kernel/patch-6.2-redhat.patch

1798 lines
62 KiB
Diff

Makefile | 4 +
arch/arm/Kconfig | 4 +-
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 3 +-
arch/s390/include/asm/ipl.h | 1 +
arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c | 5 +
arch/s390/kernel/setup.c | 4 +
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 22 +-
drivers/acpi/apei/hest.c | 8 +
drivers/acpi/irq.c | 17 +-
drivers/acpi/scan.c | 9 +
drivers/ata/libahci.c | 18 +
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_dmi.c | 15 +
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c | 16 +-
drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 124 +++--
drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c | 38 ++
drivers/firmware/sysfb.c | 18 +-
drivers/hid/hid-rmi.c | 66 ---
drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c | 19 +
drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_driver.c | 124 +++--
drivers/iommu/iommu.c | 22 +
drivers/pci/quirks.c | 24 +
drivers/usb/core/hub.c | 7 +
include/linux/efi.h | 22 +-
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 +
include/linux/rh_kabi.h | 515 +++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/rmi.h | 1 +
include/linux/security.h | 5 +
kernel/module/signing.c | 9 +-
scripts/tags.sh | 2 +
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 6 +-
security/lockdown/Kconfig | 13 +
security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 +
security/security.c | 6 +
35 files changed, 980 insertions(+), 177 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index f26824f367a9..540a8364178e 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -22,6 +22,10 @@ $(if $(filter __%, $(MAKECMDGOALS)), \
PHONY := __all
__all:
+# Set RHEL variables
+# Use this spot to avoid future merge conflicts
+include Makefile.rhelver
+
# We are using a recursive build, so we need to do a little thinking
# to get the ordering right.
#
diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig
index 43c7773b89ae..2c1db1cb5528 100644
--- a/arch/arm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig
@@ -1299,9 +1299,9 @@ config HIGHMEM
If unsure, say n.
config HIGHPTE
- bool "Allocate 2nd-level pagetables from highmem" if EXPERT
+ bool "Allocate 2nd-level pagetables from highmem"
depends on HIGHMEM
- default y
+ default n
help
The VM uses one page of physical memory for each page table.
For systems with a lot of processes, this can use a lot of
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index c5ccca26a408..4cacdb4ab764 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -1234,7 +1234,7 @@ endchoice
config ARM64_FORCE_52BIT
bool "Force 52-bit virtual addresses for userspace"
- depends on ARM64_VA_BITS_52 && EXPERT
+ depends on ARM64_VA_BITS_52
help
For systems with 52-bit userspace VAs enabled, the kernel will attempt
to maintain compatibility with older software by providing 48-bit VAs
@@ -1473,6 +1473,7 @@ config XEN
config ARCH_FORCE_MAX_ORDER
int
default "14" if ARM64_64K_PAGES
+ default "13" if (ARCH_THUNDER && !ARM64_64K_PAGES)
default "12" if ARM64_16K_PAGES
default "11"
help
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/ipl.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/ipl.h
index b0d00032479d..afb9544fb007 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/ipl.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/ipl.h
@@ -139,6 +139,7 @@ int ipl_report_add_component(struct ipl_report *report, struct kexec_buf *kbuf,
unsigned char flags, unsigned short cert);
int ipl_report_add_certificate(struct ipl_report *report, void *key,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long len);
+bool ipl_get_secureboot(void);
/*
* DIAG 308 support
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c b/arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c
index fbd646dbf440..23ca9cdb2438 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c
@@ -2568,3 +2568,8 @@ int ipl_report_free(struct ipl_report *report)
}
#endif
+
+bool ipl_get_secureboot(void)
+{
+ return !!ipl_secure_flag;
+}
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/setup.c b/arch/s390/kernel/setup.c
index 696c9e007a36..80a56c8eaaae 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/setup.c
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
#include <linux/memory.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/start_kernel.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
@@ -981,6 +982,9 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
log_component_list();
+ if (ipl_get_secureboot())
+ security_lock_kernel_down("Secure IPL mode", LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX);
+
/* Have one command line that is parsed and saved in /proc/cmdline */
/* boot_command_line has been already set up in early.c */
*cmdline_p = boot_command_line;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 88188549647c..d4147393237b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#include <linux/root_dev.h>
#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
#include <linux/tboot.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/usb/xhci-dbgp.h>
#include <linux/static_call.h>
#include <linux/swiotlb.h>
@@ -1038,6 +1039,13 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
efi_init();
+ efi_set_secure_boot(boot_params.secure_boot);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_IN_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
+ if (efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
+ security_lock_kernel_down("EFI Secure Boot mode", LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX);
+#endif
+
dmi_setup();
/*
@@ -1196,19 +1204,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
/* Allocate bigger log buffer */
setup_log_buf(1);
- if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
- switch (boot_params.secure_boot) {
- case efi_secureboot_mode_disabled:
- pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n");
- break;
- case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
- pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
- break;
- default:
- pr_info("Secure boot could not be determined\n");
- break;
- }
- }
+ efi_set_secure_boot(boot_params.secure_boot);
reserve_initrd();
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/hest.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/hest.c
index 6aef1ee5e1bd..8f146b1b4972 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/apei/hest.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/hest.c
@@ -96,6 +96,14 @@ static int apei_hest_parse(apei_hest_func_t func, void *data)
if (hest_disable || !hest_tab)
return -EINVAL;
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64
+ /* Ignore broken firmware */
+ if (!strncmp(hest_tab->header.oem_id, "HPE ", 6) &&
+ !strncmp(hest_tab->header.oem_table_id, "ProLiant", 8) &&
+ MIDR_IMPLEMENTOR(read_cpuid_id()) == ARM_CPU_IMP_APM)
+ return -EINVAL;
+#endif
+
hest_hdr = (struct acpi_hest_header *)(hest_tab + 1);
for (i = 0; i < hest_tab->error_source_count; i++) {
len = hest_esrc_len(hest_hdr);
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/irq.c b/drivers/acpi/irq.c
index c2c786eb95ab..4e3aa80cd5cf 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/irq.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/irq.c
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ struct acpi_irq_parse_one_ctx {
unsigned int index;
unsigned long *res_flags;
struct irq_fwspec *fwspec;
+ bool skip_producer_check;
};
/**
@@ -211,7 +212,8 @@ static acpi_status acpi_irq_parse_one_cb(struct acpi_resource *ares,
return AE_CTRL_TERMINATE;
case ACPI_RESOURCE_TYPE_EXTENDED_IRQ:
eirq = &ares->data.extended_irq;
- if (eirq->producer_consumer == ACPI_PRODUCER)
+ if (!ctx->skip_producer_check &&
+ eirq->producer_consumer == ACPI_PRODUCER)
return AE_OK;
if (ctx->index >= eirq->interrupt_count) {
ctx->index -= eirq->interrupt_count;
@@ -247,8 +249,19 @@ static acpi_status acpi_irq_parse_one_cb(struct acpi_resource *ares,
static int acpi_irq_parse_one(acpi_handle handle, unsigned int index,
struct irq_fwspec *fwspec, unsigned long *flags)
{
- struct acpi_irq_parse_one_ctx ctx = { -EINVAL, index, flags, fwspec };
+ struct acpi_irq_parse_one_ctx ctx = { -EINVAL, index, flags, fwspec, false };
+ /*
+ * Firmware on arm64-based HPE m400 platform incorrectly marks
+ * its UART interrupt as ACPI_PRODUCER rather than ACPI_CONSUMER.
+ * Don't do the producer/consumer check for that device.
+ */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64)) {
+ struct acpi_device *adev = acpi_get_acpi_dev(handle);
+
+ if (adev && !strcmp(acpi_device_hid(adev), "APMC0D08"))
+ ctx.skip_producer_check = true;
+ }
acpi_walk_resources(handle, METHOD_NAME__CRS, acpi_irq_parse_one_cb, &ctx);
return ctx.rc;
}
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/scan.c b/drivers/acpi/scan.c
index 0c6f06abe3f4..f66b85b2c108 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/scan.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/scan.c
@@ -1746,6 +1746,15 @@ static bool acpi_device_enumeration_by_parent(struct acpi_device *device)
if (!acpi_match_device_ids(device, ignore_serial_bus_ids))
return false;
+ /*
+ * Firmware on some arm64 X-Gene platforms will make the UART
+ * device appear as both a UART and a slave of that UART. Just
+ * bail out here for X-Gene UARTs.
+ */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64) &&
+ !strcmp(acpi_device_hid(device), "APMC0D08"))
+ return false;
+
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&resource_list);
acpi_dev_get_resources(device, &resource_list,
acpi_check_serial_bus_slave,
diff --git a/drivers/ata/libahci.c b/drivers/ata/libahci.c
index 29acc35bf4a6..c0eaa763cdad 100644
--- a/drivers/ata/libahci.c
+++ b/drivers/ata/libahci.c
@@ -727,6 +727,24 @@ int ahci_stop_engine(struct ata_port *ap)
tmp &= ~PORT_CMD_START;
writel(tmp, port_mmio + PORT_CMD);
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64
+ /* Rev Ax of Cavium CN99XX needs a hack for port stop */
+ if (dev_is_pci(ap->host->dev) &&
+ to_pci_dev(ap->host->dev)->vendor == 0x14e4 &&
+ to_pci_dev(ap->host->dev)->device == 0x9027 &&
+ midr_is_cpu_model_range(read_cpuid_id(),
+ MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_BRCM, BRCM_CPU_PART_VULCAN),
+ MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(0, 0),
+ MIDR_CPU_VAR_REV(0, MIDR_REVISION_MASK))) {
+ tmp = readl(hpriv->mmio + 0x8000);
+ udelay(100);
+ writel(tmp | (1 << 26), hpriv->mmio + 0x8000);
+ udelay(100);
+ writel(tmp & ~(1 << 26), hpriv->mmio + 0x8000);
+ dev_warn(ap->host->dev, "CN99XX SATA reset workaround applied\n");
+ }
+#endif
+
/* wait for engine to stop. This could be as long as 500 msec */
tmp = ata_wait_register(ap, port_mmio + PORT_CMD,
PORT_CMD_LIST_ON, PORT_CMD_LIST_ON, 1, 500);
diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_dmi.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_dmi.c
index bbf7029e224b..cf7faa970dd6 100644
--- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_dmi.c
+++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_dmi.c
@@ -215,6 +215,21 @@ static int __init scan_for_dmi_ipmi(void)
{
const struct dmi_device *dev = NULL;
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64
+ /* RHEL-only
+ * If this is ARM-based HPE m400, return now, because that platform
+ * reports the host-side ipmi address as intel port-io space, which
+ * does not exist in the ARM architecture.
+ */
+ const char *dmistr = dmi_get_system_info(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME);
+
+ if (dmistr && (strcmp("ProLiant m400 Server", dmistr) == 0)) {
+ pr_debug("%s does not support host ipmi\n", dmistr);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* END RHEL-only */
+#endif
+
while ((dev = dmi_find_device(DMI_DEV_TYPE_IPMI, NULL, dev)))
dmi_decode_ipmi((const struct dmi_header *) dev->device_data);
diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c
index 186f1fee7534..93e3a76596ff 100644
--- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c
+++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#include <linux/uuid.h>
#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/dmi.h>
#include <linux/delay.h>
#define IPMI_DRIVER_VERSION "39.2"
@@ -5516,8 +5517,21 @@ static int __init ipmi_init_msghandler_mod(void)
{
int rv;
- pr_info("version " IPMI_DRIVER_VERSION "\n");
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64
+ /* RHEL-only
+ * If this is ARM-based HPE m400, return now, because that platform
+ * reports the host-side ipmi address as intel port-io space, which
+ * does not exist in the ARM architecture.
+ */
+ const char *dmistr = dmi_get_system_info(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME);
+ if (dmistr && (strcmp("ProLiant m400 Server", dmistr) == 0)) {
+ pr_debug("%s does not support host ipmi\n", dmistr);
+ return -ENOSYS;
+ }
+ /* END RHEL-only */
+#endif
+ pr_info("version " IPMI_DRIVER_VERSION "\n");
mutex_lock(&ipmi_interfaces_mutex);
rv = ipmi_register_driver();
mutex_unlock(&ipmi_interfaces_mutex);
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
index b51f2a4c821e..be31d32aba53 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_EFI_STUB) += libstub
obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_BOOTLOADER_CONTROL) += efibc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_TEST) += test/
obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_DEV_PATH_PARSER) += dev-path-parser.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_EFI) += secureboot.o
obj-$(CONFIG_APPLE_PROPERTIES) += apple-properties.o
obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_RCI2_TABLE) += rci2-table.o
obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_EMBEDDED_FIRMWARE) += embedded-firmware.o
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
index 1e0b016fdc2b..7417f131db15 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include <linux/ucs2_string.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/bsearch.h>
#include <asm/early_ioremap.h>
@@ -907,40 +908,101 @@ int efi_mem_type(unsigned long phys_addr)
}
#endif
+struct efi_error_code {
+ efi_status_t status;
+ int errno;
+ const char *description;
+};
+
+static const struct efi_error_code efi_error_codes[] = {
+ { EFI_SUCCESS, 0, "Success"},
+#if 0
+ { EFI_LOAD_ERROR, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Load Error"},
+#endif
+ { EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER, -EINVAL, "Invalid Parameter"},
+ { EFI_UNSUPPORTED, -ENOSYS, "Unsupported"},
+ { EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE, -ENOSPC, "Bad Buffer Size"},
+ { EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, -ENOSPC, "Buffer Too Small"},
+ { EFI_NOT_READY, -EAGAIN, "Not Ready"},
+ { EFI_DEVICE_ERROR, -EIO, "Device Error"},
+ { EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED, -EROFS, "Write Protected"},
+ { EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES, -ENOMEM, "Out of Resources"},
+#if 0
+ { EFI_VOLUME_CORRUPTED, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Volume Corrupt"},
+ { EFI_VOLUME_FULL, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Volume Full"},
+ { EFI_NO_MEDIA, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "No Media"},
+ { EFI_MEDIA_CHANGED, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Media changed"},
+#endif
+ { EFI_NOT_FOUND, -ENOENT, "Not Found"},
+#if 0
+ { EFI_ACCESS_DENIED, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Access Denied"},
+ { EFI_NO_RESPONSE, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "No Response"},
+ { EFI_NO_MAPPING, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "No mapping"},
+ { EFI_TIMEOUT, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Time out"},
+ { EFI_NOT_STARTED, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Not started"},
+ { EFI_ALREADY_STARTED, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Already started"},
+#endif
+ { EFI_ABORTED, -EINTR, "Aborted"},
+#if 0
+ { EFI_ICMP_ERROR, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "ICMP Error"},
+ { EFI_TFTP_ERROR, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "TFTP Error"},
+ { EFI_PROTOCOL_ERROR, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Protocol Error"},
+ { EFI_INCOMPATIBLE_VERSION, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Incompatible Version"},
+#endif
+ { EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION, -EACCES, "Security Policy Violation"},
+#if 0
+ { EFI_CRC_ERROR, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "CRC Error"},
+ { EFI_END_OF_MEDIA, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "End of Media"},
+ { EFI_END_OF_FILE, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "End of File"},
+ { EFI_INVALID_LANGUAGE, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Invalid Languages"},
+ { EFI_COMPROMISED_DATA, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Compromised Data"},
+
+ // warnings
+ { EFI_WARN_UNKOWN_GLYPH, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Warning Unknown Glyph"},
+ { EFI_WARN_DELETE_FAILURE, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Warning Delete Failure"},
+ { EFI_WARN_WRITE_FAILURE, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Warning Write Failure"},
+ { EFI_WARN_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, -EPICK_AN_ERRNO, "Warning Buffer Too Small"},
+#endif
+};
+
+static int
+efi_status_cmp_bsearch(const void *key, const void *item)
+{
+ u64 status = (u64)(uintptr_t)key;
+ struct efi_error_code *code = (struct efi_error_code *)item;
+
+ if (status < code->status)
+ return -1;
+ if (status > code->status)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
int efi_status_to_err(efi_status_t status)
{
- int err;
-
- switch (status) {
- case EFI_SUCCESS:
- err = 0;
- break;
- case EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER:
- err = -EINVAL;
- break;
- case EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES:
- err = -ENOSPC;
- break;
- case EFI_DEVICE_ERROR:
- err = -EIO;
- break;
- case EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED:
- err = -EROFS;
- break;
- case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
- err = -EACCES;
- break;
- case EFI_NOT_FOUND:
- err = -ENOENT;
- break;
- case EFI_ABORTED:
- err = -EINTR;
- break;
- default:
- err = -EINVAL;
- }
+ struct efi_error_code *found;
+ size_t num = sizeof(efi_error_codes) / sizeof(struct efi_error_code);
- return err;
+ found = bsearch((void *)(uintptr_t)status, efi_error_codes,
+ sizeof(struct efi_error_code), num,
+ efi_status_cmp_bsearch);
+ if (!found)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return found->errno;
+}
+
+const char *
+efi_status_to_str(efi_status_t status)
+{
+ struct efi_error_code *found;
+ size_t num = sizeof(efi_error_codes) / sizeof(struct efi_error_code);
+
+ found = bsearch((void *)(uintptr_t)status, efi_error_codes,
+ sizeof(struct efi_error_code), num,
+ efi_status_cmp_bsearch);
+ if (!found)
+ return "Unknown error code";
+ return found->description;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(efi_status_to_err);
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..de0a3714a5d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/* Core kernel secure boot support.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2017 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+
+/*
+ * Decide what to do when UEFI secure boot mode is enabled.
+ */
+void __init efi_set_secure_boot(enum efi_secureboot_mode mode)
+{
+ if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
+ switch (mode) {
+ case efi_secureboot_mode_disabled:
+ pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n");
+ break;
+ case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
+ set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &efi.flags);
+ pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_warn("Secure boot could not be determined (mode %u)\n",
+ mode);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/sysfb.c b/drivers/firmware/sysfb.c
index 3fd3563d962b..75d67e6dde2a 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/sysfb.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/sysfb.c
@@ -34,6 +34,22 @@
#include <linux/screen_info.h>
#include <linux/sysfb.h>
+static int skip_simpledrm;
+
+static int __init simpledrm_disable(char *opt)
+{
+ if (!opt)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ get_option(&opt, &skip_simpledrm);
+
+ if (skip_simpledrm)
+ pr_info("The simpledrm driver will not be probed\n");
+
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("nvidia-drm.modeset", simpledrm_disable);
+
static struct platform_device *pd;
static DEFINE_MUTEX(disable_lock);
static bool disabled;
@@ -83,7 +99,7 @@ static __init int sysfb_init(void)
/* try to create a simple-framebuffer device */
compatible = sysfb_parse_mode(si, &mode);
- if (compatible) {
+ if (compatible && !skip_simpledrm) {
pd = sysfb_create_simplefb(si, &mode);
if (!IS_ERR(pd))
goto unlock_mutex;
diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-rmi.c b/drivers/hid/hid-rmi.c
index 84e7ba5314d3..efc96776f761 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-rmi.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-rmi.c
@@ -321,21 +321,12 @@ static int rmi_input_event(struct hid_device *hdev, u8 *data, int size)
{
struct rmi_data *hdata = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
struct rmi_device *rmi_dev = hdata->xport.rmi_dev;
- unsigned long flags;
if (!(test_bit(RMI_STARTED, &hdata->flags)))
return 0;
- pm_wakeup_event(hdev->dev.parent, 0);
-
- local_irq_save(flags);
-
rmi_set_attn_data(rmi_dev, data[1], &data[2], size - 2);
- generic_handle_irq(hdata->rmi_irq);
-
- local_irq_restore(flags);
-
return 1;
}
@@ -591,56 +582,6 @@ static const struct rmi_transport_ops hid_rmi_ops = {
.reset = rmi_hid_reset,
};
-static void rmi_irq_teardown(void *data)
-{
- struct rmi_data *hdata = data;
- struct irq_domain *domain = hdata->domain;
-
- if (!domain)
- return;
-
- irq_dispose_mapping(irq_find_mapping(domain, 0));
-
- irq_domain_remove(domain);
- hdata->domain = NULL;
- hdata->rmi_irq = 0;
-}
-
-static int rmi_irq_map(struct irq_domain *h, unsigned int virq,
- irq_hw_number_t hw_irq_num)
-{
- irq_set_chip_and_handler(virq, &dummy_irq_chip, handle_simple_irq);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static const struct irq_domain_ops rmi_irq_ops = {
- .map = rmi_irq_map,
-};
-
-static int rmi_setup_irq_domain(struct hid_device *hdev)
-{
- struct rmi_data *hdata = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
- int ret;
-
- hdata->domain = irq_domain_create_linear(hdev->dev.fwnode, 1,
- &rmi_irq_ops, hdata);
- if (!hdata->domain)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- ret = devm_add_action_or_reset(&hdev->dev, &rmi_irq_teardown, hdata);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
- hdata->rmi_irq = irq_create_mapping(hdata->domain, 0);
- if (hdata->rmi_irq <= 0) {
- hid_err(hdev, "Can't allocate an IRQ\n");
- return hdata->rmi_irq < 0 ? hdata->rmi_irq : -ENXIO;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
static int rmi_probe(struct hid_device *hdev, const struct hid_device_id *id)
{
struct rmi_data *data = NULL;
@@ -713,18 +654,11 @@ static int rmi_probe(struct hid_device *hdev, const struct hid_device_id *id)
mutex_init(&data->page_mutex);
- ret = rmi_setup_irq_domain(hdev);
- if (ret) {
- hid_err(hdev, "failed to allocate IRQ domain\n");
- return ret;
- }
-
if (data->device_flags & RMI_DEVICE_HAS_PHYS_BUTTONS)
rmi_hid_pdata.gpio_data.disable = true;
data->xport.dev = hdev->dev.parent;
data->xport.pdata = rmi_hid_pdata;
- data->xport.pdata.irq = data->rmi_irq;
data->xport.proto_name = "hid";
data->xport.ops = &hid_rmi_ops;
diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c
index 1cc052979e01..c817bc0a90c5 100644
--- a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c
+++ b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/dmi.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
@@ -2210,6 +2211,16 @@ static const struct amba_id etm4_ids[] = {
{},
};
+static const struct dmi_system_id broken_coresight[] = {
+ {
+ .matches = {
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "HPE"),
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Apollo 70"),
+ },
+ },
+ { } /* terminating entry */
+};
+
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(amba, etm4_ids);
static struct amba_driver etm4x_amba_driver = {
@@ -2243,6 +2254,11 @@ static int __init etm4x_init(void)
{
int ret;
+ if (dmi_check_system(broken_coresight)) {
+ pr_info("ETM4 disabled due to firmware bug\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
ret = etm4_pm_setup();
/* etm4_pm_setup() does its own cleanup - exit on error */
@@ -2269,6 +2285,9 @@ static int __init etm4x_init(void)
static void __exit etm4x_exit(void)
{
+ if (dmi_check_system(broken_coresight))
+ return;
+
amba_driver_unregister(&etm4x_amba_driver);
platform_driver_unregister(&etm4_platform_driver);
etm4_pm_clear();
diff --git a/drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_driver.c b/drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_driver.c
index 258d5fe3d395..f7298e3dc8f3 100644
--- a/drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_driver.c
+++ b/drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_driver.c
@@ -182,34 +182,47 @@ void rmi_set_attn_data(struct rmi_device *rmi_dev, unsigned long irq_status,
attn_data.data = fifo_data;
kfifo_put(&drvdata->attn_fifo, attn_data);
+
+ schedule_work(&drvdata->attn_work);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rmi_set_attn_data);
-static irqreturn_t rmi_irq_fn(int irq, void *dev_id)
+static void attn_callback(struct work_struct *work)
{
- struct rmi_device *rmi_dev = dev_id;
- struct rmi_driver_data *drvdata = dev_get_drvdata(&rmi_dev->dev);
+ struct rmi_driver_data *drvdata = container_of(work,
+ struct rmi_driver_data,
+ attn_work);
struct rmi4_attn_data attn_data = {0};
int ret, count;
count = kfifo_get(&drvdata->attn_fifo, &attn_data);
- if (count) {
- *(drvdata->irq_status) = attn_data.irq_status;
- drvdata->attn_data = attn_data;
- }
+ if (!count)
+ return;
- ret = rmi_process_interrupt_requests(rmi_dev);
+ *(drvdata->irq_status) = attn_data.irq_status;
+ drvdata->attn_data = attn_data;
+
+ ret = rmi_process_interrupt_requests(drvdata->rmi_dev);
if (ret)
- rmi_dbg(RMI_DEBUG_CORE, &rmi_dev->dev,
+ rmi_dbg(RMI_DEBUG_CORE, &drvdata->rmi_dev->dev,
"Failed to process interrupt request: %d\n", ret);
- if (count) {
- kfree(attn_data.data);
- drvdata->attn_data.data = NULL;
- }
+ kfree(attn_data.data);
+ drvdata->attn_data.data = NULL;
if (!kfifo_is_empty(&drvdata->attn_fifo))
- return rmi_irq_fn(irq, dev_id);
+ schedule_work(&drvdata->attn_work);
+}
+
+static irqreturn_t rmi_irq_fn(int irq, void *dev_id)
+{
+ struct rmi_device *rmi_dev = dev_id;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = rmi_process_interrupt_requests(rmi_dev);
+ if (ret)
+ rmi_dbg(RMI_DEBUG_CORE, &rmi_dev->dev,
+ "Failed to process interrupt request: %d\n", ret);
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
@@ -217,7 +230,6 @@ static irqreturn_t rmi_irq_fn(int irq, void *dev_id)
static int rmi_irq_init(struct rmi_device *rmi_dev)
{
struct rmi_device_platform_data *pdata = rmi_get_platform_data(rmi_dev);
- struct rmi_driver_data *data = dev_get_drvdata(&rmi_dev->dev);
int irq_flags = irq_get_trigger_type(pdata->irq);
int ret;
@@ -235,8 +247,6 @@ static int rmi_irq_init(struct rmi_device *rmi_dev)
return ret;
}
- data->enabled = true;
-
return 0;
}
@@ -886,23 +896,27 @@ void rmi_enable_irq(struct rmi_device *rmi_dev, bool clear_wake)
if (data->enabled)
goto out;
- enable_irq(irq);
- data->enabled = true;
- if (clear_wake && device_may_wakeup(rmi_dev->xport->dev)) {
- retval = disable_irq_wake(irq);
- if (retval)
- dev_warn(&rmi_dev->dev,
- "Failed to disable irq for wake: %d\n",
- retval);
- }
+ if (irq) {
+ enable_irq(irq);
+ data->enabled = true;
+ if (clear_wake && device_may_wakeup(rmi_dev->xport->dev)) {
+ retval = disable_irq_wake(irq);
+ if (retval)
+ dev_warn(&rmi_dev->dev,
+ "Failed to disable irq for wake: %d\n",
+ retval);
+ }
- /*
- * Call rmi_process_interrupt_requests() after enabling irq,
- * otherwise we may lose interrupt on edge-triggered systems.
- */
- irq_flags = irq_get_trigger_type(pdata->irq);
- if (irq_flags & IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH)
- rmi_process_interrupt_requests(rmi_dev);
+ /*
+ * Call rmi_process_interrupt_requests() after enabling irq,
+ * otherwise we may lose interrupt on edge-triggered systems.
+ */
+ irq_flags = irq_get_trigger_type(pdata->irq);
+ if (irq_flags & IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH)
+ rmi_process_interrupt_requests(rmi_dev);
+ } else {
+ data->enabled = true;
+ }
out:
mutex_unlock(&data->enabled_mutex);
@@ -922,20 +936,22 @@ void rmi_disable_irq(struct rmi_device *rmi_dev, bool enable_wake)
goto out;
data->enabled = false;
- disable_irq(irq);
- if (enable_wake && device_may_wakeup(rmi_dev->xport->dev)) {
- retval = enable_irq_wake(irq);
- if (retval)
- dev_warn(&rmi_dev->dev,
- "Failed to enable irq for wake: %d\n",
- retval);
- }
-
- /* make sure the fifo is clean */
- while (!kfifo_is_empty(&data->attn_fifo)) {
- count = kfifo_get(&data->attn_fifo, &attn_data);
- if (count)
- kfree(attn_data.data);
+ if (irq) {
+ disable_irq(irq);
+ if (enable_wake && device_may_wakeup(rmi_dev->xport->dev)) {
+ retval = enable_irq_wake(irq);
+ if (retval)
+ dev_warn(&rmi_dev->dev,
+ "Failed to enable irq for wake: %d\n",
+ retval);
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* make sure the fifo is clean */
+ while (!kfifo_is_empty(&data->attn_fifo)) {
+ count = kfifo_get(&data->attn_fifo, &attn_data);
+ if (count)
+ kfree(attn_data.data);
+ }
}
out:
@@ -981,6 +997,8 @@ static int rmi_driver_remove(struct device *dev)
irq_domain_remove(data->irqdomain);
data->irqdomain = NULL;
+ cancel_work_sync(&data->attn_work);
+
rmi_f34_remove_sysfs(rmi_dev);
rmi_free_function_list(rmi_dev);
@@ -1219,9 +1237,15 @@ static int rmi_driver_probe(struct device *dev)
}
}
- retval = rmi_irq_init(rmi_dev);
- if (retval < 0)
- goto err_destroy_functions;
+ if (pdata->irq) {
+ retval = rmi_irq_init(rmi_dev);
+ if (retval < 0)
+ goto err_destroy_functions;
+ }
+
+ data->enabled = true;
+
+ INIT_WORK(&data->attn_work, attn_callback);
if (data->f01_container->dev.driver) {
/* Driver already bound, so enable ATTN now. */
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/iommu.c
index 5f6a85aea501..3b1e9faa9c2d 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/iommu.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/iommu.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <linux/amba/bus.h>
#include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/dmi.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/bits.h>
#include <linux/bug.h>
@@ -2793,6 +2794,27 @@ int iommu_dev_disable_feature(struct device *dev, enum iommu_dev_features feat)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(iommu_dev_disable_feature);
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64
+static int __init iommu_quirks(void)
+{
+ const char *vendor, *name;
+
+ vendor = dmi_get_system_info(DMI_SYS_VENDOR);
+ name = dmi_get_system_info(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME);
+
+ if (vendor &&
+ (strncmp(vendor, "GIGABYTE", 8) == 0 && name &&
+ (strncmp(name, "R120", 4) == 0 ||
+ strncmp(name, "R270", 4) == 0))) {
+ pr_warn("Gigabyte %s detected, force iommu passthrough mode", name);
+ iommu_def_domain_type = IOMMU_DOMAIN_IDENTITY;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+arch_initcall(iommu_quirks);
+#endif
+
/*
* Changes the default domain of an iommu group that has *only* one device
*
diff --git a/drivers/pci/quirks.c b/drivers/pci/quirks.c
index 285acc4aaccc..a7056957e7dd 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/quirks.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/quirks.c
@@ -4296,6 +4296,30 @@ DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_HEADER(PCI_VENDOR_ID_BROADCOM, 0x9000,
DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_HEADER(PCI_VENDOR_ID_BROADCOM, 0x9084,
quirk_bridge_cavm_thrx2_pcie_root);
+/*
+ * PCI BAR 5 is not setup correctly for the on-board AHCI controller
+ * on Broadcom's Vulcan processor. Added a quirk to fix BAR 5 by
+ * using BAR 4's resources which are populated correctly and NOT
+ * actually used by the AHCI controller.
+ */
+static void quirk_fix_vulcan_ahci_bars(struct pci_dev *dev)
+{
+ struct resource *r = &dev->resource[4];
+
+ if (!(r->flags & IORESOURCE_MEM) || (r->start == 0))
+ return;
+
+ /* Set BAR5 resource to BAR4 */
+ dev->resource[5] = *r;
+
+ /* Update BAR5 in pci config space */
+ pci_write_config_dword(dev, PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_5, r->start);
+
+ /* Clear BAR4's resource */
+ memset(r, 0, sizeof(*r));
+}
+DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_HEADER(PCI_VENDOR_ID_BROADCOM, 0x9027, quirk_fix_vulcan_ahci_bars);
+
/*
* Intersil/Techwell TW686[4589]-based video capture cards have an empty (zero)
* class code. Fix it.
diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
index 9eca403af2a8..ebe803d4ad4d 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
@@ -5735,6 +5735,13 @@ static void hub_event(struct work_struct *work)
(u16) hub->change_bits[0],
(u16) hub->event_bits[0]);
+ /* Don't disconnect USB-SATA on TrimSlice */
+ if (strcmp(dev_name(hdev->bus->controller), "tegra-ehci.0") == 0) {
+ if ((hdev->state == 7) && (hub->change_bits[0] == 0) &&
+ (hub->event_bits[0] == 0x2))
+ hub->event_bits[0] = 0;
+ }
+
/* Lock the device, then check to see if we were
* disconnected while waiting for the lock to succeed. */
usb_lock_device(hdev);
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index 98598bd1d2fa..34a6233fabaf 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@
#define EFI_ABORTED (21 | (1UL << (BITS_PER_LONG-1)))
#define EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION (26 | (1UL << (BITS_PER_LONG-1)))
+#define EFI_IS_ERROR(x) ((x) & (1UL << (BITS_PER_LONG-1)))
+
typedef unsigned long efi_status_t;
typedef u8 efi_bool_t;
typedef u16 efi_char16_t; /* UNICODE character */
@@ -851,6 +853,14 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
#define EFI_MEM_ATTR 10 /* Did firmware publish an EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES table? */
#define EFI_MEM_NO_SOFT_RESERVE 11 /* Is the kernel configured to ignore soft reservations? */
#define EFI_PRESERVE_BS_REGIONS 12 /* Are EFI boot-services memory segments available? */
+#define EFI_SECURE_BOOT 13 /* Are we in Secure Boot mode? */
+
+enum efi_secureboot_mode {
+ efi_secureboot_mode_unset,
+ efi_secureboot_mode_unknown,
+ efi_secureboot_mode_disabled,
+ efi_secureboot_mode_enabled,
+};
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
/*
@@ -862,6 +872,8 @@ static inline bool efi_enabled(int feature)
}
extern void efi_reboot(enum reboot_mode reboot_mode, const char *__unused);
+extern void __init efi_set_secure_boot(enum efi_secureboot_mode mode);
+
bool __pure __efi_soft_reserve_enabled(void);
static inline bool __pure efi_soft_reserve_enabled(void)
@@ -883,6 +895,8 @@ static inline bool efi_enabled(int feature)
static inline void
efi_reboot(enum reboot_mode reboot_mode, const char *__unused) {}
+static inline void efi_set_secure_boot(enum efi_secureboot_mode mode) {}
+
static inline bool efi_soft_reserve_enabled(void)
{
return false;
@@ -897,6 +911,7 @@ static inline void efi_find_mirror(void) {}
#endif
extern int efi_status_to_err(efi_status_t status);
+extern const char *efi_status_to_str(efi_status_t status);
/*
* Variable Attributes
@@ -1099,13 +1114,6 @@ static inline bool efi_runtime_disabled(void) { return true; }
extern void efi_call_virt_check_flags(unsigned long flags, const char *call);
extern unsigned long efi_call_virt_save_flags(void);
-enum efi_secureboot_mode {
- efi_secureboot_mode_unset,
- efi_secureboot_mode_unknown,
- efi_secureboot_mode_disabled,
- efi_secureboot_mode_enabled,
-};
-
static inline
enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot_mode(efi_get_variable_t *get_var)
{
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index ed6cb2ac55fa..72fb26d13f28 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -403,6 +403,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bpf_prog_free_security, struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, locked_down, enum lockdown_reason what)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, lock_kernel_down, const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level)
+
#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_open, struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 0a5ba81f7367..39826de8d680 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1618,6 +1618,12 @@
* @what: kernel feature being accessed.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
*
+ * @lock_kernel_down
+ * Put the kernel into lock-down mode.
+ *
+ * @where: Where the lock-down is originating from (e.g. command line option)
+ * @level: The lock-down level (can only increase)
+ *
* Security hooks for perf events
*
* @perf_event_open:
diff --git a/include/linux/rh_kabi.h b/include/linux/rh_kabi.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c7b42c1f1681
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/rh_kabi.h
@@ -0,0 +1,515 @@
+/*
+ * rh_kabi.h - Red Hat kABI abstraction header
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Don Zickus
+ * Copyright (c) 2015-2020 Jiri Benc
+ * Copyright (c) 2015 Sabrina Dubroca, Hannes Frederic Sowa
+ * Copyright (c) 2016-2018 Prarit Bhargava
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Paolo Abeni, Larry Woodman
+ *
+ * This file is released under the GPLv2.
+ * See the file COPYING for more details.
+ *
+ * These kabi macros hide the changes from the kabi checker and from the
+ * process that computes the exported symbols' checksums.
+ * They have 2 variants: one (defined under __GENKSYMS__) used when
+ * generating the checksums, and the other used when building the kernel's
+ * binaries.
+ *
+ * The use of these macros does not guarantee that the usage and modification
+ * of code is correct. As with all Red Hat only changes, an engineer must
+ * explain why the use of the macro is valid in the patch containing the
+ * changes.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_RH_KABI_H
+#define _LINUX_RH_KABI_H
+
+#include <linux/kconfig.h>
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
+#include <linux/stringify.h>
+
+/*
+ * NOTE
+ * Unless indicated otherwise, don't use ';' after these macros as it
+ * messes up the kABI checker by changing what the resulting token string
+ * looks like. Instead let the macros add the ';' so it can be properly
+ * hidden from the kABI checker (mainly for RH_KABI_EXTEND, but applied to
+ * most macros for uniformity).
+ *
+ *
+ * RH_KABI_CONST
+ * Adds a new const modifier to a function parameter preserving the old
+ * checksum.
+ *
+ * RH_KABI_ADD_MODIFIER
+ * Adds a new modifier to a function parameter or a typedef, preserving
+ * the old checksum. Useful e.g. for adding rcu annotations or changing
+ * int to unsigned. Beware that this may change the semantics; if you're
+ * sure this is safe, always explain why binary compatibility with 3rd
+ * party modules is retained.
+ *
+ * RH_KABI_DEPRECATE
+ * Marks the element as deprecated and make it unusable by modules while
+ * keeping a hole in its place to preserve binary compatibility.
+ *
+ * RH_KABI_DEPRECATE_FN
+ * Marks the function pointer as deprecated and make it unusable by modules
+ * while keeping a hole in its place to preserve binary compatibility.
+ *
+ * RH_KABI_EXTEND
+ * Adds a new field to a struct. This must always be added to the end of
+ * the struct. Before using this macro, make sure this is actually safe
+ * to do - there is a number of conditions under which it is *not* safe.
+ * In particular (but not limited to), this macro cannot be used:
+ * - if the struct in question is embedded in another struct, or
+ * - if the struct is allocated by drivers either statically or
+ * dynamically, or
+ * - if the struct is allocated together with driver data (an example of
+ * such behavior is struct net_device or struct request).
+ *
+ * RH_KABI_EXTEND_WITH_SIZE
+ * Adds a new element (usually a struct) to a struct and reserves extra
+ * space for the new element. The provided 'size' is the total space to
+ * be added in longs (i.e. it's 8 * 'size' bytes), including the size of
+ * the added element. It is automatically checked that the new element
+ * does not overflow the reserved space, now nor in the future. However,
+ * no attempt is done to check the content of the added element (struct)
+ * for kABI conformance - kABI checking inside the added element is
+ * effectively switched off.
+ * For any struct being added by RH_KABI_EXTEND_WITH_SIZE, it is
+ * recommended its content to be documented as not covered by kABI
+ * guarantee.
+ *
+ * RH_KABI_FILL_HOLE
+ * Fills a hole in a struct.
+ *
+ * Warning: only use if a hole exists for _all_ arches. Use pahole to verify.
+ *
+ * RH_KABI_RENAME
+ * Renames an element without changing its type. This macro can be used in
+ * bitfields, for example.
+ *
+ * NOTE: this macro does not add the final ';'
+ *
+ * RH_KABI_REPLACE
+ * Replaces the _orig field by the _new field. The size of the occupied
+ * space is preserved, it's fine if the _new field is smaller than the
+ * _orig field. If a _new field is larger or has a different alignment,
+ * compilation will abort.
+ *
+ * RH_KABI_REPLACE_SPLIT
+ * Works the same as RH_KABI_REPLACE but replaces a single _orig field by
+ * multiple new fields. The checks for size and alignment done by
+ * RH_KABI_REPLACE are still applied.
+ *
+ * RH_KABI_HIDE_INCLUDE
+ * Hides the given include file from kABI checksum computations. This is
+ * used when a newly added #include makes a previously opaque struct
+ * visible.
+ *
+ * Example usage:
+ * #include RH_KABI_HIDE_INCLUDE(<linux/poll.h>)
+ *
+ * RH_KABI_FAKE_INCLUDE
+ * Pretends inclusion of the given file for kABI checksum computations.
+ * This is used when upstream removed a particular #include but that made
+ * some structures opaque that were previously visible and is causing kABI
+ * checker failures.
+ *
+ * Example usage:
+ * #include RH_KABI_FAKE_INCLUDE(<linux/rhashtable.h>)
+ *
+ * RH_KABI_RESERVE
+ * Adds a reserved field to a struct. This is done prior to kABI freeze
+ * for structs that cannot be expanded later using RH_KABI_EXTEND (for
+ * example because they are embedded in another struct or because they are
+ * allocated by drivers or because they use unusual memory layout). The
+ * size of the reserved field is 'unsigned long' and is assumed to be
+ * 8 bytes.
+ *
+ * The argument is a number unique for the given struct; usually, multiple
+ * RH_KABI_RESERVE macros are added to a struct with numbers starting from
+ * one.
+ *
+ * Example usage:
+ * struct foo {
+ * int a;
+ * RH_KABI_RESERVE(1)
+ * RH_KABI_RESERVE(2)
+ * RH_KABI_RESERVE(3)
+ * RH_KABI_RESERVE(4)
+ * };
+ *
+ * RH_KABI_USE
+ * Uses a previously reserved field or multiple fields. The arguments are
+ * one or more numbers assigned to RH_KABI_RESERVE, followed by a field to
+ * be put in their place. The compiler ensures that the new field is not
+ * larger than the reserved area.
+ *
+ * Example usage:
+ * struct foo {
+ * int a;
+ * RH_KABI_USE(1, int b)
+ * RH_KABI_USE(2, 3, int c[3])
+ * RH_KABI_RESERVE(4)
+ * };
+ *
+ * RH_KABI_USE_SPLIT
+ * Works the same as RH_KABI_USE but replaces a single reserved field by
+ * multiple new fields.
+ *
+ * RH_KABI_AUX_EMBED
+ * RH_KABI_AUX_PTR
+ * Adds an extenstion of a struct in the form of "auxiliary structure".
+ * This is done prior to kABI freeze for structs that cannot be expanded
+ * later using RH_KABI_EXTEND. See also RH_KABI_RESERVED, these two
+ * approaches can (and often are) combined.
+ *
+ * To use this for 'struct foo' (the "base structure"), define a new
+ * structure called 'struct foo_rh'; this new struct is called "auxiliary
+ * structure". Then add RH_KABI_AUX_EMBED or RH_KABI_AUX_PTR to the end
+ * of the base structure. The argument is the name of the base structure,
+ * without the 'struct' keyword.
+ *
+ * RH_KABI_AUX_PTR stores a pointer to the aux structure in the base
+ * struct. The lifecycle of the aux struct needs to be properly taken
+ * care of.
+ *
+ * RH_KABI_AUX_EMBED embeds the aux struct into the base struct. This
+ * cannot be used when the base struct is itself embedded into another
+ * struct, allocated in an array, etc.
+ *
+ * Both approaches (ptr and embed) work correctly even when the aux struct
+ * is allocated by modules. To ensure this, the code responsible for
+ * allocation/assignment of the aux struct has to properly set the size of
+ * the aux struct; see the RH_KABI_AUX_SET_SIZE and RH_KABI_AUX_INIT_SIZE
+ * macros.
+ *
+ * New fields can be later added to the auxiliary structure, always to its
+ * end. Note the auxiliary structure cannot be shrunk in size later (i.e.,
+ * fields cannot be removed, only deprecated). Any code accessing fields
+ * from the aux struct must guard the access using the RH_KABI_AUX macro.
+ * The access itself is then done via a '_rh' field in the base struct.
+ *
+ * The auxiliary structure is not guaranteed for access by modules unless
+ * explicitly commented as such in the declaration of the aux struct
+ * itself or some of its elements.
+ *
+ * Example:
+ *
+ * struct foo_rh {
+ * int newly_added;
+ * };
+ *
+ * struct foo {
+ * bool big_hammer;
+ * RH_KABI_AUX_PTR(foo)
+ * };
+ *
+ * void use(struct foo *f)
+ * {
+ * if (RH_KABI_AUX(f, foo, newly_added))
+ * f->_rh->newly_added = 123;
+ * else
+ * // the field 'newly_added' is not present in the passed
+ * // struct, fall back to old behavior
+ * f->big_hammer = true;
+ * }
+ *
+ * static struct foo_rh my_foo_rh {
+ * .newly_added = 0;
+ * }
+ *
+ * static struct foo my_foo = {
+ * .big_hammer = false,
+ * ._rh = &my_foo_rh,
+ * RH_KABI_AUX_INIT_SIZE(foo)
+ * };
+ *
+ * RH_KABI_USE_AUX_PTR
+ * Creates an auxiliary structure post kABI freeze. This works by using
+ * two reserved fields (thus there has to be two reserved fields still
+ * available) and converting them to RH_KABI_AUX_PTR.
+ *
+ * Example:
+ *
+ * struct foo_rh {
+ * };
+ *
+ * struct foo {
+ * int a;
+ * RH_KABI_RESERVE(1)
+ * RH_KABI_USE_AUX_PTR(2, 3, foo)
+ * };
+ *
+ * RH_KABI_AUX_SET_SIZE
+ * RH_KABI_AUX_INIT_SIZE
+ * Calculates and stores the size of the auxiliary structure.
+ *
+ * RH_KABI_AUX_SET_SIZE is for dynamically allocated base structs,
+ * RH_KABI_AUX_INIT_SIZE is for statically allocated case structs.
+ *
+ * These macros must be called from the allocation (RH_KABI_AUX_SET_SIZE)
+ * or declaration (RH_KABI_AUX_INIT_SIZE) site, regardless of whether
+ * that happens in the kernel or in a module. Without calling one of
+ * these macros, the aux struct will appear to have no fields to the
+ * kernel.
+ *
+ * Note: since RH_KABI_AUX_SET_SIZE is intended to be invoked outside of
+ * a struct definition, it does not add the semicolon and must be
+ * terminated by semicolon by the caller.
+ *
+ * RH_KABI_AUX
+ * Verifies that the given field exists in the given auxiliary structure.
+ * This MUST be called prior to accessing that field; failing to do that
+ * may lead to invalid memory access.
+ *
+ * The first argument is a pointer to the base struct, the second argument
+ * is the name of the base struct (without the 'struct' keyword), the
+ * third argument is the field name.
+ *
+ * This macro works for structs extended by either of RH_KABI_AUX_EMBED,
+ * RH_KABI_AUX_PTR and RH_KABI_USE_AUX_PTR.
+ *
+ * RH_KABI_FORCE_CHANGE
+ * Force change of the symbol checksum. The argument of the macro is a
+ * version for cases we need to do this more than once.
+ *
+ * This macro does the opposite: it changes the symbol checksum without
+ * actually changing anything about the exported symbol. It is useful for
+ * symbols that are not whitelisted, we're changing them in an
+ * incompatible way and want to prevent 3rd party modules to silently
+ * corrupt memory. Instead, by changing the symbol checksum, such modules
+ * won't be loaded by the kernel. This macro should only be used as a
+ * last resort when all other KABI workarounds have failed.
+ *
+ * RH_KABI_EXCLUDE
+ * !!! WARNING: DANGEROUS, DO NOT USE unless you are aware of all the !!!
+ * !!! implications. This should be used ONLY EXCEPTIONALLY and only !!!
+ * !!! under specific circumstances. Very likely, this macro does not !!!
+ * !!! do what you expect it to do. Note that any usage of this macro !!!
+ * !!! MUST be paired with a RH_KABI_FORCE_CHANGE annotation of !!!
+ * !!! a suitable symbol (or an equivalent safeguard) and the commit !!!
+ * !!! log MUST explain why the chosen solution is appropriate. !!!
+ *
+ * Exclude the element from checksum generation. Any such element is
+ * considered not to be part of the kABI whitelist and may be changed at
+ * will. Note however that it's the responsibility of the developer
+ * changing the element to ensure 3rd party drivers using this element
+ * won't panic, for example by not allowing them to be loaded. That can
+ * be achieved by changing another, non-whitelisted symbol they use,
+ * either by nature of the change or by using RH_KABI_FORCE_CHANGE.
+ *
+ * Also note that any change to the element must preserve its size. Change
+ * of the size is not allowed and would constitute a silent kABI breakage.
+ * Beware that the RH_KABI_EXCLUDE macro does not do any size checks.
+ *
+ * RH_KABI_BROKEN_INSERT
+ * RH_KABI_BROKEN_REMOVE
+ * Insert a field to the middle of a struct / delete a field from a struct.
+ * Note that this breaks kABI! It can be done only when it's certain that
+ * no 3rd party driver can validly reach into the struct. A typical
+ * example is a struct that is: both (a) referenced only through a long
+ * chain of pointers from another struct that is part of a whitelisted
+ * symbol and (b) kernel internal only, it should have never been visible
+ * to genksyms in the first place.
+ *
+ * Another example are structs that are explicitly exempt from kABI
+ * guarantee but we did not have enough foresight to use RH_KABI_EXCLUDE.
+ * In this case, the warning for RH_KABI_EXCLUDE applies.
+ *
+ * A detailed explanation of correctness of every RH_KABI_BROKEN_* macro
+ * use is especially important.
+ *
+ * RH_KABI_BROKEN_INSERT_BLOCK
+ * RH_KABI_BROKEN_REMOVE_BLOCK
+ * A version of RH_KABI_BROKEN_INSERT / REMOVE that allows multiple fields
+ * to be inserted or removed together. All fields need to be terminated
+ * by ';' inside(!) the macro parameter. The macro itself must not be
+ * terminated by ';'.
+ *
+ * RH_KABI_BROKEN_REPLACE
+ * Replace a field by a different one without doing any checking. This
+ * allows replacing a field by another with a different size. Similarly
+ * to other RH_KABI_BROKEN macros, use of this indicates a kABI breakage.
+ *
+ * RH_KABI_BROKEN_INSERT_ENUM
+ * RH_KABI_BROKEN_REMOVE_ENUM
+ * Insert a field to the middle of an enumaration type / delete a field from
+ * an enumaration type. Note that this can break kABI especially if the
+ * number of enum fields is used in an array within a structure. It can be
+ * done only when it is certain that no 3rd party driver will use the
+ * enumeration type or a structure that embeds an array with size determined
+ * by an enumeration type.
+ *
+ * RH_KABI_EXTEND_ENUM
+ * Adds a new field to an enumeration type. This must always be added to
+ * the end of the enum. Before using this macro, make sure this is actually
+ * safe to do.
+ */
+
+#undef linux
+#define linux linux
+
+#ifdef __GENKSYMS__
+
+# define RH_KABI_CONST
+# define RH_KABI_ADD_MODIFIER(_new)
+# define RH_KABI_EXTEND(_new)
+# define RH_KABI_FILL_HOLE(_new)
+# define RH_KABI_FORCE_CHANGE(ver) __attribute__((rh_kabi_change ## ver))
+# define RH_KABI_RENAME(_orig, _new) _orig
+# define RH_KABI_HIDE_INCLUDE(_file) <linux/rh_kabi.h>
+# define RH_KABI_FAKE_INCLUDE(_file) _file
+# define RH_KABI_BROKEN_INSERT(_new)
+# define RH_KABI_BROKEN_REMOVE(_orig) _orig;
+# define RH_KABI_BROKEN_INSERT_BLOCK(_new)
+# define RH_KABI_BROKEN_REMOVE_BLOCK(_orig) _orig
+# define RH_KABI_BROKEN_REPLACE(_orig, _new) _orig;
+# define RH_KABI_BROKEN_INSERT_ENUM(_new)
+# define RH_KABI_BROKEN_REMOVE_ENUM(_orig) _orig,
+# define RH_KABI_EXTEND_ENUM(_new)
+
+# define _RH_KABI_DEPRECATE(_type, _orig) _type _orig
+# define _RH_KABI_DEPRECATE_FN(_type, _orig, _args...) _type (*_orig)(_args)
+# define _RH_KABI_REPLACE(_orig, _new) _orig
+# define _RH_KABI_EXCLUDE(_elem)
+
+#else
+
+# define RH_KABI_ALIGN_WARNING ". Disable CONFIG_RH_KABI_SIZE_ALIGN_CHECKS if debugging."
+
+# define RH_KABI_CONST const
+# define RH_KABI_ADD_MODIFIER(_new) _new
+# define RH_KABI_EXTEND(_new) _new;
+# define RH_KABI_FILL_HOLE(_new) _new;
+# define RH_KABI_FORCE_CHANGE(ver)
+# define RH_KABI_RENAME(_orig, _new) _new
+# define RH_KABI_HIDE_INCLUDE(_file) _file
+# define RH_KABI_FAKE_INCLUDE(_file) <linux/rh_kabi.h>
+# define RH_KABI_BROKEN_INSERT(_new) _new;
+# define RH_KABI_BROKEN_REMOVE(_orig)
+# define RH_KABI_BROKEN_INSERT_BLOCK(_new) _new
+# define RH_KABI_BROKEN_REMOVE_BLOCK(_orig)
+# define RH_KABI_BROKEN_REPLACE(_orig, _new) _new;
+# define RH_KABI_BROKEN_INSERT_ENUM(_new) _new,
+# define RH_KABI_BROKEN_REMOVE_ENUM(_orig)
+# define RH_KABI_EXTEND_ENUM(_new) _new,
+
+#if IS_BUILTIN(CONFIG_RH_KABI_SIZE_ALIGN_CHECKS)
+# define __RH_KABI_CHECK_SIZE_ALIGN(_orig, _new) \
+ union { \
+ _Static_assert(sizeof(struct{_new;}) <= sizeof(struct{_orig;}), \
+ __FILE__ ":" __stringify(__LINE__) ": " __stringify(_new) " is larger than " __stringify(_orig) RH_KABI_ALIGN_WARNING); \
+ _Static_assert(__alignof__(struct{_new;}) <= __alignof__(struct{_orig;}), \
+ __FILE__ ":" __stringify(__LINE__) ": " __stringify(_orig) " is not aligned the same as " __stringify(_new) RH_KABI_ALIGN_WARNING); \
+ }
+# define __RH_KABI_CHECK_SIZE(_item, _size) \
+ _Static_assert(sizeof(struct{_item;}) <= _size, \
+ __FILE__ ":" __stringify(__LINE__) ": " __stringify(_item) " is larger than the reserved size (" __stringify(_size) " bytes)" RH_KABI_ALIGN_WARNING)
+#else
+# define __RH_KABI_CHECK_SIZE_ALIGN(_orig, _new)
+# define __RH_KABI_CHECK_SIZE(_item, _size)
+#endif
+
+#define RH_KABI_UNIQUE_ID __PASTE(rh_kabi_hidden_, __LINE__)
+
+# define _RH_KABI_DEPRECATE(_type, _orig) _type rh_reserved_##_orig
+# define _RH_KABI_DEPRECATE_FN(_type, _orig, _args...) \
+ _type (* rh_reserved_##_orig)(_args)
+# define _RH_KABI_REPLACE(_orig, _new) \
+ union { \
+ _new; \
+ struct { \
+ _orig; \
+ } RH_KABI_UNIQUE_ID; \
+ __RH_KABI_CHECK_SIZE_ALIGN(_orig, _new); \
+ }
+
+# define _RH_KABI_EXCLUDE(_elem) _elem
+
+#endif /* __GENKSYMS__ */
+
+# define RH_KABI_DEPRECATE(_type, _orig) _RH_KABI_DEPRECATE(_type, _orig);
+# define RH_KABI_DEPRECATE_FN(_type, _orig, _args...) \
+ _RH_KABI_DEPRECATE_FN(_type, _orig, _args);
+# define RH_KABI_REPLACE(_orig, _new) _RH_KABI_REPLACE(_orig, _new);
+
+#define _RH_KABI_REPLACE1(_new) _new;
+#define _RH_KABI_REPLACE2(_new, ...) _new; _RH_KABI_REPLACE1(__VA_ARGS__)
+#define _RH_KABI_REPLACE3(_new, ...) _new; _RH_KABI_REPLACE2(__VA_ARGS__)
+#define _RH_KABI_REPLACE4(_new, ...) _new; _RH_KABI_REPLACE3(__VA_ARGS__)
+#define _RH_KABI_REPLACE5(_new, ...) _new; _RH_KABI_REPLACE4(__VA_ARGS__)
+#define _RH_KABI_REPLACE6(_new, ...) _new; _RH_KABI_REPLACE5(__VA_ARGS__)
+#define _RH_KABI_REPLACE7(_new, ...) _new; _RH_KABI_REPLACE6(__VA_ARGS__)
+#define _RH_KABI_REPLACE8(_new, ...) _new; _RH_KABI_REPLACE7(__VA_ARGS__)
+#define _RH_KABI_REPLACE9(_new, ...) _new; _RH_KABI_REPLACE8(__VA_ARGS__)
+#define _RH_KABI_REPLACE10(_new, ...) _new; _RH_KABI_REPLACE9(__VA_ARGS__)
+#define _RH_KABI_REPLACE11(_new, ...) _new; _RH_KABI_REPLACE10(__VA_ARGS__)
+#define _RH_KABI_REPLACE12(_new, ...) _new; _RH_KABI_REPLACE11(__VA_ARGS__)
+
+#define RH_KABI_REPLACE_SPLIT(_orig, ...) _RH_KABI_REPLACE(_orig, \
+ struct { __PASTE(_RH_KABI_REPLACE, COUNT_ARGS(__VA_ARGS__))(__VA_ARGS__) });
+
+# define RH_KABI_RESERVE(n) _RH_KABI_RESERVE(n);
+
+#define _RH_KABI_USE1(n, _new) _RH_KABI_RESERVE(n), _new
+#define _RH_KABI_USE2(n, ...) _RH_KABI_RESERVE(n); _RH_KABI_USE1(__VA_ARGS__)
+#define _RH_KABI_USE3(n, ...) _RH_KABI_RESERVE(n); _RH_KABI_USE2(__VA_ARGS__)
+#define _RH_KABI_USE4(n, ...) _RH_KABI_RESERVE(n); _RH_KABI_USE3(__VA_ARGS__)
+#define _RH_KABI_USE5(n, ...) _RH_KABI_RESERVE(n); _RH_KABI_USE4(__VA_ARGS__)
+#define _RH_KABI_USE6(n, ...) _RH_KABI_RESERVE(n); _RH_KABI_USE5(__VA_ARGS__)
+#define _RH_KABI_USE7(n, ...) _RH_KABI_RESERVE(n); _RH_KABI_USE6(__VA_ARGS__)
+#define _RH_KABI_USE8(n, ...) _RH_KABI_RESERVE(n); _RH_KABI_USE7(__VA_ARGS__)
+#define _RH_KABI_USE9(n, ...) _RH_KABI_RESERVE(n); _RH_KABI_USE8(__VA_ARGS__)
+#define _RH_KABI_USE10(n, ...) _RH_KABI_RESERVE(n); _RH_KABI_USE9(__VA_ARGS__)
+#define _RH_KABI_USE11(n, ...) _RH_KABI_RESERVE(n); _RH_KABI_USE10(__VA_ARGS__)
+#define _RH_KABI_USE12(n, ...) _RH_KABI_RESERVE(n); _RH_KABI_USE11(__VA_ARGS__)
+
+#define _RH_KABI_USE(...) _RH_KABI_REPLACE(__VA_ARGS__)
+#define RH_KABI_USE(n, ...) _RH_KABI_USE(__PASTE(_RH_KABI_USE, COUNT_ARGS(__VA_ARGS__))(n, __VA_ARGS__));
+
+# define RH_KABI_USE_SPLIT(n, ...) RH_KABI_REPLACE_SPLIT(_RH_KABI_RESERVE(n), __VA_ARGS__)
+
+# define _RH_KABI_RESERVE(n) unsigned long rh_reserved##n
+
+#define RH_KABI_EXCLUDE(_elem) _RH_KABI_EXCLUDE(_elem);
+
+#define RH_KABI_EXTEND_WITH_SIZE(_new, _size) \
+ RH_KABI_EXTEND(union { \
+ _new; \
+ unsigned long RH_KABI_UNIQUE_ID[_size]; \
+ __RH_KABI_CHECK_SIZE(_new, 8 * (_size)); \
+ })
+
+#define _RH_KABI_AUX_PTR(_struct) \
+ size_t _struct##_size_rh; \
+ _RH_KABI_EXCLUDE(struct _struct##_rh *_rh)
+#define RH_KABI_AUX_PTR(_struct) \
+ _RH_KABI_AUX_PTR(_struct);
+
+#define _RH_KABI_AUX_EMBED(_struct) \
+ size_t _struct##_size_rh; \
+ _RH_KABI_EXCLUDE(struct _struct##_rh _rh)
+#define RH_KABI_AUX_EMBED(_struct) \
+ _RH_KABI_AUX_EMBED(_struct);
+
+#define RH_KABI_USE_AUX_PTR(n1, n2, _struct) \
+ RH_KABI_USE(n1, n2, \
+ struct { RH_KABI_AUX_PTR(_struct) })
+
+#define RH_KABI_AUX_SET_SIZE(_name, _struct) ({ \
+ (_name)->_struct##_size_rh = sizeof(struct _struct##_rh); \
+})
+
+#define RH_KABI_AUX_INIT_SIZE(_struct) \
+ ._struct##_size_rh = sizeof(struct _struct##_rh),
+
+#define RH_KABI_AUX(_ptr, _struct, _field) ({ \
+ size_t __off = offsetof(struct _struct##_rh, _field); \
+ (_ptr)->_struct##_size_rh > __off ? true : false; \
+})
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_RH_KABI_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/rmi.h b/include/linux/rmi.h
index ab7eea01ab42..fff7c5f737fc 100644
--- a/include/linux/rmi.h
+++ b/include/linux/rmi.h
@@ -364,6 +364,7 @@ struct rmi_driver_data {
struct rmi4_attn_data attn_data;
DECLARE_KFIFO(attn_fifo, struct rmi4_attn_data, 16);
+ struct work_struct attn_work;
};
int rmi_register_transport_device(struct rmi_transport_dev *xport);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 5b67f208f7de..060133d19a4b 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -487,6 +487,7 @@ int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what);
+int security_lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level);
#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
static inline int call_blocking_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data)
@@ -1402,6 +1403,10 @@ static inline int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
{
return 0;
}
+static inline int security_lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY) && defined(CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE)
diff --git a/kernel/module/signing.c b/kernel/module/signing.c
index a2ff4242e623..f0d2be1ee4f1 100644
--- a/kernel/module/signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module/signing.c
@@ -61,10 +61,17 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(ms);
info->len = modlen;
- return verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
+ ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
NULL, NULL);
+ if (ret == -ENOKEY && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING)) {
+ ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
+ VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
+ VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
+ NULL, NULL);
+ }
+ return ret;
}
int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
diff --git a/scripts/tags.sh b/scripts/tags.sh
index e137cf15aae9..2ed2341f7967 100755
--- a/scripts/tags.sh
+++ b/scripts/tags.sh
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ fi
ignore="$(echo "$RCS_FIND_IGNORE" | sed 's|\\||g' )"
# tags and cscope files should also ignore MODVERSION *.mod.c files
ignore="$ignore ( -name *.mod.c ) -prune -o"
+# RHEL tags and cscope should also ignore redhat/rpm
+ignore="$ignore ( -path redhat/rpm ) -prune -o"
# Use make KBUILD_ABS_SRCTREE=1 {tags|cscope}
# to force full paths for a non-O= build
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
index d1fdd113450a..182e8090cfe8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
@@ -74,7 +74,8 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,
return NULL;
if (*status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
- pr_err("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n", *status);
+ pr_err("Couldn't get size: %s (0x%lx)\n",
+ efi_status_to_str(*status), *status);
return NULL;
}
@@ -85,7 +86,8 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,
*status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, db);
if (*status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
kfree(db);
- pr_err("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n", *status);
+ pr_err("Error reading db var: %s (0x%lx)\n",
+ efi_status_to_str(*status), *status);
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/security/lockdown/Kconfig b/security/lockdown/Kconfig
index e84ddf484010..d0501353a4b9 100644
--- a/security/lockdown/Kconfig
+++ b/security/lockdown/Kconfig
@@ -16,6 +16,19 @@ config SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM_EARLY
subsystem is fully initialised. If enabled, lockdown will
unconditionally be called before any other LSMs.
+config LOCK_DOWN_IN_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
+ bool "Lock down the kernel in EFI Secure Boot mode"
+ default n
+ depends on EFI && SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM_EARLY
+ help
+ UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware
+ will only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Secure boot mode may
+ be determined from EFI variables provided by the system firmware if
+ not indicated by the boot parameters.
+
+ Enabling this option results in kernel lockdown being triggered if
+ EFI Secure Boot is set.
+
choice
prompt "Kernel default lockdown mode"
default LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_NONE
diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
index a79b985e917e..772a69bf43ec 100644
--- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
+++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ static int lockdown_is_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
static struct security_hook_list lockdown_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, lockdown_is_locked_down),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(lock_kernel_down, lock_kernel_down),
};
static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index d1571900a8c7..9e6be637ab68 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2705,6 +2705,12 @@ int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down);
+int security_lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(lock_kernel_down, 0, where, level);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_lock_kernel_down);
+
#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
{