kernel/efi-lockdown.patch
2018-04-03 12:18:00 -05:00

2355 lines
77 KiB
Diff

From 1235d72fe1d34f9961051d159af3b48a1617ff0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 10:04:50 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 01/31] Add the ability to lock down access to the running
kernel image
Provide a single call to allow kernel code to determine whether the system
should be locked down, thereby disallowing various accesses that might
allow the running kernel image to be changed including the loading of
modules that aren't validly signed with a key we recognise, fiddling with
MSR registers and disallowing hibernation,
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
---
include/linux/kernel.h | 17 ++++++++++++++
include/linux/security.h | 8 +++++++
security/Kconfig | 8 +++++++
security/Makefile | 3 +++
security/lock_down.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 96 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 security/lock_down.c
diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h
index 3fd291503576..dcc8916098e7 100644
--- a/include/linux/kernel.h
+++ b/include/linux/kernel.h
@@ -306,6 +306,23 @@ static inline void refcount_error_report(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *err)
{ }
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL
+extern bool __kernel_is_locked_down(const char *what, bool first);
+#else
+static inline bool __kernel_is_locked_down(const char *what, bool first)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+#endif
+
+#define kernel_is_locked_down(what) \
+ ({ \
+ static bool message_given; \
+ bool locked_down = __kernel_is_locked_down(what, !message_given); \
+ message_given = true; \
+ locked_down; \
+ })
+
/* Internal, do not use. */
int __must_check _kstrtoul(const char *s, unsigned int base, unsigned long *res);
int __must_check _kstrtol(const char *s, unsigned int base, long *res);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 73f1ef625d40..2e9690f3d1ce 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1801,5 +1801,13 @@ static inline void free_secdata(void *secdata)
{ }
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+#ifdef CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL
+extern void __init init_lockdown(void);
+#else
+static inline void __init init_lockdown(void)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
#endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index c4302067a3ad..a9e6207d287e 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -231,6 +231,14 @@ config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,
specify an empty string here (i.e. "").
+config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL
+ bool "Allow the kernel to be 'locked down'"
+ help
+ Allow the kernel to be locked down under certain circumstances, for
+ instance if UEFI secure boot is enabled. Locking down the kernel
+ turns off various features that might otherwise allow access to the
+ kernel image (eg. setting MSR registers).
+
source security/selinux/Kconfig
source security/smack/Kconfig
source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index 4d2d3782ddef..507ac8c520ce 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -30,3 +30,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o
# Object integrity file lists
subdir-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity
obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity/
+
+# Allow the kernel to be locked down
+obj-$(CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL) += lock_down.o
diff --git a/security/lock_down.c b/security/lock_down.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d8595c0e6673
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/lock_down.c
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+/* Lock down the kernel
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+
+static __ro_after_init bool kernel_locked_down;
+
+/*
+ * Put the kernel into lock-down mode.
+ */
+static void __init lock_kernel_down(const char *where)
+{
+ if (!kernel_locked_down) {
+ kernel_locked_down = true;
+ pr_notice("Kernel is locked down from %s; see man kernel_lockdown.7\n",
+ where);
+ }
+}
+
+static int __init lockdown_param(char *ignored)
+{
+ lock_kernel_down("command line");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+early_param("lockdown", lockdown_param);
+
+/*
+ * Lock the kernel down from very early in the arch setup. This must happen
+ * prior to things like ACPI being initialised.
+ */
+void __init init_lockdown(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_IN_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
+ if (efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
+ lock_kernel_down("EFI secure boot");
+#endif
+}
+
+/**
+ * kernel_is_locked_down - Find out if the kernel is locked down
+ * @what: Tag to use in notice generated if lockdown is in effect
+ */
+bool __kernel_is_locked_down(const char *what, bool first)
+{
+ if (what && first && kernel_locked_down)
+ pr_notice("Lockdown: %s is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7\n",
+ what);
+ return kernel_locked_down;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kernel_is_locked_down);
--
2.14.3
From 2c6e78b766569c7a966639346cc2b5a023998adc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kyle McMartin <kyle@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 10:04:50 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 02/31] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown
Make an option to provide a sysrq key that will lift the kernel lockdown,
thereby allowing the running kernel image to be accessed and modified.
On x86 this is triggered with SysRq+x, but this key may not be available on
all arches, so it is set by setting LOCKDOWN_LIFT_KEY in asm/setup.h.
Since this macro must be defined in an arch to be able to use this facility
for that arch, the Kconfig option is restricted to arches that support it.
Signed-off-by: Kyle McMartin <kyle@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: x86@kernel.org
---
arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h | 2 ++
drivers/input/misc/uinput.c | 1 +
drivers/tty/sysrq.c | 19 ++++++++++++------
include/linux/input.h | 5 +++++
include/linux/sysrq.h | 8 +++++++-
kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c | 2 +-
security/Kconfig | 10 ++++++++++
security/lock_down.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
8 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h
index ae13bc974416..3108e297d87d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <asm/page_types.h>
+#define LOCKDOWN_LIFT_KEY 'x'
+
#ifdef __i386__
#include <linux/pfn.h>
diff --git a/drivers/input/misc/uinput.c b/drivers/input/misc/uinput.c
index 96a887f33698..027c730631cc 100644
--- a/drivers/input/misc/uinput.c
+++ b/drivers/input/misc/uinput.c
@@ -365,6 +365,7 @@ static int uinput_create_device(struct uinput_device *udev)
dev->flush = uinput_dev_flush;
}
+ dev->flags |= INPUTDEV_FLAGS_SYNTHETIC;
dev->event = uinput_dev_event;
input_set_drvdata(udev->dev, udev);
diff --git a/drivers/tty/sysrq.c b/drivers/tty/sysrq.c
index b674793be478..7c06541b422e 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/sysrq.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/sysrq.c
@@ -487,6 +487,7 @@ static struct sysrq_key_op *sysrq_key_table[36] = {
/* x: May be registered on mips for TLB dump */
/* x: May be registered on ppc/powerpc for xmon */
/* x: May be registered on sparc64 for global PMU dump */
+ /* x: May be registered on x86_64 for disabling secure boot */
NULL, /* x */
/* y: May be registered on sparc64 for global register dump */
NULL, /* y */
@@ -530,7 +531,7 @@ static void __sysrq_put_key_op(int key, struct sysrq_key_op *op_p)
sysrq_key_table[i] = op_p;
}
-void __handle_sysrq(int key, bool check_mask)
+void __handle_sysrq(int key, unsigned int from)
{
struct sysrq_key_op *op_p;
int orig_log_level;
@@ -550,11 +551,15 @@ void __handle_sysrq(int key, bool check_mask)
op_p = __sysrq_get_key_op(key);
if (op_p) {
+ /* Ban synthetic events from some sysrq functionality */
+ if ((from == SYSRQ_FROM_PROC || from == SYSRQ_FROM_SYNTHETIC) &&
+ op_p->enable_mask & SYSRQ_DISABLE_USERSPACE)
+ printk("This sysrq operation is disabled from userspace.\n");
/*
* Should we check for enabled operations (/proc/sysrq-trigger
* should not) and is the invoked operation enabled?
*/
- if (!check_mask || sysrq_on_mask(op_p->enable_mask)) {
+ if (from == SYSRQ_FROM_KERNEL || sysrq_on_mask(op_p->enable_mask)) {
pr_cont("%s\n", op_p->action_msg);
console_loglevel = orig_log_level;
op_p->handler(key);
@@ -586,7 +591,7 @@ void __handle_sysrq(int key, bool check_mask)
void handle_sysrq(int key)
{
if (sysrq_on())
- __handle_sysrq(key, true);
+ __handle_sysrq(key, SYSRQ_FROM_KERNEL);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(handle_sysrq);
@@ -667,7 +672,7 @@ static void sysrq_do_reset(struct timer_list *t)
static void sysrq_handle_reset_request(struct sysrq_state *state)
{
if (state->reset_requested)
- __handle_sysrq(sysrq_xlate[KEY_B], false);
+ __handle_sysrq(sysrq_xlate[KEY_B], SYSRQ_FROM_KERNEL);
if (sysrq_reset_downtime_ms)
mod_timer(&state->keyreset_timer,
@@ -818,8 +823,10 @@ static bool sysrq_handle_keypress(struct sysrq_state *sysrq,
default:
if (sysrq->active && value && value != 2) {
+ int from = sysrq->handle.dev->flags & INPUTDEV_FLAGS_SYNTHETIC ?
+ SYSRQ_FROM_SYNTHETIC : 0;
sysrq->need_reinject = false;
- __handle_sysrq(sysrq_xlate[code], true);
+ __handle_sysrq(sysrq_xlate[code], from);
}
break;
}
@@ -1102,7 +1109,7 @@ static ssize_t write_sysrq_trigger(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (get_user(c, buf))
return -EFAULT;
- __handle_sysrq(c, false);
+ __handle_sysrq(c, SYSRQ_FROM_PROC);
}
return count;
diff --git a/include/linux/input.h b/include/linux/input.h
index 7c7516eb7d76..38cd0ea72c37 100644
--- a/include/linux/input.h
+++ b/include/linux/input.h
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ struct input_value {
* @phys: physical path to the device in the system hierarchy
* @uniq: unique identification code for the device (if device has it)
* @id: id of the device (struct input_id)
+ * @flags: input device flags (SYNTHETIC, etc.)
* @propbit: bitmap of device properties and quirks
* @evbit: bitmap of types of events supported by the device (EV_KEY,
* EV_REL, etc.)
@@ -124,6 +125,8 @@ struct input_dev {
const char *uniq;
struct input_id id;
+ unsigned int flags;
+
unsigned long propbit[BITS_TO_LONGS(INPUT_PROP_CNT)];
unsigned long evbit[BITS_TO_LONGS(EV_CNT)];
@@ -190,6 +193,8 @@ struct input_dev {
};
#define to_input_dev(d) container_of(d, struct input_dev, dev)
+#define INPUTDEV_FLAGS_SYNTHETIC 0x000000001
+
/*
* Verify that we are in sync with input_device_id mod_devicetable.h #defines
*/
diff --git a/include/linux/sysrq.h b/include/linux/sysrq.h
index 8c71874e8485..7de1f08b60a9 100644
--- a/include/linux/sysrq.h
+++ b/include/linux/sysrq.h
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@
#define SYSRQ_ENABLE_BOOT 0x0080
#define SYSRQ_ENABLE_RTNICE 0x0100
+#define SYSRQ_DISABLE_USERSPACE 0x00010000
+
struct sysrq_key_op {
void (*handler)(int);
char *help_msg;
@@ -43,8 +45,12 @@ struct sysrq_key_op {
* are available -- else NULL's).
*/
+#define SYSRQ_FROM_KERNEL 0x0001
+#define SYSRQ_FROM_PROC 0x0002
+#define SYSRQ_FROM_SYNTHETIC 0x0004
+
void handle_sysrq(int key);
-void __handle_sysrq(int key, bool check_mask);
+void __handle_sysrq(int key, unsigned int from);
int register_sysrq_key(int key, struct sysrq_key_op *op);
int unregister_sysrq_key(int key, struct sysrq_key_op *op);
struct sysrq_key_op *__sysrq_get_key_op(int key);
diff --git a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c
index dbb0781a0533..aae9a0f44058 100644
--- a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c
+++ b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c
@@ -1970,7 +1970,7 @@ static int kdb_sr(int argc, const char **argv)
return KDB_ARGCOUNT;
kdb_trap_printk++;
- __handle_sysrq(*argv[1], check_mask);
+ __handle_sysrq(*argv[1], check_mask ? SYSRQ_FROM_KERNEL : 0);
kdb_trap_printk--;
return 0;
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index a9e6207d287e..461d5acc3616 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -239,6 +239,16 @@ config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL
turns off various features that might otherwise allow access to the
kernel image (eg. setting MSR registers).
+config ALLOW_LOCKDOWN_LIFT_BY_SYSRQ
+ bool "Allow the kernel lockdown to be lifted by SysRq"
+ depends on LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL
+ depends on MAGIC_SYSRQ
+ depends on X86
+ help
+ Allow the lockdown on a kernel to be lifted, by pressing a SysRq key
+ combination on a wired keyboard.
+
+
source security/selinux/Kconfig
source security/smack/Kconfig
source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
diff --git a/security/lock_down.c b/security/lock_down.c
index d8595c0e6673..2c6b00f0c229 100644
--- a/security/lock_down.c
+++ b/security/lock_down.c
@@ -11,8 +11,14 @@
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/sysrq.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_ALLOW_LOCKDOWN_LIFT_BY_SYSRQ
+static __read_mostly bool kernel_locked_down;
+#else
static __ro_after_init bool kernel_locked_down;
+#endif
/*
* Put the kernel into lock-down mode.
@@ -58,3 +64,44 @@ bool __kernel_is_locked_down(const char *what, bool first)
return kernel_locked_down;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kernel_is_locked_down);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ALLOW_LOCKDOWN_LIFT_BY_SYSRQ
+
+/*
+ * Take the kernel out of lockdown mode.
+ */
+static void lift_kernel_lockdown(void)
+{
+ pr_notice("Lifting lockdown\n");
+ kernel_locked_down = false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allow lockdown to be lifted by pressing something like SysRq+x (and not by
+ * echoing the appropriate letter into the sysrq-trigger file).
+ */
+static void sysrq_handle_lockdown_lift(int key)
+{
+ if (kernel_locked_down)
+ lift_kernel_lockdown();
+}
+
+static struct sysrq_key_op lockdown_lift_sysrq_op = {
+ .handler = sysrq_handle_lockdown_lift,
+ .help_msg = "unSB(x)",
+ .action_msg = "Disabling Secure Boot restrictions",
+ .enable_mask = SYSRQ_DISABLE_USERSPACE,
+};
+
+static int __init lockdown_lift_sysrq(void)
+{
+ if (kernel_locked_down) {
+ lockdown_lift_sysrq_op.help_msg[5] = LOCKDOWN_LIFT_KEY;
+ register_sysrq_key(LOCKDOWN_LIFT_KEY, &lockdown_lift_sysrq_op);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+late_initcall(lockdown_lift_sysrq);
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_ALLOW_LOCKDOWN_LIFT_BY_SYSRQ */
--
2.14.3
From 16376a9b88db8d79637fbda7576ced261050eb2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 10:04:50 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 03/31] ima: require secure_boot rules in lockdown mode
Require the "secure_boot" rules, whether or not it is specified
on the boot command line, for both the builtin and custom policies
in secure boot lockdown mode.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 915f5572c6ff..830ce0de5386 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -431,14 +431,21 @@ void ima_update_policy_flag(void)
*/
void __init ima_init_policy(void)
{
- int i, measure_entries, appraise_entries, secure_boot_entries;
+ int i;
+ int measure_entries = 0;
+ int appraise_entries = 0;
+ int secure_boot_entries = 0;
+ bool kernel_locked_down = __kernel_is_locked_down(NULL, false);
/* if !ima_policy set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
- measure_entries = ima_policy ? ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules) : 0;
- appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ?
- ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0;
- secure_boot_entries = ima_use_secure_boot ?
- ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules) : 0;
+ if (ima_policy)
+ measure_entries = ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules);
+
+ if (ima_use_appraise_tcb)
+ appraise_entries = ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules);
+
+ if (ima_use_secure_boot || kernel_locked_down)
+ secure_boot_entries = ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules);
for (i = 0; i < measure_entries; i++)
list_add_tail(&dont_measure_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules);
@@ -459,11 +466,23 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
/*
* Insert the appraise rules requiring file signatures, prior to
- * any other appraise rules.
+ * any other appraise rules. In secure boot lock-down mode, also
+ * require these appraise rules for custom policies.
*/
- for (i = 0; i < secure_boot_entries; i++)
- list_add_tail(&secure_boot_rules[i].list,
- &ima_default_rules);
+ for (i = 0; i < secure_boot_entries; i++) {
+ struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
+
+ /* Include for builtin policies */
+ list_add_tail(&secure_boot_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules);
+
+ /* Include for custom policies */
+ if (kernel_locked_down) {
+ entry = kmemdup(&secure_boot_rules[i], sizeof(*entry),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (entry)
+ list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_policy_rules);
+ }
+ }
for (i = 0; i < appraise_entries; i++) {
list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[i].list,
--
2.14.3
From 7c0d4949d8343a3b6ceca21f3d7710b20f283de0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 10:04:50 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 04/31] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid
signatures that we can verify or that IMA can validate the file.
I have adjusted the errors generated:
(1) If there's no signature (ENODATA) or we can't check it (ENOPKG,
ENOKEY), then:
(a) If signatures are enforced then EKEYREJECTED is returned.
(b) If IMA will have validated the image, return 0 (okay).
(c) If there's no signature or we can't check it, but the kernel is
locked down then EPERM is returned (this is then consistent with
other lockdown cases).
(2) If the signature is unparseable (EBADMSG, EINVAL), the signature fails
the check (EKEYREJECTED) or a system error occurs (eg. ENOMEM), we
return the error we got.
Note that the X.509 code doesn't check for key expiry as the RTC might not
be valid or might not have been transferred to the kernel's clock yet.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
cc: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
---
kernel/module.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index ad2d420024f6..62419cf48ef6 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
#include <linux/bsearch.h>
#include <linux/dynamic_debug.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <uapi/linux/module.h>
#include "module-internal.h"
@@ -2765,10 +2766,12 @@ static inline void kmemleak_load_module(const struct module *mod,
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
-static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
+static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags,
+ bool can_do_ima_check)
{
- int err = -ENOKEY;
+ int err = -ENODATA;
const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
+ const char *reason;
const void *mod = info->hdr;
/*
@@ -2783,19 +2786,46 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
err = mod_verify_sig(mod, &info->len);
}
- if (!err) {
+ switch (err) {
+ case 0:
info->sig_ok = true;
return 0;
- }
- /* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */
- if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce)
- err = 0;
+ /* We don't permit modules to be loaded into trusted kernels
+ * without a valid signature on them, but if we're not
+ * enforcing, certain errors are non-fatal.
+ */
+ case -ENODATA:
+ reason = "Loading of unsigned module";
+ goto decide;
+ case -ENOPKG:
+ reason = "Loading of module with unsupported crypto";
+ goto decide;
+ case -ENOKEY:
+ reason = "Loading of module with unavailable key";
+ decide:
+ if (sig_enforce) {
+ pr_notice("%s is rejected\n", reason);
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
- return err;
+ if (can_do_ima_check && is_ima_appraise_enabled())
+ return 0;
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down(reason))
+ return -EPERM;
+ return 0;
+
+ /* All other errors are fatal, including nomem, unparseable
+ * signatures and signature check failures - even if signatures
+ * aren't required.
+ */
+ default:
+ return err;
+ }
}
#else /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */
-static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
+static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags,
+ bool can_do_ima_check)
{
return 0;
}
@@ -3655,13 +3685,13 @@ static int unknown_module_param_cb(char *param, char *val, const char *modname,
/* Allocate and load the module: note that size of section 0 is always
zero, and we rely on this for optional sections. */
static int load_module(struct load_info *info, const char __user *uargs,
- int flags)
+ int flags, bool can_do_ima_check)
{
struct module *mod;
long err;
char *after_dashes;
- err = module_sig_check(info, flags);
+ err = module_sig_check(info, flags, can_do_ima_check);
if (err)
goto free_copy;
@@ -3850,7 +3880,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(init_module, void __user *, umod,
if (err)
return err;
- return load_module(&info, uargs, 0);
+ return load_module(&info, uargs, 0, false);
}
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(finit_module, int, fd, const char __user *, uargs, int, flags)
@@ -3877,7 +3907,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(finit_module, int, fd, const char __user *, uargs, int, flags)
info.hdr = hdr;
info.len = size;
- return load_module(&info, uargs, flags);
+ return load_module(&info, uargs, flags, true);
}
static inline int within(unsigned long addr, void *start, unsigned long size)
--
2.14.3
From 11b23b45b895133b0c4660622fe2cd8cea373324 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 10:04:51 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 05/31] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when the kernel is locked
down
Allowing users to read and write to core kernel memory makes it possible
for the kernel to be subverted, avoiding module loading restrictions, and
also to steal cryptographic information.
Disallow /dev/mem and /dev/kmem from being opened this when the kernel has
been locked down to prevent this.
Also disallow /dev/port from being opened to prevent raw ioport access and
thus DMA from being used to accomplish the same thing.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
---
drivers/char/mem.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
index 052011bcf100..c024e7b2bbcb 100644
--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
@@ -784,6 +784,8 @@ static loff_t memory_lseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int orig)
static int open_port(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down("/dev/mem,kmem,port"))
+ return -EPERM;
return capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) ? 0 : -EPERM;
}
--
2.14.3
From ccaf57b0a1afb62c1278e3fee69634a710b60a44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 10:04:51 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 06/31] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked
down
The kexec_load() syscall permits the loading and execution of arbitrary
code in ring 0, which is something that lock-down is meant to prevent. It
makes sense to disable kexec_load() in this situation.
This does not affect kexec_file_load() syscall which can check for a
signature on the image to be booted.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
---
kernel/kexec.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
index e62ec4dc6620..7dadfed9b676 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec.c
@@ -201,6 +201,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments,
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled)
return -EPERM;
+ /*
+ * kexec can be used to circumvent module loading restrictions, so
+ * prevent loading in that case
+ */
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down("kexec of unsigned images"))
+ return -EPERM;
+
/*
* Verify we have a legal set of flags
* This leaves us room for future extensions.
--
2.14.3
From b96ff1fd9e94772fde7b58fd69969d1a1c87eb6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 10:04:51 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 07/31] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec
reboot
Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure
boot mode in new kernel, so later one can load unsigned kernel via legacy
kexec_load. In this state, the system is missing the protections provided
by secure boot.
Adding a patch to fix this by retain the secure_boot flag in original
kernel.
secure_boot flag in boot_params is set in EFI stub, but kexec bypasses the
stub. Fixing this issue by copying secure_boot flag across kexec reboot.
Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
---
arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
index fb095ba0c02f..7d0fac5bcbbe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr,
if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP))
return 0;
+ params->secure_boot = boot_params.secure_boot;
ei->efi_loader_signature = current_ei->efi_loader_signature;
ei->efi_systab = current_ei->efi_systab;
ei->efi_systab_hi = current_ei->efi_systab_hi;
--
2.14.3
From 092494dea28896108dfb654cebf9f7e3666fc514 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 10:04:51 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 08/31] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and
KEXEC_SIG_FORCE
This is a preparatory patch for kexec_file_load() lockdown. A locked down
kernel needs to prevent unsigned kernel images from being loaded with
kexec_file_load(). Currently, the only way to force the signature
verification is compiling with KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This prevents loading
usigned images even when the kernel is not locked down at runtime.
This patch splits KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE.
Analogous to the MODULE_SIG and MODULE_SIG_FORCE for modules, KEXEC_SIG
turns on the signature verification but allows unsigned images to be
loaded. KEXEC_SIG_FORCE disallows images without a valid signature.
[Modified by David Howells such that:
(1) verify_pefile_signature() differentiates between no-signature and
sig-didn't-match in its returned errors.
(2) kexec fails with EKEYREJECTED and logs an appropriate message if
signature checking is enforced and an signature is not found, uses
unsupported crypto or has no matching key.
(3) kexec fails with EKEYREJECTED if there is a signature for which we
have a key, but signature doesn't match - even if in non-forcing mode.
(4) kexec fails with EBADMSG or some other error if there is a signature
which cannot be parsed - even if in non-forcing mode.
(5) kexec fails with ELIBBAD if the PE file cannot be parsed to extract
the signature - even if in non-forcing mode.
]
Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
cc: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 20 ++++++++++----
arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 2 +-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c | 4 ++-
include/linux/kexec.h | 4 +--
kernel/kexec_file.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
5 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index eb7f43f23521..b2c5eb5a8333 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2020,20 +2020,30 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
for kernel and initramfs as opposed to list of segments as
accepted by previous system call.
-config KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
+config KEXEC_SIG
bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
depends on KEXEC_FILE
---help---
- This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
- the kexec_file_load() syscall.
- In addition to that option, you need to enable signature
+ This option makes the kexec_file_load() syscall check for a valid
+ signature of the kernel image. The image can still be loaded without
+ a valid signature unless you also enable KEXEC_SIG_FORCE, though if
+ there's a signature that we can check, then it must be valid.
+
+ In addition to this option, you need to enable signature
verification for the corresponding kernel image type being
loaded in order for this to work.
+config KEXEC_SIG_FORCE
+ bool "Require a valid signature in kexec_file_load() syscall"
+ depends on KEXEC_SIG
+ ---help---
+ This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
+ the kexec_file_load() syscall.
+
config KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
bool "Enable bzImage signature verification support"
- depends on KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
+ depends on KEXEC_SIG
depends on SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
select SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
---help---
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
index 3b7427aa7d85..b0870d47d520 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ int arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
return image->fops->cleanup(image->image_loader_data);
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
int arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *kernel,
unsigned long kernel_len)
{
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
index d178650fd524..4473cea1e877 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ static int pefile_parse_binary(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen,
if (!ddir->certs.virtual_address || !ddir->certs.size) {
pr_debug("Unsigned PE binary\n");
- return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ return -ENODATA;
}
chkaddr(ctx->header_size, ddir->certs.virtual_address,
@@ -408,6 +408,8 @@ static int pefile_digest_pe(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen,
* (*) 0 if at least one signature chain intersects with the keys in the trust
* keyring, or:
*
+ * (*) -ENODATA if there is no signature present.
+ *
* (*) -ENOPKG if a suitable crypto module couldn't be found for a check on a
* chain.
*
diff --git a/include/linux/kexec.h b/include/linux/kexec.h
index f16f6ceb3875..19652372f3ee 100644
--- a/include/linux/kexec.h
+++ b/include/linux/kexec.h
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ typedef void *(kexec_load_t)(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
unsigned long cmdline_len);
typedef int (kexec_cleanup_t)(void *loader_data);
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
typedef int (kexec_verify_sig_t)(const char *kernel_buf,
unsigned long kernel_len);
#endif
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ struct kexec_file_ops {
kexec_probe_t *probe;
kexec_load_t *load;
kexec_cleanup_t *cleanup;
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
kexec_verify_sig_t *verify_sig;
#endif
};
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
index e5bcd94c1efb..d5931e392050 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ int __weak arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
return -EINVAL;
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
int __weak arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
unsigned long buf_len)
{
@@ -116,7 +116,8 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
const char __user *cmdline_ptr,
unsigned long cmdline_len, unsigned flags)
{
- int ret = 0;
+ const char *reason;
+ int ret;
void *ldata;
loff_t size;
@@ -135,15 +136,48 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
if (ret)
goto out;
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
ret = arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(image, image->kernel_buf,
image->kernel_buf_len);
- if (ret) {
- pr_debug("kernel signature verification failed.\n");
+#else
+ ret = -ENODATA;
+#endif
+
+ switch (ret) {
+ case 0:
+ break;
+
+ /* Certain verification errors are non-fatal if we're not
+ * checking errors, provided we aren't mandating that there
+ * must be a valid signature.
+ */
+ case -ENODATA:
+ reason = "kexec of unsigned image";
+ goto decide;
+ case -ENOPKG:
+ reason = "kexec of image with unsupported crypto";
+ goto decide;
+ case -ENOKEY:
+ reason = "kexec of image with unavailable key";
+ decide:
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE)) {
+ pr_notice("%s rejected\n", reason);
+ ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+
+ /* All other errors are fatal, including nomem, unparseable
+ * signatures and signature check failures - even if signatures
+ * aren't required.
+ */
+ default:
+ pr_notice("kernel signature verification failed (%d).\n", ret);
goto out;
}
- pr_debug("kernel signature verification successful.\n");
-#endif
+
/* It is possible that there no initramfs is being loaded */
if (!(flags & KEXEC_FILE_NO_INITRAMFS)) {
ret = kernel_read_file_from_fd(initrd_fd, &image->initrd_buf,
--
2.14.3
From 7124221c5cdb956365ed731b55e663db4075a131 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 10:04:52 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 09/31] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked
down
When KEXEC_SIG is not enabled, kernel should not load images through
kexec_file systemcall if the kernel is locked down unless IMA can be used
to validate the image.
[Modified by David Howells to fit with modifications to the previous patch
and to return -EPERM if the kernel is locked down for consistency with
other lockdowns]
Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
cc: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
---
kernel/kexec_file.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
index d5931e392050..c47c4de604cd 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
@@ -167,6 +167,14 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
}
ret = 0;
+ if (is_ima_appraise_enabled())
+ break;
+
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down(reason)) {
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
break;
/* All other errors are fatal, including nomem, unparseable
--
2.14.3
From 70911b9a15ee62c6222e09099d23d94bdd132972 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 10:04:52 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 10/31] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down
There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning
from hibernate. This might compromise the signed modules trust model,
so until we can work with signed hibernate images we disable it when the
kernel is locked down.
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
---
kernel/power/hibernate.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
index a5c36e9c56a6..f2eafefeec50 100644
--- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c
+++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ static const struct platform_hibernation_ops *hibernation_ops;
bool hibernation_available(void)
{
- return (nohibernate == 0);
+ return nohibernate == 0 && !kernel_is_locked_down("Hibernation");
}
/**
--
2.14.3
From b85febc7ab5ceede3c53b438b899dfba7741f366 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 10:04:52 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 11/31] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down
uswsusp allows a user process to dump and then restore kernel state, which
makes it possible to modify the running kernel. Disable this if the kernel
is locked down.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
---
kernel/power/user.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/power/user.c b/kernel/power/user.c
index 22df9f7ff672..678ade9decfe 100644
--- a/kernel/power/user.c
+++ b/kernel/power/user.c
@@ -52,6 +52,9 @@ static int snapshot_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
if (!hibernation_available())
return -EPERM;
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down("/dev/snapshot"))
+ return -EPERM;
+
lock_system_sleep();
if (!atomic_add_unless(&snapshot_device_available, -1, 0)) {
--
2.14.3
From 9e2700d1746e53da4de4d0fbee7ca4f8f06d6ff2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 10:04:52 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 12/31] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked
down
Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in
order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code,
allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing.
Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax this for
sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 9 +++++++++
drivers/pci/proc.c | 9 ++++++++-
drivers/pci/syscall.c | 3 ++-
3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
index eb6bee8724cc..6d2afc730ab7 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
@@ -930,6 +930,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
loff_t init_off = off;
u8 *data = (u8 *) buf;
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access"))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (off > dev->cfg_size)
return 0;
if (off + count > dev->cfg_size) {
@@ -1224,6 +1227,9 @@ static int pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr,
enum pci_mmap_state mmap_type;
struct resource *res = &pdev->resource[bar];
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access"))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (res->flags & IORESOURCE_MEM && iomem_is_exclusive(res->start))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1299,6 +1305,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf,
loff_t off, size_t count)
{
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access"))
+ return -EPERM;
+
return pci_resource_io(filp, kobj, attr, buf, off, count, true);
}
diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c
index 58a662e3c4a6..b30e53eb41df 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/proc.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c
@@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
int size = dev->cfg_size;
int cnt;
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access"))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (pos >= size)
return 0;
if (nbytes >= size)
@@ -196,6 +199,9 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
#endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */
int ret = 0;
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access"))
+ return -EPERM;
+
switch (cmd) {
case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER:
ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus);
@@ -237,7 +243,8 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data;
int i, ret, write_combine = 0, res_bit = IORESOURCE_MEM;
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) ||
+ kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access"))
return -EPERM;
if (fpriv->mmap_state == pci_mmap_io) {
diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
index e725f99b5479..6cb3b22a3b94 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
@@ -93,7 +93,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned long, dfn,
u32 dword;
int err = 0;
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
+ kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCI access"))
return -EPERM;
dev = pci_get_domain_bus_and_slot(0, bus, dfn);
--
2.14.3
From d7a876a8a1616730c0bc44c47823483ec3b99c12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 10:04:52 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 13/31] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked
down
IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration
registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO
register space. This would potentially permit root to trigger arbitrary
DMA, so lock it down by default.
This also implicitly locks down the KDADDIO, KDDELIO, KDENABIO and
KDDISABIO console ioctls.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
cc: x86@kernel.org
---
arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
index 2f723301eb58..b3758cc23262 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long from, unsigned long num, int turn_on)
if ((from + num <= from) || (from + num > IO_BITMAP_BITS))
return -EINVAL;
- if (turn_on && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+ if (turn_on && (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) ||
+ kernel_is_locked_down("ioperm")))
return -EPERM;
/*
@@ -121,7 +122,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(iopl, unsigned int, level)
return -EINVAL;
/* Trying to gain more privileges? */
if (level > old) {
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) ||
+ kernel_is_locked_down("iopl"))
return -EPERM;
}
regs->flags = (regs->flags & ~X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) |
--
2.14.3
From 43e89781371daf295925ffa1f9074eb31b815491 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 10:04:53 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 14/31] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked
down
Writing to MSRs should not be allowed if the kernel is locked down, since
it could lead to execution of arbitrary code in kernel mode. Based on a
patch by Kees Cook.
MSR accesses are logged for the purposes of building up a whitelist as per
Alan Cox's suggestion.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
cc: x86@kernel.org
---
arch/x86/kernel/msr.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
index ef688804f80d..dfb61d358196 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
@@ -84,6 +84,11 @@ static ssize_t msr_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
int err = 0;
ssize_t bytes = 0;
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct MSR access")) {
+ pr_info("Direct access to MSR %x\n", reg);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
if (count % 8)
return -EINVAL; /* Invalid chunk size */
@@ -135,6 +140,11 @@ static long msr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioc, unsigned long arg)
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct MSR access")) {
+ pr_info("Direct access to MSR %x\n", regs[1]); /* Display %ecx */
+ err = -EPERM;
+ break;
+ }
err = wrmsr_safe_regs_on_cpu(cpu, regs);
if (err)
break;
--
2.14.3
From 13b28d5eb338531f53ac27bce86c663c88ac4aca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 10:04:53 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 15/31] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is
locked down
custom_method effectively allows arbitrary access to system memory, making
it possible for an attacker to circumvent restrictions on module loading.
Disable it if the kernel is locked down.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/acpi/custom_method.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
index c68e72414a67..b33fba70ec51 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ static ssize_t cm_write(struct file *file, const char __user * user_buf,
struct acpi_table_header table;
acpi_status status;
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down("ACPI custom methods"))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (!(*ppos)) {
/* parse the table header to get the table length */
if (count <= sizeof(struct acpi_table_header))
--
2.14.3
From dadc30f71155a6f2df81d791cf1314ecdb36cb84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 10:04:53 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 16/31] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has
been locked down
This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel, which
makes it possible for a user to modify the workings of hardware . Reject
the option when the kernel is locked down.
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/acpi/osl.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/osl.c b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
index 3bb46cb24a99..3d3b59b97f31 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/osl.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ acpi_physical_address __init acpi_os_get_root_pointer(void)
acpi_physical_address pa;
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC
- if (acpi_rsdp)
+ if (acpi_rsdp && !kernel_is_locked_down("ACPI RSDP specification"))
return acpi_rsdp;
#endif
pa = acpi_arch_get_root_pointer();
--
2.14.3
From 9185a89b926a57d52ac9edf588ad533d53af4985 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 10:04:53 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 17/31] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is
locked down
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel,
so do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if the kernel is locked down.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/acpi/tables.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/tables.c b/drivers/acpi/tables.c
index 7bcb66ccccf3..5ea02c9ca47f 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/tables.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/tables.c
@@ -527,6 +527,11 @@ void __init acpi_table_upgrade(void)
if (table_nr == 0)
return;
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down("ACPI table override")) {
+ pr_notice("kernel is locked down, ignoring table override\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
acpi_tables_addr =
memblock_find_in_range(0, ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE_MAX_PHYS,
all_tables_size, PAGE_SIZE);
--
2.14.3
From aa434c790a2581df5dc7973f2dc3a6a3234bd6b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 10:04:53 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 18/31] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is
locked down
ACPI provides an error injection mechanism, EINJ, for debugging and testing
the ACPI Platform Error Interface (APEI) and other RAS features. If
supported by the firmware, ACPI specification 5.0 and later provide for a
way to specify a physical memory address to which to inject the error.
Injecting errors through EINJ can produce errors which to the platform are
indistinguishable from real hardware errors. This can have undesirable
side-effects, such as causing the platform to mark hardware as needing
replacement.
While it does not provide a method to load unauthenticated privileged code,
the effect of these errors may persist across reboots and affect trust in
the underlying hardware, so disable error injection through EINJ if
the kernel is locked down.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c
index b38737c83a24..6d71e1e97b20 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c
@@ -518,6 +518,9 @@ static int einj_error_inject(u32 type, u32 flags, u64 param1, u64 param2,
int rc;
u64 base_addr, size;
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down("ACPI error injection"))
+ return -EPERM;
+
/* If user manually set "flags", make sure it is legal */
if (flags && (flags &
~(SETWA_FLAGS_APICID|SETWA_FLAGS_MEM|SETWA_FLAGS_PCIE_SBDF)))
--
2.14.3
From 5b76b160badb6e53f68a65f0374df700894559bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 10:04:53 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 19/31] scsi: Lock down the eata driver
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
The eata driver takes a single string parameter that contains a slew of
settings, including hardware resource configuration. Prohibit use of the
parameter if the kernel is locked down.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Dario Ballabio <ballabio_dario@emc.com>
cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc: "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/scsi/eata.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/eata.c b/drivers/scsi/eata.c
index 6501c330d8c8..72fceaa8f3da 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/eata.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/eata.c
@@ -1552,8 +1552,11 @@ static int eata2x_detect(struct scsi_host_template *tpnt)
tpnt->proc_name = "eata2x";
- if (strlen(boot_options))
+ if (strlen(boot_options)) {
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down("Command line-specified device addresses, irqs and dma channels"))
+ return -EPERM;
option_setup(boot_options);
+ }
#if defined(MODULE)
/* io_port could have been modified when loading as a module */
--
2.14.3
From ebdc673699d9732a1cccfc2f80e84402aa7ec0c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 10:04:54 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 20/31] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked
down
Prohibit replacement of the PCMCIA Card Information Structure when the
kernel is locked down.
Suggested-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-pcmcia@lists.infradead.org
---
drivers/pcmcia/cistpl.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/pcmcia/cistpl.c b/drivers/pcmcia/cistpl.c
index 102646fedb56..e46c948d7246 100644
--- a/drivers/pcmcia/cistpl.c
+++ b/drivers/pcmcia/cistpl.c
@@ -1578,6 +1578,9 @@ static ssize_t pccard_store_cis(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
struct pcmcia_socket *s;
int error;
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down("Direct PCMCIA CIS storage"))
+ return -EPERM;
+
s = to_socket(container_of(kobj, struct device, kobj));
if (off)
--
2.14.3
From 0f058a0aecf0aea70fc42905250bb2a0f195157a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 10:04:54 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 21/31] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
Lock down TIOCSSERIAL as that can be used to change the ioport and irq
settings on a serial port. This only appears to be an issue for the serial
drivers that use the core serial code. All other drivers seem to either
ignore attempts to change port/irq or give an error.
Reported-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
---
drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c b/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c
index c8dde56b532b..7370f3d169fe 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c
@@ -829,6 +829,12 @@ static int uart_set_info(struct tty_struct *tty, struct tty_port *port,
new_flags = (__force upf_t)new_info->flags;
old_custom_divisor = uport->custom_divisor;
+ if ((change_port || change_irq) &&
+ kernel_is_locked_down("Using TIOCSSERIAL to change device addresses, irqs and dma channels")) {
+ retval = -EPERM;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
retval = -EPERM;
if (change_irq || change_port ||
--
2.14.3
From e5a9ff56a0c1762ba2b3d3ea46b03cf2ba9d2c60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 10:04:54 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 22/31] Lock down module params that specify hardware
parameters (eg. ioport)
Provided an annotation for module parameters that specify hardware
parameters (such as io ports, iomem addresses, irqs, dma channels, fixed
dma buffers and other types).
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
kernel/params.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/params.c b/kernel/params.c
index cc9108c2a1fd..2c08c4aa376b 100644
--- a/kernel/params.c
+++ b/kernel/params.c
@@ -108,13 +108,19 @@ bool parameq(const char *a, const char *b)
return parameqn(a, b, strlen(a)+1);
}
-static void param_check_unsafe(const struct kernel_param *kp)
+static bool param_check_unsafe(const struct kernel_param *kp,
+ const char *doing)
{
if (kp->flags & KERNEL_PARAM_FL_UNSAFE) {
pr_warn("Setting dangerous option %s - tainting kernel\n",
kp->name);
add_taint(TAINT_USER, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
}
+
+ if (kp->flags & KERNEL_PARAM_FL_HWPARAM &&
+ kernel_is_locked_down("Command line-specified device addresses, irqs and dma channels"))
+ return false;
+ return true;
}
static int parse_one(char *param,
@@ -144,8 +150,10 @@ static int parse_one(char *param,
pr_debug("handling %s with %p\n", param,
params[i].ops->set);
kernel_param_lock(params[i].mod);
- param_check_unsafe(&params[i]);
- err = params[i].ops->set(val, &params[i]);
+ if (param_check_unsafe(&params[i], doing))
+ err = params[i].ops->set(val, &params[i]);
+ else
+ err = -EPERM;
kernel_param_unlock(params[i].mod);
return err;
}
@@ -553,6 +561,12 @@ static ssize_t param_attr_show(struct module_attribute *mattr,
return count;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
+#define mod_name(mod) (mod)->name
+#else
+#define mod_name(mod) "unknown"
+#endif
+
/* sysfs always hands a nul-terminated string in buf. We rely on that. */
static ssize_t param_attr_store(struct module_attribute *mattr,
struct module_kobject *mk,
@@ -565,8 +579,10 @@ static ssize_t param_attr_store(struct module_attribute *mattr,
return -EPERM;
kernel_param_lock(mk->mod);
- param_check_unsafe(attribute->param);
- err = attribute->param->ops->set(buf, attribute->param);
+ if (param_check_unsafe(attribute->param, mod_name(mk->mod)))
+ err = attribute->param->ops->set(buf, attribute->param);
+ else
+ err = -EPERM;
kernel_param_unlock(mk->mod);
if (!err)
return len;
--
2.14.3
From 6733115594290091a00d19060893f2396e51832c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 10:04:54 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 23/31] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
The testmmiotrace module shouldn't be permitted when the kernel is locked
down as it can be used to arbitrarily read and write MMIO space.
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com
cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
cc: x86@kernel.org
---
arch/x86/mm/testmmiotrace.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/testmmiotrace.c b/arch/x86/mm/testmmiotrace.c
index f6ae6830b341..bbaad357f5d7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/testmmiotrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/testmmiotrace.c
@@ -115,6 +115,9 @@ static int __init init(void)
{
unsigned long size = (read_far) ? (8 << 20) : (16 << 10);
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down("MMIO trace testing"))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (mmio_address == 0) {
pr_err("you have to use the module argument mmio_address.\n");
pr_err("DO NOT LOAD THIS MODULE UNLESS YOU REALLY KNOW WHAT YOU ARE DOING!\n");
--
2.14.3
From 69a17e04714182d314a7a7425f584ed3a54e065e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 10:04:54 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 24/31] Lock down /proc/kcore
Disallow access to /proc/kcore when the kernel is locked down to prevent
access to cryptographic data.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
---
fs/proc/kcore.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/proc/kcore.c b/fs/proc/kcore.c
index d1e82761de81..cdebdee81719 100644
--- a/fs/proc/kcore.c
+++ b/fs/proc/kcore.c
@@ -546,6 +546,8 @@ read_kcore(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen, loff_t *fpos)
static int open_kcore(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down("/proc/kcore"))
+ return -EPERM;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
return -EPERM;
--
2.14.3
From aa4a17515ea163cf0020d4a8c41302fb159b56ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 10:04:54 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 25/31] Lock down kprobes
Disallow the creation of kprobes when the kernel is locked down by
preventing their registration. This prevents kprobes from being used to
access kernel memory, either to make modifications or to steal crypto data.
Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
kernel/kprobes.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/kprobes.c b/kernel/kprobes.c
index 102160ff5c66..4f5757732553 100644
--- a/kernel/kprobes.c
+++ b/kernel/kprobes.c
@@ -1561,6 +1561,9 @@ int register_kprobe(struct kprobe *p)
struct module *probed_mod;
kprobe_opcode_t *addr;
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down("Use of kprobes"))
+ return -EPERM;
+
/* Adjust probe address from symbol */
addr = kprobe_addr(p);
if (IS_ERR(addr))
--
2.14.3
From 78bb0059c3b8304a8d124b55feebc780fb3e0500 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 10:04:55 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 26/31] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the
kernel is locked down
There are some bpf functions can be used to read kernel memory:
bpf_probe_read, bpf_probe_write_user and bpf_trace_printk. These allow
private keys in kernel memory (e.g. the hibernation image signing key) to
be read by an eBPF program and kernel memory to be altered without
restriction.
Completely prohibit the use of BPF when the kernel is locked down.
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
cc: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>
cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
---
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index e24aa3241387..3ea87a004771 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -1848,6 +1848,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(bpf, int, cmd, union bpf_attr __user *, uattr, unsigned int, siz
if (sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down("BPF"))
+ return -EPERM;
+
err = check_uarg_tail_zero(uattr, sizeof(attr), size);
if (err)
return err;
--
2.14.3
From 9d6d6000dffb44cb2269b26eafeb371345bd2297 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 10:04:55 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 27/31] Lock down perf
Disallow the use of certain perf facilities that might allow userspace to
access kernel data.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
kernel/events/core.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 96db9ae5d5af..1fba021d61d4 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -9924,6 +9924,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if ((attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR) &&
+ kernel_is_locked_down("PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR"))
+ /* REGS_INTR can leak data, lockdown must prevent this */
+ return -EPERM;
+
/* Only privileged users can get physical addresses */
if ((attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_PHYS_ADDR) &&
perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
--
2.14.3
From 3fc32260515837f4c87cb923513973f1e77ccef9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 10:04:55 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 28/31] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked
down
Disallow opening of debugfs files that might be used to muck around when
the kernel is locked down as various drivers give raw access to hardware
through debugfs. Given the effort of auditing all 2000 or so files and
manually fixing each one as necessary, I've chosen to apply a heuristic
instead. The following changes are made:
(1) chmod and chown are disallowed on debugfs objects (though the root dir
can be modified by mount and remount, but I'm not worried about that).
(2) When the kernel is locked down, only files with the following criteria
are permitted to be opened:
- The file must have mode 00444
- The file must not have ioctl methods
- The file must not have mmap
(3) When the kernel is locked down, files may only be opened for reading.
Normal device interaction should be done through configfs, sysfs or a
miscdev, not debugfs.
Note that this makes it unnecessary to specifically lock down show_dsts(),
show_devs() and show_call() in the asus-wmi driver.
I would actually prefer to lock down all files by default and have the
the files unlocked by the creator. This is tricky to manage correctly,
though, as there are 19 creation functions and ~1600 call sites (some of
them in loops scanning tables).
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
cc: acpi4asus-user@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org
cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
---
fs/debugfs/file.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
fs/debugfs/inode.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
2 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/debugfs/file.c b/fs/debugfs/file.c
index 1f99678ff5d3..51cb894c21f2 100644
--- a/fs/debugfs/file.c
+++ b/fs/debugfs/file.c
@@ -136,6 +136,25 @@ void debugfs_file_put(struct dentry *dentry)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(debugfs_file_put);
+/*
+ * Only permit access to world-readable files when the kernel is locked down.
+ * We also need to exclude any file that has ways to write or alter it as root
+ * can bypass the permissions check.
+ */
+static bool debugfs_is_locked_down(struct inode *inode,
+ struct file *filp,
+ const struct file_operations *real_fops)
+{
+ if ((inode->i_mode & 07777) == 0444 &&
+ !(filp->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) &&
+ !real_fops->unlocked_ioctl &&
+ !real_fops->compat_ioctl &&
+ !real_fops->mmap)
+ return false;
+
+ return kernel_is_locked_down("debugfs");
+}
+
static int open_proxy_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
struct dentry *dentry = F_DENTRY(filp);
@@ -147,6 +166,11 @@ static int open_proxy_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
return r == -EIO ? -ENOENT : r;
real_fops = debugfs_real_fops(filp);
+
+ r = -EPERM;
+ if (debugfs_is_locked_down(inode, filp, real_fops))
+ goto out;
+
real_fops = fops_get(real_fops);
if (!real_fops) {
/* Huh? Module did not clean up after itself at exit? */
@@ -272,6 +296,10 @@ static int full_proxy_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
return r == -EIO ? -ENOENT : r;
real_fops = debugfs_real_fops(filp);
+ r = -EPERM;
+ if (debugfs_is_locked_down(inode, filp, real_fops))
+ goto out;
+
real_fops = fops_get(real_fops);
if (!real_fops) {
/* Huh? Module did not cleanup after itself at exit? */
diff --git a/fs/debugfs/inode.c b/fs/debugfs/inode.c
index 63a998c3f252..ce261e1765ff 100644
--- a/fs/debugfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/debugfs/inode.c
@@ -32,6 +32,31 @@ static struct vfsmount *debugfs_mount;
static int debugfs_mount_count;
static bool debugfs_registered;
+/*
+ * Don't allow access attributes to be changed whilst the kernel is locked down
+ * so that we can use the file mode as part of a heuristic to determine whether
+ * to lock down individual files.
+ */
+static int debugfs_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *ia)
+{
+ if ((ia->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)) &&
+ kernel_is_locked_down("debugfs"))
+ return -EPERM;
+ return simple_setattr(dentry, ia);
+}
+
+static const struct inode_operations debugfs_file_inode_operations = {
+ .setattr = debugfs_setattr,
+};
+static const struct inode_operations debugfs_dir_inode_operations = {
+ .lookup = simple_lookup,
+ .setattr = debugfs_setattr,
+};
+static const struct inode_operations debugfs_symlink_inode_operations = {
+ .get_link = simple_get_link,
+ .setattr = debugfs_setattr,
+};
+
static struct inode *debugfs_get_inode(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct inode *inode = new_inode(sb);
@@ -359,6 +384,7 @@ static struct dentry *__debugfs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode,
inode->i_mode = mode;
inode->i_private = data;
+ inode->i_op = &debugfs_file_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = proxy_fops;
dentry->d_fsdata = (void *)((unsigned long)real_fops |
DEBUGFS_FSDATA_IS_REAL_FOPS_BIT);
@@ -516,7 +542,7 @@ struct dentry *debugfs_create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *parent)
return failed_creating(dentry);
inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR | S_IRWXU | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO;
- inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations;
+ inode->i_op = &debugfs_dir_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
/* directory inodes start off with i_nlink == 2 (for "." entry) */
@@ -611,7 +637,7 @@ struct dentry *debugfs_create_symlink(const char *name, struct dentry *parent,
return failed_creating(dentry);
}
inode->i_mode = S_IFLNK | S_IRWXUGO;
- inode->i_op = &simple_symlink_inode_operations;
+ inode->i_op = &debugfs_symlink_inode_operations;
inode->i_link = link;
d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
return end_creating(dentry);
--
2.14.3
From 42b2c81c12a8e8139fc7252cf91151c37b5a0966 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 10:04:55 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 29/31] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure
boot mode
UEFI machines can be booted in Secure Boot mode. Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT
flag that can be passed to efi_enabled() to find out whether secure boot is
enabled.
Move the switch-statement in x86's setup_arch() that inteprets the
secure_boot boot parameter to generic code and set the bit there.
Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
---
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 14 +-------------
drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/efi.h | 16 ++++++++++------
4 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 1ae67e982af7..a7c240f00d78 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -1150,19 +1150,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
/* Allocate bigger log buffer */
setup_log_buf(1);
- if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
- switch (boot_params.secure_boot) {
- case efi_secureboot_mode_disabled:
- pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n");
- break;
- case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
- pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
- break;
- default:
- pr_info("Secure boot could not be determined\n");
- break;
- }
- }
+ efi_set_secure_boot(boot_params.secure_boot);
reserve_initrd();
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
index cb805374f4bc..da2b3e37b9f0 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_FAKE_MEMMAP) += fake_mem.o
obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_BOOTLOADER_CONTROL) += efibc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_TEST) += test/
obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_DEV_PATH_PARSER) += dev-path-parser.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_EFI) += secureboot.o
obj-$(CONFIG_APPLE_PROPERTIES) += apple-properties.o
arm-obj-$(CONFIG_EFI) := arm-init.o arm-runtime.o
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9070055de0a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/* Core kernel secure boot support.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2017 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+
+/*
+ * Decide what to do when UEFI secure boot mode is enabled.
+ */
+void __init efi_set_secure_boot(enum efi_secureboot_mode mode)
+{
+ if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
+ switch (mode) {
+ case efi_secureboot_mode_disabled:
+ pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n");
+ break;
+ case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
+ set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &efi.flags);
+ pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_warning("Secure boot could not be determined (mode %u)\n",
+ mode);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index f5083aa72eae..79da76d14ca3 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -1142,6 +1142,14 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
#define EFI_DBG 8 /* Print additional debug info at runtime */
#define EFI_NX_PE_DATA 9 /* Can runtime data regions be mapped non-executable? */
#define EFI_MEM_ATTR 10 /* Did firmware publish an EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES table? */
+#define EFI_SECURE_BOOT 11 /* Are we in Secure Boot mode? */
+
+enum efi_secureboot_mode {
+ efi_secureboot_mode_unset,
+ efi_secureboot_mode_unknown,
+ efi_secureboot_mode_disabled,
+ efi_secureboot_mode_enabled,
+};
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
/*
@@ -1154,6 +1162,7 @@ static inline bool efi_enabled(int feature)
extern void efi_reboot(enum reboot_mode reboot_mode, const char *__unused);
extern bool efi_is_table_address(unsigned long phys_addr);
+extern void __init efi_set_secure_boot(enum efi_secureboot_mode mode);
#else
static inline bool efi_enabled(int feature)
{
@@ -1172,6 +1181,7 @@ static inline bool efi_is_table_address(unsigned long phys_addr)
{
return false;
}
+static inline void efi_set_secure_boot(enum efi_secureboot_mode mode) {}
#endif
extern int efi_status_to_err(efi_status_t status);
@@ -1557,12 +1567,6 @@ efi_status_t efi_setup_gop(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
bool efi_runtime_disabled(void);
extern void efi_call_virt_check_flags(unsigned long flags, const char *call);
-enum efi_secureboot_mode {
- efi_secureboot_mode_unset,
- efi_secureboot_mode_unknown,
- efi_secureboot_mode_disabled,
- efi_secureboot_mode_enabled,
-};
enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table);
#ifdef CONFIG_RESET_ATTACK_MITIGATION
--
2.14.3
From d78bf678059f83e22bec8ada1a448e22b9b90203 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 10:04:55 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 30/31] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will
only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain use cases may also
require that all kernel modules also be signed. Add a configuration option
that to lock down the kernel - which includes requiring validly signed
modules - if the kernel is secure-booted.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
---
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 6 ++++--
fs/debugfs/inode.c | 2 +-
security/Kconfig | 14 ++++++++++++++
security/lock_down.c | 1 +
4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index a7c240f00d78..1277d1857c5c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
#include <linux/crash_dump.h>
@@ -997,6 +998,9 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
efi_init();
+ efi_set_secure_boot(boot_params.secure_boot);
+ init_lockdown();
+
dmi_scan_machine();
dmi_memdev_walk();
dmi_set_dump_stack_arch_desc();
@@ -1150,8 +1154,6 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
/* Allocate bigger log buffer */
setup_log_buf(1);
- efi_set_secure_boot(boot_params.secure_boot);
-
reserve_initrd();
acpi_table_upgrade();
diff --git a/fs/debugfs/inode.c b/fs/debugfs/inode.c
index ce261e1765ff..7aff55b309a6 100644
--- a/fs/debugfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/debugfs/inode.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ static bool debugfs_registered;
static int debugfs_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *ia)
{
if ((ia->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)) &&
- kernel_is_locked_down("debugfs"))
+ kernel_is_locked_down("changing perms in debugfs"))
return -EPERM;
return simple_setattr(dentry, ia);
}
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 461d5acc3616..13fdada1ffc2 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -248,6 +248,20 @@ config ALLOW_LOCKDOWN_LIFT_BY_SYSRQ
Allow the lockdown on a kernel to be lifted, by pressing a SysRq key
combination on a wired keyboard.
+config LOCK_DOWN_IN_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
+ bool "Lock down the kernel in EFI Secure Boot mode"
+ default n
+ select LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL
+ depends on EFI
+ help
+ UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware
+ will only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Secure boot mode may
+ be determined from EFI variables provided by the system firmware if
+ not indicated by the boot parameters.
+
+ Enabling this option turns on results in kernel lockdown being
+ triggered if EFI Secure Boot is set.
+
source security/selinux/Kconfig
source security/smack/Kconfig
diff --git a/security/lock_down.c b/security/lock_down.c
index 2c6b00f0c229..527f7e51dc8d 100644
--- a/security/lock_down.c
+++ b/security/lock_down.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/sysrq.h>
+#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_ALLOW_LOCKDOWN_LIFT_BY_SYSRQ
--
2.14.3
From 89bcd5b02f125335f74289c5f4ae03e9b893ab7f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2018 14:43:03 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 31/31] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages
Print the content of current->comm in messages generated by lockdown to
indicate a restriction that was hit. This makes it a bit easier to find
out what caused the message.
The message now patterned something like:
Lockdown: <comm>: <what> is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
security/lock_down.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/lock_down.c b/security/lock_down.c
index 527f7e51dc8d..4745278e0f3b 100644
--- a/security/lock_down.c
+++ b/security/lock_down.c
@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ void __init init_lockdown(void)
bool __kernel_is_locked_down(const char *what, bool first)
{
if (what && first && kernel_locked_down)
- pr_notice("Lockdown: %s is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7\n",
- what);
+ pr_notice("Lockdown: %s: %s is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7\n",
+ current->comm, what);
return kernel_locked_down;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kernel_is_locked_down);
--
2.14.3