kernel/aio-check-for-multiplicatio...

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From 75e1c70fc31490ef8a373ea2a4bea2524099b478 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 2010 14:16:00 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] aio: check for multiplication overflow in do_io_submit
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Tavis Ormandy pointed out that do_io_submit does not do proper bounds
checking on the passed-in iocb array:
       if (unlikely(nr < 0))
               return -EINVAL;
       if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, iocbpp, (nr*sizeof(iocbpp)))))
               return -EFAULT;                      ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
The attached patch checks for overflow, and if it is detected, the
number of iocbs submitted is scaled down to a number that will fit in
the long.  This is an ok thing to do, as sys_io_submit is documented as
returning the number of iocbs submitted, so callers should handle a
return value of less than the 'nr' argument passed in.
Reported-by: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@cmpxchg8b.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
fs/aio.c | 3 +++
1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/aio.c b/fs/aio.c
index 3006b5b..1320b2a 100644
--- a/fs/aio.c
+++ b/fs/aio.c
@@ -1659,6 +1659,9 @@ long do_io_submit(aio_context_t ctx_id, long nr,
if (unlikely(nr < 0))
return -EINVAL;
+ if (unlikely(nr > LONG_MAX/sizeof(*iocbpp)))
+ nr = LONG_MAX/sizeof(*iocbpp);
+
if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, iocbpp, (nr*sizeof(*iocbpp)))))
return -EFAULT;
--
1.7.2.3