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openssh-5.9p1-privsep-selinux.patch - change SELinux context also for 

root user (#827109)
This commit is contained in:
Petr Lautrbach 2012-08-06 08:57:00 +02:00
parent b648890ead
commit 0c438f5bc5
1 changed files with 27 additions and 32 deletions
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59
openssh-5.9p1-privsep-selinux.patch
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@ -1,40 +1,35 @@
diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
index 436ea48..49c9321 100644
--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
@@ -1561,6 +1561,13 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
diff -up openssh-5.9p1/session.c.privsep-selinux openssh-5.9p1/session.c
--- openssh-5.9p1/session.c.privsep-selinux 2012-08-01 15:36:33.397565915 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p1/session.c 2012-08-02 18:18:15.038094629 +0200
@@ -1536,6 +1536,13 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
permanently_set_uid(pw);
#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
+ strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) {
+ ssh_selinux_copy_context();
+ }
+#endif
}
if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid)
diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux 2012-08-01 16:09:22.949423356 +0200
+++ openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c 2012-08-02 18:07:22.912225684 +0200
@@ -790,6 +790,14 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
skip:
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
+ strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) {
+ /* switch SELinux content for root too */
+ if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && (options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
+ strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0)) {
+ ssh_selinux_copy_context();
+ }
+#endif
+
if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid)
fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int) pw->pw_uid);
}
@@ -1670,7 +1677,9 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
/* When PAM is enabled we rely on it to do the nologin check */
if (!options.use_pam)
do_nologin(pw);
- do_setusercontext(pw);
+ /* We are already separated */
+ if (!use_privsep)
+ do_setusercontext(pw);
/*
* PAM session modules in do_setusercontext may have
* generated messages, so if this in an interactive
@@ -1791,8 +1800,8 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
optind = optreset = 1;
__progname = argv[0];
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- if (options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
- strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) {
+ if (!use_privsep &&
+ (options.chroot_directory == NULL || strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0)) {
ssh_selinux_copy_context();
}
#endif
/* It is safe now to apply the key state */
monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);