59 lines
1.8 KiB
Diff
59 lines
1.8 KiB
Diff
From bb5d57cb1278a0ca3ba6d904c3698d308c12b3be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
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Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2013 19:25:05 -0500
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Subject: [PATCH] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode
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A user can manually tell the shim boot loader to disable validation of
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images it loads. When a user does this, it creates a UEFI variable called
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MokSBState that does not have the runtime attribute set. Given that the
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user explicitly disabled validation, we can honor that and not enable
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secure boot mode if that variable is set.
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Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
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---
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arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
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1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
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index 88edd48f03e9..3b18ef2b534c 100644
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--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
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+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
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@@ -806,8 +806,9 @@ out:
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static int get_secure_boot(void)
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{
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- u8 sb, setup;
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+ u8 sb, setup, moksbstate;
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unsigned long datasize = sizeof(sb);
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+ u32 attr;
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efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
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efi_status_t status;
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@@ -831,6 +832,23 @@ static int get_secure_boot(void)
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if (setup == 1)
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return 0;
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+ /* See if a user has put shim into insecure_mode. If so, and the variable
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+ * doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well honor that.
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+ */
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+ var_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
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+ status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)sys_table->runtime->get_variable,
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+ L"MokSBState", &var_guid, &attr, &datasize,
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+ &moksbstate);
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+
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+ /* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure */
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+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
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+ return 1;
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+
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+ if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS)) {
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+ if (moksbstate == 1)
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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+
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return 1;
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}
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--
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1.9.3
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