keystate(pmonitor);
+ packet_destroy_all(1, 1);
exit(0);
}
@@ -2085,6 +2092,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
do_authenticated(authctxt);
/* The connection has been terminated. */
+ packet_destroy_all(1, 1);
+
packet_get_state(MODE_IN, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ibytes);
packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, NULL, NULL, NULL, &obytes);
verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes",
@@ -2402,6 +2411,16 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
void
cleanup_exit(int i)
{
+ static int in_cleanup = 0;
+ int is_privsep_child;
+
+ /* cleanup_exit can be called at the very least from the privsep
+ wrappers used for auditing. Make sure we don't recurse
+ indefinitely. */
+ if (in_cleanup)
+ _exit(i);
+ in_cleanup = 1;
+
if (the_authctxt) {
do_cleanup(the_authctxt);
if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) {
@@ -2412,6 +2431,8 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno));
}
}
+ is_privsep_child = use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && !mm_is_monitor();
+ packet_destroy_all(1, is_privsep_child);
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
if ((the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) &&

488
openssh-6.2p1-audit5.patch
View File

@ -1,488 +0,0 @@
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/audit-bsm.c.audit5 openssh-6.2p1/audit-bsm.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/audit-bsm.c.audit5 2013-03-25 17:43:27.495526587 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/audit-bsm.c 2013-03-25 17:43:27.502526627 +0100
@@ -491,4 +491,22 @@ audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pi
{
/* not implemented */
}
+
+void
+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp)
+{
+ /* not implemented */
+}
+
+void
+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+ /* not implemented */
+}
+
+void
+audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp)
+{
+ /* not implemented */
+}
#endif /* BSM */
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/audit.c.audit5 openssh-6.2p1/audit.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/audit.c.audit5 2013-03-25 17:43:27.495526587 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/audit.c 2013-03-25 17:43:27.502526627 +0100
@@ -290,5 +290,24 @@ audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pi
debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u",
(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
}
+
+/*
+ * This will be called on destroy private part of the server key
+ */
+void
+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+ debug("audit destroy sensitive data euid %d fingerprint %s from pid %ld uid %u",
+ geteuid(), fp, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This will be called on generation of the ephemeral server key
+ */
+void
+audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *)
+{
+ debug("audit create ephemeral server key euid %d fingerprint %s", geteuid(), fp);
+}
# endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/audit.h.audit5 openssh-6.2p1/audit.h
--- openssh-6.2p1/audit.h.audit5 2013-03-25 17:43:27.496526593 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/audit.h 2013-03-25 17:43:27.502526627 +0100
@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ enum ssh_audit_event_type {
};
typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t;
+int listening_for_clients(void);
+
void audit_connection_from(const char *, int);
void audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
void audit_count_session_open(void);
@@ -64,5 +66,7 @@ void audit_unsupported_body(int);
void audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
void audit_session_key_free(int ctos);
void audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
+void audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+void audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *);
#endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/audit-linux.c.audit5 openssh-6.2p1/audit-linux.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/audit-linux.c.audit5 2013-03-25 17:43:27.496526593 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/audit-linux.c 2013-03-25 17:43:27.503526633 +0100
@@ -356,4 +356,50 @@ audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pi
error("cannot write into audit");
}
+void
+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ int audit_fd, audit_ok;
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=server fp=%s direction=? spid=%jd suid=%jd ",
+ fp, (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid);
+ audit_fd = audit_open();
+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
+ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
+ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ error("cannot open audit");
+ return;
+ }
+ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
+ buf, NULL,
+ listening_for_clients() ? NULL : get_remote_ipaddr(),
+ NULL, 1);
+ audit_close(audit_fd);
+ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
+ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+ error("cannot write into audit");
+}
+
+void
+audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp)
+{
+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ int audit_fd, audit_ok;
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=create kind=server fp=%s direction=? ", fp);
+ audit_fd = audit_open();
+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
+ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
+ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ error("cannot open audit");
+ return;
+ }
+ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
+ buf, NULL, 0, NULL, 1);
+ audit_close(audit_fd);
+ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
+ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+ error("cannot write into audit");
+}
#endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/key.c.audit5 openssh-6.2p1/key.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/key.c.audit5 2013-03-25 17:43:27.465526415 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/key.c 2013-03-25 17:43:27.503526633 +0100
@@ -1809,6 +1809,30 @@ key_demote(const Key *k)
}
int
+key_is_private(const Key *k)
+{
+ switch (k->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ return k->rsa->d != NULL;
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ return k->dsa->priv_key != NULL;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa) != NULL;
+#endif
+ default:
+ fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type);
+ return 1;
+ }
+}
+
+int
key_is_cert(const Key *k)
{
if (k == NULL)
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/key.h.audit5 openssh-6.2p1/key.h
--- openssh-6.2p1/key.h.audit5 2013-03-25 17:43:27.465526415 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/key.h 2013-03-25 17:43:27.503526633 +0100
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ Key *key_generate(int, u_int);
Key *key_from_private(const Key *);
int key_type_from_name(char *);
int key_is_cert(const Key *);
+int key_is_private(const Key *k);
int key_type_plain(int);
int key_to_certified(Key *, int);
int key_drop_cert(Key *);
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/monitor.c.audit5 openssh-6.2p1/monitor.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/monitor.c.audit5 2013-03-25 17:43:27.497526599 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/monitor.c 2013-03-25 17:43:27.504526639 +0100
@@ -114,6 +114,8 @@ extern Buffer auth_debug;
extern int auth_debug_init;
extern Buffer loginmsg;
+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int);
+
/* State exported from the child */
struct {
@@ -190,6 +192,7 @@ int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buf
int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int, Buffer *);
#endif
static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
@@ -244,6 +247,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
#endif
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
{MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
@@ -284,6 +288,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
@@ -318,6 +323,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[]
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
@@ -333,6 +339,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
@@ -1752,6 +1759,8 @@ mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
sshpam_cleanup();
#endif
+ destroy_sensitive_data(0);
+
while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
if (errno != EINTR)
exit(1);
@@ -2491,4 +2500,25 @@ mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(in
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m);
return 0;
}
+
+int
+mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ int len;
+ char *fp;
+ pid_t pid;
+ uid_t uid;
+
+ fp = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ pid = buffer_get_int64(m);
+ uid = buffer_get_int64(m);
+
+ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid);
+
+ xfree(fp);
+ buffer_clear(m);
+
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m);
+ return 0;
+}
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/monitor.h.audit5 openssh-6.2p1/monitor.h
--- openssh-6.2p1/monitor.h.audit5 2013-03-25 17:43:27.504526639 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/monitor.h 2013-03-25 17:44:08.717763090 +0100
@@ -73,7 +73,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 116,
MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 118, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 119,
MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX = 120, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX = 121,
- MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 122, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 123
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 122, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 123,
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 124, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 125
};
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit5 openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit5 2013-03-25 17:43:27.498526604 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.c 2013-03-25 17:43:27.505526645 +0100
@@ -1540,4 +1540,20 @@ mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos,
&m);
buffer_free(&m);
}
+
+void
+mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, fp);
+ buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
+ buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, &m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE,
+ &m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+}
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit5 openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.h
--- openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit5 2013-03-25 17:43:27.498526604 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/monitor_wrap.h 2013-03-25 17:43:27.505526645 +0100
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ void mm_audit_end_command(int, const cha
void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t);
+void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
#endif
struct Session;
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/session.c.audit5 openssh-6.2p1/session.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/session.c.audit5 2013-03-25 17:43:27.499526610 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/session.c 2013-03-25 17:43:27.506526650 +0100
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ extern int log_stderr;
extern int debug_flag;
extern u_int utmp_len;
extern int startup_pipe;
-extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int);
extern Buffer loginmsg;
/* original command from peer. */
@@ -1641,7 +1641,7 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
int r = 0;
/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
- destroy_sensitive_data();
+ destroy_sensitive_data(1);
/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
packet_destroy_all(0, 1);
diff -up openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c.audit5 openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c.audit5 2013-03-25 17:43:27.500526616 +0100
+++ openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c 2013-03-25 17:43:27.506526650 +0100
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ Buffer loginmsg;
struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
-void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
+void destroy_sensitive_data(int);
void demote_sensitive_data(void);
static void do_ssh1_kex(void);
@@ -274,6 +274,15 @@ close_listen_socks(void)
num_listen_socks = -1;
}
+/*
+ * Is this process listening for clients (i.e. not specific to any specific
+ * client connection?)
+ */
+int listening_for_clients(void)
+{
+ return num_listen_socks > 0;
+}
+
static void
close_startup_pipes(void)
{
@@ -545,22 +554,47 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in
}
}
-/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */
+/*
+ * Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. Careful,
+ * this can be called from cleanup_exit() - i.e. from just about anywhere.
+ */
void
-destroy_sensitive_data(void)
+destroy_sensitive_data(int privsep)
{
int i;
+ pid_t pid;
+ uid_t uid;
if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
}
+ pid = getpid();
+ uid = getuid();
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
+ char *fp;
+
+ if (key_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]))
+ fp = key_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i],
+ FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5,
+ SSH_FP_HEX);
+ else
+ fp = NULL;
key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
+ if (fp != NULL) {
+ if (privsep)
+ PRIVSEP(audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp,
+ pid, uid));
+ else
+ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp,
+ pid, uid);
+ xfree(fp);
+ }
}
- if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) {
+ if (sensitive_data.host_certificates
+ && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) {
key_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]);
sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
}
@@ -574,6 +608,8 @@ void
demote_sensitive_data(void)
{
Key *tmp;
+ pid_t pid;
+ uid_t uid;
int i;
if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
@@ -582,13 +618,27 @@ demote_sensitive_data(void)
sensitive_data.server_key = tmp;
}
+ pid = getpid();
+ uid = getuid();
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
+ char *fp;
+
+ if (key_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]))
+ fp = key_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i],
+ FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5,
+ SSH_FP_HEX);
+ else
+ fp = NULL;
tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1)
sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp;
+ if (fp != NULL) {
+ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid);
+ xfree(fp);
+ }
}
/* Certs do not need demotion */
}
@@ -1160,6 +1210,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
if (received_sigterm) {
logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
(int) received_sigterm);
+ destroy_sensitive_data(0);
close_listen_socks();
unlink(options.pid_file);
exit(received_sigterm == SIGTERM ? 0 : 255);
@@ -2082,7 +2133,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
privsep_postauth(authctxt);
/* the monitor process [priv] will not return */
if (!compat20)
- destroy_sensitive_data();
+ destroy_sensitive_data(0);
}
packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval,
@@ -2093,6 +2144,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
/* The connection has been terminated. */
packet_destroy_all(1, 1);
+ destroy_sensitive_data(1);
packet_get_state(MODE_IN, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ibytes);
packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, NULL, NULL, NULL, &obytes);
@@ -2321,7 +2373,7 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16];
}
/* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */
- destroy_sensitive_data();
+ destroy_sensitive_data(0);
if (use_privsep)
mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id);
@@ -2432,6 +2484,8 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
}
}
is_privsep_child = use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && !mm_is_monitor();
+ if (sensitive_data.host_keys != NULL)
+ destroy_sensitive_data(is_privsep_child);
packet_destroy_all(1, is_privsep_child);
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */

60
openssh.spec
View File

@ -77,19 +77,14 @@ Version: %{openssh_ver}
Release: %{openssh_rel}%{?dist}%{?rescue_rel}
URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html
#URL1: http://pamsshagentauth.sourceforge.net
#Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
#Source1: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz.asc
# This package differs from the upstream OpenSSH tarball in that
# the ACSS cipher is removed by running openssh-nukeacss.sh in
# the unpacked source directory.
Source0: openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
Source2: sshd.pam
Source3: sshd.init
Source4: http://prdownloads.sourceforge.net/pamsshagentauth/pam_ssh_agent_auth/pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}.tar.bz2
Source5: pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders
Source6: ssh-keycat.pam
Source7: sshd.sysconfig
Source8: sshd-keygen.service
Source9: sshd@.service
Source10: sshd.socket
Source11: sshd.service
@ -107,22 +102,9 @@ Patch101: openssh-6.2p1-fingerprint.patch
Patch102: openssh-5.8p1-getaddrinfo.patch
#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1889
Patch103: openssh-5.8p1-packet.patch
#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=983
Patch104: openssh-6.1p1-authenticationmethods.patch
#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402
Patch200: openssh-6.2p1-audit.patch
# Patch200: openssh-5.8p1-audit0.patch
# # -"-
# Patch201: openssh-6.2p1-audit1.patch
# # -"-
# Patch202: openssh-5.9p1-audit2.patch
# # -"-
# Patch203: openssh-6.2p1-audit3.patch
# # -"-
# Patch204: openssh-6.2p1-audit4.patch
# # -"-
# Patch205: openssh-6.2p1-audit5.patch
# --- pam_ssh-agent ---
# make it build reusing the openssh sources
@ -133,22 +115,14 @@ Patch301: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-seteuid.patch
Patch302: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch
#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1641 (WONTFIX)
Patch400: openssh-6.2p1-role-mls.patch
#?
#Patch402: openssh-5.9p1-sftp-chroot.patch
#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1940
#Patch403: openssh-5.9p1-sesandbox.patch
#https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=781634
Patch404: openssh-6.1p1-privsep-selinux.patch
#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1663
Patch500: openssh-6.1p1-akc.patch
#?-- unwanted child :(
Patch501: openssh-6.2p1-ldap.patch
#?
Patch502: openssh-6.2p1-keycat.patch
#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1668
#Patch600: openssh-5.9p1-keygen.patch
#http6://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1644
Patch601: openssh-5.2p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1701
@ -188,8 +162,6 @@ Patch707: openssh-6.1p1-redhat.patch
Patch708: openssh-6.2p1-entropy.patch
#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1640 (WONTFIX)
Patch709: openssh-6.2p1-vendor.patch
#?
Patch710: openssh-5.9p1-copy-id-restorecon.patch
# warn users for unsupported UsePAM=no (#757545)
Patch711: openssh-6.1p1-log-usepam-no.patch
# make aes-ctr ciphers use EVP engines such as AES-NI from OpenSSL
@ -206,12 +178,6 @@ Patch801: openssh-6.2p1-force_krb.patch
Patch900: openssh-6.1p1-gssapi-canohost.patch
#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1780
Patch901: openssh-6.2p1-kuserok.patch
#https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=841065
Patch902: openssh-6.1p1-man-moduli.patch
# obsolete RequiredAuthentications options
Patch903: openssh-6.1p1-required-authentications.patch
# change default value of MaxStartups - CVE-2010-5107 - #908707
Patch904: openssh-6.1p1-change-max-startups.patch
# build regress/modpipe tests with $(CFLAGS), based on
# http://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/2013-March/031167.html
@ -221,10 +187,6 @@ Patch906: openssh-6.2p1-track-IdentifyFile.patch
# add latest config.{sub,guess} to support aarch64 (#926284)
Patch907: openssh-6.2p1-aarch64.patch
#---
#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1604
# sctp
#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1873 => https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=668993
License: BSD
Group: Applications/Internet
@ -287,10 +249,6 @@ Requires: fipscheck-lib%{_isa} >= 1.3.0
Requires(post): systemd-units
Requires(preun): systemd-units
Requires(postun): systemd-units
# This is actually needed for the %triggerun script but Requires(triggerun)
# is not valid. We can use %post because this particular %triggerun script
# should fire just after this package is installed.
Requires(post): systemd-sysv
# Not yet ready
# %package server-ondemand
@ -401,15 +359,8 @@ The module is most useful for su and sudo service stacks.
%patch101 -p1 -b .fingerprint
%patch102 -p1 -b .getaddrinfo
%patch103 -p1 -b .packet
# %patch104 -p1 -b .authenticationmethods
%patch200 -p1 -b .audit
# %patch200 -p1 -b .audit0
# %patch201 -p1 -b .audit1
# %patch202 -p1 -b .audit2
# %patch203 -p1 -b .audit3
# %patch204 -p1 -b .audit4
# %patch205 -p1 -b .audit5
%if %{pam_ssh_agent}
pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}
@ -423,18 +374,14 @@ popd
%if %{WITH_SELINUX}
%patch400 -p1 -b .role-mls
# %patch402 -p1 -b .sftp-chroot
# %patch403 -p1 -b .sesandbox
%patch404 -p1 -b .privsep-selinux
%endif
# %patch500 -p1 -b .akc
%if %{ldap}
%patch501 -p1 -b .ldap
%endif
%patch502 -p1 -b .keycat
# %patch600 -p1 -b .keygen
%patch601 -p1 -b .ip-opts
%patch602 -p1 -b .randclean
%patch603 -p1 -b .glob
@ -455,7 +402,6 @@ popd
%patch707 -p1 -b .redhat
%patch708 -p1 -b .entropy
%patch709 -p1 -b .vendor
# %patch710 -p1 -b .restorecon
%patch711 -p1 -b .log-usepam-no
%patch712 -p1 -b .evp-ctr
%patch713 -p1 -b .ctr-cavs
@ -465,9 +411,6 @@ popd
%patch900 -p1 -b .canohost
%patch901 -p1 -b .kuserok
# %patch902 -p1 -b .man-moduli
# %patch903 -p1 -b .required-authentication
# %patch904 -p1 -b .max-startups
%patch905 -p1 -b .modpipe-cflags
%patch906 -p1 -b .identityfile
%patch907 -p1 -b .aarch64
@ -625,7 +568,6 @@ install -m755 %{SOURCE3} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd
install -m644 %{SOURCE7} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/sysconfig/sshd
install -m755 %{SOURCE13} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sbindir}/sshd-keygen
install -d -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}
# install -m644 %{SOURCE8} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/sshd-keygen.service
# install -m644 %{SOURCE9} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/sshd@.service
# install -m644 %{SOURCE10} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/sshd.socket
install -m644 %{SOURCE11} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/sshd.service

11
sshd-keygen.service
View File

@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=SSH server keys generation.
After=syslog.target
Before=sshd.service
BindTo=sshd.service
[Service]
Type=oneshot
EnvironmentFile=/etc/sysconfig/sshd
ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd-keygen
RemainAfterExit=yes