openssh/openssh-6.6p1-audit.patch

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2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
index 2ad26ff..3bb7f00 100644
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -82,7 +82,8 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
kexc25519.o kexc25519c.o poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \
ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o hmac.o \
- sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o
+ sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o \
+ auditstub.o
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
diff --git a/audit-bsm.c b/audit-bsm.c
index 6135591..5160869 100644
--- a/audit-bsm.c
+++ b/audit-bsm.c
@@ -375,10 +375,23 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
#endif
}
-void
+int
audit_run_command(const char *command)
{
/* not implemented */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
+{
+ /* not implemented */
+}
+
+void
+audit_count_session_open(void)
+{
+ /* not necessary */
}
void
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@@ -393,6 +406,12 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
/* not implemented */
}
+int
+audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)
+{
+ /* not implemented */
+}
+
void
audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
{
@@ -454,4 +473,40 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
}
}
+
+void
+audit_unsupported_body(int what)
+{
+ /* not implemented */
+}
+
+void
+audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+ /* not implemented */
+}
+
+void
+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+ /* not implemented */
+}
+
+void
+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp)
+{
+ /* not implemented */
+}
+
+void
+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+ /* not implemented */
+}
+
+void
+audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp)
+{
+ /* not implemented */
+}
#endif /* BSM */
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
diff --git a/audit-linux.c b/audit-linux.c
index b3ee2f4..946f7fa 100644
--- a/audit-linux.c
+++ b/audit-linux.c
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
@@ -35,13 +35,24 @@
#include "log.h"
#include "audit.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
#include "canohost.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 128
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+extern u_int utmp_len;
const char* audit_username(void);
-int
-linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username,
- const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success)
+static void
+linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username,
+ const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
{
int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -49,11 +60,11 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username,
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
if (audit_fd < 0) {
if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
- return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */
+ return; /* No audit support in kernel */
else
- return 0; /* Must prevent login */
+ goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
}
- rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN,
+ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event,
NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
saved_errno = errno;
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -65,35 +76,150 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username,
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
rc = 0;
errno = saved_errno;
- return (rc >= 0);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+fatal_report:
+ fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+ }
}
+static void
+linux_audit_user_auth(int uid, const char *username,
+ const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
+{
+ int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
+ static const char *event_name[] = {
+ "maxtries exceeded",
+ "root denied",
+ "success",
+ "none",
+ "password",
+ "challenge-response",
+ "pubkey",
+ "hostbased",
+ "gssapi",
+ "invalid user",
+ "nologin",
+ "connection closed",
+ "connection abandoned",
+ "unknown"
+ };
+
+ audit_fd = audit_open();
+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
+ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
+ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ return; /* No audit support in kernel */
+ else
+ goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
+ }
+
+ if ((event < 0) || (event > SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN))
+ event = SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN;
+
+ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH,
+ NULL, event_name[event], username ? username : "(unknown)",
+ username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
+ saved_errno = errno;
+ close(audit_fd);
+ /*
+ * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non
+ * root user.
+ */
+ if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
+ rc = 0;
+ errno = saved_errno;
+ if (rc < 0) {
+fatal_report:
+ fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+ }
+}
+
+int
+audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)
+{
+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
+
+ audit_fd = audit_open();
+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
+ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
+ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */
+ else
+ return 0; /* Must prevent login */
+ }
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth rport=%d", host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", get_remote_port());
+ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
+ buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv);
+ if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+ goto out;
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "key algo=%s size=%d fp=%s%s rport=%d",
+ type, bits, key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, get_remote_port());
+ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
+ buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv);
+out:
+ saved_errno = errno;
+ audit_close(audit_fd);
+ errno = saved_errno;
+ /* do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
+ return (rc >= 0) || ((rc == -EPERM) && (getuid() != 0));
+}
+
+static int user_login_count = 0;
+
/* Below is the sshd audit API code */
void
audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
{
-}
/* not implemented */
+}
-void
+int
audit_run_command(const char *command)
{
- /* not implemented */
+ if (!user_login_count++)
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
+{
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
+ if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
+}
+
+void
+audit_count_session_open(void)
+{
+ user_login_count++;
}
void
audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
{
- if (linux_audit_record_event(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
- NULL, li->line, 1) == 0)
- fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (!user_login_count++)
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
+ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
+ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
}
void
audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
{
- /* not implemented */
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
+ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
+ if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
+ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
}
void
@@ -101,21 +227,43 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
{
switch(event) {
case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS:
- case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
+ linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
+ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 1, event);
+ break;
+
case SSH_NOLOGIN:
- case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
+ linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
+ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, event);
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
+ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
break;
+ case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
+ linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
+ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, event);
+ break;
+
+ case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
+ if (user_login_count) {
+ while (user_login_count--)
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON:
case SSH_INVALID_USER:
- linux_audit_record_event(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
- get_remote_ipaddr(), "sshd", 0);
+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
+ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
break;
default:
@@ -123,4 +271,135 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
}
}
+void
+audit_unsupported_body(int what)
+{
+#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ const static char *name[] = { "cipher", "mac", "comp" };
+ char *s;
+ int audit_fd;
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=unsupported-%s direction=? cipher=? ksize=? rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
+ name[what], get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())),
+ get_local_port());
+ free(s);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
+ audit_fd = audit_open();
+ if (audit_fd < 0)
+ /* no problem, the next instruction will be fatal() */
+ return;
+ audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION,
+ buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 0);
+ audit_close(audit_fd);
+#endif
+}
+
+const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
+
+void
+audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
+ uid_t uid)
+{
+#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ int audit_fd, audit_ok;
+ Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc);
+ char *s;
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=start direction=%s cipher=%s ksize=%d mac=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
+ direction[ctos], enc, cipher ? 8 * cipher->key_len : 0, mac,
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+ (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid,
+ get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), get_local_port());
+ free(s);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
+ audit_fd = audit_open();
+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
+ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
+ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ return; /* No audit support in kernel */
+ else
+ fatal("cannot open audit"); /* Must prevent login */
+ }
+ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION,
+ buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1);
+ audit_close(audit_fd);
+ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
+ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+ fatal("cannot write into audit"); /* Must prevent login */
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ int audit_fd, audit_ok;
+ char *s;
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=session fp=? direction=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
+ direction[ctos], (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid,
+ get_remote_port(),
+ (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())),
+ get_local_port());
+ free(s);
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+ audit_fd = audit_open();
+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
+ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
+ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ error("cannot open audit");
+ return;
+ }
+ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
+ buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1);
+ audit_close(audit_fd);
+ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
+ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+ error("cannot write into audit");
+}
+
+void
+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ int audit_fd, audit_ok;
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=server fp=%s direction=? spid=%jd suid=%jd ",
+ fp, (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid);
+ audit_fd = audit_open();
+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
+ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
+ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ error("cannot open audit");
+ return;
+ }
+ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
+ buf, NULL,
+ listening_for_clients() ? NULL : get_remote_ipaddr(),
+ NULL, 1);
+ audit_close(audit_fd);
+ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
+ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+ error("cannot write into audit");
+}
+
+void
+audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp)
+{
+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ int audit_fd, audit_ok;
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=create kind=server fp=%s direction=? ", fp);
+ audit_fd = audit_open();
+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
+ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
+ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ error("cannot open audit");
+ return;
+ }
+ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
+ buf, NULL, 0, NULL, 1);
+ audit_close(audit_fd);
+ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
+ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+ error("cannot write into audit");
+}
#endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
diff --git a/audit.c b/audit.c
index ced57fa..b806f03 100644
--- a/audit.c
+++ b/audit.c
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
@@ -36,6 +37,9 @@
#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
/*
* Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when
@@ -111,6 +115,40 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)
return(event_lookup[i].name);
}
+void
+audit_key(int host_user, int *rv, const Key *key)
+{
+ char *fp;
+ const char *crypto_name;
+
+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ if (key->type == KEY_RSA1)
+ crypto_name = "ssh-rsa1";
+ else
+ crypto_name = key_ssh_name(key);
+ if (audit_keyusage(host_user, crypto_name, key_size(key), fp, *rv) == 0)
+ *rv = 0;
+ free(fp);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
+}
+
+void
+audit_unsupported(int what)
+{
+ PRIVSEP(audit_unsupported_body(what));
+}
+
+void
+audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp)
+{
+ PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, getpid(), getuid()));
+}
+
+void
+audit_session_key_free(int ctos)
+{
+ PRIVSEP(audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, getpid(), getuid()));
+}
+
# ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
/*
* Null implementations of audit functions.
@@ -140,6 +178,17 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
}
/*
+ * Called when a child process has called, or will soon call,
+ * audit_session_open.
+ */
+void
+audit_count_session_open(void)
+{
+ debug("audit count session open euid %d user %s", geteuid(),
+ audit_username());
+}
+
+/*
* Called when a user session is started. Argument is the tty allocated to
* the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated.
*
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -174,13 +223,91 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
/*
* This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command. Note that
* it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
- * multiple sessions within a single connection.
+ * multiple sessions within a single connection. Returns a "handle" for
+ * audit_end_command.
*/
-void
+int
audit_run_command(const char *command)
{
debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
audit_username(), command);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This will be called when the non-interactive command finishes. Note that
+ * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
+ * multiple sessions within a single connection. "handle" should come from
+ * the corresponding audit_run_command.
+ */
+void
+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
+{
+ debug("audit end nopty exec euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
+ audit_username(), command);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This will be called when user is successfully autherized by the RSA1/RSA/DSA key.
+ *
+ * Type is the key type, len is the key length(byte) and fp is the fingerprint of the key.
+ */
+int
+audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)
+{
+ debug("audit %s key usage euid %d user %s key type %s key length %d fingerprint %s%s, result %d",
+ host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(), type, bits,
+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, rv);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This will be called when the protocol negotiation fails.
+ */
+void
+audit_unsupported_body(int what)
+{
+ debug("audit unsupported protocol euid %d type %d", geteuid(), what);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This will be called on succesfull protocol negotiation.
+ */
+void
+audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
+ uid_t uid)
+{
+ debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s from pid %ld uid %u",
+ (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, (long)pid,
+ (unsigned)uid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This will be called on succesfull session key discard
+ */
+void
+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+ debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u",
+ (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This will be called on destroy private part of the server key
+ */
+void
+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+ debug("audit destroy sensitive data euid %d fingerprint %s from pid %ld uid %u",
+ geteuid(), fp, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This will be called on generation of the ephemeral server key
+ */
+void
+audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *)
+{
+ debug("audit create ephemeral server key euid %d fingerprint %s", geteuid(), fp);
}
# endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
diff --git a/audit.h b/audit.h
index 92ede5b..a2dc3ff 100644
--- a/audit.h
+++ b/audit.h
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
# define _SSH_AUDIT_H
#include "loginrec.h"
+#include "key.h"
enum ssh_audit_event_type {
SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES,
@@ -47,11 +48,25 @@ enum ssh_audit_event_type {
};
typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t;
+int listening_for_clients(void);
+
void audit_connection_from(const char *, int);
void audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
+void audit_count_session_open(void);
void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *);
void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
-void audit_run_command(const char *);
+int audit_run_command(const char *);
+void audit_end_command(int, const char *);
ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
+int audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int);
+void audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);
+void audit_unsupported(int);
+void audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *);
+void audit_unsupported_body(int);
+void audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+void audit_session_key_free(int ctos);
+void audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
+void audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+void audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *);
#endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
diff --git a/auditstub.c b/auditstub.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..45817e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auditstub.c
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+/* $Id: auditstub.c,v 1.1 jfch Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Use is subject to license terms.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+void
+audit_unsupported(int n)
+{
+}
+
+void
+audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp)
+{
+}
+
+void
+audit_session_key_free(int ctos)
+{
+}
+
+void
+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+}
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
diff --git a/auth-rsa.c b/auth-rsa.c
index 5dad6c3..f225b0b 100644
--- a/auth-rsa.c
+++ b/auth-rsa.c
@@ -93,7 +93,10 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16])
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
{
u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16];
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
- int len;
+ int len, rv;
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ char *fp;
+#endif
/* don't allow short keys */
if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -117,12 +120,18 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16])
ssh_digest_free(md);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
/* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */
- if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) {
- /* Wrong answer. */
- return (0);
+ rv = timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) == 0;
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ if (audit_keyusage(1, "ssh-rsa1", RSA_size(key->rsa) * 8, fp, rv) == 0) {
+ debug("unsuccessful audit");
+ rv = 0;
}
- /* Correct answer. */
- return (1);
+ free(fp);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
+#endif
+
+ return rv;
}
/*
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
index 4605588..f9d191c 100644
--- a/auth.h
+++ b/auth.h
@@ -186,6 +186,7 @@ void abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt *);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
char *expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw);
char *authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *);
+int user_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -203,6 +204,7 @@ Key *get_hostkey_private_by_type(int);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
int get_hostkey_index(Key *);
int ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *);
void sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *, Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
+int hostbased_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
/* debug messages during authentication */
void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c
index 95d678e..48aede4 100644
--- a/auth2-hostbased.c
+++ b/auth2-hostbased.c
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
/* test for allowed key and correct signature */
authenticated = 0;
if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) &&
- PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
+ PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
authenticated = 1;
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -154,6 +154,18 @@ done:
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
return authenticated;
}
+int
+hostbased_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+ int rv;
+
+ rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen);
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ audit_key(0, &rv, key);
+#endif
+ return rv;
+}
+
/* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */
int
hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost,
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
index cb0f931..6d1c872 100644
--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
/* test for correct signature */
authenticated = 0;
if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) &&
- PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
+ PRIVSEP(user_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
authenticated = 1;
buffer_free(&b);
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -231,6 +231,18 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const Key *key, const char *fmt, ...)
free(extra);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
}
+int
+user_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+ int rv;
+
+ rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen);
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ audit_key(1, &rv, key);
+#endif
+ return rv;
+}
+
static int
match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct KeyCert *cert)
{
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
index 0f52b68..472a5b2 100644
--- a/auth2.c
+++ b/auth2.c
@@ -249,9 +249,6 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
} else {
logit("input_userauth_request: invalid user %s", user);
authctxt->pw = fakepw();
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER));
-#endif
}
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam)
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
diff --git a/cipher.c b/cipher.c
index 53d9b4f..226e56d 100644
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
--- a/cipher.c
+++ b/cipher.c
@@ -57,20 +57,6 @@ extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_bf(void);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(void);
extern void ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int);
-struct Cipher {
- char *name;
- int number; /* for ssh1 only */
- u_int block_size;
- u_int key_len;
- u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */
- u_int auth_len;
- u_int discard_len;
- u_int flags;
-#define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0)
-#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1)
- const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void);
-};
-
static const struct Cipher ciphers[] = {
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
{ "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null },
{ "des", SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc },
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
diff --git a/cipher.h b/cipher.h
index 133d2e7..d41758e 100644
--- a/cipher.h
+++ b/cipher.h
@@ -63,7 +63,20 @@
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
typedef struct Cipher Cipher;
typedef struct CipherContext CipherContext;
-struct Cipher;
+struct Cipher {
+ char *name;
+ int number; /* for ssh1 only */
+ u_int block_size;
+ u_int key_len;
+ u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */
+ u_int auth_len;
+ u_int discard_len;
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
+ u_int flags;
+#define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0)
+#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
+ const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void);
+};
+
struct CipherContext {
int plaintext;
int encrypt;
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
index bce2ab8..bc3e53e 100644
--- a/kex.c
+++ b/kex.c
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
#include "monitor.h"
#include "roaming.h"
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
#include "digest.h"
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
+#include "audit.h"
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
@@ -366,9 +367,13 @@ static void
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
choose_enc(Enc *enc, char *client, char *server)
{
char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
- if (name == NULL)
+ if (name == NULL) {
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ audit_unsupported(0);
+#endif
fatal("no matching cipher found: client %s server %s",
client, server);
+ }
if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL)
fatal("matching cipher is not supported: %s", name);
enc->name = name;
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -384,9 +389,13 @@ static void
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
choose_mac(Mac *mac, char *client, char *server)
{
char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
- if (name == NULL)
+ if (name == NULL) {
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ audit_unsupported(1);
+#endif
fatal("no matching mac found: client %s server %s",
client, server);
+ }
if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0)
fatal("unsupported mac %s", name);
/* truncate the key */
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -401,8 +410,12 @@ static void
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
choose_comp(Comp *comp, char *client, char *server)
{
char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
- if (name == NULL)
+ if (name == NULL) {
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ audit_unsupported(2);
+#endif
fatal("no matching comp found: client %s server %s", client, server);
+ }
if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) {
comp->type = COMP_DELAYED;
} else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) {
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -517,6 +530,9 @@ kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
newkeys->enc.name,
authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "<implicit>",
newkeys->comp.name);
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ audit_kex(ctos, newkeys->enc.name, newkeys->mac.name, newkeys->comp.name);
+#endif
}
choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -702,3 +718,34 @@ dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, int len)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
#endif
+
+static void
+enc_destroy(Enc *enc)
+{
+ if (enc == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ if (enc->key) {
+ memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len);
+ free(enc->key);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
+ }
+
+ if (enc->iv) {
+ memset(enc->iv, 0, enc->block_size);
+ free(enc->iv);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
+ }
+
+ memset(enc, 0, sizeof(*enc));
+}
+
+void
+newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys)
+{
+ if (newkeys == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ enc_destroy(&newkeys->enc);
+ mac_destroy(&newkeys->mac);
+ memset(&newkeys->comp, 0, sizeof(newkeys->comp));
+}
+
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
index 313bb51..c643250 100644
--- a/kex.h
+++ b/kex.h
@@ -182,6 +182,8 @@ void kexgss_client(Kex *);
void kexgss_server(Kex *);
#endif
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
+void newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys);
+
void
kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,
BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
diff --git a/key.c b/key.c
index 900b9e3..62f3edb 100644
--- a/key.c
+++ b/key.c
@@ -1925,6 +1925,33 @@ key_demote(const Key *k)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
}
int
+key_is_private(const Key *k)
+{
+ switch (k->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ return k->rsa->d != NULL;
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ return k->dsa->priv_key != NULL;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa) != NULL;
+#endif
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+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ return (k->ed25519_pk != NULL);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
+ default:
+ fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type);
+ return 1;
+ }
+}
+
+int
key_is_cert(const Key *k)
{
if (k == NULL)
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
diff --git a/key.h b/key.h
index d51ed81..8f61605 100644
--- a/key.h
+++ b/key.h
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ Key *key_generate(int, u_int);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
Key *key_from_private(const Key *);
int key_type_from_name(char *);
int key_is_cert(const Key *);
+int key_is_private(const Key *k);
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
int key_type_is_cert(int);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
int key_type_plain(int);
int key_to_certified(Key *, int);
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
diff --git a/mac.c b/mac.c
index 0977572..9388af4 100644
--- a/mac.c
+++ b/mac.c
@@ -222,6 +222,20 @@ mac_clear(Mac *mac)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
mac->umac_ctx = NULL;
}
+void
+mac_destroy(Mac *mac)
+{
+ if (mac == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ if (mac->key) {
+ memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len);
+ free(mac->key);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
+ }
+
+ memset(mac, 0, sizeof(*mac));
+}
+
/* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */
#define MAC_SEP ","
int
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
diff --git a/mac.h b/mac.h
index fbe18c4..7dc7f43 100644
--- a/mac.h
+++ b/mac.h
@@ -29,3 +29,4 @@ int mac_setup(Mac *, char *);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
int mac_init(Mac *);
u_char *mac_compute(Mac *, u_int32_t, u_char *, int);
void mac_clear(Mac *);
+void mac_destroy(Mac *);
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index aa70945..bdabe21 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@
#include "ssh2.h"
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
#include "roaming.h"
#include "authfd.h"
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
+#include "audit.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -113,6 +114,8 @@ extern Buffer auth_debug;
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
extern int auth_debug_init;
extern Buffer loginmsg;
+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int);
+
/* State exported from the child */
struct {
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -185,6 +188,11 @@ int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int, Buffer *);
#endif
static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -239,6 +247,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
#endif
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
{MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -274,6 +286,11 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -305,6 +322,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -316,6 +337,11 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -1390,9 +1416,11 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
Key *key;
u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
+ int type = 0;
int verified = 0;
int valid_data = 0;
+ type = buffer_get_int(m);
blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -1400,6 +1428,8 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
!monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
+ if (type != key_blobtype)
+ fatal("%s: bad key type", __func__);
key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
if (key == NULL)
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -1420,7 +1450,17 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
if (!valid_data)
fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
- verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
+ switch (key_blobtype) {
+ case MM_USERKEY:
+ verified = user_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
+ break;
+ case MM_HOSTKEY:
+ verified = hostbased_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
+ break;
+ default:
+ verified = 0;
+ break;
+ }
debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
__func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -1473,6 +1513,12 @@ mm_session_close(Session *s)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
session_pty_cleanup2(s);
}
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ if (s->command != NULL) {
+ debug3("%s: command %d", __func__, s->command_handle);
+ session_end_command2(s);
+ }
+#endif
session_unused(s->self);
}
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -1753,6 +1799,8 @@ mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
sshpam_cleanup();
#endif
+ destroy_sensitive_data(0);
+
while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
if (errno != EINTR)
exit(1);
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -1795,11 +1843,43 @@ mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buffer *m)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
{
u_int len;
char *cmd;
+ Session *s;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+
/* sanity check command, if so how? */
- audit_run_command(cmd);
+ s = session_new();
+ if (s == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: error allocating a session", __func__);
+ s->command = cmd;
+ s->command_handle = audit_run_command(cmd);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, s->self);
+
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, m);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_audit_end_command(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ int handle;
+ u_int len;
+ char *cmd;
+ Session *s;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+ handle = buffer_get_int(m);
+ cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+
+ s = session_by_id(handle);
+ if (s == NULL || s->ttyfd != -1 || s->command == NULL ||
+ strcmp(s->command, cmd) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: invalid handle", __func__);
+ mm_session_close(s);
free(cmd);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
return (0);
}
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -1943,11 +2023,13 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+ memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
free(blob);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __func__);
blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+ memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
free(blob);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
/* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -1993,6 +2075,21 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
}
buffer_free(&m);
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ if (compat20) {
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd,
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m);
+ mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
+ while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
+ ;
+
}
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -2274,3 +2371,85 @@ mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) {
#endif /* GSSAPI */
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+int
+mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ int what;
+
+ what = buffer_get_int(m);
+
+ audit_unsupported_body(what);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, m);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ int ctos, len;
+ char *cipher, *mac, *compress;
+ pid_t pid;
+ uid_t uid;
+
+ ctos = buffer_get_int(m);
+ cipher = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ mac = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ compress = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ pid = buffer_get_int64(m);
+ uid = buffer_get_int64(m);
+
+ audit_kex_body(ctos, cipher, mac, compress, pid, uid);
+
+ free(cipher);
+ free(mac);
+ free(compress);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
+ buffer_clear(m);
+
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, m);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ int ctos;
+ pid_t pid;
+ uid_t uid;
+
+ ctos = buffer_get_int(m);
+ pid = buffer_get_int64(m);
+ uid = buffer_get_int64(m);
+
+ audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, pid, uid);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ int len;
+ char *fp;
+ pid_t pid;
+ uid_t uid;
+
+ fp = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ pid = buffer_get_int64(m);
+ uid = buffer_get_int64(m);
+
+ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid);
+
+ free(fp);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
+ buffer_clear(m);
+
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m);
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
index ff79fbb..6dfb234 100644
--- a/monitor.h
+++ b/monitor.h
@@ -69,7 +69,13 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
- MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112,
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 114, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND = 115,
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 116,
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 118, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 119,
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX = 120, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX = 121,
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 122, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 123,
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 124, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 125
};
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
index d1e1caa..6df236a 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, char *user, char *host, Key *key)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
*/
int
-mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+mm_key_verify(enum mm_keytype type, Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
{
Buffer m;
u_char *blob;
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -464,6 +464,7 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
return (0);
buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, type);
buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len);
buffer_put_string(&m, sig, siglen);
buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen);
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -481,6 +482,19 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
return (verified);
}
+int
+mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+ return mm_key_verify(MM_HOSTKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen);
+}
+
+int
+mm_user_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+ return mm_key_verify(MM_USERKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen);
+}
+
+
/* Export key state after authentication */
Newkeys *
mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *blob, int blen)
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -659,12 +673,14 @@ mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__);
buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);
+ memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
free(blob);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_IN, &blob, &bloblen))
fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__);
buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);
+ memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
free(blob);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, &seqnr, &blocks, &packets, &bytes);
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -1208,10 +1224,11 @@ mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
buffer_free(&m);
}
-void
+int
mm_audit_run_command(const char *command)
{
Buffer m;
+ int handle;
debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -1219,6 +1236,26 @@ mm_audit_run_command(const char *command)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
buffer_put_cstring(&m, command);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
+
+ handle = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ return (handle);
+}
+
+void
+mm_audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+
+ debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, handle);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, command);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, &m);
buffer_free(&m);
}
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -1354,3 +1391,71 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store)
#endif /* GSSAPI */
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+void
+mm_audit_unsupported_body(int what)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, what);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, &m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED,
+ &m);
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+void
+mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
+ uid_t uid)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, ctos);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, cipher);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, (mac ? mac : ""));
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, compress);
+ buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
+ buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, &m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX,
+ &m);
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+void
+mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, ctos);
+ buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
+ buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE,
+ &m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+void
+mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, fp);
+ buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
+ buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, &m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE,
+ &m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+}
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
index 93929e0..4cf0c78 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
@@ -52,7 +52,8 @@ int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, char *, char *, Key *);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);
int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
-int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
+int mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
+int mm_user_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **);
int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char *);
BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -79,7 +80,12 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
#include "audit.h"
void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
-void mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
+int mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
+void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *);
+void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
+void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t);
+void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
#endif
struct Session;
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
index 660a9fc..f5b122b 100644
--- a/packet.c
+++ b/packet.c
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
#include <time.h>
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "audit.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "crc32.h"
@@ -476,6 +477,13 @@ packet_get_connection_out(void)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
return active_state->connection_out;
}
+static int
+packet_state_has_keys (const struct session_state *state)
+{
+ return state != NULL &&
+ (state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL || state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL);
+}
+
/* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */
void
@@ -484,13 +492,6 @@ packet_close(void)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
if (!active_state->initialized)
return;
active_state->initialized = 0;
- if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) {
- shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
- close(active_state->connection_out);
- } else {
- close(active_state->connection_in);
- close(active_state->connection_out);
- }
buffer_free(&active_state->input);
buffer_free(&active_state->output);
buffer_free(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
@@ -499,8 +500,18 @@ packet_close(void)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
buffer_free(&active_state->compression_buffer);
buffer_compress_uninit();
}
- cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context);
- cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context);
+ if (packet_state_has_keys(active_state)) {
+ cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context);
+ cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context);
+ audit_session_key_free(2);
+ }
+ if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) {
+ shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
+ close(active_state->connection_out);
+ } else {
+ close(active_state->connection_in);
+ close(active_state->connection_out);
+ }
}
/* Sets remote side protocol flags. */
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -736,6 +747,25 @@ packet_send1(void)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
*/
}
+static void
+newkeys_destroy_and_free(Newkeys *newkeys)
+{
+ if (newkeys == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ free(newkeys->enc.name);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
+
+ if (newkeys->mac.enabled) {
+ mac_clear(&newkeys->mac);
+ free(newkeys->mac.name);
+ }
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
+
+ free(newkeys->comp.name);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
+
+ newkeys_destroy(newkeys);
+ free(newkeys);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
+}
+
void
set_newkeys(int mode)
{
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -761,6 +791,7 @@ set_newkeys(int mode)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
}
if (active_state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) {
debug("set_newkeys: rekeying");
+ audit_session_key_free(mode);
cipher_cleanup(cc);
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
enc = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
mac = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
@@ -2011,6 +2042,47 @@ packet_get_newkeys(int mode)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
return (void *)active_state->newkeys[mode];
}
+static void
+packet_destroy_state(struct session_state *state)
+{
+ if (state == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ cipher_cleanup(&state->receive_context);
+ cipher_cleanup(&state->send_context);
+
+ buffer_free(&state->input);
+ buffer_free(&state->output);
+ buffer_free(&state->outgoing_packet);
+ buffer_free(&state->incoming_packet);
+ buffer_free(&state->compression_buffer);
+ newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_IN]);
+ state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = NULL;
+ newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]);
+ state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
+ mac_destroy(state->packet_discard_mac);
+// TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing;
+// memset(state, 0, sizeof(state));
+}
+
+void
+packet_destroy_all(int audit_it, int privsep)
+{
+ if (audit_it)
+ audit_it = packet_state_has_keys (active_state) ||
+ packet_state_has_keys (backup_state);
+ packet_destroy_state(active_state);
+ packet_destroy_state(backup_state);
+ if (audit_it) {
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ if (privsep)
+ audit_session_key_free(2);
+ else
+ audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid());
+#endif
+ }
+}
+
/*
* Save the state for the real connection, and use a separate state when
* resuming a suspended connection.
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -2018,18 +2090,12 @@ packet_get_newkeys(int mode)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
void
packet_backup_state(void)
{
- struct session_state *tmp;
-
close(active_state->connection_in);
active_state->connection_in = -1;
close(active_state->connection_out);
active_state->connection_out = -1;
- if (backup_state)
- tmp = backup_state;
- else
- tmp = alloc_session_state();
backup_state = active_state;
- active_state = tmp;
+ active_state = alloc_session_state();
}
/*
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -2046,9 +2112,7 @@ packet_restore_state(void)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
backup_state = active_state;
active_state = tmp;
active_state->connection_in = backup_state->connection_in;
- backup_state->connection_in = -1;
active_state->connection_out = backup_state->connection_out;
- backup_state->connection_out = -1;
len = buffer_len(&backup_state->input);
if (len > 0) {
buf = buffer_ptr(&backup_state->input);
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -2056,4 +2120,10 @@ packet_restore_state(void)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
buffer_clear(&backup_state->input);
add_recv_bytes(len);
}
+ backup_state->connection_in = -1;
+ backup_state->connection_out = -1;
+ packet_destroy_state(backup_state);
+ free(backup_state);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
+ backup_state = NULL;
}
+
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
diff --git a/packet.h b/packet.h
index f8edf85..c36c812 100644
--- a/packet.h
+++ b/packet.h
@@ -124,4 +124,5 @@ void packet_restore_state(void);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
void *packet_get_input(void);
void *packet_get_output(void);
+void packet_destroy_all(int, int);
#endif /* PACKET_H */
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
index ba4589b..4a297f1 100644
--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ extern int log_stderr;
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
extern int debug_flag;
extern u_int utmp_len;
extern int startup_pipe;
-extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int);
extern Buffer loginmsg;
/* original command from peer. */
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -745,6 +745,14 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
/* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */
close(ttyfd);
+#ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+ /* do_login in the child did not affect state in this process,
+ compensate. From an architectural standpoint, this is extremely
+ ugly. */
+ if (!(options.use_login && command == NULL))
+ audit_count_session_open();
+#endif
+
/* Enter interactive session. */
s->ptymaster = ptymaster;
packet_set_interactive(1,
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -862,15 +870,19 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
get_remote_port());
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1)
+ fatal("do_exec: command already set");
if (command != NULL)
- PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
+ s->command = xstrdup(command);
else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell;
if (shell[0] == '\0') /* empty shell means /bin/sh */
shell =_PATH_BSHELL;
- PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell));
+ s->command = xstrdup(shell);
}
+ if (s->command != NULL)
+ s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(s->command));
#endif
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
ret = do_exec_pty(s, command);
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -1707,7 +1719,10 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
int r = 0;
/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
- destroy_sensitive_data();
+ destroy_sensitive_data(1);
+ /* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
+ monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
+ packet_destroy_all(0, 1);
/* Force a password change */
if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -1931,6 +1946,7 @@ session_unused(int id)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
sessions[id].ttyfd = -1;
sessions[id].ptymaster = -1;
sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL;
+ sessions[id].command_handle = -1;
sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused;
sessions_first_unused = id;
}
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -2013,6 +2029,19 @@ session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int chanid)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
}
Session *
+session_by_id(int id)
+{
+ if (id >= 0 && id < sessions_nalloc) {
+ Session *s = &sessions[id];
+ if (s->used)
+ return s;
+ }
+ debug("session_by_id: unknown id %d", id);
+ session_dump();
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+Session *
session_by_tty(char *tty)
{
int i;
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -2529,6 +2558,30 @@ session_exit_message(Session *s, int status)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
chan_write_failed(c);
}
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+void
+session_end_command2(Session *s)
+{
+ if (s->command != NULL) {
+ audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command);
+ free(s->command);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
+ s->command = NULL;
+ s->command_handle = -1;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+session_end_command(Session *s)
+{
+ if (s->command != NULL) {
+ PRIVSEP(audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command));
+ free(s->command);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
+ s->command = NULL;
+ s->command_handle = -1;
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
void
session_close(Session *s)
{
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -2537,6 +2590,10 @@ session_close(Session *s)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
debug("session_close: session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid);
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
session_pty_cleanup(s);
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ if (s->command)
+ session_end_command(s);
+#endif
free(s->term);
free(s->display);
free(s->x11_chanids);
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -2751,6 +2808,15 @@ do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
server_loop2(authctxt);
}
+static void
+do_cleanup_one_session(Session *s)
+{
+ session_pty_cleanup2(s);
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ session_end_command2(s);
+#endif
+}
+
void
do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -2799,5 +2865,5 @@ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
* or if running in monitor.
*/
if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
- session_destroy_all(session_pty_cleanup2);
+ session_destroy_all(do_cleanup_one_session);
}
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
diff --git a/session.h b/session.h
index 6a2f35e..e9b312e 100644
--- a/session.h
+++ b/session.h
@@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ struct Session {
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
char *name;
char *val;
} *env;
+
+ /* exec */
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ int command_handle;
+ char *command;
+#endif
};
void do_authenticated(Authctxt *);
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -73,8 +79,10 @@ void session_close_by_pid(pid_t, int);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
void session_close_by_channel(int, void *);
void session_destroy_all(void (*)(Session *));
void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *);
+void session_end_command2(Session *);
Session *session_new(void);
+Session *session_by_id(int);
Session *session_by_tty(char *);
void session_close(Session *);
void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 512c7ed..b561ec8 100644
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "roaming.h"
+#include "audit.h"
#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
#include "version.h"
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -264,7 +265,7 @@ Buffer loginmsg;
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
-void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
+void destroy_sensitive_data(int);
void demote_sensitive_data(void);
static void do_ssh1_kex(void);
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
@@ -283,6 +284,15 @@ close_listen_socks(void)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
num_listen_socks = -1;
}
+/*
+ * Is this process listening for clients (i.e. not specific to any specific
+ * client connection?)
+ */
+int listening_for_clients(void)
+{
+ return num_listen_socks > 0;
+}
+
static void
close_startup_pipes(void)
{
@@ -562,22 +572,45 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
}
}
-/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */
+/*
+ * Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. Careful,
+ * this can be called from cleanup_exit() - i.e. from just about anywhere.
+ */
void
-destroy_sensitive_data(void)
+destroy_sensitive_data(int privsep)
{
int i;
+ pid_t pid;
+ uid_t uid;
if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
}
+ pid = getpid();
+ uid = getuid();
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
+ char *fp;
+
+ if (key_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]))
+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i], SSH_FP_HEX);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
+ else
+ fp = NULL;
key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
+ if (fp != NULL) {
+ if (privsep)
+ PRIVSEP(audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp,
+ pid, uid));
+ else
+ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp,
+ pid, uid);
+ free(fp);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
+ }
}
- if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) {
+ if (sensitive_data.host_certificates
+ && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) {
key_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]);
sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
}
@@ -591,6 +624,8 @@ void
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
demote_sensitive_data(void)
{
Key *tmp;
+ pid_t pid;
+ uid_t uid;
int i;
if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
@@ -599,13 +634,25 @@ demote_sensitive_data(void)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
sensitive_data.server_key = tmp;
}
+ pid = getpid();
+ uid = getuid();
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
+ char *fp;
+
+ if (key_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]))
+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i], SSH_FP_HEX);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
+ else
+ fp = NULL;
tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1)
sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp;
+ if (fp != NULL) {
+ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid);
+ free(fp);
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
+ }
}
/* Certs do not need demotion */
}
@@ -675,7 +722,7 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON)
2014-07-08 13:52:24 +00:00
box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor);
- pid = fork();
+ pmonitor->m_pid = pid = fork();
if (pid == -1) {
fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
} else if (pid != 0) {
@@ -729,6 +776,8 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
}
}
+extern Newkeys *current_keys[];
+
static void
privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
@@ -753,6 +802,10 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
+ newkeys_destroy(current_keys[MODE_OUT]);
+ newkeys_destroy(current_keys[MODE_IN]);
+ audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid());
+ packet_destroy_all(0, 0);
monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor);
/* NEVERREACHED */
@@ -1211,6 +1264,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
if (received_sigterm) {
logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
(int) received_sigterm);
+ destroy_sensitive_data(0);
close_listen_socks();
unlink(options.pid_file);
exit(received_sigterm == SIGTERM ? 0 : 255);
@@ -2134,6 +2188,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
*/
if (use_privsep) {
mm_send_keystate(pmonitor);
+ packet_destroy_all(1, 1);
exit(0);
}
@@ -2179,7 +2234,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
privsep_postauth(authctxt);
/* the monitor process [priv] will not return */
if (!compat20)
- destroy_sensitive_data();
+ destroy_sensitive_data(0);
}
packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval,
@@ -2189,6 +2244,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
do_authenticated(authctxt);
/* The connection has been terminated. */
+ packet_destroy_all(1, 1);
+ destroy_sensitive_data(1);
+
packet_get_state(MODE_IN, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ibytes);
packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, NULL, NULL, NULL, &obytes);
verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes",
@@ -2346,6 +2404,10 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char())
packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match.");
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ audit_kex(2, cipher_name(cipher_type), "crc", "none");
+#endif
+
debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type));
/* Get the encrypted integer. */
@@ -2418,7 +2480,7 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16];
}
/* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */
- destroy_sensitive_data();
+ destroy_sensitive_data(0);
if (use_privsep)
mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id);
@@ -2584,6 +2646,16 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
void
cleanup_exit(int i)
{
+ static int in_cleanup = 0;
+ int is_privsep_child;
+
+ /* cleanup_exit can be called at the very least from the privsep
+ wrappers used for auditing. Make sure we don't recurse
+ indefinitely. */
+ if (in_cleanup)
+ _exit(i);
+ in_cleanup = 1;
+
if (the_authctxt) {
do_cleanup(the_authctxt);
if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) {
@@ -2594,9 +2666,14 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno));
}
}
+ is_privsep_child = use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid == 0;
2013-04-08 15:17:10 +00:00
+ if (sensitive_data.host_keys != NULL)
+ destroy_sensitive_data(is_privsep_child);
+ packet_destroy_all(1, is_privsep_child);
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
- if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
+ if ((the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) &&
+ (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
#endif
_exit(i);