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2 Commits
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13c91ff952 | ||
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c009b417b0 |
57
libproxy-0.4.15-fix-CVE-2020-25219.patch
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57
libproxy-0.4.15-fix-CVE-2020-25219.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
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From a83dae404feac517695c23ff43ce1e116e2bfbe0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Michael Catanzaro <mcatanzaro@gnome.org>
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Date: Wed, 9 Sep 2020 11:12:02 -0500
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Subject: [PATCH] Rewrite url::recvline to be nonrecursive
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This function processes network input. It's semi-trusted, because the
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PAC ought to be trusted. But we still shouldn't allow it to control how
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far we recurse. A malicious PAC can cause us to overflow the stack by
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sending a sufficiently-long line without any '\n' character.
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Also, this function failed to properly handle EINTR, so let's fix that
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too, for good measure.
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Fixes #134
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---
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libproxy/url.cpp | 28 ++++++++++++++++++----------
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1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/libproxy/url.cpp b/libproxy/url.cpp
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index ee776b2..68d69cd 100644
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--- a/libproxy/url.cpp
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+++ b/libproxy/url.cpp
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@@ -388,16 +388,24 @@ string url::to_string() const {
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return m_orig;
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}
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-static inline string recvline(int fd) {
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- // Read a character.
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- // If we don't get a character, return empty string.
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- // If we are at the end of the line, return empty string.
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- char c = '\0';
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-
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- if (recv(fd, &c, 1, 0) != 1 || c == '\n')
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- return "";
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-
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- return string(1, c) + recvline(fd);
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+static string recvline(int fd) {
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+ string line;
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+ int ret;
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+
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+ // Reserve arbitrary amount of space to avoid small memory reallocations.
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+ line.reserve(128);
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+
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+ do {
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+ char c;
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+ ret = recv(fd, &c, 1, 0);
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+ if (ret == 1) {
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+ if (c == '\n')
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+ return line;
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+ line += c;
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+ }
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+ } while (ret == 1 || (ret == -1 && errno == EINTR));
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+
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+ return line;
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}
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char* url::get_pac() {
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93
libproxy-0.4.15-fix-pac-buffer-overflow.patch
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93
libproxy-0.4.15-fix-pac-buffer-overflow.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
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From 4411b523545b22022b4be7d0cac25aa170ae1d3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Fei Li <lifeibiren@gmail.com>
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Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2020 02:18:37 +0800
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Subject: [PATCH] Fix buffer overflow when PAC is enabled
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The bug was found on Windows 10 (MINGW64) when PAC is enabled. It turned
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out to be the large PAC file (more than 102400 bytes) returned by a
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local proxy program with no content-length present.
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---
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libproxy/url.cpp | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
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1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/libproxy/url.cpp b/libproxy/url.cpp
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index ee776b2..8684086 100644
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--- a/libproxy/url.cpp
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+++ b/libproxy/url.cpp
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@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ using namespace std;
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#define PAC_MIME_TYPE_FB "text/plain"
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// This is the maximum pac size (to avoid memory attacks)
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-#define PAC_MAX_SIZE 102400
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+#define PAC_MAX_SIZE 0x800000
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// This is the default block size to use when receiving via HTTP
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#define PAC_HTTP_BLOCK_SIZE 512
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@@ -478,15 +478,13 @@ char* url::get_pac() {
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}
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// Get content
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- unsigned int recvd = 0;
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- buffer = new char[PAC_MAX_SIZE];
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- memset(buffer, 0, PAC_MAX_SIZE);
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+ std::vector<char> dynamic_buffer;
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do {
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unsigned int chunk_length;
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if (chunked) {
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// Discard the empty line if we received a previous chunk
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- if (recvd > 0) recvline(sock);
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+ if (!dynamic_buffer.empty()) recvline(sock);
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// Get the chunk-length line as an integer
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if (sscanf(recvline(sock).c_str(), "%x", &chunk_length) != 1 || chunk_length == 0) break;
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@@ -498,21 +496,41 @@ char* url::get_pac() {
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if (content_length >= PAC_MAX_SIZE) break;
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- while (content_length == 0 || recvd != content_length) {
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- int r = recv(sock, buffer + recvd,
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- content_length == 0 ? PAC_HTTP_BLOCK_SIZE
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- : content_length - recvd, 0);
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+ while (content_length == 0 || dynamic_buffer.size() != content_length) {
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+ // Calculate length to recv
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+ unsigned int length_to_read = PAC_HTTP_BLOCK_SIZE;
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+ if (content_length > 0)
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+ length_to_read = content_length - dynamic_buffer.size();
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+
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+ // Prepare buffer
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+ dynamic_buffer.resize(dynamic_buffer.size() + length_to_read);
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+
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+ int r = recv(sock, dynamic_buffer.data() + dynamic_buffer.size() - length_to_read, length_to_read, 0);
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+
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+ // Shrink buffer to fit
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+ if (r >= 0)
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+ dynamic_buffer.resize(dynamic_buffer.size() - length_to_read + r);
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+
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+ // PAC size too large, discard
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+ if (dynamic_buffer.size() >= PAC_MAX_SIZE) {
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+ chunked = false;
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+ dynamic_buffer.clear();
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+ break;
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+ }
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+
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if (r <= 0) {
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chunked = false;
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break;
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}
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- recvd += r;
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}
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} while (chunked);
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- if (content_length != 0 && string(buffer).size() != content_length) {
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- delete[] buffer;
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- buffer = NULL;
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+ if (content_length == 0 || content_length == dynamic_buffer.size()) {
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+ buffer = new char[dynamic_buffer.size() + 1];
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+ if (!dynamic_buffer.empty()) {
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+ memcpy(buffer, dynamic_buffer.data(), dynamic_buffer.size());
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+ }
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+ buffer[dynamic_buffer.size()] = '\0';
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}
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}
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@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
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Name: libproxy
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Version: 0.4.15
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Release: 23%{?dist}
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Release: 25%{?dist}
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Summary: A library handling all the details of proxy configuration
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License: LGPLv2+
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@ -27,6 +27,10 @@ Patch5: libproxy-0.4.15-python39.patch
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Patch6: libproxy-0.4.15-mozjs68.patch
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# https://github.com/libproxy/libproxy/pull/118
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Patch7: libproxy-0.4.15-mozjs-use-after-free.patch
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# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1880350
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Patch8: libproxy-0.4.15-fix-CVE-2020-25219.patch
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# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1883584
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Patch9: libproxy-0.4.15-fix-pac-buffer-overflow.patch
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BuildRequires: cmake >= 2.6.0
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BuildRequires: gcc-c++
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@ -230,6 +234,12 @@ install -Dpm 0644 %{SOURCE1} %{buildroot}/%{_mandir}/man1/proxy.1
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%changelog
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* Tue Sep 29 2020 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 0.4.15-25
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- Fix PAC buffer overflow (#1883584)
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* Fri Sep 18 2020 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 0.4.15-24
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- Fix CVE-2020-25219 (#1880350)
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* Tue Aug 04 2020 Frantisek Zatloukal <fzatlouk@redhat.com> - 0.4.15-23
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- build with mozjs68
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- backport use after free fix for mozjs backend
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