155 lines
5.7 KiB
Diff
155 lines
5.7 KiB
Diff
From c282222a45cb9503cbfbebfdb60491f06ae84b49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
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Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2017 11:52:29 +0100
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Subject: xfrm: policy: init locks early
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From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
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commit c282222a45cb9503cbfbebfdb60491f06ae84b49 upstream.
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Dmitry reports following splat:
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INFO: trying to register non-static key.
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the code is fine but needs lockdep annotation.
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turning off the locking correctness validator.
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CPU: 0 PID: 13059 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc7-next-20170207 #1
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[..]
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spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:304 [inline]
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xfrm_policy_flush+0x32/0x470 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:963
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xfrm_policy_fini+0xbf/0x560 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3041
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xfrm_net_init+0x79f/0x9e0 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3091
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ops_init+0x10a/0x530 net/core/net_namespace.c:115
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setup_net+0x2ed/0x690 net/core/net_namespace.c:291
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copy_net_ns+0x26c/0x530 net/core/net_namespace.c:396
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create_new_namespaces+0x409/0x860 kernel/nsproxy.c:106
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unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xae/0x1e0 kernel/nsproxy.c:205
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SYSC_unshare kernel/fork.c:2281 [inline]
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Problem is that when we get error during xfrm_net_init we will call
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xfrm_policy_fini which will acquire xfrm_policy_lock before it was
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initialized. Just move it around so locks get set up first.
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Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
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Fixes: 283bc9f35bbbcb0e9 ("xfrm: Namespacify xfrm state/policy locks")
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Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
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Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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---
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net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 10 +++++-----
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1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
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--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
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+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
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@@ -3062,6 +3062,11 @@ static int __net_init xfrm_net_init(stru
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{
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int rv;
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+ /* Initialize the per-net locks here */
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+ spin_lock_init(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock);
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+ spin_lock_init(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
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+ mutex_init(&net->xfrm.xfrm_cfg_mutex);
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+
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rv = xfrm_statistics_init(net);
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if (rv < 0)
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goto out_statistics;
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@@ -3078,11 +3083,6 @@ static int __net_init xfrm_net_init(stru
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if (rv < 0)
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goto out;
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- /* Initialize the per-net locks here */
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- spin_lock_init(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock);
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- spin_lock_init(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
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- mutex_init(&net->xfrm.xfrm_cfg_mutex);
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-
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return 0;
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out:
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From 677e806da4d916052585301785d847c3b3e6186a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
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Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2017 07:29:31 +0000
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Subject: xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL replay_window
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From: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
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commit 677e806da4d916052585301785d847c3b3e6186a upstream.
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When a new xfrm state is created during an XFRM_MSG_NEWSA call we
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validate the user supplied replay_esn to ensure that the size is valid
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and to ensure that the replay_window size is within the allocated
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buffer. However later it is possible to update this replay_esn via a
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XFRM_MSG_NEWAE call. There we again validate the size of the supplied
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buffer matches the existing state and if so inject the contents. We do
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not at this point check that the replay_window is within the allocated
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memory. This leads to out-of-bounds reads and writes triggered by
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netlink packets. This leads to memory corruption and the potential for
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priviledge escalation.
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We already attempt to validate the incoming replay information in
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xfrm_new_ae() via xfrm_replay_verify_len(). This confirms that the user
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is not trying to change the size of the replay state buffer which
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includes the replay_esn. It however does not check the replay_window
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remains within that buffer. Add validation of the contained
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replay_window.
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CVE-2017-7184
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Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
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Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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---
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net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 3 +++
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1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
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--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
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+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
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@@ -415,6 +415,9 @@ static inline int xfrm_replay_verify_len
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if (nla_len(rp) < ulen || xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) != ulen)
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return -EINVAL;
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+ if (up->replay_window > up->bmp_len * sizeof(__u32) * 8)
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+ return -EINVAL;
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+
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return 0;
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}
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From f843ee6dd019bcece3e74e76ad9df0155655d0df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
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Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2017 07:45:44 +0000
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Subject: xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE incoming ESN size harder
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From: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
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commit f843ee6dd019bcece3e74e76ad9df0155655d0df upstream.
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Kees Cook has pointed out that xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() is subject to
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wrapping issues. To ensure we are correctly ensuring that the two ESN
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structures are the same size compare both the overall size as reported
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by xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() and the internal length are the same.
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CVE-2017-7184
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Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
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Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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---
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net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 6 +++++-
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1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
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+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
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@@ -412,7 +412,11 @@ static inline int xfrm_replay_verify_len
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up = nla_data(rp);
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ulen = xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(up);
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- if (nla_len(rp) < ulen || xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) != ulen)
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+ /* Check the overall length and the internal bitmap length to avoid
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+ * potential overflow. */
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+ if (nla_len(rp) < ulen ||
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+ xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) != ulen ||
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+ replay_esn->bmp_len != up->bmp_len)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (up->replay_window > up->bmp_len * sizeof(__u32) * 8)
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