Bugzilla: N/A Upstream-status: Fedora mustard. Replaced by securelevels, but that was nak'd From f212a4d8b8638a3e15e4cd76874d4fab60726752 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 17:58:15 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 01/14] Add secure_modules() call Provide a single call to allow kernel code to determine whether the system has been configured to either disable module loading entirely or to load only modules signed with a trusted key. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett --- include/linux/module.h | 7 +++++++ kernel/module.c | 10 ++++++++++ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h index 15cd6b1..30702eb 100644 --- a/include/linux/module.h +++ b/include/linux/module.h @@ -512,6 +512,8 @@ int unregister_module_notifier(struct notifier_block * nb); extern void print_modules(void); +extern bool secure_modules(void); + #else /* !CONFIG_MODULES... */ /* Given an address, look for it in the exception tables. */ @@ -622,6 +624,11 @@ static inline int unregister_module_notifier(struct notifier_block * nb) static inline void print_modules(void) { } + +static inline bool secure_modules(void) +{ + return false; +} #endif /* CONFIG_MODULES */ #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index f5a3b1e..644c33e 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -3831,3 +3831,13 @@ void module_layout(struct module *mod, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(module_layout); #endif + +bool secure_modules(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG + return (sig_enforce || modules_disabled); +#else + return modules_disabled; +#endif +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_modules); -- 1.8.4.2 From 394a8259d0b457495dddda8704821ec9e56ea44a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2012 10:10:38 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 02/14] PCI: Lock down BAR access when module security is enabled Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down from userspace in order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code, allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing. Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax this for sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett --- drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 10 ++++++++++ drivers/pci/proc.c | 8 +++++++- drivers/pci/syscall.c | 3 ++- 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c index c91e6c1..447742e 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "pci.h" static int sysfs_initialized; /* = 0 */ @@ -668,6 +669,9 @@ pci_write_config(struct file* filp, struct kobject *kobj, loff_t init_off = off; u8 *data = (u8*) buf; + if (secure_modules()) + return -EPERM; + if (off > dev->cfg_size) return 0; if (off + count > dev->cfg_size) { @@ -974,6 +978,9 @@ pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr, resource_size_t start, end; int i; + if (secure_modules()) + return -EPERM; + for (i = 0; i < PCI_ROM_RESOURCE; i++) if (res == &pdev->resource[i]) break; @@ -1081,6 +1088,9 @@ pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf, loff_t off, size_t count) { + if (secure_modules()) + return -EPERM; + return pci_resource_io(filp, kobj, attr, buf, off, count, true); } diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c index 46d1378..294fe7b 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/proc.c +++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c @@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, lof int size = dev->cfg_size; int cnt; + if (secure_modules()) + return -EPERM; + if (pos >= size) return 0; if (nbytes >= size) @@ -196,6 +199,9 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, #endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */ int ret = 0; + if (secure_modules()) + return -EPERM; + switch (cmd) { case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER: ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus); @@ -234,7 +240,7 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data; int i, ret; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || secure_modules()) return -EPERM; /* Make sure the caller is mapping a real resource for this device */ diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c index 24750a1..fa57896 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c +++ b/drivers/pci/syscall.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include "pci.h" @@ -92,7 +93,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned long, dfn, u32 dword; int err = 0; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || secure_modules()) return -EPERM; dev = pci_get_bus_and_slot(bus, dfn); -- 1.8.4.2 From 69532e626cece8a43c2528246e0421488b468102 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2012 10:35:59 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 03/14] x86: Lock down IO port access when module security is enabled IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO register space. This would potentially permit root to trigger arbitrary DMA, so lock it down by default. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett --- arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c | 5 +++-- drivers/char/mem.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c index 4ddaf66..00b4403 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include /* @@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long from, unsigned long num, int turn_on) if ((from + num <= from) || (from + num > IO_BITMAP_BITS)) return -EINVAL; - if (turn_on && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) + if (turn_on && (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || secure_modules())) return -EPERM; /* @@ -103,7 +104,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(iopl, unsigned int, level) return -EINVAL; /* Trying to gain more privileges? */ if (level > old) { - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || secure_modules()) return -EPERM; } regs->flags = (regs->flags & ~X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) | (level << 12); diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c index f895a8c..1af8664 100644 --- a/drivers/char/mem.c +++ b/drivers/char/mem.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include @@ -563,6 +564,9 @@ static ssize_t write_port(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, unsigned long i = *ppos; const char __user *tmp = buf; + if (secure_modules()) + return -EPERM; + if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, buf, count)) return -EFAULT; while (count-- > 0 && i < 65536) { -- 1.8.4.2 From 8771ff55273e964d707b174dd0dbe433783c0254 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2012 08:39:37 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 04/14] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method custom_method effectively allows arbitrary access to system memory, making it possible for an attacker to circumvent restrictions on module loading. Disable it if any such restrictions have been enabled. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett --- drivers/acpi/custom_method.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c index 12b62f2..50647b3 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c @@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ static ssize_t cm_write(struct file *file, const char __user * user_buf, struct acpi_table_header table; acpi_status status; + if (secure_modules()) + return -EPERM; + if (!(*ppos)) { /* parse the table header to get the table length */ if (count <= sizeof(struct acpi_table_header)) -- 1.8.4.2 From 7d3e3db90e1b4cf33ba4a46624ae4a68f787e5fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2012 08:46:50 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 05/14] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when module loading is restricted We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a given machine, and there's a risk that some will allow hardware state to be manipulated in such a way that arbitrary code can be executed in the kernel, circumventing module loading restrictions. Prevent that if any of these features are enabled. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett --- drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c index 19c313b..db18ef66 100644 --- a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c +++ b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c @@ -1618,6 +1618,9 @@ static int show_dsts(struct seq_file *m, void *data) int err; u32 retval = -1; + if (secure_modules()) + return -EPERM; + err = asus_wmi_get_devstate(asus, asus->debug.dev_id, &retval); if (err < 0) @@ -1634,6 +1637,9 @@ static int show_devs(struct seq_file *m, void *data) int err; u32 retval = -1; + if (secure_modules()) + return -EPERM; + err = asus_wmi_set_devstate(asus->debug.dev_id, asus->debug.ctrl_param, &retval); @@ -1658,6 +1664,9 @@ static int show_call(struct seq_file *m, void *data) union acpi_object *obj; acpi_status status; + if (secure_modules()) + return -EPERM; + status = wmi_evaluate_method(ASUS_WMI_MGMT_GUID, 1, asus->debug.method_id, &input, &output); -- 1.8.4.2 From 98ebe083d75333e269730fe374cca42ac7f08a07 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2012 09:28:15 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 06/14] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when module loading is restricted Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel to be subverted, avoiding module loading restrictions. Prevent this when any restrictions have been imposed on loading modules. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett --- drivers/char/mem.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c index 1af8664..61406c8 100644 --- a/drivers/char/mem.c +++ b/drivers/char/mem.c @@ -159,6 +159,9 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, unsigned long copied; void *ptr; + if (secure_modules()) + return -EPERM; + if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, count)) return -EFAULT; @@ -497,6 +500,9 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, char *kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */ int err = 0; + if (secure_modules()) + return -EPERM; + if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) { unsigned long to_write = min_t(unsigned long, count, (unsigned long)high_memory - p); -- 1.8.4.2 From 71353d491c70b303a07b4e79c896e729a4f74978 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Boyer Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 19:57:30 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 07/14] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter when module loading is restricted This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel, which makes it possible for a user to circumvent any restrictions imposed on loading modules. Disable it in that case. Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer --- drivers/acpi/osl.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/osl.c b/drivers/acpi/osl.c index 54a20ff..d21d269 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/osl.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/osl.c @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -248,7 +249,7 @@ early_param("acpi_rsdp", setup_acpi_rsdp); acpi_physical_address __init acpi_os_get_root_pointer(void) { #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC - if (acpi_rsdp) + if (acpi_rsdp && !secure_modules()) return acpi_rsdp; #endif -- 1.8.4.2 From e0a6b0dd91460123d71784d531b9df26449940ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 03:33:56 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 08/14] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module loading restrictions kexec permits the loading and execution of arbitrary code in ring 0, which is something that module signing enforcement is meant to prevent. It makes sense to disable kexec in this situation. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett --- kernel/kexec.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c index 9c97016..8ad0d38 100644 --- a/kernel/kexec.c +++ b/kernel/kexec.c @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -946,6 +947,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments, return -EPERM; /* + * kexec can be used to circumvent module loading restrictions, so + * prevent loading in that case + */ + if (secure_modules()) + return -EPERM; + + /* * Verify we have a legal set of flags * This leaves us room for future extensions. */ -- 1.8.4.2 From c340630e68e5ed4d731d60d05ef9e2ae27080b66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett Date: Tue, 3 Sep 2013 11:23:29 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 09/14] uswsusp: Disable when module loading is restricted uswsusp allows a user process to dump and then restore kernel state, which makes it possible to avoid module loading restrictions. Prevent this when any restrictions have been imposed on loading modules. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett --- kernel/power/user.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/power/user.c b/kernel/power/user.c index 98d3575..efe99de 100644 --- a/kernel/power/user.c +++ b/kernel/power/user.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include @@ -49,6 +50,9 @@ static int snapshot_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) struct snapshot_data *data; int error; + if (secure_modules()) + return -EPERM; + lock_system_sleep(); if (!atomic_add_unless(&snapshot_device_available, -1, 0)) { -- 1.8.4.2 From 273deda4ddec360ce67ac256b8cbdabdc5e8c51d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2013 11:12:13 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 10/14] x86: Restrict MSR access when module loading is restricted Writing to MSRs should not be allowed if module loading is restricted, since it could lead to execution of arbitrary code in kernel mode. Based on a patch by Kees Cook. Cc: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett --- arch/x86/kernel/msr.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c index 05266b5..e2bd647 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c @@ -103,6 +103,9 @@ static ssize_t msr_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, int err = 0; ssize_t bytes = 0; + if (secure_modules()) + return -EPERM; + if (count % 8) return -EINVAL; /* Invalid chunk size */ @@ -150,6 +153,10 @@ static long msr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioc, unsigned long arg) err = -EBADF; break; } + if (secure_modules()) { + err = -EPERM; + break; + } if (copy_from_user(®s, uregs, sizeof regs)) { err = -EFAULT; break; -- 1.8.4.2 From 089166c0d42f1b82988aad4f23607deb6ee531e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 18:36:30 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 11/14] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures when in Secure Boot mode UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain use cases may also require that all kernel modules also be signed. Add a configuration option that enforces this automatically when enabled. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett --- Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt | 2 ++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 10 ++++++++++ arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 6 ++++++ include/linux/module.h | 6 ++++++ kernel/module.c | 7 +++++++ 7 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt index 199f453..ec38acf 100644 --- a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt +++ b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt @@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ Offset Proto Name Meaning 1E9/001 ALL eddbuf_entries Number of entries in eddbuf (below) 1EA/001 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer (below) +1EB/001 ALL kbd_status Numlock is enabled +1EC/001 ALL secure_boot Secure boot is enabled in the firmware 1EF/001 ALL sentinel Used to detect broken bootloaders 290/040 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures 2D0/A00 ALL e820_map E820 memory map table diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 5216e28..2a147a3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -1582,6 +1582,16 @@ config EFI_STUB See Documentation/efi-stub.txt for more information. +config EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE + def_bool n + prompt "Force module signing when UEFI Secure Boot is enabled" + ---help--- + UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the + firmware will only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain + use cases may also require that all kernel modules also be signed. + Say Y here to automatically enable module signature enforcement + when a system boots with UEFI Secure Boot enabled. + config SECCOMP def_bool y prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode" diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c index a7677ba..4e172e9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #undef memcpy /* Use memcpy from misc.c */ @@ -741,6 +742,37 @@ free_mem_map: } +static int get_secure_boot(void) +{ + u8 sb, setup; + unsigned long datasize = sizeof(sb); + efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID; + efi_status_t status; + + status = efi_call_phys5(sys_table->runtime->get_variable, + L"SecureBoot", &var_guid, NULL, &datasize, &sb); + + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) + return 0; + + if (sb == 0) + return 0; + + + status = efi_call_phys5(sys_table->runtime->get_variable, + L"SetupMode", &var_guid, NULL, &datasize, + &setup); + + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) + return 0; + + if (setup == 1) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + + /* * On success we return a pointer to a boot_params structure, and NULL * on failure. @@ -760,6 +792,10 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *_table, if (sys_table->hdr.signature != EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE_SIGNATURE) goto fail; + sanitize_boot_params(boot_params); + + boot_params->secure_boot = get_secure_boot(); + setup_graphics(boot_params); setup_efi_pci(boot_params); diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h index 225b098..90dbfb7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h @@ -133,7 +133,8 @@ struct boot_params { __u8 eddbuf_entries; /* 0x1e9 */ __u8 edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries; /* 0x1ea */ __u8 kbd_status; /* 0x1eb */ - __u8 _pad5[3]; /* 0x1ec */ + __u8 secure_boot; /* 0x1ec */ + __u8 _pad5[2]; /* 0x1ed */ /* * The sentinel is set to a nonzero value (0xff) in header.S. * diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c index 182b3f9..ab6cc9e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c @@ -1129,6 +1129,12 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) io_delay_init(); +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE + if (boot_params.secure_boot) { + enforce_signed_modules(); + } +#endif + /* * Parse the ACPI tables for possible boot-time SMP configuration. */ diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h index 30702eb..3eb0f52 100644 --- a/include/linux/module.h +++ b/include/linux/module.h @@ -190,6 +190,12 @@ const struct exception_table_entry *search_exception_tables(unsigned long add); struct notifier_block; +#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG +extern void enforce_signed_modules(void); +#else +static inline void enforce_signed_modules(void) {}; +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES extern int modules_disabled; /* for sysctl */ diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index 644c33e..92b73b1 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -3832,6 +3832,13 @@ void module_layout(struct module *mod, EXPORT_SYMBOL(module_layout); #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG +void enforce_signed_modules(void) +{ + sig_enforce = true; +} +#endif + bool secure_modules(void) { #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG -- 1.8.4.2 From e9ad6bd405fa01b7dd52d8c75b9dc91ae52e131d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Boyer Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2013 19:25:05 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 12/14] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode A user can manually tell the shim boot loader to disable validation of images it loads. When a user does this, it creates a UEFI variable called MokSBState that does not have the runtime attribute set. Given that the user explicitly disabled validation, we can honor that and not enable secure boot mode if that variable is set. Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer --- arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c index 4e172e9..4905f4d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c @@ -744,8 +744,9 @@ free_mem_map: static int get_secure_boot(void) { - u8 sb, setup; + u8 sb, setup, moksbstate; unsigned long datasize = sizeof(sb); + u32 attr; efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID; efi_status_t status; @@ -769,6 +770,23 @@ static int get_secure_boot(void) if (setup == 1) return 0; + /* See if a user has put shim into insecure_mode. If so, and the variable + * doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well honor that. + */ + var_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID; + status = efi_call_phys5(sys_table->runtime->get_variable, + L"MokSBState", &var_guid, &attr, &datasize, + &moksbstate); + + /* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure */ + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) + return 1; + + if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS)) { + if (moksbstate == 1) + return 0; + } + return 1; } -- 1.8.4.2 From f9f355d5e58c1503bb7c03d92c9e89267e0f46ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Boyer Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2013 13:28:43 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 13/14] efi: Make EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE depend on EFI The functionality of the config option is dependent upon the platform being UEFI based. Reflect this in the config deps. Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 2a147a3..9e644d5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -1583,7 +1583,8 @@ config EFI_STUB See Documentation/efi-stub.txt for more information. config EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE - def_bool n + def_bool n + depends on EFI prompt "Force module signing when UEFI Secure Boot is enabled" ---help--- UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the -- 1.8.4.2 From a30576a9db583213474b74360c5869e8882e6ed7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Boyer Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2013 13:33:03 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 14/14] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit UEFI machines can be booted in Secure Boot mode. Add a EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit for use with efi_enabled. Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer --- arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 2 ++ include/linux/efi.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c index ab6cc9e..99933cd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c @@ -1131,7 +1131,9 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE if (boot_params.secure_boot) { + set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &x86_efi_facility); enforce_signed_modules(); + pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n"); } #endif diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h index 0a819e7..0c1d367 100644 --- a/include/linux/efi.h +++ b/include/linux/efi.h @@ -657,6 +657,7 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *); #define EFI_MEMMAP 4 /* Can we use EFI memory map? */ #define EFI_64BIT 5 /* Is the firmware 64-bit? */ #define EFI_ARCH_1 6 /* First arch-specific bit */ +#define EFI_SECURE_BOOT 7 /* Are we in Secure Boot mode? */ #ifdef CONFIG_EFI # ifdef CONFIG_X86 -- 1.8.4.2